1971

915'05
ME

THE MIDDLE EAST
JOURNAL

MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE · WASHINGTON, D. C.

THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE

Board of Governors
Parker T. Hart, *President*
Raymond A. Hare, *National Chairman*
John C. Campbell, *Vice President*
Kermit Roosevelt, *Vice President*
Arthur Z. Gardiner, *Treasurer*
John Badeau
George Ballou
Robert G. Barnes
William S. Blakemore, M.D.
Francis Boardman
Frances P. Bolton
Norman Burns
John H. Davis
Roderic H. Davison
Bayard Dodge, *Emeritus*
Russell H. Dorr
Dahl M. Duff
Richard Ettinghausen
Charles W. Hostler
Harry N. Howard
J. C. Hurewitz
Mrs. George Camp Keiser
Francis Kettaneh
Majid Khadduri
J. W. Komes
Cecil J. Olmstead
Garry Owen
Sidney Sherwood
Mrs. Harley C. Stevens
Phillips Talbot
Robert G. Van Peursem
Edwin M. Wright, *Emeritus*
T. Cuyler Young

Malcolm Peck, *Secretary*

THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

Editor
William Sands

Book Review Editor
Harry N. Howard

Managing Editor
Kathleen H. B. Manalo

Editorial Consultant
A. Hossein Faris

Editorial Assistants
Peter Nulty
Michael Van Dusen
Roxann Van Dusen

Board of Advisory Editors
Douglas D. Crary
C. Grove Haines
Herbert J. Liebesny
Robert F. Ogden
Afif I. Tannous
Robert D. Sethian
A. J. Meyer
Roderic H. Davison
Charles A. Ferguson
Harold W. Glidden
J. C. Hurewitz
Wilfred Cantwell Smith
T. Cuyler Young
Charles Issawi
Charlotte Morehouse
George N. Atiyeh

Published quarterly by the Middle East Institute, Washington, D. C. Subscription price, 1 year, $9.00; 2 years, $16.00. Single copies, $2.50. No additional charge for postage to United States and APO addresses. Add $.50 for foreign mailing. Mail all communications to THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, 1761 N St., N. W., Washington, D. C. 20036. Entered as second-class matter at the Post Office at Washington, D. C. Additional entry at Post Office of Baltimore, Maryland.

Vol. 25, No. 1, Copyright 1971. The Middle East Institute. Printed in U.S.A.

M584
P1453
Calcutta University
ALIPORE CAMPUS

THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

VOLUME 25 WINTER 1971 NUMBER 1

Table of Contents

The Lītānī River of Lebanon: An Example of Middle Eastern Water Development .... *James Hudson*

Agricultural Cooperatives and Tunisian Development .... *John L. Simmons* 14
Part II

The Industrial Labor Force of Iran: Problems of Recruitment, Training and Productivity .... *William H. Bartsch* 27

Lebanon's Financial Crisis in 1966: A Systemic Approach .... *Emile Ghattas* 43

CHRONOLOGY 57

4

MODERN HISTORY REVIEW

The United States and the 1940-1941 Anglo-Iraqi Crisis: American Policy in Transition .... *James A. Thorpe* 79

BOOK REVIEWS

Development: A Process of Social Change and Revolutionary Transition *The Theory of Nadīm Bīṭār* .... *Tareq Y. Ismael* 91

General 97
- Copeland: The Game of Nations, *reviewed by Dana Adams Schmidt*

Arab World 98
- Hanna and Gardner, eds.: Arab Socialism: A Documentary Survey, *reviewed by Malcolm H. Kerr*
- Waterfield: Sultans of Aden, *reviewed by D. C. Watt*

Egypt 100
- Vatikiotis: The Modern History of Egypt, *reviewed by Thomas Naff*

Morocco 102
- Waterbury: The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite: A Study in Segmented Politics, *reviewed by Stuart Schaar*

Medieval History 103
- Belyaev: Arabs, Islam and the Arab Caliphate in the Early Middle Ages, *reviewed by George N. Atiyeh*
- Holt, Lambton and Lewis, eds.: The Cambridge History of Islam. Vol. I: The Central Islamic Lands. Vol. II: The Further Islamic Lands, Islamic Society and Civilization, *reviewed by Karl Stowasser*
- Kissling *et al.*: The Muslim World, A Historical Survey, Part III. The Last Great Muslim Empires, *reviewed by C. E. Bosworth*

Modern History 108
- Kedourie: The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern Studies, *reviewed by A. L. Tibawi*
- Weber: Eagles on the Crescent: Germany, Austria, and the Diplomacy of the Turkish Alliance, 1914-1918, *reviewed by Laurence Evans*
- Selzer: The Wineskin and the Wizard, *reviewed by Alan R. Taylor*

Linguistics 110
- Verhaar, ed.: The Verb 'Be' and its Synonyms: Philosophical and Grammatical Studies, Part 4 Twi/Modern Chinese/Arabic, *reviewed by Charles A. Ferguson*

Sociology and Anthropology 112
- Hagopian and Parden, eds.: The Arab Americans: Studies in Assimilation, *reviewed by Philip K. Hitti*
- Hourani and Stern, eds.: The Islamic City: A Colloquium, *reviewed by John Gulick*

Shorter Notices 114

Recent Publications and Forthcoming Books 122

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE 133
COMMUNICATIONS 150

The Middle East Institute, publisher of this JOURNAL, is a non-profit corporation, founded in 1946 in order to develop among the American people an interest in the Middle East and an appreciation of its history, culture, and political and economic affairs. In addition to the MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, MEI publishes books of interest to both the scholar and the general reader. Other Institute activities are: annual conferences, lectures and the maintenance of the George Camp Keiser Library.

Applications for membership in the Institute are invited from all those having serious interest in the Middle East. A subscription to the MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, lectures and other MEI functions, annual conference privileges, Library privileges and a 15 per cent discount on all MEI books are among the benefits of membership. Applicants are requested to write: The Secretary, The Middle East Institute, 1761 N Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036; and enclose their *curriculum vitae.*

The photograph on the cover is of the Karaoun Reservoir.
Courtesy of James Hudson.

THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL is indexed in *Social Sciences and Humanities Index, Public Affairs Information Service, Advance Bibliography of Contents: Political Science and Government* and *Current Contents: Behavioral, Social & Management Sciences.*

THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, in conformity with the objectives of its publishers, The Middle East Institute, takes no editorial stand on the problems of the Middle East. Its sole criterion is that material published be sound and informative, and presented without emotional bias. All opinions expressed, therefore, are those of the individual authors and not necessarily those of the JOURNAL or the Institute. The JOURNAL is not responsible for manuscripts submitted.

CUK-H06107-4-P1453

THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

VOLUME 25 SPRING 1971 NUMBER 2

Table of Contents

Syria: Rate of Economic Growth and Fixed Capital Formation 1936-1968 .... *Samir A. Makdisi* 157

The Anatomy of Violence: Theoretical Reflections on Palestinian Resistance .... *Emile A. Nakhleb* 180

The Bizerta Crisis: A Bourguibist Attempt to Resolve Tunisia's Border Problems .... *Werner Klaus Ruf* 201

The Evolution of Landownership in the Sudan .... *Mohammed Hashim Awad* 212

DEVELOPMENTS OF THE QUARTER
Comment and Chronology 229

BOOK REVIEWS

General 245
- Harbottle: The Impartial Soldier, *reviewed by [illegible] G. Xydis*
- Trevelyan: The Middle East in Revolution, *rev[illegible] by Raymond A. Hare*
- Klieman: Soviet Russia and The Middle East, *reviewed by John C. Campbell*

Arab World 249
- Clausen, ed.: Der Algerische Sozialismus: Eine Dokumentation; Didden: Irak-Eine Sozio-Okonomische Betrachtung; Hachem: Libanon-Sozio-Okonomische Grundlagen; Ule: Der Arabische Sozialmus und der Zeitgenossische Islam, *reviewed by Peter Bechtold*
- 'Abd al-Rahim: Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan: A Study in Constitutional and Political Development, 1899-1956, *reviewed by Robert L. Tignor*
- Pelt: Libyan Independence and the United Nations: A Case of Planned Decolonization, *reviewed by Henry S. Villard*
- Abdel-Malek, ed.: La Pensée Politique Arabe Contemporaine, *reviewed by Tareq Y. Ismael*

Iran 254
- Lambton: The Persian Land Reform 1926-66, *reviewed by Philip C. Salzman*
- Minovi and Afshar, eds.: Yad-Name-ye Irani-ye Minorsky, *reviewed by F. R. C. Bagley*

Israel 257
- Goldmann: The Autobiography of Nahum Goldmann: Sixty Years of Jewish Life, *reviewed by Israel T. Naamani*
- Eisenstadt, ed.: Integration and Development in Israel, *reviewed by C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze*

The Palestine Problem 259
- Peretz, Wilson and Ward: A Palestine Entity?, *reviewed by Richard H. Dekmejian*

Turkey 260
- Basgoz and Wilson: Educational Problems in Turkey, 1920-1940, *reviewed by Howard A. Reed*
- Wolf: Garrison Community: A Study of an Overseas American Military Colony, *reviewed by Dorothea Seelye Franck*

Medieval History 262
- Cahen: Pre-Ottoman Turkey: A General Survey of the Material and Spiritual Culture and History, 1071-1330, *reviewed by Carl Max Kortepeter*

Shorter Notices 267

Recent Publications 276

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE 287

COMMUNICATIONS 303

The photograph on the cover is of Syrian President Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad.

THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL is indexed in *Social Sciences and Humanities Index, Public Affairs Information Service, Advance Bibliography of Contents: Political Science and Government* and *Current Contents: Behavioral, Social & Management Sciences.*

THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, in conformity with the objectives of its publishers, The Middle East Institute, takes no editorial stand on the problems of the Middle East. Its sole criterion is that material published be sound and informative, and presented without emotional bias. All opinions expressed, therefore, are those of the individual authors and not necessarily those of the JOURNAL or the Institute. The JOURNAL is not responsible for manuscripts submitted.

The Middle East Institute, publisher of this JOURNAL, is a non-profit corporation, founded in 1946 in order to develop among the American people an interest in the Middle East and an appreciation of its history, culture, and political and economic affairs. The dissemination of accurate and objective information and publication are the primary means the Institute uses to obtain these ends. In addition to THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, MEI publishes books of interest to both the scholar and the general reader. Other Institute activities are: annual conferences, lectures and the maintenance of the George Camp Keiser Library.

Applications for membership in the Institute are invited from all those having a serious interest in the Middle East. Some 1,200 members are now on the Institute's rolls; nearly 400 of these are in the Washington area and the remainder scattered all over the world; most are Americans, but there are no restrictions as to citizenship. A subscription to THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, lectures and other MEI functions, annual conference privileges, Library privileges and a 15 per cent discount on all MEI books are among the benefits of membership. Applicants are requested to write: The Secretary, The Middle East Institute, 1761 N Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036, and enclose their *curriculum vitae.* Following are the classifications of membership:

Student Member, $8.00 a year (please state college or university in which you are enrolled in a degree-conferring program)
  Please note that subscription to *The Middle East Journal* alone is $9.00
Regular Member, Out-of-Town, $12.00 a year
Greater Washington and Suburban Areas, $15.00 a year
Contributing Member, $25.00 a year
Sustaining Member, $50.00 a year
Life Member, $200.00

* *

THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

VOLUME 25 SUMMER 1971 NUMBER 3

Table of Contents

Growth and Structural Change in the Middle East............. *Charles Issawi* 309

National Integration of the Tribes in Modern Iran........ *Philip C. Salzman* 325

Turkish Industry and the Five Year Plans........... *Jane Perry Clark Carey, Andrew Galbraith Carey* 337

Turkish Villages in Interior Anatolia and von Thünen's "Isolated State": A Comparative Analysis............. *William A. Mitchell* 355

CHRONOLOGY 371

DOCUMENT

The Permanent Constitution of the Yemen Arab Republic 389

LEGAL REVIEW

Saudi Arabia's Judicial System .... *Soliman A. Solaim* 403

BOOK REVIEWS

General 409

Marlowe: Cromer in Egypt, *reviewed by Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr.*
Sachar: The Emergence of the Middle East, *reviewed by Sydney N. Fisher*
Richards, ed.: Islam and the Trade of Asia, *reviewed by George Kirk*
Itzkowitz and Mote, trans.: Mubadele: An Ottoman-Russian Exchange of Ambassadors, *reviewed by Richard L. Chambers*
Fernea: A View of the Nile, *reviewed by Alan W. Horton*

Iran 413

Algar: Religion and the State in Iran, 1785-1906, *reviewed by Hafez F. Farmayan*

Israel 415

Perlmutter: Military and Politics in Israel: Nation Building and Role Expansion, *reviewed by Marver H. Bernstein*

Pakistan 416

Ali: Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power?, *reviewed by Feroz Ahmed*

The Palestine Problem 417

Abu-Lughod, ed.: The Arab-Israeli Confrontation of June, 1967: An Arab Perspective. Dodd and Sales, eds.: Israel and the Arab World. Taylor and Tetlie, eds.: Palestine: A Search for Truth, *reviewed by Abdul H. Raoof*
Khalidi, ed.: From Haven to Conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem Until 1948, *reviewed by Harry N. Howard*

Turkey 420

Davis: The Palace of Topkapı in Istanbul, *reviewed by Jane S. Hart*
Hinderink and Kıray: Social Stratification as an Obstacle to Development: A Study of Four Turkish Villages, *reviewed by Brian W. Beeley*

Literature and Linguistics 422

Aruri and Ghareeb, eds.: Enemy of the Sun: Poetry of Palestinian Resistance. Messiri, ed.: A Lover from Palestine and Other Poems, *reviewed by Trevor LeGassick*
Stetkevych: The Modern Arabic Literary Language: Lexical and Stylistic Developments, *reviewed by Barbara Stowasser*
Bateson: Structural Continuity in Poetry: A Linguistic Study in Five Pre-Islamic Arabic Odes, *reviewed by Daud A. Abdo*

Religion and Philosophy 425

Fakhry: A History of Islamic Philosophy, *reviewed by Erwin I. J. Rosenthal*

Sociology and Economics 426

Stocking: Middle East Oil: A Study in Political and Economic Controversy, *reviewed by A. C. C. Hill*
Lutfiyya and Churchill, eds.: Readings in Arab Middle Eastern Societies and Culture, *reviewed by Samih K. Farsoun*

Shorter Notices 428

Recent Publications 436

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE.. 445

COMMUNICATIONS 463

The photograph on the cover is of Chairman of the Republican Council of Yemen ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Iryānī.

THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL is indexed in *Social Sciences and Humanities Index, Public Affairs Information Service, Advance Bibliography of Contents: Political Science and Government* and *Current Contents: Behavioral, Social & Management Sciences.*

THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, in conformity with the objectives of its publishers, The Middle East Institute, takes no editorial stand on the problems of the Middle East. Its sole criterion is that material published be sound and informative, and presented without emotional bias. All opinions expressed, therefore, are those of the individual authors and not necessarily those of the JOURNAL or the Institute. The JOURNAL is not responsible for manuscripts submitted.

The Middle East Institute, publisher of this JOURNAL, is a non-profit corporation, founded in 1946 in order to develop among the American people an interest in the Middle East and an appreciation of its history, culture, and political and economic affairs. The dissemination of accurate and objective information and publication are the primary means the Institute uses to obtain these ends. In addition to THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, MEI publishes the *Middle East Monitor* and books of interest to both the scholar and the general reader. Other Institute activities are: annual conferences, lectures and the maintenance of the George Camp Keiser Library.

Applications for membership in the Institute are invited from all those having a serious interest in the Middle East. Some 1,200 members are now on the Institute's rolls; nearly 400 of these are in the Washington area and the remainder scattered all over the world; most are Americans, but there are no restrictions as to citizenship. A subscription to THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, lectures and other MEI functions, annual conference privileges, Library privileges and a 15 per cent discount on all MEI books are among the benefits of membership. Applicants are requested to write: The Secretary, The Middle East Institute, 1761 N Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036, and enclose their *curriculum vitae.* Following are the classifications of membership:

Student Member, $8.00 a year (please state college or university in which you are enrolled in a degree-conferring program)
  Please note that subscription to *The Middle East Journal* alone is $9.00
Regular Member, Out-of-Town, $12.00 a year
Greater Washington and Suburban Areas, $15.00 a year
Contributing Member, $25.00 a year
Sustaining Member, $50.00 a year
Life Member, $200.00

* *

THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

VOLUME 25 AUTUMN, 1971 NUMBER 4

Table of Contents

Social and Economic Determinants of Political Violence: A Case Study of the Punjab .... *Shahid Javed Burki* 465

The Changing Pattern of Iraq's Foreign Trade .... *Abbas Alnasrawi* 481

Some Recent War-Related Arabic Fiction .... *Trevor J. LeGassick* 491

CHRONOLOGY 506

DOCUMENT

The Constitution of the Federation of Arab Republics (FAR) 523

BOOK REVIEWS

The Arab World 531

Tibawi: A Modern History of Syria, *reviewed by John P. Spagnolo*
Koury: The Patterns of Mass Movements in Arab Revolutionary-Progressive States, *reviewed by John H. Sigler*

Iran 533

Bartsch: Problems in Employment Creation in Iran, *reviewed by Lee L. Bean*

Israel 534

Cohen: Israel and the Arab World, *reviewed by Aaron S. Klieman*
Naamani, Rudavsky and Katsh, eds.: Israel Through the Eyes of Its Leaders, *reviewed by Michael Curtis*
Allon: The Making of Israel's Army. Shapira, ed.: The Seventh Day. Stevenson: Zanek!, *reviewed by Bernard Reich*

North Africa 537

Moore: Politics in North Africa, *reviewed by Louis J. Cantori*
Hall: The United States and Morocco: 1776-1956, *reviewed by John Damis*

The Palestine Problem 539

Kurzman: Genesis 1948: The First Arab-Israeli War, *reviewed by Scott D. Johnston*

Turkey 540

Cohn: Turkish Economic, Social and Political Change, *reviewed by Joseph S. Szyliowicz*
Ahmad: The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914, *reviewed by Glen W. Swanson*

History, Religion and Philosophy 542

Shaban: The 'Abbasid Revolution, *reviewed by Richard W. Bulliet*
Hourani: Islamic Rationalism: The Ethics of 'Abd al-Jabbar, *reviewed by Lenn Evan Goodman*
Watt: Islamic Surveys, No. 8: Bell's Introduction to the Qu'ran, *reviewed by Lorne M. Kenny*

Shorter Notices 547

Recent Publications 554

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE 561

List of Periodicals Under Survey 577

COMMUNICATIONS 583

INDEX TO VOLUME XXV 585

The photograph on the cover is the Presidents of Syria, Egypt, and Libya.

THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL is indexed in *Social Sciences and Humanities Index, Public Affairs Information Service, Advance Bibliography of Contents: Political Science and Government* and *Current Contents: Behavioral, Social & Management Sciences.*

THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, in conformity with the objectives of its publishers, The Middle East Institute, takes no editorial stand on the problems of the Middle East. Its sole criterion is that material published be sound and informative, and presented without emotional bias. All opinions expressed, therefore, are those of the individual authors and not necessarily those of the JOURNAL or the Institute. The JOURNAL is not responsible for manuscripts submitted.

DODGE-WRIGHT FELLOWSHIP FUND

At the banquet of the Middle East Institute's Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Conference, on October 1, 1971, the establishment of a fellowship fund in the names of Dr. Bayard Dodge and Dr. Edwin M. Wright was announced. Its purpose is to honor these two men and their long careers dedicated to creating bridges of understanding between Americans and peoples of the Middle East.

Dr. Bayard Dodge was born in New York City in 1888 and educated at Princeton and Columbia Universities and Union Theological Seminary. He taught for thirty-five years at the American University of Beirut, serving for a quarter century as its President. During that time he promoted the work of numerous philanthropic causes in the Middle East and later taught at Columbia, Princeton and the American University in Cairo. His multi-faceted career also included a term as USIS Regional Cultural Affairs Officer, authorship of several books including *Muslim Education in Medieval Times,* and service to the Middle East Institute as member of its Board of Governors and National Chairman.

Dr. Edwin M. Wright was born in 1897 in Tabriz, Iran of missionary parents. A graduate of Wooster College, McCormick Theological Seminary, and Columbia University, he also went to the Middle East for philanthropic and educational work following his formal education. After working in refugee rehabilitation, teaching and serving as principal of Avicenna High School in Hamadan he taught at Columbia, returned to Cairo to serve with the OSS and US Army Middle East Command during World War II. An exceptional linguist, he organized Turkish, Arabic and Persian language broadcasts for VOA and subsequently became Assistant Dean and Professor of International Relations at the Foreign Service Institute. He has lectured before innumerable academic and other forums and served on the Board of the Middle East Institute and as its President.

The work of these two men in fostering Middle Eastern education and American understanding of peoples of the Middle East will be recognized and carried on by the Dodge-Wright Fellowship Fund which has been established by unanimous vote of the Institute's Board of Governors to support the university education in America of a young man or woman from the Middle East.

Candidates will be carefully screened by the Board for their academic excellence, their potential for contributing to the betterment of their societies, and the reflection in their lives and career choices of the principles and ideals which Bayard Dodge and Edwin M. Wright have exemplified.

All who would like to support the Bayard Dodge-Edwin M. Wright Fellowship Fund are encouraged to do so by returning a contribution or pledge of contribution to the Middle East Institute, 1761 N Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20036. All contributions are tax deductible.

THE
MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

Volume XXV • *1971*

CALCU
[illegible] LIBRARY
UNIVER

Editor
WILLIAM SANDS

Book Review Editor
HARRY N. HOWARD

Managing Editor
KATHLEEN H. B. MANALO

Editorial Consultant
A. HOSSEIN FARIS

Editorial Assistants
JOHN DUKE ANTHONY
PETER NULTY
MICHAEL VAN DUSEN
ROXANN VAN DUSEN

Board of Advisory Editors

DOUGLAS D. CRARY
C. GROVE HAINES
HERBERT J. LIEBESNY
ROBERT F. OGDEN
AFIF I. TANNOUS
ROBERT D. SETHIAN
A. J. MEYER
RODERIC H. DAVISON
CHARLES A. FERGUSON
HAROLD W. GLIDDEN
J. C. HUREWITZ
WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH
T. CUYLER YOUNG
CHARLES ISSAWI
CHARLOTTE MOREHOUSE
GEORGE N. ATIYEH

THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE

Board of Governors

PARKER T. HART, *President*
RAYMOND A. HARE, *National Chairman*
JOHN C. CAMPBELL, *Vice President*
KERMIT ROOSEVELT, *Vice President*
ARTHUR Z. GARDINER, *Treasurer*

JOHN BADEAU
GEORGE BALLOU
ROBERT G. BARNES
WILLIAM S. BLAKEMORE, M.D.
FRANCIS BOARDMAN
FRANCES P. BOLTON
NORMAN BURNS
JOHN H. DAVIS
RODERIC H. DAVISON
BAYARD DODGE, *Emeritus*
RUSSELL H. DORR
DAHL M. DUFF
RICHARD ETTINGHAUSEN
CHARLES W. HOSTLER
HARRY N. HOWARD
J. C. HUREWITZ
MRS. GEORGE CAMP KEISER
FRANCIS KETTANEH
MAJID KHADDURI
J. W. KOMES
CECIL J. OLMSTEAD
GARRY OWEN
SIDNEY SHERWOOD
MRS. HARLEY C. STEVENS
PHILLIPS TALBOT
ROBERT G. VAN PEURSEM
EDWIN M. WRIGHT, *Emeritus*
T. CUYLER YOUNG

MALCOLM PECK, *Secretary*

A QUARTERLY PUBLICATION
OF THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Copyright 1971, The Middle East Institute

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Articles

WINTER

The Lītānī River of Lebanon: An Example of Middle Eastern Water Development .... *James Hudson* 1
The Industrial Labor Force of Iran: Problems of Recruitment, Training and Productivity .... *William H. Bartsch* 15
Lebanon's Financial Crisis in 1966: A Systemic Approach .... *Emile Ghattas* 31
Agricultural Cooperatives and Tunisian Development .... *John L. Simmons* 45
Part II

SPRING

Syria: Rate of Economic Growth and Fixed Capital Formation 1936-1968 .... *Samir A. Makdisi* 157
The Anatomy of Violence: Theoretical Reflections on Palestinian Resistance .... *Emile A. Nakhleh* 180
The Bizerta Crisis: A Bourguibist Attempt to Resolve Tunisia's Border Problems .... *Werner Klaus Ruf* 201
The Evolution of Landownership in the Sudan .... *Mohammed Hashim Awad* 212

SUMMER

Growth and Structural Change in the Middle East .... *Charles Issawi* 309
National Integration of the Tribes in Modern Iran .... *Philip C. Salzman* 325
Turkish Industry and the Five Year Plans .... *Jane Perry Clark Carey, Andrew Galbraith Carey* 337
Turkish Villages in Interior Anatolia and von Thünen's "Isolated State": A Comparative Analysis .... *William A. Mitchell* 355

AUTUMN

Social and Economic Determinants of Political Violence: A Case Study of the Punjab .... *Shahid Javed Burki* 465
The Changing Pattern of Iraq's Foreign Trade .... *Abbas Alnasrawi* 481
Some Recent War-Related Arabic Fiction .... *Trevor J. LeGassick* 491

Developments of the Quarter

Chronology

August 16–November 15, 1970 58

November 16, 1970–February 15, 1971 229

February 16–May 15, 1971 371

May 16–August 15, 1971 506

Documents

The Permanent Constitution of the Yemen Arab Republic 389

The Constitution of the Federation of Arab Republics (FAR) 523

Legal Review

Saudi Arabia's Judicial System .... *Soliman A. Solaim* 403

Modern History

The United States and the 1940-1941 Anglo-Iraqi Crisis: American Policy in Transition .... *James A. Thorpe* 79

Book Reviews

WINTER

Development: A Process of Social Change and Revolutionary Transition *The Theory of Nadīm Bīṭār* .... *Tareq Y. Ismael* 91

General 97

Copeland: The Game of Nations, *reviewed by Dana Adams Schmidt*

Arab World 98

Hanna and Gardner, eds.: Arab Socialism: A Documentary Survey, *reviewed by Malcolm H. Kerr*

Waterfield: Sultans of Aden, *reviewed by D. C. Watt*

Egypt 100

Vatikiotis: The Modern History of Egypt, *reviewed by Thomas Naff*

Morocco 102

Waterbury: The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite: A Study in Segmented Politics, *reviewed by Stuart Schaar*

Medieval History 103

Belyaev: Arabs, Islam and the Arab Caliphate in the Early Middle Ages, *reviewed by George N. Atiyeh*

Holt, Lambton and Lewis, eds.: The Cambridge History of Islam. Vol. I: The Central Islamic Lands. Vol. II: The Further Islamic Lands, Islamic Society and Civilization, *reviewed by Karl Stowasser*

Kissling *et al.*: The Muslim World, A Historical Survey, Part III. The Last Great Muslim Empires, *reviewed by C. E. Bosworth*

Modern History 108
- Kedourie: The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern Studies, *reviewed by A. L. Tibawi*
- Weber: Eagles on the Crescent: Germany, Austria, and the Diplomacy of the Turkish Alliance, 1914-1918, *reviewed by Laurence Evans*
- Selzer: The Wineskin and the Wizard, *reviewed by Alan R. Taylor*

Linguistics 110
- Verhaar, ed.: The Verb 'Be' and its Synonyms: Philosophical and Grammatical Studies, Part 4 Twi/Modern Chinese/Arabic, *reviewed by Charles A. Ferguson*

Sociology and Anthropology 112
- Hagopian and Parden, eds.: The Arab Americans: Studies in Assimilation, *reviewed by Philip K. Hitti*
- Hourani and Stern, eds.: The Islamic City: A Colloquium, *reviewed by John Gulick*

Shorter Notices 114

Recent Publications and Forthcoming Books 122

SPRING

General 245
- Harbottle: The Impartial Soldier, *reviewed by Stephen G. Xydis*
- Trevelyan: The Middle East in Revolution, *reviewed by Raymond A. Hare*
- Klieman: Soviet Russia and The Middle East, *reviewed by John C. Campbell*

Arab World 249
- Clausen, ed.: Der Algerische Sozialismus: Eine Dokumentation; Didden: Irak-Eine Sozio-Okonomische Betrachtung; Hachem: Libanon-Sozio-Okonomische Grundlagen; Ule: Der Arabische Sozialmus und der Zeitgenossische Islam, *reviewed by Peter Bechtold*
- 'Abd al-Rahim: Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan: A Study in Constitutional and Political Development, 1899-1956, *reviewed by Robert L. Tignor*
- Pelt: Libyan Independence and the United Nations: A Case of Planned Decolonization, *reviewed by Henry S. Villard*
- Abdel-Malek, ed.: La Pensée Politique Arabe Contemporaine, *reviewed by Tareq Y. Ismael*

Iran 254
- Lambton: The Persian Land Reform 1926-66, *reviewed by Philip C. Salzman*
- Minovi and Afshar, eds.: Yad-Name-ye Irani-ye Minorsky, *reviewed by F. R. C. Bagley*

Israel 257
- Goldmann: The Autobiography of Nahum Goldmann: Sixty Years of Jewish Life, *reviewed by Israel T. Naamani*
- Eisenstadt, ed.: Integration and Development in Israel, *reviewed by C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze*

The Palestine Problem 259
- Peretz, Wilson and Ward: A Palestine Entity?, *reviewed by Richard H. Dekmejian*

Turkey 260
- Basgoz and Wilson: Educational Problems in Turkey, 1920-1940, *reviewed by Howard A. Reed*
- Wolf: Garrison Community: A Study of an Overseas American Military Colony, *reviewed by Dorothea Seelye Franck*

Medieval History 262
- Cahen: Pre-Ottoman Turkey: A General Survey of the Material and Spiritual Culture and History, 1071-1330, *reviewed by Carl Max Kortepeter*

Shorter Notices 267

Recent Publications 276

SUMMER

General 409
- Marlowe: Cromer in Egypt, *reviewed by Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr.*
- Sachar: The Emergence of the Middle East, *reviewed by Sydney N. Fisher*
- Richards, ed.: Islam and the Trade of Asia, *reviewed by George Kirk*
- Itzkowitz and Mote, trans.: Mubadele: An Ottoman-Russian Exchange of Ambassadors, *reviewed by Richard L. Chambers*
- Fernea: A View of the Nile, *reviewed by Alan W. Horton*

Iran 413
Algar: Religion and the State in Iran, 1785-1906, *reviewed by Hafez F. Farmayan*

Israel 415
Perlmutter: Military and Politics in Israel: Nation Building and Role Expansion, *reviewed by Marver H. Bernstein*

Pakistan 416
Ali: Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power?, *reviewed by Feroz Ahmed*

The Palestine Problem 417
Abu-Lughod, ed.: The Arab-Israeli Confrontation of June, 1967: An Arab Perspective. Dodd and Sales, eds.: Israel and the Arab World. Taylor and Tetlie, eds.: Palestine: A Search for Truth, *reviewed by Abdul H. Raoof*
Khalidi, ed.: From Haven to Conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem Until 1948, *reviewed by Harry N. Howard*

Turkey 420
Davis: The Palace of Topkapı in Istanbul, *reviewed by Jane S. Hart*
Hinderink and Kıray: Social Stratification as an Obstacle to Development: A Study of Four Turkish Villages, *reviewed by Brian W. Beeley*

Literature and Linguistics 422
Aruri and Ghareeb, eds.: Enemy of the Sun: Poetry of Palestinian Resistance. Messiri, ed.: A Lover from Palestine and Other Poems, *reviewed by Trevor LeGassick*
Stetkevych: The Modern Arabic Literary Language: Lexical and Stylistic Developments, *reviewed by Barbara Stowasser*
Bateson: Structural Continuity in Poetry: A Linguistic Study in Five Pre-Islamic Arabic Odes, *reviewed by Daud A. Abdo*

Religion and Philosophy 425
Fakhry: A History of Islamic Philosophy, *reviewed by Erwin I. J. Rosenthal*

Sociology and Economics 426
Stocking: Middle East Oil: A Study in Political and Economic Controversy, *reviewed by A. C. C. Hill*
Lutfiyya and Churchill, eds.: Readings in Arab Middle Eastern Societies and Culture, *reviewed by Samih K. Farsoun*

Shorter Notices 428

Recent Publications 436

AUTUMN

The Arab World 531
Tibawi: A Modern History of Syria, *reviewed by John P. Spagnolo*
Koury: The Patterns of Mass Movements in Arab Revolutionary-Progressive States, *reviewed by John H. Sigler*

Iran 533
Bartsch: Problems in Employment Creation in Iran, *reviewed by Lee L. Bean*

Israel 534
Cohen: Israel and the Arab World, *reviewed by Aaron S. Klieman*
Naamani, Rudavsky and Katsh, eds.: Israel Through the Eyes of Its Leaders, *reviewed by Michael Curtis*
Allon: The Making of Israel's Army. Shapira, ed.: The Seventh Day. Stevenson: Zanek!, *reviewed by Bernard Reich*

North Africa 537
Moore: Politics in North Africa, *reviewed by Louis J. Cantori*
Hall: The United States and Morocco: 1776-1956, *reviewed by John Damis*

The Palestine Problem 539
Kurzman: Genesis 1948: The First Arab-Israeli War, *reviewed by Scott D. Johnston*

Turkey 540
Cohn: Turkish Economic, Social and Political Change, *reviewed by Joseph S. Szyliowicz*
Ahmad: The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914, *reviewed by Glen W. Swanson*

History, Religion and Philosophy 542
Shaban: The 'Abbasid Revolution, *reviewed by Richard W. Bulliet*
Hourani: Islamic Rationalism: The Ethics of 'Abd al-Jabbar, *reviewed by Lenn Evan Goodman*
Watt: Islamic Surveys, No. 8: Bell's Introduction to the Qu'ran, *reviewed by Lorne M. Kenny*

Shorter Notices 547

Recent Publications 554

Bibliography of Periodical Literature

Winter 133
Spring 287
Summer 445
Autumn 561
List of Periodicals Under Survey 557

Communications

Winter 150
Spring 303
Summer 463
Autumn 583

INDEX TO VOLUME 585

THE LĪṬĀNĪ RIVER OF LEBANON: AN EXAMPLE OF MIDDLE EASTERN WATER DEVELOPMENT

James Hudson

THE MIDDLE EAST is a rapidly developing region and it is an arid region. As a result, it is making increasing demands upon a severely limited supply of water. The problems of water supply and demand are among the most important problems in the Middle East, and the nature of the solutions to the problems will do much to determine the future pattern of life in the region.

One example of Middle Eastern water problems is the Līṭānī River in Lebanon. An examination of the Līṭānī is useful not only because of its importance to Lebanon but also because the problems and solutions for the Līṭānī have implications for water resources planning elsewhere.

Lebanon is not a typical Middle Eastern state: it is more prosperous and Europeanized than most of the others. Thus, it is a good testing ground, for it is further along the path that the other states, for good or ill, seem bound to follow, and conditions which appear in Lebanon are likely to appear elsewhere at a later time.

The Nature of the Basin

The Līṭānī Basin may be divided into three parts. The Upper Basin lies in the Biqā' Valley of eastern Lebanon, a long, narrow, northeast-southwest valley, bordered on the west by the steep front of the Lebanon Mountains and on the east by the Anti-Lebanon Mountains. The Middle Basin, which begins near Qir'ūn, is in an area of rugged terrain where the southern ends of the Lebanon Mountains and Mount Hermon meet. The river itself flows in a deep gorge. In the vicinity of Nabaṭīyah, the river turns sharply westward, entering the Lower Basin, and flows to the sea through the Galilean Uplands, an area of low hills with steep slopes.

The Līṭānī Basin is on the fringe of Lebanon socially as well as physically. Part of the basin, particularly that area of the Biqā' around Zaḥlah, has been drawn into the prosperous, modern, urban system centered on Beirut. The rest of the basin has only lately come to partake of a few of the advances already enjoyed by the Beirut system. Most of the people in the basin are villagers. Agriculture, particularly traditional agriculture, has been the major occupation.

△ JAMES HUDSON is associate professor of geography at Morgan State College, Baltimore. He was formerly in the geography department of the AUB, Beirut, Lebanon.

Water Supply

Although each river basin is a unique hydrologic system, the nature of the water supply of the Lịtānī River Basin illustrates many problems faced in the development of water resources in the Middle East.

Precipitation

The source of water for the basin is precipitation. The amount varies greatly from place to place, which is typical of mountainous areas in the Mediterranean. The greatest amount (1,000 mm. to 1,600 mm. annually) falls in the Middle Basin and in the Lebanon Mountains. The amount decreases to the northeast in the Upper Basin so that near Ba'labakk and in the Anti-Lebanon it averages about 500 mm. annually. The Lower Basin, between Nabaṭīyah and the sea, receives about 800 mm. annually.[1]

The amount of precipitation varies in time as well as space. The variations from year to year are not as great as might be expected: over three-quarters of the years are within 30 per cent of average.[2] Because the area has a Mediterranean climate, the seasonal variation is great. Between 60 and 70 per cent of the precipitation falls in the three months of December-February, much of it as snow in the high mountains, while the five month period of May-September, the main growing season, receives practically no rainfall.[3]

After the rain has fallen (or the snow has melted), the water will follow one of three routes. Over half is returned to the atmosphere by evaporation or by transpiration through local plants.[4] The second route is direct runoff into streams. In the Lịtānī Basin, runoff is probably higher than usual since the areas of highest precipitation are also mountainous areas with steep, bare slopes. The third route is through the alluvium of the Biqā' or, more important, through the highly permeable limestones of the mountains and the Galilean Uplands. This water reaches the river *via* springs.

River Flow

Analysis of river flow for planning has been hampered in Lebanon, as in many new nations, by the lack of hydrologic data. The desired minimum is

---

[1] J. Rey, *Carte Pluviométrique du Liban* (Observatoire de Ksara, 1954). For comparison, the average annual precipitation at Washington, D. C., is about 1,050 mm.

[2] Based on data in US Bureau of Reclamation, *Litani River Basin: Development Plan* (Denver, 1954), Appendix to Sec. 3, Table A-9. The whole study will be hereafter referred to as the *Reclamation Plan.*

[3] Based on data in Rep. Lib., Direction Centrale de la Statistique, *Climat du Liban: Bulletin statistique mensuel,* 1965-66.

[4] *Reclamation Plan,* Appendix to Sec. 3, p. A-15, estimates streamflow as 40 per cent of precipitation. If unknown interbasin transfers of groundwater are assumed to cancel out, this leaves 60 per cent for evapotranspiration, lower than the 80 per cent estimated for the United States.


MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Junie
BEIRUT
Baalbek
Zahle
Rayak
ANTI LEBANON MOUNTAINS
Damour
Awali River
LEBANON MOUNTAINS
Anjar
Mansoura
Saida
Karaoun
Jezzine
Hasbani R.
Nabatiye
GALILEAN
Khardale
Marjayoun
MOUNT HERMON
Litani River
Tyre
UPLANDS
Jordan R.
Power Houses and Water Conveyances of the Litani Project ■- - - -
0
21
MILEAGE SCALE

thirty year records from a number of different gages. When the Līṭānī was analyzed in the early 1950s, only four gages were available, one with a twenty year record, two with ten year records, and one with a three year record. Since development could not wait on perfection of data, the analysis had to rely upon these short records plus correlations of river flow with precipitation, correlations of one gage with another, and estimates.[5]

In the Līṭānī Basin as a whole, the average annual streamflow is roughly 700 Mcm (million cubic meters). Most of the water comes from only a few areas within the basin. The Upper Basin—the Biqā'—provides a net flow of 325 Mcm annually, about 45 per cent of the total. Over two-thirds of this contribution is made by two sets of springs, one stretching from Zaḥlah southwestward for 15 kms., the other extending from 'Anjar toward Rayāq. The Middle Basin adds 315 Mcm, almost as much as the Biqā'. Even though it has a much smaller tributary area (491 square kms. versus 1,331 square kms.), the Middle Basin has much heavier rainfall. The Lower Basin contributes an estimated 60 Mcm.[6]

Variations in Flow

The flow of the Līṭānī varies from season to season and from year to year. Maximum physical use of the water would require reservoir space to transfer water from the high flow season to the following low flow season and from the high flow season of a wet year to the low flow season of some subsequent dry year.

The marked seasonality of precipitation in the basin is reflected in somewhat less marked seasonality in the flow of the Līṭānī. The precipitation is highly concentrated in a few winter months, but the storage of snow as water in the mountains and the slowed movement of water through limestone aquifers results in a carry over of some water to the drier months following. On the Līṭānī, four seasons may be distinguished: a four month high flow period between January and April, with 60 per cent to 65 per cent of the average annual flow; a two month intermediate period (May and June), with 15 per cent; a four month low flow season between July and October, with about 12 per cent;[7] and a two month intermediate period (November and December), with slightly over 10 per cent of the annual total.

---

[5] Since then, more gage records have been added and some have been published. The actual flow, however, has been changed by the construction of the Līṭānī Project and by other developments. Because of these changes and because the Reclamation calculations have served as the basis for much planning, they have been used in this paper. They are contained in *Reclamation Plan,* Appendix to Sec. 3, esp. Tables A-19, A-24, A-25, A-27, and A-52. An earlier source of data is I. Abd-el-Al, *Le Litani* (Beirut: Rep. Lib., Service Hydraulique, 1948), esp. pp. 60, 99, and 100. More recent is Rep. Lib., Office National du Litani, *Annuaire Hydrométrique,* which began with 1961-62.

[6] The gages used are near Mansourah and Khardalī. The Bureau of Reclamation made no estimates for the Lower Basin. E. de Vaumas, *Le Liban* (Paris: Firman-Didot, 1954), p. 252, quotes the Lebanese hydrologist Abd-el-Al as saying that the flow at Qāsimīyah is two cubic meters per second higher than that at Khardalī, which is equivalent to 60 Mcm annually. Converting Abd-el-Al's published per-second data to annual flow, de Vaumas gives 310 Mcm for the Upper Basin and 420 Mcm for the Middle Basin. For comparison, the total Līṭānī flow is about 1/16th that of the Potomac at Washington, D. C.

The annual variation in flow may be somewhat less than on other Middle Eastern streams. On the Līṭānī, about 35 per cent of the years have a flow within 10 per cent of average. Nearly one-quarter of the years have a flow between 50 and 70 per cent of average, and one year dropped down to 33 per cent of average. More serious than the random occurrence of dry years is the occurrence of a string of dry years, such as the period 1932-1937: five of the years were less than 70 per cent of the average. Such a series can completely drain the reservoirs. The Līṭānī has also had strings of wet years, but these do not compensate because, normally, it is not economical to carry all of the excess water from a wet series to some future dry series.

Groundwater

There appear to be some groundwater deposits in the basin which do not enter into the water system of the river. Information is lacking on the location, depth and safe yield of such deposits, as well as the costs of extracting the water.[8]

Uses of Water

In developing the water resources of a river basin, planners must allocate the water among different uses. In Lebanon, as in the rest of the Middle East, there are five major uses of water: for households and businesses, for industries, for hydroelectricity, for cooling in thermal electric plants, and for irrigation. The first four may be grouped together, distinct from irrigation, as primarily urban uses which allow greater reuse of water and which have a higher economic value.

Reuse of Water

In a water-short area, the limited supply of water should perform as many tasks as possible. Reuse may be precluded by the amount of consumptive use of water and by change in the location of water.

Consumptive use is the loss of water from the concentrated supply to the atmosphere by evaporation and transpiration and to the subsurface by deep seepage. Water which is lost by consumptive use is not available for reuse. The four non-irrigation uses have a low consumptive use, usually 20 per cent or less.

---

[7] The proportion for the low flow season is slightly reduced by diversions for irrigation in the Biqā'.

[8] A UN sponsored study has been undertaken of the groundwater resources of Lebanon.

After the water has been through these uses, 80 per cent or more is available for another use or for recycling through the same use.

In contrast, irrigation has a high consumptive use of water. The purpose of irrigation is to supply the crop with water for transpiration, necessary for the survival of the plants. Measurements in the United States indicate that, under farm conditions, about 40 to 50 per cent of the water diverted for irrigation is actually transpired by the crop. Most of the remainder is lost through evaporation or seepage from canals and fields. Normally only a small amount is returned to the concentrated supply. Thus, in the Līṭānī Basin, any water taken for irrigation in the Biqā' is not available for generating hydroelectricity downstream.

Any use may cause consumptive use by the loss of water from reservoirs through evaporation or seepage. The amounts involved, however, are usually small. The Bureau of Reclamation estimated that annual losses from the Qir'ūn Reservoir would be about seven Mcm by evaporation and 19 Mcm by seepage, together about four per cent of the total supply in the river.[9]

Change in the location of water may also affect its capacity to be reused. In the Līṭānī Project, water dropped from the Biqā' to the sea through the hydroelectric system is not available for reuse in irrigation in the Biqā'. Likewise, the city of Beirut, like many in the Middle East, is located on a narrow coastal plain with little irrigable land nearby. In such a case, distance might prevent reuse of city outflow in irrigation.

Economic Value

The economic goal of water resources development would be to invest in and encourage those uses of water in which as much production as possible would result from the use—particularly the consumptive use—of the limited quantity of water. In comparison to other major uses of water, irrigation is a low productive use.

The economic weakness of irrigation is evident in the economic analyses that the US Bureau of Reclamation made in its plan for the Līṭānī. The proposed electric system (which included thermal plants) had an estimated annual cost of £L 38.4 million, using a 50 year amortization period and six per cent interest. To cover this would be the estimated annual revenues from the sale of power of £L 62.5 million, 1.6 times as much as the cost. If the same interest rates and other financial conditions are applied to the irrigation components, they had an estimated annual cost of £L 5.8 million, but with annual revenues from the sale of water to irrigation of only £L 1.0 million. Further, the Bureau of Reclamation estimated that the use of the water in irrigation rather than in power resulted in raising the annual operating costs of the hydrothermal system by £L 3.7 million.[10]

---

[9] *Reclamation Plan,* Vol. III, p. XXXV-2.

The Līṭānī Project

Development of the Līṭānī River on a large scale had to await the introduction to Lebanon of European techniques of water resources development. Three techniques were of special importance: treating the river basin as a unit, construction of large engineering works, and production of hydroelectricity. During the French Mandate, depression and war precluded any concerted development beyond two local irrigation projects at 'Anjar in the Biqā' and Qāsimīyah on the coast. In the postwar period, with Lebanese independence, there was a spate of different plans for the Līṭānī.[11] The most elaborate and detailed one was drawn up by the US Bureau of Reclamation in the early 1950s, which included most of the alternatives discussed in the other plans.

The Reclamation Plan

The Bureau of Reclamation emphasized the production of electricity. Thermal electricity accounted for 50 per cent of the annual costs, hydroelectricity for 45 per cent, and irrigation for five per cent.[12] Of the water in the project, about 10 per cent would be used exclusively for irrigation and 25 per cent for power and then irrigation.[13] The provision of urban water to Beirut and household water to settlements in the south was passed over.

The key to the development was a storage dam which utilized a good reservoir site at the southern end of the Biqā' near Qir'ūn. Two hydroelectric systems were planned: one continued down the Līṭānī from the dam, and the other, fed water by a tunnel from the reservoir through the Lebanese Mountains, continued down the Awwālī River. By having both systems, the project would utilize both the inflow of the Līṭānī below the dam and the flow of the Awwālī, estimated at over 100 Mcm annually. The Awwālī system would also be cheaper for the amount of power produced.[14]

---

[10] Based on data in *Reclamation Plan,* Vol. I, pp. V-1 to V-3, V-37, V-38, and IX-8 to IX-11. Annual costs for irrigation were also calculated at no interest for a 75 year amortization period. In calculating the benefit-cost ratio for irrigation, the Bureau used as the benefit "increase in gross crop values" rather than revenues, as had been done for electricity. For electricity, the comparable benefit would have been increase in gross value of production in electric-using industries, a sum in the hundreds of millions of pounds. For a somewhat different point of view, see Gordon H. Ward, "Economics of Irrigation Water in the Litani River Basin of Lebanon," *International Journal of Agrarian Affairs,* Vol. II (1959), pp. 425-41, esp. pp. 434-38.

[11] Slightly different summaries of prior studies are given in *Reclamation Plan,* Vol. I, pp. I-3 to I-5 and the earlier US Bureau of Reclamation, Litani River Investigation Group, *Litani River Project, Lebanon: Reconnaissance Report* (Beirut, 1951), pp. 4-8. Apparently overlooked was V. P. Yordanov, *Le Litani: Probleme de l'exploitation totale* (Beirut, 1950).

[12] *Reclamation Plan,* Vol. I, pp. IX-9, IX-11.

[13] *Ibid.,* Vol. I, p. III-22, and Appendix to Sec. 3, Table A-52.

Irrigation was suggested for three areas: part of the southern Biqā', scattered patches of good land in the Galilean Uplands, and parts of the Sidon-Beirut coastal area. All of these areas are under agriculture, but either unirrigated or with only a partial supply of water. In addition, water would continue to be provided for the Qāsimīyah Project on the coast.

Realization of the Project

Construction started on the Līṭānī Project in the late 1950s. It included the Qir'ūn Reservoir and the Awwālī power system, with irrigation and the lower Līṭānī power system left as future possibilities. Changes were made in the Awwālī power system so that it could take all the water available to it. The intake of the tunnel was moved from the reservoir to Markabā, nearly 10 kms. downstream, with a power drop from the dam to the intake. The tunnel itself was enlarged so that it could take all the releases from the reservoir plus the inflow between the dam and Markabā. As a result of the relocation, the length of the tunnel was nearly doubled.

Unfortunately, construction of water projects is as subject to Murphey's Law ("If anything can go wrong, it will") as other human endeavors. After completion of a complicated concrete arch section on the dam, realization of possible earthquake damage caused it to be torn down and the dam made entirely rockfill. More serious was the problem encountered in construction of the transmountain tunnel. A seam containing water under high pressure was reached, and the resulting flooding and cave-ins blocked the tunnel.[15] The costs were considerably increased and completion of the tunnel was delayed about two years.

The Relocated Water Supply

With the new hydroelectric system of the Līṭānī Project in operation, the location of water in the basin has been significantly changed.[16] At Markabā, the total annual flow of 520 Mcm now consists of 390 Mcm transported by the power drop from the dam and 130 Mcm provided by inflow to the river below the dam. Instead of the flow being highly irregular from season to season and year to year, it has now been smoothed out through the operations of the reservoir. From Markabā, at least 25 Mcm has to be sent on down the Līṭānī to meet peak summer demands of the Qāsimīyah Project. The remainder can be sent through the tunnel; with about 30 Mcm of groundwater entering the tunnel, there is 525 Mcm at the western end. The addition, below the first power plant, of 115 Mcm of Awwālī River water means an outflow of about 645 Mcm from the Awwālī power system, making it the biggest river in Lebanon.

---

[14] Although the lower Līṭānī facilities would have cost 89 per cent as much as the Awwālī facilities, they would have produced only 75 per cent of the power. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. VI-36, IX-3, and IX-4, and Appendix to Sec. 3, Table A-52. Under the Reclamation Plan, the water would actually have been delivered at the Bisrī, a tributary of (and alternate name for) the Awwālī.

[15] "Flowing Sand Plugs Two Miles of Tunnel—And It Won't Come Out," *Engineering News-Record,* August 25, 1960, pp. 38 ff. In recommending the tunnel, the Bureau of Reclamation had noted expected difficulties; *Reclamation Plan,* Vol. I, p. IX-1.

[16] Data are, as noted, from the *Reclamation Plan.* The *Annuaires* of the ONL for 1961-2 through 1964-5 show somewhat higher flows for that short period.

On the Līṭānī River below Markabā, the operations outlined leave 25 Mcm for Qāsimīyah plus 120 Mcm inflow between Markabā and Khardalī for a total of 145 Mcm at Khardalī, compared to 640 Mcm before the project. In the Lower Basin, the flow at Khardalī plus the estimated inflow of 60 Mcm below Khardalī gives a total of 205 Mcm. From this, over 80 Mcm are committed to the Qāsimīyah Project, leaving a net of 125 Mcm in the Lower Basin, with none of it in a five or six month summer period.

Use of Water in the Līṭānī Project

In traditional Lebanon, the only uses of surface water in the Līṭānī Basin were for household water in a few villages and for irrigation of parts of the southern Biqā' and some patches of land downstream. Introduction of new techniques and new ways of living has brought use of the water for other purposes which are largely outside of the basin. The Bureau of Reclamation proposed major emphasis on hydroelectricity, with a lesser rôle for irrigation. The Līṭānī Project, as realized, was exclusively for hydroelectricity. Recently, pressure has been applied to use some of the water for irrigation.

Electricity in Lebanon

Production of electricity in Lebanon has grown rapidly from 80 million kwh in 1948 to over 900 million kwh in 1967, an average increase of over 13 per cent annually.[17] Continued growth can be expected, though it may not necessarily be as great. To provide for past and future growth, the Lebanese have had the choice of hydroelectricity and thermal electricity. Hydroelectricity has been preferred: except for a brief period around 1960, it has provided over half of the power, and by 1967 it was providing three-quarters of the power.[18] In the future, however, thermal electricity will be of increasing importance.

The additional hydroelectric power has come mainly from the Līṭānī Project. Alternatives were the short streams that run down the western slopes of the Lebanon Mountains and thermal power. The streams do not offer a major alternative. Although the drops in elevation are great, the annual flows are small and highly seasonal and there are no economic reservoir sites. Small run-of-the-river plants have been built on these streams, producing power mainly in the winter and spring.

---

[17] On the growth of electricity in Lebanon, see Fouad Bizri, "L'electrification du Liban," *Le Commerce du Levant,* No. 66 (Feb. 1967), pp. 20-21; Paul Sanleville, "L'electricite au Liban," *Le Commerce du Levant,* No. 67 (March 1967), pp. 25-27; and "La production d'energie electrique continue de progresser," *Le Commerce du Levant,* No. 97 (Sept. 1968), pp. 16-19.

[18] "La production d'énergie . . . ," p. 19.

Compared to hydroelectric power, thermal power has certain disadvantages. It is usually more expensive: up to date data are not available for Lebanon, but thermal power probably costs about 15 to 20 per cent more than Līṭānī Project power. Thermal plants are most economical if operated continuously, which does not fit the strong (1:3) daily peaks of Lebanese electric consumption. The plants rely upon imported petroleum, a possible problem in a politically unstable area.

Thermal power has two advantages over hydroelectric power. Although much water is needed for cooling, it can be supplied from any source. A large new plant in Lebanon, for example, uses 800 Mcm annually, but takes it from the Mediterranean.[19] Secondly, there is only a small number of sites for hydroelectric plants. Once these have been developed, no further expansion is feasible. For thermal plants, there is almost an infinite number of sites, especially if questions of ecological impact are ignored.

The Lebanese experience in projecting power growth has implications for water resources development elsewhere. The amplitude of growth in consumption was not foreseen. The Bureau of Reclamation, which labelled its projections as conservative, predicted an annual growth rate of 11 per cent until 1965 and six per cent afterward.[20] By 1967, actual consumption was 30 per cent higher than predicted. This suggests that, at the beginning of electrification in a country, it is probably better to be generous rather than conservative with projections of consumption. If projections are over-optimistic, excess power can be absorbed by hastening rural electrification and slowing construction of additional units. If the projections are not over-optimistic, the power is available for use.

Also unforeseen was the change in the season of peak demand as the result of the introduction of airconditioning in Lebanon. In 1951, the peak was during the short days of December; by 1964, it had shifted to the hot days of August.[21] For hydroelectricity, this shift was particularly unfortunate since, unlike the December peak, the August peak occurs during a period of low river flow when less water is available for generating power.

Irrigation

Agriculture is of small economic importance in Lebanon, accounting for only about one-eighth of the gross domestic product. Probably not more than one-third of the people are mainly dependent upon farm earnings. Irrigation is a major part of Lebanese agriculture; it probably provides over half of the agricultural income.

---

[19] Sanleville, p. 25.

[20] *Reclamation Plan,* Vol. I, pp. VI-19, Plate VI-8, p. VIII-1.

[21] *Ibid.,* p. VI-13; Sanleville, p. 26.

In contrast to the enthusiastic and rapid development of hydroelectricity, development of irrigation in the Līṭānī Project has been long delayed. One major reason, though not often admitted publicly, was that hydroelectricity has been much more profitable. As one source noted, deploring the lack of progress, original "priorities were reversed. Hydroelectric projects show more rapid profits than do agricultural ones; the former can be self-liquidating while the latter require a long-term investment policy."[22]

Delay was also caused by changes in the irrigation plans. The coastal unit proposed by the Bureau of Reclamation was dropped. The area in the southern Biqā' was enlarged and allotted 100 Mcm of water which was to be pumped from the reservoir, thus not only making water unavailable for power production downstream, but also consuming power.

A serious dispute arose over the land to be irrigated in the Galilean Uplands.[23] The Bureau of Reclamation had recommended giving 65 Mcm to 7,500 ha. (hectares) around Nabaṭīyah and westward. In the mid-1960s, the Līṭānī Office proposed the "600 m." plan, which would deliver 105 Mcm of water, after being used for power generation at Markabā, at the western end of the trans-mountain tunnel (elevation 600 m.). The water would be used on 15,000 ha. of land, all below that elevation: 5,000 ha. each east of Sidon, around Nabaṭīyah, and south of the lower Līṭānī.

A third plan (the "800 m." plan), would divert the same amount of water, but at the Qir'ūn Dam (elevation 800 m.), precluding its use in power generation. The areas to be irrigated would be shifted: 8,000 ha. south of the lower Līṭānī, 3,000 ha. around Nabaṭīyah, 2,500 ha. east of Sidon, and 1,500 ha. near Marj'ayūn. Much of it, especially south of the Līṭānī, would be higher in elevation.[24]

Discussion of the relative merits of the "600 m." and the "800 m." plans involved quite different estimates of costs. Kamal al-Asa'd, a prominent Shi'a political leader in south Lebanon, strongly supported the "800 m." plan, arguing that the areas to be served were impoverished and unable to be irrigated in any other way. The "800 m." plan was adopted, but the pilot irrigation project east of Sidon has not been inconsistent with the "600 m." plan.

---

[22] "Regional Planning and Development in Selected Countries in the Middle East," *Middle East Express*, in *Le Commerce du Levant*, No. 110 (October 1969), p. VIII. Apparently, a "long-term" investment is not self-liquidating. The source is based on material from the UN Economic and Social Office in Beirut.

[23] For descriptions of the plans, see *Reclamation Plan*, Vol. III, Chapters XXXI through XXXIV; and R. G. (Roger Gehchan?), "Litani: Priorité absolue à l'irrigation (15,000 hectares)," *L'Orient* (Beirut), October 7, 1966.

[24] Apparently, it is not feasible to use surplus thermal power during the low peak pre-dawn period to pump up that part of the water desired at higher elevations.

Thus, irrigation development can quite easily become entangled in the regional politics of a country. The dispute also raises a question important to rural development. For quite valid social reasons, investment is made in rural regions. Should a limited resource, water, be committed to a low value use, irrigation, or should more expandable resources, such as fertilizers, roads, and subsidized factories, be committed?

Alternative Prospects for Līṭānī Water

The Līṭānī Project was exclusively for hydroelectricity with a promise of water for irrigation. Now, demands for irrigation water have been made by farmers, and two other possible demands loom: the use of water for households and industry and the diversion of water to Israel.

Household and Industrial Water

Demands for household and industrial water are most critical in the Beirut metropolitan area. Outside of Beirut, household demands can usually be met by local sources of water. In south Lebanon, the major local source is the lower Līṭānī: some water is now taken for distribution to villages, and the "800 m." plan suggested taking an additional 15-20 Mcm. There is little industry outside of Beirut except for oil refineries and cement plants near Sidon and in the Tripoli-Shakkah-Baṭrūn area.

Unlike the demand projected for an irrigated area, the demand projected for an urban area represents not a ceiling but a point along a constantly rising curve. Before 1980, Beirut will probably reach a population of 1,000,000 and have a household demand of about 90 to 100 Mcm annually. For industrial use, firm data are not available since most factories are supplied by unmeasured pumping from groundwater, but one source has estimated 20 to 25 Mcm annually by 1970-75.[25] Both of these figures will be much greater by the year 2000.

At present, Beirut's supplies are from local springs and groundwater. Even now, there is a summer shortage because of competition with prior rights of irrigation for the low flow of that season, and little water is available from local sources for expansion of the total supply. Additional water may be gained in three ways. Water now taken from springs for irrigation could be preempted for the city and replaced by city outflow, suitably cleaned up. Groundwater deposits of unknown magnitude in the mountains could be utilized. Seemingly most feasible would be the use of outflow from the Awwālī power system. This source has the advantage of a regulated year-round flow and of being large enough to serve Beirut for decades to come.

---

[25] The household figure is based on a *per capita* use of 250 liters per day. The industrial estimate is from Basim Hannoush, "Aspects of Water Utilization and Water Needs in Lebanon During The Next Decade," (in Arabic), *Al-Ra'id Al-'Arabī* (Sept. 1962), pp. 12-15.

Israel

Unlike the Nile, Jordan and Tigris-Euphrates Basins, the Līṭānī Basin lies entirely within one country.[26] Nevertheless it has been subjected to considerable international attention. After World War I, the Zionists wished to have the Palestine Mandate extend to, or north of, the lower Līṭānī. In the 1950s, as part of the discussions over the division of the Jordan River waters, the Israelis proposed that Līṭānī River water be diverted into the upper Jordan, used to generate hydroelectricity, and eventually added to Lake Tiberias, reducing its salinity and being available for further use.[27]

Transfer of Līṭānī water from Lebanon to Israel would present several political problems. Since Israel has no real share of the Līṭānī Basin, it has no claim by right under international law to any Līṭānī water. If it obtained any, it would have to buy the water, just as one country might purchase petroleum from another. With the continuing Arab-Israeli dispute, Lebanon would not risk its standing in the Arab world to sell water to Israel. Secondly, if an arrangement were made, past decades of suspicion might be difficult to overcome. Israel would possibly be unwilling to rely on Lebanese goodwill as a guarantee of future deliveries, and Lebanon would be hesitant to allow Israel an interest in Lebanese water that might give an excuse for intervention. Finally, if Lebanon did sell water out of the country, past the eyes of the Shi'a farmers in the south who do not have irrigation water, there would be considerable local discontent.

The physical transfer of the water would be expensive for the amount involved. With the present Līṭānī development, only about 100 Mcm are available in the lower Līṭānī, all of it in the winter and spring. To move this into the upper Jordan from Khardalī would require a lengthy tunnel; to transfer it along the coast would require over 30 kms. of canal or pipe to Ra's al-Nāqūrah on the border plus a similar or greater length to reach consuming areas in Israel. In addition, either a reservoir expensive for its capacity would have to be built on the lower Līṭānī or else these conveyances would have to be large enough to handle high winter flows, yet remain empty during summer and autumn, the main period of demand. The coastal route might overcome this in part with a

---

[26] About 80 square kms. of Syrian territory east of Rayāq and a few square kilometers of Israeli territory south of Khardalī might be considered to be in the Līṭānī Basin. Th Syrian territory might, at most, contribute a small amount of winter flood water to the Līṭānī; the Israeli territory contributes either nothing or practically nothing.

[27] See Dana Adams Schmidt, "Prospects for a Solution of the Jordan River Valley Dispute," *Middle Eastern Affairs,* Vol. VI (1955), pp. 1-12; and Georgiana G. Stevens, *Jordan River Partition,* Hoover Institute Studies No. 6 (1965), esp. pp. 23-25 and 28.

35 km. extension to the mouth of the Awwālī, tapping that part of the regulated flow there which might be surplus to the prospective needs of Beirut and the Lebanese coast.

Other sources of water in Israel would be less complex and more economic for Israel to tap. Irrigation takes most of the water in Israel, over 80 per cent of the deliveries.[28] Agriculture is a small and highly subsidized part of the Israeli economy.[29] With a limited supply of water, the Israelis have chosen, for various reasons, to commit most of it to a high consumptive, low value use of slight economic importance. This has been criticized by many Israeli sources, who have pointed out the wastefulness of using water in irrigation rather than industry and the particular wastefulness of using it for irrigation in the Negev.[30] In the meantime, the cities face water shortages. The most feasible solution would seem to be to give the cities priority on water use, allowing irrigation to have the surplus plus the outflow from the cities.[31]

Water Planning in the Middle East

Water planning in the Middle East is beset with a number of problems ranging from the lack of hydrologic data to political pressures on the nature of the development. One of the most serious problems is the priority given to the various uses. Preference has often been given to irrigation, following the dream of Making the Desert Bloom. This is dubious from the point of view of water use and of economic development. Irrigation is a high consumptive use which precludes the reuse of the water. For the amount of water diverted or consumed, it generates less economic growth. In contrast, the urban uses are low consumptive uses which generate more economic growth. Shortages of water have arisen because limited supplies have been committed to irrigation rather than being available for growing urban demands. A more careful water planning policy, designed to meet the problems of the future rather than solve those of the past, would give urban uses priority, reserving sufficient water for their present and prospective needs, and allowing irrigation to have the remainder.

---

[28] Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract, 1968* (Jerusalem: Government Press, 1968), p. 355.

[29] Agriculture provides under 10 per cent of the gross domestic product. Eliyahu Kanovsky, *The Economy of an Israeli Kibbutz*, Harvard Middle Eastern Monographs (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1966), p. 44, notes that, from 1959 to 1964, farm owners received an average of 23 per cent of their net income in subsidies.

[30] Stevens, pp. 6-8.

[31] *Ibid.*, pp. 56-57, also suggests desalting, and estimates the cost at 40 to 75 per cent more than conduit water. City outflow is already being used; see Arthur H. Doerr *et al.*, "Agricultural Evolution in Israel in the Two Decades Since Independence," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 24 (1970), p. 331.

THE INDUSTRIAL LABOR FORCE OF IRAN: PROBLEMS OF RECRUITMENT, TRAINING AND PRODUCTIVITY

William H. Bartsch

DURING THE PAST fifteen years, the industrial sector of the Iranian economy has been experiencing a rapid rate of growth, largely in connection with the implementation of Iran's Second (1955-62) and Third (1962-1968) Development Plans. Between the Iranian years 1338 (1959/60) and 1347 (1968/69)—for which relatively reliable data are available—total value added by manufacturing establishments (excluding petroleum refineries) increased by 113 per cent in constant prices, or at an average annual compound rate of 8.8 per cent. As a result of this growth, the share of manufacturing in Iranian gross domestic product during the nine year period increased from 9.4 per cent to 10.2 per cent.[1]

This rapid growth in industrial production can be attributed almost exclusively to a surging output from the "modern sector" of industry comprised of large units. For example, figures available on industry in the urban areas (including power production, but excluding petroleum refining)[2] by size of unit for the years 1342 (1963/64) through 1345 (1966/67) indicate that establishments employing 10 or more workers expanded their production by 68 per

---

[1] Value in manufacturing increased from 26,163 million rials in 1338 to 55,800 million rials in 1347 (in 1338 prices). See Bank Markazi Iran, Economic Research Department, *National Income of Iran 1338-1344 (1959-1965)* (Tehran: 1968), Table 29, p. 79, and Bank Markazi Iran, *Annual Report and Balance Sheet as at March 20, 1969* (Tehran: n.d.), Table 14, p. 39. (Value added figure for 1347 is writer's estimate, assuming that 1,500 million rials of 57,300 million rials reported as output of manufacturing and mining combined is attributable to mining.)

[2] Since the oil industry is an enclave sector of the Iranian economy, operated mainly by foreign companies, its workforce is being excluded from discussion in this article. For an analysis of some aspects of the oil industry's labor force, see William H. Bartsch, "The Impact of the Oil Industry on the Economy of Iran," in Raymond F. Mikesell (ed.), *Foreign Investment in the Petroleum and Mineral Industries: Case Studies on Investor-Host Country Relations* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming).

△ WILLIAM H. BARTSCH is with the International Labour Office, Geneva. He wrote this paper when he was a Ph.D. candidate in economics at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. The views expressed are the author's and do not reflect those of the ILO.

cent (in constant prices), while those units with nine or fewer workers (excluding home workshops) actually produced 22 per cent *less* in 1345 than in 1342.[3] In 1345, 0.7 per cent of the total number of industrial units, employing only 17 per cent of the industrial workforce, accounted for 65 per cent of the total industrial output (see Table I), as compared to 52 per cent in 1342. In fact, for the preceding year the Ministry of Economy has estimated that about 58 per cent of value added in manufacturing (excluding petroleum refining) was produced by only some 1,100 units—the factory sector of manufacturing—which employed 102,000 production workers only.[4]

Much of the increase in factory production during the past 15 years can be ascribed to rising levels of per-worker output. To a large extent, the growth in labor productivity is a consequence of the installation of considerable amounts of semi-automatic and automatic machinery in existing and new plants,[5] as well as of improved work organization and supervision in the factories. Increases in productivity attributable to improved quality of labor, on the other hand, have been limited, hampered by the serious problems relating to labor conditions prevailing in the factory sector during this period.

This study will examine the problems associated with the recruitment, training and productive employment of the production workforce of the factory sector of Iranian industry. To a great degree, the analysis presented here derives from the writer's interviews between December 1966 and September 1967 with the management of 23 of the largest factories, which employed over one-sixth of the total factory workforce at that time (or 21,000 of an estimated total of 121,000). The views of other persons familiar with conditions in the industrial workforce of Iran—including UN advisors, labor experts, manpower planners, industrial economists and sociologists—have also been considered.

---

[3] Gross value added in current prices in large units was 23,190 million rials in 1342 and 43,286 million rials in 1345 and for small units 18,894 million rials in 1342 and 16,442 million rials in 1345. (Ministry of Economy, General Department of Industrial and Mining Statistics, *Report on the Results of Annual Industrial Survey of Iran 1963 (1342)* (Tehran: January 1966), page C, and Ministry of Economy, Bureau of Statistics, *Report on the Results of Annual Industrial Survey in 1966 (1345)* (Tehran: n.d.), Table 1, p. 1.) Production data for both sectors for 1345 have been deflated by the writer to compensate for an 11.4 per cent price increase in manufacturing occurring between 1342 and 1345, according to Bank Markazi Iran indices.

[4] See Ministry of Economy, Bureau of Statistics, *Trends in Industrial and Commercial Statistics* (Tehran: Bahman, 1346), p. 1. The value added percentage reported in this publication has been adjusted upwards to include that of tobacco products manufacturing. Employment figure is based on the (unpublished) Ministry of Economy total of 91,300 operatives in 1344 in factories operating in 1341 (1962/63) plus an estimated 10,700 operatives employed in factories established during 1342-44 (based on totals reported to the Ministry of Economy by employers receiving going-into-operation permits during this period).

[5] Charles Issawi sees installation of new equipment as an important explanation of labor productivity increases in Iranian industry. See his "Iran's Economic Upsurge," *The Middle East Journal,* Vol. 21, No. 4, Autumn 1967, p. 452.

TABLE I *Employment and Production Structure of Iranian Manufacturing*[a] *and Power Production Industry* *1345 (1966/67)*

Characteristic	Large Establishments (10 or more workers)		Small Establishments (1-9 workers) in Urban Areas		Small Establishments (1-9 workers) in Rural Areas and All Home Workshops		Total, All Industrial Units	
	Quantity	Pct.	Quantity	Pct.	Quantity[c]	Pct.	Quantity	Pct.
No. of Establishments	3,661	0.7	108,920[b]	21.6	391,528	77.7	504,109	100.0
No. of Employed Persons	214,307	17.3	335,410	27.1	689,487	55.6	1,239,204[d]	100.0
Gross Value Added (1,000 rials)	43,286,453	64.6	16,442,310	24.5	7,300,131	10.9	67,028,894	100.0

[a] Excludes petroleum refining.

[b] Refers to year 1342; no new estimate made by Ministry of Economy.

[c] Residual figures.

[d] At November 1966, excluding unsettled population.

Source: As calculated from Table 1, p. 1 of Ministry of Economy, Bureau of Statistics, *Report on the Results of Annual Industrial Survey in 1966 (1345)* (Tehran: n.d.) and from Table 27, pp. 135-37 of Plan Organization, Iranian Statistical Centre, *National Census of Population and Housing: November 1966*, Vol. 168 (Tehran: March 1968).

Recruitment Problems and Practices

A major obstacle to the attainment of a higher level of labor productivity in the factory sector of Iranian industry originates with the recruitment of a workforce qualified to carry out production operations. Recruitment difficulties derive not only from shortages of certain skills among job seekers, but also from the practices of industrial owners and managers in selection of applicants for employment.

Demand for Factory Labor

As is the situation throughout the "modern sector" of the economy, Iranian industry is experiencing a persistent (and growing) shortage of the labor skills required to carry out expanded production activities in the factory sector. Qualified observers have repeatedly drawn attention to the critical shortages of skilled workers, foremen and technicians (as well as qualified managers), impeding the growth of manufacturing industry.[6] Many factory managers maintain that shortages of skilled workers and technicians[7] constitute the main obstacle to higher rates of production, obliging them to recruit from the mass of unskilled job applicants pressing for work and substitute them (after short on-the-job training) for their skilled worker requirements.[8] Some complain of being frustrated in their desire to install equipment embodying the latest technology in their factories because of the inadequate supply of highly skilled workers required to operate (and maintain) such sophisticated machinery.[9]

However, this picture is somewhat misleading. In actuality, effective demand for (and shortages of) skilled manpower in industry has been considerably lower than the requirements for such skills as noted by observers. While the better managed factories have recognized their requirements for various skills (based on the technical requirements of the technology in the country of origin) and have translated them into effective demand, numerous Iranian factories, owned and managed by men of no formal training in, or comprehension of, modern industrial management principles, have either not understood or have been oblivious of their skill requirements[10] and have usually been content to recruit unskilled labor (mostly ex-villagers or children) to man skilled labor positions (after on-the-job training)[11] and to ignore their needs for foremen and technicians.[12] Not understanding concepts of productivity, these employers—

---

[6] See, for instance, G. L. Peace, "Report on the Development of Small-Scale Industries in Iran," (Unpublished-Roneo), (Tehran: UNTAA, December 1961); T. Hillard Cox, "High-Level Manpower Development in Iran," (Unpublished-Roneo), (Tehran: Governmental Affairs Institute, May 1960); Kazem Sherkat, "A Nation-Wide Survey on Cotton-Synthetic Textile Industry in Iran," (Unpublished-Roneo), (Tehran: Industrial and Mining Development Bank of Iran, July 1963); and Shahpour Rahbari, "Serious Dearth of Middle Level Skills," *Kayhan International* (Tehran), December 27, 1967, p. 4.

[7] Of 18 factories replying, nine emphasized their need for more technicians. According to the November 1966 census, there were only 817 technicians employed in manufacturing (as against 1,437 engineers), or only about 0.7 per cent of the total number of operatives in factories in that year.

[8] Twelve of 17 factories replying asserted that they were obliged to follow this course of action as a consequence of the inadequate number of skilled job applicants. Their replies on this point—at least in some cases—may have sought to obscure their real reasons for hiring such workers, as noted on page 13, *q.v.*

[9] This problem has also been noted by the Personnel Management Division of the Industrial Management Institute (affiliated with the Ministry of Economy) in conversations with the writer.

[10] As noted, among others, by Iranian labor expert Habib Naficy in an unpublished report to the USAID Mission/Tehran and by the former head of the Ministry of Labor branch in Isfahan, A. Partou A'azam. See his "Problems Related to the Execution of the Labor Law in Isfahan," (in *Farsi*), (Unpublished-Roneo), (Isfahan: Ministry of Labor, Aban 1339), p. 19.

[11] The management of five of 17 factories replying acknowledged that it preferred to recruit unskilled labor for meeting all its labor requirements. A leading Iranian manpower planner maintains that factory managers have generally been satisfied to recruit rural labor. See Nasser Movafaqian, "The Problem of Vocational Training in Iran," (in *Farsi*), *Majalleh-e Otaq-e Sanaye' va Ma'adan* (The Journal of the Chamber of Industries and Mines), No. 20, Shahrivar 1345, p. 22. This preference for raw village labor over urban workers is also noted by Joseph Upton, in his *The History of Modern Iran: An Interpretation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 132.

[12] As noted by Peace, *op. cit.*, p. 35, and Cox, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

particularly in the dominant textile industry—have sought to reduce their total costs of operation by recruiting the cheapest sources of labor.[13]

Nevertheless, an improvement in the quality of industrial management in recent years had tended to lead to a narrowing of the gap between requirements and demand for skilled labor and thus to exacerbate the effective shortage of such manpower. Management of many factories previously directed by "bazaar mentality" owner-managers has been devolving to young men (often their sons) formally educated in industrial management principles who recognize the importance of recruiting a skilled workforce to meet the labor requirements of their plants. Recently established factories have benefited from the beginning of their operations from a higher quality of management than previously was the case.[14] A general upgrading of industrial managerial skills is also being accomplished through the training courses provided factory managers by the Industrial Management Institute. Furthermore, the rapid growth of new lines of manufacturing in Iran, as well as the implementation of modernization schemes in existing factories, in each case usually incorporating the latest industrial technology of the West, have given rise to growing requirements for highly skilled and specialized manpower for which semiskilled workers can no longer be substituted.

Recruitment Practices

The selection of workers to meet labor requirements of factories in most instances has been haphazard. Of the 23 factories visited by the writer during 1966-67, 22 reported that they recruited virtually all of their unskilled and semiskilled workers from among applicants appearing at the factory gates, most of whom had been informed by friends or relatives working in the factory that new workers were being hired. Only in the case of needs for specialized skilled workers, technicians, engineers, or administrative or clerical staff did management seek to fill its needs on its own initiative, generally through advertising in newspapers.

Although the Ministry of Labor operates a free public employment service and has been expanding its number of branches, it has been of limited effectiveness, partly due to its inability to fill many of the requirements of employers—

---

[13] In most cases the textile factories "have turned to rural workers willing to accept very low wages" (Sherkat, *op. cit.*, p. 15) and continue to rely heavily on child labor (as noted by A'azam, *op. cit.*, pp. 54 and 60). The management of the largest textile factory in Iran informed the writer that it was only interested in hiring children. (The textile industry in 1966 accounted for about half of total factory employment, or 59,400 of 121,000.)

[14] A 1969 Ministry of Higher Education survey of 70 of the most modern factories (all associated with foreign producing companies) indicated that all of the senior industrial managers of these factories reported themselves as holding degrees from foreign universities in disciplines related to their work. See Afshan Hessam-Vaziri, "Industry, Technical Education, and Vocational Training in Iran: An Analysis of Related Problems," (Unpublished-Roneo), Paper presented to the OECD/Plan Organization Seminar on Planning and Development of Manpower in Iran, Tehran, September 15-20, 1969, pp. 7 and 12.

usually for skilled manpower—from its stock of mostly unskilled job applicants. Only six of the 23 factories visited during 1966-67 reported ever using the Employment Service, and then only seldom and usually for a very few highly skilled requirements only. Those managers who never used its services indicated such reasons as "their applicants are more interested in the details of the Labor Law than in working," "their applicants are mostly workers who have been sacked by other factories" or "could not get work on their own," etc.

The selection of individual applicants for employment has been a highly subjective process in most factories, particularly those characterized by traditional management. A 1963 study of conditions in 45 factories in Tehran revealed that the decision whether a particular applicant was to be hired or not depended in most cases on his direct or indirect relations with the hierarchy of the factory rather than on his qualifications for the post to be filled.[15] There are also instances of owners of factories agreeing to employ applicants referred to them by friends or relatives, regardless of whether these job seekers were suitable or not, and requesting the plant manager to find positions for them. On the other hand, a number of the better managed factories have completely eliminated the play of personal relations in recruiting their workforces.

Problems of Training

The shortages of skilled workers, foremen and technicians in manufacturing industry derive from the inadequacy of the system of skill training in Iran. Neither private industry nor the Iranian government has been able to mount sufficient and effective in-service or pre-employment training programs to meet the rising demand for industrial skills.

In-Service Training Programs

Although Article 66 of the 1959 Labor Law requires industrial employers to provide skill improvement training for their workers and trainees, very few instances of in-service training based on training-within-industry or apprenticeship exist in Iranian factories.[16] Efforts of the Iranian government to encourage private employers to assume responsibility for the introduction of such programs have been unsuccessful, and the Ministry of Labor has consequently been obliged to mount limited programs of its own of short in-service training of factory workers to upgrade their skills, as well as of apprenticeship training.[17] The management of most factories has evidenced little interest in expanding the level of skill of its workers through initiation of in-service schemes[18] and has objected to the formal contract requirements of the Ministry of Labor regulating apprenticeship training.[19] Those few well-managed factories (mainly those with foreign participation) which have undertaken genuine apprenticeship programs have, however, not found them notably successful; too few apprentices trained at great expense have remained with the factories to justify the costs.

---

[15] P. Vieille and M. Haghcheno, "Problèmes Sociaux de l'Industrialisation dans un Pays Sous-Développé," (Unpublished-Roneo), (Tehran: Université de Téhéran, Institut d'Etudes et de Recherches Sociales, Juin 1964), p. 8.

[16] Only two examples of in-service training (one TWI scheme and one apprenticeship program, the latter subsequently dropped) were found in the 23 factories visited by writer during 1966-67. No in-service training schemes were in effect in 30 factories visited by a World Bank team in 1963.

Most factories (including 21 of the 23 visited by the writer in 1966-67) rely entirely on on-the-job training to meet their semiskilled and skilled manpower requirements. In most cases, unskilled workers are recruited specifically for undergoing such training (generally under the supervision of senior operatives), which is designed to prepare them in a rudimentary way for machine operation within a relatively short period of time. Interviewed managers acknowledged that such limited skill training resulted in their operatives reaching only a semiskilled level, never being able to gain the productivity that could be expected of more thoroughly trained workers. While many managers maintained that they had little alternative in view of the insufficiency of skilled applicants for work in their factories and the unsuitability of vocational training school graduates (see below), others (particularly those of textile factories) appeared satisfied with the situation, preferring to hire unskilled, usually rural-origin, labor for training to semiskilled level against payment of low wages and at little training cost to themselves than to actively seek a supply of more costly skilled manpower or to introduce their own in-service training programs.[20]

Pre-Employment Vocational Training

Since 1934 the Iranian government, through the Ministry of Education, has provided pre-employment industrial skill training for Iranian youth in a steadily

---

[17] See Plan Organization, Division of Economic Affairs, "Manpower Third Plan Frame," (Unpublished-Roneo), (Tehran: August 1961), pp. 27 and 53. The Ministry of Labor in 1969 was operating four in-service training centers, with a total capacity of 900 trainees a year. See Ebrahim Farahbakhshian, "Manpower Needs and Related Problems of Vocational Education," (Unpublished-Roneo), Paper presented to the OECD/Plan Organization Seminar on Planning and Development of Manpower in Iran, Tehran, September 15-20, 1969, pp. 3-4.

[18] In the view of Movafaqian as indicated in his two (*Farsi*) articles (of the same title) "The Problem of Vocational Training in Iran," *Majalleh-e Otaq-e Sanaye' va Ma'adan,* No. 2, Shahrivar 1342, pp. 33 and 36, and No. 20, Shahrivar 1345, p. 22.

[19] See William F. Delaney, *Labor Law and Practice in Iran,* (Washington: US Department of Labor, May 1964), p. 19. Those employers who do have apprenticeship programs often violate the terms of the contracts, using apprentices in regular production work as a cheap source of labor and discharging them at the end of the contract period.

[20] Movafaqian maintains that the ready supply of rural-origin, unskilled workers seeking factory jobs has weakened any inclination of most employers to introduce in-service schemes. See his "The Problem of Vocational Training in Iran," *Majalleh-e Otaq-e Sanaye' va Ma'adan,* No. 20, Shahrivar 1345, p. 22.

P1453

increasing number of vocational training schools at secondary school level. In addition, a few schools have been established by non-government organizations, mainly utilizing foreign technical assistance. These schools have been of two types: the *amuzeshgah-e herfe'i* (grades 7-9), which trains students for skilled worker positions, and the *honarestan-e sand'ti* (grades 10-12), whose graduates are regarded by the Ministry of Education as qualified foremen and (since 1963) as technicians. In implementing its policy to overcome shortages of skilled workers, foremen and technicians during the Third Plan (September 1962-March 1968), the government gave high priority to the expansion of vocational training during the Plan period, so that by February 1968 the number of vocational training schools had risen to 108 (with an enrollment of 11,562) from the February 1963 total of 66 (with an enrollment of 7,069).[21]

However, on both quantitative and qualitative grounds, serious criticisms have been leveled at the industrial vocational training system of Iran. A combination of inadequate levels of enrollment[22] and high dropout rates resulted in the number of graduates of industrial vocational training schools reaching only 34 per cent of the Third Plan target of 27,000 regarded as necessary to meet skill shortages over the Plan period.[23] Furthermore, there has been an overproduction in some skills and underproduction in others, as well as regional imbalance, due to the failure of the government to coordinate decisions on choice of skills to be taught and location of schools with labor market requirements for particular skills and in various regions.[24] Vocational training schools have operated in isolation from industrial enterprises, with relations between the two often marred by suspicion and negative attitudes.[25] On the qualitative side, most vocational training schools (particularly those run by the Ministry of Education)[26] have been criticized for their low standards, deriving from such internal conditions as poor student selection procedures, lack of motivation of the students, irrational utilization, shortages and inadequate qualifications of the teaching staff, poor equipment, financial and administrative problems, poor management, and unbalanced and irrelevant choice of curricula.[27] Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that the drafters of the Third Plan agreed with the general observation that "*amuzeshgahs* cannot produce competent craftsmen and *honarestans* cannot produce foremen."[28] Seven years later, in summation of its quantitative and qualitative weaknesses, the official in charge of executing the skill-training program of the Plan concluded that the vocational training system was "totally inadequate for the needs of the country."[29]

---

[21] Figures include both government and private schools. (In 1968, 101 of the 108 schools were government-run.) Enrollment figures exclude girls, who take some non-industrial courses in girls' vocational training schools (included in school totals above). All figures are those of the Department of Statistics of the Ministry of Education.

[22] Although actual enrollment met the Third Plan goal (average annual enrollment of 8,810 *vs.* average annual 8,720 achieved), this goal was set too low to ensure the targeted number of graduates, considering that even with no dropouts, only about one graduate a year could be expected for three persons enrolled in the three year courses of the schools. (Plan target from Plan Organization, *op. cit.,* Table 16, p. 49, and enrollment figure as average enrollment for six years 1962/63-1967/68 of Ministry of Education figures.)

[23] Total number of graduates for the five years 1963-67 amounted to 9,269, according to Ministry of Education data. The Plan had targeted an average annual output of 5,400 graduates (Plan Organization, *loc. cit.,*), equivalent to 27,000 over the five indicated years.

[24] As noted by *Plan Organization, Fourth National Development Plan, 1968-1972* (Tehran: 1968), p. 263; Nasser Movafaqian, "Experimentation and Experience or Imitation in Vocational Training," (in *Farsi*), *Majalleh-e Otaq-e Sanaye' va Ma'adan,* No. 5, Esfand 1342, p. 64; Shahpour Rahbari, "Vocational Training Congress" and "Vocational Training," *Kayhan International,* July 19, 1965 and April 28, 1967; and Ahmad Qassemi, "Reasons for the Failure of Vocational Training in Iran," (in *Farsi*), *Majalleh-e Masayel-e Iran,* Nos. 2 & 3, Farvardin/Ordibehesht 1344, p. 52.

[25] Movafaqian, "The Problem . . . ," (Shahrivar 1345), *op. cit.,* pp. 19-20.

[26] Those private schools benefiting from foreign assistance and long years of experience are

In terms of cost benefits, it is highly questionable if pre-employment vocational training has constituted the best means by which to produce the skills required by Iranian industry. As against the heavy costs incurred in equipping and operating vocational training schools (with their much higher per-pupil costs than academic secondary schools,[30] largely due to relatively low enrollment levels in each school),[31] only 30 per cent of entering students ever graduate,[32] and these are apparently seldom employed in industry utilizing the skill in which they were trained. Those graduates who have sought to utilize their skill training have invariably been rejected for factory work by employers, largely because of the impractical nature, irrelevancy, and/or low quality of their training,[33] and have consequently been obliged either to set up their own workshops (if they possessed adequate capital) or to abandon their vocation for employment in another occupation. However, and more of relevance, most graduates of vocational training schools have sought non-manual work rather than jobs

---

regarded as quite good, however. See, for instance, Alfred Bakhash, "Seeking Alternatives," *Kayhan International*, October 27, 1964.

[27] According to such sources as Plan Organization, *Fourth National Development Plan, op. cit.*, p. 263; Plan Organization, "Manpower Third Plan Frame," *op. cit.*, p. 44; Nasser Movafaqian, "Technical and Organizational Problems of the Vocational Training System of Iran," (in *Farsi*), *Majalleh-e Otaq-e Sanaye' va Ma'adan*, No. 27, Aban 1346, p. 34.

[28] Plan Organization, "Manpower Third Plan Frame," *op. cit.*, p. 45.

[29] Movafaqian, quoted in *Kayhan International*, October 9, 1968.

[30] In 1964 the Plan Organization calculated that while it cost between 8,000 and 9,000 rials ($107-$120) to send a boy through one year of general secondary school, it cost anywhere from 150,000 to 300,000 rials ($20,000-$40,000) to put him through one year of vocational training school (in each instance including capital costs). See Alfred Bakhash, *loc. cit.*

[31] In turn due to the low number of applicants for the training courses, (Plan Organization, *Fourth National Development Plan, op. cit.*, p. 263, and Manuchehr Afzal, "Problems of Secondary Education in Iran," *Comparative Education Review*, October 1962, p. 89). See below.

[32] This rate applies to the situation in the early 1960s. See Plan Organization, "Manpower Third Plan Frame," *op. cit.*, p. 45.

[33] But also because of their expectation of higher starting wages than those of experienced factory workers lacking formal schooling, according to many factory managers interviewed by the writer during 1966-67. The unacceptability of vocational training school graduates to industrial employers has also been indicated by Plan Organization, *Fourth National Development Plan, op. cit.*, p. 263; Gregory Lima, "The Missing Link," *Kayhan International*, January 24, 1965; Bakhash, *loc. cit.*; Qassemi, *loc. cit.*; and Plan Organization, "Manpower Third Plan Frame," *op. cit.*, p. 45.

utilizing their training. These young men were never committed to a life of manual labor in the first place, and accepted admission to vocational training schools only following failure to gain entrance to general secondary schools, with the intention of using their diploma as a stepping stone to a desk job.[34] While such an attitude may be deleterious in terms of wasted resources and the unfilled manpower needs of the economy, it is not irrational behavior on the part of these youth in a society that continues to place a high premium on the receipt of certificates from the formal school system (and on the white collar positions for which they constitute the qualifications) and relegates all persons who work with their hands, regardless of skill level, to the lowest stratum of that society.[35]

Level of Skill Training of the Industrial Labor Force

The inadequacy and ineffectiveness of skill training programs, both governmental and private, are reflected in the level of skill training completed by the industrial labor force of the country. A recent investigation by the Manpower Section of the Plan Organization revealed that only one per cent of the total of "skilled" operatives and master craftsmen employed in factories had ever benefited from any in-service training (excluding on-the-job training) and only two per cent from any formal pre-employment vocational training. The rest of the surveyed workers had learned their skills through practical experience only, without benefit of any technical foundation.[36] Another recent (1968) study by the University of Tehran indicated that only 1.3 per cent of foremen and two per cent of technicians in industry were graduates of *honarestans.*[37]

Problems of Worker Productivity

In view of the absence of employment and output data for the factory sector until recent years, the rate of increase in the productivity of the factory workforce cannot be estimated over the period under review; for the three year period 1963/64-1966/67 for which statistics are available, an average annual rate of growth of 3.3 per cent a year has been calculated by the writer.[38] For manufacturing industry as a whole (excluding oil refining again), and based on an estimate of employment in 1959/60, the rate of increase of per worker value added for the seven years 1959/60-1966/67 can be estimated at a considerably higher figure, or 5.4 per cent a year.[39] In the important cotton-synthetic textile industry, average per worker output of cloth between 1956/57 and 1964/65 grew by over 12 per cent a year, or 161 per cent for the eight year period. (See Table II.)

---

[34] See, for instance, Alfred Bakhash, *loc. cit.;* Gregory Lima, *loc. cit.;* and Norman Jacobs, *The Sociology of Development: Iran as an Asian Case Study* (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 170.

[35] This situation has been well analyzed by Jacobs in Chapter Four of his book, *op. cit.*

[36] Movafaqian, "Technical and Organizational Problems of the Vocational Training System of Iran," *op. cit.,* p. 31.

[37] Quoted in Afshan Hessam-Vaziri, *op. cit.,* pp. 5-6.

[38] Or from 184,350 rials per worker in 1342 to 203,980 rials per worker in 1345 (adjusting for an estimated increase in manufacturing output prices by 11.4 per cent over the period). (Per worker output figures calculated from employment and value added data for manufacturing and power production units employing 10 or more workers of Ministry of Economy sources indicated in footnote 3 of this report.)

TABLE II *Some Characteristics of the Cotton-Synthetic Textile Industry 1335-1343 (1956/57-1964/65)*

Characteristic	1335 (1956/57)	1343 (1964/65)	Rate of Change (Pct.)
No. of factories	32	44	+ 38
No. of spinning spindles	277,040	622,462	+125
No. of weaving looms	4,797	14,275	+198
No. of employees	19,697	40,356	+105
Production of cloth (1,000 meters)	61,892	330,594	+434
Average production of cloth per employee (meters)	3,142	8,192	+161

Source: As derived from adjusted figures of Ministry of Industries and Mines, Bureau of Industrial Statistics, *Industries and Mines Statistical Yearbook 1956/57 (1335)* (Tehran: n.d.) and from unpublished figures of Bureau of Statistics of Ministry of Economy.

Despite such gains in output per worker, however, present levels of labor productivity in Iranian factories are still considerably below those of factories utilizing similar machinery in the United States, Europe and Japan. Furthermore, the gains in average output per worker registered over this period to a great extent have been the result of installation of much greater amounts of (and more automatic) machinery per worker than before,[40] as well as the considerable work reorganization and improved supervision that has taken place in the better managed factories,[41] rather than any significant upgrading in worker productivity attributable to the worker himself. Despite the views of some Iranian factory managers, when considered in terms of its damage to, and poor maintenance of, machinery, its wastage and spoilage of raw materials, and its relatively low productivity, unskilled and semiskilled Iranian labor is not cheap and contributes heavily to the high unit costs of production incurred by factories.

---

[39] Based on value added (at 1338 prices) of 26.2 billion rials in 1338 and 52.5 billion rials in 1345, and employment of 890,000 and 1,231,000 for the two years, respectively, per worker value added amounted to 29,400 rials in 1338 and 42,600 rials in 1345. Employment in 1338 estimated on the assumption of an average annual compound increase of 4.8 per cent from the 1956 figure of 773,000 (or the average annual rate for the 1956-66 period). Employment data from the November 1956 and November 1966 censuses; value added figures from Bank Markazi Iran, Economic Research Department, *op. cit.*, Table 28, p. 78, and *Annual Report and Balance Sheet as at March 20, 1968* (Tehran: n.d.), Table 25, p. 82.

[40] Very noticeably in the case of the textile industry, where the rate of expansion in the number of looms and spindles was much greater than that of employee increase, as indicated in Table II. Furthermore, these figures do not show the considerable replacement of old equipment with fully automatic spindles and looms that occurred over the 1956-64 period.

Low labor productivity in Iranian industry may be traced to the work conditions prevailing in most factories. Most factory managers, with little understanding of productivity concepts, have left the production process to a repetition of routine operations, poorly organized and generally unsupervised.[42] The production workers themselves are able to operate much less machinery and less efficiently than their Western or Japanese counterparts.[43] Their productivity is further diminished by their work habits, often including leaving machinery unattended, carelessness, disregard of instruction, and sometimes arguing and fighting among themselves.[44] Attempts by management to introduce work reorganization schemes are often resisted by the workers, opposed to any change in the methods to which they have grown accustomed during long years of employment. Employers also complain of worker insubordination and "unwillingness to learn and follow the rules of the game."[45]

A number of explanations may be advanced for the low capabilities and poor work attitudes of Iranian factory workers. Their lack of any real skill training is a main factor in their inability to operate more machinery and at a higher efficiency, but their poor physical condition (largely attributable to payment of inadequate wages),[46] long hours of work required,[47] and low motivation are also important considerations. Until recently (see below), they have had little incentive—financial or otherwise—to increase production. The productivity of workers of village origin (who comprise the majority of the factory workforce)[48] is hampered by their lack of work consciousness and concept of the value of time, deriving from their rural upbringing, absence of contact with industrial practices, and (in most instances) lack of any basic education (or even literacy). Labor-management relations are bad in many factories (particularly in the textile mills of Isfahan),[49] largely because employers in these factories are generally uninterested in the welfare of their workforce. Such bad relations derive basically from the transfer of the old traditional landlord-peasant relationship of Iranian agriculture to the factories, resulting in the continuation of the peasant's traditional stubborn and uncooperative behavior towards an employer regarded as the exploiter of his labor.[50]

---

[41] Such as that which occurred in two of the largest (government-owned) textile mills in the country (Chitsazi Behshahr and Nassaji Shahi No. 1), the main factors responsible for the doubling of production of yarn in each plant and 80 per cent increase in cloth output in the former and 200 per cent in the latter—despite a 10 per cent reduction in the workforce of both—between 1956 and 1965. See Sherkat-e Sahami-ye Karkhanejat-e Iran, *Ten-Year Report of the Textile Company,* (in *Farsi*), (Tehran: Mordad 1345), pp. 26-32 and 44-51.

[42] As noted by P. Vieille and M. Haghcheno, *op. cit.,* pp. 9-12.

[43] The management of textile factories visited during 1966-67 claimed that many more operatives were required per number of spindles and looms than was the case in the country of origin of the equipment. A Japanese textile mission to Iran noted in 1964 that about three times more Iranian workers were required to handle a given number of spinning spindles in Isfahan cotton textile mills than the average for Japan. (See Japan Consulting Institute, "Final Report on Industrialization of Soft Wool in Iran," (Unpublished-Roneo), (Tehran: June 1965), p. 124.)

[44] Conditions which have particularly prevailed in the textile industry. See Sherkat, *op. cit.,* p. 15; J. O. Marsland, "The Esfahan Textile Industry," (Unpublished-Roneo), (Tehran: United Nations, May 1957), p. 15; and George Fry and Associates, "Foroud Textile Company, A Case Study of Business Administration in Iran," (Unpublished), (Tehran: n.d.), p. 2.

[45] According to Sherkat, *op. cit.,* p. 15.

[46] Despite a general increase in real wages during the past 15 years, the average level of wages paid to industrial workers is inadequate to cover the minimum requirements of a worker and his family, as determined by a Ministry of Labor study in 1964. See Akbar Bigdeli, "Investigation of the Wage and Salary Situation of the Economically-Active Population of Iran," (in

In an attempt to improve the financial incentive of the industrial workforce to higher levels of productivity (as well as to improve its income situation), the Iranian government introduced a profit sharing scheme (which was issued as a decree in January 1963) requiring all industrial employers to conclude collective agreements with their workers based on either productivity increases, savings in costs, reductions in wastage, or share in increased net profits (with individual shares to be based on a combination of length of service and wage being paid.)[51] By January 1969, the Ministry of Labor claimed that some 1,440 such agreements were in force (affecting 126,458 workers), with most based on productivity increase arrangements.[52] However, many employers report no success in increasing productivity with their (or their own earlier) schemes,

---

Farsi), in Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, General Department of Manpower Studies and Statistics, *Investigations of Manpower Problems* (in *Farsi*), Volume Two Tehran: 1344), pp. 1393-1431.

[47] In 1965 it was noted that the poor coloring and viewing of textiles was due to the accidental mixing of colors, the result of workmen falling asleep on duty or being unable to concentrate, occasioned by long hours of work. (*Kayhan International*, July 5, 1965). Many textile operatives work twelve hour shifts. In 1964 the average work week for factory workers was 55.6 hours. (Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, General Department of Manpower Studies and Statistics, *Statistics of Workplaces and Engaged Persons of the Country: Fall 1343*, (in *Farsi*), (Tehran: n.d.), Table 3-8, p. 65.

[48] The 1963 sample survey of Tehran factory workers indicated that 68.3 per cent had been born in villages. See Université de Téhéran, Institut d'Etudes et de Recherches Sociales, Groupe d'Etudes Sociologiques, "Origine des Ouvriers de Téhéran," (Unpublished-Roneo), (Téhéran: Août 1965), p. 9.

[49] See, for example, A'azam, *op. cit.*, p. 19, and J. O. Marsland, "The Esfahan Textile Industry," *op. cit.*, p. 14, and "The Iranian Textile Industry," (Unpublished-Roneo), (Tehran: UNTAO, June 1960), p. 25.

[50] This thesis has been developed by the French sociologist Paul Vieille after years of research in Iran. See P. Vieille and M. Haghcheno, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-12.

[51] See "Profit-Sharing Decree for Workers of Industrial and Manufacturing Establishments," *Bank Markazi Iran Bulletin*, Vol. 2, No. 8, July 1963, pp. 222-224.

[52] *Kayhan International*, January 26, 1969 and *Iran Almanac and Book of Facts 1967*, (Tehran: Echo of Iran, 1967), pp. 511-12.

allegedly because their workers do not relate the requirement for increased efforts on their part to payment of bonuses.[53]

Summary and Conclusions

During the Second and Third Development Plan periods (1955-1968), the Iranian government has emphasized industrialization as the main means by which to effect maximum rates of growth of the Iranian economy. In this policy, it has been largely successful, with annual average rates of growth in manufacturing (about nine per cent) ahead of those of other major sectors of the economy and of manufacturing in most other developing countries. However, this growth rate has been achieved mainly through considerable additional input of resources, including capital equipment and labor, rather than through increased production per worker. Furthermore, the gains in average labor productivity recorded over this period mainly reflect installation of more capital equipment per worker, considerable work reorganization, and improved supervision, with little due to improvement in worker efficiency. Increases in labor productivity traceable to improved quality of the workforce have been hindered by the persistence of traditional irrational methods of worker selection, lack of and/or ineffectiveness of skill training programs, and inadequacy of social and financial worker incentives.

Poor performance of the industrial workforce is most typical of those factories under the control of traditional management. The owner-managers of these factories are usually former bazaar merchants who regard factory operations as "merely uninteresting preliminaries to sale of the product" in pursuing their traditional interest of quick turnover at high margins.[54] With little concern for questions of productivity and efficiency, and holding traditional attitudes towards the value of labor (including a failure to acknowledge the existence of skill differences), most of these employers have discounted their real skill needs and recruited rural-origin labor willing to work for low wages but with little capacity for industrial work, ignored the need for any genuine in-service skill training, and utilized their inadequately qualified workforces inefficiently and wastefully in largely unsupervised operations.

However, even the better managed factories have experienced difficulties in recruiting a qualified workforce in light of the shortages of skilled applicants.

---

[53] Based on views of managers discussing this point with the writer during 1966-67. An American labor expert has anticipated the same difficulty with implementation of the law. (See Delaney, *op. cit.*, p. 38.) Even when bonuses are actually paid, they may not really reflect an increase in worker productivity (or cost reduction or share of net profit increase), however, but rather only arbitrary payments of private employers reluctant to divulge their true production and earnings situation to the Ministry of Labor (as required by the law), but also sensitive to the political significance of the reform.

[54] As characterized by Richard Elliot Benedick, in his *Industrial Finance in Iran*, (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 37.

From both the quantitative and qualitative standpoints, the pre-employment vocational training system favored by the Iranian government as the means by which to produce industrial skills has proved ineffective in meeting the requirements of these factories. On the other hand, the efforts of some industrial managers to introduce in-service training schemes in their factories have often been frustrated by the poor results gained in terms of the high costs incurred.

Per worker output in industry is expected to continue to rise at a significant rate during the Fourth Development Plan period (March 1968-March 1973)[55] as the result of the interaction of all those factors recognized here as influencing productivity. The trend towards increasing capital intensity of industry—as occasioned by the shift to the heavy industry phase of Iran's industrialization, use of the latest technology of the West in newly established factories, and the installation of more automatic machinery in existing factories—is steadily growing, while modernization schemes involving considerable work reorganization are being implemented throughout the industrial sector. The quality of the workforce should also be improved as a result of the spread of better selection, training and employment practices in manufacturing industry through the growing relative importance of newer, well run factories and those older ones whose management has been turned over to a younger, better educated class of industrial managers.

However, the key question regarding the possibility for significantly improved quality and performance of the industrial labor force is whether conditions can be created that will stimulate the growth of a supply of well trained and motivated workers adequate to meet the rapidly rising demand by industry (replacements plus additional new workers) for such manpower in the coming years. The government has recently begun implementing a plan to overhaul the existing educational system in order to guide greatly increased numbers of youth into vocational and technical training,[56] but the success of this revolutionary plan will depend on the provision of adequate incentives for youth to follow this course of action, a factor that has not yet been considered in the government's planning. In the first instance, the earnings of skilled industrial workers and technicians relative to those of general white collar workers must be upgraded;

---

[55] Average output per worker in "industry" (manufacturing, mining, construction, the oil industry and electricity) is projected as rising from Rls. 138,100 in 1968 to Rls. 213,500 in 1973, or at an average annual compound rate of 9.1 per cent. (As calculated from data of employment and output of Tables 2a and 4, pp. 44 and 69, of Plan Organization, *Fourth National Development Plan, 1968-1972* (Tehran: 1968).)

[56] Following completion of the first five years of primary education, students will enter a three year academic guidance course, beginning during the 1968-69 school year, in which they will be introduced to technical and vocational subjects. Graduates of this guidance course will then commence four year secondary school courses in either theoretical academic subjects, combined theoretical-vocational subjects, or vocational training. It is anticipated that at the end of the Fourth Plan period, of the total number of secondary school students, 376,000 will be in academic courses, 80,000 in combined theoretical-vocational courses, and 50,000 in vocational courses. (*Ibid.*, pp. 264-266).

LEBANON'S FINANCIAL CRISIS IN 1966: A SYSTEMIC APPROACH

Emile Ghattas

THE FINANCIAL events of 1966 marked a turning point in the history of the banking industry in Lebanon. While the smaller scale events that took place in the preceding decade had induced transition into a conceptual orthodoxy in the management of money, culminating in the promulgation of the new Code for Money and Credit, the 1966 events caused a more rigorous revision of the Lebanese banking ideology. This revision left a permanent effect on the monetary and banking organization of the country, and set up new trends in banking control the reversal of which will be very unlikely in the future no matter how strong the nostalgia to the liberal past might be.

Much of the literature on the financial events of 1966 was focused on the casualties, or victims, of those events, *i.e.* the banking organizations whose failure or difficulties were enhanced by the disturbances of that year. Our purpose in this paper, however, is to study the behavior of the banking system as a whole, and its aggregate reaction to the disrupting events of 1966. Thus, our analysis will follow a systemic approach, taking into account the background of the system which is characterized by a duality of traditional liberalism and a new orthodoxy introduced by the recent monetary code.

The International Aspect

The financial crisis in the fall of 1966 was international in scope, as it hit largely the industrial countries of Western Europe and the United States. It was only natural for Lebanon, itself a regional financial center with direct and strong ties with Western financial markets, to be affected by this crisis. The impact of the crisis was limited and manageable in the Western countries due to their well organized and mature monetary institutions with highly effective monetary controls suited for defensive and offensive strategies. In Lebanon, however, the monetary setup was far from capable of resisting the storm. The impact was dramatic and almost catastrophic.

△ EMILE GHATTAS is a member of the department of business administration of the American University of Beirut.

In accounting for this crisis, reference should be made to two basic factors: (1) the restrictions on foreign payments adopted by the United States and England in 1964, 1965 and 1966 for correcting the deficitory situation in their balance of payments, and (2) the measures adopted by the United States monetary authorities for curbing the inflationary tendencies in 1965 and 1966 which threatened local output and stability, aggravating at the same time the foreign payments position of the country.

The United States restrictions on external payments were initiated by the Equalization Tax on foreign investment introduced in 1963, which was followed by a set of "voluntary measures" in 1965 solicited from American business for the purpose of checking the outflow of US dollars. The new policy was formulated in "guidelines" for banks, non-bank financial institutions, and non-financial business in international operations, putting limits to the expenditure of US funds abroad. Similar, and even stricter and broader, measures were adopted by monetary authorities in the United Kingdom for the same objective.[1] The effect of these measures was that they induced US firms in international business to borrow abroad, particularly in the European market, and the British firms to look for funds outside the sterling area. Thus, the mounting demand for dollar and sterling balances squeezed the Eurodollar and the Euro-sterling markets, stepping up interest rates on three-month maturity money to peaks of seven and eight per cent respectively in the fall of 1966.

The effects of the US and UK corrective measures were greatly intensified by the domestic attempts of the US to curb a heated inflation after a boom of about five years. Competition among banks for available funds drove US interest rates in the second half of 1966 to record peaks never reached since the early 1920s. On the European scene, monetary tension was enhanced by a chain of increases in bank rates effected in 1966 by the central banks of Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, England and Switzerland.

The Impact on Lebanon

The international liquidity squeeze, as might be expected, should have had an enormous effect on Lebanon owing to the free channels which connect the Lebanese money market with those of Western Europe and the United States. Under the prevailing free exchange system, Lebanese banks were able to shift funds heavily from the local market to external markets in order to benefit from the higher interest rates and yields abroad. This shift was inevitable when such a rise in interest rates could not be induced in the local market and as the Central Bank's discount rate did not respond to changes effected by the majority of the leading central banks in Europe.

---

[1] For a survey of these measures see: International Monetary Fund, *Report on Exchange Restrictions* (Washington, D. C.) for the years 1965, 1966 and 1967.

Table I below demonstrates this shift to foreign investment which took place between 1965 and the third quarter of 1966. As seen in the Table, a sudden rise in the banks' foreign assets occurred in the last quarter of 1965, jumping from £L 1,452 million in September 1965, to £L 1,848 in December of the same year. A slightly lower level was maintained throughout the first six months of 1966, after which rapid climbing was resumed from £L 1,781 million in June to £L 1,882 million in July, to a peak of £L 1,907 million in August followed by a decline to £L 1,884 million in September. The increase between September 1965 and September 1966 was in the order of 30 per cent, representing an overall increment of £L 432 million in the banks' foreign assets. In a parallel movement, foreign liabilities, consisting mainly of non-resident deposits (and including, owing to statistical inaccuracies, some resident foreign currency deposits), increased suddenly in the last quarter of 1965, and kept fluctuating gently in the first nine months of 1966 with a declining trend. While this decline reflects a slowdown in the inflow of short term capital, and, to some extent, a shift of foreign short term investors from the Lebanese market to outside markets, it shows at the same time that this shift was not drastic to the extent of having contributed heavily to the liquidity crisis which followed.

TABLE I *Lebanon: Commercial Banks' Foreign Assets and Liabilities*
1965-September 1966
(£L million)

Year (End of period)	Foreign Assets	Foreign Liabilities	Net Foreign Assets
1965 (quarters)			
I	1413	888	525
II	1376	846	530
III	1452	897	555
IV	1848	1156	692
1966			
January	1774	1098	676
February	1794	1110	684
March	1690	1027	663
April	1725	1044	681
May	1771	1055	716
June	1781	997	784
July	1882	1049	833
August	1907	1035	872
September	1884	1000	884

Source: *International Financial Statistics.*

The apparent clarity in Table I is obscured by statistical inaccuracies resulting from confusing resident with non-resident deposits in local and foreign currencies. Although the Central Bank has attempted since 1964 to organize deposit liabilities into resident and non-resident elements, individual banks have been unable to report their liabilities in clearly and consistently defined resident and non-resident accounts. Part of the difficulty has arisen from the flexible, and even vague, definition of resident and non-resident accounts adopted in Lebanese banking statistics. Thus, Foreign Liabilities in Table I are overstated by the inclusion of some resident accounts which should have been included in the domestic liabilities of the banking system; on the other hand, they are understated by the exclusion of certain non-resident elements which have been reported under domestic liabilities.

The above confusion, however, does not affect the reported foreign assets of commercial banks. This is due to the fact that reported foreign assets represent an aggregate of all of the banks' holdings in foreign currencies regardless of their liabilities to non-residents or to resident foreign currency depositors. Net foreign assets, therefore, should be affected by the residence confusion, and hence weakened as an indicator of flow of funds from Lebanon. Being the difference between foreign assets and foreign liabilities, net foreign assets should have been inflated or deflated according to whether foreign liabilities have been ultimately understated or overstated as a result of the inclusion-exclusion process pointed to above. One might wonder whether this inclusion-exclusion process has left foreign liabilities neutral, *i.e.* exactly what they should have been on the assumption that aggregate inclusion of resident liabilities is offset by an equal exclusion of non-resident liabilities. While this hypothesis could be true, there is no statistical evidence to prove it.

It is of importance to point out, in this connection, the rôle of Lebanese residents in activating the flow of funds from Lebanon. Attracted by higher interest rates on foreign currency deposits, resident depositors contributed to the shift of funds to outside markets by heavy conversions of local currency funds into foreign currency deposits. These conversions put more pressure on local banks to increase their purchases of foreign funds in order to cover their increased liabilities in foreign currency, thus playing the Lebanese banker's traditional rôle of intermediating between local investors and foreign markets. Conversion was also given impetus by a more sophisticated group of resident depositors who shifted Lebanese currency funds from local banks and branches—or through direct purchases of foreign currency funds from local exchange dealers—to foreign banks for better placement terms. Funds shifted in this manner do not appear in the foreign accounts released by Lebanon, which implies that the reported foreign assets of the private sector are understated to an unknown extent. This factor adds a further inaccuracy to net foreign assets as an indicator of movement of funds.

As seen in Table I, net foreign assets grew steadily throughout the period, rising from £L 555 million in September 1965, to a peak of £L 884 million in September 1966, with an increase of £L 329 million, or 59 per cent, against an increase of 35 per cent from September 1964 to September 1965.[2] Despite the inaccuracies involved and the absence of data for direct investment abroad by residents, these figures indicate that a heavy shift of funds into foreign markets took place at a time when the demand for money, particularly for the reserve currencies (the US dollar and sterling) was exceptionally tense, with the interest rates reaching record heights as seen previously. These funds were shifted primarily to Eurodollar and Euro-sterling placements, and, to some extent, to London and US markets.

The Financing of Foreign Investment

Another point of importance is the financing of these heavy investments abroad, and the effects of the financing methods used on the general liquidity of the banking system. One can easily dismiss the possibility that financing of these investments was done through additions to the banks' capital since no significant additions were made throughout the period. The small variations noticed in the aggregate capital of banks during the period[3] were mainly adjustments for fulfilling the legal minimum capital requirement. It is also seen in Table II below that the indebtedness of the commercial banks to the Central Bank declined in 1966 below its level in the second half of 1965, which indicates that banks did not finance their excessive investment abroad through increased borrowing of reserves from the Central Bank.

On the other hand, the remaining three series in Table II show an extremely significant pattern. Bank reserves, *i.e.* the high-powered money of the system consisting of currency in vault plus the banks' deposits at the Central Bank, show a declining trend from May to September, 1966. The decline, which was in small amounts, does not account directly for the financing of an expanded investment abroad; it is rather an index, or a resultant, of the expansive forces which took place over the period, including mainly the massive expansion of investment abroad.

The remaining two series, *i.e.* total cash assets and inter-bank deposits, indicate a direct source of financing the rapid increase in foreign investment. Under total cash assets ("Cash and with Banks" in Lebanese statistics) fall mainly currency in vault, deposits with the Central Bank, and demand deposits with resident and non-resident banks in local and foreign currencies. Since bank reserves, *i.e.* currency in vault and deposits at the Central Bank, declined only moderately as shown in Table II, the third item, which is demand deposits with other banks, must be the part which fell drastically during the shift to foreign investment. It is more likely that balances in Lebanese currency declined more rapidly than those in foreign currency, depending on the extent to which banks reduced the level of foreign currency demand balances in favor of longer term foreign investments.

---

[2] For net foreign assets of September 1964 see: *International Financial Statistics.*

[3] See: Lebanon, *Bulletin Statistique Mensuel.*

TABLE II *Lebanon: Banks' Cash Assets, Inter-Bank Deposits, and Central Bank Claims on Commercial Banks 1965-September 1966*
(£L million)

Year (End of period)	Bank Reserves	Total Cash Assets	Inter-Bank Deposits	Central Bank Claims on Commercial Banks
1965 (quarters)				
I	121	1162	1039	12
II	102	1103	977	14
III	88	1215	1133	29
IV	108	1354	1433	24
1966				
January	122	1241	1381	21
February	120	1017	1343	21
March	113	808	1218	20
April	126	833	1281	19
May	136	917	1253	17
June	121	950	1250	15
July	107	907	1247	15
August	111	881	1178	16
September	104	838	1144	17

Source: *International Financial Statistics* for Bank Reserves and Central Bank Claims on Commercial Banks, and Lebanon, *Bulletin Statistique Mensuel* for Total Cash Assets and Inter-Bank Deposits.

Another indication of the liquidation of inter-bank deposits during the expansion is reflected in the remaining series falling under Inter-Bank Deposits. This series consists of a wide variety of items comprising inter-bank demand deposits with resident and non-resident banks, time deposits of different maturities, and inter-bank loans including those from the Central Bank. The overall decline in this series from December 1965 to September 1966, as seen in Table II, was much less than in the Total Cash Assets series for the same period, namely, £L 289 million in the former series against £L 516 million in the latter. The reason for this unequal fall is that the decline in the Total Cash Assets series is an aggregate decline weighted heavily by the liquidation of sizeable portions of inter-bank demand deposits along with reserves and possibly foreign currency demand balances, whereas the decline in the Inter-Bank Deposit series is net. More precisely, while the decline in inter-bank demand deposits in Lebanese currency is the same in the two series (being counted twice), other items in the Inter-Bank Deposits series should have moved in the opposite direction, *e.g.* time deposits in foreign currency and possibly inter-bank loans might have increased so that the net decrease was less than that in the former case.

The above analysis leads to the conclusion that the abnormal expansion in investment abroad was financed mainly through a wide liquidation of inter-bank deposits in the Lebanese banking system. Inter-bank deposits may be used to transfer foreign currency deposits among banks, in which case the total foreign holdings of banks would not be changed, or to buy inflows of foreign currency to the country from non-bank sellers which would increase the foreign assets of the system. In both types of transactions, inter-bank deposits in the same amounts would be extinguished. It is to be noted here that the liquidation of one inter-bank deposit may lead to a chain liquidation of inter-bank deposits. This is due to the fact that a portion of the system's inter-bank deposits is created by the mere transfer of funds among banks, and the withdrawal of any of these deposits by an individual bank would lead to a series of inter-bank deposit withdrawals by other banks.[4]

The presence of such created inter-bank deposits explains the large gap between the increase in net foreign assets between December 1965 and September 1966, and the decline in the total cash assets—being predominantly inter-bank deposits—for the same period. As seen in Tables I and II, the rise in the former series was £L 192 million, while the decline in the latter was £L 516 million, which reveals a chain liquidation of created inter-bank deposits. On the other hand, the rise in demand and time deposits by £L 64 million and £L 470 million respectively in the same period (Table III) leaves room to believe that another portion of inter-bank deposits was extinguished in favor of financing a rising level of non-inter-bank demand and time deposits, though many other factors should have contributed to the growth of these deposits.

---

[4] Thus, after bank A, for instance, had made a deposit with bank B, the latter might keep a portion as reserve and deposit the rest with bank C which in turn might, after deducting a cash reserve, deposit the rest with bank D creating thereby another deposit, and so forth. This is a similar process to deposit creation through credit expansion by the banking system, with a theoretical limiting expansion coefficient of its own. Now, when bank A withdraws its deposit from bank B in order to correct some deficiency in its reserves, bank B would probably call its deposit from bank C for the same purpose, which in turn would induce the latter to do the same, and hence a chain liquidation which may extinguish many inter-bank deposits.

TABLE III *Lebanon: Bank Reserves, Demand Deposits, and Time Deposits 1965-September 1966*
(£L million)

Year (End of period)	Bank Reserves	Demand Deposits	Ratio of Reserves to Demand Deposits	Time Deposits	Ratio of Reserves to Time Deposits
1965 (quarters)					
I	121	922	.13	1390	.09
II	101	940	.11	1443	.07
III	88	945	.09	1571	.06
IV	108	962	.11	1705	.06
1966					
January	122	979	.12	1785	.07
February	120	967	.12	1795	.07
March	113	981	.11	1796	.06
April	126	995	.13	1858	.07
May	136	1015	.13	1918	.07
June	121	1031	.12	1998	.06
July	107	1046	.10	2036	.05
August	111	1023	.11	2135	.05
September	104	1026	.10	2175	.05

Source: *International Financial Statistics.*

Table IV below shows that the abnormal shift of resources to foreign investment was accompanied by a steady rise in commercial credit, which induced, among other things, a steady rise in the money supply and quasi-money (especially the time deposits component). The ability of the banking system to sustain a rising level of commercial credit was greatly enhanced, as stated above, by the liquidation process of inter-bank deposits which meant, ultimately, a partial extinguishing of inter-bank deposits in favor of the creation of non-inter-bank deposits through credit expansion. It can be seen now that the strain on the system proceeding from the heavy shift to foreign investment, the expansion of commercial credit and the wide liquidation of inter-bank deposits left a resultant drain on the system's reserves in high-powered money. Owing to a traditionally liberal and flexible attitude toward reserves, and in the absence of defined legal reserve ratios, these reserves were allowed to drop, as under the BSL (Banque de Syrie et du Liban) régime in similar situations, to lower levels in order to sustain the expansive pressures on the economy.

TABLE IV *Lebanon: Credit to Private Sector, Money and Quasi-Money*
1965-September 1966
(£L million)

Year (End of period)	Claims on Private Sector	Money[a]	Quasi-Money[b]
1965 (quarters)			
I	2007	1417	1390
II	2074	1458	1444
III	2199	1487	1571
IV	2310	1510	1706
1966			
January	2354	1510	1787
February	2358	1495	1796
March	2410	1529	1797
April	2471	1527	1858
May	2502	1543	1919
June	2577	1572	1998
July	2602	1591	2036
August	2623	1582	2136
September	2708	1602	2176

[a] Currency outside banks plus demand deposits.
[b] Time and saving deposits plus foreign currency deposits (to residents).

Source: *International Financial Statistics.*

Liquidity and Safety

The factor to be assessed now is the extent to which the liquidity, and hence the safety, of the banking system was impaired due to the expansive pressures. As seen in Table III, bank reserves in high-powered money declined almost steadily between May and September 1966 by about 24 per cent. Similarly the ratio of reserves to demand deposits declined steadily between the two months, from a peak of 13 per cent in May, to a low of 10 per cent in September, or a fall of 23 per cent. However, the September ratio was not an exceptionally low one, and at least one lower level was reached in 1965. Furthermore, a sharper decline is noticed in the reserve ratio to time deposits (Table III), from a peak of seven per cent in May to a low of five per cent in September 1966, or a fall of about 29 per cent. This sharper decline is due to the rapid rise in the saving accounts component of time deposits as revealed in Lebanese statistics for the period under study (from £L 1,163 million in September 1965, to £L 1,719 million in September 1966, including non-resident saving accounts and foreign currency accounts).[5]

The apparently small changes in bank reserves, however, are greatly magnified through the multiple action of the coefficient of monetary expansion. Thus, at the May 1966 peak, bank reserves amounted to £L 136 million against £L 1,015 million of demand deposits, with a reserve to demand deposit ratio of 0.13 (Table III). If the banking system were to keep the same reserve ratio in the September 1966 low, total demand deposits carried at the end of this month should have been only £L 800 million ($\frac{104}{0.13} = 800$) against £L 1,026 million of demand deposits carried at the end of September. This means that the system created an additional burden on its reserves, or liquidity, equivalent to £L 226 million (£L 1,026 million–£L 800 million) between May and September 1966. Viewed from another angle, were the system to attain the demand deposit level reached in September 1966 (£L 1,026 million) without any additional strain on its liquidity relative to the May position, its reserves at the end of September should have been maintained at £L 133 million (£L 1,026 million x 0.13) instead of £L 104 million (Table III). Thus, a reserve decline of £L 29 million (£L 133 million–£L 104 million) resulted between May and September because of the system's excessive expansion of foreign investment and the persistent rise in its credit facilities.

The same analysis can be applied to the relationship between bank reserves and time deposits (Table III). The result is that only £L 1,486 million of time deposits should have been held in September 1966 with the available reserves and at a reserve ratio of seven per cent, and hence, an excess of £L 689 million of time deposits; or, a reserve level of £L 152 million should have been maintained against the actual level of time deposits at the end of September, and hence, a reserve deficiency of £L 48 million. The reserve decline in this case becomes more critical when we recall that a large portion of time deposits consists of saving deposits which are very close to demand deposits in their almost immediate claim on cash, while the timed portion (withdrawable at a fixed date or subject to prior notice) can find additional support in the banks' non-cash current resources.

While the above analysis reflects the changes in the overall liquidity of the banking system, the changes in the banks' total cash assets provides us with a significant indicator of the average liquidity per bank throughout the period. The total cash resources, which include mainly reserves in high-powered money, inter-bank deposits, and foreign exchange resources available on demand, cannot be taken as a measure of the system's overall liquidity. The inter-bank deposit element tends to cancel itself in a chain liquidation process, as explained previously, following a run on the system from the non-bank public or from the system itself. The foreign exchange element is not often available for immediate payments in the local currency. However, the total cash resources element is a good measure of the individual bank's liquidity since the inter-bank deposit component represents to the individual bank a real source of liquidity, assuming a stable level of confidence. Thus, the decline in the system's total cash assets reflects mainly on the liquidity of the average bank rather than on that of the system as a whole.

---

[5] *Ibid.*

As a result of expansive operations, as explained previously, there had been a sharp decline in the banking system's total cash assets, from a peak of £L 1,354 million in December 1965, to a low of £L 838 million in September 1966 (Table II), or a fall of 42 per cent. The ratio of these cash resources to total demand or quasi-demand deposit liability had also fallen sharply during the same period. By the latter type of deposit liability is meant total saving accounts and demand deposits in local and foreign currency, including resident and non-resident deposits. This total rose from £L 2,598 million in December 1965 to £L 3,020 million in September 1966.[6] In contrast, the ratio of total cash resources to total demand and quasi-demand deposit liability dropped from 52 per cent in December 1965 to 28 per cent in September 1966, and hence, a drastic decline in liquidity per average bank.

The belief that bank reserves, and reserve ratios, are more of a tool of monetary policy than a safety cover for the system, assumes a measure, such as deposit insurance, which prevents collective runs on the banking system, and that in case such runs do occur, no fractional reserve ratio can provide 100 per cent liquidity. In the absence of measures to prevent runs, such as was the case in Lebanon, the degree of exposure of the average bank to liquidity problems or the chances of liquidity casualties in the whole system, mark a significant measure of the system's safety.

The degree of exposure in an individual bank depends largely on the type of distribution its demand liabilities take. A more or less homogeneous distribution of demand deposits with small deviations, and hence a small standard deviation, from the mean, presents a high degree of certainty to the bank and more predictability about the amount of reserves needed for daily withdrawals. On the other hand, a heterogeneous distribution of demand deposits with a large standard deviation around the mean, reveals a high degree of uncertainty with respect to the amounts withdrawn, and hence requires a higher level of reserves in order to cover the risk of sudden large withdrawals. We may think of the minimum needed cash reserves of a bank as the expected value of the various levels reached by these reserves over a sufficiently long period of time as a result of withdrawals and additions to them. Thus, while two banks may maintain the same reserve ratio at a given time, the one with a more spread out distribution of demand deposits would be in a more risky position, and thus should raise its reserve ratio above the other bank's ratio in order to cover a higher risk of uncertainty. Of course, the probability of withdrawal of large deposits and, therefore, the pattern of deposit-withdrawal probability distribution relevant to the particular bank, should be given its proper weight when designing a safer reserve ratio.

---

[6] *Ibid.*

Furthermore, a bank may be considered in an optimal safety position if it can redeem its deposit withdrawals smoothly from its pool of cash resources, maintaining, after moderate deviations, a constant long run reserve ratio to demand deposits (or, in general, to commitments close in nature to demand deposits), and a planned level of borrowing from the Central Bank. A rush, or frequent rushes, to the Central Bank or to other banks for funds to meet unexpected withdrawals raise suspicions about that bank and invite runs on it. When the run signal is given by one bank, the run fever spreads to the other banks, which threatens the whole system with collapse unless extraordinary measures are taken to stop the fire. Thus, it is the immunity of the individual average bank against liquidity problems and the remote chances of bank casualties, more than the overall liquidity of the system, which determine the safety of the system as a whole, especially in the absence of measures to protect banks from the public's runs. The above analysis applies very closely to the banking situation in Lebanon in October 1966, and sets forth the background which helped greatly in kindling the liquidity crisis of that month.

The Aftermath of the Crisis

Milestones in the monetary history of many countries are known to have been the product of major financial crises. This is true with respect to the events which followed the 1966 crisis in Lebanon resulting in a significant revision of the banking and monetary philosophy of the country.

The well-known case of Intra Bank, the once prominent Lebanese bank which collapsed in the fall of 1966, created much pressure on the government to act in order to face the short term consequences of the disaster and to provide for the long term safety and stability of the system. The short term aspects were handled successfully by the government by putting under the disposal of the banking system, excluding Intra Bank, extraordinary credit facilities under the slogan that no bank should be left to fail because of the panic. The Central Bank was entrusted with executing this policy through its means. The handling of Intra's case required a great deal of manipulation, both legal and organizational. While the studies made by specialized committees indicated that the bank suffered from a sizeable deficit, the monetary authorities avoided its liquidation under the bankruptcy laws of the country since that would have meant widespread failures and unpredictable financial and social consequences. A settlement was finally accepted by the concerned parties based on converting the Intra complex into an investment company to be formed from the depositors[7] and other creditors of the banks as shareholders, and to have as an objective the management of Intra's assets. The new company is to hold, as its subsidiary, a rather small bank which carries the name of Intra, and which was designed to handle the financial operations of the company along with other banking activities.

The government's second task was to provide for the long range safety of the system, and the attempts made in this direction opened what may be truly called a new banking era in the country. The reform, which came through the legislation vehicle, focused on three basic issues:

(1) The handling of banks that suspend payments because of financial difficulties. The lessons from the Intra case taught that the bankruptcy of a bank is much more disastrous than that of a firm in a non-banking business. Thus, banks facing financial difficulties should receive special treatment, and their liquidation, should it become inevitable, must be done smoothly.

(2) The institution of special supervisory and safety bodies connected in one way or another with the Central Bank. Among these bodies is a Commission for Banks' Supervision whose function is to supervise individual banks and audit the periodic data they provide to the Central Bank. A second body, the Higher Banking Commission, was instituted to discipline banks which violate the monetary and banking laws of the country. This body was given a special function (which ended on December 31, 1968) of "cleansing" the banking system by spotting "ailing" banks, dissolving their owner firms, and turning over their assets and liabilities to a special administration in the semi-public Bank of Agricultural, Industrial, and Real Estate Credit (BAIRC). The latter administration would devise some settlement for the bank or liquidate it. The screening by this Commission resulted in weeding out 15 banks, ten of which were turned over to the special administration at BAIRC and the remaining five, following a mutual agreement, undertook a self-liquidation process. With six more banks disappearing because of merger or voluntary self-liquidation, the number of chartered banks dropped from 94 to 73, the ten banks in the custody of BAIRC being actually in the process of liquidation.

A third body, the National Deposit Insurance Corporation, was instituted to insure deposits not exceeding £L 15,000 in a single bank, to be financed jointly by the banking system and the government. The organizational setup of this body has not yet been established, though the insurance coverage was raised in February 1970 to a deposit ceiling of £L 30,000.

---

[7] After redeeming in cash 50 per cent of the deposits below £L 250,000.

(3) Amending the Code for Money and Credit in many respects, some with the objective of fostering safety in the banking system and others for developing the system to respond to the emerging needs of the country. Safety amendments focused mainly on the banks' capital structure and their investments, while modernization amendments included such important subjects as involving the banking system in the new public debt, regulating the flow of banking funds to semi-public companies, and encouraging bank mergers, among others.

The new banking and monetary era, which was hastened by the 1966 crisis, still has to tackle important problems, among which the following two should receive priority: The first is persistent outflow of funds to Western markets. This movement seems to have lost its short term pattern, and has been enhanced by the same factors mentioned in the preceding discussion, with political tension in the area giving it an increased momentum. The traditional tool of intervention in such cases, namely, the open market operations on the dollar, has had little effect on halting the downward pressure on the Lebanese pound caused by the outflow of funds. This is due to the limited amount of dollars the Central Bank can afford to sell in the face of a mounting demand for foreign funds. In 1969, the Central Bank resorted to a more effective strategy, that of activating, for the first time, the provision of the monetary code which requires a legal cash reserve ratio to be implemented gradually at the discretion of the monetary authority. A cash reserve ratio requirement of five per cent (to total bank liabilities excluding inter-bank deposits) was announced by the middle of 1969 and calmed down the pressure significantly. Its implementation came in two installments of 2.5 per cent each, the first effected in July and the second in December 1969.

The second problem is the tight money situation in the local market which has resulted from several factors. Most important among these are the incompetence of local interest rates to match foreign yields, the cautiousness of banks in view of political difficulties in the area, and, to some extent, the fears from new increases in the cash reserve ratio to which the Central Bank might resort. In consequence, monetary policy finds itself in the hard dilemma of combating the outflow of funds without strangling the local market. Thus, much more creativity is required and more forces should be called upon to play supporting roles, including an effectively synchronized fiscal policy.

AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES AND TUNISIAN DEVELOPMENT

John L. Simmons

Part II

THE BEST INDICATION of the net results of 15 years experience of cooperative farms was given by the Tunisian government on September 2, 1969, when it virtually abandoned them. The *unités* still remained on the ex-*colon* land. The political and economic repercussions of the land reform and management policies had become serious enough to provoke a political crisis. It was resolved by restoring private control in the management of agricultural land, and by expelling the second most powerful individual from the government.

The Effects of the Cooperative Program

Most of the small farmers and rural laborers in Tunisia between 1956 and 1970 wondered where the benefits of independence were.[16] Not only were they as poor in 1970 as they had been 15 years earlier, but their real income level had declined and the gap with the urban populations had widened even more rapidly since 1956. The cooperative program showed them that the freedom that came with independence meant the freedom of the new urban élite to restrict the freedom of the rural peasantry. Things had not changed. Only a mixture of the patience born of fatalism, the visible advantage of new schools and a reverence for Bourguiba prevented more marked alienation of the rural population from their society.

A *post mortem* so soon after the September events will be incomplete, but tentative conclusions can be drawn about the general effects of the cooperative program on land tenure, production and rural welfare.

The cooperative process had four major effects on land tenure and management: 1) Land that was previously managed by French and Italian owners was

---

[16] For some of the exceptions, see John L. Simmons, "The Political Economy of Land Use: Tunisian Private Farms," in R. Antoun and H. Illick, eds., *Rural Politics and Social Change in the Middle East*, Indiana University Press, forthcoming.

△ JOHN L. SIMMONS is Lecturer on Economics, Harvard University. He has been a Research Fellow at the Harvard Center for Middle Eastern Studies, and was the field director of the Harvard North Africa Project for 1966-1968. Part I of this article appeared in the Autumn 1970 *MEJ*.

transferred to some form of state management; 2) In the south, the Tunisian government continued French attempts to settle some of the semi-nomadic groups on newly irrigated areas, and thus to create a land-owning peasantry, but by 1962 most of the land was either owned by *commerçants* or operated as state farms: the property owners became laborers on their own land; 3) In the north, small holdings of Tunisian farmers were gradually grouped together into units of production ranging in size from 1000 to 4000 hectares depending on cropping patterns and rainfall; 4) The management of land that was previously under the control of the religious foundation *(habous)* was turned over to the management of the owners, including both private and state. During 1969, the private ex-*habous* land and remaining private lands also came under state management.

As news of the cooperative program spread, farmers began to fear confiscation of their assets. Some farmers began to sell their land. While the large landowners were the usual buyers, Duvignaud reports that for some villages in the southwest, Bedouins were often the purchasers.[17]

The major effect of the agricultural legislation of September and October 1969 was to return the private lands to their owners to manage as they see fit, with the state managing only the land that it originally owned. The pleasure of the owners was immense and accompanied by spontaneous celebrations across the countryside. By July 1970, evidence of new investment and activity, financed by careful savings over the lean years, was clear. But many farmers had no animals or equipment left, and had exhausted their savings. These hailed the return to private farming with less joy. Two things in particular had helped to swell the number of people in this category. First, as shown above, many smaller farmers had sold land to larger farmers before their holdings could be placed in cooperatives. How many did so is unknown, but the result was a distinct increase in the number of landless laborers. Secondly, and more insidiously, management techniques on the smaller parcels of land had changed after cooperatization. Khalil Zamiti has published the results of a survey of farmers in twelve *unités* who were interviewed both before and after September. They indicate that farmers who financed their production requirements before the cooperatives now had to obtain these requirements from the neighboring landlord under the system of *métayage*. For his labor and land, the farmer would keep one-third of the cereals harvest. As one farmer told Zamiti, "The generosity of the big landowner is both the solution to all our problems and a knife held to our throats."[18] One can only hope that the centuries old problems raised by the return to private farming will be met by clear economic policies and immediate action.

---

[17] Jean Duvignaud, *Change at Shebika: A North African Village,* New York: Pantheon, 1970, p. 52.

[18] Khalil Zamiti, "Les obstacles matériels et idéologiques à l'évolution sociale des campagnes tunisiennes," *Revue tunisienne de sciences sociales,* Number 21, Tunis, May 1970, p. 53.

Questions relating to the impact of the cooperatives on production and yields are more difficult to answer. The necessary time series data for a sample of individual farms are not available to either researchers or administrators.[19] The sectoral data for livestock and cereals, therefore, provide the best source of insight into the question.

The same fear of confiscation led farmers either to sell their animals or give them to friends for care before entering a cooperative. National production declined and peasants lost an important source of revenue and food. This loss is a significant indication of the decline in rural welfare. While land transfer data are not available, the numbers of animals show a steady decline since 1960, and a sharp break in 1969. Wholesale meat prices 50 per cent below normal tended to confirm the unusually high rate of sales in 1969. While a number of factors could account for short term variations in livestock numbers, the effect of cooperatization was probably the major factor causing the long term trend.

TABLE IV *Number of Livestock 1956-1969*
(000)

Year	Cattle	Sheep	Goats
1956	491	2891	1241
1960	634	4006	845
1962	480	2684	388
1964	566	3365	475
1968	592	3259	517
1969	245	1447	310

Sources: Service des Statistiques, *Annuaire Statistique de la Tunisie 1956 & 1963;* Institut National de Statistique, Files of the Service des Statistiques Agricoles, typescript, 1970.

Note: The annual figures for 1963-1968 were estimated by multiplying the previous year's total by a guess-estimate of growth. The figures before 1963 and for 1969 were based on the results of field surveys, and are thus more reliable.

Cereals occupy the major proportion of cultivated lands, and also have relatively accurate production figures. Furthermore, the state farms, until January 1969, were mainly concerned with the cereals land rather than tree crops or irrigated areas. Thus one could expect the reform to have an effect on cereals production and particularly yields.

The cereals data in Table V indicate that mean national yields of wheat and barley were virtually unchanged before and after the reforms.[20] The area under cereals had fallen 36 per cent and production, 34 per cent.

---

[19] A number of writers have examined different cooperatives but usually without analyzing the accounts or yields over time. See the publications of CERES, The University of Tunis, for these studies.

[20] While there is a three per cent increase in the combined yield of wheat and barley, given the reporting methods and the small number of years compared, it is not statistically significant.

TABLE V *Cereals Production and Cooperatives*
(1000 *mt* and 1000 *ha*)

	Before Coops. (mean 1953-56)	Maximum Coop. (mean 1966-69)	Change Per cent
Wheat			
Production	494	341	—31
Area	1131	812	—28
Yield	4.4	4.2	— 5
Barley			
Production	147	80	—46
Area	682	352	—48
Yield	2.2	2.3	+ 4
Total Cereals[a]			
Production	641	421	—34
Area	1813	1164	—36
Yield	3.5	3.6	+ 3

Sources: The means were computed from *Annuaire Statistique de la Tunisie 1956,* Tunis, 1951; J. D. Hyslop & R. P. Dahl, "Wheat Production in Tunisia," Tunis: University of Minnesota, 1968; and United States Department of Agriculture, "Tunisia: Agricultural Situation and Policy," Rabat, January 1969.

Notes: a) The value of cereal production was 29 per cent of the total value of agricultural production in 1954-1957. Cereals are more sensitive to changes instituted by governmental reforms than tree crops. Furthermore, except for the reforms of 1969, most of the reform movements affected the areas in which cereals were the principal crop.

The structure of agricultural production, as indicated in Table VI, changed over the period 1957-1969. A decline in the value of cereals production (seven per cent) was made up for by an increase in the value of livestock and tomato production. While it is not within the scope of this paper to seek the reasons for this change, state land management, and the threat of it, had an effect on the structure of production. Ex-landowners sought new sources of income, and unaffected landlords tried to maximize the near term returns from their factors of production since the medium term might, and in fact did, bring their control of their land to an end. The government converted some of the cereal lands to olives and fruit trees during the reform period. Owing to their long gestation, this change would not be indicated when structural change is measured in value terms as it is in the Table.

Have there been benefits to people in the countryside? While some figures are available on employment levels before and during the period of the state farms, they are insufficient to make a statistical comparison. From interviews made on the state farms and in the villages in 1966-1969, and from the production data presented in this paper, I would hypothesize that the level of both agricultural and rural employment measured in man/days *per annum* has probably declined. The immediate reasons are that two of the three main sources of peasant employment and income were no longer directly available. Since they had sold their animals, and their land was no longer theirs to farm, they had only their labor. And not only was this at a wage fixed by the government, but they were also prohibited from seeking work outside of the cooperatives.[21] Increased rates of population growth, continued mechanization and a decline in the numbers employed in the public works program are additional factors.[22]

The *coopérateur* on an average wheat producing *unité* received a wage (not total income) of about 15 dollars a month. As a laborer on a *colon* estate in 1955, his average wage had been no less, in terms of 1969 dollars and making allowances for cost of living increases since. The worker on a state farm was probably therefore no better off, in monetary terms, than he had been before

TABLE VI *Structural Change in Tunisian Agriculture*
(Per cent of total value at constant prices)

	Mean Production			
	1957-1959		1966-1967	
Cereals Total		31.5		24.3[a]
Wheat	24.8		21.4	
Barley	6.7		2.9	
Tree Crops Total		48.3		49.2
Olives	22.2		13.1	
Fruit	13.3		20.2	
Citrus	3.7		4.9	
Wine	6.8		5.0	
Dates	4.4		6.0	
Misc. Total		23.8		32.2
Tomatoes	2.1		5.2	
Milk	11.1		10.3	
Meat	10.6		16.7	
Interaction[c]	— 3.8		— 5.9	
Total Value (%)	100.		100.	
Total Value (million $)[b]	135.		107.8	

Source: USDA, *Indices of Agricultural Production, 1959-68*, Washington, D. C., 1969.

Notes: a) The cereals were calculated on the 1966-69 figures to smooth weather distortions.
b) Constant prices are the 1957-59 average.
c) The interaction is implicit in the original data.

---

[21] For data supporting the hypothesis, see Khalil Zamiti, *op. cit.*

[22] More labor-intensive use of the 10,000 hectares in the Medjerda Valley brought into production during the reforms would be an offsetting factor, but only partially. This offsetting factor, however, cannot be strictly considered an effect of the post-independence land reform process since the decision to irrigate these areas was made in 1947. Other smaller irrigation projects also increased labor use. The Medjerda Valley scheme, however, irrigated an area less than ten per cent of the total under irrigation in the country.

cooperatization. A further word should be said about the *colon* laborers. They were often permitted to have a garden, and could sell the surplus produce. This was usually not allowed on the *unités* in the north.

Has peasant participation in decision making at the local and national level increased because of the cooperative program? Although it is not clear what the baseline level was, I would estimate that some increase may have taken place at the farm level, but not at the national level. Extensive participation, however, was achieved outside the cooperatives in the local social and political organizations. The peasant's bargaining power, in terms of gaining more income, did not improve, although he benefited from the government's extensive rural social investments. In terms of streets, schools and clinics, the towns and villages have been transformed since independence.

If the cooperative program has had a social and psychological impact, then it has probably been through the raising of aspirations during 1956-1963 and their subsequent frustration in varying degrees. It is a fact that the peasants had, and still have, total confidence in President Bourguiba's ability to act in their best interests. When he toured the countryside selling the cooperative program and a better life, they wanted to buy it. But after trying the cooperatives for five years or more, many became discouraged, feeling that Bourguiba's ministers had misapplied his programs. Because of this experience, many peasants have either lost faith in the government's ability to improve individual welfare, or have had confirmed their pessimistic view of city people's ability to help them. For example, the cooperative officials received steady pay, good harvest or bad, while the peasants did not.

The impact of the cooperatives on the economy is a complex and separate topic. One would try to establish rough estimates of the effect of the program on the balance of trade, the earning of foreign exchange, the conservation or wastage of scarce human and natural resources, and the rate of economic growth. For example, the foreign exchange cost of the agricultural development program, 1962-1968, in both hard and soft loans, is close to 200 million dollars.[23] So far there is little evidence that current levels of agricultural production from the improved lands are sufficient even to defray current costs, let alone pay the capital costs. Unless productivity increases quickly, the foreign debt incurred by agriculture will have to be repaid by earnings from tourism and minerals, thus distorting reinvestment patterns in these subsectors and further reducing the nation's ability to create productive capacity.

Comments on the permanent impact of the cooperative program on the society lack supporting evidence. Little, however, seems to have changed. Zghal wrote of the rôle that the poorer peasantry had in promoting the state's intervention in land management: "The public spectacle of the misery of the peasantry lent significant weight to the demands of certain groups of urban social groups (trade unionists, youth, intellectuals) who finally imposed a policy of intervention which was contrary to the immediate interests of a very important group of the middle class."[24] While the cooperative program may have benefited the landless laborers, it had few benefits for the rest of the peasantry.

---

[23] Excluded from this figure is the Medjerda infrastructure paid for with grants before independence. Ministry of Planning, *The Plan 1969-1972,* Tunis, 1969.

The September 1969 reform, however, not only made the landed peasantry happy, but it also blew life back into the expiring landlord class. These five thousand families have shown their power in being able to convince President Bourguiba that it was to the nation's present advantage to end the cooperative program and let them retain their status and property. This success reaffirmed their ability to exert their influence in socialist Tunisia. The about-face in political ideology, or at least its execution,[25] was so complete that the dynamic symbol of Tunisian socialism, the former Minister of Planning, was arrested, tried for treason and sentenced to ten years hard labor.

Was Ben Salah Guilty?

This is a legal, not an economic question, but all the same he was tried essentially for economic crimes—mismanagement of the cooperatives, corruption, and the attempted abolition of the private sector. The general charge was high treason, and the death penalty a possibility.[26] The data presented in the previous sections of the paper indicated that while production of some crops had declined, others had increased. While rural welfare had declined, the cooperatives were but one of several factors. Certainly this was not the significant fall in production experienced in Iraq and Syria under similar conditions of institutional change.[27] Was there mismanagement or corruption which these figures fail to reflect?

In considering the charge of mismanagement, we need to consider several historical facts. We have stated earlier that the objectives for the agricultural sector were set in the ten year plan in 1961, three years before Ben Salah was given, against his desire, the portfolio of agriculture. While these objectives included extensive cooperatization of cultivable and often private land, they did exclude large landowners in the north, and landowners with wells in the center and south. Furthermore, the plan established the minimum size of the cooperatives in the north based on the criterion of efficient mechanization. Thus Ben Salah was neither responsible for originating the cooperative program, nor for establishing the guidelines which fixed the proportions of capital and labor—the major economic factors—before the "management" of these large enterprises actually began. In fact, it was more an administrative than a management function since not only were the economic factors proportioned but the operating procedures were adopted as national laws. These historical facts indicate that Ben Salah neither originated the cooperative program nor had the usual management options open to him.[28]

---

[24] Abdelkader Zghal, "Les effets de la modernisation de l'agriculture sur la stratification sociale dans les campagnes tunisiennes," *Cahiers internationaux de sociologie,* 1963, pp. 201-206.

[25] One official view, claiming consistence on the part of the government, was given by the new Minister of Planning, Abderrazak Rassaa, "Some people have seen in it (the end of the cooperatives) . . . a movement to the right in our general policies. In fact, it is a return to our special Tunisian concept of socialism. . ." The recent decisions "represent neither the rejection of results achieved nor a renunciation of our planning policy." "Report of Proceedings: Consultative Group of Tunisia," October 23-24, 1969. Paris, Annex II, pp. 6, 7, mimeo.

[26] Ben Salah was relieved of his last portfolio, education, in November. He was confined to his house in February. Then in mid-March, he was told he would be granted a teacher's salary and permitted to leave for Sweden or Austria. Several days later, he was arrested and imprisoned. He was tried before a specially constituted tribunal that was open to the press and a limited number of the public from May 19 to May 23. The verdict of 10 years hard labor was given on the 25th of May. Bourguiba returned from a six month absence on the first of June.

[27] John L. Simmons, "Agricultural Development in Iraq: Planning and Management Failures," *The Middle East Journal,* Volume 19, Spring 1965.

Were the cooperatives badly administered, if "mismanagement" is the incorrect term? The deliberate rate of expansion, the absence of a production decline and the pyramid of organizations designed to facilitate production and distribution suggest that in structure and operation, the Tunisian cooperative system was probably among the better Arab programs.

The initial mistake was in the economic and political "reasoning" which developed the Tunisian cooperative model. The Eastern European models for large mechanized farms run by a technical élite for the benefit of the peasants were very attractive. But the Tunisian model was developed at a time when the Eastern European countries were becoming disillusioned with the large, centrally controlled state farms. Arab leaders, however, were anxious to apply socialistic solutions to their many problems and their planners lacked first hand experience with the European model. Now, ten years after the mistake, Tunisia has the dubious honor of being the first Arab country to do away with this unsuccessful model.[29] Even effectively administered by Middle Eastern standards, a poor model cannot produce the desired results.

Could one expect a Minister of the Economy with a technical expertise in teaching secondary school Arabic and administrative experience gained in the politics of a labor union to have the knowledge and judgment to see the weaknesses of the cooperative model as it was being put into practice? Yet one could argue that Ahmed ben Salah did not have to be a cooperative expert or experienced administrator to know that the program was not running well. He certainly had indications, not the least of which were scattered incidents during recent winters of peasants robbing bakeries, planting olive trees with their roots in the air, and demonstrating for work from the *délégués*. If he wasn't able to determine the cause for these incidents, then the necessity of calling out the national guard and of killing several peasants in order to inaugurate a cooperative in Ouardanine should have caused investigations. One could speculate that the ex-teacher may have forgotten that adults cannot be treated like children. He may also have let the dangerous stereotype of the "ignorant peasant" cloud his judgment. The peasant may be ignorant about agricultural plans, but not about farming. Ben Salah would have been well advised in his endless tours of the countryside to have talked frankly with *coopérateurs* selected at random and listened to their grievances in place of some of the monologues with which he favored meetings. But both the desire of his subordinates to please him and a characteristic of his personality may have prevented the truth from reaching him. Bechir ben Yahmed, editor-in-chief of *Jeune Afrique,* recently wrote that Ben Salah was a victim of his "obstinacy": he was determined to carry out his programs. Economists, who could have offered him a range of alternative programs, he especially vilified, accusing them "all of being bookish, knowing the economy without understanding it . . . and worst of all in his eyes, being orthodox."[30] Thus Ben Salah had his weaknesses, but in trying to assess the man, these had to be weighed against his strengths—his dynamism, intelligence and accomplishments. And in President Bourguiba's judgment, this man had merited the increased ministerial responsibilities that he had given him.

---

[28] It is unclear from the court testimony to what extent the plan was written by French technicians and only approved by the various ministries.

[29] One official in the Ministry of Agriculture pointed out to me in July 1970 that the original model had the peasants running the cooperative, with *assistance* from the state. But when the cooperatives got started, his colleagues realized that the peasants were not capable of running such an operation, and that the state would have to take responsibility for their direction.

One can administer without the advice of economists. And if Ben Salah didn't talk to the *coopérateurs* themselves, then the financial accounts of the cooperatives should have alerted him. The accounts, however, didn't exist, at least not in a form which was useful. It was not until late 1968 that even the simplest accounting information was available to guide the administrators. The first results indicated that only 20 per cent of the cooperatives were doing better than breaking even.

But were these results good or bad? The program had only recently started from nothing and had had bad weather. The World Bank, which had made its first loan to cooperatives,[31] the international aid agencies and the major bilateral agencies, including the United States Agency for International Development, were not critical. And most important, the Tunisian Central Bank, the National Agricultural Bank and the Minister for Agriculture all used figures on the results of the cooperatives which showed that they were a success. In January 1969, to inaugurate the final phase of the cooperative program, President Bourguiba cited the past accomplishments of the cooperative program and told the farmers of the Cap Bon and Sahel, whose lands were then being cooperatized, that "in four or five years you will not regret having had confidence in Bourguiba."[32] Ben Salah had national and international support for the cooperative venture.

---

[30] April 21, 1970, Number 485.

[31] The World Bank, "Development Credit Agreement," and "Loan Agreement," February 21, 1967, Washington, D. C.

In short, I would suggest that given the inappropriate model of the cooperative to begin with, and the modest ability of the Tunisian administration to collect and analyze facts, Ahmed ben Salah could not have been guilty of mismanagement. It was an impossible task to begin with; in fact, it is to his credit that yields did not fall after the last *colon* left. One can certainly fault the lack of accurate information and the Minister's failure to obtain it before making decisions. One can also fault him for ignoring the guarded warnings of several members of the financial administrations in 1968, even though they were the first criticisms in seven years. But these criticisms do not indicate that the ex-Minister was guilty of high treason. Probably indicative that his efforts were made in good faith was a statement he made during the last day of the trial: "If I had been aware of one tenth of that which I have just heard today (the personal accounts of *coopérateurs*), I would have been a criminal to continue (the cooperative program)."

Was he guilty of corruption? No. Although evidence was presented that implicated several Governors of the provinces, they were responsible to the Ministry of the Interior, not Planning. Additional evidence indicated that lower officials in the cooperative organization had misused funds, but their misconduct could not be linked to higher officials.

Was he guilty of attempting to abolish the private sector? By June of 1969, he had done just that in agriculture. His defense: He was the one who wrote the economic motion accepted by the party at the Congress of Bizerte that defined the private-cooperative-public division of the economy. "I respected the doctrine of the three divisions of the economy, but I did not think that the three divisions should exist in each sector of the economy; furthermore, it does not prevent the respect of private property within collectivization."[33] Thus he walked through the loophole he left for himself in the motion accepted at the Congress of Bizerte.

What is even more revealing, however, is the tenacity with which he had held onto the idea of private property existing within the cooperative. Legally, the *coopérateurs* retained title to their land when it was in the cooperative. But the title was their only right. They were denied use of the property and could not withdraw it. They were promised benefits in proportion to the amount of land they contributed, but these never came. The retention of the idea of private property was a bluff by which the technician originators convinced the officials that they could have their private cake and eat it collectively. The concept of private and cooperative property was a self-contradiction. And it was evident from the very beginning that the human energy and financial investment that are elicited from the owners of small farms in their attempt to provide for their families' needs would be lost when their land was collectively operated.

---

[32] Speech at El Menzah, Tunis, January 24. The speech summarizes Bourguiba's position on the cooperatives, emphasizing the concept of social property—privately owned, but for social benefit.

[33] This even happened in the United States. In the 1920s, President Coolidge, son of a farmer, did nothing to assist failing agriculture during a period of industrial expansion. But that was the Protestant capitalist ethic of the nation.

All across the Arab world, the same thing happened in the 1960s. Was it ironic that in Tunisia, as elsewhere, it was often the sons of peasants who encouraged and led these programs?[34] When they rejected their rural origins for the opinions of the city, they may have repressed knowledge useful for understanding the people they tried to lead. How else can we explain the lack of psychological understanding with which some leaders have treated the rôle of their population in economic development?

The guilt of Ahmed ben Salah was not the real question for the trial. While President Bourguiba felt there were sound political reasons for holding it, he may have also been seeking answers as to why the wider program of agricultural development, after more than a decade of investment in physical and human capital, was producing such meager results. The trial provided little evidence to aid him. And this paper has concentrated on describing, and only occasionally analyzing, one aspect of agricultural development—the state cooperatives. But these answers will come slowly. The shock of the trial, while scaring some government officials into total inaction, may encourage others to re-examine their methods and programs. And not only in Tunisia.[35]

Conclusion

How does one evaluate a plan for, or supervise the results from, a state farm system of cooperatives? A wide range of possible criteria can be suggested, but when it is time for judgment, these seem inadequate. For planning, cost benefit analysis provides the best analytic framework, but sufficient data are often not available, especially to measure the social benefits. For supervising and controlling capital and income, financial accounts are essential; but in the Tunisian case, these did not exist.

A second problem is what results should one expect and when? In an investment analysis, the accepted periods of gestation and expected income streams would serve to measure and judge the results of building dams and dairies. How long should it take to make investments in a national system of land management? And what should be the character of the income streams in terms of foreign exchange earnings and income distribution? Given the nature of these analytic problems, solutions are not easily suggested. But no judgment that fails to take account of them is likely to be valid.

---

[34] See "Le compte rendu intégral du procès Ben Salah," *Jeune Afrique,* June 9, 1970, number 492, p. 63.

[35] State farm cooperatives have already been modified or ended in Malagasy, Senegal, Ivory Coast and Guinea during the last year. For a review of their problems, see "Faut-il supprimer le système coopératif en Afrique?" *Jeune Afrique,* June 2, 1970, number 419.

The Tunisian cooperative program met severe problems: to what extent they could have been avoided by using techniques of resource allocation and mobilization that were available when the cooperatives began is a crucial but unanswerable question. Having said that, one is left with almost meaningless intuitive judgments based on a nonexistent methodology and vague expectations.

The Tunisian state farm program was carried out during a period of extensive structural alteration in all the national institutions. While the Tunisification of the economy and the society began slowly, it eventually introduced a profound change in those institutions. Difficult relations with France disturbed trade and finance. American and multilateral assistance added new dimensions, and tensions, to the responsibilities of the able, but overburdened, new élite. The weather was not favorable. Finally, although many of the new leaders were sons of rural bourgeoisie, they had little understanding of how to increase agricultural production and improve income distribution.

Two criticisms from a policy viewpoint seem paramount. First, the planners did not understand the need to develop sound working models of the state farms which could then be used for model improvement and on-the-job training. Agricultural thinking was dominated by agronomists and the blackboard with no modifications from the economists and the farms. Second, while elaborate administrative structures were established to run the cooperative programs, they lacked "feedback" mechanisms. The necessary information and statistics were not available. In the face of uncertainty, the civil servants minimized their risks, which were usually unrelated to the risk functions of the farms.

The program of state farms brought on its own demise by its uncontrolled momentum and inefficiency. Although by the end of 1968 officials could only manage 20 per cent of the farms adequately, the program continued to expand. The political tolerance for such economic and social arrogance finally snapped.

What of the future Tunisian cooperatives and their rôle in development? The state cooperatives are now operating only on the ex-*colon* lands. Suggestions include selling these lands, operating them as demonstration farms, or making them sufficiently attractive to encourage private farmers to join them. The free association cooperatives, the *coopératives de service,* have come back to life unaided, and will probably expand slowly when credit is made available to the private sector. The rôle of the state cooperatives, however, will be relatively minor over the medium term for agricultural development.

The agricultural problems which faced the planners in 1961 have hardly changed. While tremendous investments in irrigation infrastructure and trees have been made during the 1960s, can they now be effectively managed? Rural unemployment remains at high levels, and the prospect given in the 1969-1972 Plan for its reduction is slight. And finally, the planners themselves still believe that agricultural modernization means big farms and machines. They have yet to study either the efficiency of different farm sizes in Tunisia or the results from other developing countries which indicate not only the relative efficiency of the one family farm but also its ability to adopt advanced techniques.

Will a decade of experience with state cooperatives and low land and capital productivity encourage planners and administrators to develop and implement the required agricultural policies? The next decade will tell.

CHRONOLOGY

August 16, 1970—November 15, 1970

Arab Israeli Conflict

1970

Aug. 17: Fatḥ leader Yāsir 'Arafāt conferred in Baghdad with Iraqi Chief of Staff Ḥamad Shihāb.

Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban charged that Egypt was continuing to build missile sites in the cease-fire zone.

Baghdad Radio said talks between Iraq and Fatḥ leader 'Arafāt would not be the last "especially since Iraq has announced she placed her forces in the eastern front at the disposal of the resistance movement."

Israeli Ambassador to the US Itzhak Rabin said Egypt had tried to create a new military situation of strength for the negotiations. He said "any negotiation should be started based on the military situation that existed prior to the cease-fire."

The Soviet Union denounced as "fabrications" Israeli allegations that Egypt installed missiles in the 32-mile zone after the cease-fire went into effect.

Lebanon reported an Israeli force crossed the border and blew up 3 houses.

The US issued a statement concluding that "there was forward deployment of surface to air missiles . . . around the time the cease-fire went into effect" and there was inconclusive evidence that this continued beyond the cease-fire deadline. "The main thing now is to concentrate all efforts on getting the discussions going," the statement added.

Aug. 19: Israel publicized photographs allegedly verifying Egyptian missile site construction within the cease-fire zone.

Israel formally notified UN Special Envoy Gunnar Jarring that she was ready to begin negotiations.

An Israeli spokesman said Israel would prefer the talks be held at the Foreign Minister level and at a location closer to the "scene of conflict" than New York.

Israeli planes attacked guerrilla bases in Lebanon.

Aug. 20: Reuters reported a Fatḥ spokesman as saying commandos inflicted heavy casualties in rocket attacks on Israeli settlements.

Israeli spokesmen said planes raided guerrilla positions in Jordan in response to rocket attacks.

Aug. 21: The UAR objected to US reconnaissance over Suez on the grounds that it could yield intelligence to Israel.

The US State Department said US reconnaissance flights would continue over the Suez Canal.

Israel charged Egypt with continuing to violate the cease-fire by constructing more missile sites in the cease-fire zone.

Aug. 22: US Senator J. William Fulbright proposed the US sign a security treaty with Israel pledging to defend her security within the borders which existed prior to the June 1967 War.

Aug. 23: Israeli Foreign Minister Eban was appointed representative to talks with UN Special Envoy Jarring with UN Ambassador Yosef Tekoah as alternate.

Aug. 24: Egyptian Minister of National Guidance Muḥammad Haykal accused Israel of violating the cease-fire by building fortifications in the Suez zone. Israeli officials rejected the charge.

Israel accused Egypt of violating the cease-fire agreement regarding prisoners of war by not "accepting the assistance of the International Red Cross in carrying out their obligations" under the Geneva Convention as called for in the cease-fire agreement.

Aug. 25: Israeli Foreign Minister Eban said UN Ambassador Tekoah was instructed to raise the question of Egyptian violations of the cease-fire at the opening session of talks with Jarring.

Negotiations with Jarring opened at the UN with Tekoah, Israel, 'Abd al-Ḥamīd Sharaf, Jordan and Muḥammad al-Zayyāt Egypt seeing Jarring separately.

Aug. 26: The New York Times reported "authoritative White House sources" saying the US was prepared to join the USSR in a peace-keeping force to maintain a settlement.

Jarring met with Egyptian and Jordanian delegates to the peace talks. A UN spokesman said "the absence of the Israeli negotiator does not affect the talks."

The Israeli delegate to the Jarring talks left New York for Jerusalem for consultations on the talks.

Aug. 27: The US State Department said the UAR had complained formally of Israeli cease-fire violations. The US also confirmed that Russian arms shipments to the UAR had continued since Aug. 7

and that the US had tried to get a mutual limitation of arms shipments with Russia but was unsuccessful.

Egypt formally complained to the US and the UN that Israel moved troops into the cease-fire zone and was building new fortifications.

Aug. 28: The Palestinian National Council rejected the cease-fire and negotiations.

Israel said 13 commandos were killed attempting to penetrate Israel from Jordan and Lebanon. Spokesmen noted a decline in cooperation between the Jordanian army and the guerrillas since the cease-fire.

USSR Communist Party leader Leonid Brezhnev called for "an honest observance" of the cease-fire and "that an end to the conflict in the Middle East would meet the vital interests of both the Arab countries and of Israel."

Aug. 13: Al-Ahrām reported the Joint Defense Council held in Tripoli on Aug. 4 adopted a plan for 3 Arab fronts confronting Israel to be coordinated by a Supreme Command under General Muḥammad Fawzī in Cairo. The 3 fronts included the "Northern" (Syrian Armed Forces Command), the "Eastern" (Jordanian Armed Forces Command), and the "Western" (Egyptian Armed Forces Command).

US President Nixon, regarding a proposed joint USSR-US peace-keeping force, said such suggestions, "well intentioned as they are" would not be "particularly helpful at a time when the Jarring Mission is going forward."

Israel made its eighth formal complaint against the alleged Egyptian buildup in the cease-fire zone to the UN Truce Supervisory Organization.

The US announced it was sending arms to Israel "so the arms balance does not tip against Israel."

Sept. 1: The US said it was "satisfied" on the basis of photographic and electronic evidence that the UAR had violated the cease-fire.

The US Senate authorized the President to provide Israel with nearly unlimited military aid "by sale, credit sale or guaranty."

Israel reported raiding Bayt Lif in Lebanon meeting "unusually heavy" guerrilla resistance.

Sept. 4: The US State Department said it was seeking "rectification of the situation that has arisen out of our evidence of violations of the standstill cease-fire."

U Thant said violations of the cease-fire are not a valid reason for delaying peace talks.

Egypt rejected charges of cease-fire violations as "completely removed from the truth."

The USSR said it will "study" US and Israeli charges of Egyptian cease-fire violations.

Israeli Ambassador to the US Rabin accused the UAR and the USSR of "duplicity, double talk and sheer conspiracy" in accepting the US peace initiative.

Sept. 5: Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan said "I hope negotiations . . . will continue." "In my opinion Israel is now in the final stages of the war."

Lebanon reported her tanks and artillery were in action against an Israeli armored thrust into the Arqūb region. Fatḥ also claimed to be engaging the column.

Israel said her forces were leaving the Arqūb region of Lebanon after a 2-day "search operation" with no casualties.

Pravda accused the US and Israel of sabotaging the peace talks with "unfounded" charges of Egyptian violations.

The UN Security Council passed a resolution demanding "the complete and immediate withdrawal of all Israeli forces from Lebanese territory."

Israel denounced the Security Council as being "biased in its structure."

Sept. 6: An official Cabinet spokesman said Israel would withdraw from the peace talks until new Egyptian missile installations are removed from the Suez area but she would continue to observe the cease-fire.

Arab commandos hijacked 3 jets over Europe. A Swissair jet and a TWA jet were flown to a desert airstrip in Jordan. A Pan American jet was taken to Cairo where it was blown up after passengers and crew were evacuated. An unsuccessful attempt was made on an El-Al jet with 1 hijacker killed.

Egypt accused Israel of trying to "blow up" the peace talks by temporarily withdrawing.

Lebanon reported an Israeli armored column crossed the border. Israel denied the charge.

Sept. 7: Guerrilla spokesmen said the Pan American jet hijacked to Cairo was destroyed in retaliation for US support of Israel and warned that American oil interests would "be next."

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) claimed credit for the hijacking and said 150 passengers would be held for the ransom of guerrillas held by Israel, Britain, Switzerland and West Germany. Another 127 passengers were taken to Amman.

Israel urged all governments to resist guerrilla "blackmail" referring to ransom demands for hijacked planes.

Switzerland and West Germany agreed to meet the hijackers' demands.

Israeli Minister of Transport Shimon Peres said Israel would consider a new cease-fire agreement if the current accord could not be carried out.

Israel denied reports of a paratroop raid in Jordan. Jordanian Army spokesmen said they could not confirm the report.

Sept. 8: Reuters reported several Israeli villages were shelled from Lebanon.

The US appealed to 10 Arab countries to assist release of hijacked hostages "on humanitarian grounds." Ṭal'at al-Ghusayn of Kuwayt speaking for the 10 nation group said the hijackings "do not serve the needs of the Palestinian people. We will try to contact the guerrillas and convince them of this."

The PFLP said no hostages would be freed unless Britain frees the woman hijacker captured Sept. 6. The US, West Germany, Switzerland and Britain agreed to coordinate efforts to free hostages of hijacked airliners and named a 3 man committee of the International Red Cross to act as liaison with the guerrillas.

Eban said Israel insisted the hijacked hostages be released all together and not country by country.

Sept. 9: The US announced it would supply Israel with 18 Phantom jets by the end of 1970.

A British Overseas Airways jet was hijacked by guerrillas and flown to Jordan, bringing the total number of hostages to 300.

The International Red Cross announced the guerrilla hijackers had suspended the deadline for destroying the airliners.

The USSR said Egypt had not introduced any missiles into the Suez Canal zone since the cease-fire began but Egypt had the "full right" to "re-deploy" missiles already there.

The UN Security Council unanimously approved a resolution calling for immediate release of all passengers and crew "without exception held as a result of hijackings and other interference in international travel."

Six US C-130 transport planes arrived at Incirlik Airport in Turkey for possible evacuation of hostages held in Jordan.

Israel said she was assured by Britain, Switzerland and West Germany that they were pressing for release of the hijacked hostages in a block.

Sept. 10: U Thant criticized Israel for ignoring his initiatives for the release of 2 Algerians taken off a BOAC jet at Lydda Airport on Aug. 14.

Egypt criticized the US for "undermining" the cease-fire with its decision to sell 18 more Phantom jets to Israel.

Sept. 11: In reference to rumors of possible US military intervention on behalf of the hijacked hostages, the US called attention to a joint statement of the 5 countries seeking the release of hostages which authorized André Rochat of the International Red Cross to inform the Arabs that no military intervention was planned. The US also said movements of the Sixth Fleet were "routine precautions in such situations for evacuation purposes."

More than 60 people who were hijacked by Arab guerrillas and then released arrived in Cyprus aboard a Jordanian airliner.

The US, Britain, West Germany, Switzerland and Israel rejected guerrilla terms for the release of hijacked hostages. The demands included release of 7 terrorists held by the 3 European states.

Jordan flew 88 hijacked passengers out of the country after their release by Arab guerrillas.

The New York Times quoted "reliable sources" as saying the Israeli Cabinet had agreed "in principle" to release some Arab guerrillas in exchange for all hostages held by Arab hijackers and the Red Cross was informed of the decision.

Iraq and Syria urged the Arab guerrillas to release the hijacked airliners and hostages to "eliminate grounds of possible military intervention by foreign countries."

Israel filed a complaint with the UN that Egypt moved SAM-3 missiles into the Suez Canal zone.

Sept. 12: Arab guerrillas blew up the 3 hijacked airliners and released all but 40 hostages, announcing that the PFLP was prepared to negotiate separate deals for exchange of the remaining hostages.

Britain said it was willing to release hijacker Layla Khālid as part of an exchange agreement with Arab hijackers.

The Vatican announced the Pope had made a "personal intervention with responsible authorities" to obtain the release of the hijacked airline passengers.

Sept. 13: Israeli security forces arrested more than 450 Arabs in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip "for purposes of interrogation." Spokesmen said they were suspected of being associated with the PFLP.

The PFLP threatened "unimaginable" reprisals for the arrest of 450 Arabs in Israel.

The West German government rejected an offer for an exchange of hostages with the Arab guerrillas separately from the other 4 Western nations involved.

The PFLP confirmed reports from the airlines that more than 50 hostages were still in guerrilla hands.

Pravda said the hijackings had "complicated" the Arab cause but Israeli efforts to benefit from this would fail.

Sept. 14: Egyptian Foreign Minister Maḥmūd Riyāḍ accused the US and Israel of obstructing the peace talks with "baseless accusations" of cease-fire violations.

Britain, Israel, Switzerland, the US and West Germany agreed on an "all-or-nothing" settlement for release of the remaining hijacked hostages.

Arab commandos announced in Amman they would not agree to further mediation efforts.

The US told the Palestinian guerrillas that holding US citizens as hostages was "totally unacceptable." In reference to Jews holding both US and Israeli passports the US said "The bearer of a United States passport carries with him *prima facie* evidence of United States citizenship."

The PFLP said it would treat the 37 or 38 American hostages "on the same basis as Israelis" and that they would be released when the Israelis are released.

Sept. 15: Referring to negotiations for the release of hijacked hostages Arab guerrilla spokesmen said "We can't wait forever" and demanded the release of "10 Lebanese soldiers" and a "Swiss comrade" held by Israel. The statement denounced international law as the "same law under which our people was forced out of the homeland."

Israel announced it would not participate in a deal to exchange Arab prisoners for airline passengers, saying Israel would be paying enough to agree to the release of 7 hijackers held by European governments. The statement indicated Israel might make a "humanitarian gesture" when the hostages are released but it would not be part of a settlement.

The US said it had evidence of Israeli violations of the cease-fire which consisted of Israeli reconnaissance over the Egyptian territory and strengthening of fortifications.

An Israeli spokesman denied the charge saying Israel has been maintaining existing positions and planes were flying 10 kilometers from the cease-fire line.

Egyptian Foreign Minister Riyāḍ described the US peace initiative as "dead" but added that Egypt would continue to respect the cease-fire "as long as Ambassador Jarring continues his mission." Riyāḍ said the death blow was dealt by the US decision to increase economic and military aid to Israel.

Sept. 16: A new Red Cross negotiator, Pierre Boissier, arrived in Amman in an attempt to revive negotiations for the release of hijacked airline passengers.

Sept. 17: A spokesman for the Arab hijackers said the fighting in Jordan does not change the terms for the release of hostages.

Sept. 18: The New York Times reported US President Nixon saying "privately" that he would be inclined to intervene in Jordan if outside countries "such as Syria and Iraq were to join the fight." White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler said there was "no direct commitment" of support to Jordan.

Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir said after a meeting with Nixon that the two countries are in "perfect agreement" as to what "has happened and is happening now." She added that Israel will continue to observe the cease-fire but there would be no negotiations without a rollback of Egyptian missiles in the canal zone.

Switzerland asked France, Italy, Spain and the Soviet Union to use their influence to obtain the transfer of airline hostages out of Jordan to another Arab country for safety.

A spokesman for the hijackers in Beirut said the request would be ignored.

Sept. 20: UAR Delegate to the UN al-Zayyāt, when asked if he saw a possibility of moving missiles back to their positions before Aug. 7, said "Yes" if the US would guarantee there would be no surprise attack by Israel.

Sept. 21: Izvestia accused the US of concealing Israeli unwillingness to negotiate by charging imaginary Egyptian violations of the cease-fire.

The New York Times reported efforts of the Red Cross to resume negotiations for the release of hijacked hostages were "at a standstill."

Sept. 26: The PFLP announced all remaining airline hostages would be released within 24 hours "without any conditions."

Israeli Chief of Staff Haim Bar Lev said if the guerrillas resume attacks on Israel the response "would differ in scope and nature" from earlier responses.

Sept. 28: The Swiss government announced the 3 guerrillas it held would be released as soon as the last 6 airline hostages were freed by guerrillas.

Sept. 29: The last 6 airline hostages were released. Swiss sources said 7 guerrillas held in Europe and 2 Algerians and 10 Libyans held by Israel would be freed.

Sept. 30: Britain released a Palestinian hijacker, Layla Khālid.

Oct. 1: Izvestia called for "strict fulfillment" of the Arab Israeli cease-fire and said only through peaceful means "can a solution to the problem of the Palestinian refugees be found."

Oct. 2: UN officials said Jarring "has done all he can do" in the present circumstances and had suspended his negotiations to return to his post in Moscow.

Following a meeting with Egyptian government officials, US Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Elliot Richardson said he urged Egypt to consider extending the cease-fire with Israel. "There was recognition on both sides that it might become desirable to do this in order to permit the negotiations to go forward, but we did not get down to specifics," he said.

Russian Communist Party leader Brezhnev accused the US and Israel of blocking negotiations with Jarring and said the fighting in Jordan did "great harm to the common cause of Arab peoples."

Oct. 3: Israeli Defense Minister Dayan said he still believed the last stages of the Middle East conflict were at hand, that the cease-fire would continue beyond the 90-day limit, that talks would not resume until missiles were removed from the truce zone and he rejected the idea of a Palestinian state on the West Bank.

Following Soviet-Egyptian talks in Cairo a joint communiqué stressed the continuation of policies decided between President Nāṣir and the USSR including a political solution with Israel and a continuation of the cease-fire.

A PFLP spokesman called for the release by Israel of prisoners including 2 Algerians and 10 Lebanese in return for the released airline hostages.

The New York Times reported the UAR privately assured the US that President Nāṣir's policy of seeking a peaceful settlement would be continued.

Oct. 4: 'Arafāt said the Palestinian Resistance "acknowledged the great assistance" given to the movement by China.

Eban said "Nov. 6 is not a date for us and we're not going to start shooting because it happens to be 90 days after the Aug. 7 cease-fire."

Oct. 6: Riyāḍ said Egypt would never move a "single anti-aircraft" missile from the cease-fire zone, and if the peace effort fails "there will be no alternative to . . . liberating the occupied lands."

The US said it would suspend talks among the deputy delegates to the UN of the "Big 4" pending "rectification" of Egyptian violations of the cease-fire.

Oct. 8: The USSR accused the US of "unscrupulous distortion of the facts" in claiming breaches of the cease-fire in the Suez area, and accused Israel of "daily intrusions" of UAR airspace and of fortification of the cease-fire zone including missile sites.

Oct. 9: US Secretary of State William Rogers said the US has conclusive evidence of Soviet complicity in Egyptian violations of the cease-fire and that Moscow's denial raised "serious questions" about the genuineness of Soviet intentions.

A guerrilla spokesman announced the formation of a Military Leadership Committee to coordinate military activities of Fatḥ, the Palestine Liberation Forces, the PFLP, the Popular Democratic Front and *al-Ṣā'iqah* in Amman.

Oct. 10: Riyāḍ said Egypt would agree to extend the cease-fire "if Israel agrees to contact Jarring and declares that she is ready to carry out the Security Council resolution." He said: "If anyone asks us to withdraw our missiles, he should also ask Israel to destroy all their fortifications in the canal zone and to ground all their Phantoms," and he indicated the Arab states might put pressure on the West by curbing oil production.

Oct. 11: Minister of National Guidance Haykal said "If Egypt agreed to an extension and this leads to nothing, then we are faced with only one alternative, and that is to stand up and fight."

US Secretary of State Rogers said the US was ready to give financial assistance to parties in the Middle East conflict including the Palestinians.

Oct. 12: Eban said no progress could be made in peace talks until the Soviet Union and Egypt "remove the obstacles to peace," new missiles in the canal done. He added that 48 hours had not elapsed since Aug. 7 without an Egyptian violation.

Egyptian Acting President Anwar al-Sādāt accused the US of attempting to weaken Egypt's stand against Israel by means of "pressure and threats" at a time when a "vacuum" existed from Nāṣir's death.

The New York Times reported a member of the PLO Central Committee confirming that George Habash, head of the PFLP, had returned to Amman.

Oct. 14: Jarring returned to the UN from Moscow.

Oct. 15: Pravda proposed a peace plan which said as soon as Jarring had an agreement and would present it to the UN "the sides must refrain from actions contradicting the ending of the state of war." It added: "The ending of the state of war and the establishment of the state of peace begins at the moment of the ending of the first stage of withdrawal (the evacuation can be carried out in two stages) from territories occupied in June, 1967."

The New York Times reported US officials discounted the *Pravda* proposal as disclosure of exchanges that were 4 months old. Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco called the proposal "soured wine in old bottles."

After a meeting with Rogers, Riyāḍ said in reference to an extension of the cease-fire: "If serious efforts are made to achieve peace, we can give it all the time needed."

Oct. 16: Al-Ahrām editor Haykal said the UAR sent 3 battalions of Palestinian commandos into Jordan during the fighting in Sept.

In a speech to the UN General Assembly Riyāḍ accused the US of undermining the truce and of breaking a promise to Egypt by selling more arms to Israel.

US Ambassador Charles Yost objected to the "substance and tone" of Riyāḍ's speech.

Oct. 19: Prime Minister Meir arrived in New York and said Israel was "prepared for quiet diplomacy" on the Middle East and "All Riad and his government have to do is recreate the situation according to the cease-fire agreement and talks can begin immediately."

Oct. 20: Meir told Rogers Israel would resume negotiations only if Egypt would rectify alleged violations of the cease-fire.

Eban said the UN General Assembly had neither the right nor power to supplant previous Security Council resolutions on the Middle East question.

Oct. 21: Meir told the UN General Assembly that Israel was willing to continue the 90 day cease-fire but would not return to the Jarring talks "until the situation obtaining at the time when the cease-fire went into effect is restored."

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko told the General Assembly there should be an immediate return to the Jarring talks "without conditions" and that the charges of cease-fire violations were "nothing but a fabrication."

Oct. 23: U Thant announced that the Big Four foreign ministers had agreed to exert the "utmost effort" to get indirect Arab-Israeli talks started "at the earliest possible date."

The US announced it would provide Israel with 180 M-60 and M-48 tanks to give Israel counterattack ability in the Sinai and to bolster defense of the Syrian and Jordanian border.

Oct. 25: Al-Ahrām reported that "Cairo has no objection to a cease-fire extension for 2 months."

The Israeli Cabinet said the UN debate on the Middle East question was a move by Egypt and the Soviet Union "to sabotage the possibility of holding peace talks" and endorsed Eban's instructions to inform the UN that the Jarring talks could be resumed only when all parts of the cease-fire are honored.

Oct. 26: Israeli sources said 4 Russian pilots were shot down by Israel on July 30.

Israeli Major General Ahron Yariv said the Egyptian Suez defenses constitute "one of the most advanced missile systems in the world" manned by 3,000 Soviet soldiers.

The Cairo weekly *Rose al-Yūsif* reported that if fighting resumed on the Suez, Egypt would employ a "war of liberation" strategy being developed rather than the "war of attrition" strategy in use since March 1969.

US State Department officials said that contrary to reports the Nixon Administration continued to insist on Egyptian "rectification" of cease-fire violations before the Jarring talks could resume.

The UN General Assembly opened debate on the Middle East problem. Riyāḍ said Israel pursued a systematic policy of aggression since 1948 with the US as an accomplice.

Eban said the Jarring talks could be resumed only if Russian missiles were removed from the cease-fire zone and that Israel would not accept any change in the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.

Oct. 27: US Ambassador Yost submitted to the UN General Assembly a resolution calling for a 3 month extension of the cease-fire and urging parties to restore "conditions of confidence" necessary for the resumption of talks. He said the US has "incontrovertible evidence" that Egypt had introduced "many more missiles into new and existing missile sites," and declared that the US recognizes "the legitimate concern and aspirations of the Palestinians."

Oct. 28: Eban told the UN General Assembly peace talks could resume only if conditions in the Suez zone prior to Aug. 7 were restored. He added that the Security Council resolution of Nov. '67 balanced Israeli withdrawal with "secure and recognized boundaries" and any attempt to set aside this balance would upset the framework of negotiation.

Oct. 30: Soviet Ambassador to the UN Yakov Malik called for immediate and unconditional resumption of the Jarring talks and demanded "total withdrawal" by Israel from Arab territory and proposed demilitarized zones observed by UN forces should mark Arab-Israeli borders.

Nov. 2: A UN investigating committee urged the General Assembly to demand that Israel cease violations of human rights in the occupied Arab territory which included "mass punishment" and systematic destruction of property.

Nov. 4: Meir accused Britain of going back on its own Middle East policies and adopting a pro-Arab position.

The UN General Assembly passed an Egyptian sponsored resolution calling for a 3 month extension of the cease-fire, unconditional resumption of the Jarring talks, and recognition of the rights of Palestinians and the territorial integrity of Israel.

Eban said the resolution distorted the balance of the Nov. '67 Security Council resolution and made resumption of the Jarring talks "less likely than before."

Algeria, Iraq, Kuwayt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen and Southern Yemen abstained from voting because the resolution failed to give full satisfaction to the Palestinians.

Nov. 5: Eban said in a meeting with Jarring that talks could resume if Egypt would "cancel the consequences" of cease-fire violations.

Nov. 6: Jordanian Premier Waṣfī al-Tall said "I know there is an American-Israeli plan to create a Palestinian state on the West Bank. But I shall do my utmost to maintain the Kingdom's unity . . . because such a Palestinian state would be controlled by Israel geographically, militarily and economically."

The 3 month extension of the cease-fire began.

Two bombs exploded in a Tel Aviv bus station killing 1 person and wounding 24. A spokesman for Fatḥ said a special unit of guerrillas had planted the bombs.

Defense Minister Dayan said regarding the cease-fire extension: "This time the Egyptians agreed to the cease-fire without any . . . promises being made to them and we do not find ourselves bound by any commitments such as those given by the United States to Egypt before Aug. 7."

After a meeting with Rogers, Riyāḍ said the 2 sides "agreed to do their best to bring about a peaceful settlement" and to improve bilateral relations.

Nov. 7: Premier al-Tall said Jordan was observing the cease-fire.

Nov. 8: A spokesman for Fatḥ said the bomb explosion in a Tel Aviv bus station was "the start of more and bigger operations within our occupied homeland."

Nov. 9: Israeli authorities discounted the military importance of the proposed UAR-Libya-Sudan Federation saying it would be a makeshift forum for preserving some degree of Arab unity.

Nov. 11: The New York Times quoted sources "close to the palace" in Jordan saying Israeli gunners fired several shells into Jordan in violation of the cease-fire.

Nov. 12: The US announced it would deliver 18 more Sky Hawk jets to Israel in partial fulfillment of a pledge made to induce Israel to accept the US cease-fire proposal.

Nov. 14: President Sādāt warned that a resumption of fighting along the Suez was "very possible" after the cease-fire extension expires on Feb. 5. "We are not committed to anything. Nothing restricts our movements after this period."

General

1970

Aug. 18: UN Secretary General U Thant warned that the UN Relief Works Agency would not be able to meet its financial obligations past the beginning of 1971 unless urgent measures were taken.

Aug. 27: Health Ministers from the UAR, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwayt, Saudi Arabia and Syria met in Damascus to coordinate policies to control cholera outbreaks in the region.

Aug. 29: The Arab Economic Unity Council adopted resolutions calling for an agreement on free movement of capital, formation of an Arab Investment Company, formation of a Union of Arab Airline Companies, and coordination in the production and marketing of medicine.

Sept. 9: The International Federation of Airlines Pilots' Associations met in London to consider a boycott of Arab countries in retaliation for hijackings.

Sept. 14: The heads of state of Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania issued a joint communiqué saying a committee was formed to "follow developments in the Spanish Sahara."

Sept. 18: The Arab Air Transport Federation met to discuss measures in the event of a Western air boycott of Arab countries.

Sept. 27: President Nixon said "One of the primary, indispensable principles of American foreign policy is to maintain the necessary strength in the Mediterranean to preserve the peace against those who might threaten the peace."

Sept. 29: All Arab governments went into official mourning for President Nāṣir.

Oct. 1: Mourning processions took place throughout the Arab world and in Israel to mark Nāṣir's funeral.

Oct. 2: Russia's Premier Kosygin met in Cairo with Libyan President Mu'ammar Qadhdhāfī, Sudanese President Ja'far Muḥammad Numayrī and guerrilla leader Yāsir 'Arafāt on matters of "mutual interest."

Oct. 16: Reuters reported the International Tanker Freight Rate Association adopted a policy of reviewing and revising oil tanker rates yearly.

Oct. 24: A resolution adopted by a meeting of Arab economists in Algeria called for "total nationalization" of oil in Arab states.

Oct. 27: A meeting of national oil companies of the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries issued a communiqué saying the companies agreed to "consolidate cooperation . . . and to co-ordinate their policies in national oil markets."

Nov. 3: The US Defense Department said the US and USSR had begun reducing their Mediterranean fleets to levels existing before the Jordan war.

Nov. 4: The Presidents of Egypt, Libya and Sudan began deliberations in Cairo on the Palestine question and matters for mutual cooperation.

Nov. 8: The leaders of Egypt, Libya and Sudan announced agreement to work toward a federation which "would become the nucleus for unity of the Arab nations." The agreement included formation of a tripartite committee "to work as swiftly as possible toward developing links among the three countries," a supreme planning council, and a national security council.

Nov. 9: Fatḥ leader 'Arafāt approved the proposed UAR-Libya-Sudan Federation and said he would recommend Palestinian membership if he is "still alive when a democratic Palestinian state is formed."

Afghanistan

1970

Sept. 20: King Muḥammad Zahir Shah left for a state visit to Czechoslovakia.

Oct. 13: Kabul Radio reported the USSR agreed to supply medicine and equipment as a grant to the 5-year malaria eradication program.

Oct. 20: King Muḥammad Zahir Shah arrived in Moscow for an "unofficial, friendly visit."

Algeria

(*See also* Arab Israeli Conflict, General, Israel)

1970

Aug. 19: Minister of Finance Ismail Mahrouq announced tighter foreign exchange controls and import quotas for "luxury and non-essential items."

Aug. 27: Foreign Minister Bouteflika said Algeria would not remain passive over detention of 2 Algerians in Israel, an act of provocation against Britain and Algeria.

Sept. 12: It was announced that complete nationalization of foreign trade would be carried out during the 1970/73 Plan.

It was announced that Fatḥ would be permitted to broadcast *Voice of the Storm* from Algiers.

Sept. 13: A joint communiqué on talks with Communist Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade Chou Houa-min said it was agreed in principle to increase the volume of trade.

Sept. 17: Two Japanese companies signed an agreement for construction of a £4.5m liquefied gas storage center at Skidda.

Sept. 21: The government refused to participate in an Arab summit on the Jordanian crisis saying the crisis was a "logical consequence of the acceptance of the Rogers plan . . . which entails the liquidation of the Palestinian resistance."

Sept. 25: The government announced it gave $400,000 to the Palestinian resistance movement and $40,000 to the Palestinian Red Crescent for emergency purposes.

Sept. 28: Talks began in Paris on relations between the 2 countries with emphasis on the oil dispute.

Oct. 7: The first phase of talks with France on economic relations ended. A communiqué said meetings would resume Oct. 26.

Oct. 12: Morocco signed an agreement for settlement of private debts and financial transactions and for ending France's position as financial intermediary between the 2 countries.

Oct. 15: Al-Mujāhid accused France of trying to sabotage the Franco-Algerian oil talks by announcing the arrest of 2 Algerians for allegedly obtaining secret documents dealing with the talks.

Oct. 20: Former leader of the FLN Belkacem Krim was found strangled in a hotel in Frankfurt, Germany.

Oct. 23: Middle East Economic Digest reported US sources, including the Export-Import Bank, granted an $8m loan to finance 29 diesel locomotives to be purchased from General Motors.

Oct. 28: A joint communiqué ending the second phase of Franco-Algerian economic negotiations said the talks covered "the definition and depth of new cooperation objectives."

Nov. 12: The government announced nationalization of the holdings of Mobil Oil and Newmont Overseas Oil. A Mobil spokesman said compensation had been agreed upon prior to the decree.

Nov. 13: Middle East Economic Digest reported agreement was reached between Atlantic Richfield and Sonatrach under which Sonatrach took over all mineral and transport rights while Atlantic Richfield would be "indirectly compensated."

Cyprus

1970

Aug. 23: Cyprus Bulletin reported "last week" President Makarios said the "separatist plans" of the Turkish Cypriot leadership had become more evident "with the passage of time" and if a separatist state is proclaimed the government will "take all appropriate measures for its dissolution."

Sept. 3: General Grivas said President Makarios was not working for *enosis* and has "never favored enosis" but "was pushed to it by genuine Greeks."

Sept. 6: Makarios denied rumors that he agreed to a settlement with President of the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber Rauf Denktaş based on a canton system.

Cyprus Bulletin reported that talks with the EEC resulted in an understanding "on a suitable formula for the negotiation and conclusion of an agreement" for the export of citrus fruit.

Sept. 7: Makarios left for Lusaka for the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations.

Sept. 10: The Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in Lusaka adopted a resolution calling for a peaceful solution on Cyprus "without any outside interference or intervention" and "including the safeguarding of the legitimate rights of the Cypriot Turkish Community" based on the Cairo declaration of Oct. 1964.

Sept. 12: Denktaş returned from talks in Ankara. He said there was no change in the Turkish Cypriot position at the intercommunal talks and there would be no further concessions.

Sept. 21: The 4th phase of the intercommunal talks began.

Oct. 5: Makarios appointed Mikhail Glikis to be Minister of Health.

Oct. 6: The clandestine *Bayrak Radio* criticized the government for appointing a Greek Cypriot Health Minister since the post "is legally held by a Turkish Cypriot" whose appointment can only be terminated by the Turkish Cypriot Vice President according to the Constitution.

Oct. 26: Makarios said union with Greece was no longer "feasible" and a solution to the Cyprus problem would be easier without "outside interference."

Oct. 27: Kharavyi charged that bases on Cyprus were being used by the US for U2 reconnaissance flights over the Suez.

Iran

(*See also* Iraq, Persian Gulf, Turkey, Yemen)

1970

Aug. 23: Reuters reported Egypt agreed to resume diplomatic relations.

Sept. 4: The Novin Party won 930 of the 960 seats contested in city and council elections. The Mardom Party took 30 seats.

Sept. 5: Former Egyptian *Chargé d'Affaires* Yaḥyā Rif'āt presented credentials as UAR Ambassador to Iran.

Sept. 9: Kayhan International reported the oil Consortium agreed to increase production by 200,000 barrels a day.

Sept. 18: A communiqué on the departure of Italian Foreign Minister Aldo Moro said a scientific and technical cooperation agreement was signed and a committee on cultural relations set up.

Oct. 6: The Shah warned the oil companies to increase production or face the "legal consequences."

Oct. 8: The government said an agreement was reached with the Soviet Union for construction of a second natural gas pipeline to the Soviet Union.

Oct. 10: Kayhan International reported the Shah wrote to Sulṭān Qabūs bin Sa'īd of Oman in "cordial terms." "Our geographical proximity and common religion necessitate the forging of friendly ties between Iran and Oman, especially in view of the impending developments in the Gulf Region."

An Iranian jet was hijacked to Baghdad by 3 Iranians who were arrested by Iraqi police while the plane was permitted to return to Iran.

Oct. 25: Kayhan International announced a 5 year trade agreement with Rumania worth $160m under which Iran would export cars, shoes, wool and silk, detergents and auto tires in return for cement, paper and cheese.

Oct. 28: The Shah and President Nicolai Podgorny of the Soviet Union formally opened a natural gas pipeline from Qum to Baku in Russia.

British Petroleum announced posted price rises of $.02 to $.10 on products from Bandar Mah Shar.

Oct. 30: The World Bank announced a $79m loan to finance electrical power distribution near Tehran and educational improvements.

Nov. 6: Ambassador to Britain Amir Afshar said Iran would not "overlook its right" to certain "tiny islands" in the Gulf "which belong to Iran."

Nov. 9: An Iranian DC-3 was hijacked to Baghdad during a flight from Dubai to Iran. The 9 hijackers asked for political asylum in Iraq.

Iraq

(*See also* Arab Israeli Conflict, General, Iran, Jordan, Kuwayt, Lebanon, Pakistan, Syria, Turkey, UAR)

1970

Aug. 22: Al-Nahār reported that Gen. Taymur Bakhtiar, opponent of the Shah's government, was assassinated while in exile in Iraq.

Aug. 29: The government announced release of all Egyptians detained since the disagreement with Egypt over the cease-fire and said all charges would be dropped.

Aug. 30: The Iraq National Oil Company signed an agreement with Soviet Techno-export for development of the North Rumelia Field.

Sept. 10: Beirut's *Al-Sayyid* reported the Kurdish Democratic Party's choice for a Vice President, Ḥabīb Karīm, was rejected by the government for his close relations with Iran.

Baghdad Radio said the purpose of British envoy Sir William Luce's visit to the Gulf states was to persuade the Gulf rulers of the necessity of keeping British troops in the region.

Sept. 16: Special British envoy to the Gulf Luce left Baghdad after 2 days of talks.

President Bakr called for a "steadfast Arab front to support the guerrillas."

Sept. 24: Baghdad Radio said events in Jordan "are the result of a joint plan between Nāṣir and the Jordanian régime."

Sept. 28: British Petroleum and Esso announced posted prices of Iraqi crude were raised $.20 to $2.41 a barrel effective Sept. 1.

Sept. 29: Shell International announced a rise of $.20 per barrel in posted price of Iraqi crude retroactive to Sept. 1.

Sept. 30: Compagnie Françaises des Pétroles announced a $.20 rise in posted price per barrel of Iraqi crude.

Oct. 2: Minister of Oil and Minerals Sādūn Ḥamādī returning from a visit to Bulgaria said an oil agreement was signed.

Oct. 15: The Revolution Command Council issued a communiqué announcing that Air Marshal Ḥardān al-Takrītī was relieved of all military and civilian posts including the Vice Presidency.

Oct. 22: Iraqi Information Minister Shafīq Kamālī denied reports that Iraqi troops were being withdrawn from Jordan.

Oct. 23: The government postponed indefinitely the census scheduled for Oct. 26 in the Kirkuk region.

Oct. 24: The government lifted the state of emergency in effect since 1965.

Oct. 27: The government announced "new gains" in agreements with Iraq Petroleum Co., Mosul Petroleum Co. and Basrah Petroleum Co. which would increase production in southern fields from 16m to 21m tons in 1970, to 28m tons in '71 and 4.5m tons each year after 1971.

Israel

(*See also* Arab Israeli Conflict, Jordan, Algeria, Lebanon)

1970

Aug. 17: Israel decided to release 2 Algerians taken off a BOAC airliner in transit through Lydda Airport on Aug. 14.

Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir announced new customs levies will raise the cost of imports 20%.

The New York Times reported Hadassah, the Women's Zionist Organization of America, founded a "community college" in Jerusalem.

Aug. 19: Death sentences against two Arab guerrillas were commuted to life imprisonment.

Aug. 22: The New York Times reported part of the "broad wall" of the Biblical description was unearthed in Jerusalem by Israeli archeologists.

Aug. 23: Construction began in Ashdad on an oil refinery to raise national capacity by 3m tons per year or 50%.

Aug. 24: Security officials said the 2 Algerians taken off a BOAC airliner were officials of Algerian security.

Aug. 25: Traffic across the Jordan was banned as a precaution against cholera.

Fifty members of the "Greater Israel Movement" were prevented by army units from establishing a Jewish settlement in the Arab village of Batir.

Aug. 26: UN Ambassador Yosef Tekoah met with Foreign Minister Abba Eban. Foreign Ministry officials said Tekoah was scheduled to return to Israel in early August "to prepare for the forthcoming session of the General Assembly" but the trip was postponed because of diplomatic pressure prior to the Jarring talks.

The New York Times reported the Israeli Chief of Staff signed detention orders for 2 Algerians taken off a BOAC jet Aug. 14.

Three cases of cholera were reported in Jerusalem which brought the total to 14.

Aug. 27: Prime Minister Golda Meir said she would go to the US for ceremonies marking the 25th anniversary of the UN late in October.

Aug. 29: The Jewish Agency outlined plans for a $1 billion fund raising drive for non-defense needs of Israel.

Aug. 30: The Cabinet failed to agree on an opening position for the Jarring talks.

Sept. 1: The government postponed further moves to advance the peace talks until all Egyptian missiles installed in the cease-fire zone after Aug. 7 were removed, according to *The New York Times.*

The Knesset approved the following Cabinet changes.

Pinhas Sapir: *Finance and Industry & Commerce*
Haim Gvati: *Agriculture and Development*
Shimon Peres: *Transport and Posts*
Mikhael Hazani: *Social Welfare*
Yosef Berg: *Interior*

Sept. 3: Premier Meir welcomed the US acknowledgment of Egyptian violations saying a "difficult debate" with the US was over.

The New York Times reported the bitter division in the Israeli Cabinet over the US stand on Egyptian violations was overcome with a "compromise." Defense Minister Moshe Dayan said what had been decided "will not lead me to leave the government."

Sept. 4: Meir advanced by 1 month a scheduled visit to the US to begin after the middle of September.

Sept. 6: Minister of Transport Shimon Peres said Israel will ask Britain for extradition of a hijacker who was caught in an unsuccessful attempt to hijack an El-Al jet.

Thirteen cholera cases were reported in Jerusalem over the weekend bringing the total of reported cases in Israel to 59.

Sept. 8: Agricultural produce was permitted to pass from the West Bank to Jordan after a 2 week closure due to cholera.

Sept. 11: Pilots of British European Airways refused to fly to Israel for fear of hijacking.

Sept. 12: The US said it was planning to resume economic aid to Israel.

Fourteen Egyptian sailors rescued from a burning vessel off Haifa were released after being held for 1 week.

Sept. 14: The government released 75 of 450 Arabs arrested over the weekend. Officials said the 75 had nothing to do with the hijackings.

Sept. 16: Meir flew to the US for meetings with President Nixon.

Sept. 18: The government announced the release of the last of 450 Arabs arrested for interrogation.

Sept. 20: Meir appealed to American Jews to provide financial aid to Israel by purchasing bonds which would also be "a demonstration to your Government, a democratic Government, that you will it so."

Chief of Staff Haim Bar Lev ordered an extension of the detention order for 2 Algerians taken off a BOAC jet at Lydda Airport.

Sept. 22: Health authorities offered medical aid to "women, children and the aged" injured during fighting in Jordan if they would cross the Jordan River.

Sept. 24: The Red Cross arranged for the transfer of 205 wounded Jordanians to hospitals in the Israeli-occupied West Bank.

Sept. 29: Foreign Minister Eban said the accord between King Ḥusayn and the commandos was a severe setback for peace because it endorsed the commando goal of "full liberation" of Palestine.

Demonstrations occurred in Arab sectors in mourning for President Nāṣir and 30 people were arrested.

Oct. 4: The New York Times reported officials "indicated last week" that plans were being formulated for elections in some towns in the West Bank.

It was officially announced Meir would attend the 25th anniversary celebration of the UN in New York.

Oct. 12: Minister of Finance Avraham Agmon said Israel had spent $800m on defense imports during the year compared with $160m in 1966.

Oct. 14: The government released Algerians Maj. Khatib Jalil and Ali Belaziz who were detailed from a BOAC airliner.

Oct. 23: Middle East Economic Digest reported the World Bank granted a $20m loan to the Agricultural Bank to aid horticulture and exports.

Oct. 30: Meir gave the UN a letter from Russian Jews appealing for help from Soviet discrimination.

Nov. 4: High school teachers went on strike for higher pay.

Jordan

(*See also* Arab Israeli Conflict, General, Algeria, Iraq, Israel, Kuwayt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, UAR)

1970

Aug. 16: *Le Nouvel Observateur* quoted King Ḥusayn as saying that after the liberation of the occupied territories, the Jordanian people "will have the occasion to decide their future for themselves" and said "in certain circumstances" a West Bank Palestine State could be created.

Aug. 22: Officials reported commandos kidnapped Sālim al-Sharīf, a Palestinian editor thought to favor a peaceful settlement.

Aug. 23: The commando group *al-Ṣā'iqah* demanded King Ḥusayn free 8 members allegedly held in prison.

Aug. 26: Shooting occurred between police and guerrillas in Amman.

Aug. 29: Ḥusayn said the unified eastern military command was dissolved at the August conference of defense ministers in Tripoli.

The New York Times reported "highly placed Jordanian informants" saying "5000 Iraqi troops were moved into Jordan from Syria."

Ḥusayn said "we shall deal with any attempt to undermine our national unity with whatever means are necessary."

Aug. 31: Skirmishing occurred in Amman between government troops and commandos.

Sept. 1: Iraq said in a memorandum to the government it would put its troops at the disposal of the guerrillas if "attempts to liquidate the Palestine revolution" did not cease.

The government reported an attempt on Ḥusayn's life as his motorcade drove to the airport. The assailants were not identified. The spokesman added that rumors of a crackdown on commandos were "completely untrue" and the "aim of these rumors was to create confusion."

Sept. 2: Skirmishing between guerrillas and the army lasted through the day. Yāsir 'Arafāt denounced the army for "ugly aggression" against the commandos.

Sept. 3: General Ṣāliḥ Mahdī 'Ammāsh and General 'Abd al-Jābir Shansāl of Iraq visited Jordan for talks with guerrilla leaders.

Ḥusayn said he asked his Cabinet to tell the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) "to insure discipline in their ranks and to prevent any provocative acts" which would continue the violence in Jordan.

Sept. 5: The government announced the "pulling back of all military units around the capital." The Central Committee of the PLO ordered all roadblocks removed and cessation of military "demonstrations inside and outside" Amman. The orders followed meetings between the government and the Central Committee.

Sept. 6: The Arab League Council ended a 2 day emergency session in Cairo calling for an end to fighting between guerrillas and the Jordanian Army and reactivated the 4 man committee to find "practical means" to end the dispute.

Sept. 7: *The Jordanian News Agency* reported an installment of JD 1.75m in aid was received from Kuwayt.

Clashes occurred between army troops and guerrillas. The American Embassy reported an American sergeant was kidnapped by unidentified men.

Sept. 8: The government and the Central Committee of the PLO agreed on a cease-fire. Commandos said the cease-fire was broken when the army laid seige to commando bases in northern Jordan.

Sept. 9: Heavy skirmishing took place in Amman despite an order by Ḥusayn authorizing Chief of Staff Mashhūr Ḥadīth to impose a cease-fire on the army.

Sept. 10: Arab commandos and Jordanian army troops fought in Amman while Cabinet ministers and commando leaders agreed on a truce.

The US said John Stewart, an information officer at the US Embassy in Amman, had been missing for 24 hours.

Sept. 13: *Amman Radio* reported clashes between the Jordanian Army and the Palestine Liberation Army in Turā.

Sept. 14: Guerrillas released US Sgt. Irwin Graham after holding him a week in Amman.

Commando spokesmen reported fighting between the Jordanian Army and guerrillas in Irbid.

Army tanks fought a brief engagement with guerrillas at Zarqa.

Sept. 16: Martial law was declared and Ḥusayn called on the commandos to disarm their militia.

Ḥusayn dismissed the government of Premier Rifā'ī and appointed a military government "to secure order and authority of the state." Hābis Majālī was named Commander-in-Chief and Gen. Ḥadīth Military Advisor to the King.

Brigadier Muḥammad Dāwūd: *Foreign Affairs, Justice*
Brigadier Māzin 'Ajlūnī: *Premiership Affairs*
Maj. Gen. Muṭlaq 'Īd: *Defense*
Brigadier Ṣāliḥ al-Shar': *Interior and Religious Affairs*
Brigadier Ibrāhīm Ayyūb: *Communications and Posts*
Brigadier Fahd Jaradāt: *Finance*
Brigadier Ya'qūb Abū Ghusham: *Health, Construction and Social Affairs*
Brigadier 'Abdallāh Sāyil: *Public Works*
Brigadier Mufliḥ 'Awdatallāh: *Municipal & Rural Affairs*
Brigadier Ibrāhīm Sāyil: *Education*
Major 'Adnān Abū 'Awdah: *Information, Tourism, Antiquities*

Iraq and Syria denounced the new military Cabinet as "reactionary imperialist authorities."

Sept. 17: Heavy fighting began at dawn between the army and guerrillas in Amman and spread to other cities.

Army tanks were battling in Amman. *Amman Radio* announced at 5:00 p.m. that the army was in full control except for scattered resistance.

Commander-in-Chief Majālī proposed a cease-fire during which the guerrillas would move to bases facing Israel.

The Central Committee of the PLO rejected the cease-fire proposal and declared the northern sector of Jordan a "liberated area" naming governors for Irbid, Jarash, Baqa, Ramthah, and Ajlum.

UAR Lieut. General Ṣādiq arrived in Amman with a message from the UAR, Sudan and Libya calling for an end to the "Arab catastrophe."

Sept. 18: Egyptian Foreign Minister Riyāḍ said Egypt was "100 per cent opposed" to US military intervention in Jordan but that there could be no objection to evacuation of US citizens if carried out in cooperation with Jordanian authorities.

The Soviet news agency *Tass* called for an end to the "fratricidal fighting" in Jordan and warned against foreign intervention as endangering a "worsening of the conflict which may then overstep the borders of that country."

Heavy fighting continued in all major cities.

Syrian President Atāsī said Syria would "spare no blood" to help the Palestinians.

Reuters reported reinforcements moving south from Syria with light artillery.

Sept. 19: US Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird said "under the present situation security can be provided by the Jordanian armed forces. As long as they have security under control, we would not need to place Americans in there."

Communist China denounced attacks on Palestinian guerrillas by "reactionary Jordanian forces" which were cooperating with "United States imperialism and its lackey, Israel."

The government accused Syria of moving army units into Jordan and called for a meeting of the Arab League Council.

Sept. 20: Field Marshal Majālī said a Syrian armored brigade crossed the border into Jordan but was repulsed "with heavy losses."

The Jordanian Army ordered a cease-fire but fighting continued. *The New York Times* reported the guerrillas were seeking the ouster of the military government and elimination of "counter-revolutionary elements" in a new government and the army and Ḥusayn was seeking guerrilla withdrawal from all towns and villages and concentration along the Israeli front.

US Secretary of State Rogers called on Syria to end her "invasion" of Jordan and urged the USSR to impress Syria with the dangers of intervention.

The government reported "Syrian armored troops and heavy artillery" crossed into Jordan for the second time. Tank battles were reported near Ramthah.

The New York Times reported President Nāṣir appealed to Ḥusayn to enforce the cease-fire proclaimed Sept. 19. Ḥusayn replied that the guerrillas ignored every appeal.

Al-Ahrām reported the cease-fire had been accepted by 'Arafāt.

Libya called for a joint Libyan-Algerian force to intervene on the Palestinian side.

Amman Radio reported 3 guerrilla leaders had defected: Abū Iyād of Fatḥ, Abū Gharbīyah of the Popular Struggle Front and Fārūq Kadūmī of Fatḥ.

The International Red Cross accepted an appeal from Ḥusayn for relief help.

Deputy Premier of Israel Allon, referring to the civil strife in Jordan, said Israel "reserves the right to act if our security is threatened. . . However I don't think we are called upon to make operational decisions at this time."

Sept. 21: French President Pompidou warned against foreign intervention in Jordan. Britain called on Russia to press Syria to halt troop movements into Jordan.

Ḥusayn declared a cease-fire but fighting continued with guerrillas reportedly in control of all northern cities except Amman with the help of tanks and troops crossing into Jordan from Syria.

Ambassador to the UN Sharaf met with US Assistant Secretary of State Sisco. *The New York Times* reported "some American officials indicated that Jordan had privately appealed for military help, although in very general language" and that the US alerted troops for "possible movement to Jordan."

Sept. 22: The government posted a reward of $11,000 for Dr. Habash, head of the PFLP.

Heavy fighting continued with more than 20 sorties by the air force against guerrilla positions.

Arab leaders of 9 countries postponed an emergency meeting in Cairo on the Jordan crisis and chose a delegation to go to Amman to persuade Ḥusayn and 'Arafāt to join the conference.

Sept. 23: Army tanks counterattacked in the north and Syrian tanks were reportedly withdrawn from Jordan or falling back.

The 4-man delegation from Arab leaders in Cairo announced an agreement between Ḥusayn and 4 captured guerrilla leaders. The delegation and the guerrilla leaders left for Cairo but the accord was repudiated by the Central Committee of the PLO.

Ḥusayn said "I believe the brunt of the problem is over." He added that Syrian units in Jordan included the Fifth Division and the 88th and 67th tank brigades which were being pushed back.

Field Marshal al-Majālī announced a cease-fire in accordance with the reported accord but fighting continued.

Guerrilla radio in Baghdad said Palestinian forces still held Irbid and Ramthah but some "tactical withdrawals" were made.

Ḥusayn, replying to a message from the 4-man Arab mediation team in Cairo concerning reports of continued fighting, said "All efforts since your visit have been directed at liquidating the causes of the conflict. I have given strict orders to all units and all commanders to cease firing and abide by the cease-fire agreement."

Sept. 24: Premier and Foreign Minister Muḥammad Dāwūd resigned while in Cairo to meet with Arab leaders as a representative of Ḥusayn.

Bahi Ladgham, member of the Arab mediation committee, said that "good intentions seem to be absent on the part of the Jordanian authorities . . . there is no other explanation to the actions of the Jordanian Army in renewing their operations after the announcement of a cease-fire."

Sept. 25: 'Arafāt agreed to meet with Sudanese President Numayrī, the head of the 4-man Arab mediation team for the Jordanian crisis.

US Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance Packard said the US was prepared to replace weapons lost in the fighting to Jordan. "I would think we would make sure they do have a continuing military capability." He added that Israel might welcome a strengthening of Jordan's defenses since it is in Israel's interest to have a "stable country on that side of the line." He termed Israel's military buildup along the Syria-Jordan border during the fighting a "reasonable" exercise in self-defense.

Israeli Premier Meir said of Ḥusayn's proposal that guerrillas be stationed along the Israeli border: "We cannot agree that Hussein and the guerrillas come to an arrangement at our expense and we must oppose this with all our force."

The government and the commandos agreed on a cease-fire. *Amman Radio* broadcast a letter from 'Arafāt saying "The Palestine revolution will adhere to this decision if the other side also adheres to it." The agreement called for withdrawal of the army from Amman and guerrillas from "all cities and towns," deployment of the guerrillas along the Israeli cease-fire line, and acceptance of Jordanian law by the commandos.

The government said it "rescued" 15 of the hijacked airline passengers from Waḥdat refugee camp. A PFLP spokesman in Beirut said: "It does not matter. We will soon have well-fed hostages—new ones—if they do not let our people go."

Ḥusayn was quoted by *Le Monde* as saying he had been "misled" by intelligence reports about the strength of the Palestinian guerrillas.

The Red Cross was given permission to visit 10,000 prisoners of war.

Sept. 26: Ḥusayn announced the formation of a new Cabinet.

Aḥmad Ṭuqān: *Premier and Foreign Affairs*
Yaḥyā al-Khaṭīb: *Communications and Public Works*
Samī Ayūb: *Agriculture*
Fawwāz al-Rūsān: *Justice, Finance and Awqaf*
Brig. Gen. Māzin al-'Ajlūnī: *State for Prime Ministry Affairs*
Brig. Gen. Ṣāliḥ al-Shar': *Interior*
Col. Ya'qūb Abū Ghawsh: *Health, Reconstruction and Development*
Maj. Mufliḥ Awdatallāh: *Interior for Municipal and Rural Affairs*
Maj. 'Adnān Abū 'Awdah: *Information, Culture and Tourism & Antiquities*
Maj. Gen. Akkāsh al-Zaban: *Defense*
Fu'ād Qaqish: *Transport, Social Affairs, Labor*
'Abd al-Majīd al-Shuraydah: *Education*
'Umar al-Nabūlsī: *National Economy*

Ḥusayn's letter of appointment to the new Premier said, "The voice of regionalism, if heard in Jordan at any time, should now be stifled. There is no difference between a West Banker and an East Banker."

A spokesman of the PLO Central Committee said of the new Cabinet: "This does not change our attitude in the least . . . as long as the royal regime exists and the real criminals, first and foremost King Ḥusayn, are in power."

A spokesman for the Central Committee of the PLO said Iraqi troops in Jordan permitted Jordanian troops to pass through the region where they were stationed and remained passive "towards the slaughter of the Palestinians."

The New York Times reported sporadic sniping and skirmishing continued in Amman.

Sudanese President Numayrī returned from Amman to Cairo and reported the Jordanian army was continuing "murderous and brutal bombardments" in Amman.

Ḥusayn rejected the charge that his army was ignoring the cease-fire and charged that certain guerrillas were trying to undermine the agreement.

Egyptian President Nāṣir sent a telegram to Ḥusayn accusing the Jordanian authorities of violating the cease-fire and of carrying out a plan "to liquidate the Palestinian resistance."

US President Nixon ordered $5m in emergency relief for Jordan's civilian casualties. He added the US will "make good" the Jordanian "losses" and "consider the requirements that they may have that may be essential for their defense against outside interference."

Sept. 27: Ḥusayn arrived in Cairo and signed an accord with 'Arafāt and other Arab leaders calling for an immediate cease-fire, withdrawal of guerrillas and army troops from Amman, release of prisoners and formation of a 3-man committee to oversee the agreement, headed by Tunisian Premier Ladgham.

Sept. 28: US C-130's began arriving in Amman with relief supplies.

Sept. 29: A team of 100 foreign Arab officers arrived in Amman to oversee the cease-fire agreement.

Gunfire continued in the center of Amman.

Ḥusayn said that if guerrillas did not leave their stronghold in Amman "the situation will have to be handled in any other way to guarantee security." He added that the agreement with 'Arafāt was a "golden opportunity to rebuild."

The cease-fire observers called for army and guerrilla withdrawal from Amman within 24 hours beginning 8:00 a.m. Sept. 30. The supervisory committee said the cease-fire was being adhered to throughout Jordan.

Sept. 30: Army units and guerrillas began withdrawing from Amman. Ladgham, head of the supervisory committee, said "Things are moving well. Cooperation has been perfect so far."

Oct. 1: Army officers and guerrillas signed an agreement in Ramthah calling for a pullout from Ramthah, Irbid and Jarash by both sides.

Minister of Information 'Adnān Abū 'Awḍah said the government would recognize and support Fatḥ as the sole legitimate guerrilla organization and would permit arms shipments to the guerrillas on the front with Israel. He added that the army had not attacked the Luwaybida district of Amman during the fighting because 'Arafāt was there. He said Fatḥ which the government considers synonymous with the PLO will continue to have a free hand in raiding Israel.

Oct. 2: The New York Times reported some commandos had pulled out of northern cities but Irbid remained under guerrilla control.

Oct. 4: A spokesman for the truce observation commission said the army had withdrawn from Amman but many commandos remained and the question of whether the commando "militia" would leave was unresolved.

Fighting broke out in Amman during the night near the home of Field Marshal al-Majālī.

A Fatḥ spokesman said "We refuse to coordinate with the Army" in Amman and that commandos will leave in the night and "we alone will choose where to place our bases" in the countryside.

Oct. 5: Officials said 1500 guerrillas had left Amman during the night.

A guerrilla spokesman said the army launched artillery and tank attacks on the village of Harimah.

Oct. 6: Truce observers reported guerrillas began a mass pullout from northern towns.

Oct. 7: The Red Cross said estimates of casualties had been exaggerated and reported 4000 casualties were being treated in Amman.

Oct. 8: The New York Times reported violations of the truce by both sides "were visible during the day." The army continued to patrol Amman and Zarqa while commandos patrolled Irbid and Jarash in violation of the accord.

Oct. 9: The government released 3000 prisoners detained as suspected guerrillas.

Oct. 13: Ḥusayn and 'Arafāt signed a peace agreement.

Oct. 14: Ḥusayn said of the peace accord with 'Arafāt that he was confident of "cooperation" with commandos and confirmed that US supplies were being airlifted to Jordan.

Oct. 15: 'Arafāt urged a mass rally to observe the truce with the Jordanian army.

Oct. 16: Shooting broke out in Amman when security forces stopped a car carrying copies of the newspaper *Fateh.*

General Muḥammad 'Abd al-Dāyim was appointed Chief-of-Staff of the Army.

Oct. 17: Fighting broke out in northern cities between guerrillas and army troops according to guerrilla spokesmen.

Oct. 18: Guerrilla spokesmen said the army was fighting to cut guerrilla supply routes in the north in violation of the truce terms.

Oct. 20: The New York Times reported "witnesses" saying army tanks shelled Ramthah.

Oct. 21: The New York Times said "informed Jordanian sources" reported Iraqi troops in Jordan were being withdrawn.

Oct. 22: Reuters reported Iraqi troops near Mafraq showed no signs of leaving Jordan and there were no trucks moving toward the Iraqi border.

Oct. 23: Jordanian officials continued to insist that Iraqi troops were being withdrawn from Jordan, the pullout to take several months.

The US asked Jordan for an estimate of the financial costs of the civil war. A reply was considered by the Cabinet and included a 28% drop in GNP and $70m in damage.

Oct. 28: Ḥusayn appointed a new Cabinet under Waṣfī al-Tall, with instructions to carry out "in letter and spirit" the agreement with commandos and to seek better relations with Arab neighbors to strengthen the "eastern front." The Cabinet is as follows:

Waṣfī al-Tall: *Premier and Defense*
Ṣubḥī Amīn 'Amr: *Development & Reconstruction*
Aḥmad al-Lawzī: *Finance*
'Abdallāh Ṣalāḥ: *Foreign Affairs*
'Abd al-Salām al-Majālī: *Health and Premiership Affairs*
Fawwāz al-Rūsān: *Justice*
Māzin al-'Ajlūnī: *Interior*
'Adnān Abū 'Awḍah: *Information, Culture and Tourism & Antiquities*
Fu'ād Qaqish: *Municipal & Village Affairs*
'Umar al-Nabūlsī: *National Economy*
'Umar 'Abdallāh: *Agriculture*
Muḥammad Khalaf: *Communications*
Ibrāhīm al-Habāshīnah: *Transport*
Isḥāq al-Farḥān: *Education and Waqfs & Islamic Affairs*
Muṣṭafā Dūdīn: *Social Affairs & Labor*
Munīb al-Maṣrī: *Public Works*
Muḥammad al-Bashīr: *Premiership Affairs*

Ladgham, head of the Arab mediation team, returned to Tunisia.

Nov. 1: The curfew was lifted in Amman but remained in force in Zarqa.

Nov. 3: A military spokesman said 4 persons were killed in Amman when armed civilians opened fire on members of the Arab observer team.

Nov. 9: 'Arafāt said an ID card of a US marine found in Amman during the fighting proved the US military was directing the Jordanian army.

The US State Department said the marine is a guard at the US Embassy and "there was no military involvement."

A pact requiring all full-time commandos, except for leaders, to withdraw from Amman went into effect.

Kuwayt

(*See also* Arab Israeli Conflict, General, Jordan)

1970

Aug. 28: Al-Jūmhuriyyah of Baghdad reported Kuwayt was imposing import duties on Iraqi goods in violation of a 1964 economic agreement.

Sept. 8: The Arab World reported *al-Ṭali'ah, al-Mujama'*, and *al-Balāgh* were ordered to suspend publication for 3 weeks for violating the Press Law. *Al-Risālah* was charged with "harming relations between Kuwayt and brotherly countries" by criticizing Arab leaders for accepting the US ceasefire proposal.

Sept. 21: Middle East Economic Digest reported Kuwayt announced suspensions of its £20m subsidy to Jordan.

Oct. 20: In a speech at the opening of the National Assembly the Prime Minister said Kuwayt would accept no settlement not agreed to by the Palestinians, welcomed the accession of Sulṭān Qabūs bin Sa'īd in Oman and expressed hope that the Gulf Federation would be founded soon.

Oct. 23: Middle East Economic Digest reported that the USSR signed an agreement with Kuwayt National Petroleum Company under which Kuwayt will supply refined oil to customers of the USSR in Asia while the USSR will supply customers of Kuwayt in Europe.

Lebanon

(*See also* Arab Israeli Conflict, General)

1970

Aug. 17: Minister of Economy Sulaymān Faranjiyyah was elected President by a 50 to 49 vote in parliament over Ilyās Sarkīs, governor of the Central Bank.

Aug. 24: Arab commandos and "pro-Egyptian" Lebanese clashed in Sidon.

Aug. 25: Three hundred villagers from Shabah demonstrated in Beirut for protection from Israeli raids.

Aug. 27: The government endorsed an agreement with commandos ending disturbances in Sidon.

Sept. 3: Interior Minister Kamāl Junblāṭ charged that 2 parliamentary deputies were involved in hashish smuggling.

Sept. 12: Foreign Minister Nasīm Majdalānī said the government would present a bill to parliament providing for prosecution and imprisonment of airplane hijackers.

Sept. 19: The New York Times reported the government announced an investigation into illegal hashish smuggling.

Sept. 20: President Charles Ḥilū said agricultural and industrial output had trebled during his administration "as a result of close cooperation between the public and private sectors" and agricultural exports had increased 40%.

Sept. 23: Sulaymān Faranjiyyah assumed the Presidency. In an address to the Chamber he said Lebanon would "work to strengthen the ties . . . with Arab states." He added that Lebanon would "remain strong in its cooperation . . . with fraternal Arab states on the basis of mutual respect for the sovereignty and system of each state" and that Palestine is a holy land for all Arabs and "Lebanon will always strive for the owners' right to return."

Oct. 3: Premier Rashīd Karāmī and the Cabinet resigned.

Oct. 5: A plane carrying guerrillas from Baghdad was turned back from Beirut airport.

President Faranjiyyah named Sa'ib Salām Prime Minister.

Prime Minister Sa'ib Salām said he was asked to form a new government and that it must "carry out a revolution at the top" to break away from outdated methods of government "to avoid a revolution from the lower levels."

Oct. 13: The following Cabinet was appointed:

Sa'ib Salām: *Prime Minister, Interior*
Ghassān Tuwaynī: *Deputy Prime Minister, Education Fine Arts, Information*
Henri Iddih (Eddé): *Public Works, Transport*
Ḥasan Musharrafiyah: *General Planning*
Sa'ib Nadīm Jarūdi: *National Economy, Tourism*
Edward Ṣawmah: *Agriculture, National Defense*
Jamīl Kibbih: *Justice, Post, Telegraph and Telephone*
Emil Biṭār: *Public Health*
Ilyās Sabā: *Finance*
Ja'far Sharaf al-Dīn: *Water and Electricity*
Munīr Ḥamdān: *Labor and Social Affairs*
Khalīl Abū Ḥamad: *Foreign and Expatriates Affairs*

Oct. 22: The parliament gave the new Cabinet a vote of confidence by 78 votes to 1.

Oct. 23: President Faranjiyyah ordered investigation of charges of corruption in 3 major government projects involving losses to the treasury of £L 70m.

Oct. 27: The New York Times reported "highly placed Lebanese informants" saying the government was pressing guerrillas not to fire rockets into Israel from Lebanon following protests by villagers fearing Israeli retaliation.

Oct. 31: The New York Times reported that Yāsir 'Arafāt met with guerrilla leaders in Lebanon and agreed to centralize fund raising activities, to close certain provincial offices, and cease wearing uniforms and carrying arms in public to smooth relations with the Lebanese government.

Libya

(*See also* Arab Israeli Conflict, General, Jordan, Syria)

1970

Aug. 4: Middle East Economic Digest reported Esso Libya was ordered to cut production by 110,000 barrels per day as of Sept. 5.

Aug. 19: The government ordered Occidental Petroleum to cut its production from 500,000 to 440,000 barrels per day.

Sept. 1: Celebrations were held marking the first anniversary of the revolution. President Mu'ammar Qadhdhāfī said he rejects the old forms of Arab unity, "agreements and treaties . . . which should only exist between foriegn countries," and the old methods and means of the Arab League.

Sept. 4: Occidental Petroleum Corp. announced agreement to an increase of the posted price from $2.23 to $2.53 per barrel and said full production of 800,000 barrels per day was resumed on Sept. 2.

Sept. 5: A government spokesman said all financial assistance to Jordan would cease because it was "not being used for its intended purpose."

Sept. 7: The government announced it would not join the Arab League committee to mediate the dispute in Jordan because it had done so before "but neither of the two parties honored their commitments."

Sept. 11: Middle East Economic Digest reported "Tripoli papers" saying 905 foreigners "with high salaries" were ordered to leave the country.

Sept. 16: Prime Minister Qadhdhāfī announced the following Cabinet changes:

Capt. Muḥammad Najm: *Foreign Affairs*
Capt. 'Abd al-Mun'im Ṭāhir Hunī: *Interior*
Capt. Mukhtār 'Abdallāh Jarwī: *Communications & Public Works*
Muḥammad 'Alī Tabū: *Agriculture*

Sept. 18: The Revolution Command Council (RCC) said Libya would not participate in the Arab League conciliation committee for Jordan until the fighting stopped.

Sept. 20: The RCC said it would take "individual action to support the Palestinian people if the Jordanian conflict is not settled in 24 hours."

Sept. 23: Le Monde reported Libya withdrew from the Maghrib Permanent Consultative Committee.

Sept. 26: The Libyan Ambassador in Cairo said Libya severed diplomatic relations with Jordan.

Sept. 28: Esso and British Petroleum announced a $.30 per barrel increase in posted price of Libyan crude.

Sept. 30: The RCC decided to donate £Lib 2m to the Palestinian guerrillas.

Oct. 8: Esso Libya concluded an agreement for a $.30 per barrel price rise and a 5% surtax effective Sept. 1.

Oct. 9: British Petroleum and Mobil said agreements were concluded calling for a $.30 per barrel price rise and a 5% surtax effective Sept. 1.

Oct. 17: The government announced appointments of Major 'Abd al-Salām Jalūd as Minister of Finance and Major Khawayldī Ḥamīdī as Minister of Interior replacing 2 ministers who resigned.

Oct. 29: Talks dealing with Libyan-British relations resumed in London.

Nov. 2: Economy Minister Jalūd said that a canceled air defense contract with British Aircraft Corp. which had been paid in part by Libya was the "key which will open or close the door to further negotiations" and warned that "outstanding problems" would stand in the way of British commerce in Libya.

Morocco

(*See also* General, Algeria, Saudi Arabia)

1970

Aug. 20: King Hasan said there was "widespread corruption . . . sometimes at high levels" and promised to take action to stamp it out.

Aug. 29: The Interior Ministry released preliminary figures showing supporters of King Hasan won 84 of 90 seats in elections to the Chamber of Representatives.

Officials indicated 21 members of the 240 man Chamber of Representatives are members of opposition parties.

Sept. 17: King Hasan announced Cabinet changes.

Abd al-Hafid Boutaleb: *Labor*
Ahmad Ben Boushta: *Justice*

Egypt signed an agreement to raise trade from $9m to $12m.

Sept. 28: Muhammad Barrada, editor of *L'Opinion,* was arrested and charged with "publication in bad faith of false news."

Oct. 2: King Hasan announced 3 Cabinet changes:

General Muhammad Mezziane: *State*
Muhammad Bahnini: *Defense*
Ahmad Osman: *Administration Affairs*

Foreign Minister Boutaleb speaking at the UN urged Spain to "heed appeals by the United Nations to let the people of the Spanish Sahara decide their own future."

Oct 9: Parliament opened its session.

Oct. 11: The Parliament elected Abdelhadi Boutaleb as speaker.

Oct. 12: King Hasan appointed Dr. Yusuf Bel Abbes as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Oct. 23: King Hasan opened at Ait Abdel the first of 6 dams included in the 1968-72 5-year plan.

Nov. 3: The government denied the existence of any foreign military or strategic bases in Morocco but added that "a certain number of American technicians" were at an aviation and telecommunications school at Kenitra.

Pakistan

1970

Aug. 29: Iraqi Vice President Ḥardān al-Takrītī left after a 5-day visit.

Sept. 8: The New York Times quoted Indian "sources" saying Pakistan received military aid from China including 6 squadrons of jet fighters since April. The sources experssed concern over an alleged military buildup in Pakistani-held Kashmir.

Sept. 24: The government denied Indian charges of a troop buildup along the Kashmir cease-fire line.

Sept. 25: The Jamiat-i Islami, the Pakistan Democratic Party and "six like-minded religious organizations" announced the formation of a United Islamic Front which would "collaborate during the general elections" and "frustrate all attempts to delay elections." The Front said it would nominate 62 candidates to the National Assembly.

Oct. 9: The government confirmed that the US agreed to supply "limited replacements" for military equipment delivered before Sept. 1965.

Oct. 10: A US State Department spokesman said the US would supply Pakistan with unspecified quantities of arms.

US officials said the sale of arms to Pakistan would not upset the military balance with India and was "a one-time, limited exception to the embargo."

Oct. 19: The President issued a decree investing the Supreme Judicial Council "with the same powers as a supreme court for holding inquiries into any matter referred to it and awarding punishment in certain respects" according to *Karachi Radio.*

Oct. 21: President Yahya Khan said in New York that the "uproar" over US arms sales to Pakistan was unjustified as the arms were "simple, outdated and outmoded."

Oct. 25: The Chinese Embassy denied charges by the press and some politicians that China has interfered in Pakistan's internal affairs.

Oct. 30: Elections were held in Kashmir for a 25-member legislative assembly.

Nov. 1: Polish Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Zygfryd Wolinak and 3 Pakistanis were killed when a truck ran into a group of people at Karachi Airport.

Polish President Spychalski left after a 4-day visit. A joint communiqué said talks were held on bilateral relations and international issues and "a fundamental convergence of opinions . . . in most of these problems was noted."

Nov. 11: President Yahya Khan arrived in Peking for a 5-day visit and was received warmly.

Nov. 15: A cyclone struck the coast of East Pakistan. *Eastern News* of Dacca estimated 200,000 people were killed.

Persian Gulf

(*See also* Iran)

1970

Aug. 20: The meeting of the deputy rulers of 9 Gulf states concerning the proposed federation to be held Aug. 22 was postponed to mid-September.

Sept. 4: Middle East Economic Digest reported Omani Prime Minister Ṭāriq Bin Ṭaymūr saying Oman plans to apply for UN and Arab League membership "to make ourselves known to the world." He added that a parliament and government "representative of the people" would be set up in accordance with a popularly approved constitution.

Sept. 6: A 3-man delegation from Baḥrayn arrived in Tehran for preliminary talks on demarcation of territorial waters.

Sept. 11: British envoy Sir William Luce ended his talks with Gulf rulers.

Sept. 22: Sir William Luce said in Cairo Britain was not insisting on formation of a Gulf Federation as a condition for withdrawal of British forces but was trying "very hard" to implement federation.

Oct. 2: Middle East Economic Digest reported Baḥrayn applied for OPEC membership.

Oct. 13: Luce returned to Baḥrayn for "further consultations."

Oct. 14: The London Financial Times reported that Iran warned Britain it will not recognize a Gulf Federation unless Iranian claims to Abu Musa and the Tumbs islands were not accepted.

Oct. 20: Oman's Prime Minister said the Sultanate must settle internal problems and could not join an Arab Gulf Federation, but might be willing to join in "a loose union" at a later date.

Oct. 25: The meeting of 9 Arab amirates to discuss federation scheduled for Oct. 26 was postponed.

Saudi Arabia

(*See also* Arab Israeli Conflict, General, UAR, Yemen)

1970

Aug. 2: Middle East Economic Digest reported an agreement establishing regular air traffic with the Yemeni Arab Republic was signed.

Sept. 2: The government announced the budget for 1970-71 would be a record SR 6,380m and would include for the first time a personal income tax to offset losses from the closure of Tapline.

Sept. 7: The Cabinet ratified the 5-year plan intended to develop human skills and diversify sources of national income.

Sept. 9: The Health Ministry announced some cholera cases had been diagnosed in Hufuf.

Sept. 18: A royal decree forbade to foreigners ownership of houses or real estate excepting diplomatic property, commercial concerns under the Foreign Capital Investment Act and by royal consent through the Interior Ministry.

Sept. 20: The trade agreement with Morocco was extended for 2 years it was announced.

Sept. 23: King Fayṣal left for Cairo to attend the Arab summit conference on the Jordan crisis.

Oct. 2: Middle East Economic Digest reported Shaykh Muḥammad Bin 'Alī Ḥarkān was appointed Minister of Justice.

Oct. 5: King Fayṣal underwent an operation in Switzerland for "glandular hernia" according to *Riyadh Radio.*

Oct. 6: The *Middle East News Agency* reported the UAR ratified an agreement for compensation of Saudi owners of funds and land nationalized in Egypt.

Oct. 16: Middle East Economic Digest reported the Monetary Agency's report showed GNP rose 9.5% in the year 1388/89 (1969).

Nov. 10: An airliner en route from Jordan to Jiddah was hijacked to Syria.

South Yemen

(*See also* Arab Israeli Conflict)

1970

Aug. 28: Middle East Economic Digest reported the People's Republic of China agreed to a loan of £18m, repayable over 20 years, to be used for roads, a textile factory and agricultural projects.

Sept. 13: The government decided to terminate the British technical mission working with the air force and replace it with Arab technicians.

Oct. 2: Middle East Economic Digest reported Prime Minister Muḥammad 'Alī Haytham denied the USSR "is building a military base on one of Southern Yemen's Islands."

Oct. 9: Middle East Economic Digest reported the Council of Ministers approved a resolution to encourage local industry by allocation of free land for factories and supply of water and electricity at reduced rates.

Nov. 9: The government decreed all lands and property of former sultans, amirs and ministers of the old régime would be confiscated without compensation.

The New York Times reported a new radio station called *Radio Free South* began broadcasting "this week" in opposition to the "communists and atheists" of the government. The station called for a state based on Islām and free of foreign ideology and claimed several military victories.

Sudan

(*See also* General, Jordan, UAR)

1970

Aug. 16: North Korea signed an agreement with President Ja'far Muḥammad Numayrī for "economic and technical assistance."

Aug. 18: President Numayrī returned from visits to the People's Republic of China and North Korea.

Aug. 25: Numayrī announced that all press and local news agencies were nationalized.

Aug. 26: The *Middle East News Agency* reported a plot against the government was foiled on Aug. 20.

Aug. 26: The Revolution Command Council (RCC) decreed all newspapers and news agencies were nationalized.

Aug. 28: Middle East Economic Digest reported the Minister of Agriculture as saying the Agricultural Production Corporation will be dissolved and 5 regional corporations established to operate "in complete decentralisation and freedom from routine practices," as of January 1971.

Sept. 11: Middle East Economic Digest reported the government announced development projects for the south worth £Sud 11.5m to be undertaken over a 5-year period. Included were wells, public works, health projects, a tannery, and forestry projects.

Sept. 16: The *Sudan Daily News* reported 9 members of the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood were arrested in Khartum.

Sept. 27: A North Korean delegation left after a 2 week visit.

Oct. 11: Minister of Local Government Abū al-Qāsim Ibrāhīm said the government would support a trade union movement in the south and urged "the organization of farmers in the South."

Oct. 15: The government announced that amnesty for rebels in the south was extended 1 year.

Oct. 25: Cairo Radio said a British fact-finding delegation in the south reported the "mutiny" was ended except for sporadic clashes in Equatoria province.

Nov. 8: Defense Minister Ḥasan 'Abbās said the army recently inflicted heavy losses on southern rebels and discovered "Israeli mercenaries" in the region.

The New York Times reported 2 representatives of the "Southern Sudan Liberation Front" arrived in New York "to interest the UN in the fate of 4 million Africans in the Southern Sudan who have been subjected to Arab colonial rule."

Syrian Arab Republic

(*See also* Arab Israeli Conflict, General, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey)

1970

Aug. 19: Beirut's *al-Riyah* said Damascus had foiled an Iraqi plot to overthrow the government.

Aug. 20: The New York Times reported "Arab diplomats" confirming reports that an Iraqi plot to overthrow the Atāsī regime "with active support from Iraqi troops stationed in Jordan and Syria" was defeated.

Aug. 23: Damascus Radio reported Libya signed agreements for economic cooperation and scientific cooperation.

Aug. 25: The 17th Damascus International Fair opened.

Sept. 7: An Iraqi delegation led by 'Abd al-Khāliq al-Sāmarrā'ī, a member of the Revolution Command Council, arrived in Damascus for talks.

Sept. 10: Lebanon agreed to sign a new trade agreement to replace one signed in 1953.

Sept. 15: Turkish Trade Minister Gurhan Titrek arrived for talks with the Minister of Economy.

Sept. 21: The Foreign Ministry denied that Syrian forces invaded Jordan and said the reports were "preparatory to American military intervention in the area."

Oct. 17: Diplomatic sources in Beirut said President Nūr al-dīn al-Atāsī submitted his resignation which was accepted by Defense Minister Lt. General Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad.

Oct. 23: The Arab World reported al-Atāsī agreed to "freeze" his resignation as head of state and Premier pending the outcome of the projected Pan Arab Conference of the Ba'th Party.

Oct. 31: The special Pan Arab Conference of the Ba'th Party opened in Damascus, presided over by Atāsī, to discuss leadership.

Nov. 13: Defense Minister Asad placed President Atāsī and General Ṣalāḥ al-Jadīd under arrest and assumed control of the country.

Nov. 14: The New York Times reported that tanks and armored cars surrounded commando camps near Damascus and Gen. Asad replaced commando officers with regular army officers.

Tunisia

(*See also* Jordan)

1970

Aug. 23: Minister of Agriculture Abdallah Farhat announced taxes would be reduced in the agricultural sector and farmers would be supplied with seed and fertilizer at reduced prices.

Sept. 7: Minister of Interior Ahmad Mestiri said the Constitution would be reformed by the end of 1970.

Sept. 10: President Bourguiba said of the Destour Party: "The true militants . . . have been pushed aside by careerists . . . the base has been contaminated. For this reason I am not willing to call a congress."

Sept. 19: President Bourguiba called for an Arab summit meeting to deal with the Jordanian crisis.

Sept. 27: Foreign Minister Muhammad Masmoudi said the *Chargé d'Affaires* in Jordan had been withdrawn in protest against "the attitude of the Jordanian leaders" against the Palestinians.

Sept. 30: It was reported that Canada granted $3m for the purchase of wheat.

Oct. 13: The National Committee of Destour militants held its first meeting.

Oct. 16: Middle East Economic Digest reported AID has agreed to a loan of $10m for "services and commodities" payable over 40 years at 3%.

Oct. 24: The Minister of Finance announced fiscal reforms dealing with customs, agricultural taxes and taxes on turnovers.

Nov. 2: Hadi Nouira was appointed Premier to replace Bahi Ladgham.

Nov. 6: Prime Minister Nouira announced the following Cabinet:

Muhammad Fitouri: *Justice*
Muhammad Masmoudi: *Foreign Affairs*
Ahmad Mestiri: *Interior*
Hasib Bin Ammar: *Defense*
Abd al-Razzaq Rasaa: *Finance*
Tijani Shalli: *Economy*
Abdallah Farhat: *Agriculture*
Shadli Ayari: *Education*
Dris Guiga: *Health*
Lasaad Bin Osman: *Public Works*
Habib Bularis: *Culture and Information*
Mansur Mualla: *Planning*
Bakkar Tuzani: *Government's Secretariat General*
Tahar Belkhoja: *Youth and Sport*

Turkey

(*See also* Arab Israeli Conflict, Syria)

1970

Aug. 23: The Soviet Union agreed to loan $113.7m for a steel mill at Iskenderun.

Aug. 24: Three 1943 warships bought from the US were delivered.

Aug. 26: The government asked the Metropolitan

Museum in New York to supply details on a hoard of antiquities allegedly smuggled out of Turkey.

Aug. 30: The Jerusalem Post reported 50 generals and admirals and 516 colonels were retired from the armed forces. Gen. Faruk Gurlar replaced Nazmi Karakoç as Commander-in-Chief of the land forces. Gen. Faik Turun replaced General Atalay as commander of the First Army in Istanbul and martial law commander.

Sept. 8: Foreign Minister Çağlayangil met with Iranian Foreign Minister Zahedi.

Sept. 9: Japan announced readiness to provide $30m credit for roads, bridges and dams.

Sept. 10: Officials announced rejection of US appeals for a total ban on cultivation of opium poppies.

Sept. 14: Prime Minister Demirel said martial law in Istanbul would not be extended and would expire on Sept. 16.

Sept. 16: Martial law in Istanbul and Kocaeli was lifted.

Oct. 9: A joint communiqué was issued following Demirel's 5-day visit to Bulgaria agreeing to establish a commission to study possibilities for a long-term trade agreement.

Oct. 15: A Soviet airliner was hijacked to Trabzon.

Oct. 16: Tass called on Turkey to extradite the 2 hijackers who were arrested by police in Trabzon.

The Health Ministry said the country faces the possibility of a cholera epidemic. The death toll rose to 27 in Istanbul with 500 patients in hospitals with cholera symptoms.

Oct. 17: The courts ordered the release of 2 Soviet airline hijackers on the ground that their act was political not criminal.

The Güven Party, the Nation Party and the New Turkey Party announced a decision to merge as the Turkish Nation and Güven Party.

Health Minister Vedat Ozkan announced that no cholera has been reported in Ankara.

The US State Department said it received a request on Oct. 16 from Turkey for 3m doses of cholera vaccine.

Oct. 20: Minister of Communications Nahit Menteşe announced Ishikawajima-Harima of Japan signed a protocol for construction of a shipyard at Pendik.

Isvestia warned that failure to extradite 2 airplane hijackers would "cast a shadow" over Turkish-Soviet relations.

A government spokesman said Russia would sign an agreement granting transport of goods and passengers from Russia through eastern Turkey to Syria and Iraq.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development said credit worth $115m was granted to provide external financial support for the government's program.

Oct. 22: The Soviet Union announced a US Air Force plane carrying 2 American generals and a Turk had violated Soviet airspace and landed in Soviet Armenia.

Oct. 27: A small Russian plane was hijacked to Sinop.

United Arab Republic

(*See also* Arab Israeli Conflict, General, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Libya, Saudi Arabia)

1970

Aug. 20: Jordan's King Ḥusayn arrived in Cairo with Sulāymān Nabūlsī for talks with Egyptian officials.

Aug. 21: The *Middle East News Agency (MENA)* reported that Iraqi citizens in Cairo were engaged in "anti-Egyptian, conspiratorial activities."

Aug. 22: Thirteen persons were killed and 54 injured when a Cairo to Aswan train overturned in Tamuk.

Aug. 23: King Ḥusayn completed talks with President Nāṣir. *Voice of the Arabs* quoting a correspondent for *al-Ahrām* said 3 issues were discussed: coordination of action in the Palestine problem; the interests of the Palestinian guerrillas; and the presence of Iraqi troops on Jordanian soil.

Aug. 26: Yāsir 'Arafāt conferred with Nāṣir in Cairo.

Aug. 29: Jordan signed a protocol for 1970/71 to increase trade from £E 3m to £E 4.5m.

Sept. 1: Al-Ahrām reported an agreement was signed under which Egypt would manage Libya's 2 major airports.

Sept. 8: Al-Ahrām said the hijackings do not "encourage world feeling of solidarity with the Palestinian cause."

Following a visit by Nigerian President Gowon a joint communiqué was issued expressing support for the Organization of African Unity and all its principles and resolutions. Gowon thanked the UAR for "unlimited support for Nigeria during its crisis."

Sept. 9: Minister of Agriculture Sayyid Mar'ī said agricultural production rose 20% in 3 years, cotton was up 29%, sugar cane 17%, and rice 11.5%.

Cairo, Assuit and Luxor airports were closed by security troops to prevent landing of a hijacked BOAC jet.

Sept. 10: A communiqué of the UAR-Sudanese Economic Coordination Council said trade will increase from £E 20.5m to £E 22.5m.

The New York Times reported a "high official source . . . reflecting government opinion" as saying "We don't support hijacking by any side."

Sept. 12: Egyptian authorities turned over to the US "secret NATO documents" found in the wreckage of the hijacked Pan American jet destroyed at Cairo Airport.

Sept. 17: MENA reported a man attempted to hijack a Cairo to Luxor airliner to Saudi Arabia but was subdued by security guards.

Sept. 23: A communiqué was issued on the end of the first stage of EEC talks saying "favorable prospects" emerged for continuation of the talks.

Sept. 28: President Nāṣir died of a heart attack at 6:00 p.m. Vice President Anwar al-Sādāt took over as interim President.

Sept. 29: A "maximum alert" was declared along the Suez Canal.

US President Nixon pledged to seek good relations with Nāṣir's successor and urged Cairo to honor the cease-fire.

The USSR said "the line aimed at a political settlement of the conflict in the Middle East and convincingly championed by the late President Nasser will continue to enjoy our utmost support."

Oct. 1: President Nāṣir was buried. The funeral was attended by HEW Secretary Elliot Richardson of the US and Aleksei Kosygin of the USSR in addition to the heads of the Arab states. Millions gathered to see the funeral cortège pass.

US representative to Nāṣir's funeral Richardson met with Minister of National Guidance Muḥammad Haykal.

Russia's Premier Kosygin met with Interim President al-Sādāt.

Oct. 5: The executive committee of the Arab Socialist Union recommended Sādāt to succeed Nāṣir.

Oct. 6: The USSR appointed Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Vinogradov as Ambassador to Egypt succeeding the late Sergei Vinogradov.

Oct. 7: The National Assembly nominated unanimously Sādāt to succeed Nāṣir. Sādāt told the Assembly he would pursue Nāṣir's policies of unity for the Arab world, defining the nation's enemies, maintaining nonalignment, supporting the national liberation movement and defending Egypt's socialist gains.

Oct. 15: A plebiscite was held to elect Sādāt as President.

Oct. 16: The government announced Sādāt was endorsed as President by 90.04% of the voters in the plebiscite.

Oct. 17: Sādāt was sworn in as President.

Oct. 18: Haykal resigned as Minister of National Guidance.

Oct. 20: Maḥmūd Fawzī was named Prime Minister.

Oct. 21: The Christian Science Monitor reported that the government sent the US a plan for reopening and enlarging the Suez Canal, intended to "break the worsening US-Soviet deadlock" in the area.

Premier Fawzī was sworn in along with a new cabinet.

Muḥammad Ṣidqī Sulaymān: *Electricity*
Kamāl al-Dīn Rif'āt: *Labour*
'Azīz Ṣidqī: *Industry, Oil and Mineral Wealth*
Sarwat 'Akāshah: *Culture*
Sayyid Mar'ī: *Agriculture & Agrarian Reform*
Ḥasan 'Abbās Zakī: *Economy & Foreign Trade*
Maḥmūd Riyāḍ: *Foreign Affairs*
Sharāwī Jum'ah: *Interior*
Amīn Ḥuwaydī: *State*
Muḥammad Fā'iq: *National Guidance*
Kamāl Abadīr: *Communications*
Muḥammad 'Abdallāh Marzabān: *Supply & Internal Trade*
Lt. Gen. Muḥammad Fawzī: *War*
Ibrāhīm Zakī Qanāwī: *Irrigation*
'Alī Zayn Āl-Abidīn Ṣāliḥ: *Transport*
Aḥmad Muṣṭafā Aḥmad: *Scientific Research*
Sayyid Jādallāh: *Planning*
Ḥasan Muṣṭafā: *Housing*
Muḥammad Bākir Aḥmad: *Land Reclamation*
'Abd al-'Azīz Muḥammad Ḥijāzī: *Treasury*
Muḥammad Ḥāfiẓ Ghānim: *Education*
Muḥammad Sayf al-Dīn Abū al-'Izz: *Youth*
Muḥammad Hamdī 'Ashūr: *Local Administration*
'Abd al-'Azīz Kāmil: *Waqfs & Azhar Affairs*
'Abd al-Wahhāb al-Burulūsī: *Higher Education*
Ḥafīẓ 'Alī Badawī: *Social Affairs*
'Abduh Maḥmūd Salām: *Health*
Muṣṭafā Ismā'īl: *Justice*
Muḥammad 'Awaḍ al-Qūnī: *Tourism*
Muḥammad al-Tahāmī: *State*
Muḥammad Sa'd Zayyid: *State*
Sāmī Sharaf: *State*

Oct. 29: Sādāt toured the Suez front and told army personnel: "You can be sure that we will not allow the cease-fire to become permanent."

Oct. 31: Sādāt appointed Ḥusayn al-Shāfi'ī Alī Ṣabrī to be Vice President.

The Cabinet ordered cuts of 10 to 15% on certain consumer goods prices, including tea, sugar, radios and shoes, and $2.3m was allocated for construction of 400 health centers throughout the country.

Nov. 5: 'Alī Maḥmūd, Egyptian editor of *Associated Press,* was released after 2 years imprisonment on charges of spying for Israel.

Nov. 6: Ceremonies commemorated the 40th day since Nāṣir's death.

Nov. 12: Sādāt said the USSR agreed to increase support to Egypt to offset pressures caused by the death of Nāṣir.

Yemen

(See also Arab Israeli Conflict, Saudi Arabia)

1970

Aug. 18: Midde East News Agency reported the heaviest rain in 10 years fell but too late to alleviate the famine.

Sept. 9: Iran recognized the Republic.

Sept. 26: The government prohibited the carrying of arms in main cities.

Oct. 3: Postmaster General Muḥammad 'Abdallāh Zayd held a meeting with the Saudi Communications Minister and it was agreed that postal services should be started between the 2 countries.

Oct. 11: Ambassadors were exchanged with Saudi Arabia.

MODERN HISTORY REVIEW

THE UNITED STATES AND THE 1940-1941 ANGLO-IRAQI CRISIS

American Policy in Transition

James A. Thorpe

American policy in the Middle East before the Second World War was limited to upholding the open door while otherwise acquiescing to British leadership. With the outbreak of the war, however, the area took on greater importance in Washington. While the German invasion of Russia in June 1941 emphasized the Middle East's rôle as a major supply route to the Soviet Union, the region had strategic importance before that event. Referring to the German threat of penetration into Syria and Iraq in 1941, Secretary of State Cordell Hull noted that "in my eyes the Near East offered the greatest danger of the war, the possible juncture of German and Japanese forces, effectively cutting the world in two." The Secretary was also cognizant of the need to protect American economic interests and of the strategic and economic blow the loss of the area would deliver the Allies. American prestige had, after all, been built up by over a century of political non-intervention and philanthropical, missionary and educational service. Hull, while still viewing responsibility there to be primarily British, believed the United States should use its unique position to emphasize to the Middle East the military potential of the Allies, the resulting hardships of an Axis victory, the economic and political benefits of an Allied triumph, and an American promise of postwar support for independence if sincere wartime assistance was given. While British concern over repercussions in Palestine precluded any such policy statement, the Secretary thought the United States should not give up its desire for greater participation in Middle Eastern affairs.[1] The serious Nazi threat of penetration into the Middle East in the Anglo-Iraqi crisis of mid-1940 to mid-1941 disclosed both increased American interest in the area and the continuance of a generally non-interventionist policy.

American Involvement After the Fall of France

American policy in Iraq before the Second World War followed that of the Middle East in general in its indifference. Even in the late 1930s when Axis influence was growing rapidly, the United States was not as concerned as were the British. Indeed, not even American oil interests, once they had been included in

---

[1] Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, II (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1948), pp. 1498-1500 (quote 1498). About one-fourth of American assistance to Russia during World War II went through the "Persian Corridor," which included Iraq. See T. H. Vil Motter, *The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1952) and British Central Office of Information, *Paiforce: The Official Story of the Persian and Iraq Command, 1941-1946* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948). American Middle Eastern policy before the Second World War is most intensively studied in John A. De Novo, *American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1939* (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota, 1963).

△ JAMES A. THORPE is an instructor of history at Wisconsin State University, Stevens Point. He would like to acknowledge the helpful suggestions of Miss Elizabeth Monroe, St. Antony's College, Oxford Univ.

the Iraq Petroleum Company, greatly concerned Washington. Britain had primary responsibility and there was a lack of desire to become embroiled in international conflict. After the fall of France in mid-1940, however, the United States discarded its traditional policy for a more active one in urging strong support for the British.[2] While Iraq had no diplomatic representative in Washington until May 4, 1942, the United States was represented in Baghdad by its Minister Resident Paul Knabenshue, a fifty-six-year-old man who, after a brief business career in the United States, entered the consular service in his early twenties and saw service in Belfast, Cairo and Jerusalem before acquiring his diplomatic post in Baghdad in 1932.[3]

With the fall of France, Knabenshue became alarmed at the resulting growth of unrest in Iraq. On May 29, 1940, he reported to Secretary Hull that during the previous weeks "the bazaars have been full of alarming rumors . . . and there was a general fear that disturbances were imminent." Emphasizing the seriousness, he explained he had not previously visualized the feasibility of an Axis attack upon the country or any difficulty protecting and evacuating Americans until the recent success, especially in Norway, of Axis air attacks, parachutists and fifth columnists. The American Minister expressed particular alarm over junior army officers, whom he thought to be pro-German, the attitude of the German-educated students, the number of converts that former German Minister Dr. Fritz Grobba made during his stay, and the existence in Iraq of the exiled Muftī of Jerusalem, Hajj Amīn al-Ḥusaynī, and his four to five hundred followers. While acknowledging Iraqi surprise over Allied reversals, Knabenshue cautioned that most alleged pro-German Iraqis were not really such, but were merely using the opportunity to squeeze British concessions on Palestine and treaty rights in Iraq and that "I believe that there is no question but that the Arabs not only would prefer British influence here, but that they would fear German influence." He admitted, however, that he could not predict Iraqi policy should the Allies suffer continued reversals. In particular he feared that violence against Jews, which he thought imminent, would lead to attacks on native Christians, Britons and Americans if the Iraqi government did not take a strong position. After separate talks with British Ambassador Sir Basil Newton and Iraqi Foreign Minister Nūrī al-Sa'īd, whom Rāshid 'Alī al-Gaylānī had displaced as Prime Minister in March of 1940, in which both agreed that something indeed had to be done, Knabenshue, in a Sa'īd arranged conference with Gaylānī, emphasized that Americans were in danger, that the American Legation would use arms if needed, that the Iraqi public was not sufficiently informed of their government's position, and that his representations were solely for the sake of protecting American nationals. While Gaylānī thought the situation not so grave, he admitted a potential fifth column existed, and immediately urged newspaper editors to publish warnings against false rumors and German agents. Moreover, the Minister of Defense cautioned all officers against pro-German or anti-British activities and the secret police reportedly was strengthened to cope with German agents.[4]

While the unrest of May was followed by a

---

2. De Novo, *ibid.*, pp. 347-354. The United States had economic interests in Iraq. Through the Near East Development Corporation, consisting of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and Socony Vacuum Oil Company, Americans had a 23¾ per cent share of the Iraq Petroleum Company. From the viewpoint of the United States, American trade with Iraq was slight, but to the Iraqis it was more important. British imports into Iraq were predominant, at about one-third total imports, but the United States accounted for about one-eighth (primarily machinery and vehicles). In Iraqi exports abroad, the British received one-third and the Americans one-fourth (mainly dates and agricultural products). Herbert Feis, *Petroleum and American Foreign Policy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1944), pp. 31-32; British Naval Intelligence, *Iraq* (London: Oxford University Press, 1944), pp. 304-306.

3. Department of State, *Register, 1940* (Washington: USGPO, 1940). For 'Alī Jawdāt's presentation of credentials as Minister to the United States see Department of State, *Bulletin*, VI (Washington: USGPO, 1942), 403-404.

4. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1940*, III (Washington: USGPO, 1958), 703-708 (quotes 704, 705). This series hereafter will be abbreviated *FR*.

relatively quiet summer, tension again mounted by fall. Although attributing the improved situation of previous weeks to greater credibility given to British war reports and to the impact of American defense buildup and assistance to Britain, Knabenshue noted in his August 29 report that some Iraqi pan-Arabists were beginning to renew pressure for British action in Palestine, that the Muftī was spreading false rumors about British activity there, and that a new Cabinet might be expected. On November 14, Knabenshue noted intensifying unrest, the cause of which he thought to be the discouragement and resentment over British Prime Minister Winston Churchill's emphatic refusal to do anything about the Palestine question until after the war. The American Minister emphasized that Axis agents, German and Italian radio broadcasts, and Iraqi politicians "egged on" by the Muftī and his followers had "seriously aggravated the situation" in the last few months. He did not think, however, that current anti-British sentiment would interfere with Britain's war effort unless the Germans invaded and forced British forces to evacuate. While expressing his confidence that Iraqi politicians and senior army officers would try to protect Britishers, Knabenshue noted that some young Iraqi officers had stated they would not allow British subjects to leave the country alive during a German invasion. He stated that despite the presence of responsible men in the government and army, the existence of extremists and fifth columnists would pose serious problems. On November 21 the American Chargé reported that two German agents had arrived to help restore Iraqi-German diplomatic relations, which, unlike those with Italy, had been severed by the Sa'īd government immediately after the war's outbreak. Restoration of telegraphic ties between Iraq, Germany and Italy, failure to break relations with Italy, failure to suppress pro-German propaganda, failure to clarify prospects of renewed German relations and repression of press criticism aimed at the October German declaration of Arab friendship were among the specific charges made by British Ambassador Newton to the Regent and Gaylānī in demanding the latter's removal. In his November 30 report Knabenshue believed that both Turkish desire to maintain Iraqi transit and British ability to apply economic pressure would force the Iraqis to capitulate.[5]

While Secretary Hull was cognizant of the need for American support of Britain, he desired to keep such a policy consistent with the tradition of American non-involvement in the area. On December 3 Hull instructed Knabenshue to inform Baghdad that "the United States Government has adopted as a firm and fundamental policy the rendering to Great Britain in the present struggle of all possible aid short of war," that "any decision or action of the Iraqi Government which might result in a less cooperative attitude in its relations with Great Britain could not fail to create a most painful impression in the United States," and that "according to our information, defeat of the British would endanger the independent existence of Iraq as well as all other States of the Near and Middle East." Knabenshue was urged to so inform the British Ambassador and to see if the Turkish representative might consider "parallel action." In view of the Cabinet's decision, reached after consultation with tribal, political and military leaders, to resist British pressure for dissolution, the American Minister informed Gaylānī on December 5 that while the United States did not want to interfere in Iraqi domestic affairs the world situation made some things of international significance, and that while Gaylānī's espousal of the 1930 treaty of alliance was laudable the contrary rumors should be publically denied. Although British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax, in a response to an Iraqi request for confirmation of Newton's strong position, had upheld the Ambassador's view on British loss of faith in the Iraqi government, he stressed that the method of rectification was up to the Iraqis themselves. While Newton had informed Knabenshue of this, the Ambassador still insisted on Gaylānī's removal. On December 10 the American Minister reported that Newton now advocated economic pressure to force the Cabinet's dissolution. Hull cautioned Knabenshue on the fourteenth, however, that "the Department is confident that you appreciate the fact that our interest does not extend to interference in the internal affairs of Iraq or an effort to bring about the overthrow of cabinets or the application of economic pressure."[6] Despite an official policy of granting Britain "all possible aid short of war," Hull specifically rejected economic as well as military action against Iraq.

---

[5] *Ibid.*, 706-716. George Kirk, *The Middle East in the War* (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), pp. 63-69.

Despite the absence of strong American and Turkish[7] support of Britain, Gaylānī faced foreign economic obstacles and increased domestic opposition. In December British banks refused Iraqi applications for use of the British dollar exchange, already low, on grounds that Iraq used such for Japanese purchases. As the Iraqi dollar exchange lacked by an estimated thirty per cent enough value to meet their American purchases, which included military equipment, Knabenshue on December 18 predicted reduced procurements from the United States. Moreover, Gaylānī also clashed with the Regent, who on the previous day urged Cabinet dissolution. While enough parliamentary votes existed to unseat Gaylānī, lingering friction from previous *coups* hindered a positive coalition. Foreign Minister Sa'īd tried to modify Gaylānī's policies by submitting a 2,300-page memorandum which emphasized his belief that American support for the Arab cause in Palestine could be enlisted by capitalizing on the concern of the United States over the Anglo-Iraqi crisis, that Britain was still a formidable force, that Russia would eventually fight against Germany, that Iraq should declare war on Germany, that Iraqi troops should be sent to assist in Libya and possibly Syria, and that a Muftī-headed delegation should be sent to the United States to propagandize. In addition to British economic obstacles and growing internal opposition, Iraq encountered Axis reluctance. Although the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty set up Britain as the primary arms supplier of Iraq, the arms buildup in Britain forced the Iraqis after 1937 to look elsewhere for modern armaments. While impending conflict with Britain necessitated rapid acquisition of arms, neither Italy or Germany were inclined to respond before early 1941. Suspicious of German objectives in the Middle East, an area Italy viewed as its promised sphere, the Italians were most loath to respond to Iraqi overtures. Germany was concerned with the impact of such assistance on her relations with other governments, particularly those of Russia, Vichy-controlled Syria and Italy, and with its own indecision on which supply route to use. Moreover, both German and Italian pressure on Japan to supply arms proved abortive.[8]

Iraq also looked to the United States for war material. As far back as the late summer of 1939 Iraq had contracted for fifteen light bombers from Douglas Aircraft Company. When Iraqi purchasing efforts in the United States were intensified in early 1941 the issue came to a head. On January 3, 1941, Knabenshue reported that Minister of Defense and Acting Minister of Economics Ṭāhā al-Hāshimī was urging Iraqi exporters to give their dollar exchange to the government in order to make American military purchases. Three days later Britain complained to Washington over the attempt of Bond Brothers and Company to fulfill Hāshimī's request for five hundred .303 caliber automatic rifles, materials for manufacturing 15,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition and other miscellaneous items. About to be asked for were antiaircraft guns, which were refused by the Japanese. The British Embassy in Washington emphasized the danger of such arms falling into the hands of Palestinian insurgents and recommended the United States prevent, or at least delay until a new Iraqi government was made, such shipments. Iraqi prospects were dim. Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles informed the British Chargé on January 7 that he could see no reason why Britain's request could not be honored. On the next day Hāshimī conceded that insufficient dollar exchange precluded the proposed procurements. Gaylānī's position in Iraq, moreover, had deteriorated. Faced with a vote of no confidence in parliament, the refusal to dissolve that body, and the flight from Baghdad of Regent Amīr 'Abd al-Ilāh, Gaylānī chose not to risk civil war and resigned in late January. Ṭāhā al-Hāshimī, a pan-Arabist who nevertheless had strong ties with the more pro-British Sa'īd, and who was looked upon by the powerful Four Colonels (whom the British termed the Golden Square) as the only acceptable replacement for Gaylānī, became Prime Minister on February 1 in the belief he could reconcile the Regent and the Colonels. Although Hāshimī was more cautious, more susceptible to the Regent's influence, and more determined to avoid conflict with Britain, the Germans and British viewed him as espousing basically the same policies as Gaylānī. One policy which Hāshimī continued was the attempt to purchase American arms. On February 19 Knabenshue reported that 'Alī Ghālib, the Iraqi Arms Inspector then visiting the United States, was negotiating with Robert Morgan and Company for 10,000 rifles and 50,000,000 rounds of ammunition—much larger than the previous attempt under Gaylānī. Knabenshue recommended that "it would seem inconsistent with our aid to Britain policy for such permits to be issued at this juncture when it is still uncertain whether this war material may not be used to assist Germany." His apprehension was eased when Hull informed him on March 1 that "for your strictly confidential information, licenses for exportation of war materials and equipment are currently being denied, except with respect to spare parts for planes already delivered."[9] While rejecting the use of general economic pressure against Iraq, the State Department was willing to limit military supplies sent to that country.

---

[6] *FR, 1940,* III, pp. 711-722 (quotes 716-717, 721).

[7] For American relations with Turkey and the latter's ambiguous position see *ibid.,* 717-722, 725; Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1941,* III (Washington: USGPO, 1959), 486; William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), pp. 112-116.

[8] *FR, 1940,* III, 723-724, and Lukasz Hirszowicz, *The Third Reich and the Arab East* (London: K. Paul, 1966), pp. 105, 112-133. For text of Sa'īd's memorandum see Majid Khadduri, *Independent Iraq, 1932-1958: A Study in Iraqi Politics* (2d ed.; London: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 373-377.

Persistent British concern over Iraqi policies was not satisfied at the March 6 Cairo conference between Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and Foreign Minister Tawfīq al-Suwaydī, in whom Knabenshue had much faith, and subsequently Hāshimī was forced to resign on the night of April 1 when Gaylānī and the Four Colonels engineered a *coup.* However, the Regent, a key in forming any new government, escaped Baghdad after learning a death certificate had been prepared for him. A coalition consisting of Gaylānī, the Four Colonels, some civilian politicians and the Muftī, had threatened Hāshimī's removal if he compromised with Britain, broke relations with Italy, or did not exile pro-British politicians. When Hāshimī, under pressure from the Regent, attempted to transfer two of the Colonels out of Baghdad, the *coup* was implemented. The anti-Hāshimī coalition itself was divided. The Colonels believed Britain to be closer to defeat and, while cognizant of deteriorating Russo-German relations, expected Russia eventually to join Germany against Britain. The Muftī was not only confident of success against Britain, but also favored working with Italy. While Gaylānī, who preferred working with Germany more than Italy, was not as cautious as Hāshimī had been concerning anti-British policy, he was more uncertain over the European war and deteriorating Russo-German relations than either the Colonels or the Muftī and consequently was more cautious. Strong British opposition to his return to power, however, left him little choice but to cooperate with the more extreme elements.[10]

---

[9] *The New York Times,* August 22 & 27, 1939, June 1, 1941; *FR, 1940,* III, 726; *FR, 1941,* III, 486-489 (quotes, 489); Khadduri, *Independent Iraq,* pp. 198-205; Hirszowicz, *Third Reich,* p. 114; Stephen H. Longrigg, *Iraq, 1900-1950: A Political, Social, and Economic History* (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 286-287; and Kirk, *Middle East,* p. 66.

[10] The Four Colonels were Salāh al-Dīn Sabbāgh, Kāmil Shabīb, Maḥmūd Salmān, and Fahmī Sa'īd, *FR, 1941,* III, 489-490; Khadduri, *Independent Iraq,* pp. 206-211; Kirk, *Middle East,* pp. 68-69; Hirszowicz, *Third Reich,* pp. 106-107, 135, 139; and Gerald DeGaury, *Three Kings in Baghdad, 1921-1958*

American Involvement in the Pro-Axis Coup *of April 1, 1941*

While the United States refused direct action against Gaylānī, it continued its policy of trying to dissuade Iraqi nationalists from following anti-British policies. In February 1941, American envoy Colonel William J. Donovan abortively sought the Muftī's support of Britain in the brief Baghdad stop on his Mediterranean tour, but it was Knabenshue who had primary responsibility for this function. After the April 1 *coup* he played an even more important rôle and displayed remarkable initiative. From the very beginning, the American Legation supported the British in counteracting Gaylānī's attempt to regain power. Fearing detection if he fled to the British Embassy, the Regent in escaping Baghdad on the night of the *coup* headed for the American Legation disguised in a woman's dressing gown and pajamas. Arriving at 8:45 on the morning of April 2, it was decided after consultation with both Knabenshue and the British Ambassador that he should be smuggled to safety. Rejecting the use of two RAF vehicles and disguise uniforms, the decision was made that the Regent should be hid under a rug in the Legation's car as the Knabenshues were to make a fifty-five mile trip to the British air base at Habbaniyah to welcome the new British Ambassador, Sir Kinahan Cornwallis. With American flag flying, Knabenshue, his wife and the Regent made the trip virtually unsearched through roadblocks where other vehicles were being searched, although at one point an Iraqi officer poked his head in the car, an act that prompted the Regent to pull out his automatic pistol. Fortunately there was no detection or gunfire. 'Abd al-Ilāh was subsequently flown to Basrah and eventually to Amman where he joined Nūrī al-Sa'īd and other political refugees.[11]

The immediate problems facing the State Department were the question of recognition of the Gaylānī government under a newly-selected Regent and the safety of Americans in Iraq. When the new British Ambassador, who was more experienced than his predecessor in Middle Eastern affairs and who had clashed with the Prime Minister in 1935 when the then Minister of Internal Affairs Gaylānī had dismissed Cornwallis as Advisor to that Ministry, arrived in Iraq he told the American Minister he would have no relations with the Gaylānī government. Since the Turkish Minister took the same view pending instructions, Knabenshue told Washington he would do likewise. On April 5 the British Embassy in Washington informed the Department it was not prepared at the moment to recognize Gaylānī and hoped the United States would take the same position. On the next day, the American Minister indicated the British Ambassador was considering three alternatives, each with certain drawbacks. Military force was dependent on the war situation in the Middle East; recognition would give temporary stability but strengthen German influence, and withdrawing diplomatic representatives would prompt a renewal of German-Iraqi relations. Responding to Knabenshue's report, Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs Wallace Murray on April 7 telephoned Nevile Butler, Counselor of the British Embassy in Washington, stating there was apparent uncertainty in British policy and thus the United States could not declare nonrecognition, a view Butler accepted. On the same day, Hull intructed the American Minister that despite the British "pessimistic" appraisal the Germans were in no position to render immediate aid to the Iraqis, that the Department would rely on his "good judgment," and that he was to take neither a position of recognition or nonrecognition. Knabenshue reported the same day that Cornwallis rejected as unacceptable a Gaylānī proposal for the Regent's recognition in exchange for anti-Axis steps. The British Embassy informed Hull on the eighteenth that, as a result of the Iraqis agreeing to let Britain

---

(London: Hutchinson & Company, 1961), pp. 118-121. For Eden's views see his *The Eden Memoirs: The Reckoning* (London: Cassell, 1965), pp. 241-244. The Muftī is treated in Moshe Pearlman, *The Mufti of Jerusalem: The Story of Haj Amin el-Husseini* (London: Gollancy, 1947).

[11] DeGaury, *Three Kings*, pp. 118-121 and *FR, 1941*, III, 491-493.

open a "line of communications" and land troops at Basrah, it was prepared to immediately enter "informal relations" with and grant eventual recognition to Gaylānī, providing that the latter showed a desire and ability to grant "unconditional cooperation." On April 19, however, the American Minister stated Gaylānī had demanded that the recently-arrived troops at Basrah be moved out of Iraq as they were supposed to be *en route* through Iraq, not stationed there. Concerning additional troops scheduled to land in about two weeks, the rebel leader proclaimed they could enter the country only if the previous arrivals were removed, advance notification was given, and their number did not exceed 8,000. Churchill, however, was convinced that troops must be sent to Basrah, primarily to ensure the erection of a planned American aircraft-assembly plant there. On April 29 Knabenshue informed the Department amidst the British-American evacuation of Baghdad that he believed Gaylānī was about to sever relations with the British. Throughout April the American Minister attempted to straddle the recognition problem. On April 7 Jamīl Mardam Bey, a Syrian politician acting as Gaylānī's intermediary, proposed concessions, similar to those Gaylānī had made previously, to Knabenshue, who in rejecting them emphasized American antipathy to governments which seize power by force and stressed that any new government must be made "in full accord with the British." On April 29 Knabenshue reported that he now thought the British justified in crushing Gaylānī as he was hindering the war effort. While Gaylānī's Foreign Minister had been informed the previous day that the United States would open informal contact on the recognition problem, the Iraqi did not pursue the matter and the eruption of hostilities in the next few days precluded serious negotiations. The only recognition of Gaylānī's government came on May 12, during hostilities, from Russia, although the alleged promise of Soviet volunteers was denied. After the German invasion of Russia in June 1941, the latter portrayed Gaylānī as a Nazi tool. Even German recognition did not materialize at the time. That came a year later and, significantly, resulted from a Gaylānī-Hitler meeting on Russian soil.[12]

The second problem facing the Department, the safety of Americans in Iraq, also caused much concern. Evacuation of both American and British citizens was planned as far back as April 6 when Knabenshue reported British preparations. On April 29 the British Embassy asked all British and American women and children to leave Baghdad immediately by RAF bus convoy for Habbaniyah air base. However, a number of British and American civilians, mainly men, remained in the capital,[13] a cause for anxiety in the month-long war that would ensue.

Despite Gaylānī's assurances to honor the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance and the transit and base rights therein, Britain decided to oppose the rebel leader. While General Sir Archibald Wavell urged diplomacy rather than force, Prime Minister Churchill discarded that advice in favor of decisive military action. At the end of April Britain disregarded Gaylānī's objections and sent more troops into Basrah while not removing others from Iraq, prompting an Iraqi protest. On April 29 an Iraqi force from Camp Rashid was sent to encircle the Habbaniyah air base. Rejecting an ultimatum to cease flights, Air Vice Marshal H. G. Smart on May 2 launched a surprise air attack on the Iraqi positions. In the ensuing war the inability of the Iraqi forces to withstand air attacks coupled with the late appearance and small number of Axis, primarily German, aircraft probably proved decisive. German military supplies, moreover, were of little value. Dr.

---

[12] *FR, 1941,* III, 492-504; Winston Churchill, *The Grand Alliance* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), p. 255; Khadduri, *Independent Iraq,* p. 240; and Walter Z. Laqueur, *The Soviet Union and the Middle East* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959), p. 124. In evaluating Britain's offer to recognize Gaylānī, the disclosure that even the alleged "pro-British" Nūrī al-Sa'īd had made an overture to the Axis in the fall of 1940 must be taken into account. For details see Majid Khadduri, "General Nūrī's Flirtations with the Axis Powers," *Middle East Journal,* XVI (Summer, 1962), 328-336. Sa'īd is analyzed in Christopher B. Birdwood, *Nuri al-Sa'id, A Study in Arab Leadership* (London: Cassell, 1959).

[13] *FR, 1941,* III, 493-494.

Grobba's arrival in Baghdad on May 11 only served to intensify German overestimation of Iraqi forces, which were not able to hold out for the two months the Germans expected. Floods and Iraqi sabotage of communications, however, meant British forces were not able to reach Baghdad until May 29, twenty-seven days after the outbreak of hostilities. After Axis and rebel leaders fled Iraq, a Committee of Internal Security under the Mayor of Baghdad was created on May 29 to arrange an armistice. It could not prevent the riots which erupted in the capital on June 1 with the death of over one hundred Jews, however, and on the following day a government under the moderate nationalist Jamīl al-Midfā'ī was formed. Axis objectives in Iraq were frustrated because of German preparations for an attack on Russia, concomitant action in Crete, Vichy and Turkish aloofness, British decisiveness, and German tardiness in rendering assistance and overestimation of Iraqi fighting capacity.[14]

American Involvement in the Anglo-Iraqi War

The influence of the United States in the Anglo-Iraqi War was due more to the initiative of its Minister in Iraq than to any decisions made in Washington. American military assistance in the month-long war was slight and indirect. American assistance to Britain in general was extended long before the Iraqi war of course and the most immediate military impact seems to have been the British purchase and immediate use of twenty large commercial American aircraft to transport Indian reinforcements into Basrah.[15] American interest in the Iraqi conflict was manifested through a military observer, Captain James Roosevelt. The American President's eldest son accompanied a British motorized column from Palestine to Iraq. After completing the long desert trip the unit was attacked at Habbaniyah's outskirts by four Messerschmitts, prompting the Captain to evacuate his vehicle "faster," he noted, "than I got out of anything in my life." Captain Roosevelt viewed the Iraqis as poor fighters but refused to comment to the press on possible results of any major Anglo-German clash in Iraq.[16] President Franklin D. Roosevelt himself at this time was more pessimistic than Churchill over the Middle East, as he thought Allied fighting there would simply be a "delaying action" with control of the Indian and Atlantic oceans eventually proving decisive in the general war against the Axis.[17] As noted previously the State Department had denounced any active interference in Iraqi internal affairs. American influence in the brief war essentially resulted from two steps taken by American Minister Paul Knabenshue: his warning the British of Iraqi troop movements and his granting of asylum to American, British and other refugees in the American Legation.

---

[14] Kirk, *Middle East*, pp. 68-69; Churchill, *Grand Alliance*, pp. 256-262; Ian S. O. Playfair, *The Mediterranean and the Middle East*, II (London: HMSO, 1956), 181-197; Denis Richards, *The Royal Air Force, 1939-1945*, I (London: HMSO, 1953), 310-318; Hirszowicz, *Third Reich*, pp. 143-172; and British Naval Intelligence, *Iraq*, pp. 304-306. In immediate press coverage of *The New York Times* and *The London Times*, the Iraqis rather than the British were portrayed as opening armed hostilities. Unfortunately, this distortion has been perpetuated by Langer and Gleason in *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941*, pp. 497-498, the most comprehensive and scholarly work on American policy during this period. The authors state that "on May 2 Iraqi forces attacked the British air camp at Habbaniya." While the occupation of the plateau surrounding Habbaniyah is sometimes pictured as a symbolic attack, that occurred on April 30, not May 2. The Anglo-Iraqi war was overshadowed in the United States by numerous other war events, but it apparently antagonized some Americans as Freya Stark, British propagandist connected with the Ministry of Information, in her *Dust in the Lion's Paw: Autobiography, 1939-1946* (London: John Murray, 1961), p. 195, tells of her encounter with a heckler during her 1944 lecture at the California Institute of Technology. Some Americans evidently were also shocked at the anti-Jewish riots. Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles in his *The Time for Decision* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944), p. 263, saw the killings of the Jews as one of the worst aspects of Axis influence. American leaders recognized the problem of Arab nationalism, but policy recommendations, while idealistic, were lacking in specific suggestions. See *ibid.*, p. 257 and Wendell Willkie, *One World* (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1943), pp. 17-36. The latter work by the 1940 Republican opponent of President Roosevelt was a very popular internationalist book written after Willkie's famous trip around the world. Wavell is studied in Elie Kedourie "Wavell and Iraq, April-May 1941," *Middle Eastern Studies*, II (July, 1966), 373-386 and Robert Woolombe, *The Campaigns of Wavell, 1939-1943* (London, Cassell, 1959). The number of Jews killed in the two-day riots has been variously estimated between one to five hundred. That such anti-Jewish action was not historically typical is stressed in H. Ayyim Cohen, "The Anti-Jewish Farhūd in Baghdad, 1941," *Middle Eastern Studies*, III (October, 1966), 2-17. For text of 1930 treaty see Jacob C. Hurewitz, *Documents of Near East Diplomatic History* (New York: Columbia University School of International Affairs, 1951), pp. 243-246.

[15] *The New York Times*, June 1, 1941.

[16] "With Roosevelt in Iraq," *Time*, XXXVII (June 2, 1941), 24. Although Captain Roosevelt refused press comment on any possible outcome, he thought "the threat was indeed serious and the situation was a most difficult one." Letter from James Roosevelt to James A. Thorpe, Geneva, July 23, 1968.

While standard accounts make no mention of the rôle played by Knabenshue in warning Habbaniyah air base of Iraqi troop movements, State Department communications have revealed that the warning may well have been invaluable to British military success in the brief war. On the midnight of April 29 the American Minister observed the advancing Iraqi armor and infantry column passing near the Legation and so notified a nearby British intelligence officer who in turn gave Habbaniyah their first notice of the Iraqi move. Upon receiving the 3 a.m. message aircraft were immediately loaded with bombs and dispersed on the field while reconnaissance planes were launched to check on the Iraqis. The base thus had approximately three hours advance notice before the Iraqis arrived and delivered their ultimatum at 6 a.m. the same morning. That the base had no artillery to match the Iraqis, that a bombing attack on Iraqi positions afforded the base its only real defense, that preloaded and pre-dispersed planes probably facilitated the surprise bombing raid without having the aircraft destroyed on the ground, that air power subsequently played a crucial rôle in the war, that involvement outside the country hindered Britain in sending immediate help to Iraq, that comprehensive Axis intervention was planned if the Iraqis could have held out for another month or so, and that Iraq was a valuable economic and political prize[18] all make Knabenshue's initial warning an important factor to consider in any analysis of the Anglo-Iraqi War.

Knabenshue's granting of asylum to American, British and other refugees in the American Legation has generally been recognized as preventing considerable loss of life. Under a joint plan Anglo-American citizens were to seek refuge in either the American Legation or British Embassy, whichever was nearer. Between April 30 and May 2 about 140 Britons, 15 Americans and 15 assorted nationalities entered the American Legation. For the next thirty days the Legation remained apprehensive as Iraqi police and uneasy besiegers prevented further arrivals or departures. Knabenshue, who had previously experienced the 1925 rebellion in Beirut and the Arab-Jewish riots in Jerusalem, immediately organized the Legation. British Indian army officer Colonel E. R. Page took charge of defense while Miss Betty Sulman, the attractive English governess of young King Fayṣal II, arranged food and shelter. Knabenshue refused the offer of British refugees to leave after a May 4 Iraqi warning threatening to bomb British citizens at the Legation in retaliation for an alleged British threat to bomb public buildings in Baghdad if Iraqi forces did not evacuate the Habbaniyah area. He offered to surrender the British only if a Cabinet minister signed a statement guaranteeing adequate and safe internment facilities. Since no such official would do so, he offered the Legation as an internment camp and accepted responsibility, an offer the Iraqis accepted. A second crisis developed in mid-May when the Iraqis threatened to arrest and intern Knabenshue in retaliation for the expulsion of Iraqi students at the American University at Beirut, prompting the American to protest and ask Washington for a replacement. As the Legation radio had been surrendered voluntarily on May 3, Knabenshue knew his messages would be read by the Iraqis. Banking on Arab pride, he sorrowfully informed Hull that the Iraqis must not be judged too harshly as they had only temporarily forgotten their well known manners. The telegram was never sent and the subject was dropped. Legation life was not difficult. The Iraqis allowed plenty of food and water. The weather was warm. Skits, singing and card playing passed time. The ten women inside encountered no problems, although Miss Sulman reportedly rejected four marriage proposals. Reflecting Knabenshue's warnings against being trigger happy, only practice shots were fired. The calmness inside the Legation, however, contrasted with the turmoil in Baghdad. The refugees left the Legation on the morning of June 2 only to return when anti-Jewish riots erupted in the afternoon. A young Legation secretary, William Porter,* heroically rescued three missionary couples from a dangerous section of the city amidst numerous killings and returned them in his bullet-ridden car to the Legation. The refugees were again released in two days when a stronger government was erected. In his June 5 report Knabenshue was critical of the Iraqi threats, especially on his internment, but was almost apologetic on his granting asylum. Nevertheless, he stated that "while my action may have caused the Department some anxiety and even embarrassment, I feel that the circumstances warranted it and there was no honorable alternative." It appears Knabenshue was justified. On April 7 Hull informed him that in the absence of instructions his "good judgment" would be trusted and Knabenshue's request for clarification of his powers to make joint asylum plans apparently went unanswered. Such plans were necessary, however, as over half the American colony lived closer to the British Embassy and no American facilities existed near the Mosul and Basrah areas where the British had consulates. Knabenshue was highly praised by both the American and British governments and was credited with the saving of many lives.[19] Moreover, Knabenshue's action probably gave pause to the Baghdad-Berlin stance.[20]

---

[17] President Roosevelt expressed this view on the Middle East and North Africa in a May 1 note to Churchill. Disturbed, the Prime Minister replied on May 4 emphasizing that the area's loss would demoralize the Middle East, Spain and Vichy France, that Britain would vigorously defend the region, and that American entrance into the war would counteract growing pessimism even if the military impact was not immediate. Roosevelt responded on May 10 by stressing that he was not underestimating the area's importance and that thirty ships with aid would be sent there within three weeks—but also restated his belief that control of the Atlantic and Indian oceans would prove decisive. The Iraqi War prompted Adolph Hitler to discard his doubts on French collaboration. Nazi-Vichy conferences on collaboration in return for German concessions were begun in early May and culminated in the May 28 Three Paris Protocols, the first of which dealt with Syria and Iraq. In response Roosevelt urged the French people in a May 15 public address to reject agreements giving France and her colonies to Germany and Hull informed Ambassador Henry-Haye that such collaboration would be considered indirect aggression against the United States. Roosevelt then seized French ships in American ports. Warned in an April 29 Churchill message that Germany might win a cheap victory in the area and that American pressure on Vichy France was needed, Roosevelt gave Britain limited support. Langer and Gleason, *Undeclared War*, pp. 416-418, 497-505. For text of Roosevelt speech, see Samuel I. Rosenman (ed.), *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, X (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), 158-159. On American-Vichy relations, see William L. Langer, *Our Vichy Gamble* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), and William D. Leahy, *I Was There* (New York: Whittlesey House, 1950).

[18] *FR, 1941*, III, 504 and Playfair, *The Mediterranean and the Middle East*, II, 182.

*Now Ambassador to Korea

American Policy Considered

The 1940-1941 Anglo-Iraqi crisis revealed American policy in transition. The State Department urged Iraqi support for Britain, abortively sought Turkish cooperation in this, and prevented further arms shipments to Iraq. Interest exceeded action, however, as economic and political pressure to remove Gaylānī was expressly ruled out. American influence resulted less from Washington's decisions than Knabenshue's initiative. He was responsible for the Regent's escape, the warning to Habbaniyah, and the asylum for foreign nationals. In part owing to his actions, a later government was able to be erected around the Regent, preparations at Habbaniyah were possible, and not a single American or British civilian life was lost. Knabenshue's decisiveness, however, should not be allowed to overshadow the ambivalence of American policy. The Anglo-Iraqi crisis resulted both in increased interest in Iraq and the maintenance of traditional non-intervention in the face of a serious Nazi threat of penetration into Iraq and the Middle East, at a time when the declared policy of the United States called for granting Britain "all possible aid short of war." In this sense, what American policy did not entail is as important as what is encompassed. The affair, nevertheless, was one of the first in a series of crises from 1940 to the present in which the United States would find itself trying to reconcile its increased interest in the Middle East with its desire to maintain its prewar policy of non-involvement.

---

[19] *FR, 1941,* III, 495-509; Gordon Gaskill, "One Brave Yank," *American Magazine,* CXXXIII (May, 1942), 104-107; *The London Times,* June 3, 1941, p. 4 and February 3, 1942; and Department of State, *Bulletin,* IV (Washington: USGPO, 1942), 137. For the "seige" of the British Embassy see Freya Stark, *Dust in the Lion's Paw,* pp. 88-116. Knabenshue died of tetanus, after an operation, on February 2, 1942. His death was viewed by some as depriving the Arabs of "a real friend." John Van Ess, "Personal Sidelights on Iraq," *Asia,* ILII (April, 1942), 211. A Legation colleague considered him an "excellent representative" because "in the days when communication with Washington was not as easy as it is now, he did not hesitate to make decisions. His action in taking in all the British and Allied nationals on our side of the Tigris undoubtedly saved many lives . . ." Letter from William J. Porter, US Ambassador to Korea, to James A. Thorpe, Seoul, July 10, 1968.

[20] Porter, *ibid.*

New and important books from Minnesota

ISLAM: A Way of Life

by Philip K. Hitti

A vivid account by the distinguished orientalist which shows that Islam is not only a religion but also a state and a culture, a whole way of life. With maps. "It is lucid, scholarly, objective, readable." Rabbi Nahum Schulman, *Minneapolis Tribune*. 1970. $6.50

THE ARABIC LANGUAGE

Its Role in History

by Anwar G. Chejne

An introduction to the rich literary heritage of Arabic and the part it has played in the history of the Arab people. With photographs and maps. "Will be of immense value to beginners and may provide an excellent refresher course to the specialist." *Times of India* (Bombay). 1969. $6.75

THE UNITED STATES RESPONSE TO TURKISH NATIONALISM AND REFORM, 1914–1939

by Roger R. Trask

An analysis of Turkish-American relations during the critical period from the beginning of World War I to the start of World War II. To be published this spring. $11.50

PROTESTANT DIPLOMACY AND THE NEAR EAST

Missionary Influence on American Policy, 1810–1927

by Joseph L. Grabill

A detailed account of the influence of missionaries and philanthropists on American foreign policy and diplomacy. With photographs and maps. To be published this spring. $13.50

AMERICAN INTERESTS AND POLICIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 1900–1939

by John A. DeNovo

A survey of American cultural, economic, and diplomatic activities in Turkey, Persia, and the Arab East. With maps. "Anyone interested in our American foreign policy or in the history of the Middle East will find it to be full of interest." Bayard Dodge, *Middle East Journal*. 1963. $11.50

At your bookseller or from

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA PRESS

2037 UNIVERSITY AVENUE S.E., MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA 55455
IN CANADA: THE COPP CLARK PUBLISHING CO., LTD.

BOOK REVIEWS

DEVELOPMENT: A PROCESS OF SOCIAL CHANGE & REVOLUTIONARY TRANSITION

The Theory of Nadim Bitar

Tareq Y. Ismael

This paper is an attempt to introduce to the Western world Dr. Nadīm Bīṭār's theories of social change and revolutionary transition. Bīṭār, born in the Arab world and educated in France and the United States, has explicated his theories in Arabic and is therefore not readily known outside the Middle East. Within the Arab world his works have proven challenging and controversial. Their insight and originality open new avenues of exploration for the study of development.

Bīṭār's theories of social change are placed in the context of revolutionary transitions. The primary emphasis is upon social change triggered by transcendental changes in ideological perspective. To examine this phenomenon Bīṭār has established criteria by which we may first judge the adequacy of contemporary ideologies to deal with the problems of social change and, second, interpret the types of change that are likely to occur from the interaction of reality and ideology. These criteria are based upon a model of change and development which Bīṭār has formulated.

The model of change and development is an attempt to interpret great changes in society by analyzing patterns of socio-political change in relation to ideological change. Bīṭār's central theme is "When and how is the ideology, the philosophy of life, of a given society changed?" If Marx dealt with the problem of social and historical change by asking "What is the economic law of motion of contemporary society?", Bīṭār tries to deal with it by positing the question "What is the ideological law of motion from one type of society to another?" This does not mean at all that Bīṭār takes an idealist philosophical position or neglects the economic and structural factors. He emphasizes the ideological approach because of its neglect by others. More fundamentally, however, he contends that after a certain degree of economic, social and structural change is achieved, the ideological factor takes precedence.

Rôle of Ideology

Man creates ideology to define his condition and his relation to his environment, give meaning to his life and protect himself. The ideology is an instrument to manipulate an alien and hostile reality. However, the relation between reality and ideology is dialectical; when the

---

△ Tareq Y. Ismael is associate professor of political science at the University of Calgary. He is editor of the recent *Government and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East* and author of the forthcoming *The U.A.R. in Africa: Egypt's Policy Under Nasser* (Northwestern University Press).

Nadīm Bīṭār is presently associate professor of sociology at the University of Toledo. His published works include: *Al-Iduyūlujīyah al-Inqilābīyah (Revolutionary Ideology)*, Beirut: al-Mu'assasah al-Ahlīyah lil-Ṭibā'ah wa al-Nashr, 1964. 1,030 pages; *Al-Fa'ālīyah al-Thawrīyah fī al-Nakbah (Revolutionary Effect of the Disaster)*, Beirut: Dār al-Ittiḥād, 1965. 164 pages; *Min al-Naksah ilā al-Thawrah (From the Setback to Revolution)*, Beirut: Dār al-Ṭalī'ah, 1968. 304 pages; *Min al-Ḥaqīqah al-Insānīyah ilā al-Ḥaqīqah al-Inqilābīyah (From Humanism to Revolutionism)*, Beirut: Dār al-Ṭalī'ah, 1969. 144 pages. The first three were reviewed in the *MEJ*. (See *MEJ* 23, no. 4 (1969) pp. 538-9.)

conditions which gave birth to a specific ideology are radically changed, the ideology itself must change or be totally destroyed.

Through a historical comparative analysis Bīṭār attempts to reveal the relationship between social and ideological change. His aim is not to explain the causes of differences among various ideologies but to establish a conceptual framework to demonstrate that great revolutionary changes signify the birth of a new philosophy of life; that the structural changes produced by the transition occurring today in the developing world are of this kind; and, finally, that these changes negate traditional society as a whole, with its classes and ideologies. Thus, although the model of change and development interprets the great transitions of history—the transitions which constitute its focal points and are its basic components—Bīṭār's interest is in understanding the process of change occurring in the developing world.

The perspective, however, is not of a society arrested in a tradition or in time but of society *in toto* in motion—in the process of becoming. Through what may be called a developmental revolutionary theory of nature and history that spans from the world of plants to the world of man, Bīṭār discerns a movement of increasing consciousness. Within man's history he finds the same tendency (which is, it should be noted, not progressive but spiral). Indeed, history is the chronicle of this gradual increase in man's level of consciousness. Rebellion and revolutionary action are the most concrete reflection and manifestation of man's expanding awareness of reality.

Revolution occurs or becomes possible, and class struggle is asserted and culminates in a revolution, not, as Marx sometimes asserted, when the life situation of the exploited reaches an extreme point of misery and deprivation, but when new conditions emerge and break the walls of misery by bringing a new hope as to the possibility of change. In fact, new conditions create the very feeling of misery and the subjective experience of oppression. The sociology of revolution has shown that revolutions do not occur when oppression, exploitation and misery attained their extreme, but when new conditions make it possible for the oppressed to visualize alternatives to misery and oppression. A revolutionary ideological vision of history is the most effective tool for the visualization and actualization of the future state.

As presented by Bīṭār, the "social," and "ideological" question of Asia is not to reform traditional society, modify or adapt it to the new age, but to destroy and replace it as a totality with a new society fundamentally different in its social structure and ideology. For him, this is not a recommendation or a rhetorical advocacy, but rather a historical necessity determined by the very dialectics of the transition. The social, ideological question of the Third World is, in other words, a question of radical redistribution of wealth, power and prestige, as well as a fundamental change of man which leads to his spiritual and intellectual rebirth.

In Bīṭār's view, any ideological equilibrium of society diminishes man's humanity, and the peak moments of history are when men are able to transcend the limits of their individual existence, and strike for new collective interests and a new vision of history. Knowledge is a means of access to the concrete and to action, a means of transforming history and man himself, and it calls for an achievement in deeds and not in words, in revolutionary action and not in abstract principles.

The forces that are able to change a social structure are to be grouped into two large categories, those which are generated by it, from within, and those which originate outside it. This distinction, however, is possible, Bīṭār writes, in analytical and not empirical terms. In radical changes, particularly, the immanent and external factors are inextricable and they combine in producing the change. Periods of transition present us with a situation of that combination. This is particularly the case where a revolutionary ideology exists to form a bridge between external and immanent changes.

As used in his works, a revolutionary ideology means a set of principles which, first, define a man's new position in the world (his relation to life, society, history); the ultimate nature of society, the meaning, the purpose, and the general order which determine the course of history. Secondly, these principles aim to transform the world into a way of life that implements itself in a new society in which every cultural phenomenon is molded in terms of their image of man and vision of history.

Every society has an ideology which defines its philosophy of life and entails a set of values which permeate, try to permeate, or have ceased to be able to permeate its institutions, social relations and general character. One of the basic emerging inner contradictions of Asian society is that the structure of its institutions has been undergoing a general change without any corresponding ideological renewal. Furthermore, the traditional ideology gives shape and form to any economic change introduced into that society. This creates a lopsided development that will have to be resolved if the transition is to result in the birth of a modern society. The effective solution of the problems and difficulties of the transition requires a radical transformation of the very categories of thinking and feeling of the Asian man. In order for economic development to be effective and for the economy to be productive in the developing countries, a certain type of man holding a certain type of new values and outlook on life is necessary.

In this stress on the rôle of ideology Bīṭār is not arguing the case of ideological or sociological transformation of the very categories of or economic determinism, but rather that each "determinism" has its place in the process of social and historical change, and the rôle it plays depends on the context registered by this change.

The objective contents of ideologies change, that is, the philosophical, moral, political, social, etc. of objectives followed by them but they all share in a common set of elements. The intrinsic characteristics, the mental and psychic operations by which, and because of which, an ideology is constructed are identical in all ideologies. In this respect there is no difference (that is, in the mental and psychic process) between revolutionaries of all times. The same operations impel them all, whether they are the early Christians, or the contemporary Communists.

Bīṭār establishes a number of regularities and patterns about revolutionary transitions that would not be possible for what he repeatedly attacks as the "moralistic" and "metaphysical" approach which shapes Arab (and for that matter the Asian) political and social analysis. In laying a particular stress on the ideological regularities he hopes, among other things, to disclose a basic factor responsible for the general malaise which is afflicting the new Asian generation.

One of the most important properties of a revolutionary ideology is that it gives the people who adhere to it similar categories of thinking and feeling. It puts them in a uniform world in which the members look at and behave towards each other in a way basically different from that which they follow in their relationship to people outside the limits of that world. Within the world of their ideology (which tends to be a universal, authoritarian and totalitarian creed) they constitute a closed society. In fact, close relationships, understanding and cooperation undergo a definable decrease at the frontiers of their ideology, the frontiers which constitute the permanent limits separating them from the external world.

The Ideological Process

The need to assess one's place in life and the meaning of history seems to be a basic characterestic of man's human condition, and a fundamental existential need. Bīṭār stresses the meaning of ideologies in history, their rôle as constituting its focal points and molding its basic units. We see, implicitly at least, that ideologies tend to reflect a dichotomous image of the world, splitting history and society into two mutually exclusive parts.

The ideological phenomenon is much more complex than any analysis of characteristics common to individual ideologies. Bīṭār reminds us of this fact, and differentiates between what might be called the structure of the ideology and the ideological process. The first refers to the basic propositions and elements which repeat themselves in all ideologies, and the second to the course taken by an ideology in its self-realization. Ideologies bear within themselves the seeds of their own negations and destruction. They come into being, develop, change, achieve and exhaust themselves, decline and die. This process follows a similar pattern in all ideologies.

History is a circulation of ideologies, and its basic units are ideological. When a unit dies, future heirs could and would borrow its technical and scientific achievements but not its ideological apparatus. Technical regressions and losses occur, but lost ground is recovered again. But ideologies disappear and are never to be recovered again as units or as ways of life. The new historical cycle or stage will fashion its own ideology. In fact Bīṭār goes further and writes that a new historical civilization or unity is impossible without a new philosophy of life, or ideology. Technical and scientific achievements are evolutionary, ideologies are not. In the first, technics are based on each other, they increase and multiply, and the law of their change is geometrical. In the second, we always face new beginnings, through a process of continual flux and through radically changed circumstances. New beginning does not mean that the ideology is totally new. Most of the components constituting every ideology are old or have roots in a preceding historical period. What is genuinely new is the formation of an ideological complex which combines those elements into a new ensemble or identity.

Bīṭār's social theory operates with something akin to a two-ideologies model. Two contending ideological positions fill the historical scene, one pressing for radical total change, the other for the traditional system and the *status quo.* There are, of course, many intermediate states, many variations and modifications of the first or the second, many conflicts internal to each one, but basically the dominant conflict is between one position which tries to uphold the traditional ideology, and one which tries to destroy and sweep it away. In every Asian country, Bīṭār reminds us, traditional ideologies (religions) always stood by the *status quo* and the dominant classes who represent it. On their part, the radicals never negated religion. In fact, compared to European radicalism, the Asian counterpart is still waiting not only for its nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but also for its eighteenth century.

Dahrendorf wrote that throughout the history of Western political thought, two views of society stood in conflict. Both intended to explain the most puzzling problem of social philosophy, namely, how is it that human societies cohere? To one distinguished school, social order results from a general agreement on values, to another equally distinguished school, coherence and order are founded on force and constraint. (R. Dahrendorf: *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society,* 1967).

Bīṭār's social theory is, in one respect, a synthesis of the two views. A social order finds its unity in a given ideology which permeates it in all its aspects, gives it its foundation. However, the birth of the ideology and its extension in society and history are not only accompanied by conflict and violence, but by total conflict and violence. Every revolutionary ideology that expresses a great transition is inclusive and exclusive. It tries to rearrange socio-cultural phenomena in its own image of man, society and history, and thereby rejects for its world everything which does not fit such a vision.

Total conflict and violence are the tools through which it tries to achieve these aims. This dynamic phase is followed, however, by another which he calls the "traditionalization" of the ideology which, in a way, corresponds to what Max Weber calls the "routinization of charisma." Total violence and conflict are surpassed and their functions are performed by an established tradition. Ideology as a tradition is an exhausted and ruminative ideology. Inner contradictions grow, develop and gradually erode its effective hold, and, at one time or the other, it becomes impossible for it, and the traditional classes representing it, to cope with them. Violence, this time reactionary and conservative, is used, but it is ineffective because it is incongruous with the new forces and tendencies which determine the new history. External factors, usually of cataclysmic nature, explode the inner contradictions and disclose the impotence of the ideology and its ruling classes. The masses become alienated, and their immense energy is released and mobilized by a new ideological revolutionary vision and a new ruling élite. Another transition sets in, which follows similar contours of ascent and descent in a new cycle. If Pareto defines history as "the cemetery of aristocracies," Bīṭār defines it as "the graveyard of ideologies." Pareto's "circulation of élites" is replaced by "circulation of ideologies," because, according to Bīṭār's social philosophy, élites derive from ideologies and find their legitimacy in them. No élite could rule effectively or use the effective violence described by Pareto or G. Sorel, as its main tool, without an ideology with a dynamic relationship to history. Asia is at the present in the grips of such a transition which compels it to move and find its way out to a new society, a new historical unit.

Each ideological system contains, as stated above, the seeds of its own negation, and the strains and contradictions brought forth by its own self-realization explode it at a certain moment of its history. If those seeds are ignored in our study of any ideological or social system, it becomes impossible for us to anticipate the future. Exclusive focusing on the traditional, the present, the customary, the functional are the best ways to make man and society passive subjects of history. Man's consciousness, subsequently, should focus on the emergence of any negative element in the ideological or social system, because what might seem to be a disruptive or an aberrant phenomenon when considered in terms of the institutionalized patterns of the system, might well be the first manifestations of a new life. It is very difficult to tell the precise moment in which a traditional social system has been changed, but no system undergoes such a transformation without the birth of a new ideological outlook on life. The emergence of the latter is a clue to the transformation of the former. Considered in the light of Bīṭār's social theory of history, any ideological or social state of affairs is transitory, pregnant with the seed of a new act of self-transcendence which would generate a new level of history. The degree of transitoriness varies from one system to another, but if we take an overall view of history, this degree seems to register a steady increase in its course.

Forms of social conflict are not carried out at random, and they are not the result of chance groupings, but stem from structural conditions and are determined by them. On the other hand, the problem of ideology cannot be ignored in any sociological analysis of these structurally determined forms of conflict because the traditional governing class finds its legitimacy in a traditional ideology, and uses it in the support and justification of the *status quo*. Not cooperation, dialogue, reform or compromise, but conflict is the key to Bīṭār's analysis.

Effects of Ideology

Once this analysis is done, Bīṭār moves from the empirical to the normative—from the sphere of the "is" to the sphere of the "ought," and advocates a vision of history which is sublime and exhilarating. The main attribute of history is the transcendental act, the act that opposes and negates existing state of affairs in the name of an ideal or nonexistent state. History is and has been possible—*i.e.* historical events have been possible—because of man's capacity to perform that act. Subsequently, situations and conditions which induce one form or another of this act are more fundamental elements in the course of history than those which support harmony, contentment and equilibrium. His emphasis on the necessity of restricting sociology to the task of establishing regularities in the societal process notwithstanding, Bīṭār attempts to bring out a vision of the fundamental, the universal, and the real which underlie history and cause it.

The supreme law of history is rebellion and the revolutionary act, and its supreme meaning is higher forms of rebellion or of revolutionary consciousness and freedom. The birth of history itself is an act of rebellion. History is open and will never be arrested *à la* Marx, *à la* Comte, *à la* Seidenberg, or *à la* Huxley, because rebellion is immanent and inherent in the human condition itself.

Thinkers of all philosophies formulated various meanings of man's essence. Bīṭār refrains from giving any such formulation. Man does not have any essence, permanent and immutable, inherent in him. He becomes human through his dialectical relationship with his historical and human condition. Man is not to be defined by a pre-existing essence, but defines himself in *praxis,* and of the latter, the primary, most important and fundamental act is rebellion and the revolutionary act. Man is, among all living beings, the only one who does not simply use symbols and meanings, but endows the environment with symbols and meanings. If any essence is to be given to man, it would be this characteristic which stems from his interaction with his human condition. Man loses his humanity and is nonhuman when he is not a part of a human society, but he also loses his humanity and becomes dehumanized whenever he lets himself, in any human society, become the object of a tradition, and simply reflects pre-existing conventions. The traditional, the conventional is the negation of man, and a man who is an extension of it is in a state of fall. This is only possible within an ideological framework of revolution, and cannot be a common subjective experience. Man finds himself in a certain act of rebellion against the traditional and in the exercise of his capacity to stand at a certain distance from his social and historical condition, to look at it and at himself as if he were not part of them, and then try to negate or modify them in part or as a whole. Man is not only capable of consciousness, or of being conscious of his self-consciousness, but of acting through a certain degree of awakened consciousness against society, its values, traditions and institutions. Historical time takes a primordial dimension, and man's life becomes a succession of shifting and changing revolutionary stages.

Importance of the Work

A library of monographs has been written about various religious (metaphysical) and secular ideologies, but no study uses the comparative historical method to create a general model that encompasses them all, employs this model in order to understand the dynamics of history in general, and the revolutionary transition occurring in the developing world (especially in Asia), in particular. Such individual studies are, of course, necessary and natural and are a precondition of any general understanding of history. The study of history and society should not stop at this point, but should supercede it. In fact, A. Toynbee suggests such a model and states that if it had occurred to him when he started his work, he would have used it instead of the one he did use. (*A Study of History,* Vol. 12, Oxford University Press, 1964, pp. 217-218.)

Looking at American sociology in the light of Bīṭār's social theory, we can conclude that the functionalism prevalent in that sociology is unable to cope with such a transition. In an article published five years ago, Bīṭār states, for example, that one of the basic barriers between Asia and the United States of America which explains to a large degree the failure of the latter's foreign policy towards the former, is the difference in the ideological state of both. While Asia is in the process of a radical transition which impels her to seek a new self-ideological formulation, the United States of America is living in a static ideological state of mind. This difference gives each one different categories of thinking and feeling, and instills a sort of "metaphysical wall" between them which obstructs any real understanding, regardless of the intentions involved. These differences reduce, in fact, dialogue to a kind of monologue when both parties confront each other.

The current functional models hinder an objective understanding and assessment of the transition in Asia because they put emphasis on the self-regulating and restorative mechanisms of a social system. In contrast, we find at the center of Bīṭār's social theory a systematic analysis of the dynamics of social action, a topic which is conspicuously neglected by the functional model. Bīṭār thinks and argues in terms of a dynamic model which posits that a given social system is under continuous pressure to adjust its system of values to the various changes which occur in its institutions, or to adjust the former to the latter. However, at one time or the other, it becomes impossible to alleviate the internal strains and contradictions, and the system then bursts asunder and a new vision of history emerges.

Bīṭār's books are all focused on various types of conflict and contradictions, and stress their determinate functions in social, political and ideological group relations. Social and ideological conflict is much more important and basic as an attribute of history than equilibrium or harmony. However, he states that any generalized use of a model of conflict, or a model of consensus, is faulty, because the effective use of one or the other depends on the historical context, or societal and cultural configuration in which it is used. Given the emphasis on equilibrium and harmony models prevalent in American sociology the import of Bīṭār's work becomes very clear, especially when we take notice of the fact that such models are very defective in the study of the present situation in the developing world.

Bīṭār's work falls into two parts which are separable. On one hand, there is that part which allows empirical testing and could be verified by historical observation. This will include, for example, his ideological model and patterns, his theory of the revolutionary nature of military defeats, of the cult of personality, of the basic shortcomings of radicalism in the Arab world and Asia, etc.

On the other hand, there is that other part which cannot be tested or empirically verified. Such is mainly his revolutionary vision of history, or history as a succession of revolutionary levels which will never be arrested. Bīṭār's position does not limit itself to an analysis of history or to a value-neutral approach to it. He emphasizes very much the necessity of a value-free sociology and there is, in fact, a chilling objectivity in his analysis of the political and ideological dynamics of history. However, the conclusions to which he arrives are used, first, to support a definite ideological, political stand, and, second, to present a special vision of man and the nature of history.

NOTE—By special arrangement with the Foreign Policy Association, readers of THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL *may obtain from the FPA's Book Center any books listed below published in the United States (except paperbacks) at the publisher's regular list price. Post free for domestic orders only. Send orders with check or money order to Desk ME, World Affairs Book Center, 345 East 46th Street, New York,* N. Y. *10017.*

GENERAL

THE GAME OF NATIONS, by Miles Copeland. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and New York: Simon and Shuster, 1969. 261 pages. Index. $6.95 or 50s.

Reviewed by Dana Adams Schmidt

The virtues and vices of Miles Copeland's reminiscences of his days of glory as a CIA Man in the Arab Middle East are pronounced. His book is entertaining reading for those with some basic knowledge of the area, and it is brightly and lightly written precisely in the slapdash, excited, repetitive manner in which Copeland talks. It is a fair assumption that he dictated it all and did not re-read it very often. The repetitions occasionally become boring as he drags his "game" gimmick into the story for the umpteenth time and explains yet once again what the "game" is all about. He is pandering to the public taste for gimmicks—a trick to make the difficult easy, the obscure clear. Entirely misleading, of course.

We gather that the "game" which he applies to the whole panorama of Middle Eastern politics from 1947 to 1967 was originally devised by Department of State officials of the Dulles era for the purpose of sharpening their political wits. In the game, each official assumes the part of some personality in the world of politics. A sprightly pastime, no doubt, for bright young men with time on their hands but one which may have led some of them, including Copeland, into some basic misapprehensions as to what politics is all about. Because some lost sight of the fact that they were manipulating not chess men (as illustrated on the American edition dust jacket) but men of flesh and blood dealing with the fate of nations, they may have become irresponsible. This is the basic vice of the book and of some of the American officials whose activities it describes.

The important part of the book is about the 1949 Ḥusnī al-Za'īm coup in Syria and Jamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir's rise to power, events in which he was professionally involved. Much of what follows is fascinating "inside" information. It includes tantalizing bits such as the rôle of Otto Skorzeny, the SS officer who is supposed to have rescued Mussolini and who became a friend of American officers and Nāṣir. And there is Nāṣir's personal invitation to Kermit Roosevelt to come and try to talk him out of his 1955 arms deal with the Russians. And the occasion when Kermit Roosevelt and Copeland flew to Cairo without the knowledge of American Ambassador Henry Byroade and surprised the unfortunate ambassador by walking into a dinner party in the company of President Nāṣir. Copeland also examines the repressive and constructive aspects of Nāṣir's régime, his terrorism and his positive neutralism, but he does it with decreasing interest as he personally drifted off the main stage in the 1960s and became more of a political gadfly than agent. Until the June War, the supposed climax of the book, he is just another observer quoting from books of those who know better.

If what Copeland reveals about the Ḥusnī al-Za'īm affair and the rise of Nāṣir were untrue, it would be an outrageous deception. But I believe most of it is all too true which makes it even more outrageous. It is, however, damaging to the American interest that the alternately callow and callous manipulations practiced by American officials should be disclosed at a time when other American officials are still dealing with many of the people mentioned. Nāṣir was deeply offended by the impression given that he is a kind of superior Ḥusnī al-Za'īm, that if he was not a creature of the CIA, then the CIA was at least indirectly involved in his rise. I consider this a false and misleading impression. But it is so strong that some knowledgeable observers in the Middle East have surmised that the book had been inspired by the CIA in order to contribute to Nāṣir's ultimate undoing. Whatever the author's ultimate game may be, there do seem to be reasonable grounds for questioning his moral right to play it.

The book was first published in London in August 1969 and was reprinted within four months. It may be assumed that Mr. Copeland has done very well. The American edition is distinctly more attractive and better printed than its British counterpart, with handy chapter headings on each page, but otherwise unchanged.

△ DANA ADAMS SCHMIDT is a correspondent of *The New York Times* and is currently stationed in Washington, D. C.

THE ARAB WORLD

ARAB SOCIALISM: A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, edited by Sami A. Hanna and George H. Gardner. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1969. xii + 408 pages. Bibl. Glds. 54.00.

Reviewed by Malcolm H. Kerr

A book providing translated selections from al-Afghānī, 'Abduh, al-Kawākibī, Shumayyil, Salāmah Mūsā, and others is bound to be useful to many readers. Professor Hanna's translations are very readable, and he has performed a commendable service. As a survey of contemporary socialism in the Arab world, however, I find the book disappointing.

In their introductory chapter, and in their choice of material, Professors Hanna and Gardner seek to show that Arab socialism has deep historical and cultural roots, and is closely related both to Islamic notions of social responsibility and to the experience of more recent generations in wrestling with the problems of modernization. It is not a western importation, nor communist-inspired, nor, as some have imagined, merely a protest movement; on the contrary, it is the wave of the future, and "there is even a certain inevitability behind the equating of modernism with socialism in the societal reorganization now sweeping through Arab society" (p. 49).

These themes are quite familiar, having long been proclaimed by the Arab socialists themselves. For the most part they are unexceptionable, in fact, and it may be beating a dead horse to insist that Nāṣir was not propagating communism, and to reprint an editorial from a semiofficial Egyptian magazine, *The Scribe,* to prove it. The "inevitability" theme, however, raises questions. The entire book, including the editors' own contributions, is confined to the ideological plane, to setting out the formal ideas of the socialists and their forerunners in a completely uncritical manner. No hint of a debate or of skeptical analysis emerges, nor any effort to relate the stream of ideas either to the development of a mentality or to governmental actions. What does it mean, then, that modernism is "inevitably" equated with socialism? Is it just the socialist label that is here to stay, or the whole catechism, or the public ownership of economic enterprises? Or is it also the other side of revolutionary Arab politics—military dictatorship, reckless adventurism, and hangings in the public square? It seems to me that a book dealing with the nice things about Arab socialism might very usefully consider why such nasty things have accompanied them; why, in fact, in some Arab states the nasty things are just about all that remain.

The editors' selection of materials is spotty and arbitrary. It is good to have the excerpts from Salāmah Mūsā, Muṣṭafā al-Sibā'ī, and Khālid M. Khālid, but Sherif Mardin's excellent essay on Ottoman reformers, and Hanna's own article on *al-Shu'ūbīyah,* are only peripherally relevant, and surely we could do without 'Abduh and al-Afghānī for once. Instead, selections from, say, 'Abdallāh Nadīm, Anṭūn Sa'ādah, and the Ahālī group might have been included. The contemporary selections are woefully few. There are several speeches by Bourguiba but none by late President Nāṣir, nothing from Syria save one ancient (1964) excerpt from 'Aflaq and the text of the Ba'th constitution, and nothing at all from any other Arab country. Furthermore, the most recent document in the whole volume is the UAR Constitution of 1964.

There is a long, but again spotty bibliography. Some items are cited in a confusing or incorrect manner; many trivia are included, and many important items, especially in Arabic, are left out. Marxist writings, and even more surprisingly, Ba'thist writings, are almost totally ignored. There are almost no entries more recent than 1965. This, however, appears to be the fault of the publisher. The editors' acknowledgments are dated October 1966, but the book was not published until 1969—a delay that must have surely set a record.

△ Malcolm H. Kerr is professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles.

Sultans of Aden, by Gordon Waterfield. London: John Murray, 1968. xiii + 241 pages. Illus. Notes. Index. 42s.

Reviewed by D. C. Watt

Any empire depends on men for its creation and maintenance. The British empire was no exception. What was extraordinary about the British empire was the extraordinarily small number of men who were involved in its creation and maintenance, when compared with the immense extent of British conquests and the vast number and variety of races over whom that conquest was made and extended. This was however not the only extraordinary thing. The men themselves were as extraordinary as their achievements. Equally extraordinary were their relations with their overlords in London, Bombay, Capetown—as ever concerned only with balancing their books and keeping official expenditure to the barest levels the domestic electorate would support.

Gordon Waterfield has written the story of one such man, Captain Stafford Bettesworth Haines of the Indian Navy who took a derelict village of six hundred inhabitants in 1839, governed it until 1854, making it into a thriving city of twenty thousand inhabitants, was imprisoned by an ungrateful government in a debtor's prison after charges of corruption against him failed, and died in 1860 a few days after his release.

Haines wanted to make Aden not only into a coaling station, dependent on the seaborne trade of the empire for its prosperity. In his view it was the natural port for the Yemen, the "Eye of the Yemen": and the maintenance of good relations with the Imāms of San'ā' was of the first importance. The East India Company, whom he served, rejected his advice, having no desire to extend its rule outside India. When the British government took over the dominions of the Company they continued this view. Aden prospered and grew, but as an enclave, a military outpost. As a commercial port for the interior it declined and lost all connection with the Yemen, which itself became more and more backward. Finally the British withdrew. Aden's wealth took a catastrophic decline; and its new revolutionary leaders have turned to the Soviet Union and China in a vain hope of keeping its port and facilities alive.

Apart from his introduction, Mr. Waterfield confines himself to the career of Captain Haines. His study is based on the papers of the East India Company now in the India Office Library in London, Haines' own papers having disappeared. It is an important contribution not only to British imperial history but to the still small volume of literature on the contacts between British rule and Arab culture. Waterfield, formerly head of the Arabic service of the British Broadcasting Service, is a gentleman-scholar of the old Victorian type, well based in history, less well based in the professional jargon of the academic political scientist, with a fine command of his own language and a considerable practical experience of British-Arab political relations. He writes for the interested lay reader, reserving his *apparatus criticus* for the end of the book, and leaving his bibliography to be extracted from his footnotes. But the reader of the *Middle East Journal* who allows himself to be put off reading this book by those characteristics will be missing an important and valuable book which can only be supplemented as and when Arabic sources become available to flush out the Arabic side of Mr. Waterfield's story.

△ D. C. WATT, The London School of Economics and Political Science.

EGYPT

THE MODERN HISTORY OF EGYPT, by P. J. Vatikiotis. New York: Praeger, 1969. 498 pages. Maps. Index. $9.50.

Reviewed by Thomas Naff

In final judgment, despite some of the criticisms that follow, P. J. Vatikiotis' *The Modern History of Egypt* must be counted a good and valuable work which should henceforth become required reading on the modern Middle East. Vatikiotis has met the formidable challenge of nineteenth and twentieth century Egyptian history largely by dint of some eight years of careful research and thoughtful writing. The thoroughness of the research is particularly impressive. There cannot be many important published Arabic and western sources that have not been used judiciously in the preparation of this book. The narrative and style are on the whole agreeable (the book is tightly written) while certain aspects of organization could be improved.

Much of the strength of the book derives from the three major themes of the survey which establish its terms of reference and bind together the several parts of the narrative. They are, quite correctly: the historical continuity in Egyptian society from ancient times to the present; the various ways in which Islām and the Arabic language shaped Egyptian society;

and Egypt's awakening and encounter with European culture in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Vatikiotis' handling of these themes is of mixed quality. The first is weakest, amounting in essence to slightly romanticized theorizing about the interplay between man and earth and man and river and the dichotomy between urban and rural Egypt. Obviously, the scholarship of modern pre-historians and anthropologists, such as Ester Boserup (*The Conditions of Agricultural Growth,* Aldine, Chicago, 1965), have not been consulted. The second theme, the Islamic one, after a faltering start finishes strongly. However, some of the lapses are important and require brief attention. Certain of the generalizations concerning the spread of Islām in Egypt and the position Egypt later assumed in the Islamic world are misleading or inaccurate. For example, in commenting on what he contends to be an unusually slow rate of conversion to Islām, Vatikiotis oversimplifies the picture. He neglected a variety of factors which might have been worth considering, such as the question of the *dhimmīs* and the *mawālī* system (an ingenious mechanism by which the early Arab conquerors managed to deal with the advanced economic structures they encountered); the inseparable identity of Arab and Muslim in the minds of the Arabs which contributed to the evolution of the *mawālī* system; the early Arab administrative structure based on the *amṣār* which in the beginning accentuated separation from the native population (though in the long run the structure contributed to conversion and Arabization); and the persistence of strong tribal traditions which emphasized the Arab element and factionalism. What is called for is not necessarily a detailed discussion of these factors, but a different generalization which takes them into account. Also, Vatikiotis' contention that it was only after the Mongol destruction of Baghdad that Egypt assumed a central position in Islamic culture ignores the century of achievement under the Fāṭimids which produced their great Islamic renaissance.

Clearly, Vatikiotis' métier is the third theme of the book, Egypt's regeneration and response to European culture. This portion of the book is superlative, notwithstanding some minor faults. For example, like most western writers before him, Vatikiotis overstates the impact of the French occupation of Egypt with its secular revolutionary ideology and Bonaparte's (and Kléber's) administrative innovations. Although the French invasion disrupted the traditional political arrangements, it did not destroy the principal parties to those arrangements—i.e., the *'ulamā'* and the *mamlūks*; it was Muḥammad 'Alī who broke their power. Nor is there conclusive evidence that the *'ulamā',* who were the crucial link with the Egyptian people, were deeply affected in their established beliefs and ways by the French episode. What was in fact decisive was what impressed Muḥammad 'Alī, and, with the major exception of the fighting effectiveness of the French army, most of Napoleon's innovations left him unmoved. Indeed, during Muḥammad 'Alī's early years, Egypt resembled in most ways a typical Ottoman province.

This point also demonstrates an organizational weakness of the book. Having made in chapter three the comment which elicited the above criticism, Vatikiotis qualifies and mitigates (but not entirely) his overestimation of the French occupation when he evaluates Muḥammad 'Alī's reign in chapter four. This is a pattern that is repeated several times.

However, as indicated, such lapses in this section of the book are exceptional and are more than offset by its strengths. None of the important problems is shirked or topics omitted. The narrative is lively, detailed, balanced, sustained, and provides many useful insights to the transformation of Egyptian society and politics. Particularly valuable in this respect is the treatment of areas of Egyptian life where the traditional and the modern clashed; that is, the encroachment of a secular-rational outlook in the tradition-bound legal, administrative, legislative and educational branches of government. Inevitably, Vatikiotis rightly points out, these issues involving the question of the place of Islām in the modern Egyptian state became the focus of political controversy because religion was consistently employed for political purposes throughout the modern period. Ultimately Islām was relinquished as the basis of government and authority. But, the author makes clear, the rapid development of political secularism, especially after 1906, did not lead to the abandonment of the Islamic faith; rather, secularism gave a practical turn to modernization in the form of compromise and gradualism, at least until the 1940s. Islām, after all, had never explicated a particular system of government.

There are many other valuable insights which help to explain the later political instability of Egyptian politics. Vatikiotis is particularly good in illuminating the decades of the 1920s and the 1930s. This crucial formative 20 year period of strife, he shows us, was permanently damaging in its effects to parliamentary institutions and laid the foundation for politics of violence. The attacks on tradition and modernism, he concludes, weakened both the traditionalists and the modernists without advancing constitutional government, led to the radicalization of the intellectual élite and of Egyptian politics and contributed to the destruction of both the conservative and liberal groups.

But it must be emphasized that this is not exclusively a political history. Interwoven into the tapestry is the evolution of the intellectual, religious, social and cultural facets of modern Egyptian life. All the principal figures—the writers, politicians, journalists, educators and reformers—and their work, are treated intelligently, though one may not always agree with the author's assessments. Nor does Vatikiotis neglect to call our attention to parallel developments in other parts of the Muslim world and to the influence of events and movements in particular areas of the world at large.

On the whole, Vatikiotis is very good at narrating the history of modern Egypt, and frequently in interpreting and explaining aspects of that history. He is less satisfactory when theorizing, which, unfortunately, is how the book ends. In discussing Egypt's historical legacies he appears to miss the point of his own question, "What National Culture for Egypt?" which he treats as a problem to be solved or resolved. But, as in the case of all changing societies, the issue is not essentially one of resolution but of a groping for a new social and political system synthesized out of the past and present. Moreover, the author is too harsh and pessimistic in his final judgments. He seems to demand of the Egyptians that they achieve more and master more effectively systems of ideology or government than he does of the western states that served as models.

Nevertheless, this book represents a highly successful effort in the face of a very difficult subject. This reviewer welcomes the book and warmly congratulates Professor Vatikiotis.

△ THOMAS NAFF is the Director of the Near East Center at the University of Pennsylvania.

MOROCCO

THE COMMANDER OF THE FAITHFUL: THE MOROCCAN POLITICAL ELITE: A STUDY IN SEGMENTED POLITICS, by John Waterbury. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1970. xvii + 321 pages. Notes. Index. $10.00.

Reviewed by Stuart Schaar

This intelligently written book deserves the attention of all interested in North Africa, the Middle East, and comparative politics. As a case study it is certainly the best volume now available in English on contemporary Morocco. Its originality lies in the application to the analysis of élite behavior of the anthropological notion of segmentation (implying that power and authority are so diffused among various levels of well matched groups within and between tribes that no one group can destroy or severely weaken another). The result is a study in political style and culture seen from the viewpoint of tension management, conflict regulation, and shifts in interlocking and crisscrossing factional, family, commercial, religious and regional alliances. As a result we get a clear idea of the social forces at work behind Moroccan politics.

Part One consists of two succinct chapters dealing with Morocco before independence. In Part Two, Chapter Three, "The Social Context of Moroccan Politics," applies the segmentary notion to national politics. Some anthropologists may object that by lifting segmentation out of the context of tribalism (agnatic lineages) the author denatures the concept, but the insight that Professor Waterbury achieves makes the attempt worthwhile, even laudable. It helps to explain the stalemate which "has been and will continue to be the dominant trait of Moroccan politics. . . ." (p. 61). The remainder of Part Two analyzes the style of élite politics and pinpoints the rôle of the king as an arbiter of conflicts. The lack of a narrative and chronological flow in this section may initially throw off beginners, but its mine of information and explanations of formerly unclear relationships make it especially valuable for those who are already familiar with Morocco. Part Three breaks with the analytical approach of the second section and deals with specific interest oriented factions (political parties, labor unions, economic interest groups, the officer corps, the bureaucracy) and their clientele.

In his approach to political culture the author stresses analysis of political behavior rather than values and belief systems. Few would really quibble with this choice after reading the final product, nevertheless ideology has been unduly neglected. One agrees fully that "there is no necessary correlation between overt belief systems (what people say they do, or should do) and the actual style of competition. In this sense it is more important to understand what Moroccans really do and why they do it than to understand what they think they are doing" (p. 5). Yet some UNFP leaders (notably Bin Barqa) recognized the need to formulate an ideology. Bin Barqa failed in this attempt not only, as the author points out, because ideological orientations worked against the traditions of shifting alliances, but also because Moroccan society was and still is too heterogeneous to accept any one set of ideas unless they are forced on the population or are sanctioned by tradition. Bin Barqa recognized this dilemma and resorted to force to achieve his ends. Likewise his demise came about not only because he broke the rules of the Moroccan political game (I remember him attacking the throne directly during an election tour in 1963), but also because he had a clientele who were receptive to his and the UNFP's ideas in the early 1960s. Despite their poor organization and their elongation from power and patronage in 1963 the UNFP still came out well in the Parliamentary elections—enough to shock the monarch and his entourage. Ideology played an important rôle in the strong UNFP showing, for the young and the discontented urbanites especially responded less to organization appeals but more to the hope that the UNFP might become the vanguard of change. Here lay the beginnings of the changes that Professor Waterbury predicts will take shape in Morocco: the old system will be increasingly challenged by the new school-leavers who are outside the present system of political horse-trading and musical chairs. In the process the ideological factor and the necessity for responsibility to a constituency and consistence in promises may just grow.

△ STUART SCHAAR is an associate professor of history at Brooklyn College of the City University of New York.

MEDIEVAL HISTORY

ARABS, ISLAM AND THE ARAB CALIPHATE IN THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES, by E. A. Belyaev. Translated by A. Gourevitah. New York: Praeger, 1969. 249 pages. Index. $10.00.

Reviewed by George N. Atiyeh

Until his death in 1964, Euvgenie A. Belyaev, a member of the Soviet Academy and author of a number of studies on Egypt and other Islamic topics, was the leading Soviet Russian Arabist. Although this book of his does not add any new element to the state of our knowledge, it does provide a Russian Marxist interpretation of Arab history which is both different, stimulating, and, at times, shocking to our frame of reference and mental conceptions.

The first section dealing with the Arabs covers the geographical environment of the Arabian Peninsula, the nomadic life, agriculture, the tribal organization, and the social and cultural situation before the rise of Islām. In the second section, the author discusses the life in Mecca and Madīnah, the life and social surroundings of Muḥammad and the policies of the Madīnah community. The third section, which is the largest of the three, gives an account of the formation of the Caliphate and the administration of the conquered territories. The author also examines the government, society and culture during the Umayyad and 'Abbāsid Caliphates. Finally, he gives an account of what he calls the popular movements.

Professor Belyaev prefaces each chapter with a study of the sources, citing extensive bibliographic commentaries. This is one of the most interesting aspects of the book. He fairly gives non-Marxian scholars their due and refers to Russian sources little known to Western students. On the other hand, his sources, except in a few cases, are not original. He uses, and paradoxically enough, admires Father Lammens works which are of high scholarly value and which yet suffer from an attitude of overzealous Christianity towards Islām and consequently do not show in the slightest any affinity with Marxism.

The Marxist coloration of the book is best seen in the use of a certain amount of Marxist jargon, and, as might be expected, in the emphasis placed on the creative rôle of the poorer groups through the class struggle, as well as in the materialist interpretation of causes. The author categorizes societies as "primitive-communal," "slaveholding" and "feudal" which, as jargon goes, is no better or worse than the anthropological and sociological jargon used by Western scholars. There is, moreover, a sense of doing justice to the poorer classes which many historians leave out as nonconsequential. The bringing out of the material causes is of great value since there is no denial of the important rôle these causes play in shaping the events of history. All these points remain, however, the privilege of the author; they are *his* conception of history and they are valid as long as they do not deviate greatly from an acceptable scientific approach which they do not. Where the author really disappoints us is in the inadequate treatment of some of the major events, such as the origins of Islām and the rise of the 'Abbāsid Caliphate, to take only two obvious examples. The author, after discussing the sources, examines the situation in Mecca at the time of the Prophet, then discusses Hanifism and Islām, and then moves hastily to describe the Muslim community in Madīnah. Muḥammad as a creative force is hardly considered and the doctrines of Islām as a religion are hardly touched upon. In the meanwhile, Dr. Belyaev makes a number of greatly debatable interpretations which detract from the value of his study. The rise of the 'Abbāsids is simply not discussed. One would expect that the organizational and propagandistic tactics of Abū Muslim, at least, would appeal to a Communist historian, but perhaps for reasons of space, the author does not dwell on this aspect, just as he does not treat many other equally important topics. Because of this, the reader receives only a sketchy vision of Islām and the Caliphate painted with wide strokes of red. And as if this is not enough, the translator interpolates in the text, within brackets of course, his own viewpoint, superimposing a different and new vision. However, the translator does a good and lucid translation job; and when his remarks take the form of footnotes and not interpolations in the texts he succeeds well in signaling out the positions of other scholars on specific points.

△ GEORGE N. ATIYEH is head of the Near East Section of the Orientalia Division of the Library of Congress and a member of the Board of Editorial Advisors of the *MEJ*.

THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF ISLAM. VOL. I: THE CENTRAL ISLAMIC LANDS. VOL. II: THE FURTHER ISLAMIC LANDS, ISLAMIC SOCIETY AND CIVILIZATION, edited by P. M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton and Bernard Lewis. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1970. xviii + 753 and xxvi + 909 pages. Maps. Plates. Dynasty lists. $37.50 for the set.

Reviewed by Karl Stowasser

This book will no doubt be warmly welcomed by the specialist and non-specialist alike. Yet, such is the reputation of the Cambridge History Series that many a reader will also feel somewhat disappointed that this latest addition, despite the illustrious list of contributing authors, does not quite measure up to the high standards one tends to associate with the name.

The history of Islām as a complex cultural synthesis, spanning a period of 1,300 years (the cut-off point in modern times is around 1950) and covering a geographical area extending from Indonesia to Spain and from Central Europe to Portuguese Mozambique, is presented in eight parts, seven of which deal—with occasional rare exceptions—with strictly political history while the eighth is set aside for the discussion of Islamic society and civilization.

Of these two unequal portions, the more rewarding and stimulating one is doubtless the second, a series of thirteen chapters on the geographical setting, the sources of Islamic civilization (a contribution of truly awesome erudition), the economy, society and institutions of Islām, its legal concepts and practice, the interaction of religion and culture, Islamic mysticism, revival and reform in Islām, Muslim literature (where the section on Arabic literature deserves special notice for its inspired lucidity), art and architecture, science, philosophy and warfare, with a concluding chapter on the transmission of learning and literary influences to Western Europe. What flaws and weaknesses the book has must be ascribed to the political section which all too often fails to fulfill the book's primary intent—at least according to the editor's Preface—namely that of readability, especially for the envisaged "non-experts and students of other fields of history." Too many chapters, one regrets to say, seem too detailed for continuous reading and not detailed enough for reference.

Although one can easily see the reason that prompted the editors to adhere to a strict separation of political from cultural and institutional history, it is equally easy to discover the inherent weaknesses of such an approach, not the least of which is that throughout the first seven parts constant reference is made to concepts and institutions whose significance within the political context can only be grasped by the reader who is already familiar with Islām and Islamic civilization. Indeed, one can even detect a certain contradiction on the part of the editors between intention and execution, as when Professor Holt says in the Introduction:

> Where the [Western] pioneers in the field [of Islamic studies] sought primarily to construct, from the best sources they could find, the essential framework of political history, and to chronicle as accurately as possible the acts of rulers, historians today are more conscious of the need to evaluate their materials—a critique all the more important in Islamic history since the control supplied by the archives is so largely deficient. They seek to penetrate the dynastic screen, to trace the real sites and shifts of power in the capitals and the camps, and to identify, not merely the leaders and figureheads, but the ethnic, religious, social and economic groups of anonymous individuals who supported constituted authority or promoted subversion. It is no longer possible, therefore, to segregate the political history of Islam from its social and economic history—although in the latter field especially materials are notably sparse over wide regions and long periods. (Vol. I, p. xvii)

Or to quote one of the contributors, Professor Claude Cahen, "It is in its solidarities at the individual level that the true social coherences and structures of Islam are to be found, not in the princes, their soldiers and their tax-collectors" (Vol. II, p. 530).

Yet, it is precisely this one-sided and one-dimensional preoccupation with princes, soldiers and tax-collectors which characterizes far too many chapters on political history. Quite often, the narrative is little more than an enumeration of raw, unprocessed data, a tedious and confusing litany of historical dates and events, of names and book titles and periodicals, without any indication of the main threads, the principal issues involved, the significance of a particular datum within the specific or larger historical context. In this respect, the contributions of two of the editors, Professors Lewis and Holt—among others, of course—stand out as notable exceptions for both their readability and clarity of presentation. One could also point to the lucidity of chapter 4 of Part V, as compared with the opaque tedium of the three preceding chapters.

Many a reader will find himself more than a little puzzled by the peculiar assignment of priorities in the treatment of main topics as well as in the presentation of details. For instance, it is a bit difficult to understand why the Great Saljūqs should merely rate a brief subsection in the chapter on the disintegration of the Eastern caliphate whereas the Rūm Saljūqs and early Ottomans receive two long chapters of their own. The history of the Maghrib is presented in three lengthy chapters while that of Spain and Sicily combined is treated on a mere thirty-five pages. One may also wonder if a concise work that tries to present the political history of an area from Bandung to Barcelona and from Khazan to Kilwa on a little less than 1,200 pages is really the place to spell out in detail the perplexing vicissitudes of the French coral-fishing monopolies in the Maghrib (Vol. II, p. 257). Or to give one last example: information like "the ruler of Bitlis, Sheref Khān, travelled to Istanbul in Rabīʿ I 922/ March 1516 to kiss the sultan's hand" (Vol. I, p. 316) seems a bit out of proportion in a book that reduces the momentous siege of Vienna to two lapidary sentences (Vol. I, p. 325): "He [Süleymān] then advanced further west against Ferdinand and laid siege to Vienna on 22 Muḥarram 396/26 September 1529. After three weeks the siege was lifted." Incidentally, it is one of the more baffling facts that this two-volume history of Islām does not have a single chapter on the religion of Islām, its Sacred Book, its eschatology, its teachings, and its ritual and ethical demands.

The illustrations in Volume II are adequate but not outstanding. Especially disappointing, in view of the abundance of excellent calligraphic material available, is Plate 20*a* showing (mostly unrepresentative and even unauthentic) samples of Arab and Persian calligraphy. The deliberately selective bibliography lists all principal and standard works on a given topic written in Western languages. It would have enhanced the value of the book if the more important Eastern sources, whether translated or not, had been included.

The *Cambridge History of Islam* is undoubtedly a very valuable and very much needed contribution to the field of Islamic studies. It is a thoroughly scholarly and often erudite presentation of the entire Muslim world that will be consulted by the specialist and non-specialist for many years to come. Whatever criticism can be leveled against it is motivated not so much by a desire to find fault with it, but by the regretful realization that the editors somehow missed by a hair an almost unique opportunity to bring out *the* standard work on Muslim history. But that is really a compliment.

△ KARL STOWASSER is an associate professor of Middle Eastern history and languages at the University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland.

THE MUSLIM WORLD, A HISTORICAL SURVEY. PART III. THE LAST GREAT MUSLIM EMPIRES, with contributions by H. J. Kissling, F. R. C. Bagley, N. Barbour, J. S. Trimingham, H. Braun, B. Spuler and H. Hartel, and with translations and adaptations by F. R. C. Bagley. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1969. ix + 303 pages. Tables. Bibls. Indices. F.62.00.

Reviewed by C. E. Bosworth

The preceding two volumes of this historical survey have been basically straight translations from the German works of B. Spuler in the *Handbuch der Orientalistik* series (I. *The age of the Caliphs*, II. *The Mongol period*). The present book is, however, a complete *refonte* and a considerable enlargement of the original *Neuzeit*, and is the first installment of two subdivisions; it carries the story down to the end of the eighteenth century (the Ottoman empire, Iran and India), the mid-nineteenth century (the Arab lands of the Fertile Crescent) or the beginnings of European colonization (the Maghrib, Sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia). Other so-called histories of the Islamic peoples (e.g. Brookelmann's) have in reality neglected peripheral areas like tropical Africa, Central Asia and Indonesia, which may not have contributed so much to Islamic civilization but which have for long had very substantial Muslim populations; it is one of the virtues of *The Muslim World* that it shows itself, above all in volume II and the volume at present under review, fully aware of the importance of these regions. Only Indonesia does not appear in this latest volume, but treatment is promised in the fourth and final volume. (May one hope, too, for something on the Muslim community in China?) It is perhaps understandable, in view of the breadth of territory covered and the complexity of political changes in the period, that the editor should have renounced including any maps, but nevertheless a pity, for the good maps were a welcome feature of the earlier volumes.

The general impression left by the book is that of a high level of excellence, and were the book not so ruinously expensive, one could predict a wide sale amongst students of Islamic and Middle Eastern studies. Coverage is as even as one could hope to achieve in a composite work; it is in any case worth devoting 41 pages to Central Asia, compared to 21 pages for the Mughal empire, when accessible, general studies of the former area are so much more lacking than for Muslim India. It is good to have a survey of the Ottoman empire from its origins down to the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarcı when previously we had in English hardly anything better than Creasy and Lane Poole, but it is regrettable that a modicum of space was not found for something on the achievements of Ottoman culture and civilization (still much under-estimated), on Ottoman attitudes to Europe and on the attempts of the Ottomans in decline to imitate European techniques and ideas; thus there is no mention of a figure like Ibrāhīm Müteferrika and the introduction of printing. On more specific points, it is surely exaggerated to stigmatize the *devşirme* as a "fearful haemorrhage" from the Balkan Christians (p. 17); the palace staff was extensive but the turnover in personnel not excessive, whilst the Janissaries were always a small, élite corps, vastly outnumbered by the Sipāhīs. It is also hard to discern a direct cause-and-effect relationship between the ending of the *devşirme* and the growth of national self-awareness amongst Balkan peoples (p. 42). The chapter on the Fertile Crescent and the Arabian peninsula is balanced and judicious, and one is glad to see the South Arabian ventures of the Mamlūks and Ottomans, and events in the Persian Gulf involving the Portuguese and then the emergent Āl Bū Sa'īd given due space. It is not easy entirely to throw off the contemporary Arab view that the present ills of the Arabs stem, if not proximately from European colonialism, then ultimately from the preceding period of Turkish rule; but the author here does concede that Arab culture and literature enjoyed a modest florescence in Ottoman times (cf. pp. 51-2). The continuing prosperity of Aleppo after the opening of the Cape route is rightly stressed (pp. 52-3), but the importance of Gombroon or Bandar 'Abbās in the seventeenth century is surely over-estimated. Down to the time when the Afghan invasions put paid to the East India Company's Persian activities, the Gombroon factory never succeeded in diverting the bulk of the Persian silk trade from the hands of the Julfa Armenians trading directly with Iraq and Syria, for the English broadcloth which they endeavored to market in Persia could never match in attractiveness the spices exported by the Dutch from the East Indies, and contemporary English mercantilist theory disapproved strongly of a continued drain of treasure to Persia to pay for silk imports. The chapter on North-West Africa or Barbary is especially readable and full of insights, such as its stress on the cosmopolitanism of Algiers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and that city's attractiveness as a center to which all sorts of adventurous spirits flocked for advancement and opportunity. Sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia are equally well-served, although in the former chapter it is somewhat misleading to describe the Falashas of Ethiopia as "indigenous Jews" (p. 170 n. 1); they are probably the descendants of elements in the ancient kingdom of Axum who resisted conversion to Christianity (E. Ullendorff).

In sum, this will undoubtedly prove itself a useful survey of this rather neglected transitional period between the decline of classical Islamic civilization and the revival of recent times, and the editor is to be complimented on having brought so much unity of treatment and smoothness of style to a composite work of this sort.

△ C. E. Bosworth is professor of Arabic studies in the University of Manchester, England.

MODERN HISTORY

THE CHATHAM HOUSE VERSION AND OTHER MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES, by Elie Kedourie. New York: Praeger, 1970. 488 pages. Index. $12.50.

Reviewed by A. L. Tibawi

There are three keys to an understanding of the drive behind this miscellany of articles spanning some twenty years' work. The first is the author's own account (p. 300ff) of the opposition of the Jewish community of Baghdad, of which he was born and brought up as a member, to the setting up of an Arab government in 1921. The second is the unfavorable verdict of Professor H. A. R. Gibb on the outcome of the author's study at Oxford of the Sykes-Picot agreement and allied subjects. The third is Professor A. J. Toynbee's summing up of the author's essay on al-Afghānī as breathing a spirit of animosity.

Having come to the same conclusion ten years earlier when I reviewed the author's first book, I find the present articles, to borrow his description of T. E. Lawrence's work, "seething with rancour and resentment." In content one-sided and in spirit polemic, no apparatus of footnotes, safely tucked away at the end of the book, can disguise their strong bias, or their dependence upon selective and twisted evidence. The Nazi textbook *Der Weg Zum Reich* included little or nothing which was contrary to historical facts, yet by selection, suppression and arrangement of facts, a false picture was created.

It must be a false picture of the Kingdom of Iraq that exaggerates the faults and leaves out the positive achievements. It must be a false picture of aspects of modern Arab history, and of Islām in general, that presents only shades and forgets the lights. The author, moreover, disfigures his pages by excessive use of the invective; to him no Arab leader can have good qualities or pure motives. All British politicians, soldiers and academics who do not subscribe to this perverse view of human nature, and these include not only Gibb and Toynbee but also, among others, Allenby, Beeley, Cornwallis, Deighton and Wavell, are accused of lack of judgement. Now we know who has it—in abundance.

The author goes to absurd lengths in attacking Toynbee, even the transliteration of Arabic. As if the author is qualified to indulge in this petty game considering his own incompetence in reading and transliterating several names, e.g. Ḥusām (p. 61, 480, 481), Farrāj (p. 318), Sirāj (p. 385), Bishāra (p. 451) and also the Arabic equivalent of Orthodox (p. 453). On page 469 there is a blunder in translating an Arabic book title.

Nor can the author's factual accuracy pass the test. For example, he writes "If *Seven Pillars* were the true history it purports to be. . ." (p. 34). Lawrence wrote in the introduction that the book was "self-regarding," that it "does not intend to be impartial" and that it was offered as "a personal narrative pieced out of memory." Then quoting a second hand reference, the author asserts that Herbert Samuel suggested to the British government in January 1916 "the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine" (p. 52). I have seen the originals of Samuel's two memoranda. Both urge a British protectorate and as a consequence Jewish immigration. But he specifically says "the time was not ripe" for a Jewish state.

△ A. L. TIBAWI, Institute of Education, University of London.

EAGLES ON THE CRESCENT: GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND THE DIPLOMACY OF THE TURKISH ALLIANCE, 1914-1918, by Frank G. Weber. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1970. x + 262 pages. Bibl. Index. $9.75.

Reviewed by Laurence Evans

The opening of European archives dealing with the foreign policy and diplomacy of the first World War is gradually bringing that period at least of the recent history of the Middle East out of the era of romance and the higher journalism. Now that British and German documents are available to the scholar (the American archives have, of course, been open for many years) the simplicities of the past are giving way to an understanding of the enormously complex problems faced by European and Turkish statesmen, the rôle of the Middle East in these problems, and the complexity of the solutions attempted. The historian awaits with impatience the opening of the French archives and with a distant hope the opening of the Russian archives. Perhaps some day even Turkish documents will be made public.

Of special interest to students of Allied policy is the picture of what was happening on the other side of the fence. Two recent books on the Central Powers and the war in the Middle East have added much to our knowledge and understanding of the forces contending with Allied policies in the area and thus have added new insights into Allied policy itself. The first of these books was *Germany and the Ottoman Empire 1914-1918* by Ulrich Trumpener (Princeton University Press, 1968). The second is the subject of this review, *Eagles on the Crescent.* Both based on German and Austrian archives and covering much of the same ground, they in fact approach their subject from different points of view and complement rather than compete with each other. Professor Trumpener emphasizes German-Turkish relations broadly considered; Professor Weber's book is primarily concerned with diplomacy and the balancing off of the interests of the three Empires.

Professor Weber begins his study with the international situation in the Eastern Mediterranean during and after the Balkan Wars paying special attention to the conflicts of interests between Austria and Germany, as well as those between the Entente Powers and the Central Powers, showing clearly that the lines between the two alliance systems were by no means as clear in the Ottoman Empire as they might be in Europe. He then proceeds to illustrate the anomalies in the relations between Austria and Germany growing out of these conflicts of interest and out of the dilemma presented to Germany by her interests in Western Europe on the one hand and her interests in South East Europe and the Middle East on the other, particularly with respect to her relations with Russia. This section is the most valuable contribution made by Professor Weber to the history of the international relations of the Middle East. Paralleling his analysis of European interests is an account of the Ottoman interest in an alliance with Germany as distinguished from an alliance with the Central Powers including Austria, and incorporates an analysis of the Young Turk view of Ottoman national interests and the foreign policies that grew out of it. From these premises, Professor Weber describes the course of the political relations between the three allies to the Armistice of Mudros ending the war in the Middle East, tracing in his very interesting narrative the convolutions and intricacies of policy, diplomacy and personalities.

There are two main criticisms one may make of this book. First, one is conducted through six years or so of complex international politicking at a standard cavalry trot without respite until the last page of the book; a little time spent on exploring the topography would have added interest as well as depth to the study. Secondly, Professor Weber spends too little attention on the context within which the events he is describing happened. However, within the limits the author set for himself, he has produced a valuable addition to the literature of recent Middle East history.

△ LAURENCE EVANS is a professor of history at the State University of New York at Binghamton and the author of *United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey,* (Johns Hopkins Press, 1965).

THE WINESKIN AND THE WIZARD, by Michael Selzer. New York: MacMillan, 1970. x + 241 pages. $6.95.

Reviewed by Alan R. Taylor

The history of culture, which seeks to relate the substance of value to the content of occurrence, is paradoxically most overlooked when it is most vitally needed. Our own troubled time is a case in point. The tendency today is to work from present difficulties to future panaceas, though the source of failure lies in the past and our inability to understand it.

Michael Selzer is specifically concerned with the "failure of nerve" as the origin of modern Jewry's ultimate problem. At a time when the meaning of Jewishness has become elusive in the context of rapid and confused events, this author has sought to establish the substantial elements of identity.

What is it to be a Jew? Recent debates over the particulars of race, nationality and affiliation remain for Selzer essentially spurious questions which evade the real issue. To be a Jew is to be "out of it," so to speak, in the political sense. It is to affirm a quality of being "abnormal," to reject the "power" approach to human relations. This alone is the meaning and justification of Jewish existence, which hinges on the "nerve of failure," the commitment to powerlessness as the condition of being a fully human person. The problem of contemporary Jewry is that it has lost the "nerve" to be itself.

To substantiate his argument, Mr. Selzer examines the course of Jewish history in eastern Europe. The development of Jewish power in the Khazar kingdom of the tenth century and the subsequent establishment of Jewish autonomy were inconsequential in terms of message and value. It was later, when the Jews were depoliticized and oppressed, that they recovered the essence of Jewish identity and resumed the rôle of a witnessing community. By refusing accommodation to mundane polities which sought to assimilate them, the Jews of eastern Europe established a contrast between justice and expediency which revived the message of the Old Testament and the Talmud. In Selzer's mind, this did not comprise a position of weakness, but one of reassertion and self-fulfillment, in which the humanist content of Jewish tradition could transmit its message to the world.

The nineteenth century marked the gradual decline of eastern European Jewry's civilizing rôle. Haskala, the modernizing cult of that region, was really part of a larger Jewish movement which was mainly interested in normalization" and "power" as the basis of Jewish becoming. Zionism, a highly politicized version of Haskala, was the ultimate resting place of these trends, and marks the eclipse in contemporary times of the Jewish mission.

In answer to Ben Gurion's assertion that Jewishness involves "privilege" and "right," Mr. Selzer suggests "obligation" and "nonconformism" instead as the ultimate criteria of Jewish identity. The title of the book is its basic theme. It is from a passage in Heine. The fantasy world of Don Quixote interpreted windmills as giants and wineskins as crafty wizards. For Heine, the opposite pertained in an age when giants seemed like vociferous windmills and wizards like empty wineskins. So it is for Selzer.

The book comprises a profound statement, too much to the point for comfort in the modern world. This is why it is important and needed, and why it should not be quieted and dismissed.

△ ALAN R. TAYLOR is associate professor of international relations at the American University in Washington, D. C.

LINGUISTICS

THE VERB 'BE' AND ITS SYNONYMS: PHILOSOPHICAL AND GRAMMATICAL STUDIES, PART 4 TWI/MODERN CHINESE/ARABIC, edited by John W. M. Verhaar. (Foundations of Language Supplementary Series 9). Doordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1969. Humanities Press, New York, distributors for U.S.A. and Canada. viii + 125 pages. $8.00.

Reviewed by Charles A. Ferguson

This volume is the fourth of a series of studies analyzing the verb "to be" and related phenomena in a number of languages in order to see what impact the description of the very different forms of "to be" and "being" in various languages might have on linguistic theory and philosophy. This fourth volume contains analyses of Twi, Modern Chinese and Arabic. Since each author is given full freedom to treat the topic as he will, the separate contributions are not fully comparable, but inevitably the reader makes comparisons, and perhaps the merits and failings of the Arabic section, which is of greatest interest to the readers of *MEJ*, are made more evident by this comparison.

The Twi contribution (pp. 1-71) is a detailed examination of the Twi equivalent to English "lexical be," i.e. the existential/locative and copula functions of the verb "to be" but not its grammatical functions as an auxiliary. The authors present a condensed account of the general grammatical nature of Twi and then present their analysis, with numerous examples taken from published texts in Twi or from the native knowledge of Twi on the part of one of the authors. Two distinct theoretical models are employed ("Transformational-Generative" and "Systemic") with the intention of giving greater illumination of the linguistic data than either model used alone could do. The Twi material is compared in a general way with "Standard Average European," particularly English as an example of this, and in an appendix explicit comparisons are made with nine languages including Classical Greek, Turkish and Russian. The section concludes with a valuable examination of the relation between grammatical properties, which are found within Twi and other natural languages, and logical distinctions, which are language-neutral. The author takes a definite although "provisional" stand that even though other languages may have interestingly different systems of verbs "to be," the study of them (or the use of such languages in scientific or philosophical discussions) will not contribute to modern "Western" symbolic logic, which "corresponds no more to English, Latin or Greek than to Chinese, Arabic or Twi" (p. 65).

The Chinese contribution (pp. 72-111) is primarily a detailed description of the uses of the modern Mandarin Chinese word *shi*, which are equivalent in part to uses of English "to be". In focussing on this one word and all its varied uses the author not only consulted the best and most up-to-date grammars of Chinese but also communicated directly with some of the leading linguists in the Chinese field and incorporated many of their comments and opinions. Thus the study is an original and highly informative work which goes beyond existing descriptions. The study is not comparative except for several minor observations and the presence of English glosses for the more than one hundred illustrative sentences. The author seems chiefly concerned with reaching the best possible formulation of deep structure and transformations which will generate the surface uses she has identified. A brief epilogue lists a number of special uses of *shi* which were not included in the discussion and makes the interesting point that *shi* is historically derived from a demonstrative and that this helps to understand how the many usages of *shi* in Modern Chinese may be related. No attempt is made to discuss philosophical issues.

The Arabic contribution of Fadlou Shehadi (pp. 112-24) is an attempt to survey the linguistic functions of "to be" in Arabic to see what light they may shed on Arabic philosophical concepts of "being." The author gives some background information about Arabic syntax on the basis of traditional Arabic grammar and then discusses in turn *kana, inna, laysa, huwa* and forms of *wajada.* He concludes that the issue of whether Arabic translators and philosophers were unable to express in a precise way the concept of "being" because of the nature of the Arabic language is a large question not easily resolved, and hopes that his essay may serve as a "useful point of departure" for that question.

From the linguist's point of view the Arabic section is the least rewarding of the book. The author does not specify the kind of Arabic that is being analyzed, and makes a loose comparison with "Indo-European," which is not uniform on this point (e.g., Indic languages or even Spanish and Irish differ very markedly from English in their verbs "to be"). But this is unimportant: it seems clear that Classical Arabic, especially as used by certain philosophers, is the variety being described (although there is one passing reference to a colloquial usage), and the author's comparisons are in fact almost always made with Classical Greek. Much more serious is the very incomplete nature of the description and the lack of illustrative material compared to the other two contributions. Examples are: no mention is made that the complement after *kana* and its "sisters" is accusative in contrast to the nominative complement of sentences without a verbal copula; no mention is made of the use of *la* as a negative copula or of the order restrictions on subject and complement in nominal sentences or the uses of *inna* apart from introducing a simple equational sentence. The author made no attempt at full presentation of the linguistic facts or at original analysis of the facts; he contented himself with citing examples of usage or statements about usage from Classical authors and commenting on them.

From the point of view of the general purpose of the series, however, the Arabic essay has some distinct merits. It does give at least some idea of what Arabic existential and copula constructions are like and it illustrates the ways Arabic constructions were expanded in order to match Greek uses of the verb "to be" and related concepts of "being." The author's cautious, understated conclusion is a sound one. In discussing the possible causal connection between the Arabic lack of copula and the alleged impreciseness of Arabic equivalents to Greek philosophical language, he says:

> Philosophic writing in any language, whether one is translating or creating, usually requires coining new terms and extending the meaning of existing terms, in other words, semantical stipulation. This of course is what the Arabic writers did in trying to handle the concept of being in its various senses. But it does not seem to me always easy to decide whether the meaning of 'being' is being restricted by the proposed equivalents, or whether the meaning of the existing vocabulary is being adeptly extended to equal its new stipulated sensitive task (p. 124).

The author's reasonable stand, including his call for more detailed investigation, is clearly preferable to the claims either that languages like Arabic, Russian or some kinds of nonstandard American Negro English, which do not have a copula in common equational sentences, are somehow unable to express logical thinking or that languages like Twi, Irish or Japanese, which have several verbs "to be," are somehow better able to make logical distinctions. A natural sequel to this study would be a more comprehensive and sophisticated analysis of the linguistic facts and then a deeper examination of the kind of question the author poses.

△ CHARLES A. FERGUSON is chairman of the committee on linguistics at Stanford University and a member of the Board of Advisory Editors of the *Middle East Journal*.

SOCIOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY

THE ARAB AMERICANS: STUDIES IN ASSIMILATION, edited by Elaine C. Hagopian and Ann Parden. Willmette, Illinois: Medina Univ. Press International, 1969. viii + 111 pages. No price indicated.

Reviewed by Philip K. Hitti

A more accurate title would have been "Papers on Arab-Americans." The papers, as we are told by Professor Ibrahim Abu-Lughod in the preface, were originally read at the first annual convention of the Association of Arab-American University Graduates held at Washington, D.C., in 1968. Editorial work on the published papers seems minimal. The authors are scholars and the material constitutes a contribution the value of which is enhanced by the paucity of literature on the subject.

The collection is introduced by a paper on nationalism and traditional preservations by Abdo A. El-Kholy of the University of Northern Illinois which discusses the phases through which Arab immigration to the United States passed and the social, economic and religious problems encountered. The second is a study of the Arab community of Canada by Baha Abu Laban of the University of Alberta, featuring tables on the community's distribution by sex, the overseas origin of its members in Arabia, Egypt, Lebanon and Syria and their varied occupations—all taken from official government sources. Professor Michael W. Suleiman (not identified as the others are) contributes an essay on the new Arab community in the United States based on answers to a questionnaire sent to 1,800 students and professionals. The majority of the respondents distinguish between Judaism and Zionism, recognize the unfair treatment of the West and the importance of the assistance provided by the Soviets but nevertheless favor neutral or pro-Arab stance.

The Arab-American community of Springfield, Massachusetts, forms the subject of the study by Naseer H. Aruri of Southwestern Massachusetts University. The study is based on personal observations as well as questionnaire answers and deals with the social and political behavior of the community and the degree of assimilation and acculturation. Elaine C. Hagopian of Simmons College sketches the institutional development of the Boston community in three periods: the early one 1890-1930, the middle one 1930-1960, in which the second generation figured, and the more recent period beginning 1960. Safia S. Haddad of St. Xavier College, Chicago, discusses the rôle of the Syrian and Lebanese women immigrants. The majority of the fifty Syrian and Lebanese families studied and lived in Chicago and have attained a cultural level comparable to middle class Americans, which could not have been achieved without the women's participation. The series closes with a sketchy review of the history of Arab migration into the United States beginning with a "Chaldean priest" in 1668, continuing through three Arabs, who in 1856 escorted a cargo of thirty-three camels imported by the government to facilitate communication in the Southwest, down to the present. The author, Adele Younis of Salem State College, has made the subject her concern since her college days.

On the factual side the reviewer found little to criticize. The rough estimate of 880,000 "pioneering Arabs in the United States" (pp. 5-6) is greatly exaggerated as a check on the reports of US immigration, naturalization and census bureaus would show. Gibran's birthplace "Beshara" (p. 68) should read Basharri. The American friend, whom an early Lebanese immigrant sought in 1854, lived in Boston, not New York (p. 103). Footnotes are rare and far between. If there is an excuse for lack of a bibliography, there is none for lack of an index.

△ Philip K. Hitti is Professor Emeritus of Semitic Literature at Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.

THE ISLAMIC CITY: A COLLOQUIUM, edited by A. H. Hourani and S. M. Stern. Oxford: Bruno Cassirer and Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1970. 222 pages. 8 plates. $7.50.

Reviewed by John Gulick

This book, Volume One of Papers on Islamic History, consists of articles delivered at the meeting of the Near Eastern History Group at Oxford University in 1965. There are twelve papers, beginning with an introductory essay by Albert Hourani, followed by the contributions of S. M. Stern, C. Cahen, J. Aubin, J. Gernet, S. A. El-Ali, J. Lassner, J. M. Rogers, N. Elisséeff, G. T. Scanlon, I. M. Lapidus, and O. Grabar. The papers by Cahen, Aubin, Gernet and Elisséeff are in French.

In the opinion of this reviewer, there is no discernible order in which the papers are presented, but this is a minor complaint. Hourani's introduction is no mere formality but an excellent contribution in itself, interweaving references to other papers in the book with many additional sources. His warnings against stereotyping "the Islamic City" are well taken, for, as he says, there have been a number of phases in the history of Islamic urbanism, and the Islamic cities also differ among themselves. His point that the Islamic city is basically an agro-city, a city integrated with a hinterland, is as valid today as it was in the past which is the context of this book.

Stern and Cahen, in different ways, dispose of Massignon's assertion that guilds similar to those of medieval Europe were characteristic of early Islamic cities. A long-accepted truism, Massignon's assertion was apparently based on no evidence whatever. Stern and Lapidus (the latter in a paper that presages his book on Mamlūk cities published in 1967) write elegant, and well documented, presentations of what were the many component social structures of Islamic cities before the fifteenth century. Aubin's paper on Iranian cities repeats the same theme of what might be called decentralization, while also stressing the lack of a clear distinction, in the Persian language, between province and provincial capital city, a linguistic key to a general phenomenon more widespread than Iran.

El-Ali and Lassner write about the Caliph al-Manṣūr's "Round City" of Baghdād, and they are critical of source materials and the inferences of other scholars on the basis of questionable evidence. Inasmuch as the Round City has long since disappeared without a trace, there is a time-bound quality to these papers that I do not feel in the others wherein there is always something which links the past with the present. Gernet's paper on the early Chinese city, though very interesting in itself, seems a bit out of place.

Rogers stresses the profligate (and therefore poor) city planning of the 'Abbāsids, with special reference to Sāmarā' and Baghdād. Display by conspicuous construction has not, in more recent centuries, been so characteristic of preindustrial Islamic cities. The physical plans, including details of sewer systems, of early Islamic cities are examined by Elisséeff (who reviews and mostly reconfirms Sauvaget's findings) and Scanlon, yet both papers also relate to the people who lived in those cities. In an entirely different approach, Grabar discusses functional architecture, noting the lack of specialized administrative structures, as deduced from manuscript miniatures.

A social anthropologist specializing in the study of the twentieth century Middle Eastern city, I found this a most rewarding book. However, I hope that historians of Islamic cities will devote more of their talents and energies to the understanding of more recent past times than those covered by this book (roughly the seventh to fourteenth centuries). In our studies of the changes now occurring in Middle Eastern cities, it is tempting to turn to such sources as this for base line, pre-modern data. But, as Hourani implies, the Islamic city changed through time, and we seriously need symposia of the fine grained quality of this book that cover the sixteenth to twentieth century period.

△ JOHN GULICK is a professor of anthropology at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He is the author of *Tripoli: a Modern Arab City* (Harvard University Press, 1967).

SHORTER NOTICES

AN ARAB COMMON MARKET: A STUDY IN INTER-ARAB TRADE RELATIONS, 1920-1967, by Alfred G. Musrey. New York: Praeger, 1969. xiii + 145 pages. Appen. Tables. Notes. Bibl. $15.00.

This work addresses itself to a pressing subject and brings up-to-date some lines of inquiry noted in Muhammad A. Diab's *Inter-Arab Economic Cooperation, 1951-1960.* With concentration on commercial ties and a chronological approach, Musrey examines the interwar period (1920-39) marked by political and economic disintegration, the 1940-1945 war years with a semblance of regionalism as seen, for example, in the creation and functioning of the Middle East Supply Center, the Syrian-Lebanese customs union and the emerging factionalism and nationalism of the postwar years (1946-51), the beginning of collective measures and attempts at wider inter-Arab trade (1952-63), ending with recent Arab Common Market agreements.

In assessing the direction and potential of Arab economic integration, the author astutely narrows his conclusions to four points: (1) economic integration among the Arab states could accelerate economic growth, (2) in order to realize integration, a broad mutuality of political and economic interests should be nurtured, (3) that such a mutuality has been largely absent on the Arab scene, and (4) nationalism has been a retarding factor along with the lack of Arab political and economic rapport.

This reviewer believes some treatment of the movement of factors of production, particularly labor, entrepreneurial ability and capital, would have given support to a more optimistic outlook on the possibility of expanded Arab economic cooperation. Moreover, there have been encouraging signs that there is growing, if limited, political and economic Arab rapport in such fields as the crisis aid to Jordan and the UAR since 1967 and the lending activities of individual states or organizations like the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development. Nonetheless, although these topics are not prominent in the study, they do not constitute important deficiencies as Musrey's announced emphasis was on trade *per se.*

Musrey's contribution is very real, for his book offers in-depth analysis and basic data needed for those concerned with Middle Eastern economics and development.

△ RAGAEI EL MALLAKH, professor of economics, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado.

AN ARABIAN DIARY OF SIR GILBERT CLAYTON, edited by Robert O. Collins. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1969. xiv + 270 pages. Appen. Biographies. Bibl. Index. $8.50.

With the publication of this diary the shadowy figure of "Bertie" so often mentioned in the writings of and about the Lawrence Crowd comes to life and proves to be the expected—a solid, efficient and dedicated official of the British Empire. Not, it would appear, that he had genius; rather, that he was more thorough than others in doing the ordinary job.

This quite enjoyable book is broken into two parts. Part I is comprised of the diary Sir Gilbert kept while in the Ḥijāz negotiating the northern borders of the Saudi kingdom with 'Abd al-'Azīz in 1925. Part II is comprised of his diary during the negotiations with Imām Yaḥyā in San'ā' early in 1926 to define the Yemen's southern borders.

The editing of the text is superb. Every conceivable name, date and place is footnoted. Given these exhaustive footnotes and several appendices (including a useful little biographical dictionary), one is unavoidably pained by the glaring typos on the maps of pages five and six.

Recently, a reviewer has made much of the need of the historian to have a feeling for, or empathy with, the mind of the British imperial administrator of this period. There is something to that. But on the other hand, it often happens that a scholar becomes so involved in this peculiar mind that its attitudes are reflected in the scholar's own writings. One catches a glimpse of this in Collin's biographical introduction to Clayton which is an unabashed eulogy. One also sees it in his historical introduction to the negotiations which ignores pre-1900 Saudi-Hashemite antipathy and considers as historical factors "the Oriental mind" and the "sullen," "wild" Arab tribes. Shades of Kipling! Perhaps this is the price we pay for a good biography or a careful edition of personal papers.

△ JON E. MANDAVILLE, Department of History, Portland State University.

BIBLIOGRAPHIE DER AFGHANISTAN-LITERATUR 1945-1967, compiled by the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Afghanistan and the Deutsches Orient-Institut, in cooperation with the Dokumentationsleitstelle für den Modernen Orient beim Deutschen Orient-Institut, Hamburg, and the Institut für Entwicklungsforschung und Entwicklungspolitik der Ruhr-Universität, Bochum. Teil I: Literatur in europäischen Sprachen, Hamburg, 1968. 189 pages; Teil II: Literatur in orientalischen Sprachen und Ergänzungen in europäischen Sprachen, Hamburg, 1969. 209 pages. DM 30.00.

The bibliography under review contains citations to 4,488 items organized topically under twenty-six headings as follows: Bibliographien; Allgemeine Länderkunde; Entwicklungsfragen; Wirtschaft, allgemein; Agrarwirtschaft; Industrie und Gewerbe; Binnen- und Aussenhandel; Infrastruktur; Wirtschaft, Sonstiges; Politik; Recht; Socialwesen; Erziehungswesen; Ethnologie und Ethnographie, Anthropologie; Religion und Philosophie; Kunst und Archäologie; Sprache und Literatur; Geschichte; Geographie; Geologie und Paläontologie; Gesundheitswesen; Botanik und Zoologie; Reisebeschreibungen; Biographien; and Periodika. Both volumes follow this organization, and each contains an author index. In addition, citations are succinct, and there are no annotations.

The compilers point out that the bibliography contains the largest number of titles of any single bibliography on Afghanistan. They also issue disclaimers concerning the completeness and correctness of entries and titles cited, which they say are due to the limiting factors of time and personnel. To compensate for these shortcomings they offer to provide verification of any defective citations for scholars desiring such service. The compilers also call attention to the fact that the bibliography provides the most complete list of Afghan periodicals and newspapers yet to appear in a Western language publication.

This bibliography will be of use to students of Afghanistan, who will find it especially valuable for its coverage of materials in German and Pashtu. It complements, and should be used in conjunction with, Donald N. Wilber's *Annotated Bibliography of Afghanistan* 3rd Ed. (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1968); and Tatyana Kukhtina's *Bibliografiya Afghanistana* (Moscow: Akademiya Nauk SSR, Institut Narodov Azii, 1965).

△ BRUCE D. CRAIG, Middle East Bibliographer, University of Minnesota.

COMMUNISM IN THE ARAB EAST, by M. S. Agwani. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1970. vii + 231 pages. Bibl. Index. $7.50.

This book examines the communist movement in the Arab world emphasizing the hectic years preceding and following the 1956 Suez crisis. Five countries are treated—Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. Whereas the earlier Laqueur tome delved more fully into the early years of the Arab communist movement in the 1930s and 1940s, Professor Agwani concentrates on the critical years when communist parties, with varying degrees of strength, met their challenges and each, one by one, crumbled as a formal entity: this is not to say, as the author does so aptly, that the movement did not aid in the extensive radicalization of Arab politics during the 1950s and 1960s. The book does not, unfortunately, deal with the 1960s and the concluding phase of the formal Arab communist movements, but then again this was not the author's main concern. The most readily available answer to the seeming contradiction of the downfall of communism in the Middle East and the radicalization of politics on the one hand and the increasing friendship with the Soviet Union on the other appears to be that Russia is less interested in the Middle East ideologically and more interested strategically. Part three of the book, on ideological issues, underlines this theme.

This work will interest all students of the Middle East and should be considered as one of the important studies on the communist movement in the Arab world. Much of the research was done in Beirut, a crucial communications center in the area.

△ MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, Johns Hopkins University.

COMMUNIST TRADE IN OIL AND GAS: AN EVALUATION OF THE FUTURE EXPORT CAPACITY OF THE SOVIET BLOC, by Robert E. Ebel. New York: Praeger, 1970. xx + 382 pages. Tables. Appen. $20.00.

Economists and political scientists interested in the Arab world will be rewarded if they study Robert Ebel's latest book on communist international trade in oil and gas. Decisions made by the Soviet planners concerned with the petroleum industry have been both competitive and cooperative with Middle East oil interests.

Russia sells her crude oil in Western Europe at prices lower than she sells to other communist countries or to developing nations. The price to West Germany, according to the author, is about one half the price to East Germany. In this way, Russia obtains the hard currency she needs to purchase industrial goods. Trade with the other countries is on a barter basis—usually raw materials such as Egyptian cotton. Such price discrimination hurts the Arab world. It reduces sales and tax revenues and aggravates balance of payments difficulties. Russian and Arab competition is a potential source of conflict.

In contrast, the author cites some important examples of cooperation. The closing of the Suez Canal in 1967 increased the shipping cost of Soviet oil being delivered to Japan, as well as the cost of Middle East oil in Western Europe. Hence, Russia arranged a swap deal with British Petroleum's Persian Gulf oil. Now Middle East oil is being sent by tankers to Japan, and Russian oil is being exported to Western Europe. Egypt will have great difficulty getting back the tanker business once the Canal is open again.

Ebel's thesis is that Russia's decisions are primarily economically motivated and not politically inspired. His examples are many, well written and statistically documented. Most economists, including this reviewer, will accept this thesis. Political scientists may not be so sure.

Readers will find in the book 191 pages of useful translations from original Soviet journals concerned with petroleum as well as many tables and maps of pipelines. Mr. Ebel is a foreign oil specialist with the Office of Oil and Gas in the US Department of Interior.

△ ALBERT L. GRAY, JR., professor of economics, Baldwin-Wallace College, Berea, Ohio.

DISCOURS SUR L'HISTOIRE UNIVERSELLE (AL-MUQADDIMA), translated and edited by Vincent Monteil. 3 vols. Beirut: Librairie Orientale, Commission Internationale pour la Traduction des Chefs-d'Oeuvres, 1967-68. xxxix + 1,333 pages. Index. No price indicated.

This translation of the famous *Muqaddima* of Ibn Khaldūn is the third complete translation by a Western scholar. The first, in French, is that of W. W. de Slane, published slightly over a century ago; the second, in English, is that of Professor Franz Rosenthal published in 1958, and followed, in turn, by the present one ten years later.

De Slane's translation was something of a trailblazing scholarly effort brought to bear on a difficult work encompassing all the Arabic-Islamic fields of knowledge. It served Western scholars well until recently. The translation which followed improved on the level of its accuracy, made use of the contributions that had been made in the interim, and went beyond, adding to the fund of knowledge concerning both the author and his work. Such, essentially, was the contribution of Professor Rosenthal's painstaking scholarly effort.

The present translator explains why he undertook the new translation: De Slane's French translation has grown old; the corrections of R. Dozy and A. Bombaci had to be taken into account (p. xxxvi ff). Why not then translate from the English of Professor Rosenthal? Several reasons are given, among which the fact that the present series of publications is meant to reach a wider public than that reached by a purely scientific work meant exclusively for arabists and specialists. Moreover, while keeping close to the text, an effort was made to rejoin the spirit of Ibn Khaldūn's work rather than its letter. Two innovations were believed necessary. First, an effort was made in the notes to bring Ibn Khaldūn closer to our times, since he was not only a witness of his own period, but also a precursor of our own; secondly, because of the major importance of Ibn Khaldūn's vocabulary, the terms are included in the text in parentheses. The translator then calls for a study of Ibn Khaldūn's vocabulary and hopes that the terms he chose to enclose in parentheses (in transliteration) will be of assistance to the future scholar of Ibn Khaldūn's terminology. This reviewer cannot but be in agreement with the latter "innovation," since he has already pointed out the need for such a study on an earlier occasion (*Journal of the American Oriental Society* Vol. 81 (1961), 58-9); in fact, the present translation is consonant with more than one suggestion made there.

The present translation is a further scholarly contribution to the study of Ibn Khaldūn's work, and the smoothness of its text recommends itself to arabist and non-arabist, specialist and non-specialist alike. De Slane, whose admirable effort sustained us for nearly a century, has been effectively superseded by the double effort of Professor Rosenthal and Monsieur Monteil.

△ GEORGE MAKDISI, Professor of Arabic, Harvard University.

ENGLAND AND THE NEAR EAST, 1896-1898, by George S. Papadopoulos. Thessaloniki, Greece: The Institute for Balkan Studies, 1969. 300 pages. No price indicated.

This is a detailed study of the development of British policy and interest relative to the Ottoman Empire, during the Salisbury administration, as the nineteenth century drew to a close and British policy underwent a basic change. From considering the Empire as the great bulwark along Middle Eastern routes to India, it would now center on: 1) strengthening the British position in Egypt, in the neighborhood of the Suez Canal; 2) readjustment of the British attitude as to the defense of Constantinople and the Turkish Straits; and 3) the improvement of the condition of the Sulṭān's Christian subjects—Slavs, Greeks and Armenians. Within the context of the world politics of the day, Great Britain was mindful of the advent of Imperial Germany into the picture and ever aware of the Russian "menace," as it moved toward the Entente Cordiale with France (1904) and understanding with Russia (1907).

Mr. Papadopoulos, of Greek Cypriot origin, centers his study around the Egyptian, Armenian and Cretan questions. After a brief historical introduction, he deals with Egypt and the Dongola expedition, the Armenian and Cretan issues, the Constantinople massacres, the effort at reform in the Ottoman Empire, and he closes with the Cretan war and the peace settlement. The author considers the repeated effort to reach an understanding with Imperial Russia as the most remarkable feature in Lord Salisbury's Near Eastern policy. The work closes with a most useful appendix, with documents on reform proposals, Sir Philip Currie's views on British policy, and an excellent bibliography.

Mr. Papadopoulos has written more than a well-documented, scholarly and well-presented volume, based on very extensive archival research and covering a critical period in the development of British policy. It is also an introduction to the new period which begins with the high politics of the twentieth century and leads to the tragedy of World War I. It repays very serious reading and study.

△ HARRY N. HOWARD, Washington, D. C.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES. 1946. THE COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS, edited in the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. Department of State Publication 8497. Washington: USGPO, 1970. 1,586 pages. $7.50.

This documentary collection maintains the standards of excellence and completeness, in all essentials, of previous volumes in the series. Devoted to the Council of Foreign Ministers, it is replete with documents and minutes which carry the reader through the entire year 1946. In many ways, in view of the preparatory work which the Council performed, the volume is a prelude to Volumes III and IV, which were devoted to the Paris Peace Conference in 1946. It should also be read along with Volumes VI and VII, which concentrated on Eastern and Southeastern Europe and the Near East.

Problems of special interest to students of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Near East, which are treated in some detail in the current issue, are those of Northern Epirus (Southern Albania), the disposition of the Italian Colonies (especially Libya), and the Dodecanese Islands. While both the United Kingdom and the United States, without prejudice, insisted on the right of the Greek government to present its case as to Northern Epirus, the Soviet Union defended the Albanian view, and the issue persisted into the Peace Conference. The discussions of the problem of the Italian Colonies are of much interest, not only because no solution appeared at the time, but because of the pressing desire of the Soviet Union for a mandate in the area. While there appeared to be little question as to the ultimate destiny of the Dodecanese Islands, the delaying tactics of Mr. Molotov are of interest, as is the Molotov observation as to the Soviet need for "a port of call in the Mediterranean for its merchant ships." When Molotov agreed, on June 26, that the Dodecanese Islands should go to Greece, Mr. Byrnes asked "for a minute or two to recover" from the shock!

△ HARRY N. HOWARD, Washington, D. C.

FRANTZ FANON, by David Caute. New York: Viking Press, 1970. 116 pages. $4.95. $1.65 in paper.

One of a series of biographical sketches of Modern Masters, the study of Frantz Fanon by David Caute is perhaps the least controversial in the Frank Kermode collection in its approach, if not in its subject. Caute's essay, limited in length by the general format of the series, succeeds in providing the interested reader with a rapid account of the life and times of the Martiniquean psychiatrist turned revolutionary in the Algerian Revolution of 1954-1962. Caute reviews the thorny path that led Fanon from Martinique to Paris and then to Lyons, where he studied medicine and psychiatry, to Blida, where he practiced psychiatry, and finally to the FLN and the newspaper for which he wrote, *el-Moudjahid*. Unlike Conor Cruise O'Brien's biography of Albert Camus, in the same series, which is in fact interesting to read with Caute's study, Caute fails to capture the passion and the tragedy that marked Fanon's life. Just as Camus' politics during the Algerian struggle reflected the predicament of the Algerian Frenchman, so Fanon's complex combination of anti-western, anti-colonialist attitudes was expressed in the language and historical context of the country towards which he felt such strong and ambivalent sentiments. He formulated but did not resolve that contradiction which is common to other partisans in the same struggle. To Caute, who is an astute follower of the man's political wanderings, it is equally compelling to contemplate the fact that Fanon's following has been largely outside of Africa, in North America and in the Middle East. Events and their interpreters, however, change at uneven schedules.

△ Irene L. Gendzier, African Studies Center, Boston University.

Die Geschichte der Oguzen des Rasid ad-Din, by Karl Jahn. Forschungen zur Islamischen Philologie und Kulturgeschichte, Band IV., 1969. Illus. ÖS 168.00.

Karl Jahn of the University of Leiden, the indefatigable editor, scholar and investigator of the "Universal History" (Jamī'at Tawārīkh) of Rashīd al-Dīn (d. 1318), the famous Persian historian of the Ilkhān period, adds to his numerous and valuable publications the present monograph devoted to the history of the Oǵuzen.

Rashīd al-Dīn's chapter on the Oǵuzen, the forerunners of the Islamic Turks, differs from other treatments of ancient people insofar as it is not based on written sources but on oral popular tradition and folklore and though a compilation of legends and reality, it constitutes an important historical source. It sheds light on the tribal organization, their origin, their geographical diffusion and the succession to the throne of its chieftains in a patriarchal society.

After a detailed account of the Persian manuscripts used for his investigation, Professor Jahn presents a complete translation of the Persian text (pp. 18-68) with valuable philological and historical notes. The text, in 26 fascicles, is attached at the end of the monograph, which is enhanced by 25 miniatures, and a bibliography. This publication is again a model of diligent and accurate scholarship which, as proven before, guides the student through this aspect of Oriental history with a sure hand.

△ Walter J. Fischel, University of California, Berkeley.

A Grammar of Southern Tati Dialects, by Ehsan Yar-Shater. Median Dialects Studies no. 1. The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1969. 276 pages. No price indicated.

Tati as defined by the author (who prefers "Median" for the group of languages under study) excludes the Tati of the Caucasus, which many may understand by this term. The book follows a series of very useful articles by the author on the still more narrowly defined "Southern Tati dialects" (south and southwest of Qazvin). It is of interest to both Iranists and linguists at large, describing as it does a secondary language with a more complex morphology than Persian (having gender, case, a variety of ergative, etc.) still alive in a multilingual society (Persian, Azerbijani Turkish, Tati). The area scholar not specializing in language will find a valuable general statement of the situation in the introduction.

The linguist may find a number of areas in which Yar-Shater does not provide him with particular information he seeks or answers he wishes. This is in part due to the fact that researchers like Yar-Shater do not have a clearly defined framework provided by the linguist for such investigations. Problems such as overall phonemic patterns and variant realizations within local dialects, which are central to such studies, are beginning to receive the attention they deserve. As early as 1954 Weinreich called for a "structural dialectology" which would meet some of the needs but a satisfactory one readily usable by the non-theorist does not yet exist. We are in the meantime grateful for information such as that provided by Professor Yar-Shater, gathered with care and presented honestly for what it is. It greatly clarifies the situation, giving the linguist much that he can work on. He is especially to be commended for the numerous examples provided.

△ Carleton T. Hodge, associate chairman, Research Center for the Language Sciences, Indiana University.

L'Influence du Stoicisme sur la Pensée Musulmane, by F. Jadaane. Recherches publiées sous la direction de l'Institute de Lettres Orientales de Beyrouth, Série I, Tome XLI. Beirut: Dar El-Machreq, 1967. 244 pages. Bibl. Index. No price indicated.

The work is based on the author's Sorbonne thesis. After surveying previous investigations on the subject (by O. Amine, J. Horowitz, D. Santillana and S. Van den Bergh), Dr. Jadaane passes on to a comparison of Stoicism and Islām and the crucial problem of transmission of Stoic ideas to the Islamic world.

Stoicism was popular in late antiquity and its influence, as one might anticipate, is discernible in Islamic philosophy. A precise methodolgy is required in order to avoid the pitfall of classifying ideas as specifically "Stoic" which are common in the schools of late antiquity. This can only be done by means of careful *Quellenforschung* and terminological precision (a determination of correspondences between Greek and Arabic terms).

The author proposes that an actual Stoic school existed in the world of Islām ("une école morale stoïcienne"), represented by such thinkers as al-Kindī, al-Rāzī, Miskawayh and Avicenna. This thesis can hardly be supported. Miskawayh, for example, even refutes views which he identifies as Stoic. Prof. Richard Walzer's studies on Miskawayh's ethics disclose his actual sources and inspiration. Nor is the idea of a universal state in al-Farābī identical with the Stoic cosmopolis. There is evidence, according to Walzer, that it was modelled on Middle Platonic sources. Dr. Jadaane also regards al-Sijistānī as a proponent of Stoic doctrine, on the basis of his quoting Stoic apophthegms. But such quotations in florilegia literature say little about a man's philosophical position, even if they can be properly identified as Stoic in origin.

In order to uncover Stoic influence the author at time indulges in unwarranted speculation. For example, a reference by Miskawayh in *Tahdhīb al-akhlāq* to the Neoplatonist Porphyry is assumed to refer to the latter's *History of Philosophy* (p. 192); then the author observes that since many sayings of the Stoics in Diogenes Laertius appear in Miskawayh, his actual source must have been the same in this instance, and Miskawayh was mistaken in thinking it was Porphyry. Actually, Miskawayh's source appears to have been Porphyry's *Commentary on Aristotle's Ethics.*

While noting the importance of the Aristotelian commentaries for the diffusion of Stoic ideas, the author makes virtually no use of them. The rather extensive Arabic Alexander of Aphrodisias material would have been relevant in this context. Also, the Arabic commentaries on the *Physics* contain Stoic material that can be traced to specific Stoic texts.

Dr. Jadaane has bravely undertaken a difficult task. His book should be a challenge, as was the work of his predecessors, which may stimulate further research on this intriguing subject.

△ JOEL L. KRAEMER, Yale University.

THE KABABISH ARABS: POWER, AUTHORITY AND CONSENT IN A NOMADIC TRIBE, by Talal Asad. New York: Praeger, 1970. xvi + 263 pages. Appen. Bibl. Index. $10.00.

Beginning with the question that provides the theoretical continuity to his study, i.e., "how was the political elite, the *Awlad Fadlallah* lineage, able to maintain its exclusive privilege and dominant authority over the mass of the Kababish" (p. xv), Talal Asad proceeds to demonstrate that legitimacy is not necessarily based on consent. Criticizing the literature of functional anthropology which assumes that consent is necessarily the principal element in non-violent dominance of rulers over their subjects, Asad admonishes: "consent must be determined empirically in each case and not assumed to be a general attribute of all political systems by definition" (p. 231).

Providing a detailed ethnographic description of the ecological framework, the pattern of annual migration and the institutional sources of domestic power and authority available to the majority of Kababish of northern Sudan, the author concludes that the overall authority of the household head is greater than any other member because of (1) his possession and control of his household and (2) his ability to carry out his rôle in a way that is considered just by those subject to it. However, this basic character of authority is different in kind from the political authority wielded by the Awlād Faḍlallāh which he describes in the latter chapters, specifically chapters nine to eleven. Their authority is based, rather, on the inability of the Kababish to compete with the Awlād Faḍlallāh for the means of administration over the tribe.

This study is an important contribution to the literature of political anthropology for its deft analytical distinction between "structure" and "culture" at both the domestic and political levels. The structural element that is common to both is hierarchy, involving differential allocation of power and a process of legitimation, but the context of legitimation and the sources of power are different.

△ CYNTHIA NELSON, Department of Sociology-Anthropology, American University in Cairo.

KNOWLEDGE TRIUMPHANT: THE CONCEPT OF KNOWLEDGE IN MEDIEVAL ISLAM, by Franz Rosenthal. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970. viii + 341 pages. Index. Glds. 64.00.

This is a work of impressive scope and vast erudition. With patient attention to scholarly detail Professor Rosenthal examines the workings of the conception of knowledge in Islamic theology and religious science, in philosophy, and in education and general culture. His many-sided investigation brings to the fore the dominant importance of the idea of knowledge in medieval Islamic civilization.

Many interesting theoretical issues come up in the course of the inquiry. Some of these are perennial and pervasive—for example, the epistemological issues of the nature and sources of human knowledge. Others are of more limited and technical interest. The theological problem of God's knowledge—with its deep roots in Aristotelian philosophy—was treated by the philosophical theologians of Islâm with great subtlety and cleverness in discussions that still have substantial epistemological interest in the present day.

One point regarding which more information than Professor Rosenthal affords would have been welcome relates to the rôle of knowledge in its bearing upon legal and moral responsibility. What, for example, does Islamic jurisprudence have to say of the responsibility of a man who unbeknownst to himself violates the law, or one whose actions injure others through results of which he did not know. The difficult but interesting region of interaction between knowledge and responsibility remains largely outside the scope of Rosenthal's discussion.

A significant merit of the book is the impressive judiciousness of Rosenthal's use of the contributions of other scholars and the fairness of his estimates of the value of their contributions. For example, he assesses more positively than most the pioneering but almost universally underrated studies of Max Horten (p. 109).

Rosenthal has carried a vast and complex inquiry to a completion of substantial interest and value. He has done this in such a way as to earn for himself the gratitude of all who are concerned with the intellectual history of Islām in particular, and of human culture in general.

△ NICHOLAS RESCHER, Department of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh.

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA, 1970-1971. London: Europa Publications, 1970. xvi+ 989 pages. Bibl. $23.50.

This updated, seventeenth edition of an excellent survey and reference work on the Middle East and North Africa certainly belongs in every good library. It includes events through August 1970. The book is divided into three parts, the first of which contains a general survey of social, religious, historical and economic features of the area and three introductory articles by Nigel Blackburn, W. B. Fisher and L. P. Elwell-Sutton. Part Two, the bulk of the volume, includes the concise country summaries which have made this book so famous over the years. The tome ends with a brief section containing a who's who, selective bibliographies and notes of research institutions concerned with the Middle East and North Africa.

△ MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, Johns Hopkins University.

MODERN ISLAMIC LITERATURE, with an introduction and commentaries by James Kritzeck. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970. viii + 310 pages. $10.00.

This book is a welcome supplement to the author's *Anthology of Islamic Literature.* It covers a wide range—in time from 1800 to the 1960s, in space from Nigeria and North Africa, through the Middle East heartland and Somalia, to Pakistan and Indonesia, and in subject from poems and short stories to theological and political tracts. The authors range from humble scholars like al-Jabartī and bohemian novelists like Sadegh Hedayat or Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm to kings and presidents: Nasiruddin and Muḥammad Reza Shah, 'Abdallāh and Jamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir.

Fuller anthologies have been published, notably in French, but on the whole this volume succeeds very well in presenting the reader with the questions that have been of concern to the Islamic world in the last century and a half. And the fact that the vast majority of the selections were taken from already available translations shows that the English-speaking world is beginning, as never before, to get interested in the Islamic peoples as people, and not just as owners of strategic real estate, means of communication and oil deposits.

Personally, I found this volume less interesting than its predecessor—but that is only another way of saying that the modern Islamic world has yet to produce thinkers, writers and poets of the calibre of Ibn Khaldūn, al-Ghazzālī, al-Ma'arrī, Ḥāfiẓ and Sa'dī. I also have a minor suggestion for a second edition: a few more dates, including that of the publication of the original text, would help the reader better to place and appreciate the selection.

△ CHARLES ISSAWI, Columbia University.

OMAN: A HISTORY, by Wendell Phillips. London: Longmans and New York: Morrow, 1967. xiv + 246 pages. Appens. Bibls. Index. 63s or $6.95.

This work supplements the author's *Unknown Oman* (1966), which concentrates on the geography, religion and customs of this land in eastern Arabia. Dr. Phillips, relying on his excellent library, his own experience, and a phalanx of authorities he has consulted, has traced the history of Oman from ancient times to 1961 (the reason for stopping at this date is not apparent). He is himself a pioneer in the investigation of the archeology of Arabia. Particularly interesting is the material on the connections of Oman with East Africa and the slave trade.

The weakest parts of the book deal with recent international and local disputes. Here the historian turns partisan. The claim advanced by the author's good friend Sulṭān Sa'īd (deposed in July 1970 by his son Qābūs) to the Buraymī oasis is buttressed in every possible way, while evidence supporting the

Saudi Arabian claim is swept under the rug. Although the abortive arbitration of the dispute is recorded, no mention is made of the unilateral imposition of so-called boundaries by the British government after the arbitration broke down in 1955. Britain then allotted two-thirds of the Buraymī villages to Abū Dhabī and only one-third to the Sulṭān. The author is also partial in his account of the struggle between Sa'īd and the Ibāḍī Imām of Oman. Sa'īd's dependence on British troops for the defeat of the Imām's forces is made clear, but the testimony of such British observers as Wilfred Thesiger and Stephen Longrigg bearing witness to how widely the Imām had wielded authority is ignored.

△ GEORGE RENTZ, Stanford, California.

SAYYID JAMĀL AL-DĪN AL-AFGHĀNĪ: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY, by A. Albert Kudsi-Zadeh. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970. xxiii + 96 pages. Indices. Gld. 36.00.

The compiler of this bibliography has attempted "to gather together every possible reference to Afghānī." He has organized 688 entries into five main categories: bibliographies, writings by Afghānī, primary writings about Afghānī, secondary writings about Afghānī, and selected tangential writings about Afghānī. The citations in all but the first of these categories are further divided, where possible, into published and unpublished works, works in Eastern and Western languages, and by literary form. The bibliography contains a list of the periodicals surveyed, a chronological table of Afghānī's life, an index of titles, and an index of personal names. All the articles appearing in a given periodical are listed by citation number after the name of the periodical in the index of titles.

Dr. Kudsi-Zadeh has thrown his nets wide and included a number of items, such as secret memoirs, forthcoming books, collections of documents, and unpublished theses and dissertations, which might otherwise escape the attention of the student of Afghānī's life and works. He has carefully indicated which of the works cited he has examined personally and has given the source for the citation of those works he has not been able to verify. If a secondary work contains translations or texts of Afghānī's writings, letters to Afghānī, or photographs, that is indicated. Most of the citations are followed by short descriptive annotations. Spotchecking reveals the bibliographical information to be accurate.

This bibliography should prove to be an excellent guide for persons interested in Afghānī: its comprehensiveness, arrangement, indices, and annotations will facilitate further study both for specialists and for those who know no Eastern tongue.

△ J. DENNIS HYDE, Middle East Bibliographer, University of Pennsylvania.

TARĪKH BAYRŪT, by Ṣāliḥ B. Yaḥyā. Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1969. 253 pages. Indices. £L. 25.00.

The author states that the purpose of this book is "to collect something about the news of ancestors which might be of benefit to the descendents of Buḥtūr B. 'Alī, Amīr of al-Gharb. . . ." So the purpose is evidently to write about his ancestors whose history in this area goes back to the twelfth century, the time of Amīr Nāḥid Abū al-'Ashā'ir Buḥtūr, founder of the house of Buḥtūr, which ruled the district of al-Gharb of the Province of Beirut at the time of the Mamlūks until 1436 (840 A.H.). It is a known fact that the Mamlūks tended to enlist the help of rural local leaders for the purpose of maintaining their authority: the Buḥtūrs were such leaders in that rural district.

Despite the fact that this book was published in 1927 (see page 1138 of *NEI* under "Bayrūt"), the present, new edition lacks any literary form: the numerous grammatical mistakes, dictation and style make it rather boring reading. The author, however, appears to possess wide and authentic knowledge of the history of the period covered and writes about historical events and anecdotes in minute detail. He gives an interesting account of the conquest and recapture of Beirut and of the customs and traditions prevailing at that time. While the book was intended to introduce biographical data of the ruling members of the Buḥtūr family, it has real abiding value for all who seek a comprehensive understanding of the history of Beirut from the twelfth to fifteenth centuries. The indices of people and places are superb.

△ MUHAMMAD M. SALAH, Falls Church, Virginia.

URBAN GOVERNMENT FOR THE PREFECTURE OF CASABLANCA, by Katherine Marshall Johnson. New York: Praeger, 1970. xxiv + 239 pages. Bibl. $13.50.

As the third largest city in both Africa and the Arab world Casablanca forms a particularly important and appropriate subject for the study of urban organization in the developing nations. The author, as a student of public administration, concentrates on the institutions of urban government paying particular attention to the formal organization of authority, the nature and extent of the city's problems, and the ways in which the national political structure articulates with that of the municipality proper.

In her introduction the author notes that Casablanca occupies a special place in the Moroccan nation not only because of its economic preeminence but because its rapid expansion to a city of 1.5 million has brought with it a host of social, economic and political difficulties. In turn, the central government has chosen to maintain tight control over the political aspects of urban organization while granting city officials jurisdiction over only certain technical problems. Unfortunately, such problems as the control of water, sanitation, mass transportation, housing, education and social welfare (each of which is treated in detail by the author) raise difficulties with which local officials have neither the resources nor the power to cope. Thus, in following chapters on finance and planning, the author concludes that the level of success with which the city's problems are now being handled cannot be sustained without a commitment on the part of the central government to cease treating Casablanca primarily as a security problem and begin establishing plans of national scope for dealing with her problems.

In short, this is an excellent study of municipal organization, one which is as sensitive to the "political realities" of the situation as it is lucid in its description of the formal structure of the city's governing institutions.

△ LAWRENCE ROSEN, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey.

YUGOSLAVIA AND THE NONALIGNED WORLD, by Alvin Z. Rubinstein. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1970. xv + 333 pages. Bibl. Index. $11.00.

Alvin Rubinstein's book is a lucid and readable exposition of Belgrade's political manipulations to avoid Soviet interference in Yugoslavia's internal affairs. Most of the book is devoted to Tito's travels and efforts to enlist the newly emerging countries into an informal grouping of "positive neutralists" free of formal entanglements with the major powers. It also traces the efforts of the nonaligned to use "summitry" and the United Nations as instruments for influencing the decisions affecting their vital interests. An extensive discussion analyzes the particularly close association that Tito developed with Nāṣir: a relationship born of mutual admiration as well as Nāṣir's key rôle in the Arab world.

Rubinstein, like many other observers, tends to exaggerate the influence of the nonaligned on major world decisions. Their interests have been too diverse for them to stay united very long, and even then it is unlikely that they could have significantly influenced the vital decisions of the major powers. The influence Tito exerted over Nāṣir also is overstated. Rubinstein concludes, for example, that "Tito has had an impact on Nasser greater than that of any other leader" and that he "influenced the maturation of Nasser's views on international politics."

A particularly intriguing conclusion is that "continued close relations with Nasser is a principal objective of Tito's diplomacy." In view of Nāṣir's death, where does that leave Tito? In all probability, Belgrade already had decided to deemphasize nonalignment as a key element in its foreign policy. It is likely that the Tito-Nāṣir relationship would have cooled under the strains of recent events. Tito had been disturbed by Nāṣir's silence over the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and viewed with alarm the deepening Egyptian dependence on Moscow and the growth of the Soviet military presence in the Mediterranean. Moreover, Belgrade's recent economic agreements with the Common Market and increasing contacts with Western leaders may well indicate that it has decided that its security can best be assured through closer relations with the West.

△ LEO TANSKY, Silver Spring, Maryland.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

Documents

Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the Near and Middle East, 2nd ed. Comp. by Helen C. Davis. New York: AMS Press, 1970. xxii + 541 pages. Map. Bibl. $15. First edition was published in 1953.

Historic Documents of the Muslim Freedom Movement. Comp. by Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad. Lahore: Publishers United, 1970. xvi + 575 pages. Rs 25.

International Documents on Palestine 1967. Ed. by Fuad Jabber. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, International Annual Documentary Series No. 3. 800 pages. $20. Available at The Institute for Palestine Studies, P.O. Box 329 A, R.D. No. 1, Oxford, Pa. 19363.

Middle East Record, 1967. Vol. 3. Jerusalem, Israel: Keter Publishing House. $25. Announced for October '70. Available from P.O. Box 7145, Jerusalem, Israel.

Middle East Research Association, 1969-70. Beirut: University Christian Center, 1970. viii + 69 pages. Bibl. Appen. $2. Concerns the work of ten students doing research in Beirut. Available from University Christian Center, P.O. Box 235, Beirut, Lebanon or Mr. H. C. Zeigler, 621 Cuyler Hall, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08540.

P. L. 480 Concessional Sales: History, procedures, and negotiating and implementing agreements. By US Dept. of Agriculture Economic Research Service. Washington: USGPO, 1970. 46 pages. No price indicated. Foreign Agricultural Economic Report no. 65.

Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East: 1 July 1969-30 June 1970. New York: UN Documents (A/8013), Supplement 13, 1970. $2.

Dictionaries

The Almanar English-Arabic Dictionary. By Hassan Karmi. Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1970. 880 pages. No price indicated.

Farūqi's Law Dictionary (English-Arabic). 2nd ed. By Ḥārith S. Farūqi. Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1970. 750 pages. No price indicated.

al-Manhal [al-Manhal, a French-Arabic dictionary]. By Jabbūr 'Abd al-Nūr. Beirut: Dār al-Ādāb, 1970. 1098 pages. Illus. LL 25.

A Modern Dictionary of Technical and Scientific Terms. Ed. by A. Sh. Al-Khatib. Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1970. 700 pages. No price indicated.

Political Dictionary of the Middle East in the Twentieth Century. Ed. by Ya'acov Shimoni and Evyatar A. Levine. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Publishing House Ltd. No price indicated. Announced for early 1971.

Biography

Chaim Weismann as Leader. By Isaiah Berlin and Israel Kolatt. Jerusalem: Hebrew Univ., Instit. of Contemp. Jewry, 1970. 51 pages. No price indicated.

Histoire de ma vie. By F. A. Mansour Amrouche. Paris: F. Maspero, 1970. n.p. NF 14.80.

A Lifetime in Jerusalem: The memoirs of the Second Viscount Samuel. By Edwin Samuel. London: Vallentine, Mitchell, 1970. £3 3s.

Mudhakkirāt al-Ṭabaqchalī [Memoirs of al-Ṭabaqchalī]. By Jāsim Mukhliṣ. Sayda: Maktabat al-'Asrīyah, 1969. 586 pages. Illus. LL 12. Documents and memoirs (June 7-September 20, 1959) of an Iraqi army officer and lawyer participating in the court martial of Nāẓim Kāmil al-Ṭabaqjalī (1913-1959) and his group.

Mudhakkirātī [My memoirs]. By Camille Chamoun. Beirut, 1969. LL 5.

Nasser. . . . By Dino Frescobaldi. Milano: Longanesi, 1970. 273 pages. No price indicated.

Tarājim Aghlabīyah (Biographical sketches of 173 Maliki scholars from Tunis, 750-950). By 'Iyaḍ ibn Mūsā. Tūnis: al-Matba'at al-Rasmīyah al-Tūnisīyah, 1968. 568 pages. £E 2.75.

Bibliography

Bibliography of Iran. Comp. by Geoffrey Handley-Taylor. Chicago and London: St. James Press, 1969. xx + 150 pages. $6.50.

Directory of Libraries and Special Collections on Asia and North Africa. Comp. by Robert Collinson. London: Lockwood, 1970. x + 123 pages. 40s.

French, German and Swiss University Dissertations on Twentieth Century Turkey: A Bibliography of 509 titles. Ed. by Peter T. Suzuki. 28 mimeographed pages. Supp. no. 1 of Newsletter (S 30 '70). Available from the author, American Arms 259, APO New York 09633.

The 1969 Bibliography of the Middle East: A complete and classified list of all the books published in about ten Middle Eastern countries. Damascus: Syrian Documentation Papers, 1970. 176 pages. No price indicated.

A Selected and Annotated Bibliography of Economic Literature on the Arab Countries of the Middle East, 1953-1965. Beirut: AUB, Economic Research Inst., 1967. xvii + 458 pages. No price indicated.

Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan

Agriculture and Related Industries in Pakistan. By F. Kahnert *et al.* Paris: OECD, Development Centre, 1970. 452 pages. $5.50.

Crescent and Green: A miscellany of writings on Pakistan. Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries, 1970. x + 170 pages. $9. Reprint of the 1955 edition.

Economic Policy and Industrial Growth in Pakistan. By Stephen Lewis. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969. xiii + 191 pages. Appen. Tables. Index. Illus. 45s.

Eighteen Years in the Khyber 1879-1898. By Sir Robert Warburton. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970. 367 pages. $8.75. Reprint of the 1900 edition.

Growth and Development in Pakistan, 1955-1969. By J. J. Stern and W. P. Falcon. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, Center for International Affairs, 1970. 94 pages. $2.75. Occasional Papers in International Affairs, no. 23.

Iran-American Review, 1970. By Iran-American Chamber of Commerce. Scarsdale, New York: Iran-American Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 1970. 62 pages. No price indicated.

L'Iran, exemple de pays en voie de développement ou la dictature du "Monde Libre". By Bahman Nirumand. Tr. from German by P.-M. Flecher. Paris: Juillard, 1969. 288 pages. No price indicated.

Iran, oil at the service of the nation. By David Missen. London: Transorient Books, 1969. 29 pages. No price indicated.

Iran's Foreign Policy; A compendium of the writings and statements of His Imperial Majesty Shahanshah Aryamehr. Tehran: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information & Press Dept., n.d. 210 pages. No price indicated. No documents.

Mohammed Ali Jinnah: Maker of modern Pakistan. Ed. by Sheila McDonough. Lexington, Mass.: Heath Press, 1970. xii + 101 pages. Bibl. $2.29 in paper.

Muslim Politics, 1906-47. By Kabir Humayun. Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1969. ix + 133 pages. $15.

Muslim Self-Statement in India and Pakistan 1857-1968. By Aziz Ahmad and G. E. von Grunebaum. Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz, 1970. x + 240 pages. No price indicated.

Pakistan: A cultural unity. By S. F. Hasan Faizi. Lahore: Muhammad Ashraf, 1970. xvi + 198 pages. Rs 7.50.

Pakistan: Industrialization and trade policies. By Stephen R. Lewis. Fair Lawn, N.J.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970. 224 pages. Tables. Appen. $9 in cloth; $4 in paper.

Pakistan in Crisis. By G. S. Bhargava. Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1969. 222 pages. Rs 24.

Pakistan's Foreign Policy. By Sangat Singh. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1970. n.p. $11.

The Politics of Pakistan; A constitutional quest. By Richard Wheeler. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1970. 352 pages. Tables. Maps. $11. Announced for October 1970.

Rise of Muslims in Indian politics; An analysis of developments from 1885 to 1906. By Rafiq Zakaria. Bombay: Somaiya Publications, 1970. xvi + 427 pages. Rp 45.

The System of Local Health Services in Rural Pakistan and Planned Administrative and Technical Support. By Aktar Awan. Lahore: Public Health Assoc. of Pak., 1969. 189 pages. No price indicated. In paper.

Two Pakistani Villages: A study in social stratification. By Muhammed Rafique Raza. Lahore: Punjab Univ. Sociologists Alumni Assoc., 1969. 104 pages. $3 in paper.

Les villes de l'Iran; des cités d'autrefois à l'urbanisme contemporain. By Fredy Bémont. Paris: Fabre, 1969. 305 pages. No price indicated.

Arabian Peninsula

The Arabian Peninsula. By Richard H. Sanger. Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries, 1970. xiv + 295 pages. Illus. Maps. Bibl. $15. Reissue of the 1954 edition.

Discovery! The story of Aramco then. By Wallace Stegner. Serialized in *Aramco World Mag.* Readers may reserve a copy of the book by writing the Manager, Public Relations, 1345 Avenue of the Americas, New York, N.Y. 10019; or the Editor, *Aramco World Mag.*, P.O. Box 4002, Beirut, Lebanon.

Ibn al-Amir wa 'aṣruh, ṣūrah min kifāḥ sha'b al-Yaman [Ibn al-Amīr and his era: a picture from the struggle of the Yemeni people]. By Qāsim Ghālib Aḥmad. San'ā': al-Marākiz al-Islāmīyah, 1970. Bibl. £E .70.

Mintaqat 'Unayzah, dirāsah iqlīmīyah [The area, Anaiza, Saudi Arabia; a regional study]. By 'Abd al-Raḥmān Ṣādiq al-Sharīf. Cairo: Maṭba'at al-Nahḍah al-'Arabī, 1969. 314 pages. Bibl. Illus. Maps. Charts. £E 1.

al-Mu'jam al-jughrāfī lil-bilād al-'Arabīyah al-Su'ūdiyah [Geographical dictionary of Saudi Arabia]. al-Riyāḍ: Dār al-Yamāmah lil-Baḥth wa al-Tarjimah wa al-Nashr, 1969. n.p. Maps. £E 2.

Central Asia

The Arab Conquests in Central Asia. By H. A. R. Gibb. New York: AMS Press, 1970. viii + 102 pages. $5. Reprint of the 1923 edition.

The Empire of the Steppes; A history of Central Asia. By René Grousset. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1970. 708 pages. Maps. Notes. Index. $17.50.

The Heartland. By Stuart Legg. New York: Farrar. $8.95. Announced for Jan. '71. On Central Asia.

Soviet Central Asia. By Edgar Knobloch. London: Benn. Illus. 50s. Announced for Winter '71.

Travels in Central Asia. By Armin Vambery. New York: Praeger, 1970. xvii + 443 pages. Illus. $21.50. Reprint of the 1864 edition.

Egypt, Sudan and Libya

Addresses delivered by Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi, September 16th, 1969, September 22nd, 1969, and October 16th, 1969. Tripoli: Libyan Arab Republic Press, 1970. 17, 12, and 16 pages. No price indicated. Available from the National Cultural Centre, Tripoli, Libya.

The Bornu Sahara and Sudan. By Sir Richmond Palmer. New York: Negro Univs. Press, 1970. viii + 296 pages. Illus. Maps. Bibl. $27.50. Reprint of the 1936 edition.

Incidents of Travel in Egypt, Arabia Petraea and the Holy Land. By John Lloyd Stephens. Ed. by Victor Wolfgang von Hagen. Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1970. liv + 457 pages. Illus. Index. $9.95.

Interview of Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi on U.A.R.'s television, October 14th, 1969. Tripoli: Libyan Arab Republic Press, 1970. 17 pages. No price indicated. Available from the National Cultural Centre, Tripoli, Libya.

Libya; Area handbook. Washington: USGPO, 1970. 307 pages. Illus. $3.00. Available from Superintendent of Documents, USGPO, Washington, D.C. 20402 (identification no.: D 101:550-85).

Lībyā al-mu'āṣirah [Modern Libya]. By Ṣalāḥ al-'Aqqād. Cairo: League of Arab States, Inst. for Arab Stud., 1970. 165 pages. Bibl. £E .50.

Libyan Independence and the United Nations: A case of planned decolonization. By Adrian Pelt. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1970. xxviii + 888 pages. Appen. Index. $35.

La lutte de classes en Egypte de 1945 à 1968. By Mahmoud Hussein. Paris: F. Maspero, 1969. 382 pages. NF 15.40. Cahiers Libres 158-159.

The Mahdist State in the Sudan 1881-1898: A study of its origins, development and overthrow. 2nd ed. By P. M. Holt. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970. xv + 266 pages. Maps. Bibl. Index. $9.

On Evacuation of British Forces. Tripoli: Libyan Arab Republic Press, 1970. 50 pages. No price indicated. Available from the Ministry of Education and National Guidance, Department of Public Relations, Tripoli, Libya.

On the Frontiers of Islam: Two manuscripts concerning the Sudan under Turco-Egyptian rule 1822-1845. Ed. by Richard Hill. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970. xxx + 216 pages. Appen. Map. Index. $9.75.

Le rôle de la coopération dans la socialisation de l'agriculture égyptienne. By Adel Ahmed Hashish. Paris: Université de Paris, Faculté de droit et des sciences économiques, 1969. xiv + 482 pages. No price indicated. A doctoral dissertation.

The Sudan in Evolution: A study of the economic, financial and administrative conditions of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. By Percy F. Martin. New York: Negro Univs. Press, 1970. xxxvi + 559 pages. Map. $18. Reprint of the 1921 edition.

The Suez Canal, 1956 Crisis-1967 War. Ed. by A. G. Mezerik. New York: International Review Service, 1969. 120 pages. $5.

United States Policy toward Egypt, 1830-1914. New York: Exposition Press, 1969. 270 pages. No price indicated.

Fertile Crescent and Cyprus

Aḥwāl al-sukkān fī al-'Irāq [The conditions of the population in 'Irāq]. By Aḥmad Najm al-Dīn. Cairo: League of Arab States, Inst. for Arab Stud., 1970. 183 pages. Illus. Maps. £E .85.

Akel: The communist party of Cyprus. By T. W. Adams. Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1970. 210 pages. $6.

Bright Levant. By Laurence Grafftey-Smith. London: John Murray, 1970. Illus. 60s.

Hape'ilut hatzionit be'Iraq. By Hayyim J. Cohen. Jerusalem: Hebrew Univ., Instit. of Contemp. Jewry, 1969. 275 pages. No price indicated.

Ḥawl al-mushkilah al-kurdīyah [About the Kurdish problem]. By Jemal Nebez. National Union of Kurdish Students in Europe, 1969. 63 pages. No price indicated.

Ḥizb al-Istiqlāl al-Jumhūrī min al-muqāwamah al-waṭanī ayyām al-intidāb al-faransī [The Republican Independence Party: from the national resistance in the days of the French Mandate]. By Adil al-Ṣulḥ. Beirut: Dār al-Ṭalī'ah, 1970. 168 pages. No price indicated.

In Aleppo Once. By Taqui Altounyan. London: John Murray, 1969. vii + 196 pages. 40s. An autobiography which deals with pre-World War II life in Aleppo.

Irakskaya neft' [Iraqi oil]. By O. Gerasimov. Moscow: Nauka, 1969. 181 pages. No price indicated.

Lamaḥāt ijtimā'īyah min tārīkh al-'Irāq al-ḥadīth [Social aspects of modern Iraqi history]. By 'Alī al-Wardī. Baghdad: Maṭba'at al-Irshād, 1969. No price indicated.

The Monetary System in Lebanon: A test of autonomous money management. By Emile Ghattas. New York: Franklin Book Program, Inc., 1969. n.p. No price indicated.

Plucked in a Far-Off Land. By Taner Baybars. London: Gollancz, 1970. 223 pages. £2 2s. Childhood in a village in Cyprus.

Shukrī al-Quwwatlī Yukhāṭibu Ummatahu: Mukhtārāt min Khuṭabihi wa Bayānātihi [. . . Speaks to his Nation: A Selection of his speeches and statements]. Beirut: Maṭba'at Salīm, 1970. 470 pages. LL 15. A collection of 92 speeches by former Syrian President al-Quwwatlī.

Syria; area handbook. Washington: USGPO, 1970. 393 pages. Illus. $3.50. Reprint of 1965 edition. Available from the Superintendent of Documents, USGPO, Washington, D.C. 20402 (identification no.: D 101.22:550-47).

Israel

Anatomy of Political Institutionalization: The case of Israel and some comparative analyses. By Amos Perlmutter. Cambridge: Harvard Univ., Center for Internat. Aff., 1970. 51 pages. Notes. $2.25. Occasional Papers in International Affairs no. 25.

An Annual of Jewish Law and Israeli Family Law, vol I. Ed. by Ze'ev Falk. Jerusalem: Wahrmann Books, 1969. xxix English text + 125 pages Hebrew text. $5.

Les arabes en Israël. By Sabri Geries. Paris: F. Maspero, Cahiers Libres 151-2, 1970. n.p. NF 14.80.

La bataille sur le front social d'Israel pendant les années 70. By The Jewish Agency, Bureau for Economic and Social Research. Jerusalem: L. Berger, 1970. 146 pages. No price indicated.

Comparative Study of the Attitudes among Jewish Students before and after the 6 Day War—June 1967. London: World Union of Jewish Students, 1969. 12 pages. No price indicated.

Encounter with Israel; A challenge to conscience. By Alice and Roy Eckardt. New York: Association Press, 1970. n.p. Maps. $8.95.

The Founding Fathers of Israel. By Gershon Winer. New York: Bloch Publishing Co., 1970. $7.95.

The Idea of the Jewish State. 2nd ed. By Ben Halpern. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1970. No price indicated.

L'information sur l'état d'Israel dans les grands quotidiens français en 1958. By J. W. Lapierre. Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1968. 327 pages. NF 35. Travaux du Centre d'Etudes Sociologiques.

Integration and Development in Israel. Ed. by S. N. Eisenstadt, Rivkah Bar Yosef and Chaim Adler. New York: Praeger, 1970. xv + 703 pages. Bibl. Tables. $20.

Israel: Imperialist mission in Africa. Africa Research Group. General Union of Palestine Students. 2nd World Conference on Palestine. Beirut: Tricontinental Publishers, 1970. 28 pages. No price indicated.

Israel: The eternal land. By Sidney L. Markowitz. New York: Saphrograph Corp., 1969. 120 pages. $2.25.

The Israeli Soldier: Profile of an army. By Samuel Rolbant. Cranbury, N.J.: Barnes Yoseloff, 1970. n.p. Illus. $6.95. Announced for September '70.

Israelis and Jews. By Simon Herman. New York: Random House, 1971. n.p. $8.95. Announced for January '71.

Making of Policy: The diaries of Moshe Sharett, vol. 2. Tel Aviv: Am Oved. $3. Announced for Spring '71. The political negotiations in the struggle for statehood in 1937; manuscript in Hebrew.

La minorité arabe en Israël, contribution à une étude socio-démographique. By Maurice Krajzman. Brussels: Centre National des Hautes Etudes Juives, 1968. vi + 92 pages. Mimeographed. No price indicated.

Moscow and Jerusalem. By Avigdor Dagan. New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1970. $6.95.

Moscow Diary. By Mordecai Namir. Tel Aviv: Am Oved. $3. Announced for Autumn '70. Impressions of an Israeli envoy in the Russian capital; manuscript in Hebrew.

New Targets for Israel. By Arie L. Eliav. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post Publications, 1969. 38 pages. £I .80.

The Passion of Israel. By Leonard Wolf. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970. n.p. $8.95. Announced for November '70.

The Politics of Compromise: State and religion in Israel. By Ervin Birnbaum. Rutherford, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson Univ. Press, 1970. 348 pages. $10.

Prelude to Israel; An analysis of Zionist diplomacy 1897-1947. By Alan Taylor. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, Reprint series No. 5. 126 pages. $2.95. Available at The Institute for Palestine Studies, P.O. Box 329 A, R.D. No. 1, Oxford, Pa. 19363.

Problèmes d'évolution et d'adaptation des immigrants originaires d'Afrique du Nord en Israël. By Doris Bensimon. Paris: F. Maspero, 1970. n.p. NF 49.70.

Ten Words of Freedom: An introduction to the faith of Israel. By Jay Williams. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970. n.p. No price indicated.

Zanek: A Chronicle of the Israeli Air Force. By William Stevenson. New York: Viking Press. 320 pages. $7.95. Announced for Jan. '71.

Maghrib

Alger. By R. Goossens. Toulouse, France: F. D. Diffusion, 1969. 210 pages. Illus. NF 42. Views of Algiers.

Culture et enseignement en Algérie et au Maghreb. By Abdullah Mazouni. Paris: F. Maspero, 1970. n.p. NF 14.80.

Les enfants d'Algérie; récits et dessins. Paris: F. Maspero, Collection "Voix" 6, 1970. NF 16.25.

La femme algérienne. By Fadéla M'Rabet. Paris: F. Maspero, Cahiers Libres 141-2, 1970. n.p. NF 18.10. Sequel to *Les Algériennes.*

History of North Africa; Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco: From the Arab Conquest to 1830. By Charles-André Julien. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970. 360 pages. Illus. Maps. £4 10s.

Marshal Lyautey's Administration of Morocco, 1912-1925. By Alan Scham. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1970. n.p. $8.75.

Migration and Development; The case of Algeria. By Madeleine Trebous. Paris: Development Centre, OECD, 1970. 242 pages. Bibl. Tables. Maps. $4.

The Political Climate for Private Investment. By Lee C. Nehrt. New York: Praeger, 1970. xxvii + 391 pages. Bibl. $18.50. Special reference to North Africa.

The Sahara is Yours: A handbook for desert travellers. By Jon Stevens. London: Constable, 1969. xiii + 270 pages. Illus. Maps. $7.50.

Shamāl Ifrīqiyah; dirāsah fī al-jughrāfiyah al-iqlīmiyah [North Africa; a study in regional geography]. By Yusrī 'Abd al-Rāziq al-Jawharī. Alexandria: al-Hay'ah al-'Āmmah lil-ta'līf wa al-Nashr, 1970. 397 pages. Maps. Illus. £E 1.30.

Tārīkh al-Jazā'ir al-ḥadīth, bidāyat al-iḥtilāl [A modern history of Algeria at the beginning of the occupation (1830)]. By Abū al-Qāsim Sa'd Allāh. Cairo: League of Arab States, Institute of Arab Studies, 1970. 192 pages. £E .60.

Tunisia: A holiday guide. By Michael Tomkinson. London: Benn, 1970. 96 pages. Illus. Maps. 21s; 15s in paper.

Vérités sur la Révolution Algérienne. By Mohamed Lebjaoui. Paris: Gallimard, 1970. 249 pages. NF 24.

The Ways of the Desert. By General E. Daumas, with commentaries by the Emir Abd-el-Kader. Austin, Tex.: Univ. of Texas Press, 1970. 230 pages. Illus. $6.75. Announced for December '70.

Western Window in the Arab World. By Leon Borden Blair. Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1970. xvi + 304 pages. Bibl. Index. $8.50. Concerns Morocco.

Zum Beispiel Marokko; Reisen durch ein Land der Dritten Welt. By Eckart Kroneberg. Munich: R. Piper, 1970. 256 pages. Maps. No price indicated.

Palestine Problem

Arab Areas Occupied by Israel in June, 1967. Chicago: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc., 1970. 37 pages. $1. Information Papers no. 2. Available from AAUG Inc., P.O. Box 49, Chicago, Ill. 60690.

The Art of the Possible; Diplomatic alternatives in the Middle East. By Michael Reisman. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1970. n.p. $6 cloth; $1.95 paper. Announced for December '70.

Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs: Key to Arab-Jewish coexistence. By Elie Eliachar. Jerusalem:

Council of the Sephardi Community, 1970. 38 pages. No price indicated.

Israel's Occupation of Palestine and Other Arab Territories. Chicago: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc., 1970. 47 pages. $1. Information Papers no. 1. Available from AAUG Inc., P.O. Box 49, Chicago, Ill. 60690.

Jewish-Arab Peace in the Middle East. By Aharon Cohen. Tel-Aviv: Amikam Publishing House, 1970. 40 pages. $.50.

The Jewish National Home in Palestine: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 78th Congress. Introduction by Ben Halpern. New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1970. xxvi + 505 pages. Index. $14.95. Reprint of the Congress debates with new introduction.

Jordan Patrol. By Igar Lev. Tr. by Stanley Broza. New York: Doubleday, 1970. ix + 202 pages. $4.95. A political novel on the June 1967 war.

Nächstes Jahr in Jerusalem; eine Bestandsaufnahme im Nahen Osten. By Heinz Nussbaumer. Köln: Styria, 1970. 227 pages. Map. Illus. DM 13.80.

Palestine, année O; un dialogue israélo-arabe. By Lorand Gaspar. Paris: F. Maspero, Cahiers Libres 174, 1970. 112 pages. NF 8.60.

The Palestine Diary. 2 vols. By Robert John and Sami Hadawi. New York: New World Press, 1970. $6.95 each volume. Available from 135 East 44th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017.

A Palestinian View. By Fayez A. Sayegh. 2nd World Conference on Palestine. Beirut, 1970. 14 pages. No price indicated.

Political Armed Struggle. The Palestine National Liberation Movement, Fateh. Beirut, 1970. 47 pages. No price indicated.

Revolution until Victory. The Palestine National Liberation Movement, Fateh. Beirut, 1970. 30 pages. No price indicated.

Le Sionisme contre Israël. By Nathan Weinstock. Paris: F. Maspero, 1969. 662 pages. Maps. Bibl. No price indicated.

The Soviet Union and the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. By Solomon M. Schwarz. New York: Schocken Books. n.p. $6.95. Announced for January '71.

Statements of Israeli Officials between June 1967 and December 1969 as Reported in the Hebrew Press. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1970. 43 pages. Index. No price indicated. Available from P.O. Box 7164, Beirut, Lebanon.

Taṣrīḥ Bālfūr [The Balfour Declaration, with a special section on Palestine in the reports of the American, William Yale]. By Maḥmūd Mansī. Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-'Arabī, 1970. xi + 343 pages. £E .90.

Towards peace in Palestine. By Yusif Sayigh. Beirut: Fifth of June Society, 1970. 29 pages. No price indicated. Available at the Fifth of June Society, P.O.B. 7037, Beirut, Lebanon.

Whose Land? A history of the peoples of Palestine. By James Parkes. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1970. 322 pages. Index. $1.95.

Whose Land is Palestine? By Frank H. Epp. Grand Rapids: Ferdmans, 1970. 283 pages. $6.95; $3.95 in paper.

Turkey

Beyond the Sublime Porte; the Grand Seraglio of Stambul. By Barnette Miller. New York: AMS Press, 1970. xxv + 281 pages. Illus. $10.50. Reprint of the 1931 edition.

The Palace of Topkapi in Istanbul. By Fanny Davis. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970. xiii + 286 pages. Illus. Bibl. Index. $14.95.

Turkey. By Freya Stark. London: Thames and Hudson, 1970. Illus. £6 6s.

Turkish Economic, Social, and Political Change. By Edwin J. Cohn. New York: Praeger, 1970. xiv + 166 pages. Appen. Bibl. $12.50.

Medieval History

Baghdad: Metropolis of the Abbasid Caliphate. By Gaston Wiet. Tr. by Seymour Feiler. Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press. 160 pages. Map. Bibl. Index. $2.95. The Center of Civilization Series no. 28. Announced for January '71.

The Early Church in the Middle East. By Elinor Moore. Beirut: Aleph, 1968. vii + 55 pages. Illus. Bibl. $3.75.

Ensayo sobre las aportaciones orientales en la España musulmana y su influencia en la formación de la cultura hispano-árabe. By Maḥmūd 'Ali Makkī. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Islámicos, 1968. 340 pages. No price indicated.

Ibn Khaldoun, naissance de l'histoire, passé du tiers monde. By Yves Lacoste. Paris: F. Maspero, 1970. n.p. NF 18.10.

The Jews in Egypt and in Palestine under the Fatimid Caliphs. 2 vols. By Jacob Mann. New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1970. xxxvii + 280 and 484 pages. $22.50.

Mu'jam Banī 'Umayyah [Biographical notices of the Umayyids in Damascus]. Comp. by Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Munajjid. Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-Jadīd, 1970. 262 pages. No price indicated.

Orientalism and History. Ed. by Denis Sinor. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana Univ. Press, 1970. 144 pages. Bibl. Index. $10. Announced for October '70.

The Origin and Development of Muslim Historiography. By M. G. Rasul. Lahore: Muhammad Ashraf, 1970. xii + 108 pages. Rs 4.50.

The Pantheistic Monism of Ibn al-'Arabi. By Sayyid Abdul Qadir Husaini. Lahore: Muhammad Ashraf, 1970. xvi + 254 pages. Rs 10.

The Sword of Allah, Khalid bin al-Waleed: his life and campaigns. By A. I. Akram. Karachi: National Publishing House, 1970. xxiv + 504 pages. Maps. Bibl. Rs 35.

Ṭabī'at al-di'āyah al-'Abbāsīyah [The nature of

'Abbāsid propaganda, 716-749 AD]. By Fārūq 'Umar. Beirut: Dār al-Irshād, 1970. 358 pages. No price indicated.

Turoyo: Die Volkssprache der syrischen Christen des Ṭūr 'Abdīn. A: Texte, Band II. By Helmut Ritter. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1969. 698 pages. DM 68.

Verrat am Bosporus; die Eroberung Konstantinopels 1204. By Ernle Bradford. Tr. by E. Heumann. Tübingen: Wunderlich, 1970. 322 pages. Illus. No price indicated.

al-Wizārah wa al-wuzarā' fī al-'aṣr al-Fāṭimī [The viziership and viziers during the Fatamid age]. By Muḥammad al-Manāwī. Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1970. 332 pages. £E .80.

Modern History and Politics

American Zionism and U.S. Foreign Policy 1942-1947. By Richard Stevens. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies. Reprint series No. 7. 236 pages. $5. Available at The Institute for Palestine Studies, P.O. Box 329 A, R.D. No. 1, Oxford, Pa. 19363.

Communism in the Arab East. By M. S. Agwani. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1970. vii + 231 pages. Bibl. Index. $7.50.

Communist China's Interaction with the Arab Nationalists since the Bandung Conference. By Joseph Khalili. New York: Exposition Press, 1970. 121 pages. $7.50.

The Cooperative Movement in the Gaza Strip, 1920-1969. By Gideon Weigert. 270 pages. Appen. Bibl. Mimeographed manuscript. In Hebrew. No price indicated.

India and the Persian Gulf Region, 1858-1907; A study of British imperial policy. By R. Kumar. New York: Asia Publishing House, n.d. n.p. $10.75.

Indo-Arab Relations: An account of India's relations with the Arab world from ancient up to modern times. By Maqbul S. Admad. New Delhi: Indian Council for Cultural Relations, 1969. xi + 187 pages. Bibl. $5.50. Order from Verry, Mystic, Connecticut.

Jerusalem. By Selma Lagerlof. Tr. by J. Brochner. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1970. viii + 396 pages. $14.50. Reprint of the 1903 edition.

The Middle East: The Temple of Janus. By Desmond Stewart. Doubleday and Co. $6.95. Announced for March '71.

The Middle East: Yesterday and today. Edited by David W. Miller and Clark D. Moore. New York: Praeger, 1970. xx + 364 pages. Maps. $7.95. In the George Sch. readings on developing lands.

The Middle East in Revolution. By Humphrey Trevelyan. London: Macmillan, and Boston: Gambit, 1970. xi + 275 pages. Map. 65s or $5.95.

Middle Eastern Political Systems. By Dankwart A. Rustow. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970. 144 pages. $5.95; $2.75 in paper.

Military Forces and Political Conflicts in the Mediterranean. Paris: The Atlantic Institute, 1970. 52 pages. $1.40. The Atlantic Papers, no. 1.

Miṣr wa azmat al-Suways [Egypt and the Suez crisis]. By Ṣalāḥ Basyūnī. Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1970. 355 pages. Illus. £E .80.

Le mouvement revolutionnaire arabe. By Nathan Weinstock. Paris: F. Maspero, 1970. 143 pages. NF 5.90.

Mubadele; An Ottoman-Russian exchange of ambassadors. Annotated and tr. by Norman Itzkowitz and Max Mote. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1970. 207 pages. Gloss. Biographical dictionary. Bibl. Index. $11.50.

Nahost am Mikrofon. By Manfred von Juterczenka. Düsseldorf: Schwann, 1970. 160 pages. Illus. DM 12.80. A travelogue throughout the Middle East and North Africa.

al-Nuẓum al-siyāsīyah wa al-qānūn al-dustūrī [Political systems and constitutional law]. 2 vols. By Muḥsin Khalīl. Alexandria: Mansha'at al-Ma'ārif, 1968-69. Bibl. £E 2.50.

Political Systems of the Middle East in the 20th Century. By W. F. Abboushi. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1970. n.p. $8.95.

The Politics of Assassination. By Murray Clark Havens, Carl Leiden, and Karl M. Schmitt. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970. xiii + 154 pages. Bibl. Appen. Index. $5.95. Includes chapters on the assassinations of Ḥasan al-Bannā' and Admiral Jean Darlan.

Soviet Penetration into the Middle East. By Wynfred Joshua. New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1970. 43 pages. Bibl. No price indicated. Available from National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 130 East 67th Street, New York, New York 10021.

Soviet Russia and the Middle East. By Aaron Klieman. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970. 101 pages. Notes. $6.50; $2.45 in paper.

Voyageurs et écrivans égyptiens en France au XIX^{e} Siècle. By Anouar Louca. Paris: Didier, 1970. 250 pages. Notes. Bibl. Index. No price indicated.

Economics and Sociology

Agriculture East and West, A background book. By M. B. Desai. London: The Bodley Head, 1969. 124 pages. Tables. 15s. A comparative study of the problems of rural development in India, Japan, Mexico, Israel, Malaysia, the U.K. and the Netherlands.

The Arab Horse in Europe. By Erika Schiele. Tr. by Anthony Dent. London: Harrap Books, 1970. 316 pages. Illus. 90s.

Die Araber im der alten Welt. By Franz Altheim. Berlin: deGruyter, 1969. 666 pages. Maps. Illus. No price indicated.

Code of Labour. Beirut: Bureau of Lebanese and

Arab Documentation, 1969. 64 pages. No price indicated.

Continuity and Change in the World Oil Industry. Ed. by Zuhayr M. Mikdashi, Sherrill Cleland and Ian Seymour. Beirut: The Middle East Research and Publishing Center, 1970. xii + 233 pages. $8 or LL 26. Available from P.O. Box 1224, Beirut, Lebanon.

Disability in Antiquity. By Fareed Haj. New York: Philosophical Library, 1970. 188 pages. $6.50. A history of the handicapped in Near East history.

The Economic Impact of the Six-Day War: Israel, the Occupied Territories, Egypt, Jordan. By Eliyahu Kanovsky. New York: Praeger, 1970. 438 pages. Appen. Bibl. $15.

Family Planning and Population Programs: A review of world developments, 4th printing. Ed. by Bernard Berelson *et al.* Chicago: Chicago Univ. Press, 1969. xvi + 848 pages. Index. Tables. Illus. No price indicated. Articles on Turkey, Tunisia, and the UAR (Egypt).

How People Live in the Middle East. By Howard Yates. Chicago: Benefic, 1970. 96 pages. Illus. $2.80.

Islam and the Trade of Asia: A Colloquium. Ed. by Donald Richards. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1970. $10.

Kamele trinken auch aus trüben Brunnen. By M. Y. Ben-Gavriel. Reinbek b. Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1968. 135 pages. DM 2.80. Stories of bedouin life between Jerusalem and Mecca.

Large-Scale Desalting: A study in the engineering economics of regional development. By Paul W. MacAvoy and Dean F. Peterson. New York: Praeger, 1969. x + 121 pages. Index. $9. Mention of the Israeli case.

al-Lijān al-intājīyah fī al-qiṭā' al-'amm. . . [Production committees in the public sector and the rôle of the worker]. By Muḥammad Maṭar. Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahḍah al-Miṣrīyah, 1970. 260 pages. Bibl. £E .60.

Les modes d'aménagement des terroirs et le dynamisme de la civilisation de l'oasis. By Sylvain Bensidoun. Paris: A. Colin, 1970. n.p. No price indicated. With particular reference to the Algerian Sahara region.

National Accounts of Less Developed Countries 1959-1968. Paris: OECD, 1970. 270 pages. Tables. $5.50.

Oil and World Power: A geographical interpretation. By Peter R. Odell. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1970. 180 pages. Index. $1.25.

Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East, 2 vols. Ed. by Louise Sweet. New York: Doubleday, 1970. xv + 398 and xv + 404 pages. Indices. $3.98 each, in paper.

Readings in Arab Middle Eastern Societies and Cultures. Ed. by Abdullah M. Lutfiyya and Charles W. Churchill. The Hague: Mouton, 1970. xvii + 733 pages. Bibl. $15. Distributed in the US by Humanities Press, New York.

Report of the Interregional Seminar on the Development of Senior Administrators in the Public Service of Developing Countries, I: Report and Technical Papers. New York: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1969. v + 142 pages. $2.50. UN publication sales no.: E.69.II.H.3.

Social Security and the Social Security Law. By Sadek el-Said. Baghdad: al-Maref Press, 1968. 344 pages. No price indicated.

Some Dimensions of Middle East Oil: The producing countries and the United States. By Ragaei El Mallakh. New York: American-Arab Association for Commerce & Industry, Inc., March 1970. 19 pages. No price indicated.

Studies on Selected Development Problems in Various Countries in the Middle East. New York: UN ECOSOC Office in Beirut, UN Documents E/4638, 1969. $1.50.

Urban Sociology: Contemporary readings. Ed. by Fuad Baali and Joseph Vandiver. New York: Appleton, 1970. n.p. $4.95.

Religion and Philosophy

Alive to God: Muslim and Christian prayer. Ed. by Kenneth Cragg. London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970. 30s in paper.

Approaches to Islam. By James Kritzeck. Notre Dame, Ind.: Univ. of Notre Dame Press. $5.95. Announced for Spring '71.

Classical Islam: A history 600 A.D.-1258 A.D. By G. E. von Grunebaum. Chicago: Aldine, 1970. 201 pages. Chron. Bibl. Index. $6. Translation of the German edition.

Conflicts and Tensions in Islamic Jurisprudence. By Noel Coulson. Chicago and London: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1969. viii + 118 pages. 36s. A publication of the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies.

The Dawn-Breakers: Nabil's Narrative of the early days of the Bahā'ī revelation. By Zarandi Nabil. Tr. and ed. by Shoghi Effendi. Wilmette, Ill.: Baha'i Pub. Trust, 1970. xiii + 685 pages. Illus. Bibl. $7.50. $1 for footnotes.

Documents of Jewish Sectaries. By Solomon Schecter. New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1970. n.p. Notes. $22.50. Reprint of the 1910 edition; both volumes in one.

Edward Granville Browne and the Bahā'ī Faith. By H. M. Balyuzi. London: George Ronald, 1970. ix + 122 pages. Index. £2 or $5.75.

Der Einfluss des Islam auf die Geschichte und Kulturentwicklung Adamauas. By Ulrich Braukämper. Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1970. 223 pages. Map. Bibl. DM 28.

Fahmī al-Mudarris, min ruwwād al-fikr al-'Arabī al-Ḥadīth [. . . , one of the leaders of modern Arab thought]. By Yūsuf 'Izz al-Dīn. Cairo: League of Arab States, Institute of Arab Studies, 1970. 548 pages. Illus. £E 1.35.

Fatāwā al-Imām Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā [Fatwas by Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā]. Ed. by Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Munajjid and Yusūf Khūrī. Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-Jadīd, 1970. No price indicated. At least 2 volumes.

The Fihrist of al-Nadīm, 2 vols. Ed. by Bayard Dodge. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1970. xxxiv + 868 pages. Bibl. Gloss. Biographical index. Index. No price indicated.

A History of Islamic Philosophy. By Majid Fakhry. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1970. xv + 399 pages. Bibl. Index. $15.

Islam and its Cultural Divergence. Ed. by Girdhari Tikku. Urbana, Ill.: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1970. n.p. $8.50. Announced for November '70.

Islamic Surveys, no. 8: Bell's Introduction to the Qur'ān. Ed. by W. Montgomery Watt. Edinburgh: University Press, and Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1970. xii + 186 pages. Notes. Table. Indices. 30s or $5.50.

Judaism and Islam. By Abraham Geiger. New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1970. xxxii + 161 pages. Indices. $12.50. Reprint of the 1898 edition with a new Prolegomenon by Moshe Pearlman.

Logic in Classical Islamic Culture. By Gustave E. von Grunebaum. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz Verlag, 1970. viii + 142 pages. DM 56. First Giorgio Levi Della Vida Biennial.

La Pensée et l'action politiques d'Al-Mawardi (364-450/974-1058). By Henri Laoust. Paris: Librairie orientaliste Paul Guethner, 1968. 92 pages. NF 10.

The Revelation of Bahá'u'llah and the Bab. By Ruhi M. Afnan. New York: Philosophical Library, 1970. $7.50.

Le Shī'isme imâmite (Colloque de Strasbourg, 6-9 May 1968). Paris: Presses Univ. de France, 1970. 312 pages. No price indicated.

The Voice of Allah. By Edwin Hoyt. New York: John Day, 1970. 468 pages. $8.95.

Linguistics, Literature and Art

Antique Rugs from the Near East. By W. von Bode and Ernst Kuhnel. London: Bell, 1970. 184 pages. Illus. 50s. Available from Bell Press, 6 Portugal Street, London, England.

Arabic and Persian Poems in English. By Omar S. Pound. New York: New Directions Publishing Corp., 1970. 80 pages. $1.95 in paper.

Arabic Writing Today; The short story. Ed. by Mahmoud Manzalaoui. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1970. n.p. $7.50. Announced for October '70.

Einführung in die moderne arabische Schriftspache; Sprechplatte zum Abschnitt "Die Laute des Arabischen." By Arne Ambros. Munich: Hueber, 1970. n.p. DM 12.

Enemy of the Sun: Poetry of Palestinian resistance. Ed. by Naseer Aruri and Edmund Ghareeb. Washington: Drum and Spear Press, 1970. 182 pages. Illus. $2.50 in paper. Available from Drum and Spear Press, 1802 Belmont Road, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20009.

From Tyre to Jerusalem: The literary world of Matityahu Shoham. By Ruth Kartun-Blum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1969. viii + 189 pages. Bibl. $7. Occasional Papers no. 3.

al-Ḥanīn wa al-ghurbah fī al-shi'r al-'Arabī al-ḥadīth [Nostalgia and expatriation-alienation in modern Arabic poetry]. By Māhir Fahmī. Cairo: League of Arab States, Institute of Arab Studies, 1970. 254 pages. £E .70.

La littérature algérienne moderne. By Svetozár Pantuček. Prague: Academia, rozmn. SCT. 18, 1969. 193 pages. Bibl. No price indicated.

Major Trends in Modern Hebrew Fiction. By Isaiah Rabinovich. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1970. No price indicated.

A Manual of Musalman Numismatics. By O. Codrington. Amsterdam: B. R. Gruner N.V., 1970. 239 pages. 2 plates. $10. Reprint of the 1904 edition.

Miṣr tabnī [Egypt builds]. By Muḥammad Ḥammād. Cairo: n.p., 1964. No price indicated. Architecture in Egypt.

The Modern Arabic Literary Language: Lexical and stylistic developments. By Jaroslav Stetkevych. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1970. xxi + 123 pages. Bibl. Index. $4.75.

The New Israeli Writers: Short stories of the first generation. Ed. by Dalia Rabikovitz. New York: Sabra Books, Funk & Wagnalls, 1969. 320 pages. $5.95.

Die Pälastina-Literatur; eine internationale Bibliographie. By Peter Thomsen. East Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1969. 320 pages. DM 48.

Photographer in Lebanon: The story of Said Jureidini. By Jane McRae. Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman, 1969. 64 pages. No price indicated.

The Poetic Vocabulary of Michel Trad: A study in Lebanese colloquial poetry. By M. C. Lyons and E. I. Maalouf. Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1969. 428 pages. No price indicated.

Le roman maghrébin. By Abdelkabir Khatibi. Paris: F. Maspero, 1970. n.p. NF 14.80.

Saïd Akl un grand poète libanais. By Jean Durtal. Paris: Nouvelles éditions latines, 1970. 179 pages. NF 15.

A Selection of Poems of Amir Xosrow (652-725 A.H.) Tehran, Iran: Regional Cultural Institute, 1970. 53 pages. No price indicated. Publication no. 18.

Seven Hundred Years of Oriental Carpets. By Kurt Erdmann. London: Faber, 1970. 20 Plates. 286 pages. Illus. £15.

Sittengeschichte des alten Orients. By Johanna Furstauer. Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1969. 341 pages. Illus. DM 4.80.

Die Sprache der Ameisen. By Cyrus Atabay. Germany (West): Econ Group. $4. Announced for Spring '71. An anthology of ancient Persian verses and lyric prose.

Structural Continuity in Poetry: A linguistic study in five pre-Islamic Arabic odes. By Mary Catherine Bateson. Paris: Mouton, 1970. 129 pages. Texts. Appen. Gld 29.

A Survey of Persian Art: From prehistoric times to the present. Vol. 14: *New Studies 1938-1960.* Ed. by Arthur U. Pope and Phyllis Ackerman. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970. 326 pages. Photos. Maps. $35. Proceedings of the 4th International Congress of Iranian Art and Archaeology, Part A, April 24-May 3, 1960.

Le théâtre algérien. By Arlette Roth. Paris: F. Maspero, 1970. n.p. NF 14.80.

The Woman in Egyptian Art. By Steffan Wenig. Tr. by B. Fischer. New York: McGraw Hill, 1969. 171 pages. Illus. Map. Bibl. $12.95. First published in English by Hamlyn, London.

Paperback

Ben Gurion Looks Back In Talks with Moshe Pearlman. New York: Schocken Books, 1970. 252 pages. Index. $2.25. Originally published in 1965.

The Golden Trade of the Moors. By E. W. Bovill. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970. $2.25.

Modern Israel, rev. ed. By Lily Edelman. N. Hollywood, Calif.: Wilshire, 1969. 224 pages. Illus. Map. Bibl. $2. Originally published under the title: *Israel: New people in an old land,* in Nelson's World Neighbor Series.

A Short History of the Arab Peoples. By Sir John Glubb. New York: Stein and Day, 1970. n.p. $2.95.

Sons of Sinbad. By Alan Villiers. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970. xxviii + 391 pages. Appen. Illus. Index. $3.50. An account of sailing with Arabs in the Red Sea, around Arabia to Zanzibar; pearling in the Persian Gulf; and the life of shipmasters, mariners and merchants of Kuwait. Reprint of 1940 edition.

The Suez Affair. By Hugh Thomas. London: Penguin Books, 1970. 6s.

New Periodicals

Current Accessions 1, no. 1 (Ja '70). Middle East Library, Univ. of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455. Contact Bruce D. Craig, Middle East Bibliographer, to be put on the mailing list.

Islam and the Modern Age; Quarterly Journal. New Delhi: Islam and the Modern Age Society, Vol. 1, no. 1 (My '70). $8 per year. Available at Islam and the Modern Age Society, Jamianagar, New Delhi 25, India.

Near Eastern Round Table. Annual. Vol. I (1967-68). New York University: published jointly by the Near East Center and the Center for International Studies, 1969. Volume I edited by R. Bayly Winder.

Syrian Christians in Muslim Society

An Interpretation

ROBERT M. HADDAD

By accelerating the movement of "profane" learning from the West to the Islamic world, Syrian Christians played a crucial role in Muslim history at two junctures: Professor Haddad links, and suggests parallels between, their influence in the formative period of Islamic civilization and in the Ottoman collapse.

Princeton Studies on the Near East $5.00

Princeton University Press
Princeton, New Jersey 08540

MEI PANEL RESUMES

25th Anniversary Series

Resumes of the five panels to be included in the Middle East Institute's 1970-1971 25th Anniversary Series may be purchased from the Institute following each panel or subscribed to in total. The remarks of each panelist are presented in concise summarized form for review or research purposes; biographies of the panelists and a suggested bibliography are also enclosed. The first of these panels was held in December, 1970, and dealt with the projected federation of Libya, the UAR and Sudan. Panelists included Mr. Frank Golino of the State Department, Professor Peter Bechtold of the University of Maryland and Ambassador Raymond H. Hare, National Chairman of the Middle East Institute. The second panel, held in February, 1971, discussed the recent elections in Pakistan and their implications for that country's future course.

The remaining three panels have not yet been finalized but they will be concerned with the evolution of governmental systems in the Middle East and the response of governments to popular demands. Topics under consideration are: Turkish Democracy; the Economic Implications of a Palestine Settlement; and a Comparison of Traditional and Radical Societies.

The price of the resumes when purchased separately is $.50 per copy. A subscription for the five resumes cost $2.00. For order forms and further information, write to:

THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE
1761 N Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE

Prepared by the Staff of The Middle East Journal

With contributions from: Jay D. Fuller, Harry N. Howard, Kerim K. Key, A. Albert Kudsi-Zadeh, Jacob M. Landau, Gare LeCompte, Louis E. Leopold, David W. Littlefield, Christopher W. S. Ross, Michael H. Van Dusen, Roxann A. Van Dusen.

Note: It is the aim of the Bibliography to present a selective listing of periodical material dealing with the Middle East since the rise of Islām. In order to avoid unwarranted duplication of bibliographies already dealing with certain aspects and portions of the area, the material included will cover North Africa and Muslim Spain, the Arab World, the State of Israel, Turkey, the Transcaucasian states of the Soviet Union, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkestan. An attempt is made to survey all periodicals of importance in these fields. The ancient Near East and Byzantium are excluded.

It would be appreciated if authors of articles appropriate to the Bibliography would send reprints or notices of such articles to: Bibliography Editor, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, 1761 N Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036.

The list of periodicals regularly reviewed will be published annually in the Autumn issue.

GEOGRAPHY

28764 "Iran." *World Survey* no. 12 (D '69) 1-20.

28765 "Kazimen—ein shi'itischer Wallfahrtsort." *Bustan* 9, nos. 3-4 (1968) 59-62.

28766 "Pakistan—70." (In Russian) *Azii i Afr. Segodnia* no. 9 (S '70) 28-39. Five articles.

28767 FRADY, M. "On Jordan's Banks: an American innocent in the Middle East, II." *Harpers* 241, no. 1446 (N '70) 104-6 ff.

28768 MELAMID, A. "Khargh Island." *Geog. Rev.* 60, no. 3 (1970) 438-9.

28769 NAKLI, A. "Essai de toponymie maghrebine." *Rev. d'Hist. et Civilisation Maghreb* no. 8 (Ja '70) 42-63.

28770 OKYAR, O. "Turkey." *World Survey* no. 14 (F '70) 1-19.

28771 PONCET, E. "Notes sur l'évolution récente de l'agglomération du Caire." *Ann. de Géog.* 79 (Ja-F '70) 78-111.

28772 PUGACHENKOVA, G. "The Nu-Gumbed Mosque in Balkh (Afghanistan)." (In Russian) *Sovietskaya Arkhbiologia* no. 3 (1970) 241-50.

28773 VINCENT, G. "Des jardins sur l'Oronte au barrage de l'Euphrate: la Syrie aujourd'hui." *Rev. Défense natl.* 26 (Jl '70) 1104-19.

28774 ZABBĀL, S. "San'ā'." (In Arabic) *al-'Arabī* no. 142. (Jl '70) 108-33.

HISTORY

(Medieval)

28775 CHANG, H. "The earliest Sino-Arab relations." *Islamic Lit.* 16, no. 9 (S '70) 5-18.

28776 GABRIELI, F. "Omayyades d'Espagne et Abbasides." *Stud. Islamica* 31 (1970) 93-100.

28777 HASAN, S. "A survey of the expansion of Islam into Central Asia during the Umayyad Caliphate." *Islamic Cult.* 44, no. 3 (Jl '70) 165-76.

28778 IMAMUDDIN, S. "Administration under the Fatmids." *J. A. Soc. Pak.* 14, no. 3 (D '69) 253-70.

28779 IRVING, T. "How Arab learning reached Western Europe." *Islamic Lit.* 16, no. 8 (Ag '70) 5-14.

28780 MANDAVILLE, J. "The Ottoman province of al-Hasā in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries." *J. Amer. O. Soc.* 90, no. 3 (Jl-S '70) 486-513.

28781 QURESHI, Z. "A critique of early Arab victories, and the causes of their success." *Islamic Rev.* 58, no. 4 (Ap '70) 6-12.

28782 SADEQUE, S. "The court and household of the Mamluks of Egypt (13th-15th centuries)." *J. A. Soc. Pak.* 14, no. 3 (D '69) 271-88.

28783 STAMBOULI, F. "Ibn Khaldoun et le système traditionnel maghrebin." *Rev. Tunisienne de Sci. Soc.* 7, no. 20 (1970) 215-25.

28784 UZUNÇARSILI, I. "The death of Fatih Sultan Mehmed." (In Turkish) *Belleten* 34, no. 134 (Ap '70) 231-4.

28785 VADET, J.-C. "L' 'acculturation' des Sud-arabiques de Fuṣṭāṭ au lendemain de la conquête arabe." *B. d'Etudes O.* 22 (1969) 7-14.

28786 VAN ESS, J. "Les Qadarites et la Gailaniya de Yazid III." *Stud. Islamica* 31 (1970) 269-86.

28787 WATT, M. "Sidelights on early Imāmite doctrine." *Stud. Islamica* 31 (1970) 287-98.

HISTORY AND POLITICS

(Modern)

28788 "France in Asia." *L'A. nouvelle* no. 215 (My-Ju '70) 2-47.

28789 "Iraq: statement of four parties." *World Marxist Rev. Information B.* 8, no. 12 (1970) 35-8.

28790 "De mahdi-beweging in de soeden; de dood van de Imam Hadi al-Mahdi." *Kroniek van Afr.* no. 2 (1970) 80-4.

28791 "Political parties; the election programs." *Pak. Aff.* (Washington) 23, no. 11 (Ju 30 '70) 3-4. Summary of the party platforms of nine Pakistani parties.

28792 "Le problème du Soudan du Sud." *Remarques Afr.* 10, nos. 313, 316 (1968) 203-7, 292-5.

28793 "Shatt-al-Arab—Iraq and Iran." *Arab World* 16, nos. 3-4 (Mr-Ap '70) 14-20. Letter from the Acting Permanent Representative of Iraq, Adnan Raouf, to the President of the UN Security Council.

28794 "The Soviet Union in the Middle East: a symposium." *Mid. East Information Series* 13 (1970) 1-36.

28795 "Transcript of Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco's interview on the NBC television programme 'Meet the Press,' July 12, 1970." *New Mid. East* no. 23 (1970) 9-12.

28796 "Treaty of Sevres." *Armenian Rev.* 23, no. 3-91 (1970) 1-79.

28797 "United Nations Security Council Resolution 287 (1970) adopted by the Security Council at its 1536th meeting on 11 May 1970." *MEJ* 24, no. 3 (1970) 373-80. Concerns the future status of Baḥrayn.

28798 ABRAHAMIAN, E. "Communism and communalism in Iran: the *Tudah* and the *Firqah-i Dimukrat.*" *Internat. J. Mid. East Stud.* 1, no. 4 (O '70) 291-316.

28799 ABU-JABER, F. "The development of Indo-Egyptian relations." *Indian Polit. Sci. Rev.* 4, no. 2 (Ag-S '70) 157-70.

28800 ADAM, W. "Pakistan an der Schwelle zur Demokratie?" *Aussenpolitik* 21, no. 9 (S '70) 569-76.

28801 AGERON, C. "Le premier vote de l'Algérie musulmane: les élections du college musulman algérien en 1919-1920." *Rev. d'Hist. et Civilisation Maghreb* no. 8 (Ja '70) 97-109.

28802 ALI KHAN, M. "Some aspects of Pakistan's foreign policy." *Pak. Horizon* 23, no. 1 (1970).

28803 BADEAU, J. " 'Let's broaden our options'." *Mid East* 10, no. 5 (O '70) 34-7.

28804 BAILEY, C. "The Soviet involvement in Egypt: a dilemma for Raqah." *New Outlook* 13, no. 6 (Jl-Ag '70) 41-8.

28805 BARNES, W. "The Middle East reviewed." *Contemp. Rev.* 216, no. 1253 (Ju '70) 287-91.

28806 BEN-DAK, J. "China in the Arab World." *Current Hist.* 59, no. 349 (S '70) 147-52.

28807 BENSON, C. "On ditching Israel: a strategic alternative?" *Natl. Rev.* 22, no. 45 (N 17 '70) 1206-10.

28808 BERNSTEIN, M. and L. BOLLING. "Alternatives for the U.S. in the Middle East." *Mid East* 10, no. 5 (O '70) 38-41.

28809 BINDRA, A. "The Indian Ocean as seen by an Indian." *U.S. Naval Inst. Proceed.* 96, no. 5 (1970) 178-203.

28810 BORRARO, P. "La presenza degli Arabi in Basilicata." *Levante* 17 (Ju '70) 12-27.

28811 BOUTROS-GHALI, B. "The Arab League (1945-1970)." *Rev. égyptienne de Droit internat.* 25 (1969) 67-118.

28812 BROWN, N. "The adverse partnership—the U.S. and Russia learn to talk." *New Mid. East* no. 23 (1970) 17-21.

28813 BURKI, R. "The idea of Pakistan and Iqbal's universalism." *J. Regional Cult. Inst. (Iran, Pak., Turkey)* 2, no. 4 (1969) 245-52.

28814 CARRÉ, O. "Le contenu politique des sermons radiodiffusés du Ramadan à Damas." *Travaux & Jours* no. 36 (Jl-S '70) 79-90.

28815 CLEMENS, W. "How the U.S.S.R. brought peace to the Middle East in 1972." *War/Peace Report* 10, no. 6 (Ju-Jl '70) 14-20. Adapted from a political-military exercise carried out by the Humanities Department of M.I.T. as part of a course in US-Soviet relations.

28816 COTTRELL, A. "A new Persian hegemony." *Interplay* 3, no. 12 (S '70) 9-15.

28817 COULAND, J. "Moyen-Orient: la stratégie de l'impérialisme français." *Nouvelle Critique* no. 36 (S '70) 4-13.

28818 DA CRUZ, D. "Lady Hester Stanhope, 'Queen of the Desert'." *Aramco World* 21, no. 5 (S-O '70) 8-12.

28819 DAMMANN, T. "Saudi Arabia's dilemma—an interview with King Faisal." *Interplay* 3, no. 12 (S '70) 16-9.

28820 DARBY, P. "Beyond East of Suez." *Internat. Aff.* 46, no. 4 (O '70) 655-69.

28821 DAYAL, R. "Crisis in the Lebanon." *India Quart.* 26, no. 2 (Ap-Ju '70) 123-33.

28822 DESJARDINS, T. "Saudi Arabia: next in line for revolution?" *Atlas* 19, no. 9 (S '70) 30-4. Translated from *Ma'ariv.*

28823 DUCLOS, L.-J. "Israël et le Tiers Monde." *L'Afr. et l'A.* nos. 89-90 (1969) 53-63.

28824 ERLICH, H. "The tribes in Yemen and their role in the war, 1962-1968. Part 2: the tribes, the Republic and the Egyptians." (In Hebrew) *Hamizrah Hehadash* 20, no. 2 (78) (1970) 129-58.

28825 ESMER, S. "Turkey in the world today." *Internat. Prob.* (Moscow) 21, no. 4 (1969) 141-68.

28826 FARHADI, A. "Afghanistan's active non-alignment." *Pacific Community* 1, no. 2 (Ja '70) 294-302.

28827 FINDLEY, C. "The legacy of tradition to reform: origins of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry." *Internat. J. Mid. East Stud.* 1, no. 4 (O '70) 334-57.

28828 FOLEY, T. "Revolution in the Arab World." *Polit. Aff.* 49, no. 8 (Ag '70) 26-32.

28829 FRANDA, M. "Communism and regional politics in East Pakistan. *A. Survey* 10, no. 7 (Jl '70) 588-606.

28830 FRY, C. "The secularization of Turkish politics, 1900-1960." *Vidya* no. 3 (1969) 41-50.

28831 GARDER, M. "Peut-on parler de stratégie sovietique au Moyen-Orient." *Stratégie* no. 21 (Ja-Mr '70) 21-34.

28832 GAZDAR, M. "Middle East *versus* Big Powers." *Islamic Lit.* 16, no. 9 (S '70) 33-55.

28833 GILLON, D. "Pawn or King? Which way will the Middle East go?" *New Mid. East* no. 23 (1970) 5-8.

28834 GOLDMANN, N. "Israeli foreign policy, II: What can be done?" *New Outlook* 13, no. 6 (Jl-Ag '70) 22-36.

28835 GOLINO, F. "Patterns of Libyan national identity." *MEJ* 24, no. 3 (1970) 338-52.

28836 HARMEL, C. "Les communistes algériens et la pluralité des partis." *Est & Ouest* 22, no. 451 (Jl 15-31 '70) 17-24.

28837 HARVEY, I. "Britain: East and West of Suez." *Contemp. Rev.* 216, no. 1253 (Ju '70) 281-6.

28838 HERADSTVEIT, D. "The great powers and the Middle East." (In Norwegian) *Internat. Polit.* (Bergen) 1 (1969) 9-23.

28839 HERADSTVEIT, D. "Norwegian policy in the Middle East." (In Norwegian) *Internat. Polit.* (Bergen) 1 (1969) 118-35.

28840 HOPE, F. "Libya: the well-oiled revolution." *Atlas* 19, no. 8 (Ag '70) 33-8. Reprinted from *New Statesman.*

28841 HOWARD, H. "The Turkish Straits after World War II: problems and prospects." *Balkan Stud.* 11, no. 2 (1970) 35-60.

28842 HUNTER, R. "Das sowjetische Dilemma im Nahen Osten." *Europa-Archiv* 25, no. 10 (O 10 '70) 723-32.

28843 ITZKOWITZ, N. " 'Kimsiniz Bey Efendi,' or a look at *Tanzimat* through Namier-colored glasses." *Near Eastern Round Table* 1 (1967-68) 41-52.

28844 JÄSCHKE, G. "On the 50th anniversary of the Grand National Assembly." (In Turkish) *Belleten* 34, no. 134 (Ap '70) 185-8.

28845 KARPAT, K. "The military and politics in Turkey, 1960-64; a socio-cultural analysis of a revolution." *Amer. Hist. Rev.* 75, no. 6 (O '70) 1654-83.

28846 KOMPANSEV, I. "The Soviet Union and the Middle East crisis." *Pak. Horizon* 23, no. 2 1970).

28847 KÖYMEN, O. "Anglo-Turkish relations, 1919-1922." *Türk Yilliği: The Turkish Yearbook of Internat. Rel.* 8 (1967) 14-28.

28848 LAKE, M. "New direction in Oman." *Venture* 22, no. 9 (O '70) 20-4.

28849 LEGA, J. "Idéologie et politique en Algérie." *Etudes* (Paris) (My '70) 672-93.

28850 LEWIS, W. "Algeria: the cycle of reciprocal fear." *Afr. Stud. B.* 12, no. 3 (D '69) 323-37.

28851 LIVINGSTON, J. "The rise of Shaykh al-Balad 'Alī al-Kabīr: a study in the accuracy of the chronicle of al-Jabartī." *BSOAS* 33, pt. 2 (1970) 283-94.

28852 LIVNI, R., tr. "The provisional Syrian Constitution, May 1, 1969." (In Hebrew) *Hamizrah Hehadash* 20, no. 1 (1970) 56-67.

28853 MARR, P. "Iraq's leadership dilemma: a study in leadership trends, 1948-1968." *MEJ* 24, no. 3 (1970) 283-301.

28854 MASMOUDI, M. "Mediterranée: présence sovietique et myopie européenne." *Preuves* no. 4 (1970) 39-45.

28855 MILLAR, T. "Soviet policies south and east of Suez." *For. Aff.* 49, no. 1 (O '70) 70-80.

28856 MOSHER, L. "Shifting sands on the 'Hill'." *Mid East* 10, no. 5 (O '70) 8-11.

28857 NASMYTH, J. "If the British leave the Gulf." *Interplay* 3, no. 12 (S '70) 4-8.

28858 OWEN, R. "Developments in the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman." *World Today* 26, no. 9 (S '70) 379-83.

28859 PERGENT, J. "L'Aide militaire de l'U.R.S.S. à l'Egypte." *Est & Ouest* 22, no. 450 (Jl 1-15 '70) 16-8.

28860 PONCET, J. "Grands travaux et difficultés marocaines." *Rev. Tiers-Monde* 11, no. 41 (Ja-Mr '70) 197-218.

28861 POPPER, D. "Lessons of United Nations peacekeeping in Cyprus." *Amer. J. Internat. Law* 64, no. 4 (S '70) 1-8.

28862 PRLJA, A. "The Jordanian crisis and intra-Arab relations." *Rev. Internat. Aff.* 21, nos. 486-7 (Jl 5-20 '70) 31-2.

28863 QUANDT, W. "Algeria: the revolution turns inward." *Mid East* 10, no. 4 (1970) 9-12.

28864 QURESHI, K. "Pakistan's relations with

Yugoslavia." *Pak. Horizon* 23, no. 2 (1970).

28865 RAHMAN, M. "The causes of the Mahdist revolution in the Sudan (1881-5)." *Islamic Lit.* 16, no. 6 (Ju '70) 371-6.

28866 RASHIDUZZAMAN, M. "The Awami League in the political development of Pakistan." *A. Survey* 10, no. 7 (Jl '70) 574-87.

28867 RASHIDUZZAMAN, M. "The national Awami Party of Pakistan: leftish politics in crisis." *Pacific Aff.* 43, no. 3 (1970) 394-409.

28868 RENZI, W. "Great Britain, Russian and the Straits, 1914-1915." *J. Mod. Hist.* 42, no. 1 (1970) 1-20.

28869 RONDOT, P. "La conférence de Djeddah (23-26 Mars 1970) et le rôle politique de l'Islam." *Rev. Défense natl.* 26 (Ju '70) 916-23.

28870 RONDOT, P. "Les crises du printemps 1970 au Liban." *Rev. Défense natl.* 26 (Jl '70) 1120-30.

28871 RONDOT, P. "Deux semaines de crise en Jordanie." *Rev. Défense natl.* 26 (Ap '70) 586-97.

28872 RONDOT, P. "Nouvelle crise en Jordanie et conjoncture arabe (juin 1970)." *Rev. Défense natl.* 26 (Ag-S '70) 1288-98.

28873 ROUCEK, J. "Britain's retreat from Aden and East of Suez." *Il Polit.* 33, no. 2 (Ju '68) 413-50.

28874 ROULEAU, E. "Libano: chi ha paura di Arafat." *L'astrolabio* 7, no. 43 (1969) 1190-213.

28875 ROUSSANOFF, N. "The liberation of Bulgaria from the Turkish yoke." *Balkania* 4, no. 4 (O '70) 16-20.

28876 RSULOVIC, M. "Rapprochement within Maghreb." *Rev. Internat. Aff.* 21, no. 485 (1970) 30-3.

28877 RUDEBECK, L. "Developmental pressure and political limits: a Tunisian example." *J. Mod. Afr. Stud.* 8, no. 2 (Jl '70) 173-98.

28878 RUSTOW, D. "Ataturk's political leadership." *Nr. East. Round Table* 1 (1967-68) 143-55.

28879 LA SABLIERE, B. "Les forces armées israéliennes." *Rev. Défense natl.* 26 (My '70) 737-50.

28880 SCHRATZ, P. "Red star over the southern sea (Mediterranean)." *U.S. Naval Inst. Proceed.* 96, no. 6 (1970) 22-31.

28881 SHAW, S. "The origins of representative government in the Ottoman Empire: an introduction to the provincial councils, 1830-1876." *Near Eastern Round Table* 1 (1967-68) 53-142.

28882 SHEEHAN, E. "In the flaming streets of Amman." *New York Times Mag.* (S 27 '70) 26-7 ff.

28883 SHIḤADAH, 'A. "The purposes of Jordanian legislation in the West Bank." (In Hebrew) *Hamizrah Hehadash* 20, no. 2(78) (1970) 166-70.

28884 SISCO, J. "U.S. objectives in the Middle East." *Dept. of State B.* 63, no. 1,624 (Ag 10 '70) 175-8.

28885 SMOLANSKY, O. "Moscow and the Persian Gulf: an analysis of Soviet ambitions and potential." *Orbis* 14, no. 1 (1970) 92-108.

28886 STANLEY, W. "Review of Turkish Asiatic Railways to 1918: some political-military considerations." *J. Transport Hist.* 71, no. 4 (N '66) 189-204. This number was published in 1970.

28887 STAUFFER, T. "Who needs the Suez Canal?" *Mid East* 10, no. 5 (O '70) 18-33.

28888 STEGENGA, J. "UN Peacekeeping: the Cyprus venture." *J. Peace Res.* 1 (1970) 1-16.

28889 SULLIVAN, R. "The architecture of Western security in the Persian Gulf." *Orbis* 14, no. 1 (1970) 71-91.

28890 SULLIVAN, R. "Saudi Arabia in international politics." *Rev. Polit.* 32, no. 4 (O '70) 436-60.

28891 TRIPET, F. "Cinq ans de révolution blanche en Iran." *Etudes* (Ag-S '69) 206-20.

28892 U THANT. "A quiet UN road to accord." *Commonwealth J.* 14, no. 4 (Ag '70) 139-44. Article discusses the issue of Baḥrayn's sovereignty.

28893 WARBURG, G. "Wingate and the Sharifian revolt, 1915-1916." (In Hebrew) *Hamizrah Hehadash* 19, no. 4 (1969) 355-63.

28894 WATT, D. "Death of the Arab nation—end of a myth?" *New Mid. East* no. 25 (O '70) 36-9.

28895 WEISBAND, E. "The Sanjak of Alexandretta 1920-1939: a case study." *Nr. East. Round Table* 1 (1967-68) 156-224.

28896 WHETTEN, L. "Moscow's story of success—design or accident?" *New Mid. East* no. 23 (1970) 24-9.

28897 WHETTEN, L. "Strategic parity in the Middle East." *Military Rev.* 49, no. 9 (S '70) 24-31.

28898 WINHAM, G. "Political development and Lerner's theory: further test of a causal model." *Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev.* 64, no. 3 (S '70) 810-9. The author examines the theory presented in *The Passing of Traditional Society.*

28899 WOLF, E. "Algerian peasant revolt." *Trans-Action* 7, no. 7 (My '70) 33-46.

28900 YODFAT, A. "The USSR and Libya." *New Outlook* 13, no. 6 (Jl-Ag '70) 37-40.

28901 ZABIH, S. "Iran's international posture: de facto nonalignment within a pro-Western alliance." *MEJ* 24, no. 3 (1970) 302-18.

28902 ZOPPO, C. "Soviet ships in the Mediterranean and the U.S.-Soviet confrontation in the Middle East." *Orbis* 14, no. 1 (1970) 109-28.

Arab-Israeli Conflict

28903 "Christian faith and the Palestine problem." *Mid. East Forum* 46, no. 1 (1970) 63-86. Articles by Father Jean Corbon, Rev. William Holladay, Rev. Hugh Harcourt, Mrg. George Khodr, Father Youakim Moubarac, and Archimandrite André Scrima.

28904 "Dokumente zur Entwicklung im Nahen Osten." *Europa-Archiv* 25 no. 19 (O 10 '70)

733ff.

28905 "Has Fatah become 'moderate'? Abu Ammar interview." *Free Palestine* 2, no. 4 (1970) 1ff.

28906 "The Middle East activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross, June 1967-June 1970." *Internat. Rev. Red Cross* no. 113 (Ag '70) 424-59.

28907 "The Middle East and Palestine refugees; issues before the 25th General Assembly." *Internat. Conciliation* no. 579 (S '70) 10-30ff.

28908 "The Middle East crisis." *Current* no. 121 (S '70) 52-64. With articles by E. Crankshaw, R. Keatley, M. Lerner, and the A.F.S.C.

28909 "On the Arab-Israeli conflict." *Reconciliation Quart.* (1970) 4-23ff.

28910 "Palestine." *Leviathan* 2, no. 4 (1970) 1-11.

28911 "The Palestine National Covenant and Fundamental Law (1964)." *New York Univ. J. Internat. Law and Polit.* 3, no. 1 (1970) 199-208.

28912 "The Palestine problem in its various dimensions." *Mid. East Forum* 46, no. 1 (1970) 27-62. Articles by Constantine Zurayk, Burhan Dajjani, George Dib, and George Corm.

28913 "Le peuple palestinien en marche." *Partisans* (Mr-Ap '70) 5-199.

28914 "La résistance palestinienne après cessez-le-feu." *Jeune Afr.* no. 505 (S 8 '70) 16-22. The article includes an interview with G. Habash.

28915 "What future for the Palestine Arabs?" *War/Peace Report* 10, no. 6 (Ju-Jl '70) 3-11. The four participants in the symposium are Marver Bernstein, Joseph E. Johnson, Don Peretz and Edward Said.

28916 'ABD AL-KARĪM, A. "Arab military activity." (In Arabic) *Dirāsāt 'Arabīyah* 5, no. 2 (1968) 32-81.

28917 ADAMS, M. "A Christian approach to Palestine." *Arab World* 16, nos. 3-4 (Mr-Ap '70) 3-6.

28918 ARNESEN, A. "The withdrawal of UNEF in May 1967." (In Norwegian) *Internat. Polit.* (Bergen) 1 (1969) 103-10.

28919 BASSIOUNI, C. "The Middle East in transition: from war to war, a proposed solution." *Internat. Lawyer* 4 (1970) 379-96.

28920 BASSIOUNI, C. "The Palestinians: refugees or a people." *Catholic World* (S '70) 257-62.

28921 BASSIOUNI, C. and E. FISHER. "An Arab-Israeli conflict: real and apparent issues, an insight into its future from the lessons of the past." *St. John's Law Rev.* 44 (1970) 399-465.

28922 BROWN, N. "Confrontation across the Suez Canal; the real implications of Egypt's missile development assessed." *New Mid. East* no. 25 (O '70) 26-9.

28923 BROWN, N. "Palestinian nationalism and the Jordanian state." *World Today* 26, no. 9 (S '70) 370-8.

28924 CAMPBELL, J. "The Arab-Israeli conflict: an American policy." *For. Aff.* 49 (O '70) 51-69.

28925 ERICSSON, B. "The Palestinian movement and Israeli counteractions." (In Norwegian) *Internat. Polit.* (Bergen) 1 (1969) 55-63.

28926 EVAN, W. "Unilateral initiatives for peace in the Middle East." *New Outlook* 13, no. 6 (Jl-Ag '70) 7-15.

28927 FELLOWES, P. "Possibilities in the Middle East." *World Today* 26, no. 9 (S '70) 362-9.

28928 FREED, R. "The Middle East conflict: an anti-imperialist view." *Arab World* 16, nos. 7-8 (Jl-Ag '70) 26-32.

28929 FURLONGE, G. "Illusion and reality in the Middle East." *RCAJ* 57, pt. 2 (1970) 147-56.

28930 GOLDMANN, N. "Toward Israel's neutralization." *Current* no. 119 (Ju '70) 53-7. This article appeared in *The Observer* (London) (Ap 12 '70).

28931 GUGGENHEIM, W. "Antizionismus—Antisemitismus." *Schweizer Monatshefte* 50, no. 5 (Ag '70) 392-5.

28932 HARKABI, Y. "The revised Palestine National Covenant (1968) and an Israeli commentary thereon." *New York Univ. J. Internat. Law and Polit.* 3, no. 1 (1970) 209-43.

28933 HARRINGTON, M. "The new left and the Arab-Israeli conflict." *Current* no. 118 (My '70) 23-7. This article appeared in *New America* (F 25 '70).

28934 HARTZBERG, A. "Palestine: the logic of partition today." *Columbia Forum* 13, no. 3 (1970) 17-23.

28935 HERADSTVEIT, D. "A study of the conflict in 1967." (In Norwegian) *Internat. Polit.* (Bergen) 1 (1969) 79-102.

28936 HOROWITZ, D. "Flexible responsiveness and military strategy: the case of the Israeli army." *Policy Sci.* 1, no. 2 (1970) 191-206.

28937 HOTTINGER, A. "The Fedayeen in Jordan." *Swiss Rev. World Aff.* 20, no. 6 (S '70) 15-9.

28938 HOWE, I. "Vietnam and Israel." *Dissent* (S-O '70) 401-4.

28939 KAMIL, F. "Arabs and Israelis." *Rev. Internat. Aff.* 21, no. 485 (1970) 27-9.

28940 KHLEIF, B. "The Arab-Israeli encounter: a sociological perspective." *Wisconsin Sociol.* 7, nos. 1-2 (1970) 17-23.

28941 LAPIDOTH, R. "La résolution du Conseil de Sécurité du 22 novembre 1967 au sujet du Moyen Orient." *Rev. générale de Droit internat. public* 74, no. 2 (Ap-Ju '70) 289-313.

28942 LOVE, K. "The art of the impossible: peace talks in the Middle East." *Mid East* 10, no. 5 (O '70) 12-7.

28943 MERTZ, R. "Why George Habash turned Marxist." *Mid East* 10, no. 4 (1970) 31-6.

28944 MICHENER, J. "What to do about the Palestinian refugees?" *New York Times Mag.* (S 27 '70) 22-5ff.

28945 MUSHKAT, M. "Israel und der Rogers-Plan. Die innere Diskussion über das Verhältnis zu den arabischen Staaten." *Europa-Archiv* 25, no.

18 (S 25 '70) 669-77.

28946 NORD, E. "Aspects of the conflict between Israel and the Arab states." (In Norwegian) *Internat. Polit.* (Bergen) 1 (1969) 64-78.

28947 PERES, Y. "Peace and security." *New Outlook* 13, no. 6 (Jl-Ag '70) 16-21.

28948 PRLJA, A. "The Rogers plan and the chances for peace." *Rev. Internat. Aff.* 21, nos. 488-9 (Ag 5-20 '70) 16-8ff.

28949 ROSTOW, E. "Legal aspects of a search for peace in the Middle East." *Amer. J. Internat. Law* 64, no. 4 (S '70) 64-70.

28950 SAFRAN, N. "Now is the time for decision." *Jewish Observer and Mid. East Rev.* 19, no. 31 (Jl 31 '70) 8-11. A critical discussion of the American Middle East initiative.

28951 SANDEGREN, K. "Nuclear weapons in the Middle East?" (In Norwegian) *Internat. Polit.* (Bergen) 1 (1969) 24-42.

28952 SARHAN, A. "The Swiss attitude toward the Arab-Israeli conflict in the light of the sentencing of the Palestinian Fedayin." (In Arabic) *Rev. égyptienne de Droit internat.* 25 (1970) 215-24.

28953 SARRĀJ AL-DĪN, I. "Towards a comprehensive plan for Arab action." (In Arabic) *Dirāsāt 'Arabīyah* 5, no. 2 (1968) 5-23.

28954 SHEEHAN, E. "The way Egyptians see Israel, Uncle Sam, the SAM's." *New York Times Mag.* (S 20 '70) 28-9ff.

28955 'UTHMANI, S. "The relationship between world imperialism and world Zionism." *Islamic Rev.* 58, no. 4 (Ap '70) 19-27ff.

28956 WINSTON, H. "Black Americans and the Middle East conflict." *Polit. Aff.* 49, no. 9 (S '70) 4-15.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

28957 "Abu Dhabi: oil industry." *Orient* (Hamburg) 11, nos. 3-4 (1970) 105-10.

28958 "L'âge d'or de Beyrouth est-il déclin?" *Etude mensuelle sur l'écon. et les finances des pays arabes* 12, no. 144 (1969) 11-23.

28959 "An analysis of law governing the first stage of land reform in Iran." *Tahqiqat-é eqtesadi* 7, no. 17 (1970) 49-74.

28960 "Basic data on the basic economy of Libya." *Overseas Business Reports* 70-25 (Jl '70) 1-22.

28961 "Basic data on the economy of Lebanon." *Overseas Business Report* no. 28 (1969) 1-9.

28962 "Establishing a business in Iran." *Overseas Business Reports* 70-23 (Ju '70) 1-20.

28963 "Evolution of Egyptian exports during and following the first Five Year Plan." *Natl. Bank of Egypt, Econ. B.* 23, no. 1 (1970) 20-9.

28964 "Foreign trade regulations of Cyprus." *Overseas Business Reports* 70-17 (My '70) 1-6.

28965 "Foreign trade regulations of Pakistan." *Overseas Business Reports* 70-14 (My '70) 1-10.

28966 "Franco-Asian Chamber of Commerce Yearbook of Members." *L'A. nouvelle* 216 (Jl '70) 1-78.

28967 "Growing Soviet economic stake in Middle East." *Mid. East Econ. Digest* 14, no. 35 (Ag '70) 1009-11.

28968 "Horizontal expansion of agriculture in U.A.R. (1952-1967)." *Central Bank of Egypt Econ. Rev.* 9, nos. 1-2 (1969) 15-23.

28969 "Market profiles for the Near East and South Asia." *Overseas Business Reports* 70-31 (Jl '70) 1-18.

28970 "Le Maroc dans la voie du développement et du progrès." *Monde Diplomatique* 17, no. 192 (Mr '70) 25-44.

28971 "Oil distribution companies in Libya libyanized." *Arab Oil Rev.* (Ap-Ju '70) 14-6ff. Text of nationalization law issued by the Revolutionary Command Council on July 4, 1970.

28972 "Pakistan's science management to be reorganized." *Orient* (Hamburg) 11, nos. 3-4 (1970) 86-91.

28973 "Samewerking in Noord-Afrika." *Afr. Inst. B.* 9, no. 7 (1969) 285-303.

28974 "The Trucial States Development Office." *Orient* (Hamburg) 11, nos. 3-4 (1970) 75-81.

28975 "Uncertain outlook for Tunisian economy." *Mid. East Econ. Digest* 14, no. 37 (S 11 '70) 1065-6ff.

28976 "The U.A.R. economy." *Natl. Bank of Egypt, Econ. B.* 23, no. 1 (1970) 5-15.

28977 "US business interests in the Arab world." *Mid. East Econ. Survey* (supp.) 13, no. 41 (Ag 7 '70) 1-4.

28978 AHMED, S. "Formation of national capital fund (Bait-ul-Mal)." *Islamic Lit.* 16, no. 5 (1970) 269-79.

28979 ALIKHANI, A. "Les perspectives de l'industrie iranienne." *Bank Markazi B.* no. 94 (Jl-Ag '69) 8-15.

28980 AWAD, M. "Government policy towards private industry in the Sudan." *L'Egypte contemp.* 61, no. 340 (Ap '70) 61-80.

28981 AYARI, C. "Une approche économetrique du problème de la croissance équilibrée et de la croissance deséquilibrée en Tunisie." *Rev. Tunisienne de Sci. Soc.* 6, no. 19 (1969) 13-9.

28982 AYARI, C. "Industrialisation et plein emploi: le cas de la Tunisie." *Rev. Tunisienne de Sci. Soc.* 7, no. 20 (1970) 9-29.

28983 BAIROCH, P. "Evolution et rôle de l'agriculture dans le Tiers Monde." *Civilisations* 20, no. 1 (1970) 25-36.

28984 BALTA, P. "La France et le monde arabe: I. Les réalités économiques." *Rev. Défense natl.* 26 (My '70) 769-79.

28985 BHARIER, J. "The Kuwaiti Dinar." *Internat. Currency Rev.* 2, no. 4 (S-O '70) 9-13.

28986 BOSE, S. and E. CLARK. "The cost of draft animal power in West Pakistan." *Pak. Develop. Rev.* 10, no. 2 (1970) 174-92.

28987 BOUINOT, J. "Les tendances au rapprochement de la comptabilité nationale et de la comptabilité privée; l'exemple du plan comptable général tunisien." *Rev. Tunisienne de Sci. Soc.* 6, no. 19 (1969) 189-234.

28988 BOUQUEREL, J. "L'industrie du sucre au Maroc." *Cah. d'Outre-Mer* 22, no. 88 (1969) 388-407.

28989 BREGMAN, A. "The influence of changes in investment on production and employment in boom and slump periods in Israel (1965-68)." *Econ. Rev., Bank of Israel* no. 34 (Jl '70) 3-19.

28990 BRIDGE, J. "The Lebanese Pound." *Internat. Currency Rev.* 2, no. 4 (S-O '70) 14-7.

28991 BULUTAY, T. and H. ERSEL. "The distribution of income in certain Turkish cities." *Türk Yilliği: The Turkish Yearbook of Internat. Rel.* 8 (1967) 29-84.

28992 BUSSINK, W. "A complete set of consumption coefficients for West Pakistan." *Pak. Develop. Rev.* 10, no. 2 (1970) 193-231.

28993 CALAMITSIS, E. "Stabilization problems and policies in Tunisia." *Finance & Develop.* 7, no. 3 (S '70) 43-8.

28994 CHAKRAVERTI, A. "Some aspects of the structural characteristics of the Turkish economy." *Artha Vijnana, J. Gokhale Instit. Polit. and Econ.* 11 (Ju '69) 236-55.

28995 CHOUDHURY, A. "Economic policy and industrial growth in Pakistan—a review." *Pak. Develop. Rev.* 10, no. 2 (1970) 264-71.

28996 COWNIE, J. *et al.* "The quantitative impact of the seed-fertilizer revolution in West Pakistan: an exploratory study." *Food Research Inst. Stud.* 9, no. 1 (1970) 57-95.

28997 CURNOW, A. "Kuwait puts its oil fortune to work." *ILO Panorama* 43 (Jl-Ag '70) 14-21.

28998 DAOUD, Z. "Algérie: le socialisme triomphant." *Jeune Afr.* no. 502 (Ag 18 '70) 40-7. Article discusses Algerian industry.

28999 DAOUD, Z. "Algérie: réforme foncière ou révolution agraire." *Jeune Afr.* no. 503 (Ag 25 '70) 42-50.

29000 DICK, K. "UK-Arab trade soars into the 1970's." *Mid. East Econ. Digest* (supp.) (My '70) 11-5.

29001 DOERR, A. *et al.* "Agricultural evolution in Israel in the two decades since independence." *MEJ* 24, no. 3 (1970) 319-37.

29002 GOODMAN, S. "Turkey's trade prospects in the Common Market: an exploratory study." *J. Common Market Stud.* 7 (Ju '69) 302-26.

29003 GUSSAROV, V. "Libya's economic development under new conditions." (In Russian) *Narodi Azii i Afriki* no. 3 (1970) 38-46.

29004 HABIBULLAH, M. "Problems of productivity in the jute industry of Pakistan." *Dacca Univ. Stud.* 17, pt. A (Ju '69) 19-26.

29005 HASHEM, G. "Planning of the national economy in Iraq." (In Arabic) *L'Egypte contemp.* 6, no. 341 (Jl '70) 21-72.

29006 HONE, A. "Pakistan's export prospects." *South A. Rev.* 3, no. 4 (Jl '70) 347-53.

29007 HUSSEIN, M. "Le rôle des techniques quantitatives dans l'élaboration des plans de développement économique en R.A.U." *Rev. Tiers-Monde* 10, no. 38 (Ap-Ju '69) 273-99.

29008 INFORMANTS. "The question of agriculture and the crisis of organization in Tunis." (In Arabic) *Dirāsāt 'Arabīyah* 6, no. 7 (My '70) 53-73.

29009 ISLAM, N. "Factor intensities in manufacturing industries in Pakistan." *Pak. Develop. Rev.* 10, no. 2 (1970) 147-73.

29010 KAZANCIGIL, A. "Le processus de conclusion des accords d'association dans la communauté économique européenne." *Türk Yilliği: The Turkish Yearbook of Internat. Rel.* 8 (1967) 148-85.

29011 KHALIL, H. "The Sudan Gezira scheme." *J. Admin. Overseas* 9, no. 4 (O '70).

29012 KHAN, A. "Capital-intensity and the efficiency of factor use: a comparative study of observed capital-labour ratios in Pakistani industries." *Pak. Develop. Rev.* 10, no. 2 (1970) 232-63.

29013 KOLARS, J. "Turkish international migrant labor." *Geog. Rev.* 60, no. 2 (1970) 262-4.

29014 LING, D. "Tunisia: modernization and moderation." *Muslim World* 60, no. 3 (Jl '70) 247-53.

29015 MANNAN, M. "A Muslim world bank: an analysis." *Islamic Lit.* 16, no. 6 (Ju '70) 325-31.

29016 MARAIS, O. "La politique agraire du Maroc indépendant." *Analyse & Prévision* 7, no. 5 (My '69) 295-306.

29017 MISSIAEN, M. "Good grain crops hold promise for North Africa." *For. Agriculture* 8, no. 37 (S 14 '70) 6-7.

29018 MUTAWALLI, H. "Towards Arab monetary cooperation." (In Arabic) *al-Ma'rifah* no. 103 (S '70) 27-51.

29019 DE PLANHOL, X. "Le déboissement de l'Iran." *Ann. de Géog.* 78 (N-D '69) 625-35.

29020 RACHID, A. "The emergence and development of public enterprise in the U.A.R." *L'Egypte contemp.* 61, no. 340 (Ap '70) 81-124.

29021 SIMPSON, I. "New approaches to irrigated farming in the Sudan." *Land Econ.* 46, no. 3 (Ag '70) 287-96.

29022 SMITH, W. "Money in the whirlwind of the Middle East." *Mid East* 10, no. 4 (1970) 27-30.

29023 SPILLMANN, G. "Le pétrole en 1969." *L'Afr. et l'A.* nos. 89-90 (1969) 3-11.

29024 TAMARI, M. "Influence of the recession on Israel's industrial companies." *Econ. Rev., Bank of Israel* no. 34 (Jl '70) 20-45.

29025 TUNCER, B. "An overview of the external financing mechanism of the Turkish economy." *Türk Yilliği: The Turkish Yearbook of Internat. Rel.* 8 (1967) 1-14.

29026 WARRINER, D. "Employment and income aspects of recent agrarian reforms in the Middle East." *Internat. Lab. Rev.* 101, no. 6 (1970) 605-26. A comparative study of Egypt, Iran, and Iraq.

29027 ZAHN, J. "Iran—Establishment of an automotive industry." *Intereconomics* (Ap '70) 129-31.

29028 ZARHI, S. "The future of the occupied territories—an economic analysis." *New Outlook* 13, no. 6 (Jl-Ag '70) 72-6.

SOCIAL CONDITIONS

29029 "The role of women in development." (In Arabic) *Maj. al-Mar'ah* (Ju 15 '70) 22-6.

29030 'ABD AL-RAḤĪM, M. "Arabism, Africanism, and self-identification in the Sudan." *J. Mod. Afr. Stud.* 8, no. 2 (Jl '70) 233-50.

29031 AJAMI, I. "Social classes, family demographic characteristics and mobility in three Iranian villages." *Sociol. Ruralis* 9, no. 1 (1969) 62-72.

29032 ANTONOVSKY, A. and D. KATZ. "Factors in the adjustment to Israeli life of American and Canadian immigrants." *Jewish J. Sociol.* 12, no. 1 (Ju '70) 77-87.

29033 ARIAN, A. "Consensus and community in Israel." *Jewish J. Sociol.* 12, no. 1 (Ju '70) 39-54.

29034 ARISTOVA, T. "A comparative essay on Kurdish material culture." (In Russian) *Sovietskaya Etnografia* no. 4 (1970) 46-57. Summary in English.

29035 ATAÖV, T. "The place of the worker in Turkish society and politics." *Türk Yilliği: The Turkish Yearbook of Internat. Rel.* 8 (1967) 85-147.

29036 BAKER, D. "Who is a Jew? The dilemma of Israel." *J. Church & State* 12, no. 2 (1970) 189-92.

29037 BEELEY, B. "The Turkish village coffeehouse as a social institution." *Geog. Rev.* 60, no. 4 (O '70) 475-93.

29038 BENT, F. "The Turkish bureaucracy as an agent of change." *J. Comp. Admin.* 1 (My '69) 47-64.

29039 BORZYKH, N. "The level of diffusion of interethnic marriages in the Republics of Central Asia and in Kazakhstan in the 1930's." (In Russian) *Sovietskaya Etnografia* no. 4 (1970) 87-96.

29040 BOUHDIBA, A. "Quelques aspects de la délinquance juvénile en Tunisie." *Rev. Tunisienne de Sci. Soc.* 6, no. 19 (1969) 67-87.

29041 BROWN, R. "Social distance: Jordanian and Israeli students, 1968." *Sociol. and Soc. Research* 53, no. 3 (Ap '69) 344-62.

29042 CAIDEN, G. "Coping with turbulence: Israeli administrative experience." *J. Comp. Admin.* 1, no. 3 (N '69) 259-80.

29043 CHOUIKHA, A. "Conception et résultats de la réforme Tunisienne de l'enseignement de 1958." *Rev. Tunisienne de Sci. Soc.* 6, no. 19 (1969) 39-66.

29044 DUPREE, L. "The 1969 student demonstrations in Kabul." *AUFS Reports, South A. Series* 14, no. 5 (My '70) 1-13.

29045 ENGEL, G. "Comparison between American permanent residents of Israel, I: American background." *J. Psychology* 71, no. 1 (1969) 133-42.

29046 ERLICH, H. "The tribes in Yemen and their role in the war, 1962-1968, I: The tribes and the Imamate." (In Hebrew) *Hamizrah Hehadash* 20, no. 1 (1970) 1-19.

29047 GUGLIELMI, G. "Origine e remoto uso dei nomi Libia ed Africa—Parte I: Libia." *Afr.* (Rome) 25, no. 2 (1970) 183-201. Summary in French and English.

29048 HAIM, A. "The Shi'ites in Iraq." (In Hebrew) *Hamizrah Hehadash* 19, no. 4 (1969) 315-32.

29049 HARA, T. "Customs and institutions related to the marriage in a Moslem village, Chittagong District, West Pakistan, I." (In Japanese) *J. A. & Afr. Stud.* no. 3 (1970) 72-105. With an English summary.

29050 HARTLEY, R. and J. NORRIS. "Demographic regions in Libya; a principal components analysis of economic and demographic variables." *Tijdschrift Econ. Soc. Geog.* 60, no. 4 (1969) 221-7.

29051 IBRAHIM, S. "Interaction, perception, and attitudes of Arab students towards Americans." *Sociol. and Soc. Research* 55, no. 1 (O '70) 29-46.

29052 JOSSE, R. "Croissance urbaine au Sahara: Ghardaia." *Cah. d'Outre-Mer* 23, no. 89 (1970) 46-72.

29053 JREISAT, J. "Administrative change of local authorities: lessons from four Arab countries." *J. Comp. Admin.* 2, no. 2 (Ag '70) 161-84.

29054 KHAN, Z. and W. SPRAGENS. "American and Pakistani policemen's attitudes toward law enforcement." *Western Polit. Quart.* 23, no. 3 (S '70) 579-88.

29055 KORTEPETER, C. "The Islamic-Ottoman social structure: the quest for a model of Ottoman history." *Nr. East. Round Table* 1 (1967-68) 1-40.

29056 KRESSEL, G. "Endogamous marriage among the Jawarish—aspects of urbanization and tradition." (In Hebrew) *Hamizrah Hehadash* 20, no. 1 (1970) 20-51.

29057 LEWIS, B. "Race and colour in Islam." *Encounter* 35, no. 2 (Ag '70) 18-36.

29058 MARCOUX, A. "Evolution générale et mouvement saisonniers des naissances en Tunisie de 1956 à 1968. *Rev. Tunisienne de Sci. Soc.* 7, no. 20 (1970) 173-93.

29059 MURĀDPŪRI, M. "Problems of marriage." *Islamic Lit.* 16, no. 5 (1970) 281-5.

29060 NATH, R. "Mughal Hammam and the institution of ghusal-khana." *Islamic Cult.* 44, no. 2 (1970) 101-10.

29061 PETERSEN, K. "Demographic conditions and extended family households: Egyptian data." *Soc. Forces* 46, no. 4 (Ju '68) 531-7.

29062 RAPHAELI, N. "The senior civil service in Israel: notes on some characteristics." *Public Admin.* 48 (1970) 169-78.

29063 REID, D. "Syrian Christians, the rags-to-riches story, and free enterprise." *Internat. J. Mid. East Stud.* 1, no. 4 (O '70) 358-67.

29064 REJWAN, N. "The strains of prolonged war: Egypt's intellectual crisis." *New Outlook* 13, no. 6 (Jl-Ag '70) 49-58.

29065 REPPETTO, T. "The Millet system in the Ottoman and American Empires." *Public Policy* 18, no. 5 (1970) 629-48.

29066 ROOS, L. and N. "Bureaucracy in the Middle East: some cross-cultural relationships." *J. Comp. Admin.* 1, no. 3 (N '69) 281-300.

29067 SCHULZ, J. "Social insurance funding and economic development in Iran." *Tahqiqat-é eqtesadi* 7, no. 17 (1970) 3-28.

29068 SHACKLE, C. "Punjabi in Lahore." *Mod. A. Stud.* 4, pt. 3 (Jl '70) 239-68.

29069 SHĀHĪN, A. "Towards a practical, rational upbringing." (In Arabic) *al-Ma'rifah* no. 103 (S '70) 3-17.

29070 SHEPHER, J. "Organizational effectiveness in Kibbutz society in the light of a new theory." *Sociol. Ruralis* 10, no. 1 (1970) 21-37.

29071 SHOHAM, S. and L. SHASKOLSKY. "An analysis of delinquents and nondelinquents in Israel: a cross-cultural perspective." *Sociol. and Soc. Research* 53, no. 3 (Ap '69) 333-43.

29072 SOEN, D. "Neighborly relations and ethnic problems in Israel." *Ekistics* 30, no. 177 (Ag '70) 133-8.

29073 STEVENSON, I. "Characteristics of cases of the reincarnation type in Turkey and their comparison with cases in two other cultures." *Internat. J. Comp. Sociol.* 11, no. 1 (Mr '70) 1-17.

29074 STOECKEL, J. "Social and demographic correlates of contraceptive adoption in a rural area of East Pakistan." *Demography* 5, no. 1 (1968) 45-54.

29075 TOMEH, A. "Birth order and friendship association." *J. Marriage & Family* 32, no. 3 (Ag '70) 360-8. The study was conducted at Beirut College for Women.

29076 TOMEH, A. "Cross-cultural differences in the structure of moral values: a factorial analysis." *Internat. J. Comp. Sociol.* 11, no. 1 (Mr '70) 18-33. Students at Beirut College for Women were among the respondents.

29077 TURIN, Y. "La commune d'Algér et ses écoles en 1871; un problème de laïcité coloniale." *Rev. d'Hist. et Civilisation Maghreb* no. 8 (Ja '70) 83-96.

29078 ZENNER, W. "Joking and ethnic stereotyping." *Anthrop. Quart.* 43, no. 2 (Ap '70) 93-113.

29079 ZIMMERMAN, C. "The traditional rural village (based upon examples from Turkey)." *Sociol. Internat.* 7, no. 2 (1969) 155-80.

SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

29080 AHMAD, A. "The role of Ulema in Indo-Muslim history." *Stud. Islamica* 31 (1970) 1-14.

29081 AHMAD, S. "Islam as against Communism." *Islamic Lit.* 16, no. 8 (Ag '70) 39-43.

29082 'ALI, 'A. "Muhammad in History." *Islamic Lit.* 16, no. 5 (1970) 261-8.

29083 ALLARD, M. "Méthode d'analyse de texte appliquée à un passage de Muḥammad 'Abduh." *Stud. Islamica* 31 (1970) 15-28.

29084 ANAWATI, G.-C. "La civilisation musulmane dans l'oeuvre du professeur Gustav Von Grunebaum." *Mélanges de l'Inst. dominicain d'Etudes O.* 10 (1970) 37-82.

29085 ANAWATI, G.-C. "La notion de 'Péché originel' existe-t-elle dans l'Islam?" *Stud. Islamica* 31 (1970) 29-40.

29086 ANSARI, M. "Liberation and Islam." *Islam & Mod. Age* 1, no. 1 (My '70) 82-9.

29087 ARKOUN, M. "Révélation, verité et histoire d'après l'oeuvre de Ġazâlî." *Stud. Islamica* 31 (1970) 53-70.

29088 BAIG, M. "Doctor Iqbal's optimism." *Islamic Cult.* 44, no. 2 (1970) 91-100.

29089 BANNERTH, E. "La rifā'iyya en Egypte." *Mélanges de l'Inst. dominicain d'Etudes O.* 10 (1970) 1-36.

29090 BEITIA, A. "A partir de quelles sources étudier al-Kindi?" *Mélanges de l'Inst. dominicain d'Etudes O.* 10 (1970) 83-108.

29091 CAHEN, C. "A propos des Shuhūd." *Stud. Islamica* 31 (1970) 71-80.

29092 CARRE, O. "Jamal al-Din al-Afghani a-t-il lu la *Moqaddima* d'Ibn Khaldun?" *Mélanges de l'Inst. dominicain d'Etudes O.* 10 (1970) 301-16.

29093 CASPAR, R. "Faith and reason in the *Munqidh* of Ghazali." *Islamic Rev.* 58, no. 4 (Ap '70) 13-8.

29094 COOPER, B. "American reform Judaism and Zionism." *Arab World* 16, nos. 7-8 (Jl-Ag '70) 3-10.

29095 FODA, E. "Sovereignty in Islam—the Hanifi and Shafi'i doctrines." (In Arabic) *L'Egypte contemp.* no. 341 (Jl '70) 111-34.

29096 GAZDER, M. "Bani Israel and the Holy Qur'ān." *Islamic Lit.* 16, no. 8 (Ag '70) 15-30.

29097 GOITEN, S. "Minority self rule and government control in Islam." *Stud. Islamica* 31 (1970) 101-16.

29098 VON GRUNEBAUM, G. "Observations on the Muslim concept of Evil." *Stud. Islamica* 31 (1970) 117-34.

29099 HAREL, M. "The Jewish presence in Jerusalem throughout the ages." *Christian News from Israel* 21, no. 1 (1970) 25-30.

29100 HARTNER, W. "La Science dans le monde de l'Islam après la chute du Califat." *Stud. Islamica* 31 (1970) 135-52.

29101 HINGORA, Q. "Ka'bah." *Islamic Lit.* 16, no. 6 (Ju '70) 333-9.

29102 ISLAM, A. "Spirit of al-Kindi's philosophy." *Dacca Univ. Stud.* 17, pt. A (Ju '69) 43-8.

29103 IZUTSU, T. "Mysticism and the linguistic problem of equivocation in the thought of 'Ayn Al-Quḍāt Hamadānī." *Stud. Islamica* 31 (1970) 153-70.

29104 JACOB, X. "An autocephalous Turkish Orthodox Church." *East. Churches Rev.* 3, no. 1 (1970) 59-70.

29105 KHAN, A. "Mass communication in developing nations." *Dacca Univ. Stud.* 17, pt. A (Ju '69) 1-10.

29106 KUDSI-ZADEH, A. "Les idées d'Afghânî sur la politique coloniale des Anglais, des Français et des Russes." *Orient* (Paris) nos. 47-48 (1968) 197-206.

29107 LECOMTE, G. "Sur une relation de la Saqīfa attribuée à Ibn Qutayba." *Stud. Islamica* 31 (1970) 171-84.

29108 MAHDI, M. "Remarks on the Theologus Autodidactus of Ibn Al-Nafīs." *Stud. Islamica* 31 (1970) 197-210.

29109 OMAR, I. and A. SHALLABY. "Introduction of a scientific Islamic system of education." *Islamic Lit.* 16, no. 9 (S '70) 19-24.

29110 PARET, R. "Signification coranique de Halīfa et d'autres dérivés de la racine Halafa." *Stud. Islamica* 31 (1970) 211-8.

29111 PELLAT, C. "Christologie Gāḥiẓienne." *Stud. Islamica* 31 (1970) 219-32.

29112 RAHMAN, F. "Islamic modernism: its scope, method and alternatives." *Internat. J. Mid. East Stud.* 1, no. 4 (O '70) 317-33.

29113 RAMGE, S. "Muhammed: on the lips of millions." *Companion* 33, no. 5 (My '70) 22-5.

29114 RAUF, M. "The Qur'ān and free will, I." *Muslim World* 60, no. 3 (Jl '70) 205-17.

29115 ROSENTHAL, E. "Religion and politics in Islam." *Islam & Mod. Age* 1, no. 1 (My '70) 50-64.

29116 ROSENTHAL, F. "The empty throne." *Stud. Islamica* 31 (1970) 233-38. God's throne is an ancient symbol of the mystic.

29117 RUSSELL, J. "Muhammed, Joan of Arc, Hitler: leaders influenced possibly by extrasensory perception." *TAIUS* 3, no. 1 (Ju '70) 7-24.

29118 SAIYIDAN, K. "The concept of a true Muslim according to the Holy Quran." *Islam & Mod. Age* 1, no. 1 (My '70) 70-81.

29119 SANKARI, F. "Plato and al-Fārābī: a comparison of some aspects of their political philosophies." *Muslim World* 60, no. 3 (Jl '70) 218-25.

29120 SHERWANI, A. "Ibn Khaldun and his politico-economic thought." *Islamic Cult.* 44, no. 2 (1970) 71-80.

29121 SOURDEL, D. "La classification des sectes islamiques dans le Kitāb Al-Milal d'Al-Sahrastānī." *Stud. Islamica* 31 (1970) 239-48.

29122 SULTANA, F. "Iqbal, the poet-philosopher." *Islamic Lit.* 16, no. 7 (Jl '70) 21-5.

29123 TAFT, R. "On the use of the Bema in the East-Syrian liturgy." *East. Churches Rev.* 3, no. 1 (1970) 30-9.

29124 VAN NIEUWENHUIJZE, C. "Islam as a determinant of Middle East civilization." *Islam & Mod. Age* 1, no. 1 (My '70) 10-28.

29125 VORA, A. "Muslim social ideals." *Islamic Cult.* 44, no. 2 (1970) 81-9.

29126 WANSBROUGH, J. "*Majāz al-Qur'ān:* periphrastic exegesis." *BSOAS* 33, pt. 2 (1970) 247-66.

29127 YAḤYĀ, 'U. "Khuṭbat al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīyah by al-Shaykh Muḥyā al-Dīn ibn al-'Arabī al-Ḥātimī." (In Arabic) *al-Mashriq* 64, no. 2 (Mr '70) 129-96.

29128 YEHOSHUA, Y. "Moslem religious life in Israel." *Christian News from Israel* 21, no. 1 (1970) 31-4.

LANGUAGE

29129 ARKOUN, M. "Contribution à l'étude du lexique de l'éthique musulmane." *B. d'Etudes O.* 22 (1969) 205-37.

29130 JOHNSTONE, T. "A definite article in the modern South Arabian languages." *BSOAS* 33, pt. 2 (1970) 295-307.

29131 MĀRIDĪNĪ, Ṣ. "Classical and colloquial dialects." (In Arabic) *Maj. Majma' al-Lughah al-'Arabīyah fī Dimashq* 45, no. 3 (Jl '70) 614-21.

29132 MATSUSHITA, S. "Non-personal sentences in Tehṛuni Persian." *J. A. & Afr. Stud.* no. 3 (1970) 59-69.

29133 AL-SHANṬĪ, I. "Our Arabic language between classical and colloquial." (In Arabic) *al-Adīb* 29, no. 8 (Ag '70) 19-20.

29134 WALTHER, W. "Fünf Jahrzehnte sowjetische Arabistik." *Bibliotheca O.* 26, nos. 1-2 (1969).

LITERATURE AND ARTS

29135 "Adonis (Ali Ahmed Said); introduction, with some of his translated poetry." *Mundus Artium* 3, no. 2 (1970) 6-17. A Syrian poet; translated by S. Hazo.

29136 "The first pan-African cultural festival (Algiers, July 21-August 1, 1969); opening address by President Houari Boumédiène." (In French and Dutch) *Kroniek van Afr.* no. 2 (1970) 136-54.

29137 "Islamic and Turkish Art." (Special Issue) *Apollo Mag.* 92, no. 101 (new series) (Jl '70). Available from 551 Fifth Ave., New York, New York 10017.

29138 "Towards a new Arab theatre." (In Arabic) *al-Ma'rifah* 104 (O '70) 1-214. Special issue.

29139 "Two modern Turkish poets, Frazil Husnu Daglarca and Orhan Veli Kanik." *Lit. East & West* 13, no. 3 (1969) 377-385.

29140 ABŪ SANAH, M. "Enigmatic concepts in modern poetry." (In Arabic) *Dirāsāt 'Arabīyah* 6, no. 8 (Ju '70) 42-51.

29141 'ARAFAT, W. "The historical background to the elegies on 'Uthmān b. 'Affān attributed to Ḥassān b. Thābit." *BSOAS* 33, pt. 2 (1970) 276-82.

29142 BEESON, I. "Soul-ist Souma." *Mid East* 10, no. 4 (1970) 14-8. An article on the Egyptian singer, Umm Kalẓūm.

29143 BELOKRENITSKY, V. "A review of the magazine 'Pakistan Development Review'." (In Russian) *Narodi Azii i Afriki* no. 3 (1970) 158-65.

29144 BERGE, M. "Espoirs et rancoeurs d'un homme de lettres; deux épîtres d'Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī." *B. d'Etudes O.* 22 (1969) 127-32.

29145 CHITTICK, W., tr. NASR, S. "Suhrawardi: the master of illumination, gnostic and martyr." *J. Regional Cult. Inst. (Iran, Pak., Turkey)* 2, no. 4 (1969) 209-25.

29146 COLETTI A., tr. "La Maqāmah di Mossul di Badī' Az-Zamān Al-Hamadhānī." *Levante* 17 (Ju '70) 28-34.

29147 DARWICH, M. "La culture arabe en Israël." *Nouvelle Critique* no. 36 (S '70) 14-9.

29148 AL-FAQUIH, Z. "Islamic art: submission to divine will." *Arab World* 16, nos. 7-8 (Jl-Ag '70) 15-25.

29149 AL-FARUQI, I. "Misconceptions of the nature of Islamic art." *Islam & Mod. Age* 1, no. 1 (My '70) 29-49.

29150 GHAZALEH, 'A. "Nationalism and literary writing in Mandatory Palestine." *Islamic Rev.* 58 (My '70) 22-6.

29151 GRIGNASCHI, M. "La Nihāyatu-l-'Arab fī Aḫbāri-l-Furs wa-l-'Arab, I." *B. d'Etudes O.* 22 (1969) 15-67.

29152 HARRIES, J. "A Berber tanšhat: in a Tamazight dialect." *BSOAS* 33, pt. 2 (1970) 308-22.

29153 HENNEBELLE, G. "Algérie décoloniser la culture." *Jeune Afr.* no. 504 (S 1 '70) 40-7.

29154 KISTER, M. "'A bag of meat'; a study of an early *ḥadīth.*" BSOAS 33, pt. 2 (1970) 267-75.

29155 LAUNOIS, A. "Estampilles, poids, étalons monétaires et autres disques musulmans en verre." *B. d'Etudes O.* 22 (1969) 69-126ff.

29156 MADKOUR, I. "Le livre de l'interprétation du Shifa." *Mélanges de l'Inst. dominicain d'Etudes O.* 10 (1970) 249-58.

29157 MAHFOUZ, N. "An alarming voice." *Lit. East & West* 13, no. 3 (1969) 386-94.

29158 MARSHALL, D. "An Arab humorist—Al-Jāhiz and 'The Book of Misers'." *J. Faculty of Arts, R. Univ. Malta* 4, no. 2 (1970) 77-97.

29159 MELIKIAN CHIRVANI, A. "Eastern Iranian architecture: apropos of the Ghūrid parts of the Great Mosque of Harāt." *BSOAS* 33, pt. 2 (1970) 322-7.

29160 MILSON, M. "Some aspects of the modern Egyptian novel." *Muslim World* 60, no. 3 (Jl '70) 237-46.

29161 AL-NAJM, W. "Islamic sources of short stories." (In Arabic) *Maj. Majma' al-Lughah al-'Arabīyah fī Dimashq* 45, no. 3 (Jl '70) 633-48.

29162 NAṢR, J. "The Dhāwī Brethren." (In Arabic) *al-Mashriq* 64, no. 2 (Mr '70) 208-28.

29163 NAṢR, J. "Dr. Amīn Yūsuf al-Khūrī." (In Arabic) *al-Mashriq* 64, no. 2 (Mr '70) 196-207.

29164 QAZI, N. "Life values in Persian literature." *J. Regional Cult. Inst. (Iran, Pak., Turkey)* 2, no. 4 (1969) 226-32.

29165 SCHIMMEL, A. "The eternal charm of classical Persian poetry." *Islam & Mod. Age* 1, no. 1 (My '70) 65-9.

29166 SHAKED, G. "The double confrontation of renascent literature." *Lit. East & West* 14, no. 1 (1970) 1-26. Modern Hebrew literature in Israel.

29167 AL-SUTAYRĪ, A. "Palestinian songs of love." (In Arabic) *al-Adīb* 29, no. 8 (Ag '70) 11-12.

29168 YETKIN, S. "Some influences of great Seljuks on Anatolian Seljuk architectural decoration." *J. Regional Cult. Inst. (Iran, Pak., Turkey)* 2, no. 4 (1969) 193-208.

LAW

29169 "The Beirut retaliation: a case study of the use of force in time of peace." *New York Univ. J. Internat. Law and Polit.* 2, no. 1 (1969) 105-32.

29170 "A disquieting law in Libya." *Rev. Internat. Commission Jurists* no. 5 (Mr '70) 10-2. The article presents a recent law enabling trial and punishment of persons who "abused their political or administrative office" between 1 October 1951 and 1 September 1969.

29171 ABDALLA, E. "La Philosophie du Legislateur Egyptien en Matière de Conflit des Lois." *L'Egypte contemp.* 61, no. 340 (Ap '70) 29-60.

29172 ANDERSON, J. "Reforms in the law of divorce in the Muslim world." *Stud. Islamica* 31 (1970) 41-52.

29173 BADR, G. "La relance du droit islamique dans la jurisprudence algérienne depuis 1962." *Rev. internat. de Droit comparé* 22, no. 1 (Ja-Mr '70) 43-56.

29174 BUKHARE, S. "The codification of Islamic law; its origin and development." *Islamic Rev.* 58 (My '70) 32-7.

29175 DÖLL, B. "Die Rechtslage des Golfes von Akaba." *Jahrbuche internat. Recht* (1969) 225-59.

29176 FODA, E. "The legal aspect of military occupation." (In Arabic) *Rev. égyptienne de Droit internat.* 25 (1969) 27-62.

29177 FYZEE, A. "Aspects of Fatimid law." *Stud. Islamica* 31 (1970) 81-92.

29178 HASHEM, Z. "Service of American citizens in Israel Armed Forces; a comment on Afroyim v. Rusk." *Rev. égyptienne de Droit internat.* 25 (1969) 187-202.

29179 HASHEM, Z. "The theory of historic bays with reference to the international status of the Gulf of Aqaba." *Rev. égyptienne de Droit internat.* 25 (1969) 1-66.

29180 LINANT DE BELLEFONDS, Y. "Le 'Hul" sans compensation en droit Ḥanafite." *Stud. Islamica* 31 (1970) 185-96.

29181 MUNSHI, A. "The background and basis of the Rann of Kutch Award." *Pak. Horizon* 23, no. 1 (1970).

29182 PEARL, D. "Within the limits prescribed by Allah." *South A. Rev.* 3, no. 4 (Jl '70) 313-22. Islamic law in Pakistan.

29183 ROUSSET, M. "De l'indépendence du pouvoir judiciaire au contrôle de l'administration: à propos d'une récente décision de la Cour suprême du Maroc." *Rev. Jur. et Polit.* 28, no. 3 (Jl-S '70) 527-42.

29184 SARHAN, A. "Israeli aggression on the Beirut airport on December 28, 1968." (In Arabic) *Rev. égyptienne de Droit internat.* 25 (1969) 197-204.

29185 TYAN, E. "La condition juridique de 'l'Absent' (Mafḳūd) en droit musulman, particulièrement dans le Madhab Ḥanafite." *Stud. Islamica* 31 (1970) 249-56.

29186 VAJDA, G. "L'attribut divin d'Irāda (Volonté) d'après une source inexploitée." *Stud. Islamica* 31 (1970) 257-68.

29187 WAHED, M. "The Egyptian legal decree of January 15, 1961 on bays and gulfs." (In Arabic) *Rev. égyptienne de Droit internat.* 25 (1969) 179-88.

29188 WEISMAN, J. "The Land Law, 1969: a critical analysis." *Israel Law Rev.* 5, no. 3 (Jl '70) 379-456.

BIOGRAPHY

29189 "The life, character, and accomplishments of Sayyid Hasan Taqīzādih." (In Persian) *Rahnema-Ye Ketab* 13, nos. 3-4 (My-Ju '70) 1-261. Eleven articles.

29190 DODGE, B. "The life of Ibn al-Nadīm." (In Arabic) *Maj. Majma' al-Lughah al-'Arabīyah fi Dimashq* 45, no. 3 (Jl '70) 545-56.

29191 AL-LAJAMĪ, A. "Fu'ād Shā'ib." (In Arabic) *al-Ma'rifah* no. 102 (Ag '70) 3-8.

29192 AL-ṬIBĀWĪ, A. "The teacher Buṭruṣ al-Bustānī." (In Arabic) *Maj. Majma' al-Lughah al-'Arabīyah fi Dimashq* 45, no. 3 (Jl '70) 595-613.

29193 TRACY, W. "Jasper Yeates Brinton: an American judge in Egypt." *Aramco World* 21, no. 5 (S-O '70) 18-21.

29194 ZAMĀMAH, A. "Ibn al-Qāḍī, historian of Fās." (In Arabic) *Maj. Majma' al-Lughah al-'Arabīyah fi Dimashq* 45, no. 3 (Jl '70) 622-32.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

29195 ADAMS, C. "Islamic religion, Part I." *Mid. East Stud. Assoc. B.* 4, no. 3 (O '70) 1-15.

29196 ANAWATI, G. "Textes arabes anciens édités en Egypte au cours des années 1966 à 1969." *Mélanges de l'Inst. dominicaine d'Etudes O.* 10 (1970) 109-88.

29197 BACCOUCHE, T. "Bibliographie critique des études linquistiques concernant la Tunisie." *Rev. Tunisienne de Sci. Soc.* 7, no. 20 (1970) 239-86.

29198 BASIT, A. "List of Islamic periodicals in various languages." *Islamic Lit.* 16, no. 9 (S '70) 57-63.

29199 BORSHCHEVSKY, Yu. and Yu. BREGEL. "The compilation of a general bio-bibliography of the history of Persian-Tadjik literature." (In Russian) *Narodi Azii i Afriki* no. 3 (1970) 104-19.

29200 BROWN, K. *et al.* "Research facilities in Morocco." *Mid. East Stud. Assoc. B.* 4, no. 3 (O '70) 55-67.

29201 ELANSKAYA, A., ed. "The Coptic manuscripts of the Saltikov-Shchedrin Public Library." (In Russian) *Palestinskiy Sbornik* 83 (1969) 1-151.

29202 GHALI, W. "Arabic dictionaries; an annotated comprehensive bibliography." *Mélanges de l'Inst. dominicain d'Etudes O.* 10 (1970) 341-66.

29203 KENNY, J. "Bibliography of Islam in the north of Nigeria and surrounding areas." *Mélanges de l'Inst. dominicain d'Etudes O.* 10 (1970) 329-40.

29204 LANDEN, R. "History of the medieval Middle East: AD 622-1799: a syllabus." *Mid. East Stud. Assoc. B.* 4, no. 3 (O '70) 16-54.

29205 SALEH, M. "Abū'l-'Alā' al-Ma'arrī (363-449/973-1057); bibliographie critique." *B. d'Etudes O.* 22 (1969) 133-204.

29206 SEKLANI, M. and F. STAMBOULI. "Note de bibliographie sélective sur Ibn Khaldoun." *Rev. Tunisienne de Sci. Soc.* 7, no. 20 (1970) 226-37.

BOOK REVIEWS

29207 *The Gulf: Implications of British withdrawal.* **Soc. Sci. Quart.** 51, no. 1 (Ju '70) 198.

(P. Fliess); **Internat. Aff.** 46, no. 4 (O '70) 841-2. (A. Eaglestone).

29208 *The Seventh Day: Soldiers talk about the Six-Day War.* **Internat. Aff.** 46, no. 4 (O '70) 847-8. (S. Leslie).

29209 *Le Shi'isme imamite.* (Colloque de Strasbourg, 6-9 May 1968). **O. Mod.** 50, nos. 3-5 (Mr-My '70) 272. (In Italian). (F. Gabrieli).

29210 'ABD AL-RAḤIM, M. *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan.* **Afr.** (London) 40, no. 3 (Jl '70) 283-4. (R. Hill); **Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev.** 64, no. 3 (S '70) 966-7. (R. Pfaff); **Internat. Aff.** 46, no. 3 (Jl '70) 605-7. (G. Gretton).

29211 ADAM, A. *Casablanca; Essai sur la transformation de la société marocaine au contact de l'occident.* **Bibliotheca O.** 27, nos. 1-2 (Ja-Mr '70) 103-4 (In French); **MEJ** 24, no. 3 (1970) 389-91. (D. Hart).

29212 ADAMEC, L. *Afghanistan, 1900-1923: A diplomatic history.* **Muslim World** 60, no. 3 (Jl '70) 269-71. (R. Newell).

29213 AHMAD, A. *Islamic Modernization in India and Pakistan, 1857-1964.* **Muslim World** 60, no. 3 (Jl '70) 265-7. (R. Miller); **Islam & Mod. Age** 1, no. 1 (My '70) 107-9. (A. Embree).

29214 AHMAD, F. *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish politics, 1908-1914.* **BSOAS** 33, pt. 2 (1970) 394-5. (C. Dodd); **Amer. Hist. Rev.** 75, no. 6 (O '70) 1750. (K. Key).

29215 AHMED, J. *The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism.* 2nd ed. **Internat. Aff.** 46, no. 3 (Jl '70) 605-7. (G. Gretton).

29216 AHMED, M. *Muslim Education.* **Islamic Cult.** 44, no. 2 (1970) 115-6. (A. Fyzee).

29217 ALBAHARNA, H. *The Legal Status of the Arabian Gulf States.* **Rev. égyptienne de Droit internat.** 25 (1969) 230-4. (J.Y.B.).

29218 ARAB INFORMATION CENTER. *Education in Sudan, Information Paper No. 125 (IX).* **Afr. Report** 15, no. 7 (O '70) 38-40. (T. Ismael).

29219 ARBERRY, A. *Modern Arabic Poetry.* **Bibliotheca O.** 26, nos. 5-6 (S-N '69) 423. (C. Nijland).

29220 ARBERRY, A., ed. *Religion in the Middle East, I: Judaism and Christianity; II: Islam and the three religions in concord and conflict.* **Mid East** 10, no. 4 (1970) 41-2. (H. Thompson).

29221 ARBERRY, A. *A Sufi Martyr—The Apologia of 'Ain al-Qudát al-Hamadhání.* **Islamic Rev.** 58, no. 4 (Ap '70) 40. (S.M.T.).

29222 ARMAJANI, Y. *Middle East: Past and Present.* **MEJ** 24, no. 3 (1970) 385-6. (H. Howard).

29223 ARNAKIS, G. *The Near East in Modern Times, I: The Ottoman Empire and the Balkan states to 1900.* **MEJ** 24, no. 3 (1970) 385-6. (H. Howard).

29224 ARON, R. *De Gaulle, Israel and the Jews.* **Western Polit. Quart.** 23, no. 2 (Ju '70) 419-22. (R. Scheinman).

29225 ATIYEH, G. *al-Kindi: The Philosopher of the Arabs.* **Muslim World** 60, no. 3 (Jl '70) 261-3. (F. Nucho).

29226 BAER, G. *Population and Society in the Arab East.* **Internat. J. Comp. Sociol.** 11, no. 1 (Mr '70) 76-7. (G. Ansari).

29227 BAER, G. *Studies in the Social History of Modern Egypt.* **Internat. Aff.** 46, no. 4 (O '70) 849-51. (T. Soper).

29228 BEDRI, Y. and G. SCOTT, eds. *The Memoirs of Badikr Bedri.* **Afr. Report** 15, no. 8 (N '70) 42. (T. Ismael).

29229 BE'ERI, E. *Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society.* **Internat. Aff.** 46, no. 4 (O '70) 843-4. (P. Vatikiotis).

29230 BENNIGISEN, A. and C. LEMERCIER-QUELQUEJAY. *Islam in the Soviet Union.* **J. Mod. Hist.** 42, no. 1 (1970) 126-9. (F. Kazemzadeh).

29231 BESHIR, M. *Educational Development in the Sudan 1898 to 1956.* **Afr. Report** 15, no. 7 (O '70) 38-40. (T. Ismael); **Afr.** (London) 40, no. 3 (Jl '70) 289-90. (R. Hill); **Internat. Aff.** 46, no. 3 (Jl '70) 605-7. (G. Gretton).

29232 BRIGNON, J. *Histoire du Maroc.* **MEJ** 24, no. 3 (1970) 388-9. (E. Burke).

29233 BRINTON, J. *The Mixed Courts of Egypt.* **Hamizrah Hehadash** 20, no. 1 (1970) 106-7. (In Hebrew).

29234 BUSCH, B. *Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914.* **J. Mod. Hist.** 42, no. 2 (1970) 264-71. (J. Kelly).

29235 CARMICHAEL, J. *The Shaping of the Arabs: A study in ethnic identity.* **Internat. Aff.** 46, no. 4 (O '70) 842-3. (M. Watt).

29236 CATTAN, H. *Palestine, the Arabs and Israel: The search for justice.* **Internat. Aff.** 46, no. 4 (O '70) 848-9. (R. Owen).

29237 CHAMPAULT, F. *Une oasis du Sahara nord-occidental; Tabelbala.* **Bibliotheca O.** 27, nos. 1-2 (Ja-Mr '70) 85-6. (In French). (P. Huard).

29238 CHEJNE, A. *The Arabic language—Its role in history.* **Canadian J. of Hist.** 5, no. 2 (S '70) 95-6. (H. Atyeo).

29239 CHILDS, J. *Foreign Service Farewell: My years in the Near East.* **Internat. Aff.** 46, no. 4 (O '70) 844-6. (P. Avery).

29240 CLAYTON, G. *An Arabian Diary.* **Internat. Aff.** 46, no. 4 (O '70) 844-6. (P. Avery).

29241 COHEN, A. *Israel and the Arab World.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,582 (O 23 '70) 1209-11.

29242 COHEN, H. *Hape'ilut hatzionit be'Iraq.* **Jewish J. Sociol.** 12, no. 1 (Ju '70) 106-7. (Y. Taggar).

29243 COTTRELL, L. *Egypt.* **Hamizrah Hehadash** 20, no. 2 (1970) 216-7. (In Hebrew).

29244 COULSON, N. *Conflicts and Tensions in*

Islamic Jurisprudence. **Mid East** 10, no. 5 (O '70) 43-4. (Z. Moghrabi).

29245 CURLE, A. *Educational Problems of Developing Societies: With case studies of Ghana and Pakistan.* **Internat. Aff.** 46, no. 4 (O '70) 776-9. (D. Burns).

29246 DANN, U. *Iraq under Qassem, A Political history, 1958-1963.* **Internat. J. Mid. East Stud.** 1, no. 4 (O '70) 378-80. (P. Vatikiotis).

29247 DATTA, D. *Humayun Kabir: A political biography.* **Pacific Aff.** 43, no. 2 (1970) 334. (S. Ryland).

29248 DEBBASCH, C. *Mutations culturelles et coopération au Maghreb.* **Bibliotheca O.** 27, nos. 1-2 (Ja-Mr '70) 85. (C. Van Nieuwenhuijze).

29249 DIAKONOFF, I. *Semito-Hamitic Languages: An essay in classification.* **Bibliotheca O.** 27, nos. 1-2 (Ja-Mr '70) 14-5. (L. Schuman).

29250 DIRKS, S. *La famille musulmane turque.* **Population** 25, no. 3 (My-Ju '70) 687. (J. Ho).

29251 DODD, C. *Politics and Government in Turkey.* **Internat. Aff.** 46, no. 3 (Jl '70) 591-2. (F. Stuart); **Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev.** 64, no. 2 (1970) 666. (A. Amirie).

29252 DUWAJI, G. *Economic Development in Tunisia.* **J. A. & Afr. Stud.** 5, nos. 1-2 (1970) 158-60. (D. Ghai).

29253 ECHE, Y. *Les Bibliothèques arabes, publiques et semi-publiques, en Mésopotamie, en Syrie et en Egypte au Moyen Age.* **Bibliotheca O.** 26, nos. 3-4 (My-Jl '69) 250-3. (J. Waardenburg).

29254 FARNIE, D. *East and West of Suez: The Suez Canal in History 1854-1956.* **Internat. Aff.** 46, no. 4 (O '70) 840-1. (J. Allan).

29255 FAST, H. *The Jews: Story of a People.* **Internat. Aff.** 46, no. 4 (O '70) 846-7. (N. Bentwich).

29256 FEIS, H. *The Birth of Israel.* **World Aff.** 133, no. 2 (S '70) 158. (R. Davidson).

29257 FELDMAN, D. *Birth control in Jewish Law.* **Commentary** 50, no. 2 (Ag '70) 64-7. (I. Greenberg).

29258 FISHER, W., ed. *The Land of Iran.* ***BSOAS*** 33, pt. 2 (1970) 404-7. (R. Tapper).

29259 FURLONGE, G. *Palestine is my Country, The story of Musa Alami.* **Hamizrah Hehadash** 20, no. 2 (1970) 222-4. (In Hebrew).

29260 FYZEE, A. *Cases in the Muhammedan Law of India and Pakistan.* **Archiv O.** 38, no. 2 (1970) 247. (J. Marek).

29261 FYZEE, A. *Compendium of Fatimid Law.* **Islamic Cult.** 44, no. 2 (1970) 116-7. (H. Sherwani).

29262 GOITEN, S. *A Mediterranean Society, I: Economic Foundations.* **Riv. Stud. O.** 44, no. 1 (1969) 65-7. (In Italian). (F. Gabrieli).

29263 GOLDMANN, N. *The Autobiography of Nahum Goldmann: Sixty years of Jewish life.* **Internat. J.** 25, no. 4 (1970) 838-9. (Z. Kay).

29264 GRASSMUCK, G., *et al. Afghanistan: Some new approaches.* **Amer. Hist. Rev.** 75, no. 6 (O '70) 1750-2. (R. Crane).

29265 GREGORIAN, V. *The Emergence of modern Afghanistan: Politics of reform and modernization, 1880-1946.* **Amer. Hist. Rev.** 75, no. 6 (O '70) 1750-2. (R. Crane); **Internat. J. Mid. East Stud.** 1, no. 4 (O '70) 372-4. (L. Adamec); **Ann. Amer. Acad. Polit. Soc. Sci.** 391 (S '70) 227-8. (M. Hanifi).

29266 VON GRUNEBAUM, G. *Studien zum Kulturbild und Selbstverständnis des Islams.* **Amer. Hist. Rev.** 75, no. 6 (O '70) 1748-50. (W. Bishai).

29267 HALPERN, B. *The Idea of the Jewish State.* **Internat. Aff.** 46, no. 4 (O '70) 846-7. (N. Bentwich).

29268 HANNA, S. and G. GARDNER. *Arab Socialism. A documentary survey.* **Bibliotheca O.** 26, nos. 5-6 (S-N '69) 429-30. (C. Van Nieuwenhuijze).

29269 HARBOTTLE, M. *The Impartial Soldier.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,575 (S 4 '70) 975.

29270 HARIK, I. *Politics and Change in a Traditional Society, Lebanon, 1711-1845.* **Internat. J. Mid. East Stud.** 1, no. 4 (O '70) 368-72. (C. Farah).

29271 HAUER, C. *Crisis and Conscience in the Middle East.* **Mid East** 10, no. 5 (O '70) 42-3. (E. Wilson).

29272 HITTI, P. *History of the Arabs.* **Przeglad O.** no. 74 (1970) 142-4. (In Polish). (J. Reychman).

29273 HOLLIS, C. and R. BROWNRIGG. *Holy Place; Jewish, Christian and Muslim Monuments in the Holy Land.* **Mid East** 10, no. 4 (1970) 38-9. (F. Johnson).

29274 HOLT, P., ed. *Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt.* **Hamizrah Hehadash** 20, no. 1 (1970) 109. (In Hebrew).

29275 HOPWOOD, D. *The Russian presence in Syria and Palestine, 1843-1914: Church and politics in the Near East.* **BSOAS** 33, pt. 2 (1970) 393-4. (M. Yapp); **East. Churches Rev.** 3, no. 1 (1970) 117-9. (D. Spring); **MEJ** 24, no. 3 (1970) 387-8. (A. Tibawi); **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,576 (S 11 '70) 987.

29276 HOURANI, A. and S. STERN, eds. *The Islamic City.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,576 (S 11 '70) 1003.

29277 HUREWITZ, J. *Middle East Politics: The military dimension.* **Bibliotheca O.** 26, nos. 5-6 (S-N '69) 321-4. (C. Van Nieuwenhuijze).

29278 HUREWITZ, J., ed. *Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East.* **Internat. Aff.** 46, no. 4 (O '70) 838-9. (Y. Evron); **Ann. Amer. Acad. Polit. Soc. Sci.** 391 (S '70) 197-8. (H. Howard).

29279 HUSSEIN, M. *La Lutte de Classes en Egypte de 1945 à 1968.* **Internat. Aff.** 46, no. 4 (O '70) 849-51. (T. Soper).

29280 JOHANSEN, B. *Muḥammad Ḥusain Heikal.*

Bibliotheca O. 27, nos. 1-2 (Ja-Mr '70) 81-2. (In German). (E. Bannerth).

29281 KANYA-FORSTNER, A. *The Conquest of the Western Sudan—A study in French military imperialism.* **Race** 12, no. 1 (Jl '70) 112-3. (D. Jones); **Amer. Hist. Rev.** 75, no. 6 (O '70) 1755-6. (R. Tignor); **Internat. Aff.** 46, no. 3 (Jl '70) 605-7. (G. Gretton).

29282 KAPUR, H. *Soviet Russia and Asia, 1917-27: A study of Soviet policy toward Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan.* **J. Mod. Hist.** 42, no. 1 (1970) 126-9. (F. Kazemzadeh).

29283 KAZEMZADEH, F. *Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914: A study in imperialism.* **BSOAS** 33, pt. 2 (1970) 402-3. (A. Lambton); **Bibliotheca O.** 26, nos. 5-6 (S-N '69) 411-2. (Z. Zeine); **J. Mod. Hist.** 42, no. 2 (1970) 264-71. (J. Kelly).

29284 KEDDIE, N. *An Islamic Response to Imperialism; Political and religious writings of Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn "al-Afghānī".* **Bibliotheca O.** 27, nos. 1-2 (Ja-Mr '70) 81. (C. Van Nieuwenhuijze).

29285 KEDOURIE, E. *The Chatham House Version and other Middle-Eastern Studies.* **Internat. Aff.** 46, no. 3 (Jl '70) 589-91. (F. Bagley).

29286 KHADDURI, M. *Republican 'Iraq.* **Internat. Aff.** 46, no. 3 (Jl '70) 593-5. (F. Bagley); **Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev.** 64, no. 3 (S '70) 959-60. (J. Bill); **Mid East** 10, no. 4 (1970) 39-40. (P. Marr).

29287 KIPPING, N. *The Suez Contractors.* **Internat. Aff.** 46, no. 4 (O '70) 840-1. (J. Allan).

29288 KLAYMAN, M. *The Moshav in Israel.* **Internat. Lab. Rev.** 102, no. 2 (Ag '70) 213-4. (J. von M.); **Mid East** 10, no. 5 (O '70) 45-6. (J. Eaton).

29289 KOTKER, N. *The Earthly Jerusalem.* **Mid East** 10, no. 4 (1970) 38-9. (F. Johnson).

29290 KRAJZMAN, M. *La minorité arabe en Israël; Contribution à une étude socio-démographique.* **Jewish J. Sociol.** 12, no. 1 (Ju '70) 112-7. (E. Marx).

29291 LAMBTON, A. *The Persian land reform, 1962-1966.* **BSOAS** 33, pt. 2 (1970) 403-4. (C. Issawi); **Bibliotheca O.** 27, nos. 1-2 (Ja-Mr '70) 72-4. (C. op 't Land); **Internat. Aff.** 46, no. 4 (O '70) 854-6. (P. Avery).

29292 LANDAU, J. *The Arabs in Israel: A political study.* **Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev.** 64, no. 2 (1970) 657-8. (J. Mayfield); **Jewish J. Sociol.** 12, no. 1 (Ju '70) 112-7. (E. Marx); **Hamizrah Hehadash** 20, no. 2 (1970) 221. (In Hebrew).

29293 LANE-POOLE, S. *Turkey.* **Archiv O.** 38, no. 2 (1970) 240. (In French). (Z. Veselá-Přenosilová).

29294 LAQUEUR, W. *The Road to Jerusalem, the Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967.* **Hamizrah Hehadash** 20, no. 1 (1970) 110-111. (In Hebrew).

29295 LAQUEUR, W. *The struggle for the Middle East: The Soviet Union in the Mediterranean 1958-1969.* **Interplay** 3, no. 11 (Ag '70) 56-7. (W. Griffith); **Internat. Aff.** 46, no. 4 (O '70) 838-9. (Y. Evron); **Ann. Amer. Acad. Polit. Soc. Sci.** 391 (S '70) 197-8. (H. Howard).

29296 LEBJAOUI, M. *Verités sur la Révolution Algérienne.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,585 (N 13 '70) 1322.

29297 LOVE, K. *Suez: The Twice-Fought War.* **Ann. Amer. Acad. Polit. Soc. Sci.** 391 (S '70) 198-9. (W. Spencer).

29298 MAHFOUD, G. J. *L'Organisation Monastique dans l'Eglise Maronite.* **Bibliotheca O.** 27, nos. 1-2 (Ja-Mr '70) 99-101. (O. Meinardus).

29299 McCARTHY, R. *et al. Spoken Arabic of Baghdad,* Parts I and II (A). **Bibliotheca O.** 27, nos. 1-2 (Ja-Mr '70) 83-4. (L. Schuman).

29300 MERAD, A. *Le Réformisme musulman en Algérie de 1925 à 1940: Essai d'histoire religieuse et sociale.* **Muslim World** 60, no. 3 (Jl '70) 264-5. (A. Heggoy).

29301 MERLIN, S., ed. *The Big Powers and the Present Crisis in the Middle East: A colloquium.* **Internat. Aff.** 46, no. 4 (O '70) 838-9. (Y. Evron).

29302 MITCHELL, R. *The Society of the Muslim Brothers.* **Amer. Hist. Rev.** 75, no. 6 (O '70) 1752-3. (M. Hudson); **BSOAS** 33, pt. 2 (1970) 395. (M. Yapp).

29303 MUSREY, A. *An Arab Common Market.* **Internat. Aff.** 46, no. 3 (Jl '70) 591. (R. Mabro).

29304 NEMETH, J. *Turkish Reader for Beginners.* **Bibliotheca O.** 27, nos. 1-2 (Ja-Mr '70) 86-7. (In German). (Gy. Káldy-Nagy).

29305 NEVAKIVI, J. *Britain, France, and the Arab Middle East, 1914-1920.* **Hamizrah Hehadash** 20, no. 2 (1970) 208-9. (In Hebrew).

29306 PAGET, J. *Last Post: Aden 1964-67.* **Internat. Aff.** 46, no. 3 (Jl '70) 596-7. (A. Eaglestone).

29307 PERLMUTTER, A. *Military and Politics in Israel: Nation-building and role expansion.* **Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev.** 64, no. 2 (1970) 659-61. (S. Decalo).

29308 PFAFF, R. *Jerusalem: Keystone of an Arab-Israeli settlement.* **Mid East** 10, no. 4 (1970) 38-9. (F. Johnson).

29309 PINDER-WILSON, R., ed. *Paintings from Islamic Lands.* **Muslim World** 60, no. 3 (Jl '70) 272-4. (I. Fairchild).

29310 PIRZADA, S., ed. *Foundations of Pakistan.* **Islamic Lit.** 16, no. 6 (Ju '70) 381-4. (A. Qadri).

29311 POLK, W. and R. CHAMBERS, eds. *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East—The nineteenth century.* **Hamizrah Hehadash** 20, no. 1 (1970) 103-4. (In Hebrew); **Bibliotheca O.** 26, nos. 5-6 (S-N '69). (C. Van Nieuwenhuijze).

29312 POPPER, W., tr. IBN TAGHRI BIRDI, A. *History of Egypt.* **Bibliotheca O.** 26, nos. 3-4

(My-Jl '69) 184-7. (In French). (T. Bois).

29313 QUANDT, W. *Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1968.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,585 (N 13 '70) 1322.

29314 QURESHI, S. *Jinnah and the Making of a Nation.* **Pacific Aff.** 43, no. 2 (1970) 334. (S. Ryland).

29315 RABIKOVITZ, D., ed. *The New Israeli Writers: Short stories of the first generation.* **Lit. East & West** 14, no. 1 (1970) 135. (A. Gillon).

29316 RAHMAN, F. *Islam.* **Islamic Cult.** 44, no. 2 (1970) 117-20. (H. Sherwani).

29317 RAMAZANI, R. *The Foreign Policy of Iran 1500-1941: A developing nation in world affairs.* **MEJ** 24, no. 3 (1970) 382-4. (S. Zabih).

29318 RAUNKIAER, B. *Through Wahabiland on Camelback.* **MEJ** 24, no. 3 (1970) 386-7. (G. Owen).

29319 RODINSON, M. *Islam et capitalisme.* **Archiv O.** 38, no. 2 (1970) 236-8. (In German). (K. Petráček); **Rev. Polit. Internac.** no. 109 (My-Ju '70) 279-82. (In Spanish). (R. Gil Benumeya).

29320 RODINSON, M. *Israel and the Arabs.* **Western Polit. Quart.** 23, no. 2 (Ju '70) 422-3. (J. Bertelsen).

29321 ROSENTHAL, E. *Islam in the Modern National State.* **Archiv O.** 38, no. 2 (1970) 245-7. (J. Marek).

29322 RUNCIMAN, S. *The Fall of Constantinople.* **Hamizrah Hehadash** 20, no. 1 (1970) 102. (In Hebrew).

29323 RUSSEL, R. and K. ISLAM. *Ghalib, 1797-1869, I: Life and letters.* **South A. Rev.** 3, no. 4 (Jl '70) 380-1. (V. Kiernan).

29324 SACHAR, H. *The Emergence of the Middle East 1914-1924.* **Mid East** 10, no. 5 (O '70) 44-5. (M. Peck).

29325 SAFRAN, N. *From War to War; The Arab-Israeli confrontation, 1948-1967.* **Mid East** 10, no. 4 (1960) 37-8. (D. Nes).

29326 SAMUEL, E. *A Lifetime in Jerusalem: The memoirs of the Second Viscount Samuel.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,578 (S 25 '70) 1089.

29327 SANJIAN A., ed. and tr. *Colophons of Armenian Manuscripts 1301-1480: A source for Middle Eastern history.* **MEJ** 24, no. 3 (1970) 384-5. (K. Maksoudian).

29328 SCHONFIELD, H. *The Suez Canal in Peace and War 1869-1969.* **Internat. Aff.** 46, no. 4 (O '70) 840-1. (J. Allan).

29329 SCHUON, F. *Dimensions of Islam.* **Islamic Cult.** 44, no. 3 (Jl '70) 187-91. (M. Valiuddin).

29330 SETTON, K. *A History of Crusades,* vols. I and II. **Islamic Cult.** 44, no. 2 (1970) 111-4. (J. Subhan).

29331 SHAPIRO, I., ed. WRIGHT, Q. *The Middle East: Prospects for Peace.* **Internat. Aff.** 46, no. 4 (O '70) 838-9. (Y. Evron).

29332 SHARABI, H. *Palestine and Israel: The lethal dilemma.* **Arab World** 16, nos. 7-8 (Jl-Ag '70) 33-5. (K. Love); **Ann. Amer. Acad. Polit. Soc. Sci.** 391 (S '70) 198-9. (W. Spencer).

29333 SHARABI, H. *Palestine Guerrillas: Their credibility and effectiveness.* **Internat. Aff.** 46, no. 4 (O '70) 849. (F. Golino).

29334 SHORTER, F. *et al. Four Studies on the Economic Development of Turkey.* **Balkan Stud.** 10, no. 2 (1969) 457-8. (D. Delivanis).

29335 TALLĀS, M. *Dirāsāt 'Askarīyah Iqtiṣādīyah Siyāsīyah.* **al-Ma'rifah** no. 102 (Ag '70) 145-51. (In Arabic). (M. Luṭfī).

29336 TIBAWI, A. *A Modern History of Syria: Including Lebanon and Palestine.* **Internat. Aff.** 46, no. 4 (O '70) 851-3. (F. Bagley).

29337 TĪBĪ, B. *Die Arabische Linke.* **MEJ** 24, no. 3 (1970) 391-2. (H. Sharabi).

29338 TIRMIZI, S., ed. *Persian Letters of Ghalib.* **South A. Rev.** 3, no. 4 (Jl '70) 380-1. (V. Kiernan).

29339 VAN DER TAK, H. and J. DE WEILLE. *Reappraisal of a Road Project in Iran.* **Internat. Aff.** 46, no. 4 (O '70) 853-4. (E. Alport).

29340 VATIKIOTIS, P. *The Modern History of Egypt.* **Hamizrah Hehadash** 20, no. 2 (1970). 214-6 (In Hebrew).

29341 VOGEL, R., ed. *The German Path to Israel.* **Internat. Aff.** 46, no. 3 (Jl '70) 595-6. (K. Sainsbury).

29342 WALDER, D. *The Chanak Affair.* **Ann. Amer. Acad. Polit. Soc. Sci.** 391 (S '70) 225-6. (D. Webster).

29343 WATERBURY, J. *The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan political elite—a study in segmented politics.* **Internat. Aff.** 46, no. 4 (O '70) 853-4. (E. Alport).

29344 WEINTRAUB, D. *et al. Moshava, Kibbutz and Moshav; Patterns of Jewish rural settlement and development in Palestine.* **Mid East** 10, no. 5 (O '70) 45-6. (J. Eaton); **Amer. Hist. Rev.** 75, no. 6 (O '70) 1754-5. (I. Gendzier).

29345 WILLIAMS, A. *Britain and France in the Middle East and North Africa.* **Hamizrah Hehadash** 20, no. 1 (1970) 104-5. (In Hebrew).

29346 WILLNER, D. *Nation-Building and Community in Israel.* **Mid East** 10, no. 5 (O '70) 45-6. (J. Eaton); **Amer. Hist. Rev.** 75, no. 6 (O '70) 1754-5. (I. Gendzier); **Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev.** 64, no. 3 (S '70) 962. (L. Seligman).

29347 WILSON, E. *The Dead Sea Scrolls.* **Mid East** 10, no. 4 (1970) 40-1. (D. Beegle).

29348 WILSON, E. *Jerusalem: Key to peace.* **MEJ** 24, no. 3 (1970) 381-2. (J. Marks); **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,576 (S 11 '70) 987.

29349 WINDER, R. *Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century.* **Bibliotheca O.** 27, nos. 1-2 (Ja-Mr '70) 80. (In French). (J. Ryckmans).

29350 WRIGHT, L. *United States Policy toward Egypt, 1830-1914.* **MEJ** 24, no. 3 (1970) 382. (J. DeNovo).

29351 ZIADEH, F. *Lawyers, the Rule of Law and Liberalism in Modern Egypt.* **Hamizrah Hehadash** 20, no. 1 (1970) 108. (In Hebrew); **Internat. Aff.** 46, no. 3 (Jl '70) 592-3. (N. Anderson).

ABBREVIATIONS

A., Asia, Asian, Asiatic, Asie, asiatique, etc.
Acad., Academy
Admin., Administration, Administrative
Aff., Affairs
Afr./afr., Africa, African, Afrique, africain, etc.
Amer., American
Ann., Annals, Annales
Annu., Annuaire
Anthrop./anthrop., Anthropology, Anthropological, Anthropologie, anthropologique, etc.
Assoc., Association
AUFS, American Universities Field Staff
B., Bulletin
BSOAS, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies
C., Central
Cah., Cahiers
Com., Communism
Comp., Comparative
Contemp./contemp., Contemporary, contemporain, etc.
Cult., Culture, Cultural
Cur., Current
D., Deutsch, etc.
Dept., Department
Dev., Developing
Develop., Development
East., Eastern
Econ./écon., Economics, Economist, Economic, Économie, économique, etc.
Fak., Fakülte
Fil., Filosofii
For., Foreign
Fr./fr., France, French, français, etc.
G., Gesellschaft
Geog./géog., Geography, Geographic, Geographical, Géographie, géographique, etc.
Hist./hist., History, Historical, Historie, historique
IBLA, Institut des belles Lettres arabes
Inst., Institute, Institut
internac., internacional
Internat./internat., International, international, Internationale, etc.
internaz., internazionale
Ist., Istorii
J., Journal
jur., juridique
Lit., Literature, Literary
Lab., Labor, Labour
M., Morgenländisch, etc.
Mag., Magazine
Maj., Majallah, Majallat
Mid., Middle
Mod./mod., Modern, moderne, moderno
Nr., Near
O., Orient, Oriental, Orientalia, oriental, oriente, Orientalistczny, etc.
Org., Organization
Pak., Pakistan
Polit./polit., Politics, Political, Politique, politique, Política, etc.
Probs., Problems
Proceed., Proceedings
Quart., Quarterly
R., Royal
Rel., Relations
Res., Research
Rev., Review, Revue, Revista
Riv., Rivista
S., School, Schools
Sci., Science, Sciences, Scienze, etc.
Soc./soc., Society, Social, Sociéte, social, etc.
Sociol./sociol., Sociology, Sociological, Sociologica, Sociologie, sociologique, etc.
Stud., Studies, Studia
Supp., Supplement
Univ., University, Université, etc.
U.S., United States
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Vop., Voprosy
Z., Zeitschrift

COMMUNICATIONS

The JOURNAL *welcomes comments from its readers. All communications should be addressed to the Editor and bear the full name and address of the writer. A selection of those received will be published periodically in these columns. In addition to letters of comment on previous articles, communications on other information of interest will be printed as space is available.*

Sir:

The readers of the *Middle East Journal* should be extremely grateful to Mr. Roughton for his excellent article on "Algeria and the June 1967 Arab Israeli War" (*MEJ*, Autumn, 1969). As far as this reader can remember this is the first attempt made to evaluate this problem.

However, the author has made what seems a fateful mistake from which he has, consequently, drawn the wrong conclusions: He writes on page 445, paragraph two: "Algeria refused, along with Syria, to accept the ceasefire."

First of all, nobody ever asked Algeria to observe a cease fire; it therefore cannot have refused a request which was never made. Secondly, Syria did accept a cease fire on June 10th, late in the evening, and on the morrow, June 11th, General Bull, Chief Ceasefire Observer on behalf of the UN, reported to the Secretary General that the cease fire on the Syrian front with Israel had come into effect and was being observed by both sides.

GIDEON WEIGERT
Jerusalem

Sir:

Mr. Weigert's interpretation of my sentence, "Algeria refused, along with Syria, to accept the ceasefire," points up what is either an imprecision of language on my part or an overly rigid interpretation of the paragraph in question. I did not mean "accept" in the legal sense of "sign" or "endorse" rather that immediately following the June 1967 war, both government and public opinion in Algeria rejected the concept of ceasefire and reaffirmed the idea of continuous struggle. Both government and public opinion also refused to accept the notion that hostilities had ended after five days of fighting. I had hoped that my essay had made these points clear. (For additional references cf., *Le Monde*, June 11-12, 13, 15, and 17, 1967.) Statements reflecting this state of affairs, such as "For Algeria, the war goes on," and "Algeria does not accept the fait accompli," can be found in Gérard Viratelle's article of June 13, 1967.

I am not sure I understand Mr. Weigert's statement that I have "drawn the wrong conclusions." Given that Mr. Weigert and I have a different understanding of the sentence discussed above, I can only add that Algerian hostility to the ceasefire led the Boumedienne government to support the new PLO leadership in its call for continuation of hostilities and to support the PLO view that Palestinians, not the Arab governments, must henceforth direct their struggle.

RICHARD A. ROUGHTON

Sir:

For several years I have found your journal of particular interest and value to me as a demographer with specialized interest in the Middle East. The articles have been well chosen; they have been well-written (or well edited), thoughtful, timely and valid. In reading the spring 1970 issue, however, I found that my perception was severely jolted by the article written by Ferydoon Firoozi, "Demographic Review: Iranian Census 1956 and 1966: A Comparative Analysis." If I believed that your journal welcomed critical responses for publication I would be sending a manuscript rather than this letter.

This article by Firoozi is in part factually incorrect; incorrectly titled; and is more representative of subjective evaluations rather than scholarly interpretation. Let me briefly document some of these charges:

1. On page 221, Firoozi argues ". . . Thus, the government pursues an active policy of a high rate of growth." One does, of course, find statements by responsible persons in Iran who argue that the country can accommodate 50 million people (not the 40 million mentioned by Firoozi). Nevertheless, at the level of a formal governmental policy, Iran is one of the many middle-eastern countries to adopt an official policy of an anti-natal nature; others include Turkey, the UAR, Pakistan, Tunisia, Morocco. The Shah has signed the world leaders' statement supporting population policies and family planning; both the Health and Literacy Corps are involved in the family planning programs and so on. There is little present in Iran today to justify Firoozi's statement.

2. There is little to justify this particular article as a demographic review of the two censuses. It neglects the excellent work which has been done on the evaluation of the 1956 census by J. C. Chasteland and M. Amani; the translation of Volume I of the 1966 census by Mr. Momeni which makes the summary volume available in English for the first time; and in no way reflects a careful demographic analysis. For example,

a. The sex ratio which he represents as unique is typical of reported sex ratios for the Middle East (page 222); rather than being unusual, they are normal for the Muslim world. Careful techniques have been developed to indicate the degree and amount of error, such as is represented by Krotki's analysis of the 1951 and 1961 Pakistan census.

b. It is unclear whether the change in literacy reported (p. 223) represents a real change or a change in definition. Regardless, given the rate of increase, the number of illiterates is increasing even while the rate of literacy is also increasing.

c. Comparison of labor force participation rates over time is warranted when one takes into account both age participation rates and structural changes. The conclusions reached are not warranted on the basis of the materials presented in this article.

To be brief, I found the article by Firoozi not a fair reflection of the censuses in Iran or Iranian society. I would hope that a careful demographic review could be presented at some time.

LEE L. BEAN
The Population Council

Sir:

Thank you for the opportunity to reply to Mr. Bean's comments of my article. May I respond to his criticisms point by point:

Concerning the title of the article: I have all through the article made an attempt to analyze and compare the 1956 and 1966 censuses. Therefore, the title is quite representative of the text. As I shall show Mr. Bean's statements are not substantiated.

Concerning point 1: Between 1956 and 1966, the population of Iran has grown by 2.9 per cent compounded on the basis of the following computation.

$$P_{66}=P_{56}(1+R)^t$$
$$25{,}323{,}064=18{,}954{,}704(1+R)^{10}$$

Solving for R we have R=.02857 or 2.9% rounded.

Most Iranian projections for further growth of the population, as I have indicated in my article (page 221) are based on "*at least* 40 million" population by 1986. For instance J. C. Chasteland to whom Mr. Bean has referred projects a population of 49,578,000 (*La Population de L'Iran: Perspectives D'Evolution de 1956 à 1986,* University of Tehran, Tehran, 1966, p. 253). This projection is an increase of about 3.4 per cent compounded based on the following computation.

$$P_{86}=P_{66}(1+R)^t$$
$$49{,}578{,}000=25{,}323{,}064(1+R)^{20}$$

Solving for R we have R=3.4% compounded. I have also given evidence in my article to support my conclusion.

However, policies could change. At the time that I wrote my article (early 1968), there was a preponderance of evidence to support the fact that the government's policy was actually one of encouraging a high rate of population increase and there was practically nothing to support the idea that family planning was promoted. In the past several months, I have seen several news items in Persian papers on seminars conducted on the subject of family planning. Rural areas are being given priority over urban regions for carrying out the new policy. Beginning June 5, 1970, a twelve day conference on this subject opened in Tehran in which 14 other nations participated. Thus, His Majesty and the government of Iran are now committed to the implementation of the world leaders' statement to which Mr. Bean refers.

Concerning point 2: Whatever the value of their article, I am sure that Messrs. J. C. Chasteland and M. Amani would be the first to agree that they are not the ultimate authority and studies could be made without reference to their article.

Chapter 1 or 2 of most introductory texts on statistics tells the student that it is better to use a primary source (in this case the 1956 and 1966 censuses which incidentally are available in both languages, English and Persian) than a secondary one (Mr. Momeni's summary and translation). "In the first place, the data in primary sources tend to be more complete than in secondary sources. . . Secondly, in a primary source the statistical data are often supplemented with pertinent information about collection methods and changes made in definition. . . Finally, the possibility also exists that errors not contained in the primary source will be introduced into secondary sources. . ." (J. Neter and W. Wasserman, *Fundamental Statistics for Business and Economics,* Boston, Allyn and Bacon, 1966, 3rd ed. p. 9).

Concerning 2a: I have not presented the sex ratio of Iran as unique. I had said, "Iran was one of the few places in the world where there are more men than women." According to H. W. Fowler's *A Dictionary of Modern English Usage,* "few" means "a small number." "Unique" according to Fowler means "applicable only to what is in some respect the sole existing specimen, the precise like of which may be sought in vain." "Unique" was, therefore, not intended at all.

Furthermore, Mr. Bean's generalization "They are normal for the Muslim world" is not warranted. Among the Muslim countries of the Middle East, Saudi Arabia (as of 1965) and Afghanistan (as of 1968) have not conducted any censuses. For Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Iraq there are, for the 1960's, only estimates of the population available. It is common knowledge that if a census would be taken, each of these countries have a 50 per cent chance to show that there are not more men than women in their territories.

Also, evidence is available that in fact there were more women than men of some Muslim Middle Eastern countries until World War II. In Turkey such a phenomenon existed. In 1935, there were 7,937,000 men versus 8,221,000 women. In 1940, the imbalance began to reverse (Richard D. Robinson, *High-Level Manpower in Economic Development: The Turkish Case,* Harvard Middle Eastern Series, Cambridge, Mass. 1967, pp. 22-23). Thus, one cannot accept it as a normal phenomenon.

Concerning 2b: The standard procedure in reporting the literacy of the population is to give the ratio of the literates or illiterates to the population of 7 or 10 years and over. In 1956 Iran had 1,910,630 literates (14.5 per cent of the population of 10 years and over). In 1966, this number had increased to 4,649,841 (28.4 per cent of the 1966 population of 10 years and over). Since both in magnitude and in ratio there had been an increase, I omitted the absolute number for the sake of brevity. It is axiomatic to anyone with some knowledge of statistics that as the population increases, if efforts for literacy continue, while the percentage of illiterates may decrease the absolute number of illiterates may increase. I could have shown either the literacy or illiteracy changes. I merely exercised my privilege of choice as to what was more important: a decade of sincere efforts by Iran for the expansion of literacy or playing number games.

Analyzing the data is a very difficult task. The analyst is faced with many agonizing questions. Am I creating a myth or presenting the facts? Am I giving recognition to the efforts of the literacy corps man who teaches a farmer in the remote villages of Khurasan, Fars or Kurdistan to read "My name is Hasan, this is my land. . ."? Or am I sitting behind the executive desk dictating what the Iranian society should like, who should write about it, and what should be written? . . .

Concerning 2c: What is wrong with my conclusions? In what way are they not warranted? Mr. Bean's statements need substantiation.

I would have been more grateful to Mr. Bean had he made fewer value judgments and emotional charges and presented a more careful statement.

FERYDOON FIROOZI
Northeastern Illinois
State College

Sir:

I am writing with regard to two maps accompanying the article "Agricultural Evolution in Israel," by Messrs. Doerr, Coling and Kerr, in the Summer 1970 issue of the *Journal,* pages 323 and 324. On these maps certain areas, i.e. the so-called Latrun no-man's land and some smaller areas in the vicinity of Jerusalem, are described as "disputed territory."

These areas, all of which were occupied by Israel during the June 1967 war, were established in the Jordan-Israel Armistice Agreement of April 3, 1949. It is true that these areas are now in dispute, in the sense that Israel has denounced the Armistice Agreements, whereas the United Nations considers them to be still in effect, but the same point could be made about any of the territories covered by the Agreements. I am puzzled, therefore, as to why this particular designation was used.

EVAN M. WILSON
Washington, D. C.

I. INTRODUCTION

American academicians recently have had problems concerning GOT regulations governing research in Turkey. These problems have arisen for essentially two reasons:

1. The researcher did not know or was unable to learn the regulations or did not consider them important.
2. The researcher failed to seek the assistance of his Embassy sufficiently in advance of departing for Turkey.

Most Americans do not realize that other countries exercise greater control over the flow of academic information than does the U. S. The Turkish Government prefers that applications for research permission be made by the Embassy in Ankara of the country of which the applicant is a citizen. *It is most important that permission be sought at least three months before leaving for Turkey.*

II. VISAS

American citizens can enter Turkey without visas, but can stay only 90 days and act only as tourists. Researchers and dependents must obtain residence visas, good for one year and for multiple entrances to Turkey. Lecturers, teachers and others who receive a salary from a Turkish institution must obtain work visas. A letter from the host institution will be needed to apply.

Visas can be obtained from the Turkish Consulates General in New York, Chicago and Los Angeles (*not* from the Embassy in Washington). Application should be made two months before departing the United States.

A. Residents of the following states should apply to:
Turkish Consulate General
50 Rockfeller Plaza
New York, New York

Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South

Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia.

B. Residents of the following states should apply to:

Turkish Consulate General
West Jackson Boulevard
Chicago, Illinois

Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Wisconsin.

C. Residents of the following states should apply to:

Turkish Consulate General
1901 Avenue of the Stars
Suite 1145
Los Angeles, California

Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, Wyoming.

III. RESIDENCE PERMITS

Researchers and dependents intending to stay more than 90 days in Turkey must obtain residence permits. Application is made to the Ministry of Interior Security Directorate (Fourth Section) in the city in which the applicant is living, within one month after arriving in Turkey. After receiving a residence permit, which sometimes can take several months, a visa is no longer necesasry. A visa which expires before the residence permit is obtained normally can be extended.

IV. RESEARCH PERMISSIONS

Neither a visa nor a residence permit authorizes a scholar to conduct research in Turkey. Making more than preliminary contacts with other academicians and, if relevant, government officials before receiving permission to do research can be grounds for denying it. Seeking a residence permit before receiving research permission may be grounds for denial. While the Turkish Consulates General in the United States on occasion will process applications for research permissions, it is to the advantage of the researcher that he make his application through the American Embassy in Turkey. Applicants should write to:

For those writing from the U.S.:
Cultural Affairs Officer
Amembassy/USIS
APO New York 09254
For those already abroad:
Cultural Affairs Officer
U. S. Information Service
Ataturk Bulvari 97
Kizilay, Ankara, Turkey

Applications take a minimum of two months to process. Applicants thus should write to the Embassy at least three months before planning to arrive in Turkey, further in advance if the intended research is other than purely historical. Edwin Cohn's article, "The Climate for Research in the Social Sciences in Turkey" (*Middle East Journal,* 1968), is very informative.

Permission to obtain access to Turkish archives for purely historical research is most easy to obtain. However, documents dating 1914 to the present usually are not open to foreign scholars; neither are documents relating to religious sects and groups which were outlawed after the formation of the Turkish Republic. Microfilming is limited to one hundred exposures.

More difficult to obtain is permission to conduct interviews for public opinion, sociological, psychological or similar studies. The difficulty increases as the location of the research moves from the major cities to small towns; permission is rarely given for research in villages, among nomads, concerning non-Turkish ethnic or religious minorities, or on contemporary topics.

Letters to the Embassy requesting application to do research should contain the following information:

1. Name, age, U.S. institution of affiliation, academic position (e.g., doctoral candidate, associate professor).
2. Proposed date of arrival and length of stay in Turkey.

3. Subject of study, with a brief paragraph of explanation.
4. Purpose of study (e.g., doctoral dissertation, proposed article in scholarly journal).
5. Exact nature of research for which permission is desired (e.g., permission to study and microfilm relevant documents, permission to conduct interviews with one hundred Turks who have worked in Germany and returned to their villages).
6. Exact location of proposed research (e.g., Ottoman Foreign Ministry Archives in Istanbul; maximum of ten villages, to be selected by provincial governors, in provinces of Erzurum and Elazig).
7. Previous experience in Turkey, including numbers and dates of previous permissions to conduct research.
8. Names of Turkish colleagues and/or institute of affiliation, if any.

The Embassy may ask the applicant to change his subject or methodology in order to increase the probability of acceptance.

When the Turkish Government has granted the permission, the Embassy will forward a copy of the written permission to the applicant. It can be used as evidence that the permission has been received; some Turkish officials prefer, nevertheless, to wait until they receive a copy through their own channels.

V. MISCELLANEOUS

American scholars coming to Turkey should bring with them, not send separately, copies of all relevant documents, including college transcripts, diplomas, and letters attesting to university affiliations, and a minimum of a dozen passport-size photographs for the scholar and each dependent accompanying him.

The Secretariat of the Commission for Educational Exchange between the United States and Turkey (Fulbright Commission) will assist all scholars under the Fulbright-Hays and Smith-Mundt Acts.

VI. ACTION REQUESTED

Please circulate the contents of this message in its entirety to the attention of the Middle East Studies Association, headquartered at New York University; the Middle East Institutes of Columbia University and the University of Chicago; American Friends of the Middle East in Washington; and the Middle East Institute in Washington.

We ask that the Department and HEW see that all successful candidates for U. S. Government grants for research or study in Turkey are familiar with the procedures described in the airgram.

American Embassy, Ankara

Sir:

Mr. Sepehr Zabih's kind words in a review of my book, *The Foreign Policy of Iran, 1500-1941:* A Developing Nation in World Affairs (*MEJ,* 1970, 382-84) are appreciated, but several instances of misunderstanding on his part impel the following remarks:

One of these instances concerns treatment of the technique of "procrastination." The review simply assumes that we have categorically disapproved of this technique because the reviewer himself chooses to dwell upon the one and only instance of procrastination which, in light of the available evidence, did not seem to work, namely, Reza Shah's policy in 1941. The study reveals that this was the only instance of unsuccessful use of the technique of procrastination in the modern history of Iranian foreign policy: it was used beneficially in 1921 (pp. 186-189, and p. 309) and in 1925 (pp. 245 and 309). More unfortunately, the review misrepresents our view of Qavam's resort to this technique in 1946; it attributes to us the notion tht Qavam's procrastination was "irrational" and "counterproductive." These are the reviewer's words placed in quotation marks; they are not ours. The text reveals clearly (pp. 312-313) that the study mentions Qavam's procrastination solely as an indication of the use of this technique even after 1941 when our study ends; and beyond this no assessment whatever is attempted.

A second instance of the review's failure of understanding concerns the study's use of the concept of "rationality." First, the main reason for the incorporation of this concept into the study is completely overlooked. The text clearly states (p. 7) that this concept is adopted as a test of the ends-and-means relationship, namely, it hypothesizes that modernization in a developing society is accompanied by the selection of objectives more commensurate with means of achievement. Second, in an apparent defense of the foreign policy of small states (such as Iran in 1941) on the ground of "higher moral objectives," the review simply assumes that rational choice is devoid of moral merit. This is patently not the case because it is so much easier to abdicate choice to irrational forces. Man's experience abounds with examples of destruction of "higher moral objectives" in refusing to recognize the unpleasant but obstinate facts of his existence, including, *inter alia,* the stark realities of power politics such as those confronting Iran in the fateful days of July-August, 1941. There is moral merit in recognizing the limits of what is possible.

The third question raised by the review is less a consequence of misunderstanding and more a product of unconstructive criticism. The review asserts that our research could have benefited from the so-called revelations of Dr. Mossadeq, Sayed Zia and Taqizadeh, but it fails to indicate concretely how. The reference to the "nature of the Shah's relations with Britain on the oil issue" and the "true nature of the British involvement in the 1921 coup" is at best ambiguous. Furthermore, no evidence is produced in support of the alleged influence of several individuals on Reza Shah's foreign policy. The only source cited in the review (and that incompletely) is *Bazigaran-e Asr-e Talai,* presumably in an attempt to show the influence of Taymourtash on the Shah's oil policy. But if anything this source proves the very opposite. It states that *Reza Shah decided,* as our study suggests, to cancel the D'Arcy concession (in 1932 not in 1933 as given in the review). Moreover, it suggests that the Shah *used* the services of Taymourtash in the early phase of negotiations with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. (See A. Khajehnouri, *Bazigaran-e Asr-e Talai,* Vol. I, Tehran, n.d., pp. 86-87.)

ROUHOLLAH K. RAMAZANI

STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND CIRCULATION *(Act of October 23, 1962: Section 4369, Title 39, United States Code).*

1. *Date of Filing:* October 1, 1970.
2. *Title of Publication:* THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL.
3. *Frequency of Issue:* Quarterly.
4. *Location of Known Office of Publication:* 1761 N Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20036.
5. *Location of the Headquarters or General Business Offices of the Publishers:* Same.
6. *Names and Addresses of Publisher, Editor and Managing Editor: Publisher:* The Middle East Institute, 1761 N Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20036. *Editor:* William Sands, 1745 N Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20036. *Managing Editor:* Kathleen Manalo, 940 - 25th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20037.
7. *Owner (If owned by a corporation, its name and address must be stated and also immediately thereunder the names and addresses of stockholders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of stock. If not owned by corporation, the names and addresses of the individual owners must be given. If owned by a partnership or other unincorporated firm, its name and address, as well as that of each individual must be given.)* The Middle East Institute, 1761 N Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20036.
8. *Known Bondholders, Mortgagees, and Other Security Holders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages or other securities (If there are none, so state).* None.
9. For completion by nonprofit organizations authorized to mail at special rates *(Section 132.122, Postal Manual).*

The purpose, function, and nonprofit status of this organization and the exempt status for Federal income tax purposes have not changed during preceding 12 months.

10. Extent and nature of circulation.

	Average No. Copies Each Issue During Preceding 12 Months	*Actual No. of Copies of Single Issue Published Nearest to Filing Date*
A. Total no. copies printed *(Net Press Run)*	4,075	4,100
B. Paid Circulation		
1. Sales through dealers and carriers, street vendors and counter sales	0	0
2. Mail subscriptions	3,611	3,435
C. Total paid circulation	3,611	3,435
D. Free distribution *(including samples)* by mail, carrier or other means	120	125
E. Total distribution *(Sum of C and D)*	3,731	3,560
F. Office use, left-over, unaccounted, spoiled after printing	344	540
G. Total *(Sum of E & F—should equal net press run shown in A)*	4,075	4,100

I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete.

H. FARIS, BUSINESS MANAGER

FROM THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE

for an understanding of the events that make headlines

Mission in Palestine, 1948-1952, by Pablo de Azcárate.

The memoirs of the Deputy Principal Secretary of the Palestine Commission and Principal Secretary of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine. "This book is a primary source for students and specialists on the area and a human record of importance for all those who wish to know how an international body can, and cannot act." *Bibliotheca Orientalis.* 211 pp. $6.75

Where the Jordan Flows, by Richard H. Sanger.

The Holy Land from pre-history to modern times. "*Where the Jordan Flows* will set a new style in travel manuals, I hope. . . . A breezy, bouncy book, rich in off-duty scholarship and light non-departmental language." Hal Lehrman in *Book Week.* 397 pp. $5.75

State and Society in Independent North Africa, edited with an Introduction by Leon Carl Brown.

Vol. 1, James Terry Duce Memorial Series. A comprehensive survey designed for class-room use as well as general reading. ". . . its contributions are of the highest order. Leon Carl Brown's team . . . could hardly be bettered." *International Affairs.* 332 pp. $7.50

The Day of Maysalun: A Page from the Modern History of the Arabs, by Sati al Husri.

Translated from the Arabic by Sidney Glazer with a new introduction by the author. Source material describing the events of July 24, 1920, when the French defeated the Arabs and drove Faysal from Syria. 187 pp. $2.75 paper

THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE

1761 N Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036

Oxford University Press

A Survey of Persian Art

FROM PREHISTORIC TIMES TO THE PRESENT; VOLUME XIV: NEW STUDIES 1938-1960, PROCEEDINGS, THE IVth INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF IRANIAN ART AND ARCHAEOLOGY, PART A, APRIL 24-MAY 3, 1960

Edited by ARTHUR UPHAM POPE *and* PHYLLIS ACKERMAN. Some of the major topics discussed in this collection of papers on Persian art include archaeological activity in Iran from 1935 to 1960, and the expression of emergent civilization and early mythology in ornaments and art. Recent finds of art works in gold, silver, ivory, and stone are surveyed, and recent discoveries of Sasanian plates are discussed. Early manuscript illuminations are examined in detail, and other forms of art discussed are woven textiles, miniature paintings, architecture, calligraphy, and various kinds of carpets, as well as ceramic and pottery objects. *(Under the auspices of the Asia Institute of Pahlavi University.) Photos, maps, drawings.* $35.00

On the Frontiers of Islam

TWO MANUSCRIPTS CONCERNING THE SUDAN UNDER TURCO-EGYPTIAN RULE, 1822-1845

By RICHARD HILL. The story of the Sudan during the first half of the last century is little known. The documents here translated by Richard Hill provide valuable information about that stage of Sudanese development. They present a commentary on some important incidents for which there is no other evidence, and on others which are known only by oblique reference in the few surviving records. *(Oxford Studies in African Affairs.)* $9.75

Alive to God

MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN PRAYER

By KENNETH CRAGG. The author has brought together a collection of prayers and other passages from writers of both the Muslim and the Christian faiths, which show the common elements and kindred themes in Muslim and Christian prayer. The author has also included notes on authors, sources, an index of authors and sources, an index of themes of prayer, and an index of Quranic and biblical passages. *Paper,* $5.00

Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to the Present Day

Edited by M. A. COOK, *University of London.* This volume contains revised papers discussed at an international conference held at the School of Oriental and African Studies in 1967 on the Economic History of the Middle East. Some of the topics treated are the concepts of "social class" among the medieval Muslims, the existence of guilds in the medieval Middle East, the ability of the enormous fiscal archives of the Ottoman Empire to tell us about population data history, and the relative prospects of growth in Iraq and Iran as a result of oil royalties. *Graphs, tables.* $9.95

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

SPRING 1971

THE MIDDLE EAS
JOURNAL

THIS ISSUE

- Rate of Economic
wth and Fixed Capital
rmation 1936-1968
Samir A. Makdisi
- Anatomy of Violence:
ieoretical Reflections on
alestinian Resistance
Emile A. Nakhleh
- e Bizerta Crisis:
A Bourguibist Attempt to
Resolve Tunisia's Border
Problems
Werner Klaus Ruf
- e Evolution of
andownership in the
Sudan
Mohammed Hashim Awad
- liography Book Reviews
- nment and Chronology
- Communications

5, No. 2 $2.50

MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE · WASHINGTON, D.

THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE

Board of Governors
Parker T. Hart, *President*
Raymond A. Hare, *National Chairman*
John C. Campbell, *Vice President*
Kermit Roosevelt, *Vice President*
Arthur Z. Gardiner, *Treasurer*
John Badeau
George Ballou
Robert G. Barnes
William S. Blakemore, M.D.
Francis Boardman
Frances P. Bolton
Norman Burns
John H. Davis
Roderic H. Davison
Bayard Dodge, *Emeritus*
Russell H. Dorr
Dahl M. Duff
Richard Ettinghausen
Charles W. Hostler
Harry N. Howard
J. C. Hurewitz
Mrs. George Camp Keiser
Francis Kettaneh
Majid Khadduri
J. W. Komes
Cecil J. Olmstead
Garry Owen
Sidney Sherwood
Mrs. Harley C. Stevens
Phillips Talbot
Robert G. Van Peursem
Edwin M. Wright, *Emeritus*
T. Cuyler Young

Malcolm Peck, *Secretary*

THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

Editor
William Sands

Book Review Editor
Harry N. Howard

Managing Editor
Kathleen H. B. Manalo

Editorial Consultant
A. Hossein Faris

Editorial Assistants
Peter Nulty
Michael Van Dusen
Roxann Van Dusen

Board of Advisory Editors
Douglas D. Crary
C. Grove Haines
Herbert J. Liebesny
Robert F. Ogden
Afif I. Tannous
Robert D. Sethian
A. J. Meyer
Roderic H. Davison
Charles A. Ferguson
Harold W. Glidden
J. C. Hurewitz
Wilfred Cantwell Smith
T. Cuyler Young
Charles Issawi
Charlotte Morehouse
George N. Atiyeh

Published quarterly by the Middle East Institute, Washington, D. C. Subscription price, 1 year, $9.00; 2 years, $16.00. Single copies, $2.50. No additional charge for postage to United States and APO addresses. Add $.50 for foreign mailing. Mail all communications to The Middle East Journal, 1761 N St., N. W., Washington, D. C. 20036. Entered as second-class matter at the Post Office at Washington, D. C. Additional entry at Post Office of Baltimore, Maryland.

Vol. 25, No. 2, Copyright 1971. The Middle East Institute. Printed in U.S.A.

I.C - 2

SYRIA: RATE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION 1936-1968

Samir A. Makdisi

THE STUDY OF economic development of the Syrian Arab Republic in the postwar period is instructive in a number of ways. A potentially rich agricultural country, unburdened by population problems faced by other developing economies, Syria has, on the whole, managed to develop at a satisfactory rate. In the process the economy has been transformed from one where the private sector was up to the early 1960s the guiding force to one where in recent years the ascendency of the public sector has been firmly established.

The performance of the economy, measured in terms of growth, has varied markedly from one period to another influenced in part by the structural changes it has been undergoing. Satisfactory growth has been achieved partly because, given the availability of potential resources and the initial stimulus provided by wartime[1] conditions, Syrian entrepreneurship especially among landlords and merchant industrialists was able initially to maintain—in fact to increase—the development momentum. In the early postwar period, economic policy did not play a major rôle in influencing or directing economic progress although, despite major failings, it made limited contributions. Two factors have eventually contributed to the rising influence of economic policy and the rôle of the government in the development process: (a) the aforementioned ascendency of the public sector brought about to a large extent by noneconomic forces and, (b) the emergence of serious economic bottlenecks in certain sectors which required greater action by the government and its agencies.

The basic aim of this paper is to provide a profile of the performance of the Syrian economy as measured by its rate of growth beginning with the late

---

[1] The war referred to in this paper is World War II.

△ SAMIR A. MAKDISI is on the staff of the International Monetary Fund. Any views expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the International Monetary Fund.

prewar period.[2] As available national income series begin only with 1953, it has been necessary to supplement this data by estimates of our own covering the late prewar and early postwar years: an attempt was therefore made to estimate gross national product for 1936-38 and 1946-48, each of the two periods comprising two good crop years and one bad crop year.[3] At the same time revised estimates of fixed capital formation during the same years (which originally appeared elsewhere)[4] have been included so as to help shed light on the changing pattern of growth over the whole period under review.

At best our estimates are very rough and can only be regarded as preliminary. Nevertheless they are useful for the purpose of providing an overall view of the rate and pattern of growth beginning with the late prewar years.

Rate of growth

a. *Rate of growth from 1936/38-1946/48*

(i) *Approximations of income for 1936-38*

For this period approximations of GNP, measured in current prices, indicate that it averaged about £S 137 million. (See Table 1 and for the method of estimation, Appendix 1.) This result is based on the assumption that the combined share of agriculture, industry and government in total GNP was in the neighborhood of 60 per cent of the total. The basis for this assumption is the share of these same three sectors as revealed by official estimates for the postwar period.[5] As indicated below, the average share of these three sectors in the second half of the 1950s and 1960s revolved around 52 per cent to 53 per cent. For the prewar period a higher percentage was assumed on the presumption that the rôle of agriculture in the prewar economy might have been more important, in terms of income, than its rôle in the postwar years; nevertheless, given the estimated rate of growth in each of the three sectors from the prewar to the early postwar years, it is improbable that their combined share in the prewar period could have exceeded 60 per cent by more than a few percentage points. A higher assumed percentage would imply a substantially higher rate of growth for the rest of the economy than that for these sectors taken together—the rate for the former sectors being more than treble that for the latter sectors. There is no *a priori* reason to hold to this

---

[2] The factors which have contributed to or retarded economic growth will be the subject of another paper.

[3] In Syria, the agricultural cycle of three crop years has normally included one poor harvest.

[4] See footnote 15.

[5] There are two series of national income estimates: the first is based on calculations for the year 1956 and the second (an improved series) based on calculations beginning with the year 1963 (see below p. 162).

TABLE 1. *Syria: Estimates of Gross National Product, 1936/38 and 1946/48*

(In millions of Syrian pounds)

	1936	1937	1938	1946	1947	1948
At current prices						
Agriculture	38.0	71.0	106.0	674	548	846
Industry[1]	4.5	6.0	6.5	103	88	70
Government[2]	5.0	4.2	5.8	67	73	(73)
Total	47.5	81.2	118.3	844	709	989
Total of three sectors adjusted by price index with 1938 as a base[3]	110.0	89.0	118.0	129	118	134

	1936-38	1946-48
Average of three sectors at current prices	82	847
GNP (*at current prices*)	137[4]	1,540[5]
Averages of three sectors at adjusted prices	106	127
GNP (*at adjusted prices*)[6]	177[4]	230[5]

Source: For method of estimation see Appendix I.

[1] See Appendix I, section 2.

[2] Includes wage bill of the central administration plus that part of development expenditures which comprised wages and profits (see Appendix I, section 3).

[3] Weighted wholesale price index including the major agricultural commodities (see Appendix I, section 4).

[4] Assuming combined share of three sectors averaged 60 per cent of total GNP (see Appendix I, section 4).

[5] Assuming combined share of three sectors averaged 55 per cent of total GNP (see Appendix I, section 4).

[6] See Appendix I, section 4.

assumption. It is also highly unlikely that the share of the three sectors could have been significantly less than 60 per cent, for this would imply that other sectors of the economy, taken together, hardly experienced any growth at a time, i.e. the war period, when the economy as a whole was expanding.[6] During the period 1936-38 itself, current income increased steadily and substantially. This was due to a rising trend in agriculture prices, accentuated by the devaluation of the Syrian pound (then linked to the French franc) in October 1936; for 1938, however, there also occurred an increase in agricultural output.

In deflating GNP, for purposes of comparison with subsequent years, a serious difficulty arose. No price indices are available which extend as far back as 1936. One available index for the city of Damascus based on the retail prices for certain essential commodities extends as far back as 1938.

---

6. See Appendix I, Section 4 pp. 177-78.

However, such an index appears highly inadequate for the purpose of measuring the rate of growth in real GNP, especially as it does not cover the years 1936 and 1937 which experienced a rising price level. Alternatively, a weighted agricultural wholesale price index covering the years under review was constructed, the nonavailability of relevant data precluding the construction of a general index. Despite its severe limitations this index probably serves more adequately as a GNP deflator than the available retail price index. Not only does it cover the years 1936 and 1937, but the movement in agricultural prices probably reflects more accurately the general trend in prices, particularly when account is taken of the major influence exercised by agricultural prices in this regard.[7] It is apparent from Table 1 that when adjustment for price changes is made using the above index (with 1938 as a base), GNP in 1936-38 would average about £S 117 million.

(ii) *Approximation of income for 1946-48*

Approximations for this period indicate that GNP, measured in current prices, averaged about £S 1,540 million (Table 1). This result is based on the assumption that the combined share of agriculture, industry and government averaged close to 55 per cent of the total. This, in turn, is partly based on the trend for the combined share of these three sectors in national income (at constant 1963 prices) for the period 1956-1969[8] which does not indicate a significant change in their relative position, their share averaging about 52-53 per cent.[9] Moreover, an independent estimate of income for 1950[10] gives support to the assumption that the combined share of the three sectors was in the neighborhood of 55 per cent, or perhaps a few percentage points higher, in which case the results would have changed only marginally. Similarly, official income estimates for the period 1953-57 alone, (i.e. covering a period which includes one poor crop year) points to the plausibility of this assumption. Adjusting for price changes by using the same price index used earlier (with 1938 as a base), GNP in real terms would average in 1946-48 about £S 230 million (Table 1). Again looking at the trend in the period 1946-48 itself, the decline in income in 1947 is explained by the poor harvest in that year.

Another approximation for GNP for the years 1946-48 was made by estimating the value added in agriculture at 1956 market prices, i.e. the prices of the base year used in the initial series of official estimates (a similar estimate for industry could hardly be attempted). The share of agriculture in total GNP is assumed to have been 40 per cent to 44 per cent of the total. This assumption is in turn based on official estimates for the agricultural sector in 1953-1957, as well as the independent estimate for the year 1950 mentioned earlier. On the basis of this alternative method real GNP averaged in 1946-48 (at 1956 prices) between £S 1,101 million and £S 1,211 million (Table 2). The higher estimate is closely comparable with the one indicated above; the difference between the two estimates varies by less than five per cent. The lower estimate, however, varies by more than 10 per cent.

---

[7] In the general wholesale price index (with 1952-54 as a base) constructed by the Syrian Director of Statistics, the weights assigned for foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials account for three-quarters of total weights.

[8] National income estimates prior to 1956 have not yet been recalculated at 1963 prices.

[9] The regression equation used for computing the trend is as follows: combined income in three sectors/national income $= C\ \alpha\ T_{56-69}$ where C is a constant and α is a regression coefficient with values of 0.52 and 0.0005 respectively.

[10] See Appendix I, pp. 176-77.

TABLE 2. *Syria: Estimates of Gross National Product, 1946-48*

(In millions of Syrian pounds)

	1946	1947	1948	Average 1946-48
Total of gross product in agriculture, industry, and government at current prices	844	709	989	847
GNP at Current Prices[1]	1,534	1,290	1,798	1,540
GNP adjusted by price index with 1956 as a base[2]	1,370	1,183	1,223	1,259
Gross product in agriculture at 1956 market prices	488	420	545	484
GNP at 1956 market prices:				
Assumption (1)[3]	1,220	1,050	1,362	1,211
Assumption (2)[4]	1,109	955	1,238	1,101

	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	Average 1955-57
GNP at 1956 market prices	2,116	2,428	2,190	2,594	2,767	2,517

Source: For 1946-48, Table 1, and Appendix I, section; for 1951-57, *Syrian Statistical Abstract, 1962.*

[1] Assuming the combined gross product in agriculture, industry and government equaled 55 per cent of total GNP.

[2] Agricultural weighted price index including the major agricultural commodities.

[3] Assuming gross product in agriculture equaled 40 per cent of total GNP.

[4] Assuming gross product in agriculture equaled 44 per cent of total GNP.

(iii) *The rate of growth from 1936-38 to 1946-48*

According to the above approximations, real GNP increased from 1936-38 to 1946-48 by a compound average rate of growth of about 2.5 per cent. This rate was relatively low in comparison with postwar rates of growth and most likely with that prevailing during the war period when the economy was expanding under the stimulus of war requirements. Nonetheless, it represented an advance in comparison with the prewar period when, according to all available indicators, the economy during the 1930s was practically stagnant if not in actual decline. It should also be noted that towards the end of the war period and immediately after, economic activity tended to slow down, as a consequence of the withdrawal of foreign troops and the decline in the effective demand for consumer goods and in the level of employment.

b. *Postwar rate of growth according to official estimates*

The first official attempt to estimate national income related to the year 1956. With the calculations for this year as a basis, national income estimates for subsequent years were extrapolated in accordance with certain economic indicators while estimates for earlier years were carried back to 1953. A new improved series based on calculations of national income for 1963 and later years (at 1963 prices) was subsequently established and it is this series of which we shall presently make use (Table 3). It should be pointed out, however, that apart from certain statistical deficiencies[11] annual figures are

TABLE 3. *Syria: Estimates of National Income 1953-1969*

(In millions of Syrian pounds)

	At 1956 prices			At 1963 prices													Provisional
	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
Agriculture	824	927	636	981	1,118	746	765	677	844	1,256	1,038	1,056	875	847	1,039	1,049	1,182
Industry	277	246	264	285	293	299	302	310	316	327	347	365	365	447	443	519	702
Public Administration	114	127	140	80	100	129	159	167	225	275	321	386	391	436	480	569	706
Other	659	876	880	1,211	1,214	1,209	1,231	1,266	1,282	1,506	1,409	1,482	1,510	1,705	1,775	1,915	2,346
Total	1,892	2,176	1,920	2,557	2,725	2,383	2,427	2,402	2,667	3,377	3,115	3,289	3,141	3,435	3,737	4,052	4,936
Annual percentage change	—	15.0	–11.7	—	6.6	–12.6	1.8	–1.0	11.0	26.6	–7.7	5.6	–4.5	9.4	8.8	8.4	21.8

Source: Syrian Arab Republic, *Statistical Abstracts.*

---

[11] Although progress has been made by Syrian government departments in improving the scope and quality of statistical data.

not always strictly comparable owing to certain adjustments made in the estimates for individual years without effecting comparable changes for the preceding years.

A striking observation, apparent from Table 3, is the marked variation in the rate of growth from year to year. This variation is not mainly attributable to changes in the size of the agricultural crop as might have been expected; rather it is in large measure due to variations in the rate of growth of other sectors the relative importance of which has been increasing throughout the postwar period. Thus, if the agricultural sector is excluded the degree of variation is increased.[12] Another observation is the exceptional occurrence of the three successive poor harvests in 1958-60 on account of inadequate rainfall in contrast to the normal cycle of one bad harvest every three agricultural years. This development tended to depress the average annual rate, being in the neighborhood of five per cent. From 1953 to 1957 the compound average rate was 6.5 per cent; during 1958-60 national income growth practically stagnated, while in 1961-68 the compound average rate of growth was about 5.5 per cent.

c. *A general view of the rate of growth beginning with the late prewar years*

As already noted, the compound average rate of growth from the prewar to the immediate postwar years, 1946-48 was approximately 2.5 per cent per annum. Comparing the estimate of average GNP for 1946-48 (adjusted by a price index with 1956 as a base—see Table 2) which included one poor harvest year with its average for the three years 1955-57[13] (at 1956 prices) which also included one poor harvest year, we derive a compound average rate of growth of more than eight per cent.

Given the serious limitations of the statistical base underlying our approximations for earlier years, allowance may be made for the possibility that for the period 1946/48-1955/57 the average rate of growth might have been biased upward. That there occurred an impressive economic expansion during this period of relative price stability is nevertheless evidenced by a number of available indicators. Real gross product originating in the agricultural sector, which could be estimated fairly adequately, nearly doubled. From 1946 to 1956 total government expenditure under the ordinary and other budgets is estimated to have increased by more than four times, while industrial output in the period 1951-56 alone is estimated to have risen five times;[14] similarly the expansion in other sectors of the economy was rapid. Even if the rate of growth was scaled down by one or two percentage points, it would still remain very favorable in comparison with the previous rate of growth and to a much lesser extent with the subsequent compound average rate of growth.

---

[12] For the period 1956-68 the standard deviation of the distribution of the rates of growth of national income around the arithmetic mean for this period is about 18.5 and the variance 342. When the agricultural sector is excluded the standard deviation increases to about 22 and the variance to 479. Apply Snedecor's F test, we derive a ratio of the two variances of 0.71, which, however, is not significant.

[13] This period was used instead of say 1956-58 since the year 1958 marked the beginning of a period of income stagnation as already mentioned in the text.

Thus, looking at the period beginning 1936-38 the picture which emerges is the following: war conditions provided the economy with an additional stimulus to break away from its prewar stagnation. The advance was, on average, relatively slow from the late prewar to the immediate postwar years, 1946-48. However, the postwar period up to 1957 appears to have witnessed an impressive rate of growth—a trend which was halted in 1958-60 partly on account of successive crop failures. The average rate of growth has since accelerated but at a slower pace than in the earlier postwar period.

Fixed Capital Formation[15]

a. *Estimates for the periods 1936-38 and 1946-47*[16]

Estimates of fixed capital formation for the two periods under review are based on imports of capital goods, private building construction and public expenditures on social overhead capital and building construction. The method followed in arriving at the estimates follows closely the one underlying the official estimates[17] which at constant prices are carried back to 1953. The main difference lies in the scope of coverage; the official data include and our estimates exclude (due to the nonavailability of reliable data): (1) estimates of domestically produced capital goods and private investment in land reclamation and water projects and (2) public expenditure on investments outside the ordinary budget.[18] These differences, however, do not invalidate the usefulness of the comparisons between the official and our own estimates. Both

---

[14] See S. Makdisi, "Industrial Development in Syria, 1939-1957," *Al-Abhath,* Quarterly Journal of the American University of Beirut, (Sept. 1960)—in Arabic.

[15] This section formed a major part of an article by the author which appeared in the *Middle East Economic Papers,* 1963 (Economic Research Institute, American University of Beirut, [1964]). Since the publication of this article, the author has made some upward revisions in the estimates of private fixed capital formation for 1936-38 and 1946-47. The revisions do not affect significantly the percentage increase in total fixed capital between these two periods but the increase from 1946-47 to the mid-fifties declines as a result, from more than four times to over three times. An error crept into the article referred to whereby the increase in real terms in total fixed capital from the prewar to the early postwar periods was stated to be over one and one-half times whereas the correct figure should have read roughly over one-half.

[16] The estimate for 1948 was not attempted.

[17] See Syrian government, *Fixed Capital Formation in the Syrian Region in the Period 1954-58.* Bulletin No. 5 (mimeographed) January 1960 (in Arabic).

[18] The Syrian fiscal system has been based upon four main budgets: (1) Ordinary, covering the various ministries, (2) Related, covering semipublic administrations and drawn up separately but financially related to the Ordinary Budget, (3) Autonomous, covering public bodies whose original capital was contributed by the Central Government, but whose budgets are independent of the Ordinary Budget, and (4) Extraordinary and, later, Development, covering major projects.

TABLE 4. *Syria: Estimates of Gross Fixed Capital Formation, 1936/38, 1946/47 and 1954/57*

(In millions of Syrian pounds at current prices)

	1936-38 Average	% of Total	1946-47 Average	% of Total	1954-57 Average	% of Total
Residential and nonresidential buildings primarily private	6.30	60	52.7	53	112.5	34(43)[1]
Capital goods: primarily private	3.51[2]	33	25.6[2]	26	94.4	29(36)[1]
Capital goods: locally produced	—		—		6.1	2
Private land reclamation and water projects	—		—		60.7[3]	18
Public sector investments in roads communications, irrigation, etc.	0.73	7	21.6	21	56.9[4]	17(21)[1]
Total	10.54	100	99.9	100	330.6	100

Source: For 1936-38 and 1946-47, estimates of the author; for method, see Appendix II. For 1953-57, data are based on U.A.R., Syrian Region, Ministry of Planning, *Fixed Capital Formation in the Syrian Region, 1954-58,* Bulletin No. 5, January 1960 (in Arabic).

[1] Excluding items 3 and 4.

[2] Includes a 40 per cent trade margin as in the official estimates to render these figures more comparable with those for 1954-57.

[3] This estimate is not very reliable.

[4] This figure includes public investment in housing construction.

categories of expenditures were relatively unimportant in the late prewar and early postwar years.

Table 4 summarizes our finding for both periods. Measured in current prices, fixed capital increased from an average of £S 10.5 million in 1936-38 to an average of about £S 100 million in 1946-47, or about 9.5 times. A correct assessment of its growth in real terms may very well be impossible to achieve due to the nonavailability of indices suitable for this purpose. On the basis of available indices, however, it might be surmised that, on average, the current price of fixed capital increased from the prewar to the immediate postwar years by roughly six times.[19] Thus the increase in real fixed investment from 1936-38 to 1946-47 would have been roughly 60 per cent, i.e. deflating by the weighted index noted in the preceding footnote, we derive an average fixed capital of about £S 17 million in 1946-47 compared with £S 10.5 million in 1936-38. As a portion of real GNP fixed capital formation rose, according to our approximations, from about six per cent in 1936-38 to above seven per cent in 1946-47. In fact this portion was likely to have been somewhat higher particularly in 1946-47 since not all components of fixed investment could be accounted for.[20]

---

[19] The Beirut wholesale price index for construction materials stood at 450 in 1946-47 with the average of the two months of June and December 1939 as a base. The index of manufactured goods stood at 700 in 1946-47 wth the average of the same two months as a base. Assuming that the rise in the average price of imported capital goods was reflected by the price index for manufactured goods and that the rise in the average cost of building construction and social overhead capital was reflected by the price index for construction materials, then the weighted wholesale price index for capital goods in 1946-47 (with the average of June and December 1939 as a base) would be: $(550 \times 74) - (700 \times 26)/100 = 589$. One source mentions that the average price of immovable property increased from 1939 to 1944 by about five times. See G. Leduc, *L'economie de Guerre dans les Etats de Syrie et du Liban,* (Beyrouth, April 1944) pp. 18-19. After 1944 the average price of construction materials started to decline.

Since the base for the price index is two months in 1939 the price rise from 1936-38 to 1946-48 is probably underestimated to the extent that prices were likely to have been rising during 1936-38.

The pattern of investment, indicated in Table 4, has undergone two or three major changes from the prewar to the immediate postwar years: private housing construction was the major component in both periods although its share, along with private investment in capital goods, declined markedly from the prewar to the immediate postwar years. This decline is a reflection of the expanding rôle of the public sector in the field of investments directed to social overhead projects. Public expenditure in 1936-38 was mainly accounted for by the Ministry of Public Works and a so-called extraordinary program[21] and largely channeled to road and building construction, followed by irrigation works and the construction of bridges (not shown in Table 4). In 1946-47 most of the developmental expenditure was covered by the ordinary budget, but in later years these were increasingly financed under extraordinary budgets which relied upon available Treasury funds and loans advanced by the monetary authorities.[22] Among imports of capital goods, there has occurred a marked shift in favor of transport equipment with a corresponding decline in the share of industrial and power generating equipment.[23] This shift was in line with the expansion of the transport sector induced by war-time requirements and in the immediate postwar years by the increased emphasis placed on developing the country's infrastructure. A large portion of the rising public investment was then channeled to the transport sector.

b. *Official estimates, 1953-1968*

As in the case of national income, two series of official estimates of fixed capital formation, measured in constant prices, are available: the first (older one) is based on the 1956 prices, and the second on the 1963 prices. Similarly,

---

[20] Estimates of the portion of real GNP going to fixed capital formation may be subject to a wide margin of error especially as the deflators used are not wholly appropriate.

[21] And in 1936 the government's "Economic Program." The extraordinary program was financed out of extraordinary receipts such as the share of the Syrian state in the surplus of the budget of the Administration of "Common Interests" (enterprises then jointly managed by Syria and Lebanon), the Reserve Fund of the Ottoman Public Debt and other special receipts.

[22] Initially the Issue Department of the privately owned Banque de Syrie et du Liban and later the Central Bank which was established in 1956.

[23] A word of caution is in order here: data relating to imports of capital goods are based on certain assumptions made concerning the share of Syria in total Syro-Lebanese imports of such goods as well as in the individual categories of capital goods (see Appendix II).

TABLE 5. *Syria: Gross Fixed Capital Formation, 1953-1968*

(In millions of Syrian pounds)

	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
				(at 1956 prices)				
Dwellings	184	200	236	257	197	266	218	304
Nonresidential buildings								
Construction								
Transport equipment	128	133	112	117	81	88	166	94
Machinery & other								
Total	312	333	348	374	278	354	384	398
Annual percentage change	—	6.7	4.5	7.5	–25.7	27.3	8.5	3.6

	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
				(at 1963 prices)				
Dwellings	84	176	131	127	104	117	91	150
Nonresidential buildings	71	68	60	65	179	64	53	55
Construction	135	127	111	109		155	140	185
Transport equipment	43	46	83	86	68	96	106	91
Machinery & other	155	237	254	225	234	269	419	353
Total	488	654	639	612	585	701	809	834
Annual percentage change	—	34.0	–2.3	–4.2	–4.4	19.8	15.4	3.1

Sources: Syrian Arab Republic, *Statistical Abstracts, 1962 and 1968* and U.N. *Yearbook of National Account Statistics* (New York, 1968).

the latter series represents improved estimates of fixed capital; but on the basis of available data so far extends back to 1961 only. For previous years the 1956 series had to be used.

Looking at Table 5 it is apparent that the annual change in the rate of investment flow is striking. In part this reflects the change in the rate of growth of GNP noted above; the variation in the investment flow has also been influenced, more so in some years than in others, by evolving economic and political conditions. For example, beginning in 1963 there occurred a major shift in economic policy which aimed at extending the public sector by additional measures of nationalization of private enterprises. This shift in policy has been accompanied by a decline in the flow of private investment which could be fully compensated by increased public investment only after a period of consolidation in the public sector had taken place. Since 1966 there has occurred on the whole a strong upsurge in expenditure on fixed capital[24] accompanied by an impressive growth of GNP.

Measured in current prices fixed investment rose from an average of about £S 350 million in 1954-56[25] to an average of £S 836 million in 1966-68 or a compound average rate of increase of 7.5 per cent. At constant (1956) prices fixed capital rose from £S 312 million in 1953 to £S 398 million in 1960, a compound average rate of growth of a little over three per cent, and (at 1963 constant prices) from £S 488 million in 1961 to £S 834 million in 1968 or a compound average rate of growth of about seven per cent. As a portion of GNP gross fixed capital formation rose from about 15 per cent in the mid-fifties to about 18 per cent in 1966-68 (measured in constant prices).

For the same period the composition of fixed investment has shifted in favor of capital goods which in 1966-68 accounted for about 58 per cent of the total compared with about 34 per cent in 1954-56 (Table 6). According to available data within this category, import of machinery and equipment have, on

TABLE 6. *1. Syria: Gross Fixed Capital Formation*

(In percent of total)

	1936/38	1946/47	1953/55	1954/56	1966/68
Dwellings	60	53	63	34	15
Nonresidential buildings					7
Construction[1]	7	21		32	20
Transport equipment	33	26	37	18	13
Machinery and other				16	45
Total	100	100	100	100	100

TABLE 6. *2. Syria: Shares of the Public and Private Sectors in Gross Fixed Capital Formation*

(In percent of total)

	1936/38[2]	1946/47[2]	1954/57	1966/68
Public sector	7	21	18	55
Private sector	93	79	82	45

Source: Table 4, Syrian Arab Republic, *Statistical Abstracts, 1959, 1962 and 1968,* and U.N. *Yearbook of National Account Statistics* (New York, 1968).

[1] For the first two periods it is assumed that the bulk of construction was accounted for by the public sector.

[2] Data for this period is not strictly comparable with that for 1954/57 and 1966/68.

---

24. The annual percentage growth for 1969 indicates an increase in fixed investment of about 30 per cent over the previous year.

25. No estimate for 1953 at current prices seems to be available.

average, grown at a faster rate than transport equipment, reflecting a growing emphasis put on the implementation of various development projects including those pertaining to power and fuel. Also in line with the ascendancy of the public sector, the share of this sector in total capital formation has risen considerably, reaching in 1966-68 close to 55 per cent compared with about one-fifth in the mid-fifties. Development expenditure by the public sector has since 1960 been carried out within the framework of five-year economic and social plans, although an (ineffective) attempt at planning had been made a few years earlier.[26]

c. *Capital formation since 1936: an overall view*

To recapitulate, on the basis of rough approximations the rate of growth in fixed capital, at constant prices, seems to have averaged about six per cent per annum from the late prewar to the early postwar period. Its share in GNP (at constant prices) has accordingly risen from about six per cent in 1936-38 to over seven per cent in 1946-47. From the latter period to the mid-fifties the increase was much faster, the level of fixed capital more than trebling: the portion of GNP comprising fixed capital stood at about 15 per cent in 1954-56. As indicated above, this was also a period in which the rate of growth was rapid, the private sector having been mainly responsible for economic expansion. From 1956 to 1969 the rate of growth in fixed capital has fluctuated considerably: after increasing in the former year by over seven per cent, it fell substantially in 1957 (although national income continued to rise) due mainly to a fall in private investment. In the following five years there occurred a gradual rise in the level of capital formation followed by a continuous fall in the subsequent three years: this was due in part to the measures of nationalization beginning in 1963 which discouraged the private sector. From 1966 to 1969, the level of capital formation rose considerably, as a result of increased public investment expenditure, averaging in 1966-68 about 20 per cent of GNP. For the period 1956-69 as a whole, the annual average rate of growth was about eight per cent.

As for the pattern of investment the following major trends may be noted: (1) a fall in the share of residential and nonresidential buildings from about 60 per cent in 1936-38 to over 50 per cent in 1946-47 to about 34 per cent in 1954-56 and 25 per cent in 1966-68; (2) a fall in the share of imported capital goods from about 33 per cent in 1936-38 to about 26 per cent in

---

[26] In 1955 an Extraordinary Development Budget was announced covering the years 1955-61. The Budget was based on an investment plan submitted by the IBRD in 1955 at the request of the government. Planning organs were created that same year only to be replaced in 1958 by the newly formed Planning Ministry. A ten-year plan prepared in September 1958 never took effect; a new five-year economic social plan was initiated in 1960 and was followed in 1965 by another five-year plan.

1946-47 and its subsequent rise to about 34 per cent in 1954-56 and to nearly 60 per cent in 1966-68;[27] part of the explanation for the considerable rise in the latter period is the stress placed by the public sector in the 1960s on development projects and the policy of diverting a larger part of imports to capital goods; (3) the rise in the share of the public sector in total capital formation from about seven per cent in the prewar period to about 20 per cent in 1946-47 and the mid-fifties and to about 55 per cent in 1966-68 (Table 6), the larger portion of public investment (practically all of it in the earlier periods) was directed towards social overhead capital and to that extent it can be presumed that, at least through the 1950s, the share of this capital in total capital formation was rising; concerning more recent years, available data do not permit a determination as to whether this trend has continued and (4) although only limited data are available regarding private investment in land reclamation and water projects, it would appear that their share in total capital formation has risen from presumably a small portion in the late prewar and early postwar periods to a relatively important position in the mid-fifties;[28] with the subsequent decline in the rôle of the private sector, it can be presumed that the share of private investment in land reclamation and water projects has also declined.

Concluding observations

The generally satisfactory postwar performance of the Syrian economy as measured by the growth of national income or GNP, has been achieved despite major political changes which Syria has undergone since World War II. The rate of fixed investment, as a portion of GNP, has risen by more than two and one-half times in the postwar period with a growing share being accounted for by expenditures on capital goods. Certainly Syrian economic performance compares favorably with that of other developing countries, although this is not intended to imply that, given the existing potential, the country's performance could not have been more vigorous or the economic policies more fully adequate. Beginning with the late prewar years, periods of relatively rapid or slow rates of growth can now be identified. Various economic and noneconomic reasons may be advanced in explaining the postwar trend in Syria's growth and, given prevailing conditions and present potentialities, in assessing its future direction. This task, however, lies outside the scope of this paper which it is hoped would prove useful in any such endeavor.

---

[27] In both 1955-57 and 1966-68 the data include locally produced capital goods which were relatively small.

[28] One estimate puts it about one-fifth in 1954-57.

APPENDIX I

Estimation of Gross National Product, 1936-38 and 1946-48

The attempt to estimate Gross National Product (GNP) for the years under consideration is based on estimates of value added (value of output less cost of production) in the agricultural and industrial sectors, and of value added in the government sector defined to include salaries and wages of employees plus that portion of capital expenditure (inclusive of expenditure on repairs and maintenance) devoted to salaries and wages and to profits of contractors. Rent paid by the government on buildings leased to them is excluded as is rent imputation for the use of owned buildings. This item, however, is relatively unimportant.

Necessary data for estimating value added in agriculture, which was and is by far the leading economic sector, are generally available in official publications. The choice of government and industry is mainly based on the feasibility of estimating value added in these two rather than in other sectors. Data for government is derived from the closed accounts for the central government; for industry it is derived from various sources, cited below, but is generally less reliable than that for agriculture and government. With regard to most other economic sectors—trade, transportation and communication and other services—sufficient data, even for very rough approximations, are either unavailable or highly unreliable. In the case of foreign trade, moreover, data for Syria and Lebanon were published jointly up to March 1950 when the customs union between the two countries was dissolved. A description of the methods followed in estimating gross product in each of the three sectors and for the total economy follows below.

1. *Agriculture*

The products included in the Table, e.g., cereals, fruits, industrial crops, vegetables, milk and milk products, wool, eggs, and meat account for the bulk, if not all, of agricultural income. This is also true of the cost elements included although to a lesser degree in the prewar than in the early postwar years.

The 1936-38 period

Output figures for cereals, fruits, industrial crops, and vegetables are taken from Haut Commissariat de la République Française en Syrie et Liban, *Bulletin Economique Trimestriel,* 1936-38. Prices are generally wholesale and taken from the *Bulletin Economique de la Chambre de Commerce d'Alep et du Damas,* 1936-38. To the extent that wholesale prices are used, the income figures are inflated by the price differential between the wholesale and the farm prices, and the profits of wholesale merchants are thus included. Similar considerations would apply whenever retail or export prices had to be used due to the unavailability of more suitable prices.

For milk production, estimates of the number of goats, sheep and cows in Syria are based on figures given in the *Bulletin Economique Trimestriel,* 1936-38. Seventy per cent of each category of livestock is assumed to have produced milk. On the basis of estimates for milk production per head given in Syria, Ministry of Planning, *Estimates of Income in the Agricultural Sector, 1952-57,* Special Bulletin No. 1/1959 (in Arabic), the total quantity of milk is derived. To derive the value of milk, export prices are used, since neither wholesale nor retail prices are available. (Note: For 1936 and 1938 the number of cows and buffaloes is given in one total. It is assumed that for these two years buffaloes comprised about three per cent of the total which is the ratio available for 1937. Similarly, for the same two years, the numbers of sheep and goats are not given separately, but the ratio of about 3:2 available for 1937 is used).

For the years under consideration, no attempt was made to estimate the value of wool, eggs and meat, all of which are relatively unimportant.

Estimates of feed are based on the method utilized in Syria, *Estimates of Income in the Agricultural Sector, 1952-57,* where figures for yearly per capita consumption of grain by "horses" (inclusive of camels, mules and donkeys) and cows are given. The number of livestock is taken from *Bulletin Economique Trimestriel,* 1936-38; wholesale prices for barley are used to derive the value of feed.

TABLE 1. *Syria: Value Added in the Agricultural Sector*
(In millions of Syrian pounds at current prices)

	1936	1937	1938	1946	1947	1948
Cereals	13.3	35.3	52.1	458	346	595
Fruits	7.0	14.9	18.0	78	67	82
Industrial Crop	6.1	4.9	4.4	35	13	30
Vegetables	3.2	7.2	5.1	33	26	73
Milk and Milk Products	12.0	15.0	36.1	129	131	131
Wool	—	—	—	7	7	9
Eggs	—	—	—	(7)	(7)	9
Meat	—	—	—	28	41	28
Other	—	—	—	—	—	—
Value of output	41.6	77.3	115.7	775	638	958
Less						
Feed	2.1	4.1	6.5	56.0	48.0	63.0
Seeds	1.1	2.5	2.8	40.0	38.0	44.0
Interest	—	—	—	2.8	2.8	2.8
Fuel	—	—	—	2.0	1.6	2.0
Others	—	—	—	—	—	—
Value added	38.4	70.7	106.4	647.2	547.6	846.2

Syria: Value Added in the Agricultural Sector at 1956 Market Prices
(In millions of Syrian pounds)

	1946	1947	1948	Average 1946-48
Value of output	535	468	529	531
Cost of Production	47	48	47	47
Value added	488	420	545	484

Estimates of the quantity of seeds used in the agricultural sector are based on the areas under the main crops, e.g., wheat, maize, barley, rice and millet and on the ratio of seeds per hectare for each of the crops. The seeds/ha. ratio for Iraq is used for this purpose since this data is not available for Syria. To derive the value of seeds, wholesale prices of the various crops are used.

No attempt was made to estimate, for the years under consideration, interest paid on agricultural loans and fuels consumed, but again in the light of postwar data their values are presumably unimportant.

The 1946-48 period

Data on quantities for cereal, fruits, industrial crops and vegetables are available in the government's yearly *Statistical Abstracts.* Data on wholesale prices for Damascus are also available in the case of cereals. For fruits, no wholesale prices are available; instead, specified portions of the export prices are used. In one or two cases, an arbitrary price was assumed, i.e. prices prevailing in 1950 and 1951. For industrial crops (tobacco and cotton) the tobacco export price and the wholesale cotton price are used. For vegetables again prices used are based either on export or retail prices, since no wholesale prices are available.

For estimates of milk and milk products, the method outlined above is used; in addition, however, estimates were attempted for milk derivatives based on the method used in the official estimates; of total milk production, 50 per cent, 20 per cent, and five per cent, respectively, are allocated for the production of *samnah* (concentrated butter), cheese and butter, while the remaining 25 per cent is consumed as fresh milk. The transformation ratios of fresh milk to *samnah,* cheese and butter, respectively, are given as seven, 20, and five per cent, i.e. kgs. 100 of fresh milk are transformed into kgs. seven of *samnah* or kgs. 20 of cheese or kgs. five of butter. To derive the respective values for these products, retail prices for Damascus are used.

For wool production figures, FAO estimates are used, while prices are wholesale for Damascus. The value of eggs is derived by multiplying annual production figures by wholesale prices. Output estimates are based on the number of laying hens for 1948-55 as given in the *Syrian Statistical Abstract*, 1956.

Estimates of feed and seeds follow the same method outlined above. Estimates of interest payments are based on the loans advanced by the Agricultural Bank, three per cent per annum on short-term loans, and four per cent on long-term loans, and on official estimates regarding loans advanced by other banks and by money lenders. According to these estimates, loans advanced by banks, at eight per cent interest, equaled roughly 20 per cent of the total institutional credit, and loans advanced by money lenders, at an average rate of interest of 25 per cent, equaled total institutional credit. The value of fuel is estimated as follows: the value of fuel consumed in 1953 is given in *Estimates of Income in the Agricultural Sector*. To derive the value for the years under consideration, use is made of two indices: that of the value of agricultural machinery and that of kerosene retail prices in Damascus.

2. *Industry*

The industries included in Table 2 accounted for only part of total industrial output. A notable exception is the tobacco industry, i.e. the manufacturing of cigarettes. Tobacco production, however, is included in the agricultural sector and the value added by the manufacturing process is likely to have been a small portion of the value of that part of output which was used to produce cigarettes. To derive value added in all the industrial sector, the following method was used: The portion of total value added arising in 1956 in the industries covered in the following Table was determined from the available official estimates. It amounted to about 28 per cent. The total of the value added figures for the industries under review were then adjusted upward accordingly. In determining the above portion, all important new industries established in Syria after 1949 were excluded; examples would include cotton ginning, mechanical glass, rubber, etc.

Following is a description of the sources relied upon and the method used in estimating value added in each of the above industries:

a. *Cotton textiles*

No figures for Syrian production in 1936-38 were available. They were derived, however, as follows: It is mentioned in A. Farra, *L'Industrialization en Syrie* (Geneva, 1950), p. 212, that Syro-Lebanese production amounted in 1938 to about 11.7 million meters. According to the *Bulletin Economique Trimestriel* of the Haut Commissariat de la République Française en Syrie et de Liban, Lebanon produced in the same year about 0.666 million meters. Thus, it is assumed that Syrian production in 1938 equaled 11.03 million meters or roughly 1,820 tons, i.e. on the assumption that one ton equals roughly 6,060 meters. This assupmtion is based on information in Y. Helbaoui, *Le Syrie: Mise en Valeur d'un Pays Sous-Developpé,* (Paris, 1956) p. 126, where it is mentioned that in 1947 Syria produced 54.54 million meters weighing 9,000 tons, one ton being equivalent to 6,060 meters or one meter being equivalent to about 170 grams. This estimate appears to be reasonable since, in the trade figures, exports of cotton textiles refer to weights of over 150 grams per meter. For the years 1936 and 1938 the same output figure as that for 1937 is assumed.

Prices for 1936-38 refer to the average export prices of the tariff items 52/c4 and 32/a4, respectively: *"tissus de cotton non façonnés, écrus, pésant au metre carré, plus de 150 grs."* and *"tissus de cotton non façonnés, teints en pieces, on fabriqués avec des fils teints, pésant au metre carré, plus de 150 grs."* When the 1946-48 weighted export prices and the wholesale prices are compared, it is noted that they move in the same direction, with the former a little lower than the latter.

Output figures for 1946-48 are available. To derive their value, wholesale prices for the Aleppo textiles as given in the *Syrian Statistical Abstract (1949)* are used.

Value added: is assumed to have equaled the difference between the value of the textile production and the value of cotton yarn consumed

TABLE 2. *Syria: Value Added in the Industrial Sector*
(In thousands of Syrian pounds)

		1936	1937	1938	1946	1947	1948
Cotton textiles	P	1,248	1,794	1,663	43,600	27,540	19,040
	V	515	145	660	8,281	7,286	5,269
Cotton yarn	P	255	569	510	11,662	8,992	7,888
	V	120	350	126	8,714	5,398	1,842
Shoes	P	(336)	757	520	11,238	8,823	8,469
	V	(158)	356	244	5,282	4,147	3,980
Cement	P	480	840	(840)	5,100	5,900	7,000
	V	340	590	(590)	3,570	4,130	4,900
Olive oil	P	2,552	3,055	(3,055)	18,840	37,510	30,400
	V	128	152	(152)	942	1,875	1,520
Soap	P	117	325	218	9,165	8,552	(10,431)[a]
	V	24	68	45	1,924	1,795	(2,086)
Total	P	4,988	7,340	6,806	99,605	97,317	83,228
	V	1,285	1,661	1,817	28,713	24,631	19,597

NOTE: *P* refers to value of output, and *V* refers to value added.
[a] Same output as that in 1947 was assumed.

in the process of production. It is also assumed that one ton of textile required 1.06 tons of yarn, in accordance with data available in S. Himadeh (ed.) *Economic Organization of Syria,* (Beirut, 1936). The yarn-textile ratios for mechanical and hand looms, as given in Himadeh, were 1.06 and 1.08 respectively. Since the difference was very small, no attempt was made to determine what portion of textile was produced by the two processes respectively.

Excluding 1938 (export prices of cotton yarn for that year are unreliable on account of the exceptionally small amount which was exported), the value added was roughly equal to 40 per cent of the value of output in the prewar and from 20 to 30 per cent in the postwar years. This compares with about 40 per cent for Turkey in 1954 and 27 per cent in 1950; and about 43 per cent for Syria in 1956.

b. *Cotton yarn*

No output figures for 1936-38 are available. That for 1938 is estimated as follows: in A. Gibb, *Economic Development of Syria,* (Syrian Government Press, 1950), (in Arabic), p. 221, it is mentioned that in 1938 Syro-Lebanese production amounted to about 1,800 tons. In *Farra* (p. 206) the figure for Lebanon for the same year is given as 820 tons. Thus, it is assumed that production in Syria in 1938 was roughly 1,800 minus 820 = 980 tons. This estimate compares favorably with a figure of 804 tons of cotton thread produced in 1938 as given in Syria, Directorate General of Information, *Syria,* vol. 2, *Economy and Finance.* The latter publication also gives the figure of 550 tons for cotton thread produced in 1937. Assuming that the 1938 yarn-thread ratio is applicable to 1937, yarn output in this year would have equaled $\frac{550 \times 980}{804} = 670$ tons. The 1936 output is assumed to have been the same or that for 1937; output figures for 1946-48 are taken from UN, *Summary of Recent Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1950-51* (April 1952). Prices in 1936-38 refer to average export prices as given in *Statistique du Commerce Extérieur* and represent "*fils de cotton simples*" (522 a). For 1946-48 wholesale prices, as given in the *Syrian Statistical Abstract, 1949,* for "Esseily cotton fiber No. 1/12" are used.

Value added: is assumed to have equaled the difference between the value of spun cotton and the value of the ginned cotton used in the process. *Gibb* mentions that every one ton of cotton yarn required 1.17 tons of raw cotton.

c. *Shoes*

For 1936-38, output figures, in pairs of shoes, are taken from the *Bulletin Economique Trimestriel* and those for 1946-48 from *Farra.* The output figure for 1948 is not available and that for 1947 is assumed instead. To derive the value of output, export prices expressed in weight units (tons) are used since no local prices are available. Tons are converted into pairs on the assumption that a pair of shoes weighs, on an average, half a kilogram.

Value added: is assumed to have equaled the percentage of cash receipts to the value of output given in the *Lebanese Industrial Census* for 1955, namely about 50 per cent. The reason is that by 1955 the bulk of shoe production was still performed by small establishments employing between five and 24 persons. It is true that even in small establishments, where wages are paid for hired workers, new methods of production might have been introduced. However, the ratio of raw materials to cash receipts is also given as 50 per cent. It is not unrealistic to assume that this ratio has not changed significantly.

d. *Cement*

For 1936-39 output figures are taken from *Gibb.* For 1946-48 output figures are taken from the *Syrian Statistical Abstract, 1949,* (in Arabic).

Prices for 1936-37 are taken from the *Bulletin Economique Trimestriel,* 1936 and 1937. Yearly prices represent an average of four price quotations for Beirut for each of the four *"Trimestres."* For 1946-48 prices are wholesale for Damascus taken from the *Syrian Statistical Abstract, 1949,* (in Arabic).

Value added: is assumed to have equaled about 70 per cent of the value of output. This percentage is based on the following information: By 1949 only one cement factory, established in 1933, was operating in Syria, namely, in Dummar, near Damascus. Raw materials and fuel were available from nearby sources. In the official estimates for 1956, available data indicate that the value of raw materials, plus fuel and electricity, made up about 70 per cent of the total value of the output of cement. Fuel and electricity alone made up about 23 per cent of the total. The 70 per cent ratio is adopted for 1946-48 and 1936-38 for the following reason: *Gibb* mentions (p. 288) that in the Dummar factory every one ton of cement required 225 kilograms of fuel oil. Given the price of fuel oil, it is estimated that in 1946 fuel made up about 20 per cent of the total value of cement output. If it is also assumed that the percentage of raw material to value of output did not change significantly from the prewar to the early postwar years, the above ratio for value added would not be unrealistic.

On the other hand, the IBRD notes in the *Economic Development of Syria* (Baltimore, 1955), p. 364, that every ton of cement consumed 0.15 ton of fuel oil. Given the price of fuel, it can be calculated that in 1949-56 fuel oil made up, on average, about 11 per cent of the total value of cement output. If raw materials and electricity are assumed to have equaled roughly 10 per cent of the value of output, value added would amount to about 80 per cent. For our purposes, however, the figure mentioned by *Gibb* is perhaps more realistic because since 1947 improvements have probably been introduced, which lowered the fuel intake per ton of cement.

e. *Olive oil*

No prewar figures for Syrian production separately are available. *Gibb,* however, cites output figures for 1936-38 for Syria and Lebanon jointly. To estimate Syrian production, the ratio of Syrian output to total Syro-Lebanese output in 1946-48 (67 per cent) is used. Prices for 1936-38 are taken from the *Bulletin Economique Trimestriel,* 1936-38. Production figures for 1946-48 are taken from *Le Commerce du Levant,* (Beirut, 20 October, 1951). Prices used are wholesale for Damascus as given in the *Syrian Statistical Abstracts.*

Value added: is assumed to have equaled about five per cent of the value of output which is the same ratio given by the official estimates for 1956. It is, in other words, assumed that the method of producing olive oil did not change significantly. This is justified by the fact that even at present the greater portion of olive presses are still operated on an individual or family basis.

f. *Soap*

Production figures for 1936-38 are taken from the *Bulletin Economique Trimestriel, 1936-39,* and for 1946-48 from UN *Summary of Recent Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1950-51* (April, 1952). Prices for 1936-38 are based on export prices given in the *Statistique du Commerce Extérieur,* 1936-39; and for 1946-49 they are wholesale, given in the *Syrian Statistical Abstracts, 1949.*

Value added: is assumed to have equaled about 20 per cent of the value of output. This is the percentage given for value added in the soap industry in the official estimates for 1956. The method of producing soap had not changed greatly from the late 1940s to that year.

3. *Government*

For 1936-38, salaries refer only to those paid by the central administration, inclusive of the economic and extraordinary programs. Agencies which were under the joint management of Syria and Lebanon and which were known as the "Common Interests" are excluded. Data on salaries and repairs and maintenance are taken from the Republic of Syria, Ministry of Finance, *Syrian General Budget, 1936-38* (in Arabic). To estimate the wage and profit component of investment expenditure, the method used in A. Badre and A. Nasr, *National Income of Lebanon,* Monograph No. 5 (Beirut, Economic Research Institute, 1953), pp. 8-9, is adopted. This is to allocate 50 per cent of the expenditure on road and building construction to wages and profits of contractors and to allocate 25 per cent of the expenditure on water and irrigation projects to same. It is assumed that the techniques utilized in road and irrigation construction did not change significantly from the immediate prewar to the early postwar years.

For 1946-47, data are taken from the Republic of Syria, Ministry of Finance, *Closed Accounts,* 1946-47. To estimate the wage component of public investment expenditures, the method mentioned above is used.

4. *Gross National Product*

According to official estimates, the combined income arising in agriculture, industry and government averaged in 1953-69 about 53 per cent of the total. What is perhaps more significant for the period 1956-69, for which a new income series at 1963 prices is available, is that there does not appear to have been a significant trend for the combined share of these sectors. The following regression equation was used for computing the trend: combined income of $\frac{\text{three sectors}}{\text{national income}} = C + \alpha\, T56\text{-}69$ where C is a constant and α a regression coefficient with values of 0.52 and 0.0005 respectively. While the regression equations run for $\frac{\text{agricultural income}}{\text{national income}}$ showed a declining trend, the equations run for $\frac{\text{public administration income}}{\text{national income}}$ and $\frac{\text{industrial income}}{\text{national income}}$ showed upward trends. The decline in the relative importance of agriculture was, in other words, offset by the rise in the relative importance of industry and the public sector. Accordingly, it was decided to assume that the share of the three sectors in the earliest postwar years was a little higher, i.e. in the neighborhood of 55 per cent. In an estimate of

TABLE 3. *Income Arising on Account of Government*
(In millions of Syrian pounds)

	1936	1937	1938	1946	1947
Central Government Expenditure on wages	3.8	4.7	5.4	58.8	62.5
Wages and profit Component of public investment expenditure (including that on repairs and maintenance)	0.4	0.3	0.4	8.1	12.8
Income	4.2	5.0	5.8	66.9	75.3

national income for 1950 by S. Dajani,* the agricultural and industrial sectors comprised about 54 per cent of the total; adding public administration (not available as such in the Dajani estimate) would have raised this share by not more than a few percentage points. Furthermore during the period 1953-57, a representative cycle insofar as it included only one bad crop year, namely 1955, income of the three sectors averaged, according to official estimates, about 56.5 per cent of the total. It does appear realistic to assume, therefore, that during 1946-48 the portion of income arising in agriculture, industry and government was in the neighborhood of 53 per cent. Admittedly this share might have been a few percentage points higher: if this were the case the results concerning rates of growth would not be modified to any appreciable extent.

To estimate real GNP, none of the available price indices could be used for that purpose since, with the exception of one, i.e. the retail index (for Damascus) for 22 essential commodities, none of them is carried back beyond 1946. The retail price index extends back to 1938, but it was preferred to use it instead of an index of wholesale prices, especially, as the former index does not cover the years 1936 and 1937 when the price level was rising. Thus, a weighted agricultural wholesale price index including the major agricultural commodities, and covering the years 1936-38 and 1946-48 was constructed, with 1956 as a base, and used to deflate GNP in 1946-48 (see Table 4). This index has probably not deviated markedly from reflecting the general trend in prices on account of the important influence of agricultural prices over the general price level. Lack of necessary data precluded the construction of a general weighted wholesale price index.

To ascertain that the results derived in accordance with the above method are reasonable, an alternative method of approximating GNP in 1946-48 was attempted. This was to estimate value added in agriculture in those years at the 1956 market prices (available from the official estimates) and then derive real GNP on the assumption that agriculture accounted for 40-44 per cent of total GNP. The reason for this range is that during 1953-57 the share of agriculture averaged about 40 per cent of total; but according to the 1950 estimate made by S. Dajani, the share of agriculture was about 44 per cent. The results of the two alternative methods of estimating real GNP are close when the 40 per cent assumption is used in which case they vary by less than five per cent; when the 44 per cent assumption is used the difference is greater, amounting to over 10 per cent.

TABLE 4. *Weighted Agricultural Price Index*

A. With 1956 as a base

1946	1947	1948	1956
112	109	147	100

B. With 1938 as a base

1936	1937	1938	1946	1947	1948
43	91	100	654	602	738

For the period 1936-38 a higher percentage, namely 60 per cent, is assumed for the combined share of agriculture, industry and government, on the presumption that, with a relatively low rate of growth in agricultural income, from 1936-38 to 1946-48 the share of the agricultural sector was not fully compensated by any possible rise in the combined share of industry and government. A higher percentage than 60 per cent for their combined share in the prewar period (beyond perhaps a few percentage points in which case the results are not affected substantially) would imply an exceptionally high average rate of growth during the war period for the other sectors of the economy than that for agriculture, industry and government whose individual *compound* rates of *real* growth averaged roughly one per cent, five per cent, and four per cent respectively. Thus, if a 65 per cent assumption is used, this would imply a compound rate of growth for the other sectors which is more than treble that for agriculture, industry and government taken together. On this assumption the compound average rate of growth of

---

* Cited in A. Akel, "National Income in the Syrian Region," Memorandum No. 4—1959 of the Directorate of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, p. 2 (in Arabic).

GNP would be a little over three per cent compared with about 2.5 per cent when the 60 per cent assumption is used. There are no *a priori* reasons, however, to hold to the assumption that the other sectors of the economy combined did expand at a rate which was relatively as high as three times that for agriculture, industry and government, although this possibility cannot be fully discounted: in which case, as noted above, the compound rate of growth for GNP would be increased by about one-half a percentage point.

Alternatively, it is possible, (although unlikely) that the combined share of agriculture, industry and government might have been the same as in 1946-48, in which case the rate of growth from the former to the latter period would have to be lowered by over one-half of a percentage point. However, it would be unrealistic to assume any smaller share for these three sectors since this would imply that the rest of the economy hardly expanded at a time when, according to available indicators, the economy as a whole was growing.

To arrive at an estimate of the growth of real GNP from 1936-38 to 1946-48, the agricultural weighted price index referred to above, was used (Table 4).

APPENDIX II

Estimates of Fixed Capital Formation 1936-38 and 1946-47

Estimates for the above two periods comprise imports of capital goods, private building construction, and public expenditure on social overhead capital and building construction.

The value of construction is based on estimates for licensed area in Damascus. Figures were supplied by *Amanat al-'Asimah* (Damascus Municipality). Data on licensed area for the whole country (i.e. the main cities) are available only since 1948, and for Hims only since 1953. In the period 1948-57, licensed area in Damascus averaged about 47 per cent of the total. In fact, variations in this portion were relatively small from year to year. On this basis, it is assumed that licensed area in Damascus comprised in 1936-38 and 1946-47 roughly the same portion of the total licensed area in the country as in later years, i.e. about one-half. Estimates of cost per square meter were supplied by engineers of the Syrian government. To derive the value of construction in the country, as a whole, however, it is assumed that the value of construction in Damascus averaged not one-half but about one-third of the total, which is the same ratio given in Syria, Ministry of Planning, *Estimates of Income in the Building Sector in the Syrian Region, 1956,* (Special Bulletin No. 5/1958) (in Arabic).

Until March 1950 Syro-Lebanese trade statistics were published jointly. The value of imports of capital goods into Syria is assumed to have been one-half of total Syro-Lebanese imports of capital goods for the years under consideration. This assumption is based on available data on imports of capital goods into Lebanon in 1956-59 and into Syria in 1954-58. For purposes of comparison we have excluded the years 1957 and 1958 in the case of Syria, since in both years new policy measures (internal and external) were taken, which led to a marked reduction in imports of capital goods, particularly vehicles. For the other three years —1954, 1955 and 1956—import policy in Syria, as in Lebanon, was liberal. For the period 1956-59, imports of capital goods into Lebanon (adjusted by free market rates) were, on average, roughly equal in value to imports of capital goods into Syria in 1954-56.*

Of course, Syria's share in imports of capital goods for the prewar and early postwar years might have been different than that for later postwar years, although not likely to any great extent. But again, even if we reasonably assume that its share might have varied between, say, 40 and 60 per cent, the results given in the text regarding the growth of fixed capital would not be greatly affected, as shown below. It is also assumed that capital goods were financed at the official rate of exchange rather than at the free or black market rate. The reason is that while many of the import payments were financed at the prevailing free market rate, a large portion of the imports of capital goods was financed at the official rate (see below).

---

* If in the case of Syria the years 1957 and 1958 are also included, then the average of Lebanese imports would exceed that of the Syrian imports by a little over 10 per cent.

Governmental expenditures are actual expenditures taken from the general budget and include purchases of equipment, construction works (buildings and roads), irrigation works, bridges and drilling of wells, as well as expenditure on repair and maintenance.

On the basis of the above, the following results regarding the growth of fixed capital, measured in current prices, were obtained: from 1936-38 to 1946-47 fixed capital increased by roughly 9.5 times. Adjusting for price variations, it is seen that the increase from the prewar to early postwar years was roughly in the neighborhood of 60 per cent—much less than its rate of growth in the postwar years.

If the Syrian share in total Syro-Lebanese capital imports was assumed to have been 60 per cent instead of 50 per cent, then the growth in fixed capital at current prices from 1936-38 to 1946-47 would have been 9.3 times (instead of 9.5 times). If the Syrian share was assumed to have been 40 per cent, then the increase in total fixed capital from 1936-37 to 1946-47 would have been 9.6 times. If it were assumed that Syria's share in 1936-38 was 40 per cent and its share in 1946-47 was 60 per cent, then the increase in total fixed capital from 1936-38 to 1946-47 would have amounted to about 10.7 times. On the other hand, if it were assumed that its share in the prewar years was 60 per cent and in the immediate postwar years 40 per cent, then the increase in total fixed capital from 1936-38 to 1946-47 would have amounted to about 8.4 times.

Another modification which may be introduced relates to the use of free exchange rates in 1946-47 instead of the official rates. In that case, and assuming a 50 per cent share for Syria, the increase in total fixed capital from 1936-38 to 1946-47, measured in current prices, would have been about 10.4 times. If it were assumed that Syria's share was 60 per cent and free rates in 1946-47 were used, then the growth in total fixed capital from 1936-38 to 1946-47 would have amounted to about 10.4 times. If it were assumed that Syria's share was 40 per cent and free rates were used, then the growth in total fixed capital from 1936-38 to 1946-47 would have been about 10.5 times. Finally, if it were assumed that free rates were used in 1946-47 and that Syria's share in those years was 60 per cent while its share in 1936-38 was 40 per cent, then the increase in total fixed capital from 1936-38 to 1946-47 would have amounted to about 12 times. On the other hand, if it were assumed that Syria's share in 1946-47 was 40 per cent and its share in 1936-38 was 60 per cent, the increase in total investment from 1936-38 to 1946-47 would have amounted to about 9.2 times. To summarize, the increase in fixed capital from 1936-38 to 1946-47, measured at current prices, may be assumed to have varied from 9-12 times, but much less in real terms, probably not exceeding 60 per cent.

Taking account of the various modifications in the assumptions mentioned above, the increase in fixed capital from 1946-47 to the midfifties, measured at current prices, may be said to have varied from 3.0 to 3.5 times. In real terms, the rate of growth would be greater.

The method of estimation outlined above is basically similar to the one used by the Syrian government in *Fixed Capital Formation in the Syrian Region in the Period 1954-58,* Bulletin No. 5 (mimeographed), January 1960 (in Arabic). While certain differences exist, they do not invalidate the usefulness of the comparisons which have been made. The main differences lie in the scope of coverage. The official estimates pertain, in addition to those included in our estimates, to locally produced capital goods and private investments in land reclamation and water projects. Both categories, however, were relatively unimportant during the late prewar and early postwar years. The former category is still relatively unimportant. The latter has become important only since the early 1950s, when cotton cultivation started to expand and the move to reclaim and irrigate land was accelerated. Regarding public expenditure on investments, our estimates for 1946-47 are based only on ordinary budget figures, while the official estimates include, in addition, the extraordinary, related and autonomous budgets. However, for 1946-47 the ordinary budget covered the bulk of capital expenditures. Expenditure on developments outside the ordinary budget became important only in later years.

THE ANATOMY OF VIOLENCE: THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS ON PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE

Emile A. Nakhleh

IN THE PROLIFERATION OF LITERATURE on the Palestinian Resistance Movement[1] and its impact on the Middle East, little if anything has been written on the conceptual framework of Palestinian violence as it relates to traditional concepts of political theory. We refer to justice, legalism, individual obligation and responsibility, building of a political community and, ultimately, to the search for excellence through individual free creativity. Questions naturally arise. Can the use of violence, i.e. armed struggle, be a justifiable method of realizing a Palestinian communal and institutional legitimate existence, legally, morally and ethically? Can the employment of force be ethically valid and morally acceptable if it is to thwart the continuation of misery and destruction? Should authority be upheld at any price? In other words, when does a people, or a *de facto* élite representative of such a people, have the right to revolt, as violently as conditions warrant, to effectuate the termination of a repressive *status quo,* created and perpetuated by force? If such a people can legitimatize its right to use violence, when does such use cease to be legitimate? When does the means (the use of violence) cease to justify the ends (the creation of a new social structure)? What restrictive conditions must be consciously observed and systematically accepted by the users of legitimate violence once the legitimacy of such violence has been established?

It is conceivable, and often expected, that a violent process of transformation neither requires a blueprint nor operates according to one. Yet, in order not to fall into the trap of circular repression,[2] which initially was to be broken by the employment of violence, a more or less conceptual parameter must be utilized to guarantee a minimum level of objective vision during the violent process. This framework gives the violent process a sense of purposefulness

---

[1] The terms Palestine resistance movement, Palestine liberation movement and Palestine Revolution are used interchangeably throughout this essay.

[2] A phrase used in this context to describe a direct proportional relationship between the authorities' perceived need to maintain a minimum necessary level of legitimacy and the measures—often repressive force—required to guarantee the previously perceived level of legitimacy. Hence the more urgent the need of legitimacy, the more repressive force is employed.

△ EMILE A. NAKHLEH is assistant professor of political science at Mount Saint Mary's College, Emmitsburg, Maryland.

which acts as a built-in inhibitor of doctrinaire restrictiveness and *a priori* dogmatic determinism. The Palestinian Resistance Movement, represented primarily by *Fatḥ* and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, is at the present time attempting to formulate adequate answers for some of the theoretical questions raised above, as witness the ideological tension between *Fatḥ* and the Popular Front. These answers may[3] form a successful synthesis which would ultimately justify the use of violence without which such a synthesis would not have developed.

To comprehend the violent struggle of the Palestinian people, it is imperative to treat at least four areas simultaneously: the rôle of theory; the adequacy of violence in political theory; the nature of Palestinian resistance; and the environmental context (Zionist existence) of Palestinian violence. Once these areas are examined, it is perhaps possible to develop a nonviolent human synthesis firmly based on classical ethical values. It is a paradox indeed.

Why Theory?

Although on the surface the quest for theory is admittedly removed from the type of pragmatic violence embodied in the Palestine Liberation Movement and although inherent in theorizing is a susceptibility to producing "a kind of intellectual grab bag,"[4] there is the possibility of providing a series of organizing concepts through a theoretical analysis of the functional hypothesis of the Movement. Such a framework renders the revolution accessible to the clinical dissection necessary for detached prediction. Furthermore, theory creates a broad spectrum of options by which a microscopic examination of the revolution becomes possible. No substantive contradiction exists between this theoretical approach and the action-oriented Palestine revolution, for neither can be value-free. The reality which has dictated the *raison d'être* of the revolution and the inseparability of the revolution's political and military arms are themselves nontheoretical, or at best atheoretical. However, the goal of the revolution—the establishment of a secular, democratic, multi-religious society in Palestine—is by definition morally charged. This form of society must be predicated upon what is good for the Palestinian man, not as a Palestinian *per se* but as a man.

The cohesion of the new society must also be predicated upon a common good which would serve the interests of all the members of that society. In this respect, the Palestine revolution provides, at least in the pronouncements of its leaders, a bridge linking ivory tower intellectualism with revolutionary action. A cautious reference may be made to Hans J. Morgenthau's observation that what gives political theory its vitality and stimulation is "its creative contact with political reality."[5] In the Palestine revolution we witness a clear rejection of Abbie Hoffman's *Revolution for the Hell of It*[6] and the fuzzy utopianism of Jerry Rubin's *Do It!*[7] This revolution presents a rather convincing combination of action and theory; hence the need for attention to theory arises.

---

[3] The added emphasis on probability and not certitude in this case indicates that the validity of whatever answers provided can be upheld only in the context of a successful revolution. Admittedly, a theoretical proposition may be vaild in and of itself, regardless of its being applicable at a particular time and to a particular circumstance. However, it is the author's position that to effectuate a true societal transformation in Palestine, a valid theory prerequires a successful action, especially in that the intended transformation could no longer be effected by persuasion—at least not the persuasion of the occupants of the matrix of the pyramid of power.

[4] Kenneth W. Thompson in Abdul A. Said (ed.), *Theory of International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1968), p. 36.

In his monumental work *Peace and War,* Professor Raymond Aron reminds us that "troubled times encourage meditation."[8] It is Aron's assumption that great works in history, such as Plato's *Republic,* Aristotle's *Politics* and Hobbes' *Leviathan,* have all coincided with major crises which indirectly contributed to the production of fertile political enquiry. Similarly, the crisis of the "Age of Revolution" witnessed the emergence of democratic theory in Montesquieu and Rousseau. *The Communist Manifesto* and *The Federalist Papers* may also, according to Aron's theory, be perceived in a crisis/response context.[9]

Theory in this context serves a multi-faceted purpose: "It makes possible the ordering of data";[10] and through a necessary and logical sorting of problems, theory can be "a useful instrument for understanding . . . [and] for the comprehension not only of uniformities and regularities, but contingencies and irrationalities as well."[11]

Violence and Theory: An Overview

Although violence is a relatively new phenomenon in political theory, at least to the extent of being examined as a separate field of inquiry, it has played an enormous rôle in human affairs. Whether as an extension of politics (Clausewitz) or as an "accelerator of economic development"[12] (Engels), violence has, especially in the last two decades, been used and legitimized by many groups and movements throughout the world as the only effective means to effectuate social, political and economic changes.

---

[5] Hans J. Morgenthau in Said (ed.), *op. cit.,* p. 176.

[6] In a completely different revolutionary context, Hoffman believes that "action is the only reality; not only reality but morality as well. One learns reality is a subjective experience." Abbie Hoffman, *Revolution for the Hell of It* (New York: The Dial Press, 1968), p. 9.

[7] Jerry Rubin, *Do It!* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970). Jerry Rubin's apocalyptic dream is that some day "there will be no more jails, courts or police. . . . The world will become one big commune with free food and housing, everything shared." (p. 256).

[8] Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations* (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 1.

[9] *Ibid.*

[10] Kenneth W. Thompson, "Toward a Theory of International Politics," *American Political Science Review,* XLIX, 3 (September 1955), pp. 735-36.

[11] *Ibid.,* p. 736.

[12] Hannah Arendt, "On Violence," *Journal of International Affairs,* XXIII, No. 1 (1969), pp. 2-3.

Inasmuch as violence and the violent process of change have characterized recent political development, and since violence is *the* principal course of action adopted by the Palestine resistance movement, it is proper at this juncture to examine some contemporary writings on violence and revolutionary change. The purpose of this overview is not to search for justifications of violence but to examine the nature, use and goals of the violent process as a political phenomenon. Hannah Arendt maintains that one of the reasons why a full-fledged theory of violence has not developed is because violence has mostly been examined from a very narrow perspective—that of justification.[13] Another plausible reason for the absence of a united theory of violence is that during the violent process the users of violence are wholly and directly involved in the process, so much so that they have no time to reflect on the violent method.[14]

Despite the proliferation of theoretical hypotheses, one question must always be raised: why is violence used? Barrington Moore, Jr., asked "Is violence a necessary feature of humanity's hesitating steps toward freedom?"[15] Many answers have been given; their contradictions are as numerous as the ideological persuasions underlying them. The Marxists maintain that violence "must be used on behalf of freedom,"[16] especially when the contradictions within a particular society have not produced a speedy process of disintegration. Revolutionary violence is used, the Marxists further reason, "when the prevailing social order is unnecessarily repressive."[17] When the breakdown of a certain society appears imminent due to the heavy burden of that society's own contradictions, violence, asserts Marx, becomes the "mid-wife of every old society pregnant with the new one."[18]

More recent political thinkers have linked violence with power, war and revolution; in so doing theories of power and revolutions have ascended to prominence, while violence as a subject of research has been relegated to a position of obscurity.[19] C. Wright Mills has stated that "all politics is a struggle for power; the ultimate kind of power is violence."[20] A few years earlier, Hans J. Morgenthau wrote in his classic text, *Politics Among Nations:* "International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim."[21] The *instrumentality* of violence stated in Mills and implied in Morgenthau has also been examined more explicitly by Hannah Arendt, who wrote: "like all means, [violence] always stands in need of guidance and justification, through the end it pursues."[22]

---

[13] "A theory of war or a theory of revolution, therefore, can only deal with the justification of violence because this justification constitutes its political limitation; if, instead, it arrives at a glorification or justificaton of violence as such, it is no longer political but antipolitical." Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (New York: The Viking Press, 1965), p. 10.

[14] Saul Alinsky: "When you're in the field of action you have to do your thinking on the run. You don't have time to figure out whether what you're doing really makes sense." Marion K. Sanders (ed.), *The Professional Radical: Conversations with Saul Alinsky* (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1970), p. 34.

[15] Barrington Moore, Jr., *Political Power and Social Theory* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965), p. 204.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 205.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 206.

[18] Quoted in Tariq Ali (ed.), *The New Revolutionaries: A Handbook of the International Radical Left* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1969), p. 302.

[19] Most political theorists, maintains Hannah Arendt, have agreed that violence "is nothing more than the most flagrant manifestation of power." *Journal of International Affairs, op. cit.*, p. 12.

Professor Arendt not only links violence with war and the struggle for power. She sees in violence an intrinsic danger of destroying the relationship between means and ends, thereby leading to the eradication of society. "The practice of violence, like all action, changes the world, but the most probable change is a more violent world."[23] Arendt does not accept the "creativity" which Frantz Fanon, Jean-Paul Sartre, Arthur I. Waskow and other leftist writers have ascribed to violence. The liberating logic which these writers have used for their theoretical constructs is a derivative of an essentially nonlogical dipolar relationship: the exploiters and the exploited.[24] However, the Platonic, Aristotelian and Hegelian logic to which Professor Arendt subscribes, as well as modern Western egalitarian-libertarian tradition, have led her to conclude that violence is futile.[25]

Yet Professor Arendt seems to vacillate between this position—rejecting violence as a matter of principle—and her tacit admiration of the members of the French Resistance during their violent struggle against Nazi tyranny. If one were to rigorously apply Arendt's inverse relationship between violence and power and the futility of violence to the French Resistance, one would expect her to conclude that more Nazi force should have been employed, whereby the legitimacy of Nazi power could be effectively demonstrated to the French Resistance, which would thereby demonstrate the Resistance's ineffectiveness. But of course Professor Arendt's conclusion was very different.[26]

---

[20] C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 171.

[21] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 4th edition (New York: Knopf, 1967), p. 25.

[22] *Journal of International Affairs, op. cit.,* p. 18.

[23] *Ibid.,* p. 33.

[24] Frantz Fanon wrote, among others, the following books: *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1963) for which Jean-Paul Sartre wrote the Preface; *Black Skins, White Masks* (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1967); and *Toward the African Revolution* (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1969). Arthur I. Waskow wrote, among others, *From Race Riot to Sit-In* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., Anchor, 1967).

[25] "It would be difficult to deny that one of the reasons why wars have turned so easily into revolutions and why revolutions have shown this ominous inclination to unleash wars is that violence is a kind of common denominator for both." Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution*, p. 9.

[26] Members of the Resistance, writes Professor Arendt, "had been visited for the first time in their lives by an apparition of freedom, not, to be sure, because they acted against tyranny and things worse than tyranny . . . but because they had become 'challengers' . . . (and) had begun to create that public space between themselves where freedom could appear." *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought* (New York: The Viking Press, 1968), p. 4.

Even if, according to the Marxist argument, the use of violence is sometimes necessary to fight a repressive social order, there are those who argue against the legitimacy or justification of violence on the grounds that it exacts a heavy price. They fail to realize, however, that "the mere continuation of the existing social order exacts its tragic price too."[27] Barrington Moore, Jr., suggests that "the calculus of suffering likely to result from revolutionary violence must include that which will come from prolonging the present state of affairs"[28]—a condition which may arise if a revolutionary opportunity is not seized.[29]

Moore maintains that although violence cannot be rejected "merely as a matter of principle,"[30] violence as a means of change should be discarded if certain conditions conducive to rational discussion prevail. Though historically rare, these conditions may be viewed on two levels: psychologically, "they require a certain maturity and balance in the human personality";[31] and sociologically and historically, "they may boil down to a rate of 'progress' slow enough not to frighten unduly the defenders of the status quo and rapid enough to satisfy at least moderately those who suffer under the prevailing system."[32] The rate of progress is a sort of utopian golden mean, more in tune with the classical libertarian harmonic image of human affairs, an image which shattered with the collapse of classical liberalism itself early in this century. The conflictive image, instead, which has characterized social relationships in both Western and non-Western societies, since the collapse of liberalism, and the indiscriminate use of violence have rendered the existence of those conditions "conducive to rational discussion" rare indeed.

Revolutionaries such as Fanon maintain that these conditions have never existed and therefore violence is the only means of action available for the powerless, the oppressed, the exploited to liberate themselves and effectuate a truly creative change in society based on the dignity of man and the value of the human person, regardless of race or color. In his preface to Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth,* Jean-Paul Sartre offers a forceful insight into the creativity of violence which undergirds Fanon's analysis of the African anticolonial revolution. Three points must be emphasized here. First, Fanon's violence is a response to an already existing violence which European settlers used against the natives. The colonized are therefore, he argues, justified in using violence to bring about the termination of more destructive violence. The violence used by the colons sought to dehumanize the natives, and it is through violence, "this mad fury,"[33] that the natives can "become men."[34] Furthermore, Sartre asserts, "this irrepressible violence . . . is man recreating himself."[35] During this creative labor, a new process of healing commences, "for violence, like Achilles' lance, can heal the wounds it has inflicted."[36]

---

[27] Barrington Moore, Jr., *op. cit.,* p. 206.
[28] *Ibid., loc. cit.*
[29] *Ibid.,* p. 207.
[30] *Ibid., loc. cit.*
[31] *Ibid.,* p. 209.
[32] *Ibid., loc. cit.*
[33] *The Wretched of the Earth,* p. 15.
[34] *Ibid.,* p. 17.

The second point that must be emphasized is that Fanon perceived his violence in terms of a creative process, which cannot proceed through labor nonviolently. "Decolonization is always a violent process"[37] on two levels: the destruction of colonization, a phenomenon born and sustained in violence; and the creation of a new decolonized society in which man is his own master. Therefore violence in this context is the "intuition of the colonized masses that their liberation must, and can only, be achieved by force."[38]

The third point that must be borne in mind is that Fanon's violence is value-oriented, for it focuses on the recreation of man. It is not an end in itself, and therefore it is not and cannot be glorified for its own sake. Violence is the means by which the native, made inferior violently and forcibly by the colon, washes away this inhuman stain and re-establishes a correct relationship based on man's humanness. *"It is the racist who creates his inferior"* declared Fanon in *Black Skin, White Masks,*[39] and it is this racism which the native must eradicate by violence.

In the Palestinian context, not unlike that of both the American and African contexts, violence has been viewed by the guerrillas as being the only effective means for liberation. It is on this violence that the next section will focus.

Palestinian Resistance: Analytical Approaches

As a revolutionary struggle, a national liberation movement and a guerrilla movement, the Palestine resistance movement is a violent process. Armed struggle is the guiding principle of the current Palestinian war of liberation. "Reliance on armed struggle is a fundamental strategic principle which ought to exclude all political compromise."[40]

The Palestine resistance movement provides a textbook case for the study of violence as a phenomenon in the political realm. Despite its complexity, this movement may be used to test the validity of the major hypotheses posed by different theorists in the first part of this study. Palestinian violence may be analyzed according to Hannah Arendt's theoretical construct on violence, i.e. that violence erupts whenever legitimate power weakens and that, whatever change revolutionaries hope to attain through the use of violence, there can only be a negative change. Professor Arendt's thesis may be applicable to the Palestine resistance movement in another aspect: the destructive spontaneity inherent in violence leaves no room for any long-range programming, which is a prerequisite for stable change. To illustrate, Professor Arendt argues that the lack of viable long-range program in the New Left movement of the 1960s is that body's most crucial weakness, and it is this defect that renders them ineffective as a credible political movement. The conclusions of Professor Arendt concerning the New Left are not necessarily completely applicable to the Palestinian revolutionary struggle. However, it can be safely assumed that Palestinian violence has been demonstrated most clearly in areas where legitimate authority had deteriorated (Jordan and Lebanon). This violence/authority inverse relationship is by no means mutually exclusive. The Arendt hypothesis should not be carried beyond this point because for the violence/authority approach to be valid, both violence and authority must be in the same society. In the case of Palestine resistance, the effectiveness of violence as a tool for political change requires that legitimate authority deteriorate in two environments: the preparatory environment (Jordan, Lebanon and Syria); and the execution environment (Palestine/Israel).[41]

---

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 21. "The native . . . through force of arms . . . discovers his lost innocence and he comes to know himself in that he himself creates his self." (p. 21).

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 30.

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 35.

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 73.

[39] P. 93. Italics are in the original.

[40] Hisham Sharabi, *Palestine and Israel: The Lethal Dilemma* (New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 198. Professor Sharabi put it very succinctly: "In proclaiming armed struggle as the only way to a 'just peace', Palestinian resistance envisaged a strategy of attrition based on protracted warfare. It based itself on the premise which held that since force is the basis of Zionist strategy, then the inescapable pre-condition of any settlement should be the invalidation of force as the instrument of achieving a Zionist peace. This could never be accomplished by persuasion, only by force." p. 206.

In addition to the Hannah Arendt approach, Palestinian violence may be examined in the context of the colon/colonized dipolarity presented by Frantz Fanon. Leaders of the Palestine resistance movement, especially those of *Fatḥ,* have frequently alluded to the Fanon hypothesis as being analogous to their struggle against Zionist colonialism in Palestine. The resistance leaders maintain that their use of violence (armed struggle) is legitimate, especially in their attempt to free Palestine from foreign control and the Palestinian man from what the resistance leaders call the racialist exclusionism of the Zionist political structure in Palestine.

The *theoretical* credibility of this position has been consciously developed since 1967 along the lines of the Fanon construct and is directly related to the actual process of liberation, as demonstrated below in the statements of the movement's leaders. *Fatḥ's* strategists are conscious of the inevitability of violence in the Fanon context; hence their uncompromising stand on armed struggle. It is interesting to note that the universal human creativity of Fanon's liberating violence has become the dominant theme in the rhetoric of the Palestine revolution. The new secular, democratic Palestinian society advocated by *Fatḥ* is, according to its theoreticians, the culmination of this creativity, to be effectuated upon the liberation of the true Palestinian reality. However, it must be pointed out that the "secular, democratic" society which *Fatḥ* hopes to achieve in Palestine following the destruction of the present structure of Israel is, at the very best, a vague slogan which must be clearly developed. Will such a society be an Arab structure based on Arab nationalism and ruled by an Arab majority, or will it be a truly humanist society open to Arabs, Israelis, Muslims, Christians and Jews alike? Unfortunately, the Palestine resistance movement has failed as yet to offer any convincing, detailed description of such a future society. What has developed over the last three years is a faint attempt on the part of the resistance movement to ascribe to their future society a kind of universal humanism which still has to acquire a convincing form. If the resistance movement is truly seeking such a humanist end, it must unequivocally state that the new society, upon liberation, will definitely reject ideological nationalistic tendencies which would give preference to some peoples over others, that is, to Arabs over Jews. Once such a statement is made, then, as evidence of this humanism, the movement must earnestly search for meaningful dialogue with Jewish progressive socialist elements within Israel and outside it—not only those elements who uphold the doctrine of violence but also those who sincerely believe in the possibility of a nonviolent solution.

---

[41] Syria's explicit support of the Palestine revolution is not necessarily synonymous with freedom of action for Palestinian revolutionaries. Indeed, the revolutionaries pose as grave a threat to established Arab régimes as to Israel; the freedom of action sought by the Palestinians ultimately involves a sharing of sovereignty in the concerned countries, a state of affairs that can lead to violence, as has recently been seen in Jordan.

The third theoretical approach possibly applicable to the Palestine revolution is the Marxian hypothesis: the use of violence is justified when the social order in a particular society has become unnecessarily repressive. This position is best apparent in the stand of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the second most important resistance organization in Palestine. In essence, the PFLP's position is that an "unnecessarily repressive social order" exists both in Arab societies and in Israel, a phenomenon which can only be eradicated by violence. Therefore, the revolutionary struggle, according to PFLP, has two distinct yet inseparable functions: to liberate Palestine and the Palestinian man from Zionist oppression and to liberate Arab society from counterrevolutionary and reactionary forces.

This position is in contrast with *Fatḥ* which views the Palestine struggle from a microscopic perspective, namely that the struggle for Palestine "is a Palestinian undertaking"[42] thereby "reaffirming the very existence of Palestinian national identity."[43] On the other hand, viewing the struggle from a macroscopic perspective, the PFLP has "considered the fate of the Palestinian struggle as ultimately bound up with the success of the revolutionary movement across the Arab world."[44] It must be remembered that in reality the differences between PFLP and *Fatḥ* have been more or less subtle and not as explicit as a casual reading of their literature might indicate. As an example, the original Palestinianism in *Fatḥ's* conception of liberation has developed in recent months in the context of a wider struggle against world imperialism. The official façade of neutrality which *Fatḥ* has taken *vis à vis* domestic political affairs of the Arab countries shows some signs of cracking. Unfortunately, *Fatḥ* has come to realize, particularly as a result of the military clashes with Jordanian and Lebanese authorities since November 1968, that neutrality *vis à vis* Arab domestic politics is rather naïve. Consequently, this position of neutrality has undergone noticeable conditioning—neutrality will now be observed only so long as Arab governments neither interfere in the internal affairs of *Fatḥ* and the Palestine liberation movement, nor attempt to impose any solution which is not acceptable to the resistance movement.

---

[42] Sharabi, *op. cit.,* p. 198.
[43] *New York Times,* December 3, 1968, p. 6.
[44] Sharabi, *op. cit.,* p. 196.

In the case of the PFLP, stronger emphasis has now been put on the struggle against Israel and Zionism than against Arab reactionary forces within the Arab countries. Moreover, PFLP leaders have shown more willingness to live with a particular class structure in the Arab milieu than their rhetoric indicates. The explanation usually given by PFLP spokesmen for these accommodations to the Arab *status quo* seems to reflect a realistic assessment of their limited military capabilities, at least for the present time.

Both *Fatḥ* and PFLP have also theoretically accepted Fanon's logic of violence, namely that the Palestinian man, like his African counterpart, has revolted in order to eradicate a form of oppressed nativehood which has been violently imposed upon him by European Zionism in Palestine, much like the other forms of European colonialism which have been imposed upon African natives. The concept of "the native" has been used by European colonists synonymously with calculated mistreatment of the indigenous inhabitants. The Palestinian man, like the African man, argue resistance leaders, has for long been treated like a *native,* felt like a *native,* and suffered like a *native*—a condition that, maintains the resistance movement, can be rightly described as unnecessarily repressive.

In addition to the three approaches described above (Arendt, Fanon, and Marx), Palestinian violence may be studied according to the model which Arthur I. Waskow has developed for the study of the civil rights movement in the United States.[45] In essence, the Waskow thesis is twofold: that the collapse of the "politics of order" in society signals the advent of the politics of disorder; and that the ensuing politics of disorder is often creative.[46] The politics of disorder can be either violent or nonviolent, a type of developmental progression which begins with nonviolence and ends with a new synthesis created by the interaction between violent disorder, which occurs somewhere along the middle of the progression, and the society of which this progression is a part.

---

[45] Arthur I. Waskow, *From Race Riot to Sit-In, op. cit.*

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 226.

The extent of the politics of disorder is a direct function of the stress applied to the politics of disorder *in practice* from within the progression (the segment of the society immediately affected by disorder) and from without the progression (the society at large). Although Waskow's tool of analysis was inspired by the civil rights movement in the 1960s, it can possibly be applied to other national and international violent developments.

Using the Waskow model in the Palestinian case, it is easy to discern a pattern of "politics of order" which has existed in Palestine since 1922 when the League of Nations instituted a mandate system in Palestine.[47] This politics in the last half century failed, so reason the guerrillas, to bring about true order in Palestine, because it was conceived against the wishes of the majority of Palestinians, imposed by force (witness the harshness and ruthlessness with which British mandatory authorities treated the leaders and activists of the Palestinian uprising of 1936-39), and perpetuated, at least on the international level, by diplomatic maneuvers which ran counter to the self-determination provision clearly enunciated in the League's Covenant. The Palestinian Arabs who considered themselves the legitimate owners of the lands were merely referred to as the "other non-Jewish communities in Palestine." In the 1930s and 1940s the Palestinian Arabs, who remained the real protagonists in the conflict, were for all practical purposes maneuvered out of the picture. This was made possible through a concerted effort to Arabize the Palestinian conflict and also as a result of the failure of Palestinian Arabs, primarily because of interfamily feuds (Ḥusaynīs *vs.* Nashashībīs), to develop a viable leadership. In the 1950s and 1960s the Palestinian Arabs ceased to exist in the eyes of the international community as a significant political entity; instead they became known as the Palestine refugees. Not until the mid-1960s, and in particular since the June 1967 war, did the Palestinians reappear in the form of a guerrilla movement seeking the redress of grievances and the eradication of what they perceived to be a Western-conceived *status quo,* the symbol of the so-called politics of order prevalent during the previous decades. The inability of the Palestine Arabs between the early 1920s and the mid-1960s to influence the course of events in Palestine in their favor (particularly as pertains to Jewish immigration) and in international conferences (particularly as pertains to the creation of a quasi-legal Jewish sovereignty in Palestine) has been put forth by the guerrillas as a justification of the use of violence. As a verification of this argument they point to the 1939 British White Paper which, they maintain, would not have been issued had it not been for the violence which prevailed in Palestine during 1936-1939.

---

[47] It is also possible to date the beginning of twentieth century politics of Western perceived order in Palestine from 1917 when Foreign Secretary Balfour, in the so-called Balfour Declaration, wrote in a letter to Baron Rothschild informing him that the British government favored "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people. . . ." However, unlike the mandate system, the Balfour letter was not an international treaty, although it was used as such. For an excellent survey of the historical development of the Palestine question see Don Peretz *et al., A Palestine Entity?* (Washington, D. C.: The Middle East Institute, 1970), pp. 1-55.

Like the civil rights movement in Alabama in the early 1960s, the Palestine resistance movement was a protest, though more violent than the events in Alabama, against an unjust legal system and an oppressive social order. The main difference in these two cases is that in Alabama the injustice was embodied in state laws (*de jure* segregation), while the federal laws, the Constitution in particular, were less discriminatory than the state law. The *de facto* segregation outside the South is yet to be resolved.[48] In the case of Palestine, the discrimination against the indigenous Arabs by domestic laws (British civil and defense laws prior to 1948 and Israeli civil and defense laws since 1948) ran parallel, as the Palestinians reason, to another injustice in the international legal order. They felt that, by being denied the right of self-determination, the concerned powers both in the League of Nations and the United Nations have violated a principle which is central to both the Covenant and the Charter. Consequently, the Palestine guerrillas have viewed the resort to violence as the only course of action available for the restoration of this right.[49]

The collapse of the politics of order in Palestine was coupled with the initiation of a new politics of violent disorder—the Palestine liberation movement. In this action-oriented dialectic, the revolutionary struggle presents itself as a logical and credible alternative to the superficially imposed politics of order. Theoretically, the change sought by the politics of violent disorder may be intellectually comprehended prior to its realization, i.e. before the liberation has been achieved, by the constant reexamination of the purpose of the violent process and its goals. One weakness of this linkage between theory and action in the Palestinian case lies in the resistance movement's failure to elaborate the goals it seeks—another compelling reason why the "democratic, secular" state must be clearly defined.[50]

Palestinian Resistance: Development and Doctrine

The Palestine revolution discussed here is primarily composed of the Palestine

---

[48] The first major civil rights legislation on the national level was the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Voting Rights Act passed Congress in 1965. Open Housing was enacted in 1968. Immediate school desegregation, though decided on in 1954, was not ordered by the Supreme Court until 1969. The "with all deliberate speed" clause has yet to be implemented fully.

[49] One often hears the argument that the Palestinian Arabs received unfavorable terms in most international conferences because they refused to cooperate with most of the international commissions of inquiry which visited Palestine. Even if this hypothesis were true, the lack of cooperation on the part of the Palestinians by no means justifies the injustice committed against them—another justification for the use of violence.

[50] "In the politics of violence," wrote Waskow, "people divide their attention between changes to be accomplished and those powerful people who get in the way of change—the enemy. In the politics of disorder, people . . . focus very strongly on the changes to be accomplished." Waskow, *op. cit.*, p. 278. In this respect, the Palestine resistance movement has combined both the politics of violence and the politics of disorder, resulting in a politics of violent disorder.

Movement of National Liberation *(Fatḥ)*, the major component of both the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and tthe Palestine Armed Struggle Command (PASC), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), not a member of PASC. Other smaller groups, which exist either within the structure of the PLO and PASC or separately, are generally too weak to constitute an effectively independent entity capable of significantly altering the course of the revolution as conceived by *Fatḥ* and the PFLP.[51] Assuming that the two major movements differ in approach and ideology and that they will have a different impact on the revolution as a whole, they are treated here from the point of view of the goals at which they aim, not from the means they employ.

Historically, *Fatḥ* came into existence as a secret movement for the liberation of Palestine in the fall of 1956 in Gaza, and following its first military operation on December 30, 1964, *Fatḥ* issued its first communiqué on January 1, 1965. From 1958 to 1966 *Fatḥ* worked against almost insurmountable odds: popular cynicism; inter-Arab governmental conflict; limited resources; a defeatist apathy on the part of the Palestinians, and a concerted campaign of innuendo and criticism in the Arab press to discredit *Fatḥ* as a group of foreign-supported adventurers.[52]

Fatḥ's early development encompasses four significant dates, the first of which is November 3, 1966. On this day the Israelis attacked the village of Samu' in Jordan (West Bank), which unexpectedly and inadvertently resulted in the collapse of the "wall of silence" with which Jordan had surrounded this liberation movement.[53] The spontaneous demonstrations which erupted following this attack not only revealed the people's awareness of the existence of a Palestinian commando movement, but also pressured the Jordanian government to arm the commandos.

The second significant date is June 10, 1967, which revealed the collapse of the conventional Arab armies in the face of the Israeli assault during the so-called Six Day War. Despite the "state of bewilderment among the Arab masses,"[54] the Arabs, particularly the Palestinians, rejected unequivocally the idea of surrender, and on June 11, *Fatḥ's* men "carried their arms into the occupied territory."[55] The third important date on *Fatḥ's* calendar is August 29,

---

[51] For a detailed composition of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the PLO Executive Committee, and the Palestine Armed Struggle Command (PASC), see Hisham Sharabi, *Palestine Guerrillas: Their Credibility and Effectiveness* (Supplementary papers of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, D. C., 1970), Appendix I, p. 45.

[52] *A Dialogue with Fatḥ* (between a leading spokesman for *Fatḥ* and the Editor-in-Chief of the Cairo magazine, *al-Tali'ah*, Spring 1969), pp. 31-37.

[53] *Ibid.*, p. 37.

[54] *Ibid.*, p. 38.

[55] *Ibid., loc. cit.* "The value of the 11 June initiative lay in the fact that it ignored all attitudes of despair and bewilderment and gave effect to the determination of the Arab people in general and of the Palestinian people in particular not to give up but to continue fighting the enemy without respite." p. 38.

1967. On this date *Fatḥ* coordinated its military and political lines of action and decided to begin relatively large-scale operations in the occupied territories.[56] The fourth, and most important, date according to *Fatḥ,* is March 21, 1968, the Battle of al-Karamah. On that day when a large Israeli force crossed the river and attacked the village of al-Karamah, the Palestine commandos were ordered to engage in a direct confrontation with the Israeli force—a strategy which proved successful for the guerrillas and unexpectedly costly for the Israelis. *Fatḥ's* new strategy of limited large-scale confrontation with Israeli forces, in contrast to the traditional hit-and-run rule of guerrilla tactics, which originated at al-Karamah, was later tried "successfully" at al-Hammah on May 2, 1969, when *Fatḥ's* al-Asifa forces briefly occupied the Israeli-held town. This new strategy is currently being examined by *Fatḥ* as a prelude to the next phase.[57]

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine made its appearance in November 1967 as a result of the merger of two small groups: *Abṭāl al-'Awdah* (Heroes of the Return); and the Palestinian faction of *Ḥarakat al-Qawmiyyīn al-'Arab* (Movement of Arab Nationalists). Since then three splinter groups have left the PFLP: the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (led by Na'if Hawatimah); the Za'rur Group; and the Jibrīl Group. In any case the PFLP joined *Fatḥ* on the battlefield about December/January, 1967/1968.

Although most resistance operations are conducted by *Fatḥ,* the PFLP has gained fame from its spectacular "special operations" conducted outside the immediate area of confrontation, the first of which was the hijacking of an El Al Boeing 707 on its flight from Rome to Israel in July 1968. The PFLP justifies these actions on the grounds that the enemy is not Israel alone, but "Israel, the World Zionist Movement, international imperialism, and Arab reaction."[58] The interests of Israel, as well as Arab reaction, argues the Popular Front, are organically interconnected with international imperialism.[59] Moreover, "geography must not be a significant question in the strategy of the total war of the Palestinian people in the face of the aggressive war waged against it. The question is not one of inside the occupied territories or outside them."[60] *Fatḥ* disagrees with the PFLP's conception of the enemy on pragmatic and tactical grounds; nonetheless it has implicitly accepted the PFLP position, with the reservation that it is valid *only* after the liberation of Palestine has been achieved.

---

[56] "(W)e were compelled to launch resistance on that date . . .(f)or a number of important considerations. First of all, it was not sound from the political, military, or psychological angles to immobilize the organizations and fighting forces after we had reached such a degree of training. . . . Secondly, immobilization would have exposed us to greater danger. Thirdly, the enemy had begun to be aware and to molest some of our secret bases." *Ibid.,* pp. 41-42.

[57] This new military thinking "means the occupation of an enemy-controlled position for a limited period of time during which the enemy's forces and potentialities in that position are wiped out. . . . This phase is in itself a preparation for the next phase of occupying positions, mopping them up and holding them." *Ibid.,* p. 22. This phase remains primarily on the drawing board.

[58] *al-Jabhah al-Sha'biyyah wa al-'Amāliyyat al-Kharijiyya* [The Popular Front and Foreign Operations]. Issued by *al-Hadaf* [The Target], the magazine of the Popular Front, no date, p. 7.

[59] *Ibid.,* p. 8. This position is the essence of PFLP's Marxist-Leninist ideology.

[60] *Ibid.,* p. 13.

Regardless of the differences in orientation, approach and tactics of the two major guerrilla movements, one fact remains indisputable: Palestinian resistance began against extremely hostile odds within Palestine, the Arab world and the international society—a situation that has greatly improved since the 1967 June War. "In Cuban terminology," writes Gerard Chaliand of *Le Monde Diplomatique,* "the Palestinian resistance began as a 'foco,' as a nucleus employing armed violence, without any political preparation of the population it is trying to involve. But while the strategy of the 'foco' as applied within the framework of *class struggle* has shown itself to be ineffective in Latin America, the armed nucleus of the Palestinian resistance, thanks to the military collapse of the Arab states, has been successful within the framework of a *national movement.*"[61] The structural context in which Palestinian resistance has operated since its inception, i.e. as a national movement, was primarily determined not by any organizational blueprint, but by the practical considerations of Arab society, especially in relation to the forces that would support or oppose the resistance. Naturally the potential sources of financial support could not be overlooked. It is here where *Fatḥ* and the PFLP part company. *Fatḥ* admits that Arab society is pregnant with contradictions and that the Arab man is in dire need of liberation. Yet it maintains that the liberation of Palestine and the Palestinian reality from Zionism is the primary goal, of which the resistance must not lose sight. Moreover, since the battle of liberation is understandably a long one, *Fatḥ* argues, all capabilities within Arab society must be mobilized regardless of the ideological affinities of the sources tapped. Thirdly, since the battle of liberation is the main immediate task, the question concerning the nature and form of the post-liberation society, within a Palestinian or Arab context, is at the moment academic, premature and a matter of polemic.[62] This last point, as has been illustrated above, has failed to cover up the need for a further elaboration of the nature of the post-liberation society. If the envisioned society is to be credible, it is imperative that *Fatḥ* clearly define the basic structure of such a society. Questions concerning the structure, governing, ideological orientation, and nationalistic affinities of the future society must be answered. Otherwise, the resistance movement's revolutionary rhetoric will hardly lead to any meaningful dialogue and will only elicit mistrust and suspicion.

---

[61] *The Palestinian Resistance Movement.* An extract from a report by Gerard Chaliand, published by *Le Monde Diplomatique,* March 1969, pp. 13-14. Italics in the original.

[62] Recent attempts on the part of *Fatḥ* to engage in theoretical discussion of the post-liberation society have been caused by two factors: a pressure exerted by criticisms from other resistance and non-resistance groups to the effect that *Fatḥ* is militarily oriented and lacks a political program for the society it seeks to create; secondly, a pressure from within *Fatḥ* further to elaborate on the concept of the democratic, multi-racial society which would be established in Palestine upon liberation. These attempts, however, have for the most part been fairly cursory.

The Popular Front, on the other hand, maintains that the true liberation of Palestine can only be achieved upon the fulfillment of two conditions: the masses must be politically educated; and the Arab society as a whole must be liberated. Admittedly, the PFLP is the first Marxist-Leninist movement to have won visible popular support among the Palestine refugees. However, this point should not be over-emphasized, for a convincing case can be made that such support is possibly caused by the PFLP's daring, and news-making, operations (aircraft hijacking, etc.) and not by its Marxist-Leninist ideology.[63] These actions no doubt have at least temporarily satisfied the ego of Arab youth, sadly battered since the defeat of 1967. Another possible reason for the success of the PFLP is its attacks, though very limited in number, on American interests, especially when one considers the hostile attitude of the Palestinians toward the United States because of what they believe to be its unflinching support of Israel. These actions however should impose a heavy responsibility on PFLP strategists: they must prove that PFLP is a credible resistance movement with a viable program and not a gang of ruthlessly adventurous mavericks. That is, violence for its own glorification must be denounced by the PFLP, especially since no justifiable connection can be established between a people's suffering and that people's bent on violence for violence's sake, PFLP's statements to the contrary not withstanding.

Since the scope of this essay is not primarily concerned with the structure of or ideological groups within the resistance movement, it suffices to mention here some of the important points of the doctrines of the two major movements. *Fatḥ's* doctrine contains the following points:

1. "The Palestinian revolutionary movement alone has the final responsibility for upholding Arab right . . .
2. "The basis and propellant of the Palestinian movement is armed struggle . . ."[64]
3. "Some people criticize us for not having formulated a social ideology for the revolution. The fact is that as a revolutionary movement responding to the needs of our struggling people, who seek to return [to their homeland] in dignity and freedom, we can adhere neither to classical theories nor to rigid idealistic concepts; they have no relevance to our situation . . .
4. "The bloody battle with Zionist occupation is one of survival and not over a social ideology, it is a struggle of life and death, of being or not being . . ."

---

[63] Professor Hisham Sharabi draws a clear connection between the PFLP's success among the Arab masses and its Marxist ideology. This success, asserts Sharabi, is "particularly significant in that hitherto all Arab communist parties had failed to make headway in the proletariat and peasant classes and had remained small factional groups dominated by ineffectual petit bourgeois intellectuals." *Palestine Guerrillas: Their Credibility and Effectiveness, op. cit.*, p. 28.

[64] *Fatḥ, Kayfa Tanfajir al-Thawrah al-Sha'biyyah al-Musallaha* [How Popular Revolutions Break Out], a new edition (Amman, 1967), pp. 29-32. Quoted in *Palestine Guerrillas: Their Credibility and Effectiveness, op. cit.*, p. 48.

5. "The people ought to join together in a broad revolutionary front to dismantle the political, social and economic structure of the oppressor state, and up-root Zionism from our noble soil."[65]

6. "Let our slogan always be: 'The land belongs to the revolutionaries who liberate it'."[66]

The doctrine of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine contains the following major points:

1. "To prepare the entire people for war means to create the people in arms...

2. "Our imperialist enemy is vicious and determined to bend us to his will to safeguard his vital interests. It is our duty ... to hit his interests everywhere ...

3. "We can defeat imperialism through protracted war on a broad Arab front encompassing all of the Arab world—by creating another Vietnam.

4. "Because our struggle is a just struggle we are confident that we can ... win the support of all progressive and peace-loving peoples of the world ...

5. "There is no alternative to the long road of protracted struggle and great sacrifice. It will be a struggle for survival ...

6. "What is scientifically valid is that inevitable victory belongs to the technologically superior side when engaged in a lightning war, and that inevitable victory belongs to the side with the greater human potential when engaged in a protracted war."[67]

Bearing the above goals in mind, one can properly raise the following questions: how can we guarantee that a truly humanist society will be created upon liberation? If the resistance movement aims at helping the Palestinian man develop a socio-political context in which he can not only live and let live but live truly, what assurances can the movement offer against the possibility that the new society would not fall victim to irredentism and chauvinism caused by euphoria of an *Arab* victory?—a state of affairs not dissimilar to that which befell Israel following the 1948 *Zionist* victory? Will the resistance movement guarantee Palestinian Jews who disavow the Zionist ideology that a Jewish reality can continue to freely exist in Palestine without being oppressively overshadowed by an Arab reality? Will the new society born in violence bring about a truly humanist reality which would reaffirm man's most elemental desires for justice and fairness? Or will the new society be just a state harboring all of the anachronisms and social ills of other states? To raise the above questions is not an exercise in utopia nor a futile attempt at theorizing. The answers to these questions, though understandably they may lack certitude, might perhaps provide an inkling of the future of the new society and hence contribute to the understanding of the moral/ethical fiber and direction of the violent process presently pursued. How this violence may be positively influenced by the participants in the process will be examined in the next section.

---

[65] *Fatḥ, Min Muntalaqāt al-'Amal al-Fidā'ī* [Starting Points of Commando Action], a new edition (Amman, 1967), pp. 60-63.

[66] *Ibid.*, p. 63.

[67] PFLP, *al-Muqātil al-Thawrī* [The Revolutionary Fighter] (no place, June 1969), pp. 4-8. Quoted in *Palestine Guerrillas: Their Credibility and Effectiveness, op. cit.*, pp. 52-54.

Palestinian Resistance: A Human Synthesis

In a narrow sense, the Palestine liberation movement, like other liberation movements, can be "disruptive, disorienting, and evil"[68] if what is to be liberated is a constrictive image of a limited collective reality, exclusive of and closed to other realities within the same area. This would be the case if the Palestine liberation movement were to advocate the establishment of a society of one class, one religion, one race or one color. This would be a society in which the privileged class or race (the chosen people, so to speak) would dominate and exploit the other members of the new society, or in which opportunities are allocated to individuals on the basis of class or racial affiliation rather than merit. The society will be dominated by an Arab majority, while non-Arabs will constitute a second class oppressed minority.

However, on a wider plane, liberation movements, the Palestinian struggle included, can be "constructive, integrating, and unifying"[69] if the liberating process is dedicated to the service of man within the objective realities of the struggle regardless of race, origin or religious affiliation—so long as the liberated man has voluntarily decided to join the new society. It is imperative that the Palestinian resistance movement unequivocally call for an open human reality in Palestine—a goal that must be constantly reasserted—because it is only through this humanism that a process of construction, integration and unification will be nourished. This is the essence of revolutionary logic because it is only through this process that an organic link can be established between the liberated society and all of its members. Clearly, this moral commitment places a heavy responsibility on the shoulders of the Palestinian revolutionaries. Yet, they must squarely face it lest they fall in the same trap of humanist decadence into which Zionist colonialism in Palestine has fallen. To avoid such a trap, it is proper that one examines the ideological/moral supports of Herzlian Zionism which was conceived as a solution of the "Jewish Problem" in Europe.

In a book entitled *The Jewish State* (1896), Theodor Herzl proposed a solution for the "Jewish Problem" by establishing an independent national state for the Jews. Herzl's basic thesis revolves around four assumptions.[70]

---

[68] Kenneth W. Thompson in Abdul A. Said (ed.), *Theory of International Relations, op. cit.,* p. 34.

[69] *Ibid., loc. cit.*

[70] Samuel Halperin, *The Political World of American Zionism* (Detroit, Michigan: Wayne State University Press, 1961), p. 6.

First, psychologically and culturally, the Jews constitute a nation, but they lack the attributes of political nationhood. Second, the Jews' statelessness is a form of abnormality which has resulted in anti-Semitism and Jewish suffering ("the eternal Jewish problem"). Third, unless the Jews are given the opportunity to express themselves spiritually and without fear of physical retaliation, Jewish civilization or culture is in danger of extinction. Fourth, the only way in which the Jews can be guaranteed self-expression and self-defense is in the form of an independent national state. The transformation of Herzl's dream into a practical political movement calling for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine reached fruition at the first Zionist Congress in Basle, Switzerland, in August 1897. In the so-called "Basle Platform" adopted by that Congress, Palestine was overwhelmingly proposed as *the* land in which a Zionist state would be established.

What is of significance here is not the Zionists' aspirations for a homeland but the Zionist attitude toward the fate of the indigenous inhabitants of Palestine, once Zionist colonizing had begun. The Zionist blueprint for a national state in Palestine was viewed by Herzl as an extension of three very important elements. First, Zionist settlement in Palestine was an extension of European imperialism. Herzl based his hopes of receiving European support on this logic. He made it clear that the Zionist state in Palestine would be an outpost of European imperialist policies in the East. Herzl wrote: "We should there form a portion of the rampart of Europe against Asia, an outpost to civilisation as opposed to barbarism."[71]

The second element in the Zionist plan is the negativism inherent in Herzl's position towards Judaism. He believed that anti-Semitism was "a movement useful to the Jewish character,"[72] and his conception of the good, freedom, and national creativity was viewed only in the light of the pressure put on Jews by anti-Semitism. Yet, Herzl's solution was in essence a perpetuation of the same exclusiveness that characterized anti-Semitism. He did not call for the eradication of anti-Semitism in Europe, nor did he call for the creation of a new, open European society. His solution, loyal to the European tradition, was to establish a new exclusivist state somewhere far away from Europe. European anti-Semites saw in the Jew a human obstacle; and Herzl's Zionism saw in the native Palestinian a human obstacle: and both—the anti-Semite and the Zionist—were intent on eliminating this hindrance.

The third and most important element of the Zionist blueprint was Herzl's enumeration of the "obligations" which Zionist settlers must perform with regard to the native Arabs of Palestine:

---

[71] Theodor Herzl, *The Jewish State* (London, 1946), p. 30.

[72] Theodor Herzl Foundation, *The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl,* Vol. I (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1960), p. 196.

1. "We must expropriate gently the private property on the estates assigned to us.

2. "We shall try to spirit the penniless population across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it any employment in our own country.

3. "If we move into a region where there are wild animals to which the Jews are not accustomed—big snakes, etc.—I shall use the natives, prior to giving them employment in the transit countries, for the extermination of these animals. High premiums for snake skins, etc. as well as their spawns."[73]

The above "obligations" show how Herzl proposed to deal with the human obstacle which the Zionist colonial state would encounter in Palestine. Unfortunately, the Herzlian blueprint was followed almost to the letter after Zionists had begun to colonize Palestine. So faithful were the Zionists to these precepts that Ahad Ha'am, a Russian and Hebrew philosopher, wrote around the turn of the century, chastising the Jews for their behavior against the Arabs of Palestine. He lamented the fact that the change experienced by Zionist settlers since they came to Palestine "brought about within them a tendency towards despotism as is always the case when a servant becomes a master and they treat the Arabs with hostility and cruelty, curtail their rights in an unreasonable manner . . . and nobody takes any action against this despicable and dangerous tendency."[74]

These discriminatory policies have been practiced by the Zionist settlers against the Arabs of Palestine before and since 1948, when Israel was declared a state. The natives were denied the most elemental human moral right—the right to livelihood. To solve the problem of unemployment for Jewish settlers, Jewish businesses simply refused to hire Arab workers. "In Tel Aviv, which on the eve of the founding of the state of Israel had nearly 300,000 inhabitants, there was not one—I repeat, not *one*—Arab worker, nor one Arab inhabitant."[75]

This policy of deprivation and discrimination was adopted against the Arabs of Palestine by the State of Israel in the form of oppressive security laws, land confiscation, denial of human rights, and employment discrimination. Only recently Israeli spokesmen have even denied that a Palestinian people has ever existed, an admission that, in the minds of Israeli Zionists, the Palestinian human obstacle has finally been eliminated.

Against this background the Palestine resistance movement must always view its goals. Though utopia is at best a state of mind, a less than utopian but a truly human solution must be advocated, embodying the basic principles of justice and morality which civilized people throughout the world have accepted. The Palestinian revolution has called for the establishment of a democratic, progressive, non-racial and non-sectarian Palestine in which Jews, Muslims and Christians can live without discrimination. The present citizens of Israel can, if they so wish, become citizens of the liberated Palestine—an open society in which individual rights, freedoms and liberties will be protected. "The Palestinian revolution is determined to fight for the creation of the new democratic and non-sectarian Palestine as the long-term ultimate goal of liberation. Annihilation of the Jews or of the Palestinian exiles and the creation of an exclusive racist state in Palestine be it Jewish, Christian or Moslem is totally unacceptable, unworkable and cannot last."[76]

---

[73] *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 88. Quoted in Palestine Research Center, *Zionism and Arab Resistance* (Beirut, 1969), pp. 24-25.

[74] *Free Palestine* (Washington, D. C.), Vol. 11, No. 1 (May 1970), p. 6.

[75] Tony Cliff, "The Struggle in the Middle East," in Tariq Ali, *The New Revolutionaries, op. cit.*, pp. 220-221.

The moral implications in this position are compelling; the logic intelligible. Yet, the mere statement of such a goal is, as has been stated above, insufficient unless the resistance movement can demonstrate in action the moral certitude of its call for an open society. Real fears, cynicism, and hesitancy are shared by many Jews concerning the post-liberation future. These attitudes can be thwarted only if the guerrillas display convincing willingness to enter into a dialogue with those Jewish elements who show concern for Palestine and for the Palestinian people and who will share in the future of the new society. It must be emphasized beyond any doubt that the human reality will be able to reassert itself without being negated by such abnormalities as anti-Semitism, racism, class exploitation and racial injustice. Cooperation, peace and justice—very basic human needs—must highlight the newly liberated society, and in the final analysis this is how violence can be vindicated, and this is what the Palestine liberation movement must be all about.

---

[76] *Free Palestine, op. cit.,* Vol. 11, No. 2 (June 1970), p. 6.

THE BIZERTA CRISIS: A BOURGUIBIST ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE TUNISIA'S BORDER PROBLEMS*

Werner Klaus Ruf

THE YEAR 1970 seemed to be the year for resolving latent conflicts among the states of the Maghrib. In January Tunis and Algiers signed a treaty defining their common southern border.[1] In May King Hassan II and President Boumediene met in Tlemcen and agreed on a border south of Bechar. In both cases, the borders remained almost exactly as they were left by the French; both Tunisia and Morocco surrendered their claims for the rectification of the Saharan borders. Finally, relations between Morocco and Mauretania approached normalcy after President Mokhtar Ould Daddah's visit to Casablanca in June.

It is important for the discussion to follow to recall that the border issues between Morocco and Algeria as well as the dispute between Tunisia and Algeria had led to armed clashes. Bourguiba had first attempted to rectify the Tunisian border before Algerian independence at a time when the question did not openly involve the two countries. The persistence of the issue, and Bourguiba's attempts to resolve it, however, has placed a heavy burden on Algerian-Tunisian relations since Algerian independence. The resolution of the issue and the appearance of new leadership in Tunisia, including Mohamed Masmoudi as Foreign Minister, may be signs of a new "post-Bourguiba" era and the abandonment of the "Bourguibist" technique of policymaking. The

---

* For a more detailed analysis of the events of the summer of 1961 and for a general discussion of "Bourguibism," see the author's *Der Burgibismus und die Aussenpolitik des unabhängigen Tunesien,* (Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag, Gütersloh, Germany, 1969).

Δ WERNER KLAUS RUF teaches Political Science at Freiburg University (Germany). Head of the Arnold-Bergstraesser-Institute's Near-East and North African Department, 1967-69. During 1968-69 Senior Fellow at New York University's Center for International Studies. April 1970-71 field research in North Africa on "The Impact of Ideologies on Interstate Relations in North Africa," financed by a grant of the German National Science Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft). He has published widely in the field.

The author owes thanks to Mr. Barton Stevens, Junior Fellow of New York University's Center for International Studies, who read and commented on the paper and who reviewed the final English version.

[1] See *Journal Officiel de la République Tunisienne,* 113e année, No. 6, Loi No. 70-1, du 3 Février 1970.


34°
Tozeur
Chott Djerid
Gabès
I. de Djerba
B. el Hadjila
Sabria
Naoura
B. el Hadj Brahim
Ben Gardane
33°
Ksar Rhilane
Foum Tatahouine
Guelb Mizena
B. Slougui
Bir Remtsa
ZONE FRONTALIÈRE
Remada
Bordj Le Bœuf*
32°
DE SÉCURITÉ
Nalout
31°
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 km
Rhadamès
30°
8°
9°
10°
11°

* später Bordj Bourguiba

Karte entnommen aus: Ladhari Noë: Les Conventions franco-tunisiennes du 3 juin 1955, Seite 113, Tunis, o.J.

Bizerta crisis not only demonstrates Bourguiba's dissimilation of his real objectives in the summer of 1961, but it also illustrates the inefficiency of Bourguibist politics in the multilateral relationships of the post-colonial Maghrib.

For the present purposes it is sufficient to define Bourguibism not as an ideology but as a tactical device that developed during the struggle for independence against France. The basic assumption of Bourguibism was that France—with her democratic, humanistic and politico-cultural tradition—could not long remain an imperialist, inhuman, racist oppressor in the eyes of her own people and the world. Thus, by demonstrating the "immoral" character of colonization, by force if necessary, Bourguiba tried to bring "moral" pressure to bear on French governments. For this tactic to be successful, however, three conditions had to exist: 1) The political partner (or enemy) had to be sensitive to a moral argument (as during the Fourth French Republic); 2) the issue had to be limited to the bilateral relationship between the parties if the partner (or enemy) was to be subject to pressure from its allies; 3) as the tactics often required sudden tactical changes, the leadership required a "united and disciplined people."[2]

The Juridical and Historical Background of the Crisis

The so-called independence protocol signed by Tunisia and France on March 20, 1956, conceded to Tunisia the "principles" of political autonomy. However, the juridical situation was still governed by the convention on "interior autonomy" of June 3, 1955. Virtually all conflicts between the two parties arose from their different interpretations of the two treaties. For France every concession beyond the convention of 1955 was subject to negotiation; for Tunisia any further French presence in Tunisia was a violation of the independence protocol of 1956. Needless to say, the situation was ideal for the application of Bourguibism. After the French evacuation of Tunisia in 1958, Tunisia's demands were related to the two places where French troops remained: Bizerta and some of the southern territories beyond the border whose status had been annexed to the convention of 1955. Both questions were incorporated into Neo-Destour propaganda and termed "the battle for evacuation."[3]

Bourguiba's position concerning the *southern territories* was that the border had been drawn arbitrarily by France which still considered Algeria part of its national territory. He demanded, first, a Tunisian "opening" to the Sahara (including Tunisian territorial gains) and, second, that the Sahara, beyond Tunisia's new frontier, be considered a "common hinterland" for all Saharan

---

[2] Speech of President Bourguiba, March 2, 1959. Speeches are quoted from the official edition of the Tunisian Ministry of Information.

[3] The Tunisian Ministry of Information edited a collection of Bourguiba's speeches dealing with this issue under the title *La Bataille de l'Évacuation* (Tunis, 1959).


GAFSA
TOZEUR
CEKHIRA
GABÈS
DJERBA
ZARZIS
MEDENINE
BEN GARDANE
FOUM TATAHOUINE
PIPE-LINE
BIR ROMANE
ACCORD ALGÉRO-TUNESIEN 1901
REMADA
BORDJ BOURGUIBA
FRONTIÈRE QUI SERA DÉLIMITÉE AVEC L'ALGÉRIE INDÉPENDANTE
ESPACE SAHARIEN DE LA TUNISIE OCCUPÉ INDUMENT PAR LA FRANCE
FORT SAINT
Garet el Hamel B. 233
ACCORD TUNISO-TURC 1910
ACCORD FRANCO-LIBYEN 1955/56
PIPE-LINE
ESPACE SAHARIEN LIBYEN
ESPACE SAHARIEN ALGÉRIEN
EDJELE

Karte entnommen aus: Anhang zur Rede Burgibas vom 17. Juli 1961, hrsg. v. Secrétariat d'État à l'Information du Gouvernement Tunisien.

nations.[4] As for Tunisia's border with Libya, Bourguiba's argument rested on the Tunisian-Ottoman treaty of May 12, 1910, and on the Franco-Libyan treaty of August 10, 1955, which confirmed the earlier one.[5] This Tunisian-Turkish (or Franco-Turkish) treaty defined the Tunisian-Libyan border from the Mediterranean to a point about ten miles south of Ghadames. The southernmost point was called Garat El Hamel or border mark 233. France, however, recognized Tunisian sovereignty only as far as Fort Saint, a few miles north of Ghadames, near border mark 220.

Tunisia's southwestern border had been marked up to the well Bir Romane; the border was confirmed by a treaty signed by the French authorities in Algiers and Tunis in 1901. It was understood that the definition of the border south of that point remained open. Thus, the delineation of the Tunisian-Algerian border between Bir Romane in the west and Fort Saint, or Garat El Hamel, in the east, had never been defined, and had been the subject of dispute between the French authorities in Tunis and Algiers.[6] However, neither Bir Romane nor Garat El Hamel (which Tunisia had not yet reached!) was recognized by Bourguiba as the terminus of Tunisian territory. Rather, these points were considered provisional and as indicators of the direction in which Tunisia's borders should extend southward.[7] The Tunisian argument placed France in an awkward position. If she recognized Tunisian sovereignty over Garat El Hamel, then the existing delimitation of the border between the two points had to be reconsidered because Tunisia could claim a hinterland for her new border with Libya. If France did not recognize Tunisian sovereignty south of Fort Saint, she would violate the treaty of 1910 which she had negotiated herself and to which she had referred in the August 1955 treaty with Libya.

The Tunisian demands could be summarized as follows: 1) Tunisia claimed that her sovereignty be recognized up to Garat El Hamel. 2) Neither Bir Romane nor Garat El Hamel constituted the furthest extension of Tunisian territory. Rather, Tunisian territory continued towards the south; beyond those two points, however, its delimitation was subject to negotiations with Libya and not yet independent Algeria. 3) The Sahara would be considered an "interior ocean"—its resources to be exploited jointly by the surrounding states. The formula, however, would be applied only after Tunisia's territorial claims had been met. These territorial claims included the oilfield of Edjeleh south of Garat El Hamel which was considered of "vital importance" for Tunisia and as part of its national territory.[8]

---

[4] See Bourguiba's speech of April 11, 1957; and, Bourguiba, Habib, "Das heutige Tunesien—Problem, Gedanken, Errungenschaften, Aussichten," *Internationale Politik,* Vol. VIII, No. 170, May 1, 1957.

[5] In spite of its "de facto" recognition of the autonomy of the Beylicate of Tunis in the early 18th century the Ottoman Empire had never recognized the establishment of the French Protectorate. Therefore, the Turks insisted that the treaty which delineated the borders between Tunisia and the Tripolitanian province of the Ottoman Empire be signed by a plenipotentiary of the Bey of Tunis. The French officers negotiating the border treaty of 1910 in Tripoli, therefore, took the Kadi of the town Foum Tatahouine in southern Tunisia to Tripoli so that he could sign the treaty. This is why the Tunisians call the treaty a "Tunisian-Turkish" one, while the French call it "Franco-Turkish." In the *Franco-Libyan Treaty of Amity* (published in *La Documentation Française, Notes et Etudes Documentaires,* No. 2.251, January 17, 1957) the French refer "expressis verbis" to the Tunisian-Turkish treaty.

[6] For this question and the different definitions of the Algerian-Tunisian border between Bir Romane and Fort Saint, see Henri Marchat, "Sahara, Tunisie, Communauté," *Revue de Defénse Nationale* (1961), p. 19ff.

[7] Tunisia's position was illustrated by a map which appeared as an annex to Bourguiba's speech of July 17, 1961. This map and the map accompanying the Franco-Tunisian convention of June 3, 1955, reproduced here, were originally reproduced in the author's *Der Burgibismus.*

These requests were formally addressed to France which was still involved juridically. However, it was quite clear that any change in the existing territorial situation affected the Algerian FLN which was struggling against the French for the "independence and integrity" of Algeria.

The *status of Bizerta* had been provisionally agreed upon in an exchange of letters between France and Tunisia on June 17, 1958.[9] The agreement provided for the complete withdrawal of all French troops from Tunisia within four months. (The troops beyond the Bir Romane-Fort Saint line were not mentioned.) Negotiations could then begin concerning a new status for the base and on "other matters" of common interest. Such negotiations, however, never took place. One reason may be that, as early as 1958, Bourguiba had linked the issue of Bizerta with that of the Sahara. The ambiguous situation provided advantages for both sides: Bourguiba could resume the final "battle for evacuation" whenever he found it necessary. France, on the other hand, could still refer to the pre-independence convention of June 1955 as the legal basis for her presence in Bizerta.

The Armed Conflict and Its Result

At the end of February 1961, Bourguiba met General de Gaulle in Rambouillet. While the Tunisian press, and Bourguiba himself, emphasized that one of Bourguiba's major objectives was to mediate the issue between France and the FLN, the French government declared that it would not accept mediation.[10] The FLN also rejected the Tunisian initiative.[11] It seems that both the meeting and the preparatory talks which took place between General de Gaulle and Mohamed Masmoudi (at that time Tunisian Minister of Information) concentrated essentially on the question of the Tunisian Sahara. Furthermore, it seems likely that, at that time, de Gaulle favored a solution which was similar to the Tunisian proposal for considering the Sahara as some kind of "interior ocean."[12] It appears from the joint communiqué that was issued after the meeting that the two presidents had agreed not to finally resolve their disputes before Algeria had gained her independence. Such an agreement, however, was possible only as long as France had not agreed to the Algerian claim that the entire Sahara was a part of Algeria. The French position conflicted fundamentally with that of the FLN. The first official negotiations between France and the FLN at Evian on May 20, 1961, were discontinued by France in June, the greatest difference in their respective points of view being the future of the Sahara.[13]

---

[8] "Nous tenons à faire valoir nos droits de souveraineté. La découverte du pétrole ne change rien à l'affaire." Bourguiba, speech of April 7, 1960. Cf. his speech of October 7, 1960.

[9] Exchange of letters between Mr. Sadok Mokkaddem, Tunisian Foreign Minister, and Mr. Benard, French *chargé d'affaires* in Tunis, June 17, 1958. The text is pubilshed as document no. 7 in the author's *Der Burgibismus.*

[10] *La Presse* (Tunis), February 10, 1961.

[11] *Le Monde,* February 18, 1961.

By June the differences between Tunisia and the FLN openly surfaced. On June 12 following a visit by the President of Mali, Modibo Keita, to Tunis, a communiqué was issued designating the Sahara as an "integral part of the African territory." From prison Ben Bella and his comrades strongly condemned the "attitude of some African governments concerning this question."[14] In the Tunisian weekly *Afrique Action*[15] Mohamed Masmoudi reiterated the Tunisian point of view. The Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA) presented a memorandum to the Tunisian government on June 26 stating that the French view regarding the Sahara as a "question of itself" had rendered successful negotiations impossible and had forced the Algerian people to continue its struggle.[16] The controversy was debated without success in secret negotiations between the Tunisian government and the GPRA on July 1.[17] On July 5 the French Minister of Information, Terrenoire, declared that France had never intended a partition of the Algerian territory, and on July 20 negotiations between France and the FLN were resumed in Lugrin.

In the meantime, on July 14, Bourguiba had decided to resume the "battle for evacuation." The decision was justified by the fact that France was proceeding on an extension of the runways at Bizerta, and in doing so violated the limits of the base by two meters.[18] On July 6 he addressed a letter to General de Gaulle in which he referred to the linkage between Bizerta and the border question.[19] In two speeches (July 14 and 17) he again explained Tunisia's position: since France had refused to negotiate the issues pending since 1958, he was now forced to solve them otherwise. Bizerta and the south should be evacuated. The border south of Bir Romane would be negotiated with the government of independent Algeria. The recognition of Tunisian sovereignty over Garat El Hamel, however, would concern Tunis and Paris exclusively.

---

[12] *La Presse* (Tunis), February 26, 1961. Mohamed Masmoudi confirmed the point in an interview with the author on July 6, 1963.

[13] During a press conference the French chief negotiator Louis Joxe declared that France had organized the Sahara so that it would become a "source of wealth" for all countries. *Le Monde*, June 15, 1961.

[14] *Le Monde*, June 23, 1961.

[15] *Afrique Action*, June 25, 1961.

[16] The memorandum was published by the GPRA on July 17, 1961, as an answer to President Bourguiba's speech of that day (see below: *La Presse*, July 18, 1961).

[17] *La Presse*, July 2, 1961.

[18] *La Presse*, July 5, 1961, and *Le Monde*, July 6, 1961. Later most newspapers (including *Le Monde*) referred to a distance of "about ten meters."

[19] Letter published in *La Documentation Française, Série Articles et Documents*, No. 1126, August 3, 1961.

Bourguiba also designated the actions to be undertaken against the French. First, the French would not be permitted to move beyond the limits of the base proper. As Bizerta maintained a large number of small outposts which depended upon the base itself for food and water, the decision would almost inevitably provoke armed clashes. Second, the army in the south was ordered to advance "under all circumstances" up to Garat El Hamel. Once the army occupied the border mark the question of a redefinition of the border would be raised. Garat El Hamel was not the southernmost limit of Tunisia's border with Libya; the common border extends south of Edjeleh. The map, then, sustains the assumption that in an exchange of letters which took place shortly before the crisis (and were never published),[20] Libya had conceded Tunisian sovereignty over Edjeleh.

In response to Bourguiba's speeches France agreed to open negotiations on the future status of Bizerta immediately. However, France refused to discuss the border issue, while Tunisia insisted that her "opening towards the Sahara" and her right for a "natural Saharan extension" should be recognized.[21]

The blockade of Bizerta became effective on June 17. The Tunisians fired on anyone leaving the base and refused to permit the evacuation of some of the smaller outposts. Commandos attacked the base during the night.[22] In the days that followed the French brought in reinforcements from Algeria, among them the notorious first regiment of paratroopers of the Foreign Legion. They came under heavy Tunisian fire while being parachuted over the base. In large-scale sorties, the French reëstablished control over the roads connecting the parts of the base, destroying barricades with air attacks. They also occupied the road and railroad to Tunis; and, after heavy fighting, French troops occupied the city of Bizerta, except the medina. In order to participate in the "battle of evacuation" all Tunisian "national organizations," e.g. trade unions, youth organizations, the students and women's unions, and even the "children of Bourguiba" (an organization for orphans), had sent "volunteers" to Bizerta. They were organized and commanded primarily by national guardsmen; most of the army units were concentrated in the south. Thus, the French attacks inevitably led to enormous losses among Tunisian civilians.[23] The exact number of casualties at Bizerta is unknown. Estimates reach as high as three or four thousand; the Tunisian government usually speaks of something "over a thousand."[24] There is also some evidence that the paratroopers of the Foreign Legion had brutalized civilians and had mutilated and executed prisoners.[25] After initial reports concerning the success of the Tunisian troops in the south, the subject soon disappeared from the Tunisian press and official communiqués. It seems that the Tunisian army, after a few initial successes, never reached Garat El Hamel. This policy of selective information also made it easy for Tunisia to play down her conflict with the Algerians and to concentrate on the rôle of the French army in Bizerta.

---

[20] Bourguiba mentioned this document in his speech of July 17, 1961.

[21] The French note to the Tunisian government is published in *La Documentation Française, Série Art. et Doc.*, No. 1126, August 3, 1961. The Tunisian communiqué is published in *La Presse*, July 19, 1961.

[22] See the French note to the Tunisian government of July 20, published in *La Documentation Française, Série Art. et Doc.*, No. 1126, August 3, 1961. One of the commando leaders declared to the author in 1962: "It appeared that the French did not want to attack. So we had to do something and attacked them with small arms and handgrenades."

On July 20, i.e. during the French counterattack, Tunisia presented its case to the Security Council. The resolution on which the Council finally agreed called for an immediate ceasefire and a return of all troops to their initial bases. The resolution was a defeat for Tunisian policy since it did not sustain the Tunisian demand for the complete withdrawal of all French troops from all parts of Tunisian territory. Instead, Tunis was required to withdraw her troops to Fort Saint. France, as in the case of the Algerian war, demonstrated her disregard for the United Nations. Dag Hammarskjöld, attempting to visit Bizerta, was searched by French paratroopers; the French admiral commanding the base refused to receive him.[26] In spite of the Security Council resolution, French troops continued to occupy Bizerta and minor incidents occurred daily.

Tunisia lost heavily as a result of the crisis. There was, first, a heavy loss of human lives. Tunisia also suffered a grave deterioration of her relations with France and an unexpected diplomatic defeat in the United Nations (extending to an extraordinary session of the General Assembly). Tunisia also found it impossible to solve her border problems by military means. Finally, the distrust of the Algerian FLN toward the Tunisian régime deepened.

Due to the continued French occupation, the situation in Bizerta remained explosive. On September 5, General de Gaulle attacked Bourguiba personally in a press conference, emphasizing that he, Bourguiba, had claimed Tunisian sovereignty over Edjeleh during the Rambouillet talks. Furthermore, he repeated the old French position that France was ready to negotiate the status of Bizerta on the basis of the agreement of June 1958, but that the French military presence in Bizerta must be guaranteed "as long as the dangerous tension in the world exists." The border problem, he continued, was of no concern to Tunisia. The Tunisian press reacted sharply, declaring that the resumption of the battle was inevitable in order to achieve national goals.[27] Bourguiba himself, however, who was then participating in the conference of non-aligned states in Belgrade, issued a statement saying that de Gaulle's declaration contained new and positive elements. Shortly thereafter, a sensible détente was reached; at the end of September the French troops withdrew from the territory they had occupied outside the base. Successful negotiations on the future of the base, however, were delayed until the beginning of July 1962 when Algeria became independent. In October 1963 France withdrew from Bizerta. These events confirmed French reluctance to endanger her future presence at the Algerian base of Mers El Kebir by concessions on Bizerta. They also confirmed the notion that Bizerta was a secondary problem for Tunisia; the solution followed a settlement of the Saharan problem that favored Algeria.

---

[23] As early as July 21, 1961, *La Presse* reported more than one hundred dead and six hundred wounded in Bizerta.

[24] Debbasch, Charles, "La Politique de Bizerte," in *Annuaire d'Afrique du Nord*, 1963, p. 202, especially note 3.

[25] Bodies exhumed by the Tunisians from mass graves showed traces of torture and mutilation. See the *Report of the International Commission of Jurists.*

[26] See the letter of Hammarskjöld to Foreign Minister Couve de Murville of July 25, 1961, and the letter of de Murville to Hammarskjöld of July 26, 1961. Both have been published by the press services of the French embassies. Cf. *Le Monde*, July 28, 1961.

Conclusion

The linkage of the border problem and the Bizerta issue had enabled Bourguiba to present his essential claim, the oilfield of Edjeleh, as a question of decolonization. Formally, the issue involved only Tunisia and France. If the appearance of decolonization was to be maintained, the question had to be resolved before Algerian independence. From the Tunisian point of view the need for a solution became acute when France evinced readiness to agree to the Algerian demand concerning the future of the Sahara. This explains the timing of the crisis. Bourguiba relied on the same tactics that he had successfully employed to attain Tunisian independence from France. The reasons for the failure of his policy in 1961 become clear if we return to the three essential conditions for the successful application of Bourguibism.

The third condition mentioned above was the existence of a "disciplined people" who had "total confidence" in its leader. This was the case before the crisis; thereafter, Bourguiba's condition was weakened: His old rival Salah Ben Youssef was assassinated in August in Frankfurt; his murderers were never identified. In October Mohamed Masmoudi sharply criticized Bourguiba's autocratic style of policymaking; he then disappeared from the Tunisian political scene for three years.

The second condition was that there be a bilateral relationship between the parties. This condition was only formally met, the border issue involving, in fact, the FLN much more than France. This trilateral relationship, and the peculiar relationship between Tunis and the FLN, also made it impossible to prepare public opinion with propaganda. Bourguiba could have been accused of stabbing the Algerian revolution in the back. Perhaps it is this fact that explains the lack of support which Tunisia received from the Afro-Asian countries at the United Nations.

---

[27] *La Presse* and *Le Petit Matin* (both Tunis), September 6, 1961.

The first condition was that the political partner (or enemy) must be sensitive to "moral" arguments. In General de Gaulle, Bourguiba found himself confronting a man who relied much less on domestic political currents than the governments of the Fourth French Republic. This explains, at least in part, the French reaction in Bizerta. It may also help to explain Bourguiba's probable miscalculation of France's reaction.

The liquidation of the border dispute between Algiers and Tunis occurred at a moment when long-standing disputes between the Maghribī states, frequently extending back to pre-independence days, seemed to have disappeared. This may, at least partly, be attributed to the careful policymaking of the Algerian leadership since June 1965. The recent transformation of Tunisian domestic politics, including Bourguiba's tendency to concede more competence to his ministers, as well as the diminished influence of Moroccan parties as a result of the new constitution may also contribute to a more pragmatic approach to relations among the states of the Maghrib.

THE EVOLUTION OF LANDOWNERSHIP IN THE SUDAN

Mohammed Hashim Awad

OF THE FOUR Arab countries where the army seized power during the 1950s, the Sudan was the only country whose military rulers did not include land reform in their manifesto. In Egypt, Syria and Iraq land reform laws were promulgated in 1952, 1958 and 1959, respectively, but no such legislation was passed in the Sudan throughout the period of the previous military rule, which lasted from 1958 to 1964. Earlier, the declaration of independence in 1956 also failed to produce any changes in the system of land tenure comparable to the major developments which occurred in many countries of north, east and central Africa after they gained their independence. In fact, the pattern of landownership in the Sudan has hardly changed during the last fifty years or so, and it seems that very few people regret that this is the case. The reason is that, in a sense, land reform had taken place in the Sudan nearly half a century before the independent Arab and African nations began to reform their systems of land tenure. Many of the changes which these nations introduced in recent years[1] had long been forestalled by the measures taken by the Anglo-Egyptian administration (1899-1955) in its first years in office. These measures successfully stemmed the growth of an indigenous neo-feudalist class, prevented the dissolution of communal holdings and the appropriation of the land by the tribal chiefs, checked the expropriation of the small freeholders by wealthy landowners, and arrested the alienation of land to Europeans.

The purpose of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium was not only to avert the occurrence of some undesirable developments in the pattern of landownership, but also to remove some of the innovations introduced by the Funj Sultans (1504-1821) and their successors into the system of landholding which the Arabs established during the early part of this millennium. The removal of these innovations restored to the system its original form, which has been largely preserved to this day. This is why many of the traditional patterns of landholding which have crumbled in many African and Arab countries under the impact of sweeping social, economic and political changes are still virtually

---

[1] For detailed accounts of the changing patterns of landownership in some Arab and African countries see, for example, D. Warriner, *Land Reform and Development in the Middle East* (London, 1962), chapters i-iv, and Lord Hailey, *An African Survey* (London, 1957), chapter xi.

△ MOHAMMED HASHIM AWAD is a lecturer in economics at the University of Kharṭūm.

intact in the Sudan. The survival of the old land institutions in this country is, undoubtedly, due to their flexibility and durability, but it is also due to the fact that some of the forces of change which have disrupted the traditional patterns of landownership in many developing countries have operated in the Sudan in a manner which actually helped to preserve these patterns. This is particularly true of (Turkish and British) colonialism to which the Sudan is, paradoxically, indebted for the absence of classes of indigenous feudalists and European colonists, which are a common feature of most colonies.

The unusual environment in which the system of land tenure evolved in the Sudan and the important changes which affected its structure are examined in some detail in the following pages. First we describe the system of landownership with which the Arabs replaced that of Christian Nubia, and then we trace the innovations introduced by the Funj, the Turks and the Mahdists during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and how the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium disposed of them and prevented other changes from taking place. Finally, we assess briefly the effect of the existing pattern of landholding on the country's agricultural development.

II

The coming of the Arabs to the Sudan heralded the destruction of the feudalism of ancient Nubia and the introduction of the existing systems of individual landownership in the riverain areas and communal holdings in the rainlands. This transformation was a long drawn-out process which lasted from the middle of the seventh century to the middle of the thirteenth century. It is not surprising then that we are less certain about the pattern of landownership which was destroyed than we are about the one that emerged. For very little is known about economic conditions in the Sudan before she came into contact with the Muslim world. The fragmentary information which we have about that period suggests that the system of land tenure of Christian Nubia was essentially a continuation of the system which had existed in pagan Nubia, as indeed were most of the institutions of the Christian kingdoms of Nubia. In the words of J. W. Crowfoot, "Nubia was one of the few countries of the old world which adopted Christianity without having passed under the discipline of Roman law, because after some hesitation the Romans wisely decided that it was too poor and remote to justify the cost of conquest and administration. The old forms of cultural organization which had been disrupted in Egypt by a succession of foreign conquerors—Persian, Macedonian, Roman—were here relatively intact . . . Both economically and politically the land was in the stage of pre-Ptolemaic Egypt."[2]

Economically, the country remained in a state of classic feudalism. The king owned all the lands within his domain, and the people whom he ruled were his slaves. Economic life centered around the churches (the temples in pre-Christian days), which were also the centers from which the king's representatives administered their provinces. These representatives, who were usually of royal blood themselves, also officiated at the religious functions, and this was, apparently, the reason why they were described as priests by Abū Ṣāliḥ al-Armanī,[3] who visited Nubia early in the thirteenth century. Their functions also included the management of the royal estates located within their parishes, and they were also responsible for conducting the religious ceremonies connected with such major economic events as floods, seed-sowing and harvests.

---

[2] "Christian Nubia," *Journal of Egyptian Archaeology*, vol. 13, nos. 3 & 4 (1927), p. 19.

This was the state in which S. 'Abdallāh ibn Sa'd ibn Abī Sarh found the Nubian economy when he invaded the country in 641-2. The campaign ended in a pact between the Muslims and the Nubians under which the former undertook to supply the latter with grain and various other commodities in return for slaves, an accepted means of settling debts in Nubia in those days.[4] Three centuries later, ibn Salīm al-Aswānī, an Arab traveller who toured Nubia's two kingdoms, Makarra and 'Alwa, discovered that transactions were still settled by the delivery of slaves (as well as ropes, grain and cattle). He was also shocked by the cruelty of the despotic king to his subjects, but more so by their readiness to serve him as slaves.[5] But by the time this traveller was touring Nubia the economy had been slowly changing under the impact of Muslim Egypt. The change was naturally most marked in the northern part of Nubia which was under the immediate influence of Egypt. There the Muslims introduced the use of coins, as ibn Salīm was quick to notice.[6] It was also there that the first Muslims came to trade[7] and, later, to buy land and mix with the indigenous population.

From the start, Muslim infiltration into Nubia assumed the form of a two-pronged thrust which progressed along two different routes. On one front, sections of Rabī'ah and Juhaynah tribes pushed their way along the Nile banks and mixed with the riverain Nubians. On the other, different sections of the same tribes and other ones swarmed into the northeastern plains inhabited by the Beja tribes.

The movement along the banks of the Nile was the earlier of the two movements. It began during the Umayyad Caliphate (662-750) when Muslims began to buy lands from the Nubians in the Aswan region. By the time Caliph al-Ma'mūn (813-33) was in power so much land had passed into the hands of the Muslims that the king of Makarra sent a deputation to Baghdad in order to protest to the Caliph directly. The king claimed that the lands sold to the Muslims and all the lands of his kingdom were his personal property, and that all the Nubians were his slaves and had no land of their own. The Caliph referred the matter to the Governor of Upper Egypt who began an inquiry. Fearing that they might lose the estates which they had bought, the Muslims persuaded the Nubians who sold the lands to them to contest their king's claim that they were his slaves living on his land. When summoned before the Governor, the defending Nubians declared that their relationship with their king was no different from that of the Muslims with their Caliph. This argument seemed to impress the Muslim jurists who were present, for the voluntary and contractual nature of the relationship between the ruler and his subjects is fundamental to the concept of authority in Islām. The refusal of the Nubians to recognize the seigneurial rights claimed by their king was sufficient to undermine his case in the eyes of the Governor and his council, and the sale deeds were judged to be valid. However, the new owners were required to pay land dues to the Nubian king since their estates fell within his domains.[8] Naturally, the verdict in this case encouraged the Nubians to sell more land to the Muslims.

---

[3] *Tarīkh al-Shaykh Abū Ṣāliḥ al-Armanī* (Oxford, 1893), pp. 125 ff.

[4] A. J. Arkell, *A History of the Sudan to 1821* (London, 1961), p. 188.

[5] Quoted in al-Makrīzī, *Al-Mawā'iz wa al-I'tibār* (Cairo, 1853), vol. 1, p. 191.

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] H. MacMichael, *The Coming of the Arabs to the Sudan* (Kharṭūm, 1929), p. 6.

The complete transformation of the system of land tenure in the riverain region came much later after large numbers of Arabs had settled among the Nubians and intermarried with their nobility. As ibn Khaldūn shrewdly observed,[9] the adherence of the Nubians to the matrilineal system of succession, another relic of the pre-Christian era, enabled the new settlers to usurp political and economic power from the Nubian royalty. By marrying the daughters and sisters of the Nubian nobles, the Arab immigrants became the fathers of the lawful heirs to the Nubian power and wealth in accordance with the recognized system of inheritance which reserved the deceased's legacy for the offshoot of his daughter or his sister. Of course, once the land passed into the hands of the Muslims, the *sharīʿah* laws of inheritance were applied. According to these laws the land could be divided among the immediate relations of the deceased in unequal shares according to the strength of the blood tie between the dead person and his heir and whether the heir is male or female. Consequently, the land which previously had belonged to the Nubian king alone became divided and subdivided among its new Muslim owners and their descendants until, generations later, there were no large holdings left and the problem of extreme land fractionalization appeared. Today, statistics show that in the Northern Province, where the Arabs first settled in the beginning of this millennium, the fractionalization of holdings reached the stage where a freehold plot of ten *faddāns** may have up to 576 co-owners. The average for the whole Province is 300 co-owners per plot of ten *faddāns*. For the three riverain Provinces of northern Sudan—Northern, Kharṭūm, and Blue Nile—the average is 20.[10]

---

[8] Al-Mas'ūdi, *Murūj al-Dhahab* (Cairo, 1964), vol. 2, pp. 22-23.

[9] *Al-'Ibar wa Dīwān al-Mubtada'wa al-Khabār* (Cairo, 1866), vol. 5, p. 429.

* *Faddān* equals 1.038 acres or 4,200 square meters.

[10] A. B. Miskin, "Land Registration," *Sudan Notes and Records*, 31, 2 (1950), pp. 274-286.

Full private ownership of land *(mulk)* had been long established in the riverain areas before the displacement of the Christian dynasties of Makarra by Muslim kings in 1315 paved the way for the appearance of other institutions such as state-owned *(mīrī)*, reserve *(matrūkah)*, dues-paying *(kharāj)* and leasehold *(ḥikr)* lands. But these forms of landownership took root only under the Funj and Turkish administrations (1504-1885).

Arab infiltration through the northeastern plateau was resisted by the indigenous Beja, who feared that the immigrants would seize their gold mines. Twice they fought the Arabs and twice they were defeated and forced to sign a treaty safeguarding the lives and property of the new settlers. The treaties of 831 and 856 created the *modus vivendi* under which large numbers of Rabī'ah and Juhaynah Arabs came to live and intermarry with the Beja. Very soon there were enough of them for a soldier of fortune called 'Abdallāh al-'Umarī to form an army and carve out for himself a kingdom that extended from the Red Sea hills to the Nile. This kingdom did not last long and disappeared before the end of the ninth cetnury, leaving the door wide open for more Arab infiltration through the northeastern plains. From there the immigrants fanned out in a southerly and southwesterly sweep which took them to the borders of modern Ethiopia and Chad.[11] Most of them were bedouins escaping from the harsh discipline imposed upon them by the Fāṭimī, Ayyūbī and Mamlūk rulers of Egypt after they had been involved in a number of abortive revolts.[12] The topography and the climate of the eastern and western plains of the Sudan suited their nomadic modes of living, and the rains grew enough crops and grass to support them and their livestock. A special attraction of the plains of the Sudan from the immigrants' point of view was their remoteness from the riverain towns from which the Nubian kings traditionally administered their kingdoms. This allowed them a great deal of the independence they cherished so much.

The system of land tenure which the nomadic immigrants brought with them had more in common with the one which their ancestors had known in the Arab peninsula before Islām than with the system which their contemporaries in the riverain areas were practicing. Their nomadic way of life left no room for a permanent occupation of land by the same person and, consequently, the institution of private landownership could not take root. Nor did their simple methods of organization favor the growth of the complex land institutions which the sophisticated urban communities delighted in inventing. To these nomads, the concepts of *waqf, mīrī* or *ḥikr* were as incomprehensible as they were to their pre-Islamic ancestors (and to their present descendants). Their way of life has always dictated that each tribe must acquire for itself a large territory *(dār)* to which it limited its movements. This *dār* is regarded as the property of the whole tribe. The chief *(shaykh)* of the tribe is the custodian of its property, which he manages with the advice and assistance of a council of sub-chiefs. The shaykh-in-council allots land to the members of the tribe. Every member is entitled to be given a plot of land to cultivate and to utilize any form of wild life that exists upon it. As there was always land in excess of the needs of the tribesmen, every able person was given as much land as he could develop *(kifāyat yad).* Shifting cultivation has always been the practice in the central rainbelt, and it entailed the reallotment of land every three to five years in order to give the used land time to rest and regain its fertility. This made it possible for every member of the tribe to get at one time or another a plot in the better lands of the tribe. Clearing the plot assigned to him gave the person the right to occupy it for as long as he wished, and if he died his heirs could claim it for themselves. He could desert his plot for a short period without relinquishing his right to it, and he could abandon it to someone else with the shaykh's permission. The member of the tribe is also entitled to utilize together with his fellow tribesmen the wealth of the common *(mushā'a)* lands of the tribe, be it water, wood or game. In return for enjoying these privileges the tribesman is required to surrender to the tribe one-tenth *('ushur)* of what he grows. This tithe is given to the shaykh who spends it, together with any other revenue which he may obtain by renting excess tribal lands to non-members, on administering the affairs of the tribe in war and peace, on entertaining guests, and on maintaining the widows, the orphans and the disabled.[13]

---

[11] MacMichael, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-9.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

The subjugation of the nomadic tribes to the authority of the central government after the creation of the Funj Sultanate in 1504 did not change the basic structure of the system outlined above, which to this day governs the relationship between the individual and his tribe. What has changed considerably is the relationship between the tribe and its shaykh and the central authority with which he has come to be closely associated.

III

The institutions of individual ownership of riverain lands and communal landholding in the central plains have remained since the days of mass Arab immigration the backbone of the Sudanese system of land tenure. Neither the conversion of some of the nomadic tribes into sedentary farming communities nor the revival of the principle that all the land belonged to the supreme ruler could weaken these institutions.

At present, private landownership is largely confined to the banks of the Main Nile and some of its tributaries which lie north of latitude 10° (excluding the Gash and Tokar Deltas), most (roughly 70 per cent) of the

---

[13] S. Wajī'a Allāh, "Landownership in the Republic of the Sudan," (in Arabic), *Al-Majlis,* vol. 6, no. 110 (November 1960), pp. 17-18.

Gezira plain, and the cultivated areas of the Nuba hills.[14] The total area owned in this manner is about six million *faddāns,* most of which are regularly cultivated. The total area of the Sudan is 596.6 million *faddāns,* all of which—except for the six million privately owned *faddāns*—are owned by the state. The cultivable part of the country is no more than 18.0 per cent, and the rest is either pastures and meadows (9.6 per cent), forests (36.5 per cent) or waste land (35.9 per cent).[15] Communally held lands are state lands subject to mere usufruct rights vested in a tribal or a village community. Communal landholdings are found in the *qoz* (sand) and clay plains running across the center of the country and in the ironstone plateau of the southern Sudan. They cover river deltas, rainlands, pastures and some waste land and forests, and they add up to about 40 per cent of the area of the country. For obvious reasons, the percentage of cultivable land and pastures tends to be higher in the areas under communal possession than in the rest of the state owned territories.

State ownership of land goes back only to the Funj days when the eastern plains and some of the western plains occupied by various nomadic tribes were brought under the control of the Sultan at Sannār and his viceroy at Qarrī. Before 1504 the Nubian kings of Makarra and ʿAlwa had no real authority over the nomads and their ownership of the lands occupied by these nomads was virtually in abeyance. The tribes were the *de facto* owners of their *dārs,* and they continued to do so until the Funj rulers reasserted their ownership rights in these areas and reduced the resident communities to mere usufructers whom the Sultan could, in theory at least, evict whenever he wanted. But in practice the Sultan seldom interfered with the rights of the communities or with their exercise of these rights, except with regard to surplus communal lands. Occasionally, the Funj rulers (and, later, the Turkish Governors) granted some of the unused communal lands to landless groups as a reward for them or in an attempt to develop the territory. It was in this manner that the Shayqiyyah came to occupy large tracts of Jaʿāliyīn lands,[16] and the Dongolāwis occupied parts of Dār Ḥāmid's lands until they were ousted by the Mahdists.[17]

The short period of Mahdist rule in the Sudan (1885-1898) was a period of extensive state interference with the system of land tenure. The ownership of vast territories was transferred from disloyal factions to loyal ones, and large areas of cultivable land turned into waste land after the occupants had been massacred or forced to migrate. But, fortunately, the changes introduced by the Mahdists in the system of landownership affected the place of certain individuals and groups within this system rather than its basic structure. Moreover, these changes proved to be short-lived, for soon after the régime had collapsed the confiscated and abandoned lands reverted to their original holders. Far more lasting and significant were the changes introduced by the Funj and the Turks in the structure of landholding in the country. Of particular importance was their policy of conferring upon some people the title to a particular piece of land or the right of collecting for themselves land dues from its occupants. This policy almost led to the creation in the Sudan of a landed aristocracy similar to the feudalist classes which emerged in many of the Arab countries which were ruled by the Ottomans.

---

[14] There has been no cadastral survey in the Sudan except in parts of the three riverain provinces of northern Sudan, i.e. the Northern Province, Kharṭūm Province, and the Blue Nile Province. Therefore, the figures given above are either taken or calculated from various government and non-government records. These records are incomplete and the information which they contain must be treated with utmost caution.

[15] Ministry of Agriculture, *Bulletin of Agricultural Statistics of the Sudan, 1967/68* (Kharṭūm, 1969), table lix, p. 79.

[16] P. M. Holt, *A Modern History of the Sudan* (London, 1961), p. 55.

[17] K. M. Barbour, *The Republic of the Sudan* (London, 1961), p. 163.

The instrument by which land grants were bestowed upon individuals was known as *wathīqah,* a charter bearing the ruler's seal. In some cases the ruler conferred upon his subject the actual ownership of the land mentioned in the *wathīqah* with or without an exemption from *kharāj* (land dues). In other cases the ruler merely conferred upon the *wathīqah*-holder the right of retaining the dues paid by the occupants without assuming the title to the land.[18] Land grants of the former type were more common and they were first made to religious leaders in an effort to win their favor and, perhaps, to make religious education self-supporting. Large estates which in some instances were measured in thousands of *gada'as** were granted to such renowned pious men as Shaykh Yūsuf Abū Shara, Shaykh Khogalī Abū al-Jāz, Shaykh Ḥasan Wad Ḥassūnah, and Shaykh 'Alī Abū Deleij.[19] As the custom is today, the land was cultivated by the students and followers of the shaykh working on a part-time basis, and the crops which they produced were the chief source of sustenance for the people of the *masīd* (religious school).

When the political power of the tribal chiefs began to grow at the expense of the Sultans during the latter part of the Funj rule many tribal chiefs were able to obtain *wathīqahs* bestowing upon them the ownership of large territories or the right to collect dues from the occupants. One such *wathīqah* was granted in 1800 by Sultan Bādī Wad Dakīn to Shaykh 'Awad al-Karīm Abū Sīn, the chief of the Shukriyyah tribe; the charter empowered Shaykh Abū Sīn to collect for himself land dues from the occupants of an area covering millions of *faddāns* including a substantial part of his tribe's traditional *dār.*[20] Numerous *wathīqahs* were also issued to senior members of the Sultan's court such as *wazīrs* (ministers), *meks* (governors), *muqaddams* (generals) and *qāḍīs* (judges). Most of their estates were located east or west of the Blue Nile River in the vicinity of Sannār. The estates varied a great deal in size, but we know of none as large as that of Shaykh Abū Sīn in Rufā'ah district.

---

[18] M. I. Abū Salīm, *Some Land Certificates from the Funj* (in Arabic) (Kharṭūm, 1967), pp. 30-31.

* *Gada'a* is roughly equal to 5¼ *faddāns* or 22,050 square meters.

[19] Abū Salīm, *op. cit.,* pp. 135-36.

[20] *Ibid.*

The Turkish administration made similar land grants to influential persons either as a special favor or as a means of bringing as much land as possible under cultivation.[21] Fortunately for the country, the Turkish administrators and most of the foreigners who came to settle in the country found it easier to get rich by trading in ivory or slaves or through corruption than by investing in land. One of the very few Turks who acquired *abā'diyyahs* (estates) in the Sudan was Aḥmad Pāshā Abū Widān, who served as Governor General from 1838 to 1843.[22] His example was not widely followed, and the bulk of the arable lands remained in the hands of the Sudanese.

As the number of the *wathīqah*-holders increased, a system of land tenure with distinct neo-feudalist features began to emerge in what is now the Blue Nile Province. Unlike the religious leaders who settled with their followers on the lands granted to them by the Sultans, most of the lay *wathīqah*-holders became overlords to tenants with whom they had no direct contact and no personal ties. They mostly had agents *(wakīls)* to manage their estates for them for a commission while they remained at Sannār, forming a new class of wealthy absentee landlords. The farmers were in fact tenants-at-will working on a cropsharing basis in the plots assigned to them by the landlord or his agent. They were burdened with heavy rentals and land dues. The share of the landowner varied from *'ushur* (one-tenth) of the crop in the rainlands to *khums* (one-fifth) in the riverain lands. But there were various charges which the tenant had to pay in addition to the agreed share of the landlord. The tenant who received a plot of land which required no clearing was charged a fee called *dugundi.* If the plot included *garf** land the tenant was required to supply the landlord with two *dammur thaubs* (grey cotton pieces). Whenever he constructed a hut on the tenancy, the occupant had to pay the landlord a special tax called *dajjajah,* and if he grew sesame he gave the landowner the *gadah,* i.e. as much as a large wooden dish could hold of this seed crop. Over and above these fees and charges, the tenant was sometimes required to spend a *dahawa* (morning) working on his landlord's *'amarah* (private plot) without pay.[23]

When the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium was established in 1899, the new rulers were alarmed by the excessiveness of the dues which the tenants had to pay to their overlords. At that time the government was being urged by its land commissioners to recognize the rights of the *wathīqah*-holders even if temporarily until a cadastral survey was conducted and all the land claims settled. But the government was also determined not to allow the overlords to drive the tenant class to revolt by their excesses. So a compromise was reached in 1902, when the new administration recognized the seigneurial rights of the overlords and at the same time issued an order restricting their total share in the crop to one-fifth *(khums).* In 1906 the recognition by the state of the universal right of the overlords to one-fifth of the crop was withdrawn. Only those who could prove that their share before 1902 had been no less than the *khums* were allowed to demand this amount from their tenants.[24] In some places the government arranged for the tenants to buy the plots in their possession from the overlords, but later when it was ruled that the right to collect seigneurial dues did not constitute full ownership the plots were made over to the tenants after paying only a small fixed sum in commutation of the recognized dues.[25] It was also decreed that the outstanding seigneurial rights were neither divisible nor alienable: they could be transferred only within the *wathīqah*-holding family from one head to his successor, and not divided among his heirs.[26] But the final blow to the landed aristocracy of the Sudan came in 1920 when the government, while still refusing to confiscate the large estates, absorbed a large number of them in the Gezira Scheme and offered their owners a small fixed rent.

---

[21] Holt, *op. cit.*

[22] R. Hill, *Egypt in the Sudan* (London, 1959), p. 76.

[23] J. M. Matthew, "Land Customs and Tenure in Singa District," *Sudan Notes and Records,* vol. 4, no. 1 (1921), pp. 11-12.

* The slope of the river bank which is cultivated with the aid of a digging stick as the water subsides after the annual flood.

Thus, without nationalizing or drastically redistributing land, the Condominium government was able within a short period to stifle the growth of a neo-feudalist class in the Sudan. By determining for the landlords the manner in which they could dispose of their holdings and the maximum rent which they could demand from their tenants, the government succeeded in making the ownership of large estates of negligible social and economic importance in the Sudan. At the same time, it gave the tenant a status which nearly equalled that of the proprietor-cultivator. To all intents and purposes, the Condominium government successfully restored the structure of landownership in this country to what it had been before it was modified by the Funj, Turkish and Mahdist administrations.

IV

At the time when the government was taking various measures to protect the tenants in the Singa and Rufā'ah districts, the small freeholders in other areas were being threatened with expropriation by wealthy land speculators, most of whom were foreign. The wave of land speculation which swept the country during the first decade of this century was mainly a spillover from

---

[24] *Ibid.,* p. 13.

[25] *Ibid.,* p. 14.

[26] A. R. C. Bolton, "Land Tenure in Agricultural Land in the Sudan," in J. D. Tothill (Ed.), *Agriculture in the Sudan* (London, 1954), p. 192.

Egypt. There, land hunger was mounting in the wake of an ambitious program launched by Lord Cromer during the 1890s in an effort to rehabilitate Egyptian agriculture. Many people immigrated into the Sudan from Egypt soon after the Reconquest and began to look for land to buy. Speculation in land reached high proportions after the government announced its plans to link the Nile with the Red Sea by a railway line and to develop the Gezira plain.

At first the speculators confined their interest to the riverain lands of the Northern Province, which is adjacent to Egypt. There, Greek and Syrian immigrants began to practice some of the familiar techniques by which poor landowners are expropriated. They might have succeeded in achieving their goal had not the local administrator acted swiftly enough to prevent land from changing hands. In his report for the year 1902, the Governor of Wadi Halfa described what happened in the following words:

> There was formerly a certain amount of usury here—Greeks and Syrians lending money at exorbitant interest, and allowing the borrower to renew his obligation until the lender thought he had reached the limit of his resources. I have checked this by not permitting the land to change hands, and substituting monthly installments in lieu of mortgages; also by not accepting a bill in any civil suit as evidence of money borrowed unless such bill is stamped by me at the commencement of the transaction. It must be, of course, taken into consideration that a man may be hard pushed for money, and may withhold information as to the interest due on the bill, but I found that this procedure has checked the rapacity of the moneylender.[27]

The fragmentation of the holdings in the Northern Province was another factor which militated against the transfer of freehold land from the natives to the foreign speculators. J. H. Nevile, the first Director of Agriculture under the Condominium government, explained how the extreme fractionalization of landholdings in the Berber district rendered the purchase of large plots of arable land virtually impossible. He wrote:

> . . . . Owing to Mohammedan law of inheritance single pieces of one or two *uds* (i.e. 175 centimeters) are common and in registering land it is found that as many separate claims and registration forms are found as there are feddans of land. What this means to the persons who are anxious to buy 1,000 feddans is easily seen, as while half the owners may be willing to sell at once, the remainder may prefer to stand out for higher prices, and at the end of a year or two's haggling it may still be that the owners of some 5 or 10 *ud* strips running across the estate say that they are not in want of money, and will not sell at any price.[28]

---

[27] *Reports on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan* consisting of (i) Report by Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General, (ii) Memorandum by Governor General, (iii) Departmental Reports, and (iv) Province Reports—hereafter referred to as *General Reports*—1902, Cmd. 1529, part i, p. 3.

[28] *General Reports,* 1903, Cmd. 1951, part iii, p. 6.

It is not surprising then that the eyes of the speculators turned southwards towards the Blue Nile Province and its fertile Gezira plain. There was no problem of land shortage or fractionalization of holdings there, and the anticipated appreciation in the value of land as a result of the plan for agricultural development in the region offered the speculator a good chance of profit. The only problem was that at the time when speculation began there had been no land settlement and registration in the region. The government repeatedly warned the speculators against buying land which had not been settled and registered, but the lure of high profit was so great that they were ready to throw away all caution. For their part, the native landowners showed an alarming willingness to dispose of their patrimony for the sake of getting a few pounds in their hands. The result was that an active land market developed, and it soon became clear to the government that, unless it intervened to control the traffic in land, a large number of native landowners would be expropriated and much land would pass into the hands of Europeans and wealthy natives. So, in 1905 a Proclamation was issued which made it necessary to obtain the approval of the Province's Governor before any land was sold, mortgaged or otherwise disposed of. Any disposition of land which did not receive the prior consent of the Governor was declared to be void and any monies paid as part of the deal could not be recovered. It was also made very clear that the Governor would not consider any transactions involving land which had not been settled and registered.[29] However, these measures did not put an end to land speculation which went on until many of those who bought unsettled lands discovered, only too late, that they had bought land from people without a valid title.[30]

Realizing that there were foreigners who were genuinely interested in buying land with the intention of developing it, the government promised to sell blocks of 10,000 *faddāns* or more of state lands to interested investors. The applicants were required to comply with some stiff stipulations which were intended to keep away the speculator. Land surveys showed that in the riverain areas, where the demand for land was largely concentrated, most of the cultivable land was individually owned and there was only a limited supply of state land to cater for the hundreds of applications which poured in from foreign land syndicates. Only a few concessions were granted, but even these few were not all taken up by the concessionaires, which confirmed the government's suspicion that most of the demand for land was purely speculative. Yet the government land policy was severely criticized, especially by foreign businessmen, some of whom accused the government of "narrow officialism which is reluctant to encourage private enterprise and is not sufficiently active in promoting the development of the country."[31] But irrespective of whether the land policy followed by the Sudan government was intended to encourage or discourage economic development in the country, its social outcome was aptly described by the British Foreign Secretary when he told his Parliament in 1924 that

---

[29] *General Reports*, 1905, Cmd. 2817, part i, p. 31.

[30] *General Reports*, 1904, Cmd. 2409, part iii, p. 6.

> practically the whole of the [riverain] land . . . remains in native ownership divided into comparatively small holdings, so that it may be said that not only has the foreign speculator been kept out, but also the wealthy native absentee landlord, and the whole of the land remains in the ownership of the actual cultivators that work upon it.[32]

It must be added, however, that the land policy which the Condominium government pursued was hardly typical of the land policy followed by Britain in her colonies, and it was the British, no doubt, who dictated all the policies of the Anglo-Egyptian administration. Almost everywhere in British overseas possessions Europeans were allowed to acquire vast tracts of agricultural land. Also, large areas of state and tribal lands were made over to influential chiefs and notables and registered in their names. As for the relationship between the landlord and his tenants, the British typically left it to be decided by private negotiation between the parties concerned with very little intervention from the state.

A. Gaitskell[33] attributes the unorthodoxy of the land policy of the colonial administration in the Sudan to the nonconformist nature of Lord Kitchener—the General who reconquered the Sudan and became the first Governor General of the Condominium—and the special interest which he took in the welfare of the country and its people. Without detracting from the plausibility of this theory, we suggest that the Condominium government had, perhaps, more concrete reasons for deviating from the standard land policy followed by most colonial administrations. We shall discuss some of these reasons below.

After defeating the armies of the Khalīfah near Omdurman in 1899, the new administration faced the problem of pacifying the country (which had been in a state of continuous warfare for nearly two decades) and winning the support of its people. The British were also anxious to end the dependence of the Sudan government on a subvention received from Egypt in view of the meagerness of the government's local resources. Its largest single source of revenue was agriculture, which in 1903 contributed 49 per cent of its income in the form of land, date and animal taxes.[34] But in the beginning of this century Sudanese agriculture was in a very poor state after that which the farming communities had suffered under Mahdist rule. Being more attached to land than the nomadic and semi-nomadic population of the western and eastern plains, they were slow to follow the Mahdī in his triumphant sweep across the country and paid dearly for it. The harsh treatment which they received at the hands of the Khalīfah made them ready to welcome the reconquering armies as saviors. It was only natural, then, that the new administration should pay special attention to agriculture and the farming communities in the Sudan. The revitalization of the agricultural sector was the best way of increasing government revenue and reducing its dependence on Egypt's grants. At the same time, a rehabilitated farming community would be an asset to the government, and its inherent conservatism would have a stabilizing influence on Sudanese society. The way to fulfill these twin objectives was to follow a land policy which would induce the maximum number of people to settle down to cultivate the land with confidence. Hence the need to protect the freeholders from expropriation by foreign capitalists (and the tenants from exploitation by native landlords).

---

[31] *General Reports,* 1906, Cmd. 3394, part ii, p. 133.

[32] *Correspondence Respecting the Gezira Irrigation Project,* Cmd. 2171 (London, 1924), p. 46.

[33] *The Gezira* (London, 1959), p. 61.

[34] *General Reports,* 1903, part iii, p. 166.

Another important factor was the well-known struggle for power which was still going on in Britain at the turn of the century between the aristocracy and the middle class. This struggle was also evident in the colonies where the nobility-dominated armed forces dogged and harassed the mercantile class every time it ventured into some unexplored territory and opened it for European trade. The Sudan was one of the few colonies where the trader followed the flag, and not vice versa, and this made the paramilitary administration exceptionally jealous about its hard-won supremacy in this country, and determined to defend it against the encroachments of the bourgeois. This was very clear from the attitude of General Wingate, the Governor General of the Sudan from 1900 to 1916, towards the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, the company with the largest concessions and greatest influence in the Sudan. Like Lord Kitchener before him, he clashed several times with the representatives of this company. He once warned his colleagues against these "gentlemen who are very well up in all company-mongering details, and would not fail to take advantage of the Sudan Government which has not much experience in these matters,"[35] and he expressed his fears that the Sudan might "become something like Rhodesia . . . , namely that the Company would have acquired so much power as would probably have resulted in its eventually being given a Charter."[36]

The government officials must have been concerned also with the possible outcome of allowing mass expropriation of the native proprietors by foreign land companies. "If unsophisticated people are given the chance to sell their land," wrote a land officer, "they will do so, and a large discontented landless class, easy prey for an agitator, is formed."[37] In the atmosphere of uneasiness which prevailed in the Sudan at the beginning of this century this threat was by no means unreal.

---

[35] Letter to L. Stack dated 10.4.1913, quoted in Gaitskell, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 65-66.

V

Thus, by the end of the first decade of the twentieth century a pattern of landownership had emerged in the Sudan which differed only slightly from the one which the Funj had inherited four centuries earlier. The only significant difference was that, whereas there was no effective central government at the time when the Arab immigration was in full swing and the Nubian kings' claim to own all the lands within their domain was a sham, the Condominium government was in full control of the country and its title to all lands other than those held in fee simple was undisputed. This government deliberately reversed many of the changes introduced by the Funj, the Turks and the Mahdists into the system of land tenure, and it checked the attempts of the Europeans to dispossess the native landowners. The result was that the essential features of the traditional structure of landholding—individual ownership in the riverain areas and communal holdings in the rainlands—were fully preserved; the growth of a neo-feudalistic class of big landlords was halted; the appropriation of communal lands by tribal chiefs was prevented; and the attempts of the foreigners to expropriate the small freeholders were foiled. Land in the Sudan remained, as it was in the early days of the Funj Sultanate, either held in fee simple by a broad class of small freeholders, or controlled collectively by tribal and village communities, or vested in the supreme ruler (the state after 1899).

As we have seen, this similarity between the structure of landownership which exists today and the one which existed several centuries ago is not due to stagnation in this aspect of economic life, but due to the fact that the changes which took place were self-correcting, rather, self-reinforcing. The indigenous régimes (the Funj and the Mahdists) made several significant departures from the traditional system of land tenure, but most of these changes were reversed by the colonial administrations which alternated with the indigenous ones in ruling the country.

The preservation of the old forms of landownership was, fortunately, not achieved at the expense of the country's economic development. This, however, is not everybody's view. There are many observers who think that the existing system of land tenure in the Sudan has certain aspects which are detrimental to her agricultural development. Their criticisms center around the fractionalization of holdings in the territories which are held in fee simple, the issuing of short term leases to the occupants of government land, and the practice of holding tribal and village land collectively. As we see it, these criticisms constitute an *a priori* judgment of the normal effects of land fractionalization, short term leases and communal landholding, and do not take into account the special context in which these institutions function in the Sudan. For instance, the fractionalization of holdings in the Sudan is largely a legal phenomenon, and not a physical one. In most cases the division of a plot of land left by a person to his heirs takes the form of a distribution of its yield (or revenue) and it seldom leads to the partition of the plot itself. Thus, in spite of continuous changes in the number of its owners and their respective shares, the plot of land may continue for generations to be cultivated as one unit. In fact, separate holdings are often grouped together in order to help in realizing economies of scale in irrigation, cultivation or the use of agricultural machinery. This is quite evident in the Northern Province where land fractionalization is at its worst. There, the number of water wheels fell from 9,880 in 1927 to 5,299 in 1957 while the pump schemes increased from 65 to 786; since the total freehold land under cultivation increased very little in this province, the replacement of *sāqia* units averaging about 10 *faddāns* by pump schemes of an average area of 92 *faddāns*[38] reflects the extent to which freeholders were ready to group their holdings for the sake of benefiting from better means of irrigation. Similarly, some 26,000 small farmers organized themselves in 90 cooperative schemes comprising an area of 22,855 *faddāns* of freehold land (and 22,914 *faddāns* of state land) and bought pumps and tractors to use collectively in irrigating and ploughing their individual holdings.[39]

---

[37] Miskin, *op. cit.*, p. 283.

In eight government pump schemes in the Northern Province, the tenants voluntarily offered to consolidate their small holdings. This process began in the 1940s when the owners of private land in the Gendettu pump scheme offered to rent their fragments of holdings for seven years (initially) to the state so that it might reallot the land in suitable sizes.[40] The schemes in which small holdings were consolidated in this manner cover an area of 25,364 *faddāns* out of which 12,325 *faddāns* were privately owned, i.e. about 11 per cent of the total area under fee simple in the province.[14]

The system of issuing short term leases to the occupants of government agricultural land (instead of selling it outright to them, as was the case in the early years of the Condominium) is generally considered to be stifling to the occupant's interest in the land. The leaseholder is not likely to look after the plot or invest heavily in it if he does not expect to keep it. The same applies to communal lands allotted for short periods to community members. But, again, one finds that the circumstances in which these systems operate in the Sudan differ considerably from those prevailing in many other countries. As far as government land is concerned, the term of the lease is determined mainly by the amount of capital which the lessee intends to invest in the land: the larger the amount of capital which he invests in overhead such as buildings, pumps, agricultural machinery, etc., the longer is the term of the lease. Leases are usually granted for periods of five, ten or fifteen years, which are regarded as sufficient to give the investor a fair return on his capital (allowing for a reasonable rate of asset depreciation). Besides, if he runs his concession well, the lessee may have his lease renewed for an indefinite number of times, and this should keep his interest in the land alive.

---

[38] This average is for the pump schemes established on private land only. The average freehold area in the pump schemes which include also state domain is 167 *faddāns*.

[39] The data on pump schemes is taken from Department of Statistics, *A Report on the Census of Pump Schemes,* 1963, vol. ii, part 2, table 9, p. 44. Information about *sāqias* is found in the *Annual Reports* of the Department (now the Ministry) of Agriculture and Forests.

[40] J. W. Hewison, "Northern Province Agriculture," in Tothill, *op. cit.*, p. 755.

[41] Department of Statistics, *op. cit.*

In the case of communal landholdings, the problem of deterioration in the plots assigned to the individuals for short periods does not arise in any serious manner. The rain crops which are grown on the communal lands (which are largely confined to the areas receiving more than 600 mm. of rainfall *per annum*) are invariably annual crops, like sorghum, sesame and cotton. Gum arabic is practically the only perennial crop known in the communally held rainlands, and its trees grow wild. So the farmer has no perennial trees which need nursing for a number of years, and he is quite free to shift to a new plot after four or five years of continuous cultivation has exhausted the fertility of the soil. Besides, communal land is far in excess of demand and is expected to remain so for a long time to come. So long as these conditions continue to exist, shifting cultivation will remain the most economic mode of agriculture, for it is much cheaper in such circumstances to shift from one plot to another instead of trying to preserve and replenish the fertility of one plot by applying artificial fertilizers and conforming to a rigid crop rotation. For these reasons, the manner in which government and communal lands are allotted to users has no real bearing on the question of maintaining the fertility of the land and investing in it.

From this we conclude that the manner and circumstances in which the institutions of (fragmented) freeholding of land and the allotment of state and communal land function in this country are such that they do not have their usual adverse effect on agricultural development. Indeed, they have proved to be quite workable and far more intelligible and acceptable to the indigenous population than most of the institutions which were proposed to replace them. So far, they have adapted admirably to centuries of economic, social and political change. Most of the alterations which were made in them proved to be short lived, and they were, anyway, introduced for political reasons and not dictated by economic necessity. However, the future is uncertain and it remains to be seen if economic conditions will change so radically that it may be necessary to abolish or modify these institutions. But judging by their past performance, one can predict with a fair amount of confidence that they will not fail to accommodate any foreseeable change in their environment.

DEVELOPMENTS OF THE QUARTER

Comment and Chronology

GARRY OWEN
1902-1971

On March 7, 1971, the Board of Governors of The Middle East Institute lost a most valued member and friend, who for the past thirty years had devoted his life and energies to strengthening the bonds of friendship and mutual respect between America and the peoples and governments of the Middle East. In the worldwide community of people knowledgeable about the Middle East, Garry Owen stood out as an elder business statesman, representing the totality of American oil interests in the Arabian Peninsula from its modest beginnings in the early 1940s to the present enterprise that represents one of America's greatest overseas ventures. His mostly unsung accomplishments as skilled negotiator and dedicated representative for the Arabian American Oil Company and the Trans-Arabian Pipe Line Company were attributable to his perception and wisdom in bringing about harmony among all the myriad international relationships involving American and Middle Eastern interests.

To those who had the privilege of being closely associated with him, he was admired for his gracious style and consideration for others. He gave freely of his intimate knowledge of the history and cultures of the Middle East, and his friendship was a valuable asset from which one derived not only added dimensions of knowledge but also a feeling of confidence and trust in one of America's truly great "old Middle East hands." He was the confidant and friend of high officialdom throughout the Middle East, the foremost being King Faysal of Saudi Arabia, who considered him as a brother. During his 14 years' residence in Jiddah, he became the undisputed dean of the foreign business community known to all, whether resident or visitor, as a strongly partisan "Jiddawi"—the American counterpart to his friend and neighbor, the British scholar and Arabist, H. St. John B. Philby. In his daily life, whether engaged in business or social activities, he attracted admiration and respect for his ideals of fruitful relationships between the United States and the people and governments of the Middle East. He will be sorely missed by all who subscribe to these ideals.

CHRONOLOGY

November 16, 1970 — February 15, 1971

Arab Israeli Conflict

1970

Nov. 16: Jordan's King Ḥusayn said he had turned down a proposal for bilateral talks with Israel made through UN Special Envoy Gunnar Jarring by Israel.

Israeli Premier Golda Meir said of Israeli efforts to obtain rectification of Egyptian missile buildup violations: "I was never prepared to undertake that our struggle would lead to fulfillment of our just demand in its entirety, and in full."

Time Magazine reported that Israeli Deputy Premier Yigal Allon and King Ḥusayn held a series of secret meetings since Sept. 1968 to discuss "peace."

Ḥusayn issued a denial that he had met Deputy Premier Allon in secret talks and rejected the idea of bilateral talks.

Nov. 17: Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan said he favored resuming the Jarring talks on condition that a new cease-fire would be arranged through the US based on certain "physical arrangements" of a "more permanent" nature.

Nov. 18: Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban said "it has been made absolutely clear to us that there is no chance" of a return to the Aug. 6 *status quo* in the Suez area; but "we do not believe we can pass over . . . violations in silence. The Prime Minister therefore used a comprehensive phrase—that is, the creation of conditions which will enable the talks to take place—but she added that such conditions do not at present exist."

A UN spokesman said UN Special Envoy Jarring would return to Moscow for an "indefinite period."

Israel reported a mortar attack on Metulla with no casualties.

Nov. 19: UAR President Anwar al-Sādāt said "no one in our country could ever agree that only part of our territories" occupied in June, 1967 "should be liberated. This would be surrender."

Jarring, in a message to the Israeli government, confirmed that his mandate continues to derive from the Nov. 1967 Security Council resolution.

Nov. 22: The Israeli Cabinet resolved to continue efforts to "create conditions that will justify" resumption of the Jarring talks.

The New York Times cited "reliable sources" saying the Israeli Cabinet rejected a proposal of Defense Minister Dayan for a longterm cease-fire based on a mutual cutback of strength at the Suez Canal.

Nov. 23: Israel said UAR aircraft violated the cease-fire by crossing the Suez Canal.

A UAR spokesman called the charge "a pure lie without any foundation of truth."

Nov. 24: *Al-Fateh* said any Palestinian supporting the creation of a West Bank Palestinian state would be regarded as a traitor and tried by a revolutionary court.

Ḥusayn said he was calling on Arab heads of state to convene for talks on Palestinian representation at peace talks and the establishment of a West Bank Palestinian state.

Nov. 26: Dayan confirmed reports that he favored a new cease-fire agreement involving a mutual cutback of forces at the Suez so talks could begin without fear of attack.

Nov. 27: UAR President Sādāt warned Israel against joining the Jarring talks only to "freeze the situation. . . . Because Egypt will not accept an extension of the cease-fire unless she is convinced that Israel's contacts with Jarring are serious."

Nov. 28: A hand grenade thrown at an army patrol wounded 3 soldiers and killed 1 Arab in Gaza.

Nov. 30: Sādāt said the UAR would not accept a second extension of the cease-fire unless a timetable is set for Israeli withdrawal from land occupied in June 1967.

Israel accused Egypt of continuing to build missile sites in the Suez zone.

The US said U-2 reconaissance flights over the Suez Canal were stopped "3 weeks ago" and there were no plans to resume them.

Dec. 1: Israel announced that an Egyptian motor launch loaded with hashish and carrying at least 1 Egyptian intelligence agent was sunk off the coast of Sinai killing 4 Egyptians.

The New York Times reported the US was continuing to survey the Suez Canal by satellite.

Dec. 2: The US called for prudence and restraint that "nothing be done which could jeopardize the cease-fire" and said the US "deeply regrets any incidents."

The UAR called the sinking of an Egyptian motor launch a "criminal act" and denied the craft was involved in smuggling.

Dec. 5: Israel reported 1 Egyptian was killed in the 1st Suez crossing by an Egyptian intelligence unit since Aug. 7.

Egypt said the report was "utterly fabricated."

Dec. 6: Premier Meir told the Israeli Cabinet that additional clarification of US commitments were necessary before Israel would resume the Jarring talks.

Dec. 8: The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Central Committee announced it was decided to establish a central command for all resistance forces including regulars, commandos and militia.

The UN General Assembly passed a resolution saying the "people of Palestine" have the "inalienable rights" of self-determination. The vote was 47 to 22 with 50 abstentions.

Dec. 12: Ḥusayn said he proposed a meeting of the Arab heads of state as "just the place" to bring up the issue of a Palestinian West Bank state and when Israel is withdrawn from the West Bank "if the Palestinians should then wish to separate . . . it is entirely up to them." He added that it would be letting the Palestinians down to move toward a West Bank state now "while the whole of Palestine is under occupation" and the Palestinians are divided.

National Secretary of the Russian Communist Party Boris N. Ponomarev told the Arab Socialist Union that in the event of Israeli "aggression" the Soviet Union "will support the struggle of the people and leaders of the United Arab Republic under all circumstances."

Guerrilla spokesmen announced the formation of a secretariat and a unified information office to oversee the commando movement, and the Central Committee of the PLO established a "central military command" to direct military operations.

Dec. 13: Ḥusayn said he would like to see the US and USSR take an active peacekeeping rôle in the Middle East.

Dayan said Israel would never permit UN troops on her soil.

Dec. 14: An Israeli official said the government was opposed to direct political dealings with Palestinian leaders in the West Bank since "peace must be negotiated with responsible governments, and in this case that means the government of Jordan."

The New York Times reported "reliable sources" as saying the US would be willing to participate in a UN sponsored peacekeeping force if other nations were also involved.

Dec. 16: PLO Central Committee Chairman Yāsir 'Arafāt held talks with Syrian Premier Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad.

Dec. 19: Lebanon reported an Israeli raiding party was driven out after destroying houses near the village of Ainata.

Meir said Russia was supplying Egypt with Frog-7 surface to surface missiles.

Dec. 20: Commandos fired 2 rockets into a residential area of Jerusalem.

Dec. 21: Russian Premier Aleksei Kosygin called for "immediate" Israeli acceptance of the Nov. 1967 Security Council resolution and warned that Israel should not expect concessions in return for agreeing to a peaceful settlement.

Dec. 22: Meir said Israel would want assurances that the Arabs were ready for peace before discussing withdrawal from occupied territory.

Dec. 23: US Secretary of State William Rogers said the US had "not excluded the possibility" of a peacekeeping rôle in the Middle East as an "added assurance that the agreement would be observed" but he added that a joint Soviet-American force, "with just the two of us involved, would be totally impractical."

Sādāt outlined the UAR's conditions for peace to *The New York Times* as follows: Israeli withdrawal from "every inch" of territory occupied in June 1967 followed by Egyptian recognition of Israel's rights as an independent state and acceptance of a 4 Power guarantee of the agreement; Israel's "rights of passage" through the Strait of Tiran "at once"; settlement of the "refugee problem" as a precondition to Israeli access through the Suez Canal; no formal diplomatic relations between Israel and Egypt.

Dec. 26: Following talks between Egyptian Vice President 'Alī Ṣabrī and Russian leaders, a joint communiqué said both countries support all efforts toward a peaceful settlement.

Dec. 28: Israel said an army unit crossed into Lebanon and blew up 4 houses used by guerrillas.

Lebanon reported 12 commandos and 2 civilians were killed in the raid.

The Israeli Cabinet voted to resume the Jarring talks.

Sādāt said Israel's decision to resume the Jarring talks was a "maneuver" to get the cease-fire extended.

Dec. 29: Meir said "not one Israeli soldier will be withdrawn . . . until a binding peace agreement has been reached" and called for free negotiations without outside pressure.

Sādāt ordered "all the executive, political and legislative organs of the nation to be put in battle formation and that they should have a battle plan."

Dec. 30: Israeli Foreign Minister Eban called for a "rhetorical de-escalation" between Israel and the UAR and said the talks should be carried out with a sense of "urgency, but patience."

The New York Times cited "informed sources" as saying Egypt might arm civilians in expectation of resumed fighting with Israel.

1971

Jan. 1: Editor of *Al-Ahrām* Muḥammad Haykal wrote in an editorial: "The use of force will be the unavoidable choice if a reasonable and acceptable compromise of the Middle East crisis is to be realized."

Jan. 2: Jordanian Premier Waṣfī al-Tall outlined his government's negotiating position saying Jordan "insists on the Palestinian people's right to their soil and homeland."

Sādāt said the UAR was ready for an "all-out battle" after Feb. 5 and warned that Israel might try a pre-emptive strike before then.

Jan. 4: Israel reported 3 grenade attacks against military patrols in Gaza.

Sādāt said at a rally in Tanta 6 Soviet soldiers were killed in an Israeli raid on a missile site early in 1970.

Ambassadors to the UN Yosef Tekoah of Israel and Muḥammad al-Zayyāt of Egypt arrived in New York.

Jan. 5: Ambassadors to the UN Tekoah, al-Zayyāt and Muḥammad al-Farra of Jordan met individually with Jarring. Zayyāt said afterwards: "I am not as hopeful as when I went in. I don't think we are getting a serious intention to talk."

Jan. 7: Jarring flew to Israel with Tekoah for talks with Meir and the government.

Israel charged Egypt with overflying the Suez cease-fire line.

Jan. 8: Jarring met with Meir and Eban.

Jan. 9: Jarring met with Meir. An Israeli spokesman said: "We have taken the initiative in proposing ideas and suggestions for the establishment of peace." "We hope we have given the talks an effective start."

Egyptian Foreign Minister Maḥmūd Riyāḍ said he met with "very good understanding" in talks with France, Britain and the Soviet Union but that the US was "encouraging Israeli aggression."

Jarring returned to New York and said his talks in Israel were "very interesting and useful."

A strike closed down the city of Gaza while 12 Arabs were injured by commando grenade attacks.

Jan. 10: The New York Times reported Egypt and Jordan appealed to the UN to stop Israel from "further changing the character and demographic composition" of the occupied territories.

Jan. 11: Jarring conveyed to Egypt the outlines of an Israeli proposal for a settlement.

Sādāt accused "Israeli-American propaganda" of misrepresenting his warning that he would not extend the cease-fire without progress toward a settlement. He said that a refusal to extend the cease-fire beyond Feb. 5 would not necessarily mean immediate all-out war with Israel.

Jan. 15: An Israeli force raided a commando base at Sarafand on the Lebanese coast 28 miles from the Israeli border.

Zayyāt presented Jarring with a document he described as Egypt's "position today."

Jan. 18: Jarring conveyed to Tekoah an Egyptian response to Israeli peace proposals. Tekoah said Israel would study the response "very carefully."

UN Secretary General U Thant said he was "cautiously optimistic about the outcome of those discussions" and that the "cautious optimism is shared by Ambassador Jarring."

Libya proposed holding an Arab summit conference in Kuwayt on Jan. 25 to discuss "pan-Arabization of the battle" against Israel.

Jan. 19: Jeune Afrique published an alleged copy of the proposals Israel submitted to Jarring on Jan. 8. The proposals included "peace must be expressed in a binding treaty. . . ." and "withdrawal of military forces from territories lying beyond positions agreed in the peace treaty."

Jan. 20: Al-Ahrām reported that the Central Committee of the PLO decided to support Jordan and the UAR for a political settlement. Commando spokesmen denied the report adding that the commandos do not object to efforts of the Arab governments to regain territory lost in June 1967.

Egypt made public its reply to Israeli proposals to Jarring which called for termination of "Israeli aggression," withdrawal of forces beyond the "5 June 1967 lines" and "a just settlement of the Palestine refugees."

Jan. 21: Israeli Minister of Communications Shimon Peres said the alleged Israeli proposals published in *Jeune Afrique* approximated the true Israeli position.

Jan. 22: Meir said the Arabs were not considering Israel's proposals but only restated their positions to Jarring.

The heads of state of Libya, Egypt, Sudan and Syria ended a 2 day conference in Cairo. A joint communiqué said the "Tripoli charter states" consider it necessary to "strengthen the eastern front by massing various forces along the frontline with the enemy" and to "continue supporting the Palestinian resistance," and it charged Israel with trying to prepetuate the occupation of Arab territories "by turning the temporary cease-fire into a permanent one."

Jan. 24: An Israeli Cabinet spokesmen said: "Despite the polemical tone of the Egyptian note, the Government of Israel intends to continue the process of talks via Ambassador Jarring. . ."

Jan. 25: The New York Times printed the text of Jordan's proposals submitted to Jarring on Jan. 18 calling for "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from all occupied territories," a "just settlement of the Palestine refugees," free navigation of international waterways, free access to religious and historical sites in Arab Jerusalem and guarantees of "the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area."

Jan. 26: Dayan said Sam 2 missiles were deployed in Syria.

Jan. 27: Israel submitted a 2nd policy statement to Jarring.

Feb. 1: Israel reported army units raided guerrilla bases in Lebanon.

Feb. 4: Sādāt said Egypt would extend the cease-fire for 30 days and would allow reopening of the Suez Canal if Israel would begin a partial withdrawal from the east bank of the canal.

Israeli officials said Egypt's 30 day truce extension was like holding a pistol to the heads of the negotiators.

The New York Times said the US "was reliably reported" to have told a Big Four meeting that the US was willing to discuss big power guarantees of a Middle East settlement if the Jarring talks showed signs of progress.

Feb. 5: Meir said if the Suez should be opened it must be open to Israeli shipping as well as to that of other nations.

Feb. 6: An Egyptian spokesman said if Israel did not accept the proposal to open the Suez Canal it would be the same as rejecting "any efforts for a peaceful solution."

Feb. 7: The Israeli Cabinet decided to seek clarification through diplomatic channels of the Egyptian proposal to open the Suez Canal.

Feb. 9: Meir said Israel was ready to support a reopening of the Suez Canal to all ships including Israel's and to discuss a "mutual de-escalation of the military confrontation." She reiterated Israel's refusal to withdraw troops until a peace agreement should be reached and added that the Egyptian proposal "tries to achieve a strategic advantage by the withdrawal of Israel's forces without actual progress toward peace."

An Egyptian spokesman commenting on Egypt's Suez proposal said withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Canal was an essential condition for reopening and that the passage of Israeli ships "comes after the solving of the problem of the Palestinian refugees."

Feb. 10: The New York Times reported "Western diplomats" confirming disagreement between the US and the other participants in the Big Four talks on resolutions concerning substantive points in the Jarring talks. The US opposed the resolutions, favoring "quiet diplomacy" instead.

Feb. 12: Allon criticized Jarring's rôle in the peace talks saying "He is neither an obligatory nor an optional arbitrator." *The New York Times* reported Jarring had submitted to Egypt and Israel questions which Israel felt contained Jarring's personal views and proposals.

A spokesman for UN Secretary General U Thant said: "The secretary general regards Dr. Jarring's contacts with the two parties as entirely within his mandate."

Feb. 14: US Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco commended Jarring's rôle in the talks and Sādāt's efforts to reach a political solution. He said the talks were dealing with the "crucial questions" and it was time for "painful decisions" by both sides.

Sādāt clarified his proposal to open the Suez Canal saying if Israel would withdraw to a line east of Al-Arish, "I would guarantee to reopen the canal within six months. I would prolong the cease-fire to a fixed date. I would guarantee free passage in the Strait of Tiran with an international force at Sharm el-Sheik."

Feb. 15: Egypt said it sent a "positive" reply to questions submitted by Jarring.

General

1970

Nov. 18: The Commissioner General of UNRWA said the agency is threatened by acute financial needs.

Nov. 23: The US issued an appeal to all nations at the UN to contribute to UNRWA.

Nov. 27: Following talks between UAR President Anwar al-Sādāt and Syrian Premier Ḥāfiẓ Asad it was announced Syria would join the alliance with the UAR, Sudan and Libya to work toward federation.

Dec. 4: Britain announced a donation of £1.8m to UNRWA and criticized UN members for not giving more, according to *Middle East Economic Digest.*

Dec. 5: Commissioner General of UNRWA Laurence Michelmore said the agency was $5.5m to $6m short of the $47.5m minimum needed in 1971.

Dec. 8: A Franco-Arab chamber of commerce was established including 14 Arab League members and 6 Gulf amirates.

Dec. 9: The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) opened its 21st meeting in Venezuela.

Dec. 12: OPEC agreed to work for "substantial" increases in the price of crude oil.

Dec. 15: The US announced that a joint British-US air and communications base would be built on the Diego Garcia atoll in the Indian Ocean.

Dec. 26: The Second Islamic Conference opened in Karachi.

Dec. 27: The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) ended a meeting without accepting Iraq's bid for membership. Formation of an Arab oil tanker fleet and a petroleum services company was approved.

OPEC announced it decided to set 55% as the minimum tax on the net income of oil companies.

Dec. 29: The Second Islamic Conference adjourned after agreeing to set up an Islamic secretariat and to support the Palestinians in "their rightful struggle."

The 30th Conference of Arab Boycott of Israeli Offices concluded with a resolution to tighten the boycott.

1971

Jan. 2: The UN made an appeal for funds to help educate Palestinian refugees saying $10m is needed to overcome a crisis.

Jan. 12: Talks opened in Tehran between OPEC representatives and oil companies to negotiate price rises and a 55% profit rate for Iran, Iraq, Kuwayt, Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi and Qatar.

Jan. 20: A summit conference of the heads of state of the Tripoli Charter States, Egypt, Libya, Sudan Syria, convened in Cairo.

Feb. 2: Oil negotiations in Tehran broke down. A statement by 22 oil companies said: "It has not been possible to reach agreement on financial items or to obtain adequate assurance that a sufficient volume of oil will be available for the needs of consuming countries."

Feb. 3: A report by the UN Relief Works Agency said: "If UNRWA cannot collect the requested $41m it will be impossible for her to meet part of her commitments as of next September."

Feb. 4: Iranian Finance Minister Jamshid Amouzegar, speaking for the oil producing countries at negotiations in Tehran, said if no settlement is reached by Feb. 15 the exporting countries would pass legislation to raise prices unilaterally.

Feb. 7: OPEC threatened a "total embargo on shipments of crude oil and petroleum products" if oil companies refused to meet demanded price rises in 2 weeks.

Feb. 14: An agreement was reached between oil companies and 6 Persian Gulf states negotiating in Tehran. Taxes were raised to 55% and posted prices by $.35 a barrel. The settlement would increase the producing countries' total annual oil income from $4.4 billion to $7.4 billion by 1975.

Afghanistan

1970

Dec. 15: The Asian Development Bank approved a $5.15m loan for agricultural development in Baghlan and Kunduz.

Algeria

(*See also* Libya, Morocco)

1970

Nov. 16: The 3rd phase of French-Algerian talks on economic relations opened in Paris.

It was announced Canada would grant £91m, to be repaid over 50 years without interest, and credit for 1m tons of wheat over a 4 year period.

Nov. 17: Three Frenchmen were sentenced to prison for "economic espionage and threatening the external security of Algeria."

Head of the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization Yāsir 'Arafāt left after meetings with President Boumedienne.

Nov. 19: The Ministry of Industry & Power announced terms to compensate Royal/Dutch Shell for nationalization of Shell's holdings.

Nov. 20: A member of the French Embassy staff, Gerard Maurois, was expelled from Algeria after being arrested for espionage.

Nov. 28: The 3rd phase of the Franco-Algerian economic talks adjourned with an agreement to supply France with natural gas for a 15 year period and to resume talks on Dec. 16.

Dec. 10: Saida province was declared a disaster area because of drought.

Dec. 16: The 4th phase of Franco-Algerian talks opened.

Dec. 18: Students clashed with police in a demonstration in Algiers demanding greater use of Arabic in schools and universities.

Dec. 31: The 4th phase of the Franco-Algerian negotiations ended.

1971

Jan. 9: Port authorities prevented French Elf-ERAP tankers from loading oil bound for France because of a "commercial dispute."

Feb. 3: France signed an agreement to purchase 3,500m cubic meters of natural gas per year for 15 years.

Cyprus

1970

Nov. 19: Four Greek Cypriots were sentenced to 14 years in prison for an assassination attempt on President Makarios in March.

Dec. 10: Twenty-one Greek Cypriots were sentenced to prison terms for a raid on a Limassol police station in May and for being members of the illegal National Front.

Iran

(*See also* General)

1970

Nov. 12: Foreign Minister Ardeshir Zahedi said of the Persian Gulf: "Our idea is to deter any foolish ideas and to maintain stability." He stated Iran's claims to Abu Musa and the Tumbs Islands. "These islands have been ours and they are going to be ours. There is no compromise. Look at the Chinese Communists in Aden. If these islands go all our interests will be damaged."

Nov. 16: The Oil Consortium announced it agreed to a tax rise on net oil income from 50 to 55% and a rise in posted prices of crude of $.09 per barrel, both effective Nov. 14, 1970.

Nov. 18: Gulf Aviation of Baḥrayn agreed to cooperate with Iran Air to operate flights between Bandar Abbas, Shiraz, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Qaṭar and Baḥrayn.

Nov. 21: A 10 day naval exercise under the auspices of the Central Treaty Organization was completed.

Nov. 24: It was reported the government ordered 30 Hercules transport aircraft worth $51m from Lockheed of the US.

Dec. 11: Middle East Economic Digest reported the 1963 EEC trade agreement was extended for another year.

Dec. 23: A government spokesman said a plot to assassinate 28 Iranian leaders was halted by security forces. It was alleged that the late Gen. Taymur Bakhtiar had conspired with Iraqi Ba'thists to overthrow the government. Twenty men were arrested.

The World Bank granted a $60m loan for expanding the electricity network around Tehran.

1971

Jan. 2: Premier Abbas Hoveyda announced Cabinet changes:

- Reza Azimi: *War*
- Assadollah Sani'i: *Agricultural Products & Consumer Goods*
- Manuchehr Gudarzi: *Minister of State for Transport Affairs*

Jan. 3: The newly appointed UAR Ambassador Muḥammad Sāmī Anwar presented credentials to the Shah.

Feb. 11: An earthquake struck Azerbaijan.

Iraq

(*See also* General, Iran, South Yemen, UAR)

1970

Nov. 17: President Ḥasan al-Bakr appealed for private investment in Iraqi industry and announced easing of import restrictions. He added that on Nov. 10 the Planning Council had approved linking private capital to 820 projects distributed "to achieve a balance among the various regions of the country."

Nov. 20: South Yemen's Defense Minister 'Alī Aḥmad Anṭār left after a 7 day visit.

Nov. 22: Minister of Oil & Minerals Sa'dūn Ḥammādī said the government demanded that the Iraq Petroleum Company and its associated companies match the terms of the Iranian settlement of Nov. 16 raising taxation on nominal profits from 50 to 55% and posted prices of crude by $.09 per barrel.

Nov. 27: Middle East Economic Digest reported President Bakr appealed for "investment of private capital in Iraqi industry" to contribute to the success of the 5-year plan and announced easing of import restrictions.

Bakr issued a decree lifting restrictions on public freedoms. Political detainees Ṭāhir Yaḥyā and 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Bazzāz were released along with other political prisoners detained since July 1968.

Nov. 29: Baghdad Radio reported that 15 Iraqis arrived in Baghdad after release from Egypt ending a "period of abnormality in relations between the two sister Arab countries."

Dec. 2: The Iraqi National Minerals Corporation announced large phosphate deposits were discovered in the Akkasha region.

Dec. 30: Beirut's *Al-Kifāḥ* reported the government ended military censorship of mail in effect since 1958.

1971

Jan. 6: Units of the Soviet fleet arrived in Umm Qasr on a goodwill visit marking the 50th anniversary of the Iraqi army.

Feb. 11: The Soviet Communist Party condemned "reactionary forces" in Iraq for persecution of Iraqi communists.

Israel

(*See also* Arab-Israeli Conflict)

1970

Nov. 16: Premier Golda Meir charged that the USSR was setting up show trials to crush the spirit of Jews seeking to emigrate to Israel.

Nov. 18: US President Nixon asked Congress for $500m to finance arms for Israel.

The New York Times reported "Israeli and Arab sources" confirmed Palestinian officials deported during the hijacking crisis of Sept. were being allowed to return to the West Bank.

Nov. 22: Police announced 13 members of the terrorist cell responsible for the bombing of the Tel Aviv bus station were arrested.

Nov. 24: Postal workers in Tel Aviv went on strike.

Nov. 28: Police reported 6 assassinations in Gaza on Nov. 26 bringing the total to 15 in Nov.

Dec. 9: Defense Minister Moshe Dayan arrived in the US for talks with the Nixon administration.

Dec. 16: Demonstrations were held to protest the trial of Jews in the USSR on charges of attempted hijacking.

Dec. 20: Five new cholera cases were confirmed in Gaza which brought the total to 230.

Dec. 25: The Knesset called on the Soviet Union to cancel the death sentences of 2 Jews convicted of attempted plane hijacking.

1971

Jan. 3: Military authorities dismissed Raghib al-Alamī, Egyptian appointed Mayor of Gaza for refusing to cooperate with the authorities.

The army published figures showing 237 Israelis were killed and 782 wounded in hostile action during 1970.

Jan. 4: Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir presented the 1971/72 budget totaling $3.8 billion, with 40% allocated to military spending.

A civilian agricultural settlement was opened in the Sinai desert.

Jan. 12: Authorities said an espionage and sabotage ring in Jerusalem was broken and suspects included Arab UN employees.

Jan. 26: The New York Times reported Israel requested an additional $500m in economic and military credit for 1971.

Feb. 3: The government issued an appeal for international pressure on Arab governments to halt alleged persecution of Jewish subjects and to permit them to emigrate to Israel.

Feb. 9: A *Fatḥ* cell was broken in the Hebron hills and 45 Arabs were arrested.

Feb. 15: The Ministry of Housing announced it would proceed with plans for housing projects in areas of Jerusalem occupied in June 1967.

Jordan

(*See also* Arab-Israeli Conflict, Kuwayt, Saudi Arabia, UAR)

1970

Nov. 16: Fatḥ charged that the Jordanian army killed or wounded 35 persons in attacks on Irbid and reported fighting in Jarash.

A government spokesman said 6 soldiers were killed in clashes started by commandos.

Nov. 18: Damascus Radio reported fighting broke out in the Ramthah region between the Army and guerrillas.

Skirmishes occurred in Amman for 2 hours while the Higher Arab Committee which is supervising the truce met in extraordinary session.

US President Nixon asked Congress to approve $30m in military aid to Jordan.

Nov. 19: Economy Minister 'Umar al-Nabulsī said the September civil war had already caused a loss of nearly £29m to the economy. He added that aid was hoped for from Britain, West Germany and the World Bank and the US had already offered $5m.

Agence France Presse quoted a "reliable source" saying JD 20m had been transferred abroad since the September fighting.

A cease-fire went into effect after night fighting in Amman.

Nov. 22: A member of the Higher Arab Committee was killed during clashes in Amman.

Nov. 23: UAR Chief of Staff Aḥmad Ṣadīq held talks with King Ḥusayn in Amman.

Nov. 24: An IMF delegation ended talks in Amman lending $10m for an Amman-Zarqa road and for school construction.

Nov. 25: A government spokesman said the army clashed with guerrillas in the north in "an operation against dissident *fedayeen* who were rebelling against their commanders."

A government spokesman said the army routed guerrillas from positions near Jarash after the deadline for their withdrawal from the area expired.

Nov. 28: Arab truce observers reported the government has released all guerrilla prisoners taken in Sept.

Bahi Ladgham, head of the Higher Arab Committee, said recent incidents "had been unmeasureably exaggerated abroad" and there was no question of deliberate and willful acts.

Dec. 3: Ḥusayn arrived in London for talks with Prime Minister Heath and Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home.

Dec. 6: Ḥusayn said once a "general settlement" has been fully implemented, then "we can reexamine the whole question" of the West Bank "excluding nothing, even the possibility of the separation of the West Bank from Jordan."

Fighting was reported in Amman and Kerash. The Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) complained to the Higher Arab Committee supervising the truce that the army was planning an offensive against commandos in Jarash and Irbid. The government accused commandos of attacking police stations and placing all forces on alert.

Dec. 7: Reuters reported an agreement was reached between the government and commandos to "stop provocative actions and end tension."

Dec. 8: Ḥusayn conferred with President Nixon on "military and economic conditions" in Jordan and the Jarring talks.

Fighting was reported in the north for the 4th day. Army officers said commandos were cleared out of Jarash on Dec. 7 but resistance continued around the Bekaa refugee camp.

Ḥusayn met with President Nixon and US Defense Secretary Melvin Laird.

Dec. 10: Ḥusayn said he asked the US for $200m repayable over 5 or 10 years and added that he was extremely satisfied with his talks in Washington.

Dec. 13: Al-Ahrām reported Chairman of the Central Committee of the PLO Yāsir 'Arafāt requested on Dec. 11 that Egypt and Syria intervene in the deteriorating situation in Jordan.

Ḥusayn arrived in Paris for talks with President Pompidou.

Head of the Higher Arab Committee Ladgham said the government and commandos had reached an agreement to end fighting, suspend press attacks on each other and permit freedom of transport and supplies for the commandos.

Dec. 14: Syria warned that she would continue to support the commandos against "plans to liquidate the commando movement" in Jordan.

Clashes in Amman killed 2 persons.

Dec. 15: Ladgham announced a new agreement between the government and commandos in which the commando militia would be disarmed until a national emergency or war with Israel.

Dec. 16: Ḥusayn held talks with West German Chancellor Willy Brandt.

Dec. 20: Ambassador to Kuwayt Muḥammad Naẓẓāl Armūṭī said the rulers of the Gulf states "showed sympathy and full understanding" and expressed readiness to give Jordan every possible support.

Dec. 24: The government announced the US agreed to grant an additional $5m for reconstruction of damage.

Dec. 25: A government spokesman said guerrillas killed 2 army soldiers in an attack near Amman.

Dec. 26: A guerrilla communiqué said commandos and army troops fought a 2 day battle near Salt. A government statement said a guerrilla base was overrun with 4 army casualties.

Dec. 27: The Higher Arab Committee reported a skirmish in Amman. Guerrilla spokesmen in Beirut accused Jordan of continuing assaults on guerrilla bases near Salt.

1971

Jan 8: Commando spokesmen said the army was conducting a sweep of commando positions in the north. The Central Committee of the PLO broadcast an appeal to Arab heads of state to intervene in Jordan to end the "conspiracy to liquidate the Palestinian revolution."

Middle East Economic Digest reported Jordan will receive ½ of its subsidy from Saudi Arabia in the form of crude oil.

Jan. 9: Egyptian President Anwar al-Sādāt urged Arab heads of state to send envoys to Amman to seek a solution to the "deteriorating situation."

A *Fatḥ* spokesman reported the army was continuing its offensive against commando bases near Salt and Jarash.

Jan. 10: Fighting continued in Amman. The government accused unidentified men of opening fire on a police station.

Laghdam called for an immediate cease-fire and said this would be a condition for his continuing his duties in Jordan.

Jan. 11: Calm was reported outside Amman but sporadic shooting occurred in the city. A member of the PLO Central Committee, Ibrāhīm Bakr, said government attacks had encouraged Palestinians to consider the creation of a separate Palestinian state.

Syria's President Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad offered to mediate the dispute between the government and commandos.

Jan. 12: Government and commando leaders appealed for calm as fighting continued in Amman and in the countryside.

Jan. 13: Commandos attacked army positions near the Syrian border.

It was announced a truce was agreed between the government and commandos providing freedom of movement for commandos and stipulating that part-time commandos would turn over their guns for storage in commando arsenals.

Jan. 17: Beirut's *Al-Nahār* published an interview with George Habash, head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, in which Habash said King Ḥusayn was "determined to crush the Palestinian resistance movement" and urged Ḥusayn's overthrow.

Jan. 21: Ḥusayn returned after talks in the US, France and Britain and medical treatment in London.

Jan. 31: The mandate of the Higher Arab Committee expired but acting chief Aḥmad Ḥilmī said the committee would continue work for the time being.

Feb. 11: Fighting broke out in Amman between the army and guerrillas. The government said guerrillas had violated agreements not to carry unauthorized arms and had attacked security patrols and a police station.

Feb. 12: Fighting spread in Amman. Commandos said they destroyed a helicopter at Amman airport and routed army troops with artillery. Yāsir 'Arafāt appealed to Arab leaders to "end the torture and suffering of our people." The government said the situation was in hand and a cease-fire was agreed on.

Feb. 13: Heavy fighting ended in Amman but sporadic firing continued.

Kuwayt

(*See also* General, Persian Gulf, Sudan)

1970

Nov. 20: Middle East Economic Digest reported the National Assembly's Economic Committee rejected a plan for taxes on gasoline, cinema tickets and cigarettes to aid the Palestinian resistance movement.

Middle East Economic Digest reported that the government allocated $3m. to aid victims of the fighting in Jordan.

Nov. 21: A Saudi Arabian delegation arrived in Kuwayt to discuss means of bringing about the proposed Federation of Arab Amirates.

Nov. 24: The Kuwayt Oil Company agreed to raise the posted price by $.09, from $1.59 to $1.68 per barrel and to pay a tax increase from 50 to 55% effective Nov. 14.

Nov. 27: It was announced the government would establish a company to take over the British Bank of the Middle East when the concession expires in Dec. 1971.

Dec. 6: Minister of Finance Aḥmad Lawzī announced aid to Jordan would be resumed.

Dec. 23: *Reuters* reported Foreign Minister Sabāh al-Sabāh as saying financial aid to Jordan, which was resumed early in December, would again be cut off if fighting resumes between the Jordanian army and commandos.

Dec. 27: East Germany announced agreement to exchange consulates.

1971

Jan. 12: The government announced that the subsidy to Jordan was discontinued until assurances are received that the government honors agreements with the commandos.

Jan. 23: General elections were held. The Merchant and Beduin Parties won 17 seats each and the Arab Nationalist Movement won 5.

Feb. 2: A new Cabinet was announced.

Jāsim Dāwūd al-Marzūq: *Justice*
Ḥamad Mubārak 'Iyyār: *Social Affairs & Labor*
Muḥammad Yūsuf al-Naṣr: *Public Works*
Khalid Sulaymān al-'Adasānī: *Commerce & Industry*
Rashīd al-Farḥān: *Awqaf & Islamic Affairs*
Sa'd al-'Abdallāh: *Interior* and *Defense*
'Abd al-Raḥmān Salīm al-'Atiqī: *Finance* and *Oil*
'Abd al-Razzāq Mishārī al-'Adwānī: *Public Health*
'Abd al-'Azīz Ḥusayn: *State for Cabinet Affairs*
'Abd al-'Azīz al-Sar'āwī: *Post, Telephone & Telegraph*
Sabāh al-Aḥmad al-Jābir al-Sabāh: *Premier*

Lebanon

(*See also* Arab-Israeli Conflict, Syria)

1970

Nov. 15: Government authorities sent investigators to Aitarun village to discover the causes of the murder of a village notable and his family which a witness claimed was done by guerrillas.

Nov. 18: US President Nixon asked Congress to appropriate $5m. for military aid to Lebanon.

Minister of Defense and Agriculture Edward Ṣawmah resigned because he was unable to get a leave of absence from the FAO. Ilyās Sabā and Henri Iddih (Eddé) were made acting Ministers of Defense and Agriculture.

Nov. 21: President Sulaymān Franjiyyah sent a cable to Syrian President Aḥmad Khatīb congratulating him on his appointment.

Students demonstrated in Beirut against a decision not to honor Egyptian high school diplomas for entrance to a university.

Nov. 23: *Al-Nahār* published a report by Minister of Public Works Iddih criticizing the Council of Construction Projects for underestimating time and costs of projects.

Nov. 25: The Cabinet dismissed the chairman of the Council of Construction Projects Malik Salām and announced charges into "irregularities" in projects were continuing.

Dec. 22: Syria signed an agreement to establish a joint committee to promote economic and social relations.

1971

Jan. 3: *Fatḥ* announced that it would disarm some of its men in Lebanon and close 4 offices in refugee camps.

Jan. 21: Premier Salām said defense plans include setting up a ground-to-air missile system.

Libya

(*See also* Arab-Israeli Conflict, General, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, UAR)

1970

Nov. 17: Chairman of the Revolution Command Council Mu'ammar Qadhdhāfī said: "After the establishment of the new leadership in Syria, my mind is at ease."

Nov. 24: The British Foreign Office said Libya suspended talks in London on military and economic issues.

Financial Times of London reported Britain said the contract delivery of Chieftain tanks would not be made "until there is a Middle East settlement."

Al-Thawrah reported most of the oil companies were responding to the government's plan of "Libyanization," of the oil industry.

Nov. 26: It was announced that the Islamic University was abolished and its faculties incorporated into the University of Libya.

Nov. 29: UPI reported "official diplomatic sources" saying a power struggle was taking place between Qadhdhāfī and 'Abd al-Salām Jalūd, Minister of Economy.

Nov. 30: Qadhdhāfī said the proposed federation between Libya, Egypt, Sudan and Syria would be open only to "socialist" Arab states.

Dec. 8: Foreign Minister Muḥammad Najm resigned. The *Libyan News Agency* said he would retain his position on the Revolution Command Council (RCC).

Syrian Premier Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad arrived in Tripoli for talks on the proposed federation.

Dec. 11: Qadhdhāfī said Libya would agree to delays in the proposed 3 year deadline for federation "as long as the lapse of time worked for the interest of federation."

Dec. 22: The government issued a decree nationalizing all foreign banks. A joint stock company named Unity Bank would take over foreign shares after shareholders received compensation.

Dec. 26: Algerian President Houari Boumedienne arrived for a state visit.

Dec. 30: Boumedienne ended his visit. A joint communiqué said the 2 countries were determined to form "a united front to defend their vital interests, particularly in oil and exploitation of their vital resources."

Morocco

1970

Nov. 16: The National Front charged that US servicemen were operating 3 "secret bases." The statement opened a campaign to have the Americans removed from the country.

Opposition groups issued a joint communiqué calling for evacuation of Americans from bases at Kenitra, Sidi Yahia and Sidi Bouknadel.

Nov. 19: Premier Ahmad Laraki said the government would attack the "serious social disease" of bribery, and that tourism, agriculture and training would get priority in economic development.

Nov. 26: An agreement was signed to buy 800,000 tons of crude oil and 100,000 tons of petroleum products from the USSR for $16.5m.

Dec. 7: Rumanian President Nicolai Ceausescu began a 6 day state visit.

Dec. 11: A joint communiqué ending President Ceausescu's visit said it was agreed steps would be taken for cooperation in industry, public works and "especially in the domain of developing agriculture."

Dec. 19: A joint communiqué ending the visit of French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann said an intergovernmental committee would meet "at least once a year . . . to examine relations between the two countries."

1971

Jan. 7: A trade protocol with Algeria was signed increasing total value of trade by 50% from £8.6m to £12.9m.

Jan. 11: Foreign Minister Yusuf Bel Abbes began an official visit to Spain to discuss "bilateral and international problems."

Jan. 14: Reuters reported an official spokesman as saying a plot "by non-Moroccan elements" to overthrow the government was uncovered.

Feb. 2: The Jerusalem Post reported a memorandum was submitted to the Cabinet by the National Front calling for urgent measures to terminate the US military presence in Morocco.

Pakistan

(*See also* General)

1970

Nov. 16: Relief officials said the death count from the cyclone and tidal wave had risen to 55,000.

UN Secretary General U Thant issued an appeal for all possible assistance to Pakistan.

Nov. 22: President Yahya Khan conceded there were "slips" and "mistakes" in the relief operation but that "everything is being done and will be done." He denied that elections would be postponed because of the disaster.

Nov. 23: East Pakistani political leaders issued a statement charging the government with "gross neglect, callous inattention and utter indifference" to the cyclone-struck region.

The government announced allocation of $105m to relief efforts in addition to $14m granted earlier.

Nov. 24: President Yahya Khan arrived in Dacca to take charge of relief operations.

Nov. 25: India said Pakistan refused an offer of planes and helicopters to help relief efforts.

The official death toll rose to 175,000.

Nov. 26: Awami leader Shaykh Mujib ar-Rahman said the government relief effort "brought into sharp focus" the fact that East Pakistan has been treated as a colony and warned that if the elections are postponed or the polls frustrated, "I go for total struggle" for secession.

Dec. 2: The World Bank estimated it would cost $185m to reconstruct the cyclone devastated area and presented plans for reconstruction which were accepted by the government.

Dec. 7: Nationwide elections were held to elect a national assembly to draft a constitution.

Dec. 9: It was announced the Awami League had won a majority in the assembly with 151 seats out of 300. The People's Party of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto won 81. Leader of the Awami League Shaykh Mujib said a constitution granting full regional autonomy and leaving defense and foreign affairs to the central government "has to be framed and implemented in all its aspects."

1971

Jan. 3: Mujib affirmed his pledge to seek full regional autonomy for East Pakistan. He said that in drafting a new constitution his party would "certainly seek the cooperation of the elected representatives of West Pakistan, without compromising on principle."

Jan. 13: The World Bank announced a loan of $25m for reconstruction of East Pakistan.

Jan. 30: Yahya Khan admitted his government had not solved national economic problems and would pass them on.

An Indian plane was hijacked by 2 Kashmiri students and landed in Lahore.

Feb. 2: An Indian airliner hijacked to Lahore was blown up by the hijackers. India cancelled Pakistan's right to overfly Indian territory.

Feb. 15: People's Party leader Bhutto said he agreed to the Awami League's points that Pakistan should be a "true federation" and that the Federal units could maintain paramilitary forces but added that he would boycott the Assembly session opening March 3 unless there was "room for compromise" in the Awami League's program.

Persian Gulf

(*See also* General, Iran)

1970

Nov. 20: Middle East Economic Survey reported Qaṭar donated $1m for relief of victims of fighting in Jordan.

1971

Jan. 22: A joint Saudi-Kuwayt delegation said it received replies "which boost our hopes" after talks in the Gulf Amirates on the possibilities of forming a Gulf Federation.

Feb. 13: The New York Times reported the government of Oman was embarked on "its most determined military drive yet" against guerrillas in Dhufar.

Saudi Arabia

(*See also* General, Kuwayt, Persian Gulf, South Yemen)

1970

Dec. 18: Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Central Committee Yāsir 'Arafāt arrived in Riyadh for talks.

Dec. 19: Jordanian Premier Waṣfī al-Tall arrived for talks.

1971

Jan. 15: Middle East Economic Digest reported the government raised the tax rate from 50 to 55% on net income of Aramco retroactive to Nov. 14 and increased posted prices by $.09 per barrel.

Jan. 16: A 21 member Japanese trade delegation arrived to discuss measures to promote trade.

Jan. 22: British Special Envoy Sir William Luce arrived in Jiddah.

Feb. 2: King Fayṣal said "the Muslim world cannot remain indefinitely idle to Israel's continued occupation" and said 3 conditions necessary for peace are Israeli evacuation of Muslim holy places in east Jerusalem, withdrawal from war conquered regions and assurance of the rights of Palestinian refugees.

South Yemen

(*See also* Iraq)

1970

Nov. 18: Minister of Economy 'Abdallāh Abdan said the Chinese government had "expressed its enthusiastic readiness to provide all possible facilities for the promotion of trade."

Nov. 20: Deputy Defense Minister Aḥmad Anṭār returned from "most successful" talks in Baghdad according to the *Iraqi News Agency.*

Nov. 24: The semiofficial *Aden News Agency* denied there were Soviet bases on the island of Socotra.

Nov. 26: The *Middle East News Agency* reported South Yemen and Yemen agreed to establish committees to study steps to be taken to achieve unity.

Nov. 30: The name of the state was changed from the People's Republic of South Yemen to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

The government announced a new constitution which would transfer legislative power from the National Front General Command to a 101 member "People's Supreme Assembly."

Dec. 1: Defense Minister 'Alī Ḥasanī accused Saudi Arabia of aiding 4000 troops of elements hostile to the government massing along the borders of the governorates of Hadramaut and Alamahra.

Dec. 8: Middle East News Agency (MENA) reported the 1st group of Chinese experts arrived in Aden to aid agricultural projects.

Dec. 18: Middle East Economic Digest reported a law imposing import duties in Aden has "in effect" ended the privileges of a free port. The Minister of Finance estimated the import duties would amount to £5m a year.

1971

Jan. 31: In a Cabinet shuffle Foreign Minister 'Alī Sālim al-Bayḍ was appointed Minister of State for Presidency Affairs and Prime Minister 'Alī Haytham took the Foreign Ministry portfolio.

Sudan

(*See also* Arab-Israeli Conflict, General, Libya, Syria)

1970

Nov. 16: Three government officials were removed from their posts and replacements appointed. The replacements are:

Ja'far al-Numayrī: *Planning and Economy*
Maj. 'Abd al-Qāsim Muḥammad Ibrāhīm: *Local Government*
Maj. 'Abd al-Qādir: *Agriculture and Animal Resources*

Nov. 19: Chairman of the Revolution Command Council Numayrī said the tripartite agreement between Egypt, Libya and Sudan did not refer "to any immediate unity or union" but "only affirmed and furthered the broad lines previously agreed upon . . . for coordination of policies."

Nov. 21: Assistant Premier for Agriculture & Animal Resources Zayn 'Abd al-Qādir issued a statement denying a purge of leftists in the civil service.

Dec. 1: The Communist Party called for the reinstatement of 3 ministers dismissed in Nov. and accused the government of adopting a "rightist policy" intended to "liquidate the left, beginning with the Communist Party."

Dec. 2: The Communist Party issued a communiqué criticizing Numayrī for planning federation with the UAR, Libya and Syria "without previously seeking the approval of the people" and accused the UAR of masterminding Numayrī's campaign of repression against the communists.

Dec. 8: Defense Minister Ḥasan 'Abbās arrived in Moscow for talks with Soviet defense officials.

Dec. 20: The Revolution Command Council named 3 Cabinet ministers.

Zayn 'Abd al-Qādir: *Deputy Premier for Agriculture*
Mu'āwiyah Ibrāhīm: *Labor*
Yaḥyā Munawwar: *Animal Resources*

1971

Jan. 4: Laurence Wol Wol, a member of the Southern Sudan Liberation Front, presented a petition to the UN charging the Sudanese government with genocide and claiming that Egyptian and Libyan troops and Soviet planes were being used "against the four million blacks of Southern Sudan."

Jan. 6: Agriculture Minister 'Alī al-Tūm resigned. 'Uthmān Abū al-Qāsim was appointed acting Minister.

Jan. 9: Numayrī arrived in Kuwayt for talks on economic cooperation.

Jan. 11: The Cabinet decided to aid the Palestinian commandos with £Sud 40,000 and military arms.

Jan. 31: Uganda accused Sudanese troops of invading Uganda territory.

Feb.12: Numayrī accused the Communist Party of subversive and treasonous activity, of working against the proposed federation with Egypt, Syria and Libya and he called on the Sudanese people to "destroy" the Communist movement.

The following Cabinet changes were announced:

Muḥammad 'Abd al-Ḥalīm: *Treasury & Planning*
Muḥammad 'Alī al-Bakhīt: *Local Government*
Muḥammad Idris Maḥmūd: *Minister of State for the Economic Sector*
'Abd al-Jalil Ḥasan: *Agriculture*
'Abd al-Raḥmān 'Abbās: *Minister of State for the Service Sector*

Syria

(*See also* Arab-Israeli Conflict, General, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Tunisia, UAR)

1970

Nov. 16: A new 14 man Provisional Command of the Ba'th Party was formed: Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad, Muṣṭafā Ṭalās, 'Abd al-Raḥmān Khulayfāwī, Nājī Jamīl, Aḥmad al-Khaṭīb, 'Abd al-Ḥalīm al-Khaddām, Maḥmūd al-Ayyūbī, Dāwūd al-Raḍāwī, 'Abdallāh al-Aḥmar, Fahmī al-Yūsufī, 'Alī al-Ḥalabī, Muḥammad Ḥaydar, 'Abd al-Karīm 'Adī.

Gen. Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad said the new Ba'th Party "provisional" leadership would seek a "natural" place in the union of Egypt, Libya and Sudan. The statement promised a "people's assembly" and a permanent constitution within 90 days.

The government issued a declaration pledging to establish a "People's Council" and a permanent constitution within 3 months, to achieve unity with the UAR, Sudan and Libya, and to support the "Palestine revolution."

Nov. 18: Aḥmad al-Khaṭīb, formerly head of the teachers union, was appointed head of state.

Nov. 19: It was announced that Gen. Asad had become Premier and Aḥmad al-Khaṭīb provisional head of state, and that a "people's assembly" would be convened to elect a new head of state.

Speaking at a demonstration the Mayor of Damascus, Muḥammad al-Halabī, said "The stage during which the party was isolated from the masses has ended."

Nov. 20: The following Cabinet was announced:

Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad: *Premier* and *Defense*
'Abd al-Ḥalīm Khaddām: *Foreign Affairs*
Muḥammad Ṭalīb Hilāl: *Agriculture & Agrarian Reform*
Maḥmūd al-Ayyūbī: *Education*
Dāwūd Raḍāwī: *Health*
'Abd al-Ghanī Qannūt: *Public Works* and *Water Resources*
Sāmī Ṣūfān: *Planning*
Shakīr al-Fahhām: *Higher Education*
Muṣṭafā Ḥaddād: *Petroleum, Electricity & Minerals*
Ghālib 'Abdūn: *Awqaf*
Fāyīz Ismā'īl: *State*
Suhayl al-Ghazzī: *Supply & Internal Trade*

Nājī al-Darāwishah: *Information*
Nūrallāh Nūrrallāh: *Finance*
'Abd al-Laṭīf Quṭayṭ: *Industry*
Munīr Wannūs: *Euphrates Dam*
'Adnān Baghajātī: *Cabinet Affairs*
Aḥmad Qablān: *Frontline Village Affairs*
Mut'ib Shinān: *Labor & Social Affairs*
'Abd al-Raḥmān Khulayfāwī: *Interior*
Muṣṭafā Hallāj: *Economy & Foreign Trade*
Yūsuf Fayṣal: *State*
Fawzī Kayyālī: *Culture, Tourism* and *National Guidance*
'Umar al-Sibā'ī: *Communications*
Adīb al-Naḥāwī: *Justice*
Maḥmūd Qumbāz: *Municipal & Village Affairs*

Nov. 22: UAR Defense Minister Maḥmūd Fawzī arrived for talks which official spokesmen said were aimed at "deepening brotherly relations and cooperation."

Nov. 25: Premier Asad denied the change of government was a *"coup"* and said it was "a natural development of our party."

Nov. 30: Asad said Syria would try to consolidate relations with the USSR and the "socialist countries."

Dec. 2: The New York Times reported the government rescinded a ban on the import of Lebanese apples in a goodwill gesture toward Lebanon.

Dec. 4: Lebanese Premier Sa'ib Salām met in Damascus with Asad. Asad said they "discussed everything connected with improving relations."

Dec. 5: Asad said the liberation of Arab territory was the main objective of his government.

Asad said the government would "provide every opportunity for private enterprise within . . . the phased plan of the revolution."

Dec. 10: President of the Trans Arabian Pipeline Company William Chandler arrived for talks in Damascus at the invitation of the government.

Dec. 14: The requirement that Syrians traveling to Beirut must obtain permits was dropped.

Dec. 26: Asad received Lebanese National Bloc Party leader Raymond Iddih and assured him that the Syrian backed *al-Sa'iqah* commandos would not interfere in Lebanese affairs.

Dec. 31: The government ordered a 15% cut in prices of essential foods including butter, sugar, rice and flour; and a 15% raise in family allowance in wages of workers.

1971

Jan. 29: The Trans Arabian Pipeline was repaired in Syria and resumed operation.

Feb. 1: Asad arrived in Moscow for talks.

Tunisia

1970

Nov. 17: Premier Hadi Nouira pledged the government to "continuity" in foreign affairs including cooperation with Libya's closest neighbors. He said land was a key in the economy and traditional policies in this sector would be augmented, priority in industry would be given to "directly productive projects" and the "renewal programme" to improve the conditions of the poor would be based on respect for private property.

Dec. 11: The US Agency for International Development granted a $10m loan not tied to purchase of US goods at 2% interest repayable over 30 years.

1971

Jan. 4: Iran signed a cultural cooperation agreement.

Jan. 6: President Bourguiba arrived in the US for medical tests.

Economy Minister Tijani Shalli said the government plans further measures to encourage foreign investment.

Feb. 11: The head of Libya's Revolution Command Council Mu'ammar Qadhdhāfī arrived for a state visit.

Feb. 15: It was announced that diplomatic relations with Syria would be resumed.

A joint communiqué following the visit of Libyan RCC leader Qadhdhāfī said the 2 countries agreed to strengthen the Palestine resistance movement by all moral and material means possible.

Turkey

1970

Nov. 20: The State Planning Office canceled plans for 2 tractor plants worth $43m after talks with Canada's Massey-Ferguson Co. failed.

Nov. 21: Trabzon District Court ruled that the hijacking of a Soviet plane on Oct. 15 was a political crime and the hijackers could not be extradited.

Nov. 23: The EEC signed a protocol establishing a 22 year transition period before membership during which Turkey would reduce customs on imports to zero and the EEC would reduce customs on Turkish agricultural goods by 50 to 100% and loan Turkey $220m.

Nov. 30: The Republican Party (RPP) Council issued a statement blaming one of Turkey's "worst breakdowns in law and order" on the Justice Party which failed "to deal with economic and social crises which have created unrest" and then encouraged "the arming of some groups" against others.

Dec. 4: Middle East Economic Digest reported a World Bank loan of $40m to the Industrial Development Bank of Turkey payable over 15 years at 7¼% interest.

Dec. 6: The government reported the population grew by 4m between 1965 and 1970.

Dec. 8: Leftist and rightist students clashed in Ankara; 5 persons were wounded including 2 policemen and 83 students were arrested.

Dec. 19: The Justice Party's majority in the National Assembly was cut to 1 member as 3 Party members resigned.

Dec. 26: Students threw several firebombs at Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel's car in Istanbul but he was not injured.

Student clashes at Ankara University left 1 dead and 2 wounded. Army Commander Maj.-Gen. Gürler warned that "extremists are trying to tear apart the national ideal . . . to dissociate the nation from its aims set up by . . . Atatürk."

Dec. 30: A bomb exploded in the headquarters of the labor federation Türk-Iş and 5 other explosions were reported in residential areas of Ankara.

1971

Jan. 5: President Sunay began talks with party leaders to find a solution to ending political unrest.

Jan. 8: Premier Süleyman Demirel said the democratic régime was not in danger.

Jan. 19: A Justice Party Deputy resigned leaving Premier Demirel without an absolute majority in the Assembly.

Feb. 1: Three ships of the US 6th Fleet cut short a stay in Izmir following demonstrations against the visit.

Feb. 15: An American soldier was kidnapped from an American military installation in Ankara and later released.

United Arab Republic

(*See also* Arab-Israeli Conflict, General, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Sudan, Syria)

1970

Nov. 17: The government granted a long standing request of the US that diplomatic representation in Cairo be increased from 16 to 17 men.

Nov. 18: A new Cabinet was announced:

Maḥmūd Fawzī: *Premier*
'Azīz Ṣidqī: *Industry, Oil & Mineral Resources* and *Deputy Premier for Production & Commerce*
Sayyid Mir'ī: *Agriculture & Agrarian Reform* and *Deputy Premier for Agriculture & Irrigation*
Maḥmūd Riyāḍ: *Deputy Premier* and *Foreign Minister*
Sharawī Jum'ah: *Interior* and *Deputy Premier for Public Services*
Muḥammad Fā'iq: *Guidance*
Kamal Henry Badīr: *Communications*
Muḥammad Fawzī: *War*
Muḥammad 'Abdallāh Marzabān: *Economy & Foreign Trade*
Ibrāhīm Zakī Qanāwī: *Irrigation*
'Alī Zayn Āl 'Abdīn Ṣāliḥ: *Transport*
Aḥmad Muṣṭafā Aḥmad: *Scientific Research*
Sayyid Jādallāh al-Sayyid: *Planning*
Muḥammad Bākir Aḥmad: *Land Reclamation*
'Abd al-'Azīz Ḥijāzī: *Treasury*
Muḥammad Ḥāfiẓ Ghanim: *Education*
Muḥammad Sayf al-Dīn Abū al-'Izz: *Youth*
'Abd al-'Azīz Kāmil: *Waqf & Azhar Affairs*
Muḥammad Hamdī Ashūr: *Supply & Internal Trade*
'Abd al-Wahhāb al-Burulūsī: *Higher Education*
Ḥāfīz 'Alī Badāwī: *Social Affairs* and *National Assembly Affairs*
'Abduh Maḥmūd Salām: *Health*
Muḥammad Sa'd Zayyid: *Housing*
Samī Sharaf: *Presidency Affairs*
Ḥilmī Muḥammad al-Sa'īd: *Electricity*
Muḥammad Ḥāfiẓ Isma'īl: *State*
Muḥammad Aḥmad Muḥammad: *Local Administration*
Ḥasan Fahmī al-Badāwī: *Justice*
Aḥmad 'Uthmān 'Abd al-Majīd: *State*
Aḥmad al-Sayyid Darwīsh: *Tourism*
Badr al-Dīn Abū Ghazī: *Culture*
'Abd al-Laṭif Bulṭiyah: *Labor*
Muḥammad al-Khawājah: *Deputy Minister of Economy & Foreign Trade*

President Sādāt announced the formation of a National Defense Council with 11 members including Sādāt, head of the Council, Vice-Presidents Shāfi'ī and 'Alī Ṣabrī, Premier Fawzī, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Intelligence. The Council would have authority over all decisions and activities in the war with Israel.

Nov. 19: Sādāt said the priority in economic development must be given to heavy industry, including Soviet aided projects in iron, steel, aluminum and phosphates.

Nov. 29: Prosecutor General 'Alī Nūr al-Dīn said 15 Iraqis arrested in August on political charges were released as a fraternal gesture towards Iraq.

Dec. 2: King Ḥusayn of Jordan conferred with Sādāt in Cairo.

Dec. 3: King Ḥusayn ended talks with Sādāt on the "political and military aspects of the current situation." A communiqué said it was agreed "to continue full coordination between the two fraternal states."

Dec. 10: Syrian Premier Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad arrived in Cairo and met with Sādāt before leaving for Khartum.

Dec. 20: An Egyptian delegation headed by Vice President 'Alī Ṣabrī arrived in Moscow for talks.

Dec. 27: A joint Soviet-Egyptian communiqué said it was agreed to conclude long range trade and economic agreements.

Dec. 28: Sādāt ordered Premier Fawzī to return property seized by the government since 1961 and ordered that further sequestration be carried out under strict legal procedure in special courts with citizen representation on the juries. Sādāt said the decree was part of a campaign to establish "the sovereignty of law" in Egypt.

Dec. 29: *Al-Ahrām* called the decision to return confiscated property "one of the most important measures taken toward codification of the revolution."

1971

Jan. 3: Aḥmad Nūh was named to the Cabinet as Minister of Civil Aviation after a UAR civilian jet crashed in Libya killing 16 persons.

Al-Ahrām reported the World Bank agreed to loan $26m for a drainage system in the Nile Delta intended to increase Egypt's agricultural output by 30%.

Jan. 6: Foreign Minister Maḥmud Riyāḍ arrived in France for talks.

Jan. 14: Soviet President Nicolai Podgorny conferred with Sādāt.

Jan. 15: Soviet President Podgorny and Sādāt attended ceremonies dedicating the Aswan Dam. Podgorny pledged the USSR to assist in building a power network for the dam's power plant.

Jan. 19: Podgorny ended his state visit. A joint communiqué said the 2 countries had "reached agreement on all urgent questions pertaining to the current international situation."

Feb. 9: The Agrarian Reform Authority returned sequestrated land to 800 landowners.

Yemen

(*See also* South Yemen)

1971

Jan. 2: President 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Iryānī presented to the National Assembly a permanent constitution providing for a 179 seat Consultative Council to be elected every 4 years. The Council would choose a 5 man Presidential Council.

ERRATUM

Through printer's error, the sequence and page numbers of the articles listed on the front cover and in the Table of Contents of the Winter 1971 issue are incorrect. They should read as follows:

The Līṭānī River of Lebanon: An Example of Middle Eastern Water Development .... *James Hudson* 1

The Industrial Labor Force of Iran: Problems of Recruitment, Training and Productivity ...... *William H. Bartsch* 15

Lebanon's Financial Crisis in 1966: A Systemic Approach .... *Emile Ghattas* 31

Agricultural Cooperatives and Tunisian Development Part II .... *John L. Simmons* 45

CHRONOLOGY 58

The *Journal* regrets the error; the rest of the Table of Contents is correct.

BOOK REVIEWS

NOTE—By special arrangement with the Foreign Policy Association, readers of The Middle East Journal *may obtain from the FPA's Book Center any books listed below published in the United States (except paperbacks) at the publisher's regular list price. Post free for domestic orders only. Send orders with check or money order to Desk ME, World Affairs Book Center, 345 East 46th Street, New York, N. Y. 10017.*

GENERAL

THE IMPARTIAL SOLDIER, by Michael Harbottle. London and New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970. vii + 210 pages. Index. 40s.

Reviewed by Stephen G. Xydis

This is an informative, well-written, judicious and lively account of UNFICYP's operation as viewed by its British Chief-of-Staff between June 1966 and August 1968 with an appropriate flashback to give coherence. Its climactic chapter deals in minute and revealing detail with the Ayios Theodhoros incident of November 15, 1967, assessing responsibility for it. If the Turkish Cypriot side in this mixed village under the leadership of a certain Mehmed was initially responsible for the dispute that eventually exploded into a fight, the Greek Cypriot response represented an overreaction to the Turkish Cypriot challenge. The bloody toll included 22 Turkish Cypriots and one Cypriot National Guard killed, and 9 Turkish Cypriots and 2 Greek Cypriots wounded. As in crises since 1958, this outbreak of interethnic violence led to ominous Turkish military preparations to invade the island, to Greek-Turkish tension that came close to the brink of war, and to crisis-management efforts on the part of the United Nations, NATO and the United States, not to mention various démarches through diplomatic channels.

As a result of this crisis, the 6,000-7,000 troops, sent to the island covertly since the previous Cyprus crisis of 1964, were withdrawn by the Greek government. So was their commander, General George Grivas, who had returned to Cyprus during the crisis of 1964; it seems American officials had initially welcomed his presence. For at the time they saw in the leader of EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters), who had fought the British colonial authorities in Cyprus between 1955-1958, a pro-NATO man and an antagonist of President Makarios supposedly motivated by the desire to oust him. (Edward Weintal and Charles Bartlett, *Facing the Brink,* New York: Scribners, 1967, pp. 31-32).

In the aftermath of this crisis, new efforts were exerted by the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot elements in Cyprus to reach agreement for establishing a formal mode of peaceful symbiosis on their island. While this goal has not yet been achieved, the outbreak of new organized interethnic violence has been averted, partly because all parties seem to have recognized the uselessness of such violence; partly, too, because of the continued presence of UNFICYP.

As Brigadier Harbottle points out, the United Nations, through its multinational peacekeeping forces in Cyprus and elsewhere, has done what no state or group of states has been able to do. By contrast, the establishment by the British colonial authorities in Cyprus of an auxiliary police, which only Turkish Cypriots were willing to join, had exacerbated the relations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots and was largely responsible for the interethnic strife of 1958.

Whether such peacekeeping forces create a climate in which political solutions to the sources of conflict can be worked out is a matter of controversy. Brigadier Harbottle believes they do. "Crisis" in Chinese, however, as

President Kennedy once pointed out, is synonymous with "opportunity." Perhaps the most one can venture to say of these forces is that their presence and activities often hinder the degeneration of local disputes or acts of violence into large-scale organized fights. This, in itself, is no mean achievement. Moreover, such forces are sources of third-party information about respective responsibilities for incidents. As such they are more effective than *ex post facto* international investigation commissions.

In carrying out the duties of a military observer, success, Brigadier Harbottle emphasizes, "depends more than anything else on the vigilance and mental alertness of the most junior soldier and his non-commissioned leader." These qualities may be inculcated, sharpened and maintained by training and mental exercises designed to counter the tedium and monotony that often accompany the job. Senior commanders depend wholly on their most junior commanders for instant intelligence of any incident that is likely to disturb the peace, and on the personal initiatives of the junior officers to pacify and mediate where incidents occur.

In his experience, for achieving maximum effectiveness, the multinational peacekeeping force must constitute a single entity, not a series of national contingents under an international headquarters operating on the basis of its own procedures and giving its own interpretation of their duties. "The more it performs as an integral whole, the better it will do the job."

Brigadier Harbottle, finally, favors the creation of a permanent planning staff at UN Headquarters which would be entrusted with the responsibility of physically preparing peacekeeping operations once authorized by the United Nations. This planning staff, under a senior, civilian member of the Secretariat, would act as a coordinating staff for supplying the needs of a peacekeeping force. Moreover, it would prepare contingency plans for future operations.

△ Stephen G. Xydis is a professor of political science at Hunter College of the City University of New York.

The Middle East in Revolution, by Humphrey Trevelyan. London: Macmillan, and Boston: Gambit, 1970. xi + 266 pages. Index. $5.95.

Reviewed by Raymond A. Hare

I first met Humphrey (now Lord) Trevelyan in New Delhi in June 1947, where he was then serving in the External Affairs Department and I was visiting prior to taking over the Middle East and Indian Division in the State Department. This was just before the partition of the subcontinent and my notes of our talk show that Trevelyan accurately foresaw many of the long term problems which India would have to face both domestically and internationally. Undoubtedly, this experience in divestment of the rôle of empire served him well in other situations of similar character, such as constitute the subject matter of *The Middle East in Revolution.*

Our paths next crossed in Cairo where I arrived in September 1956, and where Trevelyan had preceded me as British Ambassador the year before. We immediately hit it off both professionally and personally but this promising relationship was brought to an abrupt end by the Suez crisis of the following month and the mandatory departure of Trevelyan and his staff.

So my experience in Cairo began where his left off and the notes struck in his account have a familiar ring in terms of my own work during the following three years. Specifics changed, to be sure, but the dramatis personae, with Nasser in the lead rôle, remained, and problem-solving presented essentially the same frustrations, but also the same fascination. For there was always an element of gamesmanship in dealing with Nasser, who was not only adept to subtle maneuver but also not averse to a good head-on bash with no hard feelings provided the play remained impersonal and good-humored.

In this situation, Trevelyan was ideally qualified not only by experience but also as a seasoned professional who approached his problems and missions not as crusades but as work to be done as effectively as possible by sensitivity, openmindedness, and cool-headed application. Sometimes his comments serve to make sense of what otherwise might seem irrational, but, always frank, he never hesitates to call a mistake a mistake even when, in retrospect, he feels it was his own. Neither does he hesitate to fault his superiors on occasion, but he never does so in a spirit of recrimination—just in order to set the record straight as he sees it.

As a consequence, what he gives us is not the chronicle of an historian nor a self-serving autobiography of the type which so gluts the market these days but rather a personal record by one who played a prominent part in the events he narrates and sets them down for such worth as they may have for others—which in this case is indeed considerable.

Aside from his 1955-56 tour in Cairo, the author tells of subsequent assignments to Baghdad as Ambassador in 1958-61 and Aden as High Commissioner in 1967, assignments of a descending order of magnitude as foci of attention in the field of international affairs but of ascending magnitude in terms of demands on Trevelyan's skill and fortitude in the rôle of what, in American government parlance, is called a "trouble shooter."

As Trevelyan very well puts it:

"This is sometimes regarded as a period of failure in British policy in the Middle East. It should properly be considered to have been a period of difficult readjustment to changing conditions in the Arab world and changing power relationships. Those who consider it to have been a period of failure are the sentimentalists who do not understand why things should not have gone as they were before. A more current judgment is that though we made mistakes like everyone else involved, we have so far come through an unusually difficult and complex period without more damage to our real interests in the Middle East than was inevitable as a result of the fundamental changes in world conditions which have taken place since the end of the German war" (p. ix).

Trevelyan dwells at greatest length on his short but momentous period of service in Cairo, using the dossier or case method to cover a series of subjects: British-Egyptian maneuvering over implementation of the Sudan agreement; the British troop withdrawal after an occupation dating back to 1882 (when incidentally the Egyptian Chief of Staff was an American general, Stone Pasha); the arms supply question leading up to the Egyptian-Soviet arms deal of 1955 (where Trevelyan's realism regarding the problem as presented to the British becomes a "lost opportunity" from the American angle); attempts to meet the Palestine problem (where once again Americans came in for a bit of chiding for being hesitant to carry the American generated Tripartite Declaration of 1950 into a plan for joint military action); the violent Egyptian reaction to the Baghdad Pact (a continuing problem during my own tenure with the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine being a troubling addition); the abortive Aswan Dam negotiations; the Suez aftermath.

The fact that Trevelyan is able to cover these subjects in such small compass is made possible by his cryptic style where no words are wasted and sentences often crackle with staccato brevity. But this capsulation still leaves latitude for some very penetrating commentary on persons, especially Nasser (p. 86-91), and on issues such as criticism of the policy which led to British-French armed intervention (p. 105-6).

Summing up Trevelyan reflects:

"We lost much in prestige and position in the Middle East but I thought at the time that this could be overstated. . . . Even before Suez we no longer had the dominant position of the past. . . . Suez made us begin to realize what the Arab world now was. It projected us into the twentieth century" (pp. 129-30).

Although the personality of Nasser looms large in the record of his Cairo experience, the accent is essentially on issues. In contrast, his Iraq story centers largely around Abdul Karim Qasim as a sort of mad spider sitting in the middle of a weirdly tangled web. Historically this section is so politically esoteric as to be of value primarily for the specialist but, as a story of political hobgoblinism, it makes fascinating reading with the spookey behavior of Qasim supplying the theme but with macabre supporting rôles being filled by the reprehensible Mahdāwī as the Grand Inquisitor and by the street mobs intent on finding victims for "dragging" through the streets.

As Trevelyan summed it up:

"Yet this unattractive man, so lacking in charm, so uninspired, so wrapped up in his own conceit, so insufferably self-righteous, with God firmly on his side, a bit crazy with his mad, staring eyes, succeeded in holding his position and in keeping himself alive for four and a half years by cunning and a single-minded devotion to the maintenance of his power. In the end, this was all that the Iraqi revolution was about" (p. 187).

Two political aspects, however, should be noted; the first being the way in which the Communists, in ostensible support of Qasim, so blatantly overplayed their hand as to bring about their eventual downfall (and also a spectacular crisis in Soviet-Egyptian relations); and the second Qasim's threat to take over Kuwait, a move thwarted by a British display of force and followed by Arab intervention headed by Egypt.

The third part of the book deals with Trevelyan's tenure as High Commissioner in Aden where, in his words, "my task was to evacuate the British forces . . . in peace . . . and, if possible, to leave behind an independent government which could assure peace and stability. . . . The British had good intentions but things had gone badly wrong" (p. 211).

In terms of world events this may have been a mini-crisis but, as an immediate problem, it had developed from one of serious frustration into a terrifying nightmare by the time of Trevelyan's arrival. Thanks to his sensitive, patient and firm leadership he was able to complete the first part of his task—the British evacuation—albeit in an atmosphere of cliff-hanging danger but, despite his best efforts, he was unable to leave behind that stable régime which constituted the second part of his mandate.

In his own words of conclusion to this section and his book:

"All we could say at the time was that it might have been worse. And, in the end, another little Arab state came into being, desperately poor and probably destined to go through periods of violence and revolt. The mark of the British on it was light and will soon have disappeared. . . . Our period of occupation did the country little permanent good, for all the selfless work of many devoted Englishmen and so many good intentions. Whatever the rights or wrongs of the way we left, whatever was to come after us, the time for us to be there was over. And if we were to go, it was better not to linger on" (p. 266).

It is not unusual in the business of foreign affairs that men of talent should be called on to perform thankless and often impossible tasks. What is unusual in this case is that this Daniel should have been thrown into the lion's den so often and come out not only unscathed but with acclamation, to which I take this occasion to add my own.

△ RAYMOND A. HARE is Ambassador of the United States of America, Retired, and National Chairman, The Middle East Institute.

SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST, by Aaron S. Klieman. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970. 101 pages. Notes. $6.50 and $2.45 in paper.

Reviewed by John C. Campbell

The growth of Soviet naval power and the successes of Soviet political and diplomatic strategy in the Middle East have stimulated such a quantity of stories in press, journal, pamphlet and book that it is hard for a reader to keep his ears free of the alarms being sounded or to dig himself out from under the massive repetition. Here is the essence of the story: the Soviet Mediterranean squadron is fast approaching the strength of the Sixth Fleet; the use of port facilities and airfields in Egypt and Syria gives the Soviets the advantage of flexible power in the Eastern Mediterranean which the West formerly held; ties with Algeria bring Soviet power into the Western Mediterranean, threatening to outflank NATO; as the British withdraw east of Suez, Soviet ships make their appearance in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, along with Soviet influence at Aden and the Horn of Africa; US support of Israel and the radicalization of Arab politics are pushing one country after another from a Western to a Soviet alignment; and Soviet diplomacy toward Turkey and Iran has largely neutralized the northern tier as a barrier. One wonders if the United States or Western Europe has a particle of influence left. The story is generally true, if often exaggerated in the telling. It is not difficult to establish the facts; the real question is what they mean: inevitable disaster for the West, or perhaps a new balance which is still tolerable.

Aaron Klieman cites the developments on the above list, though not all of them in such extreme form, and fills in the details. His is essentially a cool analytical study, not a scare story, but the recitation of the record of Soviet advantages and gains nearly overwhelms his own counter-arguments to the effect that Soviet designs may come to grief through the weakness of the Arab base on which they are built, or may be held within limits by well conceived American policies.

The author sketches out three interrelated lines of action for the United States, assuming it decides that Soviet primacy in the area is worth contesting: (1) measures to disengage the Arabs from the USSR, though not "at the price of Israel" which would risk alienating a confirmed ally without any guarantee of winning over the Arabs; (2) bringing sufficient power and influence to bear, especially through a strengthened naval presence and the collaboration of other interested parties, to increase the strains under which Soviet policy must operate; and (3) striving for an accommodation with the USSR, encouraging common approaches where interests converge. One is entitled to be skeptical, and the author is. Yet these are the right directions for American policy, inconsistent though they may be on any given issue at a given time. It is unfortunate that he does not go further to specify what these policies would involve in military effort, financial cost, diplomatic initiatives and strategy, allied cooperation, and popular will and support.

Although the book is by no means the last word on the subject and says little on the politics of the Middle East countries, its analysis of Soviet and US policy does not miss any of the important known factors on either side. It is probably the best of the current crop of short studies on this now popular theme. Intended above all to inform, it succeeds in that purpose.

△ JOHN C. CAMPBELL, Vice President of the Middle East Institute, is Senior Research Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations.

THE ARAB WORLD

DER ALGERISCHE SOZIALISMUS: EINE DOKUMENTATION, edited by Ursel Clausen. Opladen: C. W. Leske Verlag, 1969. 463 pages. Bibl. DM 36.

IRAK—EINE SOZIO-ÖKONOMISCHE BETRACHTUNG, by Horst Didden. Opladen: C. W. Leske Verlag, 1969. 278 pages. Map. Bibl. DM 32.

LIBANON — SOZIO-ÖKONOMISCHE GRUNDLAGEN, by Nabil Hachem. Opladen: C. W. Leske, 1969. 375 pages. Map. Bibl. DM 29.

DER ARABISCHE SOZIALISMUS UND DER ZEITGENÖSSISCHE ISLAM, by Wolfgang Ule. Opladen: C. W. Leske, 1969. 263 pages. Appen. Bibl. DM 29.

Reviewed by Peter Bechtold

These four books are among the most recent publications in the series *Schriften des Deutschen Orient-Instituts,* which are aimed primarily at making studies about various aspects of the contemporary Middle East available to German-language audiences. In view of the relative paucity of German publications on this period these books contribute almost by default towards filling a distinct need. But they accomplish more: each monograph in its own way is a useful addition to the existing literature in the respective issue-areas and deserves to come to the attention of non-German students of Middle Eastern affairs, for the simple reason that they offer comprehensive collections and presentations of facts, documents and references.

This sort of comprehensive and thorough collection appears to have been the main purpose of the first three books, and their chief common usefulness lies in their convenience as handbooks of facts and documents about their respective subjects. *Der algerische Sozialismus* contains a lengthy introduction, almost three hundred pages of documents, and a bibliographic section. Most of the latter references are in French, with a few additional Arabic, German, English and Italian sources. The documents, all in French, are mostly a collection of speeches with some interviews and manifestos covering the period 1962-66. Most of the speeches were by Ben Bella and Boumedienne.

The introduction includes an interpretive analysis of the meaning of Algerian socialism in its historical evolution, the competing and component ideological wings of the movement, comparisons with other official varieties of socialism (e.g. UAR, Tunisia, Communism), and an examination of existing economic and political conditions in Algeria measured against particular objectives stated by the régimes. This section is the weakest part of the book; the level of analysis is uneven in some places and inadequate in others. For example, an examination of Algerian socialism *per se* should include a study of political institutions and processes—not merely the rhetoric of leaders or the author's selective use of economic facts. Nevertheless, the book constitutes the most comprehensive collection of statements by Algerians about their notions of what socialism means. From this perspective it is a "must" for students of Algerian politics and of socialism in developing nations; for scholars interested in the approach of content-analysis, it is also potentially an excellent source.

Nabil Hachem's and Horst Didden's books are almost parallel accounts of economic, geographic, and social conditions and facts in Lebanon and Iraq, respectively. Emphasis is on the description and comprehensive presentation of virtually any conceivable information which might be relevant to the Lebanese and Iraqi economies. The many tables (124 in Didden's volume alone) contain data, generally up through 1966, which should be of particular interest to geographers and economists.

Wolfgang Ule's book on Arab socialism and contemporary Islām is a brave attempt to tackle a problem troublesome not only to students of Middle Eastern politics, but also to practitioners and ordinary citizens. The work consists of three parts, of which only the first is addressed to the general topic. Here the author examines in considerable detail the theoretical relationships between Islām, Arab socialism, Marxism and Communism. The two remaining parts contain case studies of doctrine, practice and economic-political conditions in Iraq and the United Arab Republic.

At the risk of doing an injustice to a rather elaborate analysis, I will try to summarize and simplify Ule's essential points: 1) The Qur'ān does not contain an economic body of theory; however, Islām from the beginning has been sufficiently flexible so that it could be adapted to several different economic systems. 2) The current attempts to demonstrate the compatibility of Islām with Arab socialism are intellectually and theoretically unjustifiable; nevertheless, Islām has been used to legitimize Arab socialism. In the process it has been rediscovered and practiced more fervently and thus has led, if anything, to a return of tradition, not a break from it.

As evidence for these assertions the author examines in detail the economic bases of traditional Islām, especially the roles of *waqf, zakāt,* and *ribā;* official statements and interpretations by spokesmen for Arab socialism; selective critiques by Arab scholars opposing socialism; and applications of the doctrine in Egypt and Iraq. The strongest aspects of the book lie in the systematic treatment of the topics and in the wide utilization of Arabic texts (plus the extensive bibliographic section encompassing thirty pages of references, mostly in Arabic). The major shortcomings arise from methodological problems, especially the unfortunate emphasis placed on structure and statement instead of process. Why, for example, should the Qur'ān serve as a basis for economic analysis rather than the actual system developed in traditional Islamic society? Similarly, the analyses of the Egyptian and Iraqi cases, although rich in detail and mostly accurate in description, view the state as a monolithic actor and fail to consider the rôles played by such factors as the military, the single-party systems, the range of political alternatives, etc. Moreover, it is not clear how the Egyptian and Iraqi cases might suffice as examples of Arab socialism. Statements about economic effectiveness, doctrinal commitment, and theoretical compatibility would be on much firmer ground if the discussion had included relevant aspects of Algerian socialism, Tunisian Destourism, and Syrian Ba'thism. But perhaps it is unfair to expect so extensive an analysis in a single volume covering such a broad topic; from that point of view, Ule's book represents a useful guide, both in its strengths and shortcomings, for further and truly comparative research in the field of Arab socialism.

△ PETER BECHTOLD is an assistant professor of politics at the University of Maryland in College Park.

IMPERIALISM AND NATIONALISM IN THE SUDAN: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, 1899-1956, by Muddathir 'Abd al-Rahim. New York and London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1969. xviii + 227 pages. Appen. Index. $8.75.

Reviewed by Robert L. Tignor

The primary title of 'Abd al-Rahim's study, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan,* is misleading. Admittedly the volume does deal with Sudanese problems of imperialism and nationalism, but not in a probing, analytical and comparative fashion. The reader who turns to this study to increase his understanding of European imperialism and African nationalism as general phenomena will be disappointed. The author does not delve deeply into the motives behind British expansion into the Sudan or relate this expansion to current theories of European imperialism in Africa. Nor does he investigate Sudanese nationalism in the light of recent discoveries about African nationalism, its varying sources and its patterns of development.

Actually the subtitle, *A Study in Constitutional and Political Development 1899-1956,* more accurately describes the scope of the work. Constitutional studies are not in vogue these days. Contemporary scholars have a greater concern with the personal and social forces that give shape to institutional and constitutional arrangements. Yet the modern Sudan has evolved from such bewildering and complex institutional and constitutional arrangements that it is easy to see why a scholar would devote attention to these problems. These confusing, even unique, arrangements truly imposed themselves on modern Sudanese history. To mention the most obvious, the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium fashioned by Lord Cromer in 1899 tied the Sudan to Egypt as well as Britain. Subsequently Sudanese nationalism was refracted off the British and Egyptian presence. Beginning in the 1920s the Southern Provinces were separated administratively from the north and allowed to develop on their own.

The most stimulating sections of the book deal with the Sudan in its relations to Egypt and Britain. The author skillfully shows how easily and cynically the British manipulated the arguments regarding the Sudan as part of or separate from Egypt. In the reconquest of the Sudan Cromer and other British publicists argued that Egypt and the Sudan were united economically and politically through the Nile Valley. This argument justified the British effort to keep the French out of the Upper Nile and to attach the Sudan to Egypt and Britain. It was even used to sanction spending Egyptian revenues on the Sudan in the early years of colonial administration. Yet by 1919, as Egyptian nationalism was developing, British imperialists had changed their refrain. They talked now of the differences between Egypt and the Sudan and portrayed the Egyptians as conquerors and exploiters of their Sudanese neighbors, thus justifying the removal of Egyptian influences.

The development of the Southern policy is also expertly presented. The policy of separate development for north and south had not always existed. Rather it was an uprising in the Sudanese army in 1924 and signs of nationalism among educated, mostly northern Sudanese that persuaded the British to seal off the south from northern, Arab, and Muslim influences. Lugard's political ideology of indirect rule through local rulers was ready at hand. The British ousted the educated northern element and sought to rule through southern chiefs. Perhaps the author exaggerates the political factors behind this policy, placing too little emphasis on the impact of new ideas about ruling African societies.

A third and final contribution is 'Abd al-Rahim's discussion of Sudanese nationalism. Arguing convincingly for the integrity of Sudanese nationalism, the author shows that the Sudanese were always concerned about their autonomy and self government. At first nationalists favored unity with Egypt, but only for expediential reason. Distrusting the British slogan of the Sudan for the Sudanese as a means for securing continued British domination of the Sudan, they saw Egypt as a protector against British control and a fellow colonized territory. As independence approached and British authority waned, the nationalist factions inevitably converged on the goal of a Sudan independent of British and Egyptian controls.

This study is a solid contribution to the political history and constitutional development of the Sudan.

△ Robert L. Tignor is an associate professor in the department of history at Princeton University.

Libyan Independence and the United Nations: A Case of Planned Decolonization, by Adrian Pelt. Foreword by U Thant. Published for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. New Haven and London: Yale Univ. Press, 1970. xxviii + 888 pages. Appen. Index. $35.00.

Reviewed by Henry S. Villard

When Foreign Minister Anthony Eden declared in 1942 that the Sanūsī tribesmen of Cyrenaica, who were actively cooperating with British forces in World War II, would "in no circumstances again fall under Italian domination," he unwittingly laid the foundation for the modern state of Libya. No one could have foreseen that from the military seizure of Italy's North African colonies there would emerge a united Arab kingdom under Sayyid Muḥammad Idrīs al-Sanūsī, named Amīr of Cyrenaica by the British. Yet on December 24, 1951, in accordance with a resolution passed two years earlier by the General Assembly of the United Nations, Libya was given its freedom and took its place in the family of nations.

What to do with the barren territories of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and the Fazzān was a question which vainly engaged the Four-Power Council of Foreign Ministers from 1945 to 1948. The problem then passed to the General Assembly, where lengthy discussions, involving many points of view and marked by acute differences (but centering for the most part on proposals for trusteeship) culminated on November 21, 1949, in a recommendation that the areas should be combined—not later than January 1, 1951—in an independent and sovereign state; and that in the interim a United Nations Commissioner, with a Council to aid and advise him, should assist the people in the formation of a constitution and the establishment of an independent government. Adrian Pelt of the Netherlands, an international civil servant with experience going back to the League of Nations, was appointed by the General Assembly for this task.

How Libya came to be launched within the stipulated time limit as a full-fledged constitutional monarchy is a fascinating story. The difficulties in creating a viable nation from scratch were enormous: no political rights, no economic benefits, no social progress had ever before been considered for the indigenous population. "I wish your husband the best of luck," a high United Kingdom official remarked to the Commissioner's wife, "but to be quite frank, I am afraid he is going to break his neck."

Quite the contrary—the preparation of Libya for statehood was an astonishing success. Step by step the reader is led through the complex phases of the transitional period: preliminary consultations with the local inhabitants and the administering authorities; the setting up of a preparatory Committee of Twenty-One to plan for a National Assembly; the coming into being of a provisional government; the arrangements for technical assistance and foreign financial aid; and finally the transfer of powers to the new government as an independent entity. That the operation was efficiently planned and orderly in the execution (though not without moments of deep discouragement) is as much a tribute to the institutional machinery of the United Nations and its specialized agencies as it was to the conscientious personal efforts of all the experts in the UN's Mission to Libya.

While Mr. Pelt's analytical case history is based largely on official or public documents, it is also the personal narrative of the chief protagonist in the drama of giving birth to a nation. The exhaustive treatment given to the *accouchement* hardly makes for light reading—with copious footnotes, annexes, and an index there are more than a thouasand pages—and the price alone precludes popular perusal. For reasons which he makes clear, the author chooses to refer to himself throughout as "the Commissioner," which may seem to carry objectivity to unnecessary lengths; but the impersonel approach cannot conceal his abiding interest in and complete identification with his subject. Nor can the concern for detail with which the book is written detract from its generally readable style. For students of the Middle East and those curious about the practical results which can be achieved by an international body functioning in ex-colonial territory—happily, with the peaceful cooperation of all concerned—its importance is obvious.

There is a particular timeliness about this publication, for it appears just twenty years after Libya took over the reins of its own destiny. A generation has elapsed, in which the outlook for the nation has been radically altered by the discovery of oil and, more recently, by the overthrow of the king and proclamation of a Republic. Even with "the luxury of hindsight" which he allows himself in a chapter titled "Afterthoughts," the Commissioner-author can only cautiously speculate on what the future may hold for this child of the United Nations which he helped so ably to bring forth.

Among his friends Mr. Pelt has been referred to as the patron saint of Libya. The Libyans themselves recognized the key rôle he played in implementing the General Assembly's resolution by naming a street in Tripoli the Shāri' Adrian Pelt. And in a preface to the book, U Thant mentions his "outstanding qualities of patience, tolerance, and sincerity." Without those attributes in abundance, it is safe to say, the process of Libya's decolonization would not have been the admirable example to the world that it was.

△ HENRY S. VILLARD was United States Minister to Libya from 1952 to 1954 and is the author of *Libya: The New Arab Kingdom in North Africa* (Cornell Univ. Press, 1956).

LA PENSÉE POLITIQUE ARABE CONTEMPORAINE, edited by Anouar R. Abdel-Malek. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1970. 378 pages. Appen. No price indicated.

Reviewed by Tareq Y. Ismael

Contemporary Arab thought, the subject matter of this book, is indeed a kaliedoscope of political and social ideas. Anouar R. Malek's purpose is to show the historial and logical symmetry of the patterns of thought that have emerged in the Arab world. Through a long introduction and a selection of categorized readings, the author attempts to present an outline of the main currents of contemporary Arab thought as history has channeled them.

Abdel-Malek identifies two fundamental factors that have shaped the contour and determined the course of contemporary Arab thought: (1) the Arabic language, which has maintained its fundamental structure from the tribal period through the twentieth century, reflecting, in effect, a community with historic and cultural identity; and (2) the Arab national movement. From the nineteenth century to World War Two, the principal struggle was directed against imperialist rule; the goal was restoration of formal sovereignty. With the support of the popular masses, the national bourgeoisie assumed the essential rôle. The ruling élites, concerned with maintaining and extending their own privileges, rallied their support to the occupying powers.

After the war, the goals of the movement expanded to include real independence, access of the population to the material and cultural resources of their countries, and the democratization of political power. Socialist doctrines became advocated as the means to achieve these goals. How to translate socialism to the Middle Eastern milieu and make it relevant to the needs of modernizing societies became a problem of political and intellectual foment.

The author categorized the intellectual efforts giving account to and reflecting the national liberation movement under two main currents: Islamic fundamentalism and liberal-modernism. The essential nature of Islamic fundamentalism, initiated by Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and Muḥammad ‘Abduh, consists, despite a tone of modernism and renovation, of a return to the real sources of Islām. Liberal-modernism puts its main accent on scientific spirit, philosophical rationalism and political liberalism. These two currents, in their varied manifestations, reflect the historic circumstances that channeled contemporary Arab thought: the Islamic past and European expansion.

Neither current, however, could cope with the fundamental problems of social change engulfing the Arab world. Here is the greatest challenge to Arab society. Thus, from Islamic fundamentalism emerged an Orthodox school that rejected modernization and advocated a return to the past; also, a school dedicated to the full modernization of the faith as a basis for national awakening and progress. From liberal-modernism developed doctrines modelled after the European left and doctrines based on liberal-constitutional models.

The 1967 June War resulted in the greatest cataclysm in the Arab struggle for national dignity and social progress. The depths of the upheaval are reflected in the agonizing reappraisal of Arab society and the polarization of politics around the Palestinian cause.

The readings in this book reflect the currents in the introduction. The author's classification does indeed illuminate the principal themes that have occupied contemporary Arab thought. Their sequence reflects the symmetrical pattern of development within the context of history. However, in several cases articles selected are not the best representations of the main intellectual currents which dominate contemporary Arab thought.

Certainly the task of selecting relevant readings is a difficult one, as the author notes in his introduction. It is not always a question, however, of selecting works that are representative of a topic. Intellectual efforts may not only reflect the adjustment of man to a changing environment. There are many that, in themselves, have had a fundamental impact, radically changing man's perception of his environment. Such is the significance of many writers overlooked by Abdel-Malek. Ignored are Constantine Zurayq, Ṣādiq al-‘Aẓm, Ilyās Murquṣ, Yāsīn Ḥāfiẓ, Kātib Yāsīn, ‘Ismat Sayf al-Dawla, al-‘Afīf al-Akhḍar, Sa‘dūn Ḥammādī and Nadīm al-Bayṭār. The topics chosen by the author to a large extent have been fashioned by these men.

To elaborate on one example, under the topic "Palestine: From Resistance to Revolution," the author gave space to the Democratic Popular Front. Now, the DPF is nothing more than a splinter group of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. It is not comparable, by any stretch of the imagination, to the parent organization at the intellectual, military, or organizational levels; nor has it had any notable impact as has the PFLP. But the author chose this clearly secondary group under his topic, without mention of the truly significant rôle of the PFLP.

△ TAREQ Y. ISMAEL is an associate professor of political science at the University of Calgary, Alberta, Canada.

IRAN

THE PERSIAN LAND REFORM 1926-66, by A. K. S. Lambton. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1969. xii + 366 pages. Illus. Gloss. Index. Map. $11.75.

Reviewed by Philip C. Salzman

The Persian land reform, according to Ann K. S. Lambton in the most comprehensive account of the subject to date, has succeeded in improving socio-political and economic conditions: on the one hand, the peasants have been freed from opppression of the landowners, and consequently have become independent agents with increasing self-confidence and feelings of well-being. On the other hand, increased initiative on the part of the peasants has resulted in more intensive and more imaginative investment on the land in which they now have a stake.

Previous to reform, Persian peasants, by and large, worked on a share-cropping basis for absentee landowners. Their shares were usually small, often not enough for subsistence, and they had no security of tenure, could not build on their land, had little control over the crops grown, were indebted through pre-sale at unfavorable prices and credit at exorbitant interest, had little or no access to social or cultural resources of the larger society, lived in a context of factionalism among their fellows and arbitrary power from above, and had no opportunity to improve their circumstances. The peasant was, in addition to crop sharing, obliged to provide for his landlord various taxes, duties and labors for which he received no return. The atmosphere of rural Persia prior to land reform was detrimental to well-being; "distrust, insecurity, faction, and intrigue prevailed on all sides" (p. 30).

Since reform, peasants have security of tenure, the right to build on their land, control over choice of crops and agricultural activities, credit facilities at reasonable rates, and mechanisms for group cooperation. They are bringing more land under cultivation, working harder on the land, using fertilizer where they previously did not do so, investing in irrigation and other improvement schemes, and building houses, schools, mosques and baths. In the course of these activities, they are working together, learning how to cooperate and how to deal with the larger society and its agencies.

The land reform has been successful because it was pragmatically conceived, entailing the minimum reorganization on the land; because it was oriented toward independent peasant proprietorship, rather than government control of the land, and because it was integrally tied to the formation and operation of cooperative societies. These points were especially true of the first stage of reform; the second stage was less oriented toward peasant proprietorship and more oriented toward agricultural development, and consequently had less impact. Lambton believes the initial approach to be the most fruitful because it facilitates exercise of the peasants' initiative and previously inhibited abilities.

This book follows well from Lambton's previous work (i.e. *Landlord and Peasant in Persia,* Oxford, 1953), and is based upon observations during extensive travels in Iran between 1962 and 1968. Many specific villages in different parts of the country are discussed, usually from data collected first hand. A great deal of the reporting, however, is based upon interview responses and impressions, and this reader would have welcomed somewhat more "hard" data in the form of direct observations of behavior and of actual improvements being made and of increases in production being counted. That such observation was not possible in this survey should not reduce our appreciation of this work's great contribution to our understanding of the Iranian scene. But the lacks that the reader feels, and probably Professor Lambton feels them also, can be overcome only by long term, detailed field studies of particular peasant communities. Such studies are singularly lacking in Iran: the anthropologists have concentrated on tribes and the geographers on cities. If Lambton's work receives the attention it deserves, it may well stimulate ethnographic studies of the peasantry in the midst of land reform as well as provide a general frame of reference for such studies.

△ PHILIP C. SALZMAN is an assistant professor of anthropology at McGill University.

YĀD-NĀME-YE IRĀNI-YE MINORSKY, edited by Mojtabā Minovi and Iraj Afshār. Tehran: Univ. of Tehran Press, 1969. xiii + 205 pages in Persian. xxxi + 255 pages in English, French and German. Illus. Map. No price indicated. University of Tehran Publications #1,241; *Ganjine-ye Taḥqiqāt-e Irani* #57.

Reviewed by F. R. C. Bagley

V. F. Minorsky devoted his life (1877-1966) to Iranian studies. After studying Oriental languages in Moscow, he became a consul and diplomat in Iran and Turkey and served on the commission which delimited the Iranian-Ottoman frontier in 1914. He taught at the Universities of Paris (1923-1932) and London (1932-1944), and continued while in retirement at Cambridge to study and write until a month before his death. Knowing a dozen languages, and receiving much help from Mme. Minorsky, he wrote more than 200 articles and books in Russian, French, English and Persian. Perhaps his greatest services were in historical geography, Āzarbāyjāni and Caucasian history, and Ṣafavid history. Tehran University honored him in 1964 by reprinting twenty of his articles in a volume called *Iranica* (Univ. of Tehran Publications #775), and has honored his memory by publishing this Iranian Memorial Volume (*Yād-Nāme*). Another Memorial Volume edited by C. E. Bosworth and J. Aubin is in the press in England.

The *Yād-Nāme* includes appreciations and biographies of Minorsky by I. Afshār, the late Sayyed Ḥ. Taqizāde, M. Minovi (who worked with him in England 1936-1950), and D. M. Lang, together with a list of his works brought up to date by Mme. Minorsky. There are ten contributions in Persian, twelve in English, seven in French, and one in German, by scholars from Iran, Britain, France, Germany, the United States, the Soviet Union, Poland, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Naturally the topics vary in importance. Some, such as E. Yār Shāṭer's study of the use of postpositions in a northwestern Iranian dialect and R. Frye's "Continuing Iranian influences on Armenian" (both in English), are highly technical; others, such as Z. Safa's and M. Achena's excellent essays (in French) on the evolution of ideas in Persian poetry and on the anecdote in Persian mystic poetry, are regrettably brief. The contributions cannot all be listed and discussed here. Perhaps the following deserve mention.

(In Persian). 'A. Ḥ. Ḥabibi of Kabul contests the opinion of Minorsky and others that the Khalaj, who held the Delhi Sultanate 1290-1320 and were probably ancestors of the Pashto-speaking Ghalzays, were originally Turkish, and produces evidence that they were Aryan. He identifies Khalaj and Ghalzay with Ghalji and Gharche, names still applied to Iranian or "Tājik" farmers in Afghanistan and Soviet Turkistan, and thinks that the epithet T-r-k given to them in early sources is not Turk but Tarak, the name of a still existing Afghan tribe. With less evidence he speculates that they and the Abdāli Afghans stem from the Hephthalites, that the Hephthalites (also known as White Huns) were Aryan, and that Abdāli is derived from Hephthalite (not from *abdāl—Ṣūfī* saints). Sayyed M. T. Moṣṭafavi gives a description and photographs of ruins called Qaṣr-e Zaḥḥāk near Khorasānak station on the Miāne-Marāghe railroad, probably dating from the Median, Sāsānid, and Islamic periods, with a Sāsānid edifice which may have been a royal hunting lodge. T. Binesh discusses the towns which were collectively known as Ṭus, with special reference to Ṭābarān where Ferdawsi's tomb is located; and H. Karimān, author of *Ray-ye Bāstān,* makes some corrections and additions to Minorsky's valuable article on Ray in *EI.* (1st ed.). G. H. Yusofi writes charmingly about the Amīr Kay-Kāvus's book of advice for his son (of which we have an English translation by R. Levy). M. Minovi tells us, also in beautiful Persian, about the career of Mollā Qoṭb ol-Dīn Shirāzi (d. 1311), physician, mathematician, astronomer, theologian, Ṣūfī, politician, and prototype of the phrase *"anbān-e Mollā Qoṭb"* ("walking encyclopedia"); in an appendix he describes manuscripts of Mollā Qoṭb's works.

(In English). A. J. Falaturi (*emām* of the Shī'ah mosque at Cologne) discusses the logic of Fakhr ol-Dīn Rāzi (d. 1209), whose main concern was to defend religion by refuting metaphysics; although Rāzi's writings are inconsistent and self-contradictory, he sometimes moved towards an empiricism not unlike that of Hume. W. Hinz shows how the *tumān* depreciated between 1300, when it was worth 10,000 silver *dīnārs* equivalent to 29,400 pre-1914 German gold marks, and 1718, when it was worth 66½ marks. H. Roemer considers the tasks lying ahead for Iranian historiography; he stresses the importance of archives, and therewith of palaeography, and endorses the hope of the 1966 Iranology Congress that the Pahlavi Library will build up a central collection and catalogue of manuscripts, printed texts, microfilms, etc.

(In German). H. Lenz, after examining the important passage about Iranian religion in Plutarch's *Moralia,* finds (contrary to the views of some scholars) that it contains no evidence for existence of Zervanism (Zurvānism) at that time.

There are a good many misprints in the European language section, and some in the Persian; but they only spoil the intelligibility of one contribution (in French, by B. Skalanek), and elsewhere are no worse than in most contemporary European books.

Through this volume Tehran University has paid a worthy tribute to a great scholar.

△ F. R. C. BAGLEY is Lecturer in Persian Studies at the University of Durham in England.

ISRAEL

THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF NAHUM GOLDMANN: SIXTY YEARS OF JEWISH LIFE. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969. viii + 343 pages. $7.95.

Reviewed by Israel T. Naamani

At the age of 75 Dr. Nahum Goldmann continues to be the *enfant terrible* in Jewish public life. In his youth he seemed to be a "normal" Jewish genius, excelling in his studies and taking delight in shocking respectable people.

Years later Goldmann, seduced by whiffs of politics, headed the World Zionist Organization and the World Jewish Congress (among other worldwide Jewish organizations). He still retains the presidency of the WJC which has lost much of its influence since the creation of the State of Israel. As a university student and later as a Jewish leader he met some of the greatest men of this century: Max Weber, Einstein, Hammarskjöld, Ben-Gurion, Truman and Adenauer. Goldmann's autobiography is somewhat a strain on the author's modesty: from time to time he delights in revealing how he bested a Ben-Gurion or a Nehru in a verbal match.

Goldmann would have made a magnificent pre-World War I French premier or British prime minister. Even in his book there is the attempt to keep up with history, but inevitably he emerges as the grand statesman of an earlier era. For a few flimsy moments he toyed with greatness—during the behind-the-scenes struggle in the United Nations for the 1947 partition plan. But he wavered when the time came for bold action; it was Ben-Gurion's vision and decision that won out. Goldmann's crowning achievement was to work out with Adenauer the gigantic German reparations scheme for Israel.

Paradoxically, it was this ability and desire to "negotiate," to "fix," to "promote," to "arrange" which did not endear him to the Israelis. They disliked his "exilic," "Diasporic" approach to problems and because he had never settled in Israel, he remained a symbol of the "wandering Jew." Observed one Israeli leader: "He discovered the secret of perpetual motion."

Goldmann's tragedy, so evident in his memoirs, is that he thought he was speaking for world Jewry, but in the three largest centers of Jewish population his leadership was ineffectual. Israel had its own government. Russian Jewry was not in a position to accept outside leadership. United States Jewry and Goldmann were never on the same wave length. Moreover, the vast majority of American Jews never even heard of Goldmann.

All this is unfortunate, not only for Goldmann but for peace in the Middle East. Goldmann has always stressed, as he does in his present book, that when the Jewish homeland in Palestine was founded sufficient attention was not paid to relations with the Arabs. This made Goldmann hesitate to support the 1948 independence declaration. It was his view that "Israel cannot exist forever as a hostile island in an Arab ocean." He wanted Israel as a distinct political entity in a Middle East Confederation, and he desired the Jewish state to serve as a spiritual and cultural center for Jews the world over, yet at the same time he felt that the Diaspora must be assigned a greater rôle in Israeli affairs.

Another Goldmann solution to the Arab-Israeli problem was the suggestion for the international neutralization of the Jewish state. Goldmann could come up with these proposals, because he had no responsibility for Israeli foreign affairs. But in making his suggestions, as usual, he was a step behind times. "Neutralization" is a pre-World War II concept which proved time and again its futility (except Switzerland). Moreover, Goldmann himself says ruefully: "Ben-Gurion represents the Jewish people and the Israeli *yishuv* much more truly than I do." (P. 293)

△ ISRAEL T. NAAMANI is a professor of political science at the University of Louisville and co-editor of the recently published *Israel Through the Eyes of its Leaders.*

INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN ISRAEL, edited by S. D. Eisenstadt, Rivkah Bar Yosef and Chaim Adler. New York: Praeger, 1970. xv + 703 pages. Bibl. Tables. $20.00.

Reviewed by C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze

In his Preface (p. viii) the senior editor, Professor Eisenstadt, states that this reader is a complement to his earlier work, *Israeli Society.* His epilogue, on Israeli identity (also called self-identity), is perhaps an overly rapid summary of the major arguments of this older work. His influence, however, goes well beyond these and two further signed contributions to this new volume. Indeed this work bears, for the major part, the imprint of the Eisenstadt school or workshop. It can be seen as a testimonial of—and let us add, a tribute to—Eisenstadt's formative impact on a generation of Israeli sociologists.

This book has the advantage of consistency, usually a major problem with readers. As Professor Eisenstadt will be the first to agree, it also has certain drawbacks. Notably, matters that might otherwise prove controversial do not immediately appear as such: for example, the relatively scanty attention to Arab phenomena and the inclination to deal with integration problems in terms of social change. Again, matters that might be highlighted by a different kind of approach may not get their due: for example, the topic of large cities and that of the military.

After two introductory chapters setting the political scene, the volume is devoted to two broad problem areas. One is the Israeli economy, considered from its socio-economic, occupational and manpower angles. Three sections of Part I of the book, totalling eleven chapters, provide a broad and penetrating conspectus. Because education is discussed in the perspective of manpower, its cultural aspects fall more or less by the wayside. The second main field of interest is the articulation and integration of the Israeli nation; it comprises parts II and III plus one chapter of part IV, totalling fourteen chapters. Most of the attention goes to immigrant adjustment and to experiences with new forms of communal living, at the village and small town levels.

Coupled with Eisenstadt's *Israeli Society,* this hefty volume should be adequate as material for a solid course on Israeli society, whether taught in Israel or to Jewish students elsewhere. For others, Israel features appear perhaps a bit too much as a monad, notwithstanding editorial claims that it will be of comparative use. If I have any hesitation about this volume, it stems from the already mentioned fact that its relative homogeneity results from its emerging, by and large, from one school of thought: sociologically as well as in terms of perception of Israeli society.

In its present appearance the volume is beyond the price range that the average student can afford. Maybe a cheap paperback edition could remedy this.

△ C. A. O. VAN NIEUWENHUIJZE is the chairman of the department of sociology and anthropology at the University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario.

THE PALESTINE PROBLEM

A PALESTINE ENTITY?, by Don Peretz, Evan Wilson and Richard J. Ward. Washington, D. C.: The Middle East Institute, 1970. 114 pages. Tables. $1.75.

Reviewed by Richard H. Dekmejian

This is the first monograph in a series of special studies that the Middle East Institute has chosen to present its readers as background reading, in this case for its 24th Annual Conference. In the midst of the protracted Arab-Israeli confrontation, the authors have succeeded in producing a singularly dispassionate and probing study of the various facets of the Palestinian problem. Unperturbed by the prevailing milieu of emotional rhetoric, they perceive the Palestinian issue as being basic to the issues of war and peace, and they proceed to explore a number of options that could produce a settlement.

The work begins with a historical survey of Arab nationalism in Palestine with special emphasis on the events that shaped the evolution of the Palestinian personality from World War One to the present. Authored by Don Peretz, a noted student of Arab-Israeli affairs, this section traces the progressive development of a separate Palestinian Arab nationalism initially in response to British mandatory rule and the growth of the Yishuv, and subsequently due to their refugee status in the context of repeated Arab defeats. In a milieu of frustration and hopelessness came the guerrillas with a group charisma of their own to challenge both Israel and the neighboring Arab states, especially the Kingdom of Jordan. Mr. Peretz's concise discussion of the main guerrilla groups and the accompanying organizational chart are extremely useful in giving the reader a comprehensive view of the differing ideologies, estimated strengths, income sources, and leading figures of the commando organizations.

The second essay, written by Evan M. Wilson, focuses on the place of Jerusalem in a possible future Palestinian-Arab entity. Drawing upon his long years of experience as US Minister-Consul General in Jerusalem, Mr. Wilson accounts the turbulent history of the Holy City, Jordan's denial of Israeli access to Jewish shrines as well as Israeli infringements upon Muslim and Christian rights in the new city. Mr. Wilson recognizes that a solution for Jerusalem is possible only in the context of a general Arab-Israeli settlement. He goes on to list a number of requirements that an equitable solution would entail. These include the protection of Jordanian (and Palestinian Arab) and Israeli interests as well as those of Jerusalem's Jewish and Arab inhabitants; free access to all of the Holy Places; and full recognition of the international interest in the city. The author then advances a number of alternative solutions ranging from exclusive Israeli or Arab control to condominium, to variants of internationalization. For a number of sound reasons, he favors partial territorial internationalization of the main Holy Places to be administered by the United Nations, in cooperation with Israeli and Arab deputy administrators. The essay closes with an exploration of possible economic arrangements to maximize cooperation and profits from the tourist trade.

The last two essays are devoted to the possible political and economic forms that a projected Palestinian entity might assume. Professor Peretz advances four different options for a Palestine entity and Richard Ward follows up with an analysis of the economic problems involved in such an enterprise. Nevertheless, the authors recognize that the immediate problem is not the form of the Palestinian entity but the achievement of mutual recognition of national rights by the parties involved.

Since the conclusion of the study in March 1970, a number of factors have changed in the Arab-Israeli situation. President Nāṣir's death, the rise of pragmatic Ba'thism in Syria, internal troubles in Iraq and diminishing Arab financial support have weakened the guerrilla movement. Internal dissension has been rampant. In their repeated encounters with the Jordanian army since September 1970, the guerrillas have suffered heavily. Indeed, it would be interesting to see what would happen to the concept of a Palestinian entity if the guerrillas are finally crushed in a Jordanian push toward the impregnable Israeli defense line at the Jordan River. After all, it was the guerrillas who, albeit by violent means, had brought the tragic plight of the Palestinian Arabs to world attention. One wonders if the notion of a Palestinian entity will survive the guerrillas. Whatever the case, the present monograph remains a welcome addition to the scholarly literature. One would hope that the authors will proceed toward their stated goal of writing a more comprehensive and larger work on the Palestine entity.

△ RICHARD H. DEKMEJIAN is an associate professor of political science at the State University of New York at Binghamton.

TURKEY

EDUCATIONAL PROBLEMS IN TURKEY, 1920-1940, by Ilhan Başgöz and Howard E. Wilson. Bloomington, Ind.: Research Center for Language Sciences and The Hague: Mouton, 1968. 204 pages. Notes. Appen. Bibl. Index. $7.00. Uralic and Altaic Series, Vol. 86.

Reviewed by Howard A. Reed

This collaborative study presents substantial data, much of it not otherwise available in English, on the creation and diversification of republican Turkish education between 1920 and 1940. The late Howard E. Wilson unfortunately died before completing his revision of the last two chapters of this work based on Mr. Başgöz's original Turkish text. It was in press when A. M. Kazamias' *Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey* appeared in 1966. Two initial chapters review traditional institutions such as the *sibyan, medrese* and more secular *Mekteb-i Enderun* or Palace School, then over a century of reform before 1920. The next chapter surveys education during the national liberation struggle and first efforts of the nationalist Ministry of Education started under Riza Nur on May 2, 1920. Its first aim was that, "Our children's education must be more religious and nationalistic. Our children must become creative, self-reliant and productive. We must revitalize our schools and cultural institutions according to scientific and modern principles. . . ."

The core of the book is in the final three chapters. The first of these deals with the search for an educational philosophy and structure relevant to the economic and social realities of republican Turkey and the struggle to build a new system. Turkey drew heavily on her own scholars such as Gökalp and Ismail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu as well as on reports by John Dewey, Albert Malche or the Kemerrer group. She broke with Islamic tradition in unifying education in 1924, secularizing it sharply thereafter, adopting a Latin alphabet in 1928 and disestablishing Islām in 1929.

Educational administration and finance introduce the next chapter. The reasons for the shift from substantial provincial autonomy and support for schools in the 1920s to the centralized control of the Ministry of Education by the mid-1930s are explained. Coeducation, and adult education, especially in the Turkish Hearth (*Türk Ocağı*) until 1932, and later through the widespread People's House (*Halk Evi*) programs are described. The Nation Schools (*Millet Mektepleri*) to teach literacy and the new Latin script, notably from 1928-1932, and related projects of the Teachers' Association and by the military after 1925 are also reviewed.

Innovation and experimentation with new educational approaches highlight the final chapter. The views of trailblazers in education for the peasant like Nusret Kemal Köymen and Ismail Hakki Tonguç, creator of the remarkably effective Village Institutes, contrast with the educational policies of the ruling Republican People's Party and the People's Houses, and reform of Istanbul University with the help of German *emigré* scholars after 1933. The growth of agricultural, technical, teacher and vocational education is also depicted. The book closes with a review of Atatürk's schooling and discussion of his educational ideas and keen interest in reform. He wanted Turkish culture and education to be both unmistakably Turkish yet also international in character.

The main value of this study lies in its focus on aspects of national educational policy formulation and on central educational management. It suffers from the lack of an adequate historical framework for the main issues discussed. It neglects the upper secondary level *lisé's (lycées)* dealt with comprehensively in Richard Maynard's unpublished 1961 Chicago doctoral thesis drawn upon substantially by Kazamias. The ideas and publications of Nusret Kemal Köymen get inadequate attention, and the documentation is rather limited. For instance, only four of I. H. Baltacioğlu's many works are cited. The study also slights the "Anatolian," or rural-realistic, trend in Turkish thought and writing in presenting a more urban, official view with few alternatives. This book is marred by numerous omissions of cited works and footnotes, and a blank page 190. It is, however, a useful record of elements in the significant Turkish educational experience with valuable data for students of educational development.

△ HOWARD A. REED, Professor of History, University of Connecticut.

GARRISON COMMUNITY: A STUDY OF AN OVERSEAS AMERICAN MILITARY COLONY, by Charlotte Wolf. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Corp., 1969 xvi + 263 pages. Appen. Bibl. Index. $13.00.

Reviewed by Dorothea Seelye Franck

Charlotte Wolf reveals herself as a happy combination of accommodating wife and enterprising sociologist. Apparently her husband was assigned to Ankara and she made the most of an unusual opportunity. Not that the book is any kind of exposé. It is a fair analysis of one isolated American military community from 1965 to 1967—based on extensive interviewing and set within the framework of sociological theory. The community happens to be Ankara, Turkey, but the observations are just as applicable to other military communities—presumably with more or fewer tensions depending on the greater or lesser differences between American culture and that of the host country.

The first chapter presents the concepts of the community and describes the study's approach as "primarily one of studying the relationship of group members to the community" (p. 24). The second chapter sketches the newcomer's impressions of Ankara (unfavorable), the political setting (tense after Cyprus), and the development of the Ankara military community concluding that "as . . . [it] has become more organized and elaborated, it has also become more isolated from the mainstream of Turkish life" (p. 54).

The third chapter on the nature of the "military ethnic community" begins with a description of the dominance of the military institution, describes the Ankara organization with its heightened sense of nationalism and belief in the military mission, its idealization of the United States combined with little feeling of participation in political and social concerns stateside, and such personal variables as the interchangeability of personnel, status considerations and intense rotation which encourages short-term perspectives. A sketch of the "Marks of Ethnic Status" is followed by a description of the "Non-Image"—the attempt to make the military appearance as unobtrusive as possible. The analysis of the intereffects of the military community and other American groups concludes that "for the most part, members of the military community live in relative isolation from any real incursions by American civilians" (p. 103).

The fourth chapter on "the Demographic, Ecological and Social Properties" of the 5,000 member community presents a breakdown according to rank groups correlated with educational attainments, career commitments, and overseas experience. In a description of the spatial patterns the point is made that the encapsulation was a state of mind, not a state of space, there being no high-walled compound like those in which American missions of another era protected themselves. The social structure properties of the military group include rank with its systemized privileges, special educational facilities, isolated economic life, the military's own religious institutions and leisure activities as well as particular problems of family life and mental health. Of special interest is the section quoting the reaction of interviewees to the army's welcome and orientation. The author concludes that advance preparation was unduly negative with little said in the official statements to encourage people to venture out from the American community into the Turkish.

The fifth chapter details the areas of intergroup (i.e. American-Turkish) tension including traffic, currency and customs regulations, competition in housing and services, and disparities in living standards and value systems. The situation deteriorated with the "Ami Go Home" demonstrations starting with the Cyprus conflict. Implements of closure include the milieu of secrecy fed by growing generalized suspicion. Community stereotypes were reinforced by the vocabularies of prejudice, although some members of the community "were extraordinarily resistant to the prevalent stereotype," receiving as they did, "some support from the secondary military goal of good relations with Turkey" (p. 224). As to the forces for extra-community innovation, "the core areas were composed of those groups which had the highest rank, the most education, were married with their families in Turkey, were older and had spent the longest time in the country" (pp. 242-3).

The concluding chapter points out that other studies have related the variables of education, occupation, income, length of residence, and age to participation in community affairs—members of higher socio-economic classes participating more frequently than members of the lower. This study has found that the same observations hold for a military group's *extra*-community participation in an overseas setting. This is true even though the lower-ranking groups in Ankara frequently lived in areas with a higher composition of Turks than did the higher-ranking groups.

Mrs. Wolf writes:

> The findings of the study suggest that so pervasive a tendency toward closure in lower-ranking groups . . . might be primarily explained in terms of community organization, and only secondarily in terms of local conditions, differences in culture, and particular personalities. (p. 257)

The author sees no prospect for other than a continued response of closure and calls it naïve to expect "an organization which is characterized by authoritarianism, barracks neatness and hierarchical order to represent other than just that . . ." (p. 259).

Footnotes are extensive and livelier than most, including as they do a variety of examples supporting the sociological commentary. An appendix presents the questionnaires used. In the extensive bibliography only one title, *Germania: USA,* indicates a slight resemblance to *Garrison Community.* Mrs. Wolf's in-depth study of a single typical military community must truly be an original piece of research. From her study can we draw one small constructive conclusion supporting a limited objective? Could orientation for overseas service be modified so that at the least it does not unduly frighten most of the Americans being sent and at best encourage more extra-community participation on the part of those who start their new Life with open minds?

△ DOROTHEA SEELYE FRANCK, who lived in Istanbul for nine years, has a masters in sociology. She is currently completing a manuscript based on the journals and letters of the first president of the Istanbul American College for Girls and entitled "Yankees from New York to the Garden of Eden."

MEDIEVAL HISTORY

PRE-OTTOMAN TURKEY: A GENERAL SURVEY OF THE MATERIAL AND SPIRITUAL CULTURE AND HISTORY, 1071-1330, by Claude Cahen. New York: Taplinger, 1968. xx + 370 pages. Plates. Bibl. Index. $12.95.

Reviewed by Carl Max Kortepeter

The English version of this study, prepared by the eminent French historian of the Islamic Middle Ages, Claude Cahen, has long been awaited, for the field of Islamic history in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, in particular, has attracted few gladiators and synthesizers. The reason for this is quite apparent. Few scholars have the opportunity or patience to master Arabic, Turkish and Persian and also Greek, Latin and a whole array of Western European languages. Not since the comprehensive work on the same subject by V. Gordlevsky appeared in Russian in 1941 (note Cahen's judicious criticism on pp. 443-444) and the sterling works of M. A. Köymen, O. Turan and I. Kafesoğlu, in the 1950s and 1960s have historians had such an opportunity to get close to the narrative sources for the period, and notably the Persian chronicles of Ibn Bībī, Aqsarayī and the anonymous *Tarikh-i Al-i Saljuq*.

The author begins his narration with an essay on the Islamization and early history of the Turks in Transoxiana and Khorasan (pp. 1-15). Part I deals rather briefly with the history of the Great Saljuqs, emphasizing the rôle of Niẓām al-Mulk, of family squabbles among the Saljuqs and the use of income from rural estates in the form of *iqṭā'* to pay for a large standing army (pp. 19-54). Part II deals primarily with the relationship of the Rūm Saljuqs to Byzantium, the Danishmend, the Crusaders, the Khwarezmians and the Ayyubids (pp. 55-142). In Part III Professor Cahen covers the same time span as in Part II, the years 1071 to 1243, but gives particular attention to social and cultural developments and problems (pp. 143-268). Perhaps the unique chapter of this study is Part IV, the concluding section, wherein the author emphasizes the difference between the Saljuq and the Saljuq-Mongol eras (pp. 269-372). The book is amply provided with attractive plates (primarily Saljuq architecture), a full bibliography, an index and four maps. This reviewer would strongly support the addition of dynastic tables. The book provides lists of various high Saljuq officials which would be more useful if placed in a dynastic context.

In impressionistic fashion, this reviewer would like to discuss *ad seriatim* various points in the book which will be of interest to students of Turkish history and which illustrate the importance of Cahen's spade work, even though his study lacks, in many places, a certain evenness of treatment.

If one is to give any credence at all to the study of Creel ("the Role of the Horse in Chinese History," *Am. Hist. Rev.* LXX/3), one is reluctant to accept entirely the author's statement that the pastoral economy of the Turks is "based on the Asiatic camel" (p. 3). Cahen's explanation of the westward propulsion of the Oghuz Turks in the tenth century as a result of Mongol tribal occupation of "Mongolia" is interesting but not fully satisfying unless we integrate this fact with other events taking place in Eastern Turkestan and North China where the Liao held sway (p. 4). The discussion about the Ilek Khans or Karakhanids is important for two reasons: it reveals the eastward-oriented nature of this first Turko-Muslim state and also reveals the vitality of its Turkish cultural life which Cahen notes is "far in advance" of what the Saljuqs were able to develop. When reading Cahen, one has the distinct impression that even Maḥmūd (999-1030), the redoubtable sultan of the Ghaznevids, must have felt the inevitability of the Saljuq takeover in Khorasan.

The author deals courageously with a difficult issue of Turkish history (pp. 32-34) which lies at the core of much of the history of the Middle East, to wit, how were the Turks able to control vast territories in the central Muslim lands from the eleventh to the twentieth centuries? Or, put another way, why were the Turks, generally speaking, more single-minded and efficient politically than were the other peoples of the Middle East? Professor Cahen gives credit first of all to the special wide-ranging nature of Turkish nomadism. The implication is that to move peoples over great distances requires a great deal of organization and efficiency. This reviewer would also enlarge upon an observation of Professor Paul Wittek that Turks, who were responsible for running sophisticated governmental machinery, always had at their disposal a large ethnic reserve of Turks living in a tribal state who provided sturdy, willing recruits to shore up any given system. (I don't think that we should forget also the incredible ability of Turks to endure and to muddle through in times of adversity—a characteristic of another imperial people, the British.)

The recent study by George Makdisi on "The Marriage of Tughril Beg" [*I.J.M.E.S.* I/2 (1970)], which Professor Cahen would not have seen, goes far towards clarifying the world view and aims of the Great Saljuqs. The intention of marrying the Caliph's daughter symbolized ". . . the possibility of a Saljuq descendant assuming (the authority of) the Abbasid Caliphate. . ." and hence the marriage was opposed by the Caliph.

The author studies closely the "significant Turkish institutions" as guideposts for the understanding of subsequent developments. For Niẓām al-Mulk the model state was understandably his homeland of Ghazna. But Cahen looks beyond the classical Islamic models, calling attention to some typical Turkish institutions such as the assigning of appanages to leading members of one's family (a cause of instability whenever a sultan died), the appointing of an *atabek* to rear one's son, the maintenance of a large standing army and so forth. The size of the Saljuq army led to important modifications in and the extension of the *iqṭā'* system (pp. 40-41). Typical institutions harking back to previous Islamic dynasties included the *amir-i dad* (overseer of both *qāḍī* and *maẓālim* courts), the *wazīr*, who controlled the bureaucracy while the Saljuq sultans made war, and the *mustawfī*, the chief financial officer. Bureau chiefs and provincial governors belonged to a pool of senior officials, the *'Umadā'*. As Cahen emphasizes, the Saljuqs sought the support of the orthodox and Ṣūfī religious establishments and hence subsidized *medreses, khanqahs, tekkes,* etc.

The post-Manzikert (1071) Rūm Saljuqs initially looked to Baghdad and to the older lands of Islām for political and cultural inspiration and indeed continued up to the Mongol victory of Kösedagh in 1243 to involve themselves in the affairs of Muslim rivals, defeating, for example, the Ayyubids (1233) and the Khwarezmians at Yassï Chimen (1237). But in Turkish Asia Minor, there were always two cultures living side by side: on the one hand, the cities and towns of the Rūm Saljuqs blossomed as centers of traditional Irano-Islamic civilization; on the other, the countryside, particularly the mountainous regions and the territories remote from central authority, were dominated by the tribal Turkomans. These tribals Turks were ever ready to make demands on weak central or regional authorities. Professor Cahen, while indicating this dichotomy on several occasions, hesitates to assign specific causes to the Bābā Isḥāq revolt of 1240, that welling up of tribal and popular discontent in the form of a popular religious movement (p. 136). Thus, the Turkomans were a two-edged sword. They could bolster a friendly régime with their pastoral products and their raw martial energy, but they could greatly weaken a régime with fire and swords if they nurtured some real or imagined grievance. This reviewer would suggest the possibility that there was jealousy among some of the Turkomans after the Khwarezmians (mostly Kipchak Turks) were assigned whole provinces in Eastern Asia Minor after their defeat in 1237. If the central government at the same time attempted to press upon the Turkomans more orthodox religious practices or attempted to suppress them, the Bābā Isḥāq revolt would seem more intelligible.

For this reader, Professor Cahen has settled once and for all the controversial issue of how the Turks, with relatively small numbers, were able to Turkify the whole of Asia Minor. His argument goes like this: i) Asia Minor was relatively thinly populated during the eleventh and twelfth centuries owing to flight, enslavement and deaths of indigenous populations as the tides of conquest swept to and fro; ii) The former component elements of Byzantine culture had been greatly weakened or destroyed; iii) The invaders found in Asia Minor a land similar to their native steppe, or richer, and hence they thrived; iv) The Turks, then, had a "superiority in (active and cohesive) numbers" not "superiority of race" as some writers have contended. This superiority of "active" numbers, as we know, was later increasingly eroded away in Ottoman times because the Turks, with a monopoly of warfare, suffered heavy ethnic losses in continual warfare on many fronts. Cahen admits that Turkification did not proceed with equal intensity everywhere and that large numbers of the indigenous rural population survived. Perhaps Cahen's most important observation here is that when the "powers of penetration" (the Turks) are matched with the "powers of resistance" (Byzantium, etc.), the Turks won out hands down, and this change occurred in spite of William of Rubruck's estimate that there were ten locals for every Turk.

In addition to Turkification as such, the writer delves deeper into the Iranization and Byzantinization of the Turks in the process. Professor Cahen emphasizes the rôle Iranians played in the cultural and commercial life of the Rūm Saljuqs. In matters of land tenure and weights and measures, Cahen assigns a major influence to Byzantium (p. 173). This question has long been a controversial issue between Byzantine and Islamic historians. Cahen, for example, prefers to associate the later Ottoman word and institution of the *timar* with the Byzantine *pronoia* rather than with the Saljuq *iqṭā'* (pp. 174-183). The "living" or income from *pronoia* and *timar* estates were granted by rulers to heads of families "on condition that they provide *military* service" (Vasiliev, *Hist. of Byz. Empire* II, 546), while the income from an *iqṭā'* served a variety of purposes such as pay for provincial governors and so forth.

Professor Cahen has long been recognized for his studies of Islamic towns. He cites Ibn Sa'īd for the observation that the Rūm Saljuqs had 24 provincial towns possessing a governor, a *qāḍī,* mosques, bathes and cloth (!) merchants. The police function is handled in the thirteenth century by a special corps of men with mixed ethnic backgrounds (the *ikdish*). But the chief town of a province was also the seat of a military command. The *ikdish* are replaced by the *Akhis* in the fourteenth century (p. 242). Following Cahen, at the turn of the fourteenth century, the semi-corporate craftsmen (*Akhi*) have a strong encounter with the ethical codes of the *futuwwa* and the *Akhis,* thus morally re-enforced, are a power (as Taeschner has indicated) with which the young Ottoman state had to contend. Cahen suggests that craft organizations of Central Asia, Iran and possibly Asia Minor may have had a different type of corporate identity than existed in the Arab lands. Needless to mention, the Saljuq and Ottoman rulers sought control over these semi-autonomous bodies and the traditional instrument of the Islamic state, the *muḥtasib* ("head of the vice squad") appears to have won out (pp. 190-200).

From the first appearance of the Turks in Asia Minor, the Greeks of Monophysite persuasion assisted the conquerors. One wonders if some of this same stock of nonconformists later helped to swell the ranks of the *Qīzīlbash* Shi'ites who brought so much grief to the Ottomans. The Armenians, even in this early period, quickly ingratiated themselves with the Turkish power structure because they were not connected to any external power block.

Cahen emphasizes the importance to the later Ottoman state of the Saljuq-Mongol governmental patterns (post-1243). In Iranian lands, there tended to be a clear-cut distinction in profession and ethnic origin between administrative and judicial offices (Iranian) and politico-military occupations (Turks and Kurds). This division persisted in Asia Minor because the native population (and the Turks?) could not initially handle the Arabic and Persian, the languages of the bureaucracy (p. 224). The native townsmen, however, soon found their way as traders. In fact, this reviewer would suggest that the checks and balances of Islamic history often resulted from the ethnic "separation of powers" in the major career lines, not just in the so-called "Ruling Institution" but in the society as a whole.

The administrative control of the Saljuqs over their provinces varied greatly from century to century. Cahen distinguishes four periods: i) in the eleventh century, control rested with tribal entities; ii) in the twelfth century, the provinces were parcelled out as appanages to "princes of the blood." But as the Persian bureaucrats gradually took control of the central administration in Konya, they informed the sultans of the dangerous centrifugal forces to which the state could be subjected when a province was in the hands of a prince. iii) They, therefore, preferred and actually accomplished in the thirteenth century the transferal of provincial control from the princes to the official classes, who were dependent on the favors of central power and authority. iv) With the coming of the Mongol protectorate, provincial control broke down because the Ilkhanid Mongols, unlike the system of the Golden Horde, could not agree upon one authority only to carry out their bidding. Meanwhile, court officials carved out whole provinces for themselves as compensation for their services. The Mongol *yarligh* (diploma of authority) and *payza* (authentication) sometimes were bestowed upon the sultan, sometimes on the vezir and sometimes on lesser officials such as the *pervane,* the bearer of official messages and gifts. This confusion was augmented, after the death of Kaykhusraw in 1245-46, by the existence of these claimants to the Sultanate, all of whom were minors.

In the post-1243 Mongol period, Cahen distinguishes three phases in the disintegration of the Rūm Saljuq state. *In the first phase,* elder statesmen, possessing great diplomatic skills and a concern for the maintenance of the Islamic nature of the state, attempted to limit the detrimental effects of Mongol rule by regularizing the tribute and the quartering and upkeep of envoys and troops. [Rūm was a protectorate of Batu (of the Golden Horde) until 1256 and only thereafter did Asia Minor pass to the control of Hülagü and the subsequent Il Khans.] Bayju, the local hatchet man of the Mongols, participated in the destruction of the 'Abbāsid Caliphate in 1258 (Baghdad) but also shared in the decisive defeat of the Mongols by the Mamlūks of Egypt at the Battle of 'Ayn Jalūt in 1260. Once the young sultan, 'Izz al-Dīn, and more importantly, his vezir, Karatay, had fallen out of favor, another major figure, the Pervane Mu'īn al-Dīn (1256-77) became the virtual dictator of Mongol Anatolia. Legitimized as the vezir of the Sultan Rukn al-Dīn, the Pervane also attempted to gain a respite for Asia Minor. Towards the end of his era, he intrigued with Baybars of Mamlūk Egypt who then delivered a crushing defeat to the Mongols near Elbistan in 1277 and marched to Qayseri where he was crowned as the Saljuq ruler. But the hoped-for general uprising against the Mongols did not materialize and the Mamlūks withdrew. Only the Turkomans of the Taurus, under the leadership of a woodcutter known as Karaman, took the occasion to seize Konya. At the same time, a number of Turk and Kurdish halfbreeds set up the Germiyan state with their seizure of Akseray. The Pervane was executed for his treachery and thereafter, the protectorate phase of Mongol rule was ended and *the second phase,* direct Mongol rule, began. Basically the old generation, including the great mystic, Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, had passed on. Kangirtay, brother of the Ilkhan, and the Khan's own vezir, the "quizzling" Juwaynī, drove the Turkomans out of Tokat, Konya and Akseray, but the aggressive and untamed spirit of the Turkomans persisted, to such an extent, in fact, that the Mongols were, very soon, forced out of Western Asia Minor altogether. Basically, *the third and last phase* of the Saljuq demise began shortly thereafter, the phase of the Turkish amirates, during which the Karaman, the Germiyan, the Ottoman and others sought legitimacy from the Saljuqs, but set up their own principalities.

The economic evolution of Asia Minor took a new turn under the Mongols. The latter day puppet Saljuq rulers transformed many *iqṭā's* into private properties to gain adherents and to raise money (p. 331). Whole provinces were given over to the Mongols as *iqṭā'* to secure loans from the Mongol treasury. Mongol revenues came from *muqāṭa'āt* (leases of tax farms in certain districts or of natural resources such as mines). In addition, there were a large number of other "haphazard and disruptive" taxes (p. 334). Professor Cahen concludes his study with the assertion that the most fertile symbiosis in Asia Minor was that of Turk and Iranian, not Turk and native (Greek). He further notes that given the odds against the Turks, Islām proved to be, in this era, a greater integrating force than did Christianity. Doubtless the professor would give particular credit to the new-type integrating activities of certain eclectic dervish orders, such as the Bektashiyya.

It will be obvious that this reviewer believes in exposing some of the most precious, if controversial, gems of this study which might otherwise be hidden behind the shortcomings of style and translation. But it would be a mistake to go too far in such criticisms. Given the biases of many grant-giving bodies and of many of the bureaucrats and scholars who administer research funds today, we must count ourselves fortunate that such a study ever saw the light of day. It is ironic that as we in the United States expend more and more research funds to study contemporary events in Asia and to develop more theories of human behavior (to manipulate humans?), in the real world, we are out of touch with the aspirations of more than half of the world's population. In our making haste to look like a "Great Power," we are not nurturing the social and intellectual roots which might guarantee our longevity in that rôle. Thus, for example, only by studying in *Pre-Ottoman Turkey* the foundations of a Turkish empire which lasted seven centuries, can we, with a little humility, understand why we have almost destroyed Turkish-American friendship in 1971.

△ CARL MAX KORTEPETER is an associate professor of Middle East history at New York University, Washington Square Campus.

SHORTER NOTICES

ANATOMY OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION: THE CASE OF ISRAEL AND SOME COMPARATIVE ANALYSES, by Amos Perlmutter. Cambridge: Harvard Univ., Center for International Studies, 1970. 51 pages. Notes. $2.25. Occasional Papers in International Affairs no. 25.

Amos Perlmutter has provided us with an important outline of research topics concerning Israeli politics. He has taken some of the concepts of modernization developed by Samuel Huntington and tried to apply them to the Israeli case. For Perlmutter, the pre-State period represents Huntington's mobilization and the post-State period demobilization. He then presents some details regarding the two periods, emphasizing the development of the socialist-Zionist organizations and parties in the pre-State era. Finally, Perlmutter offers some brief comments regarding these processes in the Soviet Union and Communist China.

Unfortunately, Perlmutter's effort suffers from a lack of development and a lack of systematic work on all the many topics covered. The integration of so many seminal ideas and analyses is necessarily hindered by the abbreviated nature of the monograph. The seven-page "theoretical" chapter lacks, for example, serious consideration of the applicability of Huntington's formulation to the special case of Israel and the weighing of alternative conceptual frameworks.

It is important that Perlmutter has again reminded us of the crucial rôle of the pre-State era in determining the political arrangements of the Israeli state. He properly emphasizes the importance of the organizational genius of the founding fathers of the socialist-Zionist organizations, but his analyses rest too heavily on ideology and organizational structure; to do justice to his own framework and to their genius, he must more adequately deal with the mechanisms and dynamics of power aggregation and perpetuation.

The major weakness of the mongraph is that its topic requires a full-length book, at least. It is unfortunate that he has failed to digest and develop some of the important points he has to make more fully.

△ ALAN ARIAN is an associate professor of political science at Tel Aviv University.

ARABIC AND PERSIAN POEMS IN ENGLISH, by Omar S. Pound. New York: New Directions Publishing Corp., 1970. 80 pages. $1.95 paper.

For one concerned with Near Eastern literature not only as an academic discipline but even more because of its specific and universal literary values, the appearance of a new effort of translation is an event. I am especially happy to recommend Omar Pound's renderings of passages from Arabic and Persian poetry since he has avoided the pitfalls of "academic" translations and presented enjoyable and representative examples of the poetic art of these languages.

Although generally excellent, Pound's translations, in my opinion, do possess one major fault: his attempt to "modernize" some passages by substituting Western allusions for the original ones tends to destroy the distinctive character of the poetry, otherwise well preserved in his renderings. For example, the colloquialism "Nuts!" hardly accords with "lovers parting with caravans at dawn" (p. 42), a typical Arabic theme; similarly (p. 31) British family names contrast oddly with the theme of abandoned encampments and the typical Arab images which follow. Similar examples can be found in several other poems, causing rude and jarring contrasts and weakening the poems by making them neither Eastern nor Western but a hodge-podge of both.

With this exception, however, the translations are highly readable and are both enjoyable English poems and good representations of some of the poetic themes and images typical of Arabic and Persian. Moreover, Pound's introductions provide a valuable overall view of classical Arabic and Persian poetry, although necessarily very generalized, and explain the basis for the somewhat limited selection he has made. His bibliographical notes also indicate directions for further reading.

The almost complete absence of readable, nonpedantic translations from Arabic and Persian poetry makes this small volume, in spite of some shortcomings, at once welcome and tantalizing: on finishing it, one is frustrated at having few other sources to turn to for further reading of actual poems, although works about poetry are fairly numerous. Hopefully Pound's example will encourage other translators to pay more attention to the poetry, and less to the literal and scholarly precision, of their renderings, and we will thus be able to enjoy translations which truly reflect the richness and distinctive flavor of Arabic and Persian poetry.

△ JULIE SCOTT MEISAMI, Tehran, Iran.

THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE: DIPLOMATIC ALTERNATIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, by Michael Reisman. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1970. 161 pages. $6.00 and $1.95 paper.

In this very brief essay, Professor Reisman suggests that four major revisions must be made in the approach if we are to break out of the vicious circle of war in the Middle East: 1) the goal of "peace" should give place to that of minimum order; 2) the assumption of the monolithic or integrated nature of Middle Eastern problems must be reexamined; 3) the ambiguous rhetoric of "imposed" versus "indigenous" solutions must be scrapped; and 4) the need for social and political invention must be recognized without qualification. It is difficult to disagree with these suggestions which, however, are not precisely novel to students familiar with the problems of the area. There will be much question as to the author's neat proposals for a Sinai Development Trust and for an Israel trust for the Druze in the Golan Heights, while there are very serious complications as to the Jordan Valley, a Palestinian "entity" and a form of internationalization of Jerusalem. The author seems clear as to the necessity of Israel withdrawal, even if under certain conditions, from occupied Arab territories. The era of "colonialism" and "imperialism" has passed, as Professor Reisman implies.

While the book is not annotated and contains no bibliography, there is a useful appendix which includes the League of Nations Palestine Mandate, the Partition Resolution of November 29, 1947, the Trusteeship Council's Draft Statute for Jerusalem (1950), and the Security Council's Resolution of November 22, 1967. The book should be read along with the growing literature of peace proposals, and more particularly with the American Friends Service Committee's *Search for Peace in the Middle East.*

△ HARRY N. HOWARD, Washington, D. C.

CONCISE GRAMMAR OF LITERARY ARABIC: A NEW APPROACH, by Wilson B. Bishai. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co., 1971. xiii + 282 pages. Gloss. $12.00.

For years, Wright's *Arabic Grammar* was the most adequate grammar available to students of Arabic, but it was and is far too complicated for beginning students. In 1965, J. A. Haywood and H. M. Nahmad compiled *A New Arabic Grammar,* a more useful reference but still too detailed for the beginner. Dr. Bishai's new work is an admirable attempt to compile and simplify the major points of grammar which a student must master during the first year or two of Arabic study.

The work is not, as the author himself states, to be used as a basic text since (1) a totally grammatical approach to studying any language is boring and uninspiring and (2) the exercises of the beginning lessons contain too many vocabulary items (the student must initially memorize and master a limited number of related sentences and these sentences should progress from the very simple to the relatively difficult).

Finally, the exercises at the end of each chapter are most useful for review purposes or for use as supplementary exercises in courses with basically political and economic texts.

△ G. LAMPE, Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies.

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE SIX-DAY WAR: ISRAEL, THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, EGYPT, JORDAN, by Eliyahu Kanovsky. New York: Praeger, 1970. 438 pages. Appen. Bibl. $15.00.

The war between Israel and neighboring Arab states in June 1967 was surprisingly short in duration, but certainly long in impact. Its reverberations continue to dominate the regional scene and create increasingly serious concern among world powers. The author of this book addresses himself to the economic impact of that war. He dwells on it as a focal and crucial period, but widens his investigation to include an analysis of the prewar base and a look to the future.

The contributions of this book are both timely and significant. Some issues discussed are: the solid and far-flung web of financial and business support provided for Israel by Jewish establishments abroad; the magnitude and impact of the prewar recession in Israel; the characterization of economic planning in Israel as "notably ineffectual" (p. 106); Israel as an exporter of military equipment; the use of Arab labor from the occupied territories in Israeli agriculture and industry and the sub-contracting of work to Arab industries; and the indications of plans for "permanent Israeli presence in the Golan Heights" (pp. 198-201).

The author also arrives at a number of major conclusions which are worthy of serious consideration by policy and decision makers. Here are some examples: on balance, the occupied territories constitute an economic liability rather than asset for Israel; the highly centralized control in the Egyptian system has been the major factor responsible for frustrating its economic development; despite some initial setbacks, the West Bank economy has been making successful adjustments and promising growth in a process of integration into the Israeli economy; during the decade preceding the war, Jordan's economy had developed to such a healthy and vigorous condition that it was able, contrary to some predictions, to absorb the shock of the war damage and the loss of the West Bank and maintain a reasonable viability. Despite a few missing features, the book constitutes an excellent treatment of the subject. It is comprehensive in factual presentation, balanced in appraisals of strengths and weaknesses in the various economies concerned, and challenging in its conclusions.

△ AFIF I. TANNOUS, Washington, D. C.

EDWARD GRANVILLE BROWNE AND THE BAHÁ'I FAITH, by H. M. Balyuzi. London: George Ronald Publishers, 1970. ix + 122 pages. Index. £2 or $5.75.

Inasmuch as the late Professor Browne was the most prolific writer on the origins and early history of Bābī-Bahā'ism, this book should be of great interest to the students of the movement. Very few religions have escaped internal strife and bloodshed and Bahā'ism is not one of them. After the execution of the Bāb in 1850, there were bitter feuds between the appointed successor of the Bāb ("The nominee of the Bāb" according to the author), Mirzā Yahyā Sobh-e Azal and his half-brother Mirzā Hoseyn Ali Bahā'ullāh. The latter won, but his death in 1892 produced another feud between his sons, Abbās Abdul Bahā and Mohammad Ali. The majority followed Abdul Bahā, but at his death in 1921, his successor, Shoghi, was involved in more feuds and schisms.

Mr. Balyuzi, who is the "Hand of the Cause" in the Bahā'ī hierarchy, has written this book to show that "in the works of this renowned scholar [Browne], Mirzā Yahyā [Sobh-e Azal] is given a prominence which is misleading" (p. 6). The author would have probably preferred if Browne had not mentioned Yahyā at all. If, however, Browne felt that he had to mention him, then he should have been perceptive enough to realize that all truth was on the side of Bahā'ullāh who, after all, was "Him whom God shall manifest." He has gone through Browne's major works on the subject and has tried to show the latter's mistakes.

In the opinion of this reviewer Professor Browne was a victim of an unfulfilled expectation. He was so thoroughly captivated by the sincerity, courage and tenacity of the early Bābīs in the face of overwhelming and cruel opposition, that he thought he had found himself at the threshold of the Kingdom of God. He wanted to be the "interpreter" of the movement. But the feuds, murders, charges and counter-charges among the leaders disappointed him and dimmed his enthusiasm. This book leads one to believe that perhaps Professor Browne's disappointment somewhat clouded his judgment in favor of the underdog, Yahyā Sobh-e Azal.

Mr. Balyuzi also is a victim of unfulfilled expectation. It is quite evident that Bahā'īs saw in Browne a potential missionary of their cause to the intelligentsia of the West. Apparently he was the only European to visit Bahā'ullāh. He was reminded more than once that "of all historians of Europe none attained the holy threshold but you" (p. 104). That Browne was not converted has been disappointing to the Bahā'īs and has clouded the author's judgment against Browne, whenever the latter has given space and sympathy to the opposition.

This volume is marred by the unfortunate decision of Mr. Balyuzi to adopt Browne's system of transliteration and thereby distort Persian pronunciation.

△ YAHYA ARMAJANI, professor of history, Macalester College.

EVOLUTION D'UN CENTRE DE VILLÉGIATURE AU LIBAN (BROUMMANA), by Richard Alouche. Beirut: Dar el-Machreq, 1970. 312 pages. Bibl. Maps. Appen. Illus. Tables. No price indicated.

This study is the second in the series "Hommes et Sociétés du Proche-Orient." It details the transformation of Broummana from a small Lebanese mountain village to an important summer resort. But Alouche has written more than a village history: he is studying social change both in terms of changes in the politico-economic structure of the village and in terms of changes in the lives of individuals. The author is looking toward the development of a sociology of tourism, and his study must be welcomed as a step in that direction.

The monograph is divided conceptually into three parts: in the first, the author attempts to reconstruct the geographic, economic, political and demographic picture of Broummana before the heavy influx of summer residents. He makes ingenious use of maps, aerial photographs, and official documents, as well as a detailed questionnaire, to accomplish this task. The second part deals with changes in the economic and social structures of Broummana as it developed into a summer tourist center. In the third section, Alouche examines the village-level socio-economic changes from the vantage point of one of its citizens, thus combining a macro- and micro-approach to social change.

This study will be welcomed by many groups: sociologists, economists, political scientists, Middle East specialists and Libanophiles. We look forward to future studies in this excellent series.

△ ROXANN VAN DUSEN, Johns Hopkins University.

INCIDENTS OF TRAVEL IN EGYPT, ARABIA PETRAEA, AND THE HOLY LAND, by John Lloyd Stephens, edited with an introduction by Victor Wolfgang von Hagen. Norman, Okla.: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1970. liv + 457 pages. Illus. Index. $9.95.

Stephens' *Arabia Petraea,* originally published in New York in 1837, was a phenomenal success in its time, earning for its author an international reputation as a travel writer in an era when American literature in general was pretty much in the doldrums. It is a travel classic of the Middle East, to be shelved alongside those of Stephens' European contemporaries such as Kinglake, Lamartine and Curzon. Long out of print, it now appears in an attractive and moderately priced edition that will appeal to anyone interested in what the Middle East was like in the early nineteenth century.

Stephens' route took him from Alexandria to Cairo, up and down the Nile, then across the desert to Sinai, 'Aqabah, Petra, and eventually to Jerusalem (How many fortified boundaries would one have to cross these days to retrace Stephens' steps? I count at least six). His writing combines vigor and occasional irony with warmth, humor and sensitivity. Often informative, he is never pompous. As Mr. von Hagen points out in the introduction, Stephens had absorbed a great deal through extensive reading before he set out, but erudition never interferes with readability. Perhaps the most striking passages are those that describe his own poignant experiences—as, for instance, when he is compelled to witness a sickening torture by bastinado while sweating out a travel permit (pp. 147-9), and when he pauses at the grave of a boyhood friend who died in Jerusalem (pp. 407-9).

Mr. von Hagen, who has traveled extensively over these same areas, contributes an informed commentary on geography and topography. His introduction is in itself a valuable essay relating Stephens' travels to other aspects of his never uneventful life and to the lusty American age of which Stephens was a part. Unfortunately, his editorial contribution shows some signs of haste: Commodore Porter's rank at Istanbul was *chargé d'affaires* from the outset, he was not "raised" to that rank (p. xxii); William Lynch's account of the navigation of the Jordan and the Dead Sea was published in 1849, not 1843 (p. xxxv); George Gliddon became American consular agent at Alexandria in 1832, not consul in 1820 (p. xxviii); and it's Lady Hester (not Esther) Stanhope (p. 455n). Nitpicking? O.K., but at least the reader should not be forced to choose in a single footnote between 1849 and 1857 as the date of Muḥammad 'Alī's death (p. 23n). This reviewer also noted with surprise that certain material in the introduction and footnotes had been quoted or closely paraphrased without attribution to its source (e.g., p. 456n).

△ DAVID H. FINNIE is the author of *Pioneers East: The Early American Experience in the Middle East* (Cambridge, 1967).

IRAN: EMERGENCE OF A MIDDLE EASTERN POWER, by Firouz Bahrampour. New York: Theo. Gaus' Sons, 1970. 71 pages. Appen. Bibl. Index. $5.00.

This is a brief commentary by the director of the international relations section of Tehran University which is intended, in the author's own words, "to help strengthen the already cordial relations existing between Iran and the United States, . . . to introduce modern Iran and to assess the outlook for the future."

The book is general in scope and contains very brief chapters on historical, cultural, socio-economic and political characteristics of Iran as well as on the achievements of the present Shah and his father, Reza Shah Pahlavi. The book contains several useful appendices, including "Modern Iranian Historiography" by Kerim K. Key, the Iranian constitution, and a chronology of historical events of Iran.

△ A. HOSSEIN FARIS, Middle East Institute, Washington, D. C.

THE ISLAMIC WORLD AND THE WEST, 622-1492 A.D., edited by Archibald Lewis. New York: John Wiley, 1970. ix + 146 pages. $5.95 and $2.95 in paper.

One of the principal objectives of this "Major Issues in History" series is to provide selected readings for undergraduate lecture courses; and this is well served by the present volume, though the addition of an index would have helped. It might be noted on pp. 37-38 (the well-known passage of ibn

Khurradadhbah on the Rahdānīyah Jewish merchants) that its historicity has been questioned by no less an authority than Claude Cahen (*Revue des Etudes Juives,* vol. 123, pp. 499-505); and the corrupt form "Rhademite" on the last line of p. 1 should be cross-referred.

Professor Lewis's interest in what it is now fashionable to call a confrontation between the Islamic world and the West leads him to assert that the "narrowing" of Islamic religious and cultural emphases, detectable in Saladin and still more in the early Mamlūks, was a result of their "closing ranks against Western Europeans in Syria" (pp. 39, 53). Obviously the challenge of the Crusades cannot be ignored; but the primary purpose of integrating Sunnī higher education in the madrasah was surely *internal* to Islām and directed against the Ismā'īlī challenge of the Fāṭimids, not against the Crusaders: see G. E. Von Grunebaum: *Classical Islam* (London, Allen & Unwin, 1970), p. 166; and for the "narowing" effects of this integration, Sir Hamilton Gibb: *Studies on the Civilization of Islam* (Boston, Beacon Press, 1962), pp. 23-25.

△ George Kirk, University of Massachusetts.

Kapitalismus und Linke im Libanon, by Muhammad Kischli. Frankfurt am Main: Europaïsche Verlagsansalt, 1970. 126 pages. Bibl. No price indicated.

This small paperback is the German translation of the original Arabic text (*al-Niẓām al-Ra'smālī wa al-Yasār fī Lubnān,* [Beirut: Dār al-Ṭalī'ah, 1967]) plus an introductory and a concluding section by Bassam Tibi, editor of *Die Arabische Linke* (See *MEJ,* Summer 1970, pp. 391-2). It contains a series of essays, first printed in the New Left publication *al-Ḥurrīyah,* by one of the leading exponents of Lebanese Marxism-Socialism on three central themes: the economic structure of Lebanese capitalism, the rôle of the New Left, and the rôle of confessionalism in historical context.

Some of the essays would have benefited from greater in-depth analysis, and much of the information in this book is familiar to the student of contemporary Lebanon. Nevertheless, the book is worth reading because it provides an authentic exposition of both the problems and the perspectives of leftist groups, and especially intellectuals, in Lebanon today. Very useful are Kischli's and Tibi's analyses of political and philosophical differences among the various leftist organizations in Lebanon and their relationships to the Palestinian movements. A pleasant surprise is the concise, clear style and the systematic, cliché-free approach of the author.

△ Peter Bechtold, University of Maryland.

Lyautey in Morocco: Protectorate Administration, 1912-1925, by Alan Scham. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1970. xi + 205 pages. Map. Appen. Gloss. Bibl. Index. $8.75.

The book under review, despite indications that it is intended to be a beginning to a new and more critical view of the administration of Maréchal Louis-Hubert Lyautey, first French Resident-General in Morocco (1912-1925), is essentially an administrative history of the early protectorate period based on published French materials, largely laudatory in tone, and adding little that is new to what is known about this most famous of French imperial proconsuls.

The book consists of six chapters, a fifty-page appendix of protectorate documents, and a bibliography. The first chapter deals with Lyautey, soldier-administrator, and is largely drawn from Lyautey's published writings and André Maurois's authorized biography (long available in an English translation). The four chapters which follow present a series of case studies of protectorate administration (the apparatus of government, property, Franco-Muslim education, and judicial organization) and form the core of the book. Those interested in administrative history will find here a descriptive account of the elaboration of the French protectorate drawn from official and semi-official published sources, most notably the *Bulletin Officiel.* The final chapter is a fifteen page "critical assessment" of Lyautey's administration which largely because of the length has difficulty getting much beyond the level of the commonplace. Little attempt is made to place Lyautey in historical perspective, to compare his administration with French colonial administration elsewhere, or with the great pro-consuls of the British empire. The impact of the Lyautey protectorate upon Moroccan society (as opposed to Moroccan institutions) is largely unconsidered. Not consulted were major British and French archival deposits which bear on the Lyautey period, including the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and War Ministry, and British Foreign Office records. When the critical assessment of Lyautey comes to be written, these sources, along with others currently unavailable like the Lyautey papers, will form the essential documentation for such a work.

△ Edmund Burke, III, is an assistant professor of history, Merrill College, University of California at Santa Cruz.

Méditerranée Rouge: Un Nouvel Empire Sovietique? by Michel Salomon. Paris: Robert Laffont, 1970. 399 pages.

In this essay, the special Middle Eastern correspondent of *L'Express* Michel Salomon traces the expansion of the Soviet empire in the Middle East and poses a number of basic question: 1) Achieving its secular dream of access to the open sea through the Mediterranean, what does the Soviet Union really want or seek? 2) Is its policy based on ideological considerations or upon those of national and imperial interest, as in the past? 3) Deployed on the southern flank of Europe, is its military presence a threat to the continent—to France and to the West? 4) Is its military and naval presence in the Mediterranean of benefit to the Arab States which it "protects" along the shores of the Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa? 5) Will the United States contest the Soviet presence or will we see a kind of Soviet-American "condominium," to impose a new "Roman peace" in the area?

The author provides his readers with an opening historico-geographical essay, and then proceeds with a consideration of Soviet naval, military, ideological, political and diplomatic, and economic penetration. While there will be much difference of opinion concerning many of his general statements and some of his biased views, he has provided some solid ground for response to his problems. He is well aware, among other things, of the increasing Soviet interest in Middle Eastern oil. Mr. Salomon has no hard and fast answers, but he closes with the observation that "the USSR has penetrated the Mediterranean with no intention of leaving it, surreptitiously at first and later more openly, thanks to the weakness and opportunism of the West. It would be dangerous to underestimate the importance of this fact for the security of Europe and the peace of the world." The appendix contains useful data on naval forces in the Mediterranean and a selected bibliography.

△ HARRY N. HOWARD, Washington, D. C.

A MIDDLE EAST READER, edited by Irene L. Gendzier. New York: Pegasus Press, 1969. xl + 453 pages. Notes. Bibl. $8.95.

Edited collections both of articles on the society and politics of the contemporary Arab world and the Arab-Israeli conflict abound. Professor Gendzier has assembled here a well-conceived grouping of essays, including pieces on social and political change in Israel and the Arab countries and a substantial sampling of important statements of the past three decades on the Arab-Israeli conflict. The latter is thereby usefully placed in its larger context.

The editor has assigned herself the task of clarifying a number of topics she judges critical to an understanding of the contemporary Middle East, grouped under four headings: Reflections on Radical Change in the Arab East and Israel, The Transformation of Society, Israeli Perspectives and Arab Unity, and Squaring the Circle: Israel and the Arabs. These are linked by the unifying theme of total societal change as conceived and implemented in the Middle East. The articles are introduced by a lengthy essay which skillfully analyzes the essence and significance of the viewpoints represented in the volume.

Professor Gendzier is a leading advocate of the necessity of informing any attempt at understanding contemporary realities with a deep sense of their historical roots. Her editorship here is a persuasive argument for her case.

△ MALCOLM C. PECK, Middle East Institute, Washington, D. C.

MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF ALGERIA, by Madeleine Trebous. Paris: Development Centre of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 1970. 234 pages. Bibl. $4.00.

In the decade of the 1970s, Algeria like much of the Third World will face serious employment problems. However, by its proximity to Europe, Algeria has an important escape valve for some of its excess labor. Madeleine Trebous in her recent study for the O.E.C.D. analyzes the dynamics of this labor flow from Algeria to France, West Germany and Belgium and the effects which this migration is having on the growth and diversification of the Algerian economy.

As of 1966, 800,000 Algerians were living abroad. Although a mere 6 per cent of the total population, this number represents one out of every eight working Algerians, or one out of four of all those who hold permanent jobs. In analyzing the current Algerian work force in Europe by sector and skill level, the author finds the largest group employed in unskilled construction jobs; the second largest in electrical and mechanical engineering where a somewhat higher proportion hold semi-skilled positions. While more Algerians have risen to higher positions since 1965, the author notes how few Algerians are in managerial and skilled positions.

The tragedy of migration is not only that so many Algerians do not receive the managerial and technical skills Algeria desperately needs, but also what training they do receive is often not used on their return to Algeria. In some cases, skills acquired are too specific for Algerian industry; in other cases, trained workers have difficulty finding out about appropriate jobs on their return home.

The relationship between Europe, France in particular, and Algeria, the author concludes, must be one of mutual dependency. While Algeria benefits directly from the jobs provided for its unemployed, from the vital foreign exchange from workers regular transfers home, as well as from the important apprenticeship in industrial life and skills which some young Algerians gain, France also gains. At a time when its own labor shortages threaten to curtail growth, France can draw on a flexible amount "free" human capital (on which it pays no child rearing or old age support). Only with the acknowledgement of European dependence on this cheap labor supply will it become possible to reassess the relationship between the developed and developing economies. The author concludes with some tentative suggestions for alleviating the present problems and for moving toward closer cooperation in this field.

The work is excellently documented and will make a valuable contribution to the field of labor and manpower studies as well as the understanding of French-Algerian relationships since independence.

△ SARAH JACKSON, Washington, D. C.

NATIONALITIES OF THE SOVIET EAST: PUBLICATIONS AND WRITING SYSTEMS, by Edward Allworth. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1971. xi + 387 pages. Index. $17.50.

Every library with a good Middle East collection and certainly every student interested in Central Asia will want this excellent reference volume. The tome is divided into two parts: the first is an almost three hundred page bibliographical directory of Czarist and Soviet East languages publications located in libraries in the United States and covering the years 1818 to 1945. There are some 3,350 entries listed. The second section gives a transliteration system for each of the twenty-six writing systems of the Soviet East. This part will prove valuable in the standardization of each language transliteration scheme. This book is the third in the Modern Middle East Series sponsored by the Middle East Institute at Columbia University.

△ MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies.

OIL AND WORLD POWER: A GEOGRAPHICAL INTERPRETATION, by Peter R. Odell. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1970. 180 pages. Index. $1.25.

This book may prove useful to students of the Middle East in two ways. First, despite its subtitle, the book is a tidy account of the world oil industry in the broadest sense, summarizing economic and political elements and providing a useful framework for this immense subject. Second, Mr. Odell brings together the relevant geographic factors affecting Middle East oil, thus going beyond the political and economic analyses that dominate much of the literature in this field. Middle East specialists should not hope to find in-depth treatment of Middle East oil since only two chapters are devoted exclusively to that area.

△ PETER NULTY, Middle East Institute.

THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE TO ISRAELI OCCUPATION, edited by Naseer Aruri. Wilmette, Ill.: Medina Univ. Press International, 1970. viii + 167 pages. Appen. $3.50. AAUG Monograph Series no. 2.

This is a valuable book. In the space of an introduction by Naseer Aruri and thirteen papers deriving from the December 1969 convention of the Association of Arab-American University Graduates, a thorough survey and analysis is presented of the Palestinian movement as a revolution and resistance to colonization by European Zionist immigrants and refugees from European persecution. The range of content includes anthropological, economic, historical, political, legal and esthetic discussions. Most of the papers are scholarly and well documented; ideological rhetoric is limited to one or two papers, but the bitterness of the constrained and deprived minority or the displaced refugee is certainly understandable. Even the assessment of the cost of the Middle East conflict, not only to the protagonists and their Great Power patrons but to the world, in a conventional economic analysis by Ragaei El-Mallakh emerges as a clear indictment of the irrationality and arrogance of United States foreign policy and Israeli expansionism.

An as anthropologist and a witness of events from Lebanon in 1969-70, I find Barbara Aswad's paper on the importance of the "middle peasants" among the Palestinians in the resistance movement, and the sympathy and support they have from the peasants of South Lebanon, Syria and Jordan the most interesting, and I can attest to its validity. But nearly all of the other papers provide information that is scarcely known in the United States: David Waines' survey of Palestine under the British mandate occupation is especially enlightening and suggests to me that the close parallel with the Algerian revolution began long before Zionist incursion began to win the competition with the indigenous population for the land.

The rise of a "revolutionary" studio art and of a political poetry of Israeli Arabs, told by Kamal Boullata and Emile A. Nakhlah respectively, add resonance to this volume, and one only regrets the lack of even one illustration from the magnificent political posters that have appeared in the past few years. The paper by Ania Francos, "The Palestinian Revolution and the Third World," seemed unnecessarily strident—or, rather, out of place, in this volume.

In short, this is one of the scant dozen of books I would expect any student, colleague or friend to read before I would discuss the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with him with any hope of enjoying a judicious discourse. Ibrahim Abu-Lughod and the AAUG are to be congratulated for their courage and the quality of their convention and the contributions to it.

△ LOUISE E. SWEET, Visiting Professor of Anthropology at the University of Wisconsin at Madison.

PARTNERSHIP AND PROFIT IN MEDIEVAL ISLAM, by Abraham L. Udovitch. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1970. xii + 261 pages. Bibl. Gloss. Index. $10.

With the publication of this well organized, detailed study of Islamic partnerships and *commenda,* the two basic instruments for combining financial and human resources for the purposes of trade, Professor Udovitch has significantly broadened our knowledge of Muslim commercial arrangements, particularly for the early medieval period. Beginning his study by raising the fundamental problem of source material, the author argues that Islamic legal texts, particularly early Ḥanafī works, reflect actual late Ummayad and early 'Abbāsid practices. With an extremely careful analysis of his sources, clearly indicating those areas where it is difficult to prove that the legal texts reflect actual practices, Dr. Udovitch describes the various types of arrangements whereby Muslims could combine their resources for mutual gain. By the concluding chapter, "Islamic Law: Theory and Practice," this reviewer was absolutely persuaded by Professor Udovitch's method, extremely impressed by his use of evidence, and convinced by his conclusions.

Ḥanafī law has the most detailed discussion of partnerships distinguishing between an unlimited investment partnership (*mufāwaḍa*) and a limited one (*'inān*). The former demands equality in investment, personal status and distribution of profits and liabilities while anything short of this is usually a limited partnership or a hire contract (*ijāra*). To justify certain partnership arrangements, Ḥanafī legalists had recourse to such legal devices as juristic preference (*istiḥsān*) and legal evasions for circumventing the *sharī'a* (*ḥiyal*). On rare occasions they even argued on the basis of current practices. On the other hand, Shāfi'ī law rejected the unlimited partnership (*mufāwaḍa*) on the basis of analogy (*qiyās*) while Mālikī law accepted it, but defined it differently than the Ḥanafī did. It is the precision with which the author keeps the distinctions between the different schools clear that is so impressive. In contrast to the preceding, a *commenda* relationship, whereby one man supplies the financial resources and assumes most of the liabilities, while a second supplies his time, labor and usually travels, is accepted by all three schools with only relatively minor variations.

The general reader will be most interested in the introductory and concluding chapters as well as pages 72-82 on credit and pages 170-176 on the development of the *commenda.* The material is not only fascinating, but lends itself to incorporation into lectures on the vitality of medieval Islamic economic life as well as giving a sense of the type of research problem facing modern scholars.

△ JERE L. BACHARACH, Department of History, University of Washington.

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MIDDLE EAST: A COMPUTERIZED GUIDE TO THE CURRENT LITERATURE, edited by Ali M. S. Fatemi, Panos Kokoropoulos and Abbas Amirie. Akron: Univ. of Akron Press, 1970. xxvii + 346 pages. Subject Index. Author Index. $12.50.

This ambitious volume is the first in a series being prepared by a program entitled International Development-Economics Awareness System (IDEAS) to compile vital economic and political information on developing countries. This Middle East volume contains over 2,600 entries of both articles and books, almost all of which were published between 1958 and 1970. The volume's utility is aided by a user's guide, country abstracts and exhaustive subject and author indices. Despite numerous misspellings, observed during a random check through the entries (including two rather glaring mistakes in the one entry used in the user's guide), the volume will prove useful for libraries.

△ MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies.

POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT IN TURKEY, by C. H. Dodd. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1969. 335 pages. Tables. Bibl. Index. $7.95.

Its title is too pretentious for this book. In fact, the text has a far more limited scope. The author confines himself principally to the important period of transition between military rule in 1960-1961 and the election of a Justice Party government in 1965. The book opens with a brief general summary of events from Ottoman times to the 1961 elections, including a noteworthy analysis of various arguments advanced to explain the military intervention in 1960. There follows a detailed examination of the series of civilian coalition governments that were the hallmark of the era ended by the landslide victory of the Justice Party in the 1965 elections. The political narrative is complemented by a discussion of Turkish political institutions and by an overview of the often ignored bureaucratic structure, as both existed in the early 1960s. The treatment includes previously published information developed by the author through polls administered during his three years as a professor at the Middle East Technical University in Ankara. The work closes with a short postscript touching on developments up to June 1968.

Effectively presented, the material is generally reliable and shows considerable familiarity with pertinent Turkish documentation. To this reviewer, however, the approach seems unduly static; it reflects little of the dynamism of contemporary Turkish politics and government. Important facets of the student movement are missing; one looks in vain for mention of "Yankee Go Home!" or the like which began to be standard fare among student activists with the Cyprus crisis in 1963-1964. Likewise, the radicalization of the labor movement, so notable since 1960, receives scant attention in this book. Even some key institutions are ignored. For example, somehow there is no mention of the highly important National Security Council instituted by the 1961 Constitution to serve as a legal forum for the military commanders to express their views to the civilian government. Nor do personalities fare well in this treatment. It is hard to accept the characterization of Kasım Gülek as an exponent of "broadly socialist criticism" (p. 137); Turhan Feyzioğlu's alienation from the Republican Peoples Party certainly involved a struggle for party leadership as well as a dispute over the leftward drift within the organization (p. 138); to note Aydın Yalçin (p. 129) solely as a leading member of the New Turkey Party (correct for 1961) obscures his rapid rise to the top levels of the Justice Party by 1965.

Unfortunately, the editors have not served the writer very ably. There are numerous instances of minor infelicities in the text: *viz.* the military takeover of May 1960 is in one place dated August (p. 27); the change from indirect to direct elections is incorrectly dated (pp. 24 & 46) as 1950 instead of 1946; the alleged text of the Sunay letter appeared in *Cumhuriyet* on November 18, 1964, not 1965 (p. 93); the allegation that the trade unions are not politicized (p. 162) does not quite square with the analysis on pp. 178-79; nor is it true that between 1950 and 1960 "the party with the highest number of votes obtained all the seats" in each province (p. 46).

△ George S. Harris, School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D. C.

The Sudan: Land and Water Resources Survey in the Jebel Marra Area, by FAO. Rome: FAO, 1968. ix + 57 pages. Appen. Maps. $9.00. Available from UNIPUB, P.O. Box 433, New York, New York 10016.

This is the final report on a project to provide the Sudanese government "with basic technical data required for the preparation of an agricultural development plan for the Jebel Marra and upper Madi Azun area" of Darfur province. The survey was undertaken by the UN at the request of the Sudanese government in 1962. Field operations lasted from 1963 to 1967.

The project resulted not only in the collection of data but also in a set of recommendations. It proposed that the government set up pilot projects to test and demonstrate suitable methods of extending agriculture with emphasis on production of high gross-value crops which are normally imported or only seasonally available, on integration of livestock and crop production in a pattern of mixed farming, and on development of forest resources.

Furthermore, the report suggests that peasant agriculture, rather than large scale state enterprises such as the Gezira scheme, would be the most suitable form of agricultural organization in this region. These proposals are based appropriately on surveys of existing social organization, land use and communications as well as on technical data of water resources, vegetation and soils, all of which are summarized in the report.

△ Peter Nulty, Middle East Institute.

Taxation in Islam, Vol. III: Kitāb al-Kharāj, by Abū Yūsuf, translated by A. Ben Shemesh. Leiden: Brill and London: Luzac, 1969. 143 pages. Bibl. Index. 85s.

This welcome translation of Abū Yūsuf's *Kitāb al-Kharāj* (Book on Taxation) by Professor Shemesh is the third volume in a series of works on Islamic taxation. The first two volumes were translations of Yaḥyā b. Adam's *Kitāb al-Kharāj* and Qudāma b. Jaʿfar's *Kitāb al-Kharāj* (reviewed in *MEJ* 22, no. 2 (1968), 235). This third volume is perhaps the most important for scholars, as it is the earliest text on law in extant and is from the pen of Abū Yūsuf, Chief Judge in the reign of the Caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd (d. 193/809), the principal disciple of Abū Ḥanīfa and the one responsible for writing down his Master's legal opinions with the assistance of Muḥammad b. Ḥasan al-Shaybānī. Professor Shemesh "is not certain whether Abū Yūsuf ever saw the Kitab in the form of a complete book," but only "his Address to the Caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd bears the signs of originality." It is possible that the original work of Abū Ḥanīfa was expanded by disciples and copyists, as the repetitious paragraphs bear witness, but Muslim publicists seem to agree that Abū Yūsuf did write a book on taxation in response to the Caliph's order: Abū Yūsuf gives us a hint to this effect in his own Address to the Caliph (see Baghdādī's *Ta'rīkh Baghdād*, vol. 14, *passim;* and Schacht, "Abū Yūsuf," *NEI*, vol. 1, pp. 164-5).

Like the previous volumes, Professor Shemesh translated only parts of the text. Thus, scholars needing other parts of the work will have to use either the original Arabic or Fagnan's French translation, as Abū Yūsuf's text provides legal material on non-financial subjects. The full translation of the Arabic text will perhaps await further labor of love, as Fagnan's French translation, with all its excellence, is not a very critical study of the original text.

△ Majid Khadduri, Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies.

UNITED STATES INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research

THE DILEMMA OF ISRAEL, by Harry B. Ellis. Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1970. 110 pages. $2.00.

PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AND SOCIALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST, by Howard S. Ellis. Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1970. 126 pages. $2.00.

TRADE PATTERNS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, by Lee E. Preston, in association with Karim A. Nashashibi. Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1970. 96 pages. $2.00.

With these three new brochures, the American Enterprise Institute has now completed a series of six studies dealing with various aspects of American Interests in the Middle East, all written under the direction of George Lenczowski, of the University of California. The first of the current volumes, by Harry B. Ellis, the well-known correspondent of *The Christian Science Monitor,* is a forthright, responsible and objective consideration of the problem of Israel in the Middle East. Briefly it traces the historical background, delineates the diplomatic history of Israel; and then traces the relationships of Israel with the Arabs, the United States and other Powers, and the United Nations and Israel. There is an excellent, brief description of the internal structure of Israel and of the problem of "where the power is." With his long experience in the Middle East, Mr. Ellis is deeply sensitive as to the basic problems. He begins his study with a analysis of Israel's basic current dilemma: whether to remain an occupying power in Arab territories, or to give citizenship to some 1,000,000 additional Arabs and lose its identity as a Jewish State. He also states a third alternative, backed by the United States and the United Nations, which Israel refuses to contemplate short of a directly negotiated overall settlement, namely partial or complete withdrawal from Arab lands taken in 1967. By similar token, the United States also faces Israel's dilemma, as chief supplier of military equipment and economic assistance to Israel: Can the United States "maintain its protective attitude toward Israel and still preserve essential American interests in the Arab world?" The author's skepticism deserves serious consideration by all who deal with the problem.

Professor Howard Ellis presents a well balanced analysis of *Private Enterprise and Socialism in the Middle East.* He examines the economic development of the United Arab Republic, Iraq, Turkey, Lebanon and Iran, and closes with some conclusive observations based on the Middle Eastern experience. Israel is not covered on the ground that it is not typical of the Middle East. Arab socialism is generally defined as the brand which is practiced in Egypt. The author indicates that UAR economic development, other considerations aside, runs into very special bureaucratic difficulties, while Iraqi development, even granted petroleum resources, has suffered basically from political instability. Turkey is treated as a form of state capitalism, with recent stress on private enterprise, Lebanon almost as a laissez-faire economy, and Iran as private enterprise with state assistance. Like many other authors, Professor Ellis finds great promise in Iran's development, politically and economically. This brief volume, replete with tables, with a well-selected bibliography, should prove very helpful to thoughtful students of the Middle East.

So also should Lee E. Preston's *Trade Patterns in the Middle East,* which concentrates on intraregional trade patterns, contains much tabular data, and discusses both aid and international trade. Except for the oil producing states, the author well points out the persistent imbalance in international trade—in the instances, for example, of the UAR, Syria, Lebanon and Israel. The book closes with a case study of foreign trade and UAR economic development by Karim A. Nashashibi.

△ HARRY N. HOWARD, Washington, D. C.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

Documents

Colonial Governors from the Fifteenth Century to the Present: A comprehensive list. By David P. Henige. Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1970. 416 pages. $12.50. Contains a list of all colonial administrators in various parts of the Middle East.

Corpus Constitutionnel, Vol. I, Fasc. 2. Ed. by G. Berlia and Paul Bastid. Leiden: Brill, 1970. pp. 205-497. Index. Gld 62. Includes Saudi Arabia.

The Great Powers and the Near East, 1774-1923: Documents of modern history. Ed. by M. S. Anderson. London: Edward Arnold, 1971. £ 1.80 and £ .90 in paper.

The Library Catalogs of the Hoover Institution, Stanford: Catalogs of the Turkish and Persian collection. Ed. by the Hoover Institution. Boston: G. K. Hall, 1969. xi + 670 pages. $7.

The Libyan Civil Code. Ed. by I. M. Arif and M. O. Ansell. Stoughton, Wisc.: The Oleander Press, 1970. $45. Available from Rte. 3, Box 234, Stoughton, Wisc. 53589.

al-Murshid ilā Wathā'iq al-Mahdī [A Guide to the documents of the Mahdī]. Ed. by Muḥammad I. Abū Salīm. Kharṭūm: Dār al-Wathā'iq al-Markazīyah, 1969. 575 pages. No price indicated.

Palestine during the Ottoman Period: Documents from archives and collections in Israel. Jerusalem: Hebrew Univ., Institute of Asian and African Studies, 1970. 13 pages. No price indicated.

Report by the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Special Representative to the Middle East. New York: United Nations Document S/10070. January 4, 1971. 17 pages. Appen. Report of the Jarring Mission.

General

Abr-Nahrain, Vol. 10. Ed. by J. Bowman *et al.* Melbourne: Dept. of Middle Eastern Studies, Univ. of Melbourne, 1971. viii + 133 pages. NF 36. Produced in honor of the 28th International Congress of Orientalists, Canberra, January '71.

The Arab Middle East. By Larry Henderson. Camden, N. J.: Nelson, 1970. 224 pages. Illus. Map. $4.50. Suggested for ages 12-up.

Domestic Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East: The view from Washington. By William B. Quandt. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corp., 1970. 27 pages. P-4309. No price indicated.

Faḍl al-Ḥadārah al-Islāmīyah wa al-'Arabīyah 'alā al-'Ālam. [On the role of Islamic and Arab civilization in the world]. By Zakarīyā H. Zakarīyā. Cairo: Dār Nahḍat Miṣr, 1970. 618 pages. No price indicated.

al-Insān al-'Arabī wa al-ḥaḍārah [On Arabs and civilization]. By Anwar al-Rifā'ī. Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1970. 536 pages. Illus. Maps. Bibl. £E 2.40.

Leadership of the American Zionist Organization, 1897-1930. By Yonathan Shapiro. Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press. $9.50. Announced for Ju '71.

Mawsū'āt al-Ma'arif al-ḥadīthah lil-duwal al-'Arabīyah [Modern encyclopedia of the Arab states]. Cairo: al-Dār al-'Arabīyah lil-Mawsū'āt, 1970. No price indicated.

Middle East: Culture Area in Perspective. By Leften S. Stavrianos. Boston: Allyn, 1970. 72 pages. Illus. Maps. Bibl. $2.

The Middle East: The Temple of Janus. By Desmond Stewart. New York: Doubleday. $8.95. Announced for Ap '71.

1969 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs. Ed. by Richard F. Starr. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1970. xii + 1,079 pages. Chron. Bibl. Index. $19.95.

The Shaping of Jewish History: A radical new interpretation. By Ellis Rivkin. New York: Scribners. 288 pages. $6.95. Announced for Ju '71.

Taqwīm al-'Alam al-Islāmī. Cairo: Jam'iyat al-Dirāsāt al-Islāmīyah, 1970. 894 pages. Maps. Bibl. No price indicated. Articles on 39 political units having Muslim population majorities.

Themes of Islamic Civilization. Ed. by John Alden Williams. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. $11.75. Announced for Mr '71.

Biography

'Abd al-Nāṣir, Dhalika al-Insān [Jamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir]. By Ṣabrī Ghunaym. Cairo: Dār al-Sha'b, 1970. 159 pages. Illus. £E .10.

Ataturk. By Katherine Gavin. New York: Morrow, 1970. 342 pages. No price indicated. A political novel.

L'autobiographie (Fahrasa) du Soufi Marocain Ahmad Ibn 'Agiba (1747-1809). By J.-L. Michon. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1969. Illus. Gld 32.

Ayyām Khālidah fī Ḥayāt 'Abd al-Nāṣir [Everlasting days in the life of Nāṣir]. By Jamāl al-Dīn al-'Uṭayfī. Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1970. 176 pages. Illus. £E .15.

Candle's Smoke; Ghalib's life and verse. By Inder Jit Lall. Delhi: Ghalib Academy, 1970. 64 pages. Illus. Rs 7.50.

Fanon. By Peter Geismar. New York: Dial, 1971. $6.95.

Jamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir, Ḥayātuhu wa Jihāduhu [. . . , his life and his struggle]. By Amīr al-'Aqqād. Cairo: Dār al-Sha'b, 1970. 126 pages. Illus. £E .10.

Jirjī Zaydān [Critical study on Jirjī Zaydān (1861-1914), Arab scholar and publisher]. By Muḥammad 'Abd al-Ghanī Ḥasan. Cairo: al-Hay'ah al-Miṣrīyah al-'Āmmah lil-Ta'līf wa al-Nashr, 1970. 242 pages. Bibl. £E .10.

Merveilles biographiques et historiques ou chroniques du Cheikh Abd el-Rahman el-Djabarti. 4 vols. Trans. by Chefik Mansour Bey *et al.* Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus, 1970. $114.

Mudhakkirātī [Memoirs, 1917-1967, of an Iraqi politician]. By Tawfīq al-Suwaydī. Beirut: Dār al-Kātib al-'Arabī, 1969. 647 pages. Illus. LL 12.

Muḥammad Farīd Wajdī Ḥayātuhu wa Āthāruhu [. . . , his life and his works]. By Ṭāhā al-Ḥājirī. Cairo: League of Arab States, Institute for Arab Studies, 1970. No price indicated. Lectures on Muḥammad F. Wajdī (1875-1954), Egyptian scholar and reformer.

Nasser. By Jean Lacouture. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1971. 360 pages. NF 24.

Recollections of David Ben-Gurion. Ed. by Thomas R. Bransten. London: Macdonald, 1970. 216 pages. 30s. From a film based on a 6 hour interview.

Syed Ahmed Khan: Pioneer of Muslim resurgence. By M. Hadi Hussain. Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1970. viii + 259 pages. Bibl. Rs 15.

Who's Who in Lebanon, 1970-1971. 4th Edition. Beirut: Les Editions Publitec, 1970. 439 + 77 pages. LL 100 or $35.

Bibliography

Bibliyūjrāfīyat al-Tanmīyah al-Sinā'īyah [A bibiography of industrial development.] Ed. by Markaz al-Tanmīyah al-Sinā'īyah lil-Duwal al-'Arabīyah. Cairo: Markaz, 1969. No price indicated.

Dalīl al-Marāji' al-'Arabīyah [Guide to Arabic Reference Books]. By 'Abd al-Karīm al-Amīn. Baghdād: Maṭba'at Shafīq, 1970. ID .50.

Turkskaya filologiya v SSSR 1917-1967 [Turkic philology in the USSR 1917-1967]. By A. N. Kononov. Moscow: Nauka, 1968. 46 pages. Bibl. No price indicated.

Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan

Afghanische Studien. Band 3: Nationalismus und Nationalstaat in Entwicklungsländern. By Dieter Fröhlich. Meisenheim: Verlag Anton Hain, 1970. x + 250 pages. No price indicated.

Agriculture and Related Industries in Pakistan. By F. Kahnert *et al.* Paris: OECD Books, 1970. 452 pages. $5.50.

The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan, 1958-1969. By Lawrence Ziring. Syracuse Univ. Press, 1971. xiii + 198 pages. Appen. Notes. Bibl. Index. $10.

Burma and Pakistan: A comparative study of development. By Mya Maung. New York: Praeger. 175 pages. Tables. $12.50. Announced for My '71.

Development Alternatives in Pakistan: A multisectoral and regional analysis of planning problems. By Arthur MacEwan. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 232 pages. $9. Announced for Mr '71.

Development Planning and Policy in Pakistan. Ed. by Moin U. Baqai and Irving Brecher. Montreal: McGill-Queen's Univ. Press. Announced for '71.

The Evolution of Indo-Muslim Thought after 1857. By Lini S. May. Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1970. vii + 488 pages. Bibl. Rs 30.

Forschungen im Gebiete der älteren religiösen, politischen und literarischen Bildungsgeschichte der Völker Mittelasiens. By Isaak J. Schmidt. Leipzig: Zentralantiquariat Verlagsabteilung, 1971. $13.20. Reprint of the 1824 edition.

A Geography of Pakistan. 2nd ed. By Kazi S. Ahmad. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1969. iv + 262 pages. Illus. Maps. $8.

Health and Disease in Rural Afghanistan: An epidemiological study of four villages. By Alfred Buck *et al.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ., School of Hygiene and Public Health, 1970. 261 pages. No price indicated.

The Historical Background of Pakistan, 1857-1947: An annotated digest of source material. By Khursheed Kamal Aziz. Karachi: Pak. Instit. Internat. Aff., 1970. xi + 626 pages. Bibl. Rs 45.

Jinnah and the Making of a Nation. By Saleem M. M. Qureshi. Karachi: Council for Pakistan Studies, 1969. 104 pages. Index. $2 or 17s.

Kazakhstan v XV-XVIII vekakh [Kazakhstan in the 15th-18th centuries]. Ed. by B. S. Suleymenov. Alma-Ata: Nauka, 1969. 204 pages. Illus. No price indicated.

Khilafat to partition: A survey of major political trends among Indian Muslims during 1919-1947. By Moin Shakir. New Delhi: Kalamkar Prakashan, 1970. xxiv + 300 pages. Rs 35.

Pakistan. Ed. by Tropical World Review. Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute. $2.50. Announced for '71. Available from Mauritskade 63, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

Pakistan: Industrialization and trade policies. By Stephen R. Lewis, Jr. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970. xvii + 214 pages. Bibl. $9 and $4 in paper.

Pakistan and the Great Powers. By Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri. Karachi: Council for Pakistan Studies, 1970. 134 pages. Appen. Bibl. Index. $3.25 or 25s.

Persien. By James Morris *et al.* Freiburg: Atlantis, 1970. 218 pages. Map. Illus. DM 42.

The Pushtun Role in the Afghan Political System. By Leon B. Poullada. New York: The Asia Society, 1970. 26 pages. Notes. No price indicated. Occasional Paper no. 1 of the Afghanistan Council of the Asia Society, 112 East 64th Street, New York, New York 10021.

Semnan: Persian city and region. By members of the Department of Geography, University College, London. 1970. 120 pages. Photos. Maps. 10s. Available from John Connell, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton, Sussex, England.

The Structure of Protection in Developing Countries. By Bela Balassa *et al.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 384 pages. $12. Announced for Jl '71. One chapter on Pakistan.

Touring Iran. By Philip Ward. London: Faber. Illus. Map. $2.25. Announced for '71.

Les Trésors de l'Iran. By A. Mazaheri. Geneva: Skira, 1970. 300 pages. Illus. SF 132.

Waldverbreitung bäuerliche Waldwirtschaft und kommerzielle Waldnutzung im östlichen Afghanistan. By Dieter Fischer. Meisenheim: Verlag Anton Hain, 1970. xii + 148 pages. DM 26.20. Afghanische Studien Band 2.

Arabian Peninsula

Area Handbook for the Peripheral States of the Arabian Peninsula. By Foreign Area Studies, American University. Washington, D. C.: USGPO, 1971. xiv + 178 pages. Bibl. Index. $2.50.

Arwā bint al-Yaman [On the Sulayhite state at Yemen (1048-1138); special reference to Arwā bint Aḥmad al-Sulayhī, Queen of Yemen]. By 'Ārif Tāmir. Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1970. 160 pages. Illus. £E .10.

Al-Barq al-Yamānī fī al-Fatḥ al-'Uthmānī [Yemeni glitter in the Ottoman conquest]. By Muḥammad al-Nahrawālī. Ed. by Ḥamad al-Jāsir. Riyāḍ: Dār al-Yamāmah, 1967. 543 pages. No price indicated.

Bilād al-'Arab [Arabia]. By al-Ḥasan al-Iṣfahānī. Ed. by Ḥamad al-Jāsir and Ṣāliḥ al-'Alī. Riyāḍ: Dār al-Yamāmah, 1968. 527 pages. No price indicated. Printing of a 9th century description of Arabia.

Ḥawḍ al-Khalīj al-'Arabī [The Persian Gulf Basin]. By Muḥammad Mutawallī. Cairo: Maktabat al-Anjilū al-Miṣrīyah, 1970. Illus. Charts. Maps. No price indicated. A geographic study.

Khalij-i Fars [The Persian Gulf]. By Muhammad Janab. Tehran: Chap-i Shari'at-wa-Sharq, 1970. 666 pages. Illus. Map. Bibl. Index. No price indicated.

Kuwait: Miracle in the desert. By David C. Cooke.

New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1970. 148 pages. Illus. $4.50. Juvenile literature.

Riyadh, history and guide; a brief historical survey of the development of Riyadh from a small desert town into the capital of Saudi Arabia. By William A. Rugh. Damman, Saudi Arabia: Al-Mutawa Press, 1969. 112 pages. Illus. No price indicated.

The War in the Yemen. By Edgar O'Ballance. London: Faber and Hamden, Conn.: The Shoe String Press, Archon Books, 1971. 202 pages. Appen. Index. Maps. £ 2.25 or $7.

Egypt, Sudan and Libya

Area Handbook for the United Arab Republic (Egypt). Foreign Area Studies, American Univ. Washington: USGPO, 1970. xx + 501 pages. Bibl. Index. $3.75.

Cairo: 1001 years of The City Victorious. By Janet Abu-Lughod. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press. Illus. Maps. $30. Announced for Ju '71.

The Common Law in the Sudan. By Zaki Mustafa. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1971. 288 pages. $11.25.

La crise de Suez. By Georges Assima. Paris: F. Maspero, 1970. NF 18.80.

Egypt. By Otto Siegner. New York: Scribners, 1970. 190 pages. Map. $9.95. First published in 1955 under title *Agypten.*

England in Egypt. By Alfred M. Milner. New York: Fertig, 1970. vii + 429 pages. $11.50. Reprint of the 1920 edition.

The Garamantes of Southern Libya. By Charles Daniels. Stoughton, Wisc.: The Oleander Press, 1970. 44 pages. Bibl. $2.10.

Ḥadīth 'an al-thaqāfah. . . [Essay on culture; some facts about contemporary Egyptian culture]. By Sayyid 'Uways. Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, 1970. 308 pages. Bibl. £E .75.

Healing Practices and Prevention of Illness among the Egyptian Fellahin. By Victor Sanua. New York: City Univ. of New York, 1970. 19 pages. No price indicated.

The Increase of Population in the United Arab Republic and its Impact on Development. By al-Jihāz al-Markazī lil-Ṭabā'ah al-'Āmmah wa al-Iḥsā'. Cairo: al-Jihāz, 1969. 392 pages. No price indicated.

al-Jaysh al-Miṣrī fī al-'aṣr al-Islāmī [The Egyptian army in the Moslem period, 640-1250 A.D.]. By 'Abd al-Raḥmān Zakī. Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, 1970. 246 pages. Illus. Maps. Bibl. £E .56.

The Legacy of Egypt. 2nd ed. Ed. by John Harris. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1971. 460 pages. Illus. $9. Revision of the 1942 edition.

Motoring to Nalut. By Philip Ward and Angelo Pesce. Tripoli: Oasis Oil Co., 1970. 24 pages. Illus. No price. Oasis Travel Series no. 1. Available from Oasis Oil Co. of Libya Inc., P. O. Box 395, Tripoli, Libyan Arab Republic.

Planning for Development in Libya: The exceptional economy in the developing world. By Rawle Farley. New York: Praeger, 370 pages. Tables. Appen. Bibl. $17.50. Announced for Mr '71.

al-Qānūn al-Dustūrī wa al-Nuẓum al-Siyāsīyah al-Sūdānīyah: Dirāsah Muqārinah bi-Dasātīr wa al-Nuẓum al-Miṣrīyah [Constitutional law and the Sudanese political systems: A comparative study with the Egyptian constitutions and systems]. By al-Shāfi'ī M. Bashīr. Alexandria: Mansha'at al-Ma'ārif, 1970. No price indicated.

A la recherche de manuscrits en Egypte. By Oleg V. Volkoff. Cairo: Instit. fr. d'archéologie O., 1970. viii + 336 pages. Map. Illus. Bibl. £E 4.

Report on the first phase of the household sample survey, Benghazi Town. Libya: Ministry of planning and development, Census and Statistical Dept., 1969. 1 + 10 + 39 + 10 pages. In Arabic and English.

Sabratha: A guide for visitors. By Philip Ward. Stoughton, Wisc.: The Oleander Press, 1970. 61 pages. Plates. Bibl. $3.50.

A Search in Secret Egypt. By Paul Brunton. New York: S. Weiser. 287 pages. Illus. Plates. $3.50. Reprint of the 1936 edition. Available from 734 Broadway, New York, N. Y. 10003.

al-Sūdān; arḍuh wa-tārīkhuh wa-ḥayāt sha'bih [The Sudan; land, history and daily life of the people]. By Ḥasan Muḥammad Jawhar. Cairo: Dār al-Sha'b, 1970. 326 pages. Illus. Map. Bibl. £E .30.

al-Tajribah al-dimuqrāṭīyah wa-taṭuwwur nuẓum al-ḥukm fī al-Sūdān [Dissertation on democracy in the Sudan and its constitutional system, Jan. 1956-May 1969]. By Ibrāhīm Muḥammad Ḥājj Mūsā. Cairo, 1970. 639 pages. Bibl. £E 1.75.

U.A.R.-Egypt. Ed. by Tropical World Review. Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute. $2.50. Announced for '71. Available from Mauritskade 63, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

Fertile Crescent and Cyprus

Baghdād. Baghdād: Iraqi Engineers Association, 1969. 488 pages. Illus. Maps. £E 12. Baghdad's history and historical geography.

Hādha huwa ṭarīq arba'ah 'ashar Tammūz [This is the way of the Revolution of 14 July; the defense of Ibrāhīm Kubbah before the court of the Revolution]. By Ibrāhīm Kubbah. Beirut: Dār al-Ṭalī'ah, 1969. 237 pages. No price indicated.

Innenarchitektur syrischer Stadthäuser des 16 bis 18 Jahrhunderts. By Dorothea Duda. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1970. 200 pages. Tables. Illus. DM 54. A study of the private collection of Henri Pharaon in Beirut.

Lubnān: Mabāḥith 'Ilmīyah wa Ijtimā'īyah [Lebanon: Historical and Social Studies]. Ed. by Ismā'īl Ḥaqqī Bey. Beirut: Manshūrāt al-Jamī'ah al-Lubnānīyah, 1969. Illus. No price indicated.

al-Quwā al-Siyāsīyah fī Lubnān [Political Forces in Lebanon]. Beirut: Dār al-Ṭalī'ah, 1970. 342 pages.

No price indicated. A series of lectures on Lebanese political parties.

Rapport 1969/1970 sur l'Economie syrienne. Damascus: Office arabe de Presse et de Documentation, 1970. 350 pages. Tables. SL 50 or $14 (plus $1 for airmail). The report covers 1969 and the first months of 1970.

Ṣiḥāfat al-Aḥzāb wa Ta'rīkh al-Ḥarakah al-Waṭanīyah [The Iraqi Political Party Press and the History of the National Movement]. By Fā'iq Buṭṭī. Baghdād: Maṭba'at al-Adīb, 1969. 199 pages. No price indicated.

Ṣiḥāfat al-'Irāq: Ta'rīkhuha wa Kifāḥu Ajyāliha [The Iraqi Press: its history and the struggle of its generations]. By Fā'iq Buṭṭī. Baghdād: Maṭba'at al-Adīb al-Baghdādīyah, 1968. 228 pages. Plates. No price indicated.

The Socialist Transformations in the Financial and Banking Sectors. Damascus: Office arabe de Presse et de Documentation, 1970. SL 35. or $9.50 (plus $1 for airmail outside the Arab Postal Union). Order from: Office arabe de Presse et de Documentation, 67 Place Chahbandar, B. P. 3,550, Damascus, Syria.

Le système monétaire et la banque au Liban. By Talal Georges. Beirut: Dār al-Nahār, 1970. 206 pages. No price indicated.

Touring Lebanon. By Philip Ward. London: Faber. Illus. Map. £1.80. Announced for '71.

The Travelers' Guide to Cyprus. By Hazel Thurston. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc. Illus. $5. Announced for My '71.

Urban Life in Syria under the Early Mamluks. By Nicola A. Ziadeh. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1970. xxvi + 299 pages. Maps. $12.50. Reprint of the 1953 edition.

Israel

American Students in Israel. By Simon N. Herman. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1970. viii + 236 pages. $7.50.

Area Handbook for Israel. By Harvey H. Smith *et al.* Washington: USGPO, 1970. xvi + 412 pages. Bibl. Index. $3.50. Revision of the 1964 edition.

The Cursed Blessing: The story of Israel's occupation of the West Bank. By Shabtai Teveth. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and New York: Random House, 1971. 373 pages. Illus. Map. Index. 50s or $8.95.

al-Duwal al-Iskandanāfīyah wa Isrā'īl [The Scandinavian countries and Israel]. By Samīr Būtānī. Beirut: PLO Research Center, 1969. 142 pages. LL 2.

Economic Productivity in Israel. By Arieh L. Gaathon. New York: Praeger. 290 pages. Tables. Appen. Index. $10. Announced for Mr '71.

The Faces of Israel. By Roman Freulich and Joan Abramson. New York: Barnes-Yoseloff. 160 pages. Illus. $12.50. Announced for My '71.

Falsafat al-Di'āyah al-Isrā'īlīyah [The philosophy of Israeli propaganda]. By Ḥāmid A. Rabī'. Beirut: PLO Research Center, 1970. 224 pages. Illus. LL 3.

The Flow of Funds in Israel. By Meir Heth. New York: Praeger, 1970. xviii + 326 pages. Appen. Bibl. Index. $10.

The Impact of Government Subsidies on Industrial Management: The Israeli experience. By Nachum Finger. New York: Praeger. 100 pages. Maps. Tables. Bibl. $12.50. Announced for My '71.

Impaled on a Cactus Bush: An American family in Israel. By Arnold Sherman. New York: Sabra Books, 1970. 250 pages. $5.95.

Israel: A society in transition. By V. D. Segre. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1971. 234 pages. Maps. $9.95.

Israel among the Nations. By J. L. Talmon. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970. 208 pages. 40s.

Israel between East and West: A study in human relations. 2nd ed. By Raphael Patai. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing, 1970. xiv + 394 pages. Bibl. $12.

Israel und die Deutschen. By Inge Deutschkron. Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1970. 368 pages. DM 28.

The Israelis: Founders and sons. By Amos Elon. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. $10. Announced for My '71.

Israel's Administrative Culture. By Gerald E. Caiden. Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, Univ. of California, 1970. xii + 118 pages. $2.75.

Israel's Parliament: The law of the Knesset. By E. Likhovski. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. 300 pages. $14.50. Announced for My '71.

National Insurance in Israel. By Giora Lotan. Jerusalem: National Insurance Institute, 1969. 162 pages. Tables. Index. No price indicated.

The Negev: The challenge of a desert. By Michael Evenari *et al.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. 384 pages. $15. Announced for Mr '71.

Planned Urban Environments: Sweden, Finland, Israel, the Netherlands, France. By Ann Louise Strong. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. about $20. Announced for Ju '71.

The Politics of Compromise: State and religion in Israel. By Ervin Birnbaum. Rutherford, N. J.: Fairleigh Dickinson Univ. Press, 1970. 384 pages. Bibl. $10.

Portrait of Israel. By Moshe Brilliant. New York: American Heritage Press, 1970. 373 pages. Illus. Index. $7.95.

The Seventh Day: Soldiers' talk about the Six-Day War. Ed. by Avraham Shapira. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 256 pages. $6.95. Announced for Mr '71.

The Shattered Silence: The Eli Cohen Affair. By Zwy Aldouby and Jerrold Ballinger. New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, Inc. $6.95. Announced for My '71.

al-Siyāsah al-Nawawīyah li-Isrā'īl [The Nuclear Policy of Israel]. By Maḥmūd K. Bannūnah. Cairo: Dār al-Sha'b, 1970. 126 pages. Bibl. £E 20.

Structural Change and Economic Policy in Israel. By Howard Pack. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. $9.75. Announced for My '71.

West German Reparations to Israel. By Nicholas Balabkins. New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers Univ. Press. 415 pages. Index. $12.50. Announced for My '71.

Maghrib

Affrontements culturels dans l'Algérie coloniale. By Yvonne Turin. Paris: F. Maspero, 1970. 428 pages. NF 26.70.

L'Algérie Algérienne. By Gérard Viratelle. Paris: Economie et humanisme, Editions ouvrières, 1970. 186 pages. Maps. NF 29.

Area Handbook for the Republic of Tunisia. By Foreign Area Studies, American University. Washington, D. C.: USGPO, 1970. 415 pages. Bibl. Index. No price indicated.

Bilād al-Jazā'ir [History of Algeria through the 12th century; special reference to Arabic and Islamic elements]. By Ibrāhīm Aḥmad al-'Adawī. Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, 1970. 328 pages. Map. Bibl. £E 1.

British Policy towards Morocco in the Age of Palmerston. By Francis R. Flournoy. Westport, Conn.: Negro Univs. Press, 1970. xiii + 287 pages. $11.50. Reprint of the 1935 edition.

Corsairs of Malta and Barbary. By Peter Earle. London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1970. 307 pages. Illus. Maps. Bibl. Index. 60s.

Die Djerbi in Tunesien; Soziologische Analyse einer nordafrikanischen Minderheit. By Wolfgang Freund. Meisenheim am Glan: A. Hain, 1970. 145 pages. Bibl. No price indicated.

La Guerre d'Algérie. By Pierre Beyssade. Paris: C.A.L. 311 pages. Illus. NF 25.75.

The Independence Movements in Arab North Africa. By 'Alal al-Fasi. Trans. by Hazem Zaki Nuseibeh. New York: Octagon, 1970. xi + 414 pages. $12. Reprint of the 1954 edition.

In Morocco. By Faith Mellen Wilcox. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Illus. Map. $12.50. Announced for Ap '71.

L'Itineraire marocaine. By Albert Serstevens. Paris: Arthaud, 1970. 284 pages. Illus. NF 55. Many good rotogravure photos.

Le Maghreb moderne. By Samir Amin. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1970. 244 pages. NF 18.

Mémoires d'espoir Le Renouveau, 1958-1962. By Charles de Gaulle. Paris: Plon, 1970. 314 pages. NF 27.50. Covers the Algerian revolution.

Morocco. Photos by Dorothy Hales Gary. Text by Lord Kinross. New York: Viking Press. $7.95. Announced by My '71.

Morocco that Was. By Walter B. Harris. Westport, Conn.: Negro Univs. Press, 1970. viii + 333 pages. $14.50. Reprint of the 1921 edition.

The Passing of the Shereefian Empire. By Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett. Westport, Conn.: Negro Univs. Press, 1970. xii + 532 pages. Illus. Map. $23. History of Morocco. Reprint of the 1910 edition.

Le Plateau Central Marocain et ses Bordures. Etude géomorphologique. By Gaston Beaudet. Rabat: Impr. fr. et marocaines, 1969. 480 pages. Illus. Maps. Bibl. No price indicated.

La politique culturelle de la Tunisie. By Rafik Said. Paris: UNESCO, 1970. 56 pages. No price indicated.

Sahara, the Great Desert. Emile F. Gautier. New York: Octagon Press, 1970. xvii + 264 pages. Illus. Maps. Bibl. $11. Reprint of the 1935 edition.

Tunisia. Ed. by Tropical World Review. Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute, 1970. $2.50. Available from Mauritskade 63, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

The Wars in Barbary. By Donald Barr Chidsey. New York: Crown, 1971. Notes. Bibl. $4.50.

Palestine Problem

A'māl Isrā'īl al-Intiqāmīyah didda al-Duwal al-'Arabīyah [Israeli reprisals against Arab countries]. By Muḥammad Majdhūb. Beirut: PLO Research Center, 1970. 199 pages. LL 2.

Al Fatah. Photo. by Carlo Vogel. Milan: Vangelista, 1969. n.p. Illus. IL 12.

al-Hijrah al-Yahūdīyah ilā Filasṭīn al-Muḥtallah [Jewish immigration to Palestine: 1882-1968]. By Ilyās Sa'd. Beirut: PLO Research Center, 1969. 255 pages. LL 2.

al-Iḥtilāl al-Isrā'īlī wa al-Muqāwamah al-Filasṭīnīyah fī Ḍaw' al-Qānūn al-Duwalī al-'Āmm [Israeli occupation and Palestinian armed resistance in international law]. By 'Izz al-Dīn Fawdah. Beirut: PLO Research Center, 1969. 176 pages. LL 2.

In the Bunkers of Sinai. By Arnold Sherman. New York: Amis Publishing Co. 192 pages. $5.95. Announced for Ap '71.

Israel Will Win! Ed. by Norman Hill. New York: Popular Library Inc. $.95. Announced for F '71.

Israelis and Jews: The continuity of an identity. By Simon Herman. New York: Random, 1971. $8.95.

The Jerusalem Question: 1917-1968. By H. Eugene Bovis. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. Announced for '71. No price indicated.

Leila's Hijack War. By Peter Snow and David Phillips. London: Pan Books, 1970. No price indicated.

Palestine. By Michel Chiha. Tr. by Leo Arnold. Beirut: Trident Publications, 1969. 201 pages. No price indicated. A collection of his editorials in *Le Jour* (Beirut) 1944-1954.

Palestine and the Bible. Ed. by M. T. Mehdi. New York: New World Press, 1970. 60 pages. $2.

The Palestine Problem. By Samir S. Saleeby. London: Institute of International Studies, 1970. 92 pages. No price indicated.

The Palestinian Mystery Play. By Winifred Babcock.

New York: Dodd, Mead & Co. $2.95 in paper. Announced for Ja '71.

Poker d'espions à Tel-Aviv et au Caire. By Ben Dan. Paris: Fayard, 1970. 274 pages. NF 24. Ben Dan is the pseudonym of Uri Dan who, under the same name, wrote "L'Espoir qui venait d'Israël."

The Position of the Palestinians in the Israel-Arab Conflict and Their National Covenant (1968). By Y. Harkabi. Trans. by J. Kraemer. Jerusalem: n.p., 1970. Bibl. No price indicated.

Qaḍiyat al-Quds fī Muḥīṭ al-'Alāqāt al-Duwalīyah [The question of Jerusalem in international relations]. By 'Izz al-Dīn Fawdah. Beirut: PLO Research Center, 1969. 263 pages. LL 2.

La Révolution palestinienne et les juifs. By Fatah. Paris: Editions de minuit, 1970. 71 pages. NF 5.

The Search for Peace in the Middle East, Rev. Ed. Prepared by the American Friends Service Committee. New York: Hill & Wang. $4.50. Announced for Mr '71.

Strike Terror: The Story of Fatah. By Ehud Yaari. New York: Amis Publishing Co., 1971. 288 pages. $7.95.

United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations: A military and political appraisal. By James Boyd. New York: Praeger. 278 pages. Tables. Appen. Bibl. Index. $15. Announced for Mr '71.

al-Uns al-jalil [Classical history of Palestine, with special reference to Jerusalem and Khalil]. 2 vols. By 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-'Ulaymī. Nejef: al-Matba'ah al-Ḥaydarīyah, 1968. Bibl. £E 3.50. Originally written in the early 16th century.

'Urūbat Bayt al-Maqdis [The Arab character of Jerusalem]. By Isḥāq M. al-Ḥusaynī. Beirut: PLO Research Center, 1969. 86 pages. LL 2.

Turkey

Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 1789-1807. By Stanford J. Shaw. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. 544 pages. $15. Announced for Ap '71.

Bridge across the Bosphorus: The foreign policy of Turkey. By Ferenc A. Vali. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970. $12.50.

British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement: A study in Anglo-Turkish relations, 1826-1853. By Frank E. Bailey. New York: Fertig, 1970. xiv + 312 pages. Bibl. $11. Reprint of the 1942 edition.

The Mediterranean Naval Situation, 1908-1914. By Paul G. Halpern. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1971. x + 367 pages. Appen. Bibl. Index. $13.50. Chapter 11 concerns the Greek and Turkish Navies.

914 Letters Writ by a Turkish Spy. By Giovanni P. Marana. Ed. by Arthur J. Weitzman. New York: Columbia Univ. Press (distributor), 1970. xix + 233 pages. $7.95. Selections from the first complete English edition of 1694.

The Smyrna Affair: A story of betrayal. By Marjorie Housepian. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. $7.95. Announced for My '71.

Turkish Art and Architecture. By Oktay Aslanapa. New York: Praeger. 440 pages. Illus. Maps. $50. Announced for Ju '71. Also to be published by Faber (London), £ 15.

La Turquie, le declin de l'Empière, les reformes d'Ataturk, la Republique moderne. By Geoffrey Lewis. Verviers, Belgium: Marabout Univ., 1968. 272 pages. No price indicated.

The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform, 1914-1939. By Roger R. Trask. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. $11.50. Announced for Ju '71.

The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A study in the contact of civilizations. By Arnold J. Toynbee. New York: H. Fertig, 1970. xxxv + 408 pages. Maps. Bibl. $11.50. Reprint of the 1923 edition.

Medieval History

Arab Civilization to AD 1500. By D. M. Dunlop. London: Longman, 1971. 352 pages. 70s.

al-Ayyūbīyūn wa al-Mamālīk fī Miṣr wa al-Shām [The Ayyubids and Mamlūks in Egypt and Syria, 1171-1517]. By Sa'īd A. 'Ashūr. Cairo: Dār al-Nahḍah al-'Arabīyah, 1970. 395 pages £E .60.

The Central Structure of the Mughal Empire and Its Practical Working up to the Year 1657. By Ibn Hasan. New Delhi: M. Manoharlal, 1970. 398 pages. Illus. $10. Reprint of the 1936 edition.

Historiae: Ibn Wādhih Qui Dicitur al-Ja'qubī. 2 vols. Ed. by M. Th. Houtsma. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1969. 318 + 629 pages. Gld 175. Reprint of the 1883 edition.

History of Mehmed the Conqueror. By Kritovoulos. Trans. from Greek by T. Riggs. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1970. ix + 222 pages. $9.50. Reprint of the 1954 edition.

An Introduction to Mamlūk Historiography: An analysis of Arabic analistic and biographical sources for the reign of al-Malik an-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qalā'ūn. By Donald P. Little. Montreal: McGill-Queen's Univ. Press, 1970. 156 pages. $14.

Islamic History A.D. 600-750 (A.H. 132): A new interpretation. By M. A. Shaban. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1971. about 244 pages. $13.

Land Revenue Administration under the Mughals. By Noman Ahmad Siddiqi. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1970. 182 pages. No price indicated.

The Life and Times of Rabbi David Ibn Abi Zimra: A social, economic and cultural study of Jewish life in the Ottoman Empire in the 15th and 16th centuries as reflected in the Response of the RDBZ. By Israel M. Goldman. New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1970. xxi + 256 pages. Bibl. $9.50. Available from Ktav, New York.

Mechithar's, des Meisterarztes aus Her, Trost bei Feibern. By Mechithar. Leipzig: Zentralantiquariat, 1971. 309 pages. $16.80. Reprint of the 1908 edition. Armenian history of medicine in the 12th century.

A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish communities of the Arab World as portrayed in the documents of the Cairo Geniza, Vol. II: The Community. By S. D. Goitein. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. $20. Announced for My '71.

Papal Envoys to the Great Khans. By I. de Rachewiltz. London: Faber. Map. Illus. £ 1.75. Announced for '71.

Qarāmiṭat al-'Irāq . . . [The Qarmatians of Iraq in the 3rd and 4th centuries A.H.]. Muḥammad A. 'Alyān. Cairo: al-Hay'ah al-Miṣrīyah al-'Āmmah, 1970. 228 pages. £E .25.

Der zweite Bürgerkreig im Islam (680-692). By Rudolf Sellheim. Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1970. 31 pages. DM 4.

Modern History and Politics

The Arab World and Israel: Two essays. By Ahmad El Kodsy and Eli Lobel. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970. 137 pages. Bibl. $6. and $2.25 in paper.

Britain, India, and the Arabs, 1914-1921. By Briton Cooper Busch. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. $12. Announced for My '71.

Dīghūl didda Isrā'īl [De Gaulle against Israel]. By Muḥammad F. al-Qaṣrī. Damascus: al-Matba'ah al-'Umūmīyah, 1970. 456 pages. No price indicated. A refutation of Uri Dan's *De Gaulle contre Israel* and a general discussion of French arms and aid to Israel.

The Hejaz Railway and the Muslim Pilgrimage: A case of Ottoman political propaganda. By Jacob M. Landau. Detroit: Wayne State Univ. Press. 300 pages. $12.95. Announced for Ap '71.

al-Liqā' al-thawrī al-thulāthī fī al-Kharṭūm [Revolutionary tripartite meeting in Kharṭūm]. By Khalīfah 'Abd al-Majīd al-Muntaṣir. Beirut, 1970. 114 pages. LL 2.

al-Majlis al-Amrīkī lil-Yahūdīyah: Dirāsah fī al-Badīl al-Yahūdī lil-Sahyūnīyah [The American Council for Judaism: A study of a Jewish alternative to Zionism]. By As'ad Razzūq. Beirut: PLO Research Center, 1970. 271 pages. LL 2.

Die Nahostpolitik Frankreichs und Russlands 1891-1898. Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz, 1970. 524 pages. Bibl. No price indicated.

Natsional'nye protsessy v stranakh Blizhnego i Srednego Vostoka [Nationalist movements in the Near and Middle East]. Moscow: Nauka, 1970. 229 pages. Rub .84. The national revival of Turkey, Afghanistan, Iran, and the Kurds.

The New Arab Extremists: A view from the Arab world. By Tom Little. London: Current Affairs Research Services Centre, 1970. 22 pages. Conflict Studies no. 4. Available from 36 Kingsway, London WC2B 6BR, England.

Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary influence on American policy, 1810-1927. By Joseph L. Grabill. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. Photos. Map. $13.50. Announced for Ju '71.

Les relations turco-soviétiques et la question des détroits. By Feridun Erkin. Ankara, 1968. 540 pages. No price indicated.

Russian diplomacy and the opening of the Eastern question in 1838 and 1839. By Philip Mosely. New York: Russell & Russell, 1969. 178 pages. No price indicated. Harvard Historical Monographs 4.

The Secret War: The spy game in the Mideast. By Uri Dan and Y. Ben-Porat. New York: Amis Publishing Co. 272 pages. $6.95. Announced for Ap '71.

Soviet Policy in the Middle East. By A. S. Becker and A. L. Horelick. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corp., 1970. 115 pages. No price indicated.

al-Tārīkh al-sirri lil-'alāqāt al-shuyū'īyah al-Ṣahyūnīyah [Secret history of the Zionist-Communist relationship]. By Nihad al-Ghadiri. Beirut: Dār al-Kātib al-'Arabī, 1969. 218 pages. No price indicated.

al-Wajīz fī al-Mabādi' al-'Āmmah lil-Da'wā al-Idārīyah wa Ijrā'ātiha [A Guide to administrative procedures according to Egyptian law]. By 'Abd al-'Azīz K. Bidīwī. Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-'Arabī, 1970. No price indicated.

Economics and Sociology

Agricultural extension; a sociological appraisal. By Sara Molho. Jerusalem: Keter Pub. House, 1970. 193 pages. Illus. Bibl. I£ 17.50.

Arabskiye strani; Istoriya, Ekonomika [Arab countries; History, Economics]. By E. A. Lebedev. Moscow: Nauka, 1970. 256 pages. Maps. No price indicated.

Chez les Bedouins. By Le Comte Carlo de Landberg. Ed. by A. Albert Kudsi-Zadeh. Leiden: Brill, 1970. 77 pages. Gld 8.

Le Conte Kabyle, étude ethnologique. By Camille Lacoste-Dujardin. Paris: F. Maspero, 1970. 535 pages. NF 32.70.

Economic, Social and Political Studies of the Middle East. Ed. by C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze. Leiden: E. J. Brill. Announced for '71.

Foreign Investment in the Petroleum and Mineral Industries. By Raymond F. Mikesell *et al.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971. xvii + 446 pages. Index. $15. Two articles on the Middle East: "Aramco: The Evolution of an Oil Concession" by Donald A. Wells and "The Impact of the Oil Industry on the Economy of Iran" by William H. Bartsch.

al-Ittijāh al-Jamā'ī fī al-Tashrī' al-Iqtiṣādī al-Islāmī [Socialist tendencies in Islamic economic law]. By Muḥammad F. al-Nabhān. Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1970. 528 pages. Bibl. No price indicated. Could also have been published in Cairo.

al-Mas'alah al-zirā'īyah wa azmat al-niẓām fī Tūnis [Agricultural problem and crisis of the regime in

Tunis]. Beirut: Manshūrāt Dār al-Ṭalī'ah, 1970. 48 pages. Bibl. LL .75.

The Middle East Supply Centre. By Martin W. Wilmington. Ed. by Laurence Evans. Albany: State Univ. of New York Press. Announced for Ju '71.

The 1970 Agricultural Data Book for the Far East and Oceania. Washington: US Dept. of Agriculture Economic Research Service, 1970. 135 pages. No price indicated. Pakistan included. (ERS-Foreign 267).

Rapport Economique Arabe Annuel, 1969/1970. Vol. 6. Damascus: Office Arabe de Presse et de documentation, 1971. $16.50. Available from P. O. 3,550, Damascus, Syria.

Science and Education in Developing States: Proceedings of the Fifth Rehovot Conference. Ed. by Philip and Hadassah Gillon. 302 pages. Appen. $16.50. Announced for Mr '71.

al-Sūq al-'Arabīyah al-mushtarakah [The Arab Common Market]. By Yaḥyā 'Urwadkī. Damascus: Manshūrāt wizārat al-thaqāfah wa al-Siyāḥah wa al-Irshād al-Qawmī, 1970. 392 pages. Illus. Map. Bibl. SL 4.

al-Zirā'ah al-Yahūdīyah fī Filasṭīn al-Muḥtallah [Jewish agriculture in Occupied Palestine]. By Khalīl Abū Rajaylī. Beirut: PLO Research Center, 1970. 239 pages. Map. LL 3.

Religion and Philosophy

African Perspectives: Papers in the history, politics and economics of Africa presented to Thomas Hodgkin. Ed. by Christopher Allen and R. W. Johnson. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1971. xx + 426 pages. Appen. Bibl. Index. $17.50. Five articles related to Islām in Africa.

Aḥmad ibn aṭ-Ṭaiyib ibn Halaf bis Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Sarā'a. Comp. by Ihsan Abbas. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1969. 443 pages. DM 16.

Conflict between Socialism and Islam. By Muhammad Akbar Muradpuri. Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1970. iv + 125 pages. Rs 4.

Cutting of hand and Islamic ideology; a commentary on the recommendations of the Advisory Council on Islamic Ideology with some the salient features of Islamic ideology. . . By Mohammad Iqbal Ghazi. Lahore: Ripon Print. Press, 1970. 123 pages. Rs 4.50.

The Early Development of Islamic Jurisprudence. By Ahmad Hasan. Islamabad, Pakistan: Islamic Research Institute, 1970. xvi + 223 pages. Bibl. Index. Rs 18. Distributed by Oxford Univ. Press.

al-Islām wa al-thawrah al-ijtimā'īyah [Islam and social revolution]. By Ṣābir 'Abd al-Raḥmān Ṭu'aymah. Cairo: Maktabat al-Qāhirah al-Ḥadīthah, 1970. 535 pages. Bibl. £E 1.

Islamic Rationalism: The ethics of 'Abd al-Jabbar. By George F. Hourani. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1971. 172 pages. $6.50.

Kitāb al-ḥurūf [Al-Farābī's book of letters, commentary on Aristotle's metaphysics]. By al-Farābī. Intro. and notes by Muhsin Mahdi. Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1970. 252 pages. £E 5.20. Arabic text; introduction in Arabic and English.

Letters of a Sufi master. By Ibn al-'Arabī al-Darqāwī. Tr. by Titus Burckhardt. London: Perennial Books, 1969. 38 pages. No price indicated.

The Mejelle; being an English translation of Majallahel-ahkam-i-adliya and a complete code on Islamic civil law. Tr. by C. R. Tyser *et al.* Lahore: All Pakistan Legal Decisions, 1967. 327 pages. Rs 20.

Minhaj 'Umar Ibn al-Khaṭṭāb fī al-Tashrī' [Program of . . . regarding Islamic Law sources]. By Muḥammad Biltājī. Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-'Arabī, 1970. 592 pages. No price indicated.

Muḥammad ibn Maḥmūd bis Ibrāhīm ibn Sulaimān. Comp. by Sven Dedering. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1970. 383 pages. DM 16.

Religion: Combined Library handlist series. Ed. by Ahmad Ashfaq and Ahmad Saeed Khan. Aligarh, India: Centre of West Asian Studies and Institute of Islamic Studies, 1970. 128 pages. Index. No price indicated.

Social Justice in Islam. By Sayyid Qutb. Trans. by John B. Hardie. New York: Octagon, 1970. ix + 298 pages. $9. Reprint of the 1953 edition.

Tārīkh al-taṣawwuf fī al-Islām [History of Sufism in Islam]. By Qāsim Ghanī. Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahḍah al-Miṣrīyah, 1970. 495 pages. £E 1.

al-Taṣawwuf al-Islāmī; tārīkhuhu wa-madārisuhu wa-ṭabī 'atuhu wa-atharuh [Islamic sufism; history, schools, nature and effect]. By Aḥmad Tawfīq 'Ayyād. Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, 1970. 335 pages. Bibl. £E .65.

Linguistics, Literature and Art

The Arabic Language Today. By A. F. L. Beeston. New York: Hillary House Publishers, 1971. 119 pages. Bibl. Index. $5.50 and $2.50 in paper.

Das Arabische Tonsystem in Mittelalter. By Liberty Manik. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1969. 140 pages. Gld 30.

The Ashes of Smyrna: A novel of the Greco-Turkish War. By Richard Reinhardt. New York: Harper and Row, 1971. $7.95.

The Authenticity of the Tradition Literature: Discussions in modern Egypt. By G. H. A. Juynboll. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1969. 171 pages. GGld 42.

A Classical Armenian grammar; morphology, syntax, texts, vocabulary. By F. Casimir Roszko. Indianapolis: Catholic Seminary Foundation of Indianapolis, 1970. 146 pages. No price indicated.

Dhū al-Rummah, Shā'ir al-Ḥubb wa al-Ṣaḥrā' [. . . , Poet of love and the desert]. By Yūsuf Khalīf. Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1970. 455 pages £E .90.

Etudes de linguistique sémitique et arabe. By David Cohen. The Hague: Mouton, 1970. 178 pages. Illus. Bibl. No price indicated. The study deals mostly with Arabic.

Gulf Arabic: Based on Colloquial Abu Dhabi Arabic. By Hamdi A. Qafisheh. Tucson, Ariz.: Univ. of Arizona Environmental Research Laboratory, 1970. 307 pages. $5.

A History of Ottoman Architecture. By Godfrey Goodwin. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971. 464 pages. Illus. Maps. $30.

Islamic Calligraphy. Section 22, Fasc. 1. By Annemarie Schimmel. Leiden: Brill, 1970. xi + 31 pages. 76 figures. 48 plates. Gld 32.

Jūrj Abyaḍ: al-Masraḥ al-Miṣrī fī Mā'at 'Ām [. . . : the Egyptian theater in a hundred years]. By Su'ād Abyaḍ. Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1970. 391 pages. No price indicated. Study of Jūrj Abyaḍ (1880-1959), founder of Egyptian theater.

Kalimāt muqātilah [Modern Arabic poetry on the Palestinian resistance]. By Sulaymān al-'Īsā. Beirut: Dār al-'Awdah, 1969. 111 pages. LL 2.

Kurdische Handschriften: Band XXX. Ed. by Kamal Fuad. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1970. lx + 158 pages. DM 72. From the Verzeichnis der Orientalischen Handschriften in Deutschland.

Langue et littérature arabes. By Charles Pellat. Paris: Armand Colin, 1970. 240 pages. NF 9.80.

Libyan Poems Trilogy: Seldom Rains, At the Best of Times, and Maps on the Ceiling. By Philip Ward. Stoughton, Wisc.: The Oleander Press, 1970. $1.25 each. Available from Rte. 3, Box 234, Stoughton, Wisc. 53589.

A Lover from Palestine and Other Poems: An anthology of Palestinian poetry. Ed. by Abdul Wahab al-Messiri. Illus. by Kamal Boullata. Washington, D. C.: Free Palestine, 1970. 98 pages. $3. Available from P. O. Box 21096, Kalorama Station, Washington, D. C. 20009.

Mélanges Marcel Cohen: Études de linguistique, éthnographie et sciences connexes. Ed. by David Cohen. Paris: Mouton, 1970. xxxix + 461 pages. $54.

Mi-shirat 'Arav [Ancient Arabic Poetry]. Ed. by Asher Goren. Jerusalem: Hebrew University, Institute of African Asian Studies, 1970. 143 pages. I£ 14.

Orientalische Musik. Ed. by Hans Hickmann and Wilhelm Stauder. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970. 254 pages. Gld 64.

The Secret of Divine Civilization. By 'Abd ul-Baha ibn Bahaullah. Wilmette, Ill.: Baha'i Pub. Trust, 1970. xi + 126 pages. $3. Second edition of the original translation from the Persian.

Ta'mmulāt fī 'ālam Najīb Maḥfūẓ [Essays on Najīb Maḥfūẓ]. By Maḥmūd Amīn al-'Ālim. Cairo: al-Hay'ah al-'Āmmah lil-Ta'līf wa al-Nashr, 1970. 163 pages. £E .25.

Die Turkische Sprache in Ungarn im Siebzenhten Jahrhundert. By J. Németh. Amsterdam: B. R. Gruner, 1970. 281 pages. $11.20.

Dictionaries

A Concise Pahlavi Dictionary. Ed. by D. N. MacKenzie. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1971. 255 pages. $17.75.

Lughāt al-Qur'ān [Arabic-Urdu dictionary of the Koran, with etymological notes], 4 vols. By Ghulam Ahmad Parwez. Lahore: Maktabat Lughat Islam, 1960-61. 1838 pages. Notes. Rs 57.

Qāmūs 'Abarī-'Arabī [A Hebrew-Arabic Dictionary]. Ed. by Y. Kojman. Tel Aviv. n.p., 1970. 1,035 pages. I£ 40.

Paperback

The Battle for North Africa. By John Strawson. New York: Ace, 1970. 223 pages. Maps. $.95.

The Evasive Peace: A Study of the Zionist/Arab problem. Rev. ed. By John H. Davis. New York: New World Press, 1970. 136 pages. $2.95.

Iran (Persia) in Pictures. Rev. ed. By Jon A. Teta. New York: Sterling, 1970. 64 pages. Illus. $1.

Israel in Pitcures. By Peggy Mann. New York: Sterling, 1970. Rev. ed. 64 pages. Illus. Maps. $1.

Kuwait in Pictures. By Camille Mirepoix. New York: Sterling, 1970. 64 pages. Illus. Map. $1.

The Maghreb in the Modern World. By Samir Amin. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1971. $2.25. African Library Original AP 29.

Pakistan in Pictures. Rev. ed. By Jon A. Teta. New York: Sterling, 1970. 64 pages. Illus. $1.

Palestine: The road to peace. By Henry Cattan. London: Longman, 1971. 80 pages. 7s.

Search for Peace in the Middle East. Rev. ed. By American Friends Service Committee. Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett, 1970. vii + 75 pages. $.75.

Sinai Victory. By S. L. A. Marshall. West Caldwell, N. J.: William Morrow & Co., 1971. $1.95.

The Six-Day War: Prologue and aftermath. By David Kimche and Dan Bawly. New York: Stein & Day, 1971. $2.95.

Society, Culture and Change in the Middle East. 3rd Rev. ed. By Raphael Patai. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1971. 560 pages. $5.95.

Suez and Sinai. By Harry Browne. London: Longman, 1971. 128 pages. 15s.

New Journals

METU Studies in Development. Attilâ Sönmez, editor. Ankara: Middle East Technical University, 1970.

Tropical Man. Yearbook of the Department of Social Research, Royal Tropical Institute, Amsterdam. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968. A continuation of the *International Archives of Ethnography.*

American Elsevier announces

THE MIDDLE EAST

Economic and Political Problems and Prospects

Studies from a research program of The Rand Corporation and Resources for the Future, Inc.

A series of volumes based upon research studies of The Rand Corporation and Resources for the Future, Inc., sponsored by The Ford Foundation, aimed at clarifying the interrelated economic, political, and social factors of the Middle East in order to provide an informed foundation for sound policy decisions concerning that area. Five major subjects receive particular emphasis in these studies of the region: political dynamics, economic development, population, agriculture, and oil. Professor Sidney S. Alexander of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology is director of the entire research project.

Included in the series:

THE AGRICULTURAL POTENTIAL OF THE MIDDLE EAST
By Marion Clawson, Hans H. Landsberg, and Lyle T. Alexander
332 pages March 1971 $19.50

MIDDLE EASTERN OIL AND THE WESTERN WORLD
Prospects and Problems
By Sam H. Schurr and the late Paul T. Homan, with J. Darmstadter, H. Frank, J. J. Schanz, Jr., T. R. Stauffer, and H. Steele
224 pages April 1971 $16.00

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND POPULATION GROWTH IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Edited by Charles A. Cooper and Sidney S. Alexander
320 pages approximately 1971 In preparation

POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Edited by Paul Y. Hammond and Sidney S. Alexander
340 pages approximately 1971 In preparation

THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF THE MIDDLE EAST
By Sidney S. Alexander
1971 In preparation

Detailed information on the series is available upon request.

American Elsevier Publishing Company, Inc.
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10017

☐ Please send the book(s) indicated and bill me.

☐ Please send the book(s) indicated, for which I enclose payment of $......... (Postage paid on all prepaid orders.)

☐ Please enter my subscription for the series *The Middle East: Economic and Political Problems and Prospects* as published.

☐ Alexander, THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF THE MIDDLE EAST, In prep.

☐ Clawson, THE AGRICULTURAL POTENTIAL OF THE MIDDLE EAST, $19.50

☐ Cooper, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND POPULATION GROWTH IN THE MIDDLE EAST, In prep.

☐ Hammond, POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, In prep.

☐ Schurr, MIDDLE EASTERN OIL AND THE WESTERN WORLD, $16.00

Name______________________________

Address______________________________

City_______________ State__________ Zip________

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE

Prepared by the Staff of The Middle East Journal

With contributions from: Jay D. Fuller, Harry N. Howard, Kerim K. Key, A. Albert Kudsi-Zadeh, Jacob M. Landau, Gare LeCompte, Louis E. Leopold, David W. Littlefield, Christopher W. S. Ross, Peter T. Suzuki, Michael H. Van Dusen, Roxann A. Van Dusen.

Note: It is the aim of the Bibliography to present a selective listing of periodical material dealing with the Middle East since the rise of Islām. In order to avoid unwarranted duplication of bibliographies already dealing with certain aspects and portions of the area, the material included will cover North Africa and Muslim Spain, the Arab World, the State of Israel, Turkey, the Transcaucasian states of the Soviet Union, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkestan. An attempt is made to survey all periodicals of importance in these fields. The ancient Near East and Byzantium are excluded.

It would be appreciated if authors of articles appropriate to the Bibliography would send reprints or notices of such articles to: Bibliography Editor, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, 1761 N Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036.

The list of periodicals regularly reviewed will be published annually in the Autumn issue.

GEOGRAPHY

29352 "Focus on Libya." *B. Afr. Inst. of S. Afr.* 8, no. 7 (Ag '70) 292-6.

29353 "Le Soudan." *Notes & Documents* 22 (Ap '70) 3-21.

29354 BOUQUEREL, J. "Un port industriel du Maroc: Mohammedia." *Cah. d'Outre-Mer* 23, no. 91 (Jl-S '70) 277-306.

29355 DESPOIS, J. "Le cadre physique des pays musulmans: introduction géographique à l'étude de l'Islam." *Acta Geog.* no. 3 (Jl-S '70) 143-58.

29356 EFRAT, E. "The distribution of settlements in Judea and Samaria." (In Hebrew) *Hamizrah Hehadash* 20, no. 3 (1970) 257-65. Summary in English.

29357 FOX, W. "Baghdad, a city in transition." *East Lakes Geog.* 5 (D '69) 5-23.

29358 GOLDBRITH, J. "Italy, the British East Africa Company and the Benadir Coast 1888-1893." *J. Mod. Hist.* 42, no. 4 (D '70) 549-63.

29359 HEYERDAHL, T. "The voyage of Ra II." *Natl. Geog.* (Ja '71) 44-70.

29360 LE BERRE, M. "Le monument de Danestama en Afghanistan." *Rev. Etudes Islamiques* 38, no. 1 (1970) 43-53.

29361 ORGELS, B. "L'oasis de Gabès." *Correspondance d'O. Etudes* nos. 13-14 (1968) 3-90. An oasis in Tunisia.

29362 SOFFER, G. "Iran." *Focus* 21, no. 5 (Ja '71) 12 pages.

29363 TAVERNIER, R. "Le Liban." *Europe Sud-Est* no. 81 (S '70) 13-8.

29364 TOGAN, Z. "The topography of Balkh (Afghanistan) down to the middle of the seventeenth century." *C. A. J.* 14, no. 4 (1970) 277-88.

29365 TOMKINSON, M. "Requiem for the Empty Quarter." *Geog. Mag.* (D '70) 183-93.

29366 ÜLKÜTAŞIR, M. "A study of Söğüt Beylik." (In Turkish) *Türk Kültürü* 8, no. 95 (S '70) 769-75.

29367 VAUMAS, E. "Questions de géomorphologie en Israel." *B. Assoc. Géog. fr.* nos. 362-363 (Ap-My '68) 167-80.

29368 WILSON, I. "Journey across the Grand Erg Oriental." *Geog. Mag.* 43, no. 4 (Ja '71). Across the Algerian desert.

29369 ZABBĀL, S. "Qaṭar." (In Arabic) *al-'Arabī* no. 144 (N '70) 92-115.

29370 ZABBĀL, S. "Ta'iz." (In Arabic) *al-'Arabī* no. 145 (D '70) 92-117.

HISTORY

(Medieval)

29371 ABD AR-RAZIQ, A. "Un document concernant le mariage des esclaves au temps des

Mamlūks." *J. Econ. Soc. Hist. O.* 13, no. 3 (N '70) 309-14.

29372 ASHTOR, E. "The number of Jews in mediaeval Egypt." *J. Jewish Stud.* 19, nos. 1-4 (1968) 1-22.

29373 COLLESS, B. "Persian merchants and missionaries in medieval Malaya." *J. Malaysian Branch, R. A. Soc.* 42, pt. 2 (D '69) 10-47.

29374 DESTREE, A. "L'ouverture de la Perse à l'influence européenne sous les Rois Safavides et les incidences de cette influence sur l'évolution de l'art de la miniature." *Correspondance d'O. Etudes* nos. 13-14 (1968) 91-104.

29375 FORAND, P. "The relation of the slave and client to the master or patron in medieval Islam." *Internat. J. Mid. East Stud.* 2, no. 1 (Ja '71) 59-66.

29376 HESS, A. "The evolution of the Ottoman seaborne empire in the age of the oceanic discoveries, 1435-1525." *Amer. Hist. Rev.* 75, no. 7 (D '70) 1892-1919.

29377 JADON, S. "A comparison of the wealth, prestige, and medical works of the physicians of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn in Egypt and Syria." *B. Hist. Medicine* (Ja-F '70).

29378 JADON, S. "The physicians of Syria during the reign of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn 570-589 A.H./1174-1193 A.D." *J. Hist. Medicine* (Jl '70).

29379 LE TOURNEAU, R. "Sur la disparition de la doctrine almohade." *Stud. Islamica* 32 (1970) 193-202.

29380 LEWIS, B. "On the revolutions in early Islam." *Stud. Islamica* 32 (1970) 215-32.

29381 MAKDISI, G. "Madrasa and university in the Middle Ages." *Stud. Islamica* 32 (1970) 255-64.

29382 MERÇIL, E. "Gaznavid rule in Kirman." (In Turkish) *Tarih Dergisi* no. 24 (Mr '70) 35-44.

29383 NAGEL, T. "Ein früher Bericht über den Aufstand von Muḥammed b. 'Abdallāh im Jahre 145 h." *Der Islam* 46, no. 3 (S '70) 227-62.

29384 PETRUSHEVSKY, I. "The history of the Mazdakites during the Islam period." (In Russian) *Narodi A. i Afr.* no. 5 (1970) 71-81.

29385 SOHRWEIDE, H. "Dichter und Gelehrte aus den Osten im osmanischen Reich (1453-1600)." *Der Islam* 46, no. 3 (S '70) 263-302.

HISTORY AND POLITICS
(Modern)

29386 "After Abdul Nasser everything has changed: an interview with Professor J. L. Talmon." *New Mid. East* 26 (N '70) 11-6.

29387 "Civil war in Jordan." *Mid East* 10, no. 6 (D '70) 21-4.

29388 "The coming decade in the Middle East—a symposium, I." *Interplay* 3, no. 14 (N '70) 8-18.

29389 "Egypt after Nasser." *New Outlook* 13, no. 8 (N '70) 7-10. An interview with "an Egyptian journalist."

29390 "The explosion of a myth—China, the Soviet Union and the Middle East." *New Mid. East* no. 27 (D '70) 32-45. Articles by Sevinc Carlson, Neville Brown, and Robert Kilmarx.

29391 "The Fawzi version of the post-Nasser programme: the official text of Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmoud Fawzi's address to the National Assembly." *New Mid. East* 28 (Ja '71) 27-31.

29392 "Israel and Africa." *B. Afr. Inst. of S. Afr.* 8, no. 6 (Jl '70) 218-31.

29393 "The Middle East." *Survival* 13, no. 1 (Ja '71) 17-24. 3 articles.

29394 "Middle East: the Soviet-UAR posture." *Mizan* 12, no. 1 (O '70) 1-6.

29395 "Quand les communistes comparaient le régime de Nasser à celui de Hitler." *Est & Ouest* 22, no. 454 (O 16-31 '70) 4-8.

29396 "Second Congress of the Iraqi Communist Party." *World Marxist Rev. Information B.* 8, no. 19 (1970) 19-25.

29397 "Tunesië: een louteringsproces?" *Kroniek van Afr.* no. 3 (1970) 162-7.

29398 'ABBŪD, Ḥ. "The Arab revolution and imperialism." (In Arabic) *al-Ma'rifah* no. 107 (Ja '71) 3-14.

29399 ADAM, W. "A change of scene in Pakistan." *Swiss Rev. World Aff.* 20, no. 10 (Ja '71) 19-20.

29400 AKSENTIJEVIC, M. "The crisis in Jordan." *Rev. Internat. Aff.* 21, no. 492 (O '70) 6-8.

29401 AKTEPE, M. "Ipşir Mustafa Paşa and some related documents." (In Turkish) *Tarih Dergisi* no. 24 (Mr '70) 45-58.

29402 AMIN, S. "Atouts et faiblesses du maghreb, I." *Jeune Afr.* no. 517 (D 1 '70) 56-61.

29403 ARNONI, M. "Ideological myths in Israeli foreign policy." *New Outlook* 13, no. 7 (S-O '70) 25-34.

29404 ARURI, N. "Kuwait: a political study." *Muslim World* 60, no. 4 (O '70) 321-43.

29405 ASSEILY, A. "Mexican lessons for the Middle East." *Euromoney* (Ag '70).

29406 'AẒM, Ṣ. "Arabs, Marxism and the Jewish problem." (In Arabic) *Dirāsāt al-'Arabīyah* 6, no. 3 (Ja '70) 3-49.

29407 BAILEY, C. "America and the Soviet involvement in Azerbaijan in 1946: some parallels for 1970." *Internat. Probs.* 9, nos. 3-4 (N '70) 20-4.

29408 BAILEY, C. "Cabinet formation in Jordan, 1950-1970." *New Outlook* 13, no. 8 (N '70) 11-23.

29409 BALY, D. "Christians and Israel." *Mid East* 10, no. 6 (D '70) 33-6.

29410 BARNDS, W. "Pakistan: old issues in a new context." *World Today* 26, no. 11 (N '70) 458-66.

29411 AL-BAYṬĀR, N. "From economic development to coup d'état." (In Arabic) *Dirāsāt al-'Arabiyah* 6, no. 2 (D '69) 49-75.

29412 BEBARS, D. "Mena House Centenary." *Egypt Travel Mag.* no. 155 (1970) 21-9.

29413 BLANCO GASPAR, V. "Problemática de la seguridad mediterránea (II)." *Rev. Polit. Internac.* no. 110 (Jl-Ag '70) 7-22.

29414 BONSEL, E. "Nasser is dood—is Nasser dood?" *Internat. Spectator* 25, no. 20 (N 22 '70) 1870-9.

29415 BRADNOCK, R. "East Pakistan in a winter of discontent." *Geog. Mag.* 43, no. 4 (Ja '71) 289-93.

29416 BRIDGE, F. "*Tarde venientibus ossa:* Austro-Hungarian colonial aspirations in Asia Minor 1913-1914." *Mid. East. Stud.* 6, no. 3 (O '70) 319-30.

29417 BROWNFELD, A. "The Jews of Morocco and the Zionist philosophy of nationality." *Arab World* 16, nos. 9-10 (S-O '70) 17-23.

29418 BUSCHER, H. "Demokratisierung und Ansätze zur Parteienbildung in Afghanistan." *Vierteljahresberichte* (Mr '70) 1-32.

29419 CARDASHIAN, V. "The 'Armenian policy' of the U.S. administration in 1928." *Armenian Rev.* 23, no. 4-92 (1970) 3-7.

29420 CASTELLINA, L. "L'Alternativa rivoluzionaria nel Medio Oriente." *Il Manifesto* 2, nos. 10-11 (1970) 25-38.

29421 CHALMETA GENDRÓN, P. "El 'Kitāb fī ādāb al-ḥisba' (libro del buen gobierno del zoco) de al Saqaṭī." *al-Andalus* 32, fasc. 1 (1967) 125-62.

29422 COLEBROOK, J. "Cairo Journal." *Commentary* 50, no. 4 (O '70) 45-56.

29423 COSMIN, S. "Les Dardanelles." *Europe Sud-Est* no. 82 (O '70) 3-10.

29424 CZUDNOWSKI, M. "Legislative recruitment under proportional representation in Israel: a model and a case study." *Midwest J. Polit. Sci.* (My '70) 216-48.

29425 DERSHOWITZ, A. "Terrorism and preventive detention: the case of Israel." *Commentary* 50, no. 6 (D '70) 67-78.

29426 DESALVO, A. and S. STAME. "Medio Oriente: imperialismo e socialimperialismo al lavoro." *Avaderni Piacentini* 9, no. 42 (N '70) 2-9.

29427 DOUMAS, C. "The 1960 constitution of Cyprus: some observations." *Southern Quart.* 9, no. 1 (O '70) 67-86.

29428 DRULOVIC, M. "'Mare Nostrum' or a mousetrap." *Rev. Internat. Aff.* 21, no. 496 (D 5 '70) 11-3.

29429 EHRHARDT, C. "Europäische Gemeinschaft und Mittelmeer." *Aussenpolitik* 21, no. 12 (D '70) 713-22.

29430 FARḤI, D. "Nizām-i Jedīd: military reform in Egypt under Meḥmed 'Ali." (In Hebrew) *Hamizrah Hehadash* 20, no. 4 (1970) 325-48.

29431 FERNAU, F.-W. "La Turquie, l'Alliance atlantique et la Détente." *Europe Sud-Est* no. 82 (O '70) 13-25.

29432 FIELD, M. "Iraq—growing realism among the revolutionaries." *New Mid. East* no. 29 (F '71) 27-9.

29433 FOLEY, T. "The mighty transformation: Soviet aid and Arab liberation." *New World Rev.* 38, no. 4 (1970) 33-41.

29434 FRANK, C. "Israël: la Knesset, organe du monocamérisme israëlien." *Rev. Droit publique Sci. polit.* (My-Ju '70) 591-636.

29435 GARANG, J. "The Southern Sudan." *Afr. Com.* no. 37 (1969) 41-55.

29436 GIL BENUMEYA, R. "Actualidad de la cabecera tunecina en la política mediterránea." *Rev. Polit. Internac.* no. 111 (S-O '70) 157-64.

29437 GIL BENUMEYA, R. "El nuevo Islam político en su problemática mundial." *Rev. Polit. Internac.* no. 110 (Jl-Ag '70) 145-54.

29438 GORTER, W. "Een Ombudsman voor het Midden-Oosten." *Internat. Spectator* 24, no. 20 (N 22 '70) 1930-9.

29439 HAIM, A. "A review and evaluation of the 1969 elections in Turkey." (In Hebrew) *Hamizrah Hehadash* 20, no. 3 (1970) 266-9. Summary in English.

29440 HARRIS, G. "The causes of the 1960 revolution in Turkey." *MEJ* 24, no. 4 (1970) 438-54.

29441 HASSAN, S. "Emergency powers of executive in the United Arab Republic." *Cornell Internat. Law J.* 3 (1970) 45-62.

29442 HEINZLMEIR, H. "Die Arabische Republik Jemen—Aspekte ihrer Innen—und Aussenpolitik." *Vierteljahresberichte* (Mr '70) 77-86.

29443 HORGEN, J. "Ali's navy." *Aramco World* 21, no. 6 (N-D '70) 18-21.

29444 HOTTINGER, A. "Ferment on the Persian Gulf." *Swiss Rev. World Aff.* 20, no. 11 (F '71) 12-6.

29445 HOTTINGER, A. "Der Machtzuwachs der arabischen Freischärler und ihr Zusammenstoss mit der jordanischen Regierung." *Europa-Archiv* 25, no. 20 (O 25 '70) 737-46.

29446 HOTTINGER, A. "Syria's new régime." *Swiss Rev. World Aff.* 20, no. 10 (Ja '71) 17-8.

29447 HUIZINGA, J. "Nasser: from soldier to socialist." *Interplay* 3, no. 14 (N '70) 19-22.

29448 KAKÉ, I. "L'aventure des Bukhara (prétoriens noirs) au Maroc au XVIII^{e} siècle." *Présence Afr.* no. 70 (1969) 67-74.

29449 KAPELIUK, A. "Nasser's new strategy." *New Outlook* 13, no. 7 (S-O '70) 10-9ff.

29450 KEDDIE, N. "The Iranian power structure and social change 1800-1969: an overview." *Internat. J. Mid. East Stud.* 2, no. 1 (Ja '71) 3-20.

29451 KENT, G. "Foreign policy analysis: the Middle East." *Internat. Probs.* 9, nos. 3-4 (N '70) 40-56.

29452 KINSMAN, J. "Strange bed-fellows and new alignments in the Maghreb." *New Mid. East* no. 29 (F '71) 23-6.

29453 KRÜGER, H. "Der Frühlingshügel: Ansichten von Tel Aviv." *Merkur* 24, no. 12 (D '70) 1130-47.

29454 KUNTBAY, M. "L'Administration locale en Turquie." *B. Inst. Internat. Admin. Publique* (O-D '69) 93-107.

29455 KUX, E. "Peking's Middle Eastern interests." *Swiss Rev. World Aff.* 20, no. 8 (N '70) 13-4.

29456 LAITHWAITE, G. "The emergence of Pakistan." *Round Table* no. 240 (N '70) 595-602.

29457 LANG, N. "Les Soviétiques à Amman et au Caire." *Est & Ouest* 22, no. 454 (O 16-31 '70) 1-4.

29458 LENCZOWSKI, G. "Arab radicalism: problems and prospects." *Cur. Hist.* 60, no. 353 (Ja '71) 32-7ff.

29459 LEVY, A. "The Officer Corps in Sultan Mahmud II's new Ottoman army, 1826-39." *Internat. J. Mid. East Stud.* 2, no. 1 (Ja '71) 21-39.

29460 LIEBMAN, M. "Une tête de pont de l'Occident." *Polit. aujourdhui* (Jl-Ag '70) 41-57. Israel's alliance with imperialist powers.

29461 LIVI, R. "Nasce un' 'altra Israele'." *Ponte* (Jl '70) 809-16.

29462 LUCCHINI, L. "L'Administration tunisienne." *B. Inst. Internat. Admin. Publique* (O-D '69) 67-91.

29463 LUMER, H. "On the origins of the State of Israel." *Polit. Aff.* 49, no. 12 (D '70) 52-6.

29464 McCLINTOCK, D. "The Southern Sudan problem: evolution of an Arab-African confrontation." *MEJ* 24, no. 4 (1970) 466-78.

29465 MANSFIELD, P. "Nasser and Egypt." *Venture* 22, no. 11 (D '70) 11-4.

29466 MARTEL, A. "Le Maghreb." *Rev. fr. d'Hist. d'Outre-Mer* 57, no. 206 (1970) 91-132.

29467 MERHAV, P. "The strategy of the Israeli Left." *New Outlook* 13, no. 7 (S-O '70) 40-5.

29468 MIGNOT, E. "Les événements de Jordanie, le monde arabe et Israel." *Nouvelle Critique* 38 (N '70) 5-10.

29469 MONATS, T. "Der Nahe Osten nach Nassers Tod." *Aussenpolitik* 21, no. 10 (O '70) 581-4.

29470 MONROE, E. "*The Round Table* and the Middle East peace settlement 1917-22." *Round Table* no. 240 (N '70) 479-92.

29471 MORTIMER, R. "The Algerian revolution in search of the African revolution." *J. Mod. Afr. Stud.* 8, no. 3 (O '70) 363-88.

29472 MOULAHID, J. "Le Maroc dans l'inquiétude." *Esprit* 38, no. 397 (N '70) 793-804.

29473 MOURIN, M. "L'Iran et les problèmes de l'équilibre." *Rev. Défense Natl.* 26 (O '70) 1446-61.

29474 PERES, Y. "Modernization and nationalism in the identity of the Israeli Arab." *MEJ* 24, no. 4 (1970) 479-92.

29475 PERPIÑÁ GRAU, R. "Prometeo en Alemania e Israel." *Rev. Polit. Internac.* no. 111 (S-O '70) 187-94.

29476 PORATH, Y. "The Palestinians, the Palestine issue and negotiations towards a British-Hejazi Treaty, 1920-1925." (In Hebrew) *Hamizrah Hehadash* 20, no. 3 (1970) 237-56. Summary in English.

29477 PORTAL, R. "Les forces armées israéliennes." *Europe Sud-Est* no. 81 (S '70) 13-8.

29478 POZDNIAKOV, N. "The problem of Sudan's national unity." (In Russian) *Narodi A. i Afr.* no. 4 (1970) 27-36.

29479 PRJLA, A. "The lessons of the drama in Jordan." *Rev. Internat. Aff.* 21, no. 494 (N 5 '70) 24-7.

29480 RAHMAN, F. "Islam and the constitutional problem of Pakistan." *Stud. Islamica* 32 (1970) 275-88.

29481 RAHMAN, M. "The foundation of the All-India Muslim League." *J. Pak. Hist. Soc.* 18, no. 3 (Jl '70) 157-79.

29482 RAMAZANI, R. "Iran's changing foreign policy: a preliminary discussion." *MEJ* 24, no. 4 (1970) 421-37.

29483 RAZI, H. "Genesis of party in Iran: a case study of the interaction between the political system and political parties." *Iranian Stud.* 3, no. 2 (1970) 58-90.

29484 REICH, B. "United States-Arab relations since the June War." *Wiener Library B.* 24, no. 3 (1970) 1-8.

29485 REICH, B. "United States policy in the Middle East." *Cur. Hist.* 60, no. 353 (Ja '71) 1-6.

29486 RHEE, T. "The Sino-Soviet conflict and the Middle East." *New Outlook* 13, no. 7 (S-O '70) 20-4.

29487 RODOLFO, C. "Le Golfe Persique (II): Situation actuelle et perspective d'avenir." *Polit. Étrangère* 35, no. 5 (1970) 547-86.

29488 RONDOT, P. "Le coup de théâtre de Mascate (23 juillet 1970)." *Rev. Défense Natl.* 26 (O '70) 1474-80.

29489 RONDOT, P. "Soudan: Réserves à l'égard de l'unité arabe." *Rev fr. d'études polit. afr.* no. 60 (D '70) 29-33.

29490 ROUCEK, J. "Las implicaciones de la expansión naval soviética en el Mediterráneo." *Rev. Estudios Polit.* nos. 169-70 (Ja-Ap '70) 123-36.

29491 ROUSSET, M. "L'Administration marocaine." *B. Inst. Internat. Admin. Publique* (O-D '69) 7-65.

29492 SAFRAN, N. "Israeli politics since the 1967 war." *Cur. Hist.* 60, no. 353 (Ja '71) 19-25ff.

29493 SAFRASTIAN, A. "The 'Armenian Empire' in Syria." *Armenian Rev.* 23, no. 4-92 (1970) 15-8.

29494 SAID, A. "Clashing horizons: Arabs and revolution." *Mid. East Information Series* 14 (1970-71) 13-8.

29495 SAMUEL, H. "Lenin and the Armenian question." *Armenian Rev.* 23, no. 4-92 (1970) 9-14.

29496 SARIANIDI, V. "Former relations between southern Turkistan and northern Iran." (In Russian) *Sovietskaya Arkheologiya* no. 4 (1970) 19-32.

29497 SCHWEID, E. "Israel as a Zionist state." *Dispersion & Unity; J. Zionism & Jewish World* no. 11 (1970) 51-60.

29498 SHAQRAH, A. "Protection of the Coast." (In Arabic) *al-'Arabī* no. 145 (D '70) 52-9. On the Kuwayti navy.

29499 SHEEHY, A. "The Baluchis of the Turkmen SSR." *Mizan* 12, no. 1 (O '70) 43-54.

29500 SHELDON, J. "Mass murder in the Sudan." *Prevent World War III* no. 77 (1971) 8-10.

29501 SILVERBURG, S. "Hussein—sovereign or national leader?" *Internat. Probs.* 9, nos. 3-4 (N '70) 29-33.

29502 SISCOE, F. "Prelude to Schuyler's 'Turkistan'." *RCAJ* 57, pt. 3 (O '70) 293-304.

29503 SPENCER, W. "Morocco's monarchial balancing act." *Afr. Report* 15, no. 9 (D '70) 19-21.

29504 SRIVASTAVA, R. "India-Israel relations." *Indian J. Polit. Sci.* 31, no. 3 (Jl-S '70) 238-64.

29505 STEGENGA J. "Third world afflictions: an alarmist's catalogue." *Internat. Rel.* 3, no. 9 (My '70) 667-78.

29506 STEIGER, H. "Völkerbund, Vereinte Nationen und der Nahe Osten." *Der Staat* 9, no. 4 (1970) 433-74.

29507 SWENSON, V. "The military rising in Istanbul 1909." *J. Contemp. Hist.* 5, no. 4 (1970) 171-84.

29508 SYLVESTER, A. "Turn of the tide in the Yemen." *New Mid. East* no. 29 (F '71) 41-3.

29509 TEKINDAG, M. "The matter of Bayezid's death." (In Turkish) *Tarih Dergisi* no. 24 (Mr '70) 1-16.

29510 TEVETOGLU, F. "The Karakol Cemiyeti of the secret organizations of the National War of Independence." (In Turkish) *Türk Kültürü* 8, no. 95 (S '70) 757-63.

29511 THOMAN, R. "The Persian Gulf region." *Cur. Hist.* 60, no. 353 (Ja '71) 38-45ff.

29512 THOMPSON, W. "The Arab subsystem and the feudal pattern of interaction: 1965." *J. Peace Res.* no. 2 (1970) 151-68. A sociometric model for international interaction.

29513 TIBI, B. "On Ilyās Murquṣ' 'Marxism and the National Question'." (In Arabic) *Dirāsāt 'Arabīyah* 6, no. 10 (Ag '70) 115-22.

29514 TIBI, B. "Kolonialherrschaft: Antikolonialismus und Dekolonisation." *Neue Polit. Lit.* 15, no. 4 (D '70) 507-32.

29515 TIBI, B. "Die krise des Bourgibismus: Entstehung und verfall des 'konstitutionellen Sozialismus' in Tunesien." *Das Argument* 12, nos. 7-8 (N '70) 530-55.

29516 TROUT, F. "The return of Ifni to Morocco." *Genève-Afr.* 9, no. 1 (1970) 59-66.

29517 ÜLKÜTAŞIR, M. "The month of August in our military history and the Mercidâbik-Sakarya wars." (In Turkish) *Türk Kültürü* 8, no. 94 (Ag '70) 640-4.

29518 VAN DOOREN, P. "Structural and institutional obstacles facing Turkey's peasant-farmers." *Tropical Man* 2 (1969).

29519 VERETE, M. "Why was a British Consulate established in Jerusalem?" *English Hist. Rev.* 85, no. 315 (Ap '70) 316-45.

29520 VERNET, J. "Le Tafsīr au service de la polémique anti-musulmane." *Stud. Islamica* 32, (1970) 305-9.

29521 WALZER, M. "A journey to Israel." *Dissent* (N-D '70) 497-503.

29522 WATT, D. "The proposed new Arab union." *World Today* 26, no. 12 (D '70) 497-9.

29523 WELLMAN, H. "Drug abuse: a challenge to U.S.-Turkish cooperation in the seventies." *Dept. State B.* 64, no. 1649 (F 1 '71) 140-6.

29524 WERNER, E. "Die Türkei 1914 zwischen Dreibund und Entente." *Wissenschaftliche Z. (G.)* 19, no. 3 (1970) 431-46.

29525 WESSON, R. "The Soviet interest in the Middle East." *Cur. Hist.* 59, no. 350 (O '70) 212-9ff.

29526 WHEELER, G. "British and Russian imperial attitudes in Asia." *RCAJ* 57, pt. 3, (O '70) 256-64.

29527 YEDLIN, R., tr. "The Provisional Iraqi Constitution." (In Hebrew) *Hamizrah Hehadash* 20, no. 4 (1970) 361-9.

29528 YODFAT, A. "The U.S.S.R. and the inter-Arab relations." *Internat. Probs.* 9, nos. 3-4 (N '70) 25-8.

29529 ZABBĀL, S. "The Kurds" (In Arabic) *al-'Arabī* no. 146 (Ja '71) 100-30.

29530 ZARTMAN, W. "Revolution and development: form and substance." *Civilisation* 20, no. 2 (1970) 181-97.

Arab-Israeli Conflict

29531 "L'accordo russo-tedesco, la tregua a Suez e la pace." *Riv. di Stud. polit. internaz.* 37, no. 3 (Jl-S '70) 339-50.

29532 "The Arab-Israeli conflict." *Trans-Action* (special issue) 7, nos. 9-10 (Jl-Ag '70).

29533 "L'avenir d'Israel." *Preuves* no. 5 (1971) 17-23. Comments by Yasir Arafat and David Ben Gurion.

29534 "Avnery without illusions—an interview." *Mid East* 10, no. 6 (D '70) 12-7.

29535 "Intervista con Abu Leila dell'Ufficio Politico del F.D.P.L.P." *Avaderni Piacentini* 9, no. 42 (N '70) 13-8.

29536 "The McMahon-Hussein correspondence: comments by Arnold Toynbee and a reply by Isaiah

Friedman." *J. Contemp. Hist.* 5, no. 4 (1970) 185-201.

29537 "The Middle East: beginning of peace or quiet before the storm?" *Prevent World War III* no. 77 (1971) 1-5.

29538 "Moyen-orient: la seconde guerre des six jours." *Jeune Afr.* no. 509 (O 6 '70) 20-9.

29539 "Mrs. Meir's statement on Jarring peace talks." *New Mid. East* no. 29 (F '71) 45-50.

29540 "Peace for the Middle East." *Worldview* 14, no. 1 (Ja '71) 12-5. Transcript from a panel discussion in Seattle, N '70.

29541 "War in the Middle East." *B. Peace Proposals* 1, no. 4 (1970) 362-74. Articles contributed from eleven sources.

29542 ALEXANDER, Y. and L. SWEET. "The 'Just War' concept and the 6 Day War." *Internat. Probs.* 9, nos. 3-4 (N '70) 34-9.

29543 ALROY, G. "The Arab myth of Zionism." *Patterns of Prejudice* 4, no. 6 (N-D '70) 1-8.

29544 ALROY, G. "A conflict like any other?" *Mid. East Information Series* (1970-71) 2-9.

29545 ARIELI, Y. "Principles for peace negotiations." *New Outlook* 13, no. 8 (N '70) 34-40.

29546 BENTOV, M. "Israel and the Palestinians." *New Outlook* 13, no. 8 (N '70) 41-5.

29547 BICHARA, K. "La résistance palestinienne." *Rev. nouvelle* (S '70) 161-76.

29548 BUFFUM, W. "US abstains on UN resolution on Lebanese complaint against Israel." *Dept. State B.* 63, no. 1632 (O 5 '70) 402-3.

29549 CARADON. "A plan for peace." *War/Peace Report* 10 (D '70) 7-11.

29550 COMAY, M. "Peace in the Middle East." *Internat. Probs.* 9, nos. 3-4 (N '70) 14-9.

29551 EBAN, A. "Perspectives de paix au Moyen-Orient." *Chronique Polit. Etrangère* 23, no. 6 (N '70) 615-36.

29552 ETZIONI, A. "A buffer zone at the Suez." *New Outlook* 13, no. 8 (N '70) 30-3.

29553 FRANCOS, A. "Les Palestiniennes." *Jeune Afr.* no. 518 (D 8 '70) 35-40.

29554 FULBRIGHT, J. "The Middle East: perspectives for peace." *Survival* 12, no. 11 (N '70) 360-8.

29555 GENDZIER, I. "The Palestinian revolution, Palestine, Fatah, the Jews, and other matters." *New Mid. East* 28 (Ja '71) 38-41.

29556 GILLON, D. "Enforced peace in the Middle East?" *Venture* 22, no. 8 (S '70) 26-9.

29557 GOLDEN, H. "Israel and the Christian shrines." *Saturday Rev.* (D 19 '70) 15-6.

29558 HEYMONT, I. "Israeli defense of the Suez Canal." *Military Rev.* 51, no. 1 (Ja '71) 3-11.

29559 HOTTINGER, A. "El Fatah oder die Grenze des Opferwillens." *Monat* 22, no. 267 (D '70) 49-54.

29560 HOWARD, H. "The United Nations in the Middle East." *Cur. Hist.* 60, no. 353 (Ja '71) 7-12ff.

29561 ISMAEL, T. "The Palestinian emergence and U.S. foreign policy." *Mid. East Forum* 46, nos. 2-3 (1970) 65-72.

29562 KARMI, H. "How holy is Palestine to the Muslims?" *Islamic Quart.* 14, no. 2 (Ap-Ju '70) 63-90.

29563 KEDOURIE, E. "Sir Mark Sykes and Palestine, 1915-16." *Mid. East. Stud.* 6, no. 3 (O '70) 340-5.

29564 LANG, N. "L'U.R.S.S. et le Plan Rogers." *Est & Ouest* 22, no. 453 (O 1-15 '70) 1-5.

29565 MATES, L. "The war and the Palestinian problem." *Rev. Internat. Aff.* 21, no. 495 (N 20 '70) 8-11.

29566 MUSHKAT, M. "Zum arabische-israelischen Konflikt." *Schweizer Monatshefte* 50, no. 9 (D '70) 763-74.

29567 NAHUMI, M. "Entanglement on three levels." *New Outlook* 13, no. 7 (S-O '70) 46-55.

29568 RICHMOND, J. "The future of Palestine after the Rogers Plan: a personal interpretation." *New Mid. East* no. 29 (F '71) 38-40.

29569 RIGA, P. "Thoughts on the Middle East conflict." *Polit. Aff.* 49, no. 12 (D '70) 46-52.

29570 ROGERS, W. "Peace and stability in the Middle East and Asia." *Dept. State B.* 64, no. 1646 (Ja 11 '71) 61-7.

29571 ROSE, N. "The debate on partition 1937-38: the Anglo-Zionist aspect—The Proposal." *Mid. East. Stud.* 6, no. 3 (O '70) 297-318.

29572 ROULEAU, E. "Yasser Arafat's self-criticism." *New Outlook* 13, no. 9 (D '70) 8-11. An interview.

29573 RUPPERT, H. "Ost-Jerusalem. Boebachtungen zu Anderungen der Verkehrsorientierung und zum Funktionswandel seit dem Sechstage-Krieg 1967." *Die Erde* 101, no. 3 (1970) 198-208.

29574 SCHIFFNER, A. "The Palestine Truce—February 5, 1971—What then?" *Prophetic Herald* 32, no. 3 (Mr '71) 1-34.

29575 SCHWADRAN, B. "The Soviet role in the Middle East crisis." *Cur. Hist.* 60, no. 353 (Ja '71) 13-8ff.

29576 SEYMOUR, G. "The Middle East, September-October 1970." *Contemp. Rev.* 217, no. 1259 (D '70) 303-8.

29577 SHACHAM, J. "The status of the Israeli-held territories and some problems of self-defense in regard to the 6 Day War." (In Hebrew) *Internat. Probs.* 9, nos. 3-4 (N '70) 15-22.

29578 SHARABI, H. "Palestine resistance: crisis and reassessment." *Mid. East Newsletter* 5, no. 1 (Ja '71) 11-4.

29579 SISCO, J. "The fluid and evolving situation in the Middle East." *Dept. State B.* 63, no. 1643 (D 21 '70) 748-51.

29580 SMART, J. "Military insecurity and the Arab-Israel conflict: there is an effective alternative to the United Nations." *New Mid. East* 26 (N '70) 28-32.

29581 SORNAGA, P. "Palestina: l'altra faccia della rivoluzione." *Avaderni Piacentini* 9, no. 42 (N '70) 9-13.

29582 STRUYE, P. "Comment s'acheminer vers la paix au Proche-Orient?" *Chronique Polit. Etrangère* 23, no. 6 (N '70) 637-46.

29583 TALMON, J. "The impotence of victory." *Dissent* (N-D '70) 504-16.

29584 TESSLER, M. "A cultural basis for Arab-Israeli accommodation." *World Aff.* 133, no. 3 (D '70) 183-200.

29585 TIBI, B. "Political thinking and the defeat: The interpretations of Qusṭanṭīn Zurayq on the defeat of June 5th." (In Arabic) *Mawāqif* 2, no. 8 (Mr-Ap '70) 160-5.

29586 U THANT. "The story of the Jarring mission." *New Mid. East* no. 29 (F '71) 30-5.

29587 WATAD, M. "Co-existence." *New Outlook* 13, no. 7 (S-O '70) 68-73ff. The author is a member of the Editorial Board of *al-Mirsad*, an Arabic weekly published by Mapam.

29588 WOLF, J. "The Palestinian resistance movement." *Cur. Hist.* 60, no. 353 (Ja '71) 26-31ff.

29589 YOST, C. "U.S. gives views in U.N. General Assembly debate on the situation in the Middle East." *Dept. State B.* 63, no. 1639 (N 23 '70) 656-63.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

29590 "Aswan dam completed." *B. Afr. Inst. of S. Afr.* 8, no. 7 (Ag '70) 283-91.

29591 "Basic data on the economy of Afghanistan." *Overseas Business Report* 70-56 (O '70) 1-9.

29592 "Ben Saleh et le développement tunisien (1961-1969)." *Esprit* 38, no. 397 (N '70) 805-17.

29593 "Les chemins de fer africains et malgaches." *Industries et Travaux d'Outremer* (Special Issue) 18, no. 205 (D '70). 20 pages on the railway systems of Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, the UAR and Sudan.

29594 "The development of the Su'udi Arabian economy." *Islamic Rev. & Arab Aff.* 58, nos. 7-8 (Jl-Ag '70) 11-9.

29595 "Foreign trade regulations of the Republic of Tunisia." *Overseas Business Report* 70-67 (N '70) 1-10.

29596 "Le marché algérien." *Marchés Trop et Med.* no. 25 (1969) 1231ff.

29597 "Pakistan's economic survey 1969-70." *Orient* (Hamburg) no. 5 (O '70) 150-5.

29598 "A survey of the rural economic problems of Kurdestan." *Tahqiqāt-e Eqtesādi* 7, no. 18 (1970) 92-111.

29599 "Water and power development in East Pakistan." *Perspective* 4, no. 1 (Jl '70) 59-64.

29600 ABU JABER, K. "The 1952 revolution: an impetus to Egyptian labor." *Mid East* 10, no. 6 (D '70) 37-41.

29601 AÏSSAOUI, M. "L'évolution de la masse monetaire par rapport à la production intérieure brute." *B. Econ. & Soc. Maroc* 30, no. 108 (1968) 13-55.

29602 'ARŪDKĪ, Y. "Economic and human development in Syria." (In Arabic) *al Ma'rifah* no. 106 (D '70) 23-53.

29603 ATA, M. "RCD, a symbol of prosperity." *Perspective* 4, no. 1 (Jl '70) 19-24.

29604 AVRAMOVIC, D. "Industrialisation of Iran: the records, the problems and the prospects." *Tahqiqāt-e Eqtesādi* 7, no. 18 (1970) 14-47.

29605 EL AYADI, H. "Les impôts directs en Tunisie." *Rev. tunisienne Sci. Soc.* (My '70) 57-90.

29606 BADAOUI, A. "The influence of international labour conventions on the Arab labour standards convention." *Internat. Lab. Rev.* 102, no. 5 (N '70) 475-96.

29607 BASILE, A. "Mouvements de capitaux à court terme et petites nations: une application particulière au Liban." *Econ. Appliquée* 33, no. 4 (1970) 669-734.

29608 BEGOT, M. "Les industries textiles à Casablanca." *Rev. Géog. Maroc* no. 16 (1969) 71-96.

29609 BENCHEIKH, T. "Planification et politique agricole." *B. Econ. & Soc. Maroc* 31, nos. 112-3 (1969) 191-6. In Morocco.

29610 BERGER, L. "Remarks on the economic situation of Israel." *Internat. Probs.* 9, nos. 3-4 (N '70) 69-77.

29611 BERRAOUI, M. "Revenus et dépenses des marins pêcheurs de sardines de Safi." *B. Econ. & Soc. Maroc* 30, no. 108 (1968) 57-87.

29612 BLITZER, C. *et al.* "A dynamic five-sector model for Turkey, 1967-1982." *Amer. Econ. Rev.* 60, no. 2 (My '70) 70-5; *METU Stud. in Develop.* no. 1 (1970) 1-32.

29613 BOSSARD, R. "Production et consommation d'énergie au Maroc; situation actuelle du problème." *Rev. Géog. Maroc* no. 16 (1969) 127-42.

29614 BRUNO, M. "Development prospects and trade and liquidity in the Middle East." *J. Internat. Aff.* 24, no. 2 (1970) 224-44.

29615 ÇAGATAY, N. "Ribā and interest concept and banking in the Ottoman Empire." *Stud. Islamica* 32 (1970) 53-68.

29616 CLEVENGER, W. "Dams in Horasan; some preliminary observations." *East & West* 19, no. 3 (S-D '69) 30 pages.

29617 CURNOW, A. "Cyprus: where natural blessings are turned to good account." *ILO Panorama* no. 45 (N-D '70) 22-8.

29618 DAGAN, A. "Une comparaison du coût de la main d'oeuvre dans le CEE et en Israël." *Ann. Sci. Econ. Appliquées* 28, no. 4 (N '70) 407-16.

29619 DELANNOY, H. "Le 'Code des Investissements agricoles'; nouveau cadre legislatif de la transformation des campagnes marocaines." *Rev. Géog. Maroc* no. 16 (1969) 151-7.

29620 DESOMOGYI, J. "Economic geography of Islamic countries." *Islamic Cult.* 44, no. 4 (O '70) 197-226.

29621 DUPREE, L. "Free enterprise in Afghanistan, Part III: Programs, problems and prospects." *AUFS S. A. Series* 14, no. 6 (My '70) 1-19.

29622 EIGELAND, T. "The twice-used water." *Aramco World* 21, no. 6 (N-D '70) 22-9. Irrigation in al-Hasa, Saudi Arabia.

29623 ETIENNE, B. "La coopération culturelle, scientifique et technique entre l'Algérie et la Communauté économique européenne." *Coopération internat.* (Ju '70) 5-21.

29624 FAY, G. "Evolution de l'industrie à Kenitra." *Rev. Géog. Maroc* no. 16 (1969) 143-9.

29625 FELLOWS, P. "Political consequences of the Middle East oil showdown." *New Mid. East* no. 29 (F '71) 16-9.

29626 GAATHAN, A. "Economic productivity in Israel, 1950-1965." *Rev. Income Wealth* no. 1 (Mr '70) 1-18.

29627 GEISSBÜHLER, H. "Yemen: hunger and development." *Swiss Rev. World Aff.* 20, no. 8 (N '70) 15-6.

29628 GRAHAM, A. "Man-Water relations in the East Central Sudan." in *Environment and Land Use in Africa,* ed. by M. F. Thomas and G. W. Whittington (London: Methuen, 1969) 409-45.

29629 HYDEN, G. "Can co-ops make it in Africa?" *Afr. Report* 15, no. 9 (D '70) 12-5. Information on Tunisia and Sudan, among other countries.

29630 IMAM, K. "A structural model of Pakistan's monetary sector." *Pak. Develop. Rev.* 10, no. 3 (1970) 359-80.

29631 JAIN, R. "Planning machinery of Pakistan: a review (1947-1965)." *Internat. Rev. Hist. Polit. Sci.* 8, no. 2 (Ap '70) 20-36.

29632 JENTSCH, C. "Die Kareze in Afghanistan." *Erdkunde* 24, no. 2 (Ju '70) 112-9. Karezes is a water transport system found in Iran and Afghanistan.

29633 KASSAB, A. "Les basses terrasses de la Medjerda dans la plaine Testoura-Slovguia." *Rev. tunisienne Sci. Soc.* (My '70) 119-58.

29634 KATOUZIAN, M. "The analysis of labour force statistics." *Tahqiqāt-e Eqtesādi* 7, no. 18 (1970) 76-82.

29635 KEYDER, N. "Real income in Turkish agriculture and the villagers' standard of living." (In Turkish) *METU Stud. in Develop.* 1 (1970) 33-58.

29636 KHAN, M. "Demand for food in Pakistan in 1975." *Pak. Develop. Rev.* 10, no. 3 (1970) 310-33.

29637 LANDAU, J. "Soviet studies on workers' movements in the Middle East." *Mid. East. Stud.* 6, no. 3 (O '70) 346-9.

29638 MAJID, R. "The C B D of Dacca: delimitation and the internal structure." *O. Geog.* 14 (Ja '70) 44-63. The Central Business District of Dacca.

29639 MARTENS, A. "The two-gap theory of development reconsidered with special reference to Turkey." *European Econ. Rev.* 1, no. 4 (1970) 512-45.

29640 MURĀD, A. "Transportation of oil in Arab pipelines from the Gulf to the Mediterranean." (In Arabic) *al-Ma'rifah* no. 106 (D '70) 3-22.

29641 NACIRI, M. "Conditions climatiques, récoltes cerealières et situation des campagnes traditionnelles du Maroc." *Rev. Géog. Maroc* no. 16 (1969) 35-69.

29642 OUALALOU, F. "Tiers-monde et communauté économique européenne." *B. Econ. & Soc. Maroc* 31, nos. 112-3 (1969) 145-90.

29643 PAPANEK, G. "The location of industry." *Pak. Develop. Rev.* 10, no. 3 (1970) 291-309. Industry in Pakistan.

20644 PLANCK, U. "Dorfinventur in der Türkei." *Orient* (Hamburg) no. 6 (D '70) 191-3.

29645 RAHMAN, M. "Jute cultivation in the Indus Delta, West Pakistan." *O. Geog.* 14 (Ja '70) 35-43.

29646 SAMAD, M. "Pakistan's water problems and the law of international rivers." *Pak. Horizon* 23, no. 3 (1970) 265-74.

29647 SANLAVILLE, P. "Les variations holocenes du niveau de la mer au Liban." *Rev. Géog. de Lyon* 45, no. 3 (1970) 279-304.

29648 SAYIGH, Y. "Problems and prospects of development in the Arabian Peninsula." *Internat. J. Mid. East Stud.* 2, no. 1 (Ja '71) 40-58.

29649 SIMMONS, J. "Agricultural cooperatives and Tunisian development, Part I." *MEJ* 24, no. 4 (1970) 455-65.

29650 SÖNMEZ, A. "Ottoman terms of trade, 1878-1913." *METU Stud. in Develop.* no. 1 (1970) 111-47.

29651 STEVENS, J. "Changing agricultural practice in an Arabian oasis." *Geog. J.* 136, pt. 3 (S '70) 410-8.

29652 VAN DOOREN, P. "State-controlled changes in Tunisia's agrarian structure." *Tropical Man* 1 (1968).

SOCIAL CONDITIONS

29653 "L'Orient et l'avènement de la valeur monde." *Esprit* 38, no. 395 (S '70) 323-35. Interview with Jacques Berque.

29654 ABBAS, M. "Public administration training in Pakistan: a critical appraisal." *Internat. Rev. Admin. Sci.* 36, no. 3 (1970) 256-70.

29655 ABRAMS, C. and A. "Our life on a border kibbutz." *Natl. Geog.* 138, no. 3 (S '70) 364-91.

29656 ABU-LABAN, B. "Social change and local politics in Sidon, Lebanon." *J. Dev. Areas* 5, no. 1 (O '70) 27-42.

29657 ABU-ZAHRA, N. "'On the modesty of women in Arab Muslim villages': a reply." *Amer.*

Anthrop. 72, no. 5 (O '70) 1079-87. A reply to R. Antoun, and his rebuttal.

29658 AKDER, N. "The crisis of ideals and university anarchy." (In Turkish) *Türk Kültürü* 8, no. 94 (Ag '70) 672-711.

29659 ALASYA, H. "The Turkish population on Cyprus and its distribution." (In Turkish) *Türk Kültürü* 8, no. 94 (Ag '70) 663-9.

29660 ALGAR, H. "An introduction to the history of Freemasonry in Iran." *Mid. East. Stud.* 6, no. 3 (O '70) 276-96.

29661 BEN SEDRINE, M. "Milieu socio-familial et orientation scolaire; enquête dans un lycée de Tunis." *IBLA* 33, no. 126 (1970) 297-304.

29662 CARRE, O. "Le contenu socio-économico-politique des manuels d'enseignement religieux musulman dans l'Egypte actuelle." *Rev. Etudes Islamiques* 38, no. 1 (1970) 87-126.

29663 CUISENIER, J. "Une tente turque d'Anatolie centrale." *L'Homme* 10, no. 2 (Ap-Ju '70) 59-72.

29664 DI MEGLIO, R. "Il problema dei nomadi in Arabia Saudiana e le sue soluzioni." *O. Mod.* 50, no. 6 (Ju '70) 273-9.

29665 DIRKS, S. "Is there conflict between the generations in Turkey today?" *Islamic Rev. & Arab Aff.* 58 (Ju '70) 35-8.

29666 DUPREE, L. "Population dynamics in Afghanistan." *AUFS S. A. Series* 14, no. 7 (Ap '70) 1-11.

29667 ELLIS, B. "Talking Turkey on opium." *Mid East* 10, no. 6 (D '70) 18-20ff.

29668 FĀRŪQĪ, Ḥ. "The Qur'ānic social order." *Islamic Lit.* 16, no. 11 (N '70) 49-55.

29669 GOITEIN, S. "Nicknames as family names." *J. Amer. O. Soc.* 90, no. 4 (O-D '70) 517-24. A study of the use of nicknames in the Geniza documents, Cairo (10th-13th centuries).

29670 GOLDBERG, H. "From Shaikh to Mazkir: structural continuity and organizational change in the leadership of a Tripolitanian Jewish community." *Folklore Res. Center Stud.* 1 (1970) 29-41.

29671 HELBIG, D. *et al.* "IUD retention in West Pakistan and methodology of assessment." *Demography* 7, no. 4 (N '70) 467-82.

29672 IDRIS, H. "Le mariage en Occident musulman." *Stud. Islamica* 32 (1970) 157-68.

29673 ISKANDER, M. "Can we plan for the future? The prospects and problems of Arab children and youth." *Mid. East Forum* 46, nos. 2-3 (1970) 5-18.

29674 JAFFE, E. "Adoption in Israel." *Jewish J. Sociol.* 12, no. 2 (D '70) 135-46.

29675 JARRAHI-ZADEH, A. and W. EICHMAN. "The impact of sociocultural factors on Middle Eastern students in the U.S." *Internat. Educ. and Cult. Exchange* 5, no. 3 (1970) 82-95.

29676 KAGITCIBASI, C. "Social norms and authoritarianism: a Turkish-American comparison." *J. Personality & Soc. Psych.* 16, no. 3 (N '70) 444-51.

29677 KATZ, R. "Mannerism and cultural change: an ethnomusicological example." *Cur. Anthrop.* 11, nos. 4-5 (O-D '70) 465-74. A study of Jewish immigrants from Aleppo, Syria, to Israel.

29678 KIRAY, M. "The approach of development plans in Turkey to the question of the village and the villager." (In Turkish) *METU Stud. in Develop.* 1 (1970) 59-72.

29679 LAHLOU, A. "Etude sur la famille traditionnelle au Maroc; le mariage à Fès." *IBLA* 33, no. 126 (1970) 323-46.

29680 MARTENSSON, M. "La planification familiale au Maghreb; enquêtes nationale concernant les connaissances, les attitudes et les pratiques." *B. Econ. & Soc. Maroc* 31, nos. 112-3 (1969) 197-210.

29681 MOTZKIN, A. "A thirteenth-century Jewish physician in Jerusalem (A Geniza portrait)." *Muslim World* 60, no. 4 (O '70) 344-9.

29682 NAṢĪF, M. "Military Academy in Kuwayt." (In Arabic) *al-'Arabī* no. 146 (Ja '71) 20-34.

29683 ÖZORAN, R. "A few pages from the history of Turkish primary education on Cyprus." (In Turkish) *Türk Kültürü* 8, no. 96 (O '70) 826-38.

29684 PASCON, P. and M. BENTAHAR. "Ce que disent 296 jeunes ruraux." *B. Econ. & Soc. Maroc* 31, nos. 112-3 (1969) 1-143.

29685 PAYDARFAR, A. and M. SARRAM. "Differential fertility and socioeconomic status of Shirazi women: a pilot study." *J. Marriage & Family* 32, no. 4 (N '70) 692-9.

29686 PERES, Y. *et al.* "National education for Arab youth in Israel: a comparative analysis of curricula." *Jewish J. Sociol.* 12, no. 2 (D '70) 147-64.

29687 PRUVOST, L. "La dot dans le Code du Statut Personnel." *IBLA* 33, no. 126 (1970) 265-82. Tunisia.

29688 RABAH, T. "L'éducation des adultes en Tunisie; alphabétisation et pédagogie de la communication." *IBLA* 33, no. 126 (1970) 209-26.

29689 SCHNEIDER, J. "Of vigilance and virgins: honor, shame and access to resources in Mediterranean societies." *Ethnology* 10, no. 1 (Ja '71) 1-24.

29690 SCOTT, C. and G. SABAGH. "The historical calendar as a method of estimating age: the experience of the Moroccan multi-purpose sample survey of 1961-63." *Population Stud.* 24, no. 1 (Mr '70) 93-109.

29691 SEIKALY, S. "Coptic communal reform: 1860-1914." *Mid. East. Stud.* 6, no. 3 (O '70) 247-75.

29692 SERTEL, A. "A study of power conceptions in a Turkish village." *Hacettepe B. of Soc. Sci. and Humanities* 2, no. 1 (Ju '70) 49-83.

29693 SHAPIRA, R. and E. ETZIONI. "'Individual' and 'collective' values of Israeli students: the impact of youth movements." *Jewish J. Sociol.*

12, no. 2 (D '70) 165-80.

29694 SHARIFF, Z. "Social information and government-sponsored development: a case study from West Pakistan." *Annals Amer. Acad. Polit. Sci.* 393 (Ja '71) 92-108.

29695 SHILOH, I. "Marriage and divorce in Israel." *Israel Law Rev.* 5, no. 4 (O '70) 479-98.

29696 SOEN, D. "Neighborly relations and ethnic problems in Israel." *Ekistics* 30, no. 177 (Ag '70) 133-8.

29697 STERN, P. "The village of Beirut." *Alicia Patterson Fund* (D '70) 1-8. Available from The Alicia Patterson Fund, 535 Fifth Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017. The current Beirut social scene.

29698 TARHAN, T. "A short chronology of the steppe civilization." (In Turkish) *Tarih Dergisi* no. 24 (Mr '70) 17-33.

29699 ÜNAL, T. "The Hatiiniye Medrese at Karaman." (In Turkish) *Türk Kültürü* 8, no. 96 (O '70) 841-8.

29700 UPLEGGER, H. "Zur Korbflechterei in Marokko." *Z. für Ethnologie* 94, no. 2 (1969) 259-65.

29701 WATAD, M. "One Saturday in Nablus." *New Outlook* 13, no. 8 (N '70) 46-50.

29702 WEIHL, H. "Aging in Israel." *Amer. Behavioral Sci.* 14, no. 1 (S-O '70) 110-20.

29703 WILLIAMSON, J. "Subjective efficacy and ideal family size as predictors of favorability toward birth control." *Demography* 7, no. 3 (Ag '70) 329-39. A comparative study of Chile, India, Pakistan, Israel and Nigeria.

29704 ZAMITI, K. "Les obstacles matériels et idéologiques à l'évolution sociale des campagnes tunisiennes. L'expérience de mise en coopératives dans le gouvernement de Beja." *Rev. tunisienne Sci. Soc.* (My '70) 9-55.

29705 AL-ZĀYID, M. "Our youth and the crisis of their heritage." (In Arabic) *al-Ma'rifah* no. 107 (Ja '71) 15-49.

SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

29706 ARAFAT, W. "al-Ghazālī on moral misconceptions." *Islamic Quart.* 14, no. 2 (Ap-Ju '70) 57-62.

29707 ARNALDEZ, R. "La place du Coran dans les Uṣūl Al-Fiqh, d'après le Muḥallā d'Ibn Ḥazm." *Stud. Islamica* 32 (1970) 21-30.

29708 BELAL, A. "Sur la pensée économique d'Ibn Khaldoun." *B. Econ. & Soc. Maroc* 30, no. 108 (1968) 3-11.

29709 CASPAR, R. "Muhammad 'Abduh et la langue française." *IBLA* 33, no. 126 (1970) 305-22.

29710 DOI, A. "Islamic thought and culture: their impact on Africa." *Islamic Quart.* 14, no. 2 (Ap-Ju '70) 97-108.

29711 GÓMEZ NOGALES, S. "Problemas alrededor del 'Compendio sobre el alma' de Averroes." *al-Andalus* 32, fasc. 1 (1967) 1-36.

29712 GOODMAN, L. "Ghazâlî's argument from Creation (I)." *Internat. J. Mid. East Stud.* 2, no. 1 (Ja '71) 67-85.

29713 HOURANI, G. "The early growth of the secular sciences in Andalusia." *Stud. Islamica* 32 (1970) 143-56.

29714 IQBAL, M. "Was the Prophet Muhammad harsh to the Jews?" *Islamic Rev. & Arab Aff.* 58 (Ju '70) 9-17.

29715 JABRE, F. "L'Etre et l'Esprit dans la pensée arabe." *Stud. Islamica* 32 (1970) 169-80.

29716 LAMBTON, A. "A nineteenth century view of Jihād." *Stud. Islamica* 32 (1970) 181-92.

29717 LEWICKI, T. "Les origines de l'Islam dans les tribus berbères du Sahara occidental: Mūsā ibn Nuṣayr et 'Ubayd Allâh ibn al-Ḥabḥāb." *Stud. Islamica* 32 (1970) 203-14.

29718 MADELUNG, W. "Early Sunnī doctrine concerning faith as reflected in the Kitāb al-Īmān of Abū 'Ubayd al-Qāsim b. Sallām (d. 224/839)." *Stud. Islamica* 32 (1970) 233-54.

29719 MASWANI, A. "The Sufis of East Pakistan." *Perspective* 4, no. 1 (Jl '70) 11-6.

29720 PINES, S. "Ibn Khaldūn and Maimonides. A comparison between two texts." *Stud. Islamica* 32 (1970) 265-74.

29721 RAḤMĀN, M. "The institution of Khilāfah—its origin and growth." *Islamic Lit.* 16, no. 10 (O '70) 5-28.

29722 RAMADAN, S. "The birth of Islam heralded a revolution in religious and social ideas of man." *Islamic Rev. & Arab Aff.* 58 (Ju '70) 5-8.

29723 ṢALĪBĀ, J. "al-Ghazzālī and scholastic theology." (In Arabic) *Maj. Majma' al-Lughah al-'Arabīyah fi-Dimashq* 45, no. 4 (O '70) 748-72.

29724 AL-SHARABĀṢĪ, A. "From Sa'd Zaghlūl to Muḥammad 'Abduh." (In Arabic) *al-Adib* 29, no. 10 (O '70) 13-5.

29725 STONE, F. "The Muslim 'faith and reason' discussion and its implications for Islamic education." *Muslim World* 60, no. 4 (O '70) 314-20.

29726 VAHIDUDDIN, S. "The crisis of religious consciousness with special reference to Islam." *Islam & Mod. Age* 1, no. 2 (Ag '70) 24-33.

29727 WALZER, R. "L'éveil de la philosophie islamique, I et II." *Rev. Etudes Islamiques* 38, no. 1 (1970) 7-42.

LANGUAGE

29728 GARDET, L. "De quelques questions posées par l'étude du 'Ilm al-Kalâm." *Stud. Islamica* 32 (1970) 129-42.

29729 GATJE, H. "Zum Begriff der Determination und Indetermination in Arabischen." *Arabica* 17, no. 3 (O '70) 225-51.

29730 'INĀYATULLAH, S. "The Persian language in its international aspects." *Islamic Lit.* 16, no. 11 (N '70) 5-21.

LITERATURE AND ARTS

29731 "Arabic Plays." (In Arabic) *al-Ma'rifah* (Special Issue) no. 105 (N '70) 1-297.

29732 ABADIR, A. and R. ALLEN. "Nagib Mahfuz, his world of literature." *Arab World* 16, nos. 9-10 (S-O '70) 7-13.

29733 'ABBŪD, H. "Literary fights in the socialist movement." (In Arabic) *al-Ma'rifah* no. 106 (D '70) 54-65.

29734 ABU-GHAZALEH, A. "The impact of 1948 on Palestinian Arab writers: the first decade." *Mid. East Forum* 46, nos. 2-3 (1970) 81-92.

29735 AKIDIL, I. "Ist Nasreddin Hodscha 'Der Turkische Eulenspiegel?' " *Hacettepe B. of Soc. Sci. and Humanities* 2, no. 1 (Jn '70) 84-92.

29736 BECKA, J. "Two outstanding satires of modern Tajik and Iranian literature." *Archiv O.* 38, no. 4 (1970) 400-30.

29737 BLACQUE-BELAIR, L. "A new generation of North African writers treats post-independence cultural ambiguities." *Afr. Report* 15, no. 2 (1970) 32-3.

29738 BOLLAND, R. "An old Pakistan loom." *Tropical Man* 1 (1968).

29739 BOSWORTH, C. "A dramatisation of the Prophet Muhammad's Life: Henri de Bornier's *Mahomet." Numen* 17, no. 2 (Ag '70) 105-17.

29740 BOULLATA, I. "Badr Shakir al-Sayab: a life of vision and agony." *Mid. East Forum* 46, nos. 2-3 (1970) 73-80.

29741 CERULLI, E. "Le Calife 'Abd Ar-Raḥmān III de Cordoue et le martyr Pélage dans un poème de Hrotsvitha." *Stud. Islamica* 32 (1970) 69-76.

29742 CORRIENTE CÓRDOBA, F. "Dos elementos folklóricos comunes en la versión etiópica de la leyenda de Alejandro y la literatura árabe." *al-Andalus* 32, fasc. 1 (1967) 221-30.

29743 AL-FARUQI, I. "On the nature of the work of art in Islam." *Islam & Mod. Age* 1, no. 2 (Ag '70) 68-81.

29744 VON GRUNEBAUM, G. "The convergence of cultural traditions in the Mediterranean area." *Diogenes* no. 71 (1970) 1-17.

29745 HALE, S. "Sudanese cultural renaissance." *Afr. Report* 15, no. 9 (D '70) 29-31.

29746 ḤASHAYMAH, K. "Letters of orientalists and literary figures to Father Louis Cheikho." (In Arabic) *al-Mashriq* 64, nos. 4-5 (Jl-O '70) 421-64.

29747 JABRĪ, S. "The development of prose in the 'Abbāsid period." (In Arabic) *Maj. Majma' al-Lughah al-'Arabīyah fi-Dimashq* 45, no. 4 (O '70) 721-33.

29748 JOYAUX, G. "L'Engagement chez les écrivains nord-africains autochtones de langue française." *Afr. Stud. Rev.* 13, no. 2 (S '70) 155-68.

29749 AL-KAYYĀLĪ, S. "The manuscript of Aleppo." (In Arabic) *Maj. Majma' al-Lughah al-'Arabīyah fi-Dimashq* 45, no. 4 (O '70) 840-51.

29750 KESSLER, C. " 'Abd al-Malik's inscription in the Dome of the Rock: a reconsideration." *J.R.A. Soc.* 1 (1970) 2-14.

29751 MANSOOR, Z. "Growth of Pakistan culture." *Pak. Rev.* 18, no. 11 (N '70) 6-12.

29752 MILSON, M. "An allegory on the current crisis in Egypt: Walīd al-'Anā' by Najīb Maḥfūẓ." (In Hebrew) *Hamizrah Hehadash* 20, no. 4 (1970) 349-58.

29753 MILSON, M., tr. "Walīd al-'Anā' by Najīb Maḥfūẓ." (In Hebrew) *Hamizrah Hehadash* 20, no. 4 (1970) 393-402.

29754 MONTEIL, V. "Quatrains d'Omar Khayyâm." *Rev. Etudes Islamiques* 38, no. 1 (1970) 129-60. Translations.

29755 OBOJSKI, R. "Stamp out deficits!" *Aramco World* 21, no. 6 (N-D '70) 12-7. Postal stamps of the Arabian peninsula.

29756 OSTLE, R. "Three Egyptian poets of 'westernization': 'Abd al-Raḥmān Shukri, Ibrahim 'Abd al-Qadir al-Mazini, and Mahmud 'Abbas al-'Aqqad." *Comp. Lit. Stud.* 7, no. 3 (S '70) 354-73.

29757 PETRACEK, K. "Les recherches scientifiques en Tchécoslovaquie dans le domaine de la littérature arabe." *Archiv O.* 38, no. 4 (1970) 391-9.

29758 RAJPUT, A. "Folk dances of Pakistan." *Perspective* 4, no. 1 (Jl '70) 25-33.

29759 ṢĀDIQ, 'A. "Najīb Maḥfūẓ: 'Imlāq and the dream of the bourgeoisie." (In Arabic) *Dirāsāt 'Arabīyah* 6, no. 9 (Jl '70) 42-50.

29760 SLOBIN, M. "Persian folksong texts from Afghan Badakhshan." *Iranian Stud.* 3, no. 2 (1970) 91-103.

29761 SÖNMEZ, E. "Turkish women in Turkish literature of the nineteenth century." *Hacettepe B. of Soc. Sci. and Humanities* 2, no. 1 (Ju '70) 17-47.

29762 ṢUBḤĪ, M. "Melodrama in the poetry of al-Bayyātī." (In Arabic) *al-Ma'rifah* no. 107 (Ja '71) 50-70.

29763 YAKOBSON, A. "Armenian and Georgian architecture during the Middle Ages." (In Russian) *Sovietskaya Arkheologiya* no. 4 (1970) 41-53.

29764 YŪNIS, 'A. "Literary societies, can they reform at all?" (In Arabic) *Dirāsāt 'Arabīyah* 6, no. 1 (N '69) 50-63.

29765 ZAFRANI, H. "La parodie dans la littérature judéo-arabe et le folklore de *Pūrim* au Maroc." *Rev. études juives* 128, no. 4 (O-D '69) 377-93.

LAW

29766 "Iran: Court of First Instance Decision in Sapphire International Petroleums Ltd. *v.* the National Iranian Oil Co. *(Arbitration Proceedings; National Jurisdiction)." Internat. Legal Materials* 9, no. 6 (N '70) 1118-24.

29767 ABDEL-HAMID, M. and Y. TAGELDIN. "Trends in legal learning: the Arab-Islamic world." *Internat. Soc. Sci. J.* 22, no. 3 (1970) 367-77.

29768 ABEL, A. "La djizya: tribut ou rançon?"

Stud. Islamica 32 (1970) 5-20.

29769 AIT-MESBAH, M. "Les terres arch en Algérie." *Rev. jur. et polit.* 24, no. 4 (O-D '70) 1105-12.

29770 AMOR, M. "Le domaine des collectivités publiques au Maroc." *Rev. jur. et polit.* 24, no. 4 (O-D '70) 815-22.

29771 AL-ASSIUTY, S. "Present trends in the Islamic Fiqh as illustrated in the work of the Institute of Arabological Research and Studies." *Rev. Contemp. Law* 16 (1969) 29-55.

29772 BELDICEANU, N. "A propos du code coutumier de Mehmed II et de l'oeuvre juridique d'Ahmed Hersekzāde." *Rev. Etudes Islamiques* 38, no. 1 (1970) 163-72.

29773 BELKEZIZ, A. "L'évolution du régime de la propriété immobilière au Maroc." *Rev. jur. et polit.* 24, no. 4 (O-D '70) 663-82.

29774 BERQUE, J. "En lisant les Nawâzil Mazouna." *Stud. Islamica* 32 (1970) 31-40.

29775 BOUSLAMA, A. "L'évolution du régime de la propriété immobilière en Tunisie." *Rev. jur. et polit.* 24, no. 4 (O-D '70) 683-94.

29776 BOUSLAMA, A. "La réforme du régime des Habous en Tunisie." *Rev. jur. et polit.* 24, no. 4 (O-D '70) 1113-8.

29777 BRUNSCHVIG, R. "De la fiction légale dans l'Islam médiéval." *Stud. Islamica* 32 (1970) 41-52.

29778 CHARNAY, J. "Dialectique entre droit musulman et juridisme industriel." *Stud. Islamica* 32 (1970) 77-88.

29779 CHEHATA, C. "Les concepts de Qabḍ Ḍamân et de Qabḍ Amâna en droit musulman Hanéfite." *Stud. Islamica* 32 (1970) 89-100.

29780 COULSON, N. "Representational succession in contemporary Islamic law." *Stud. Islamica* 32 (1970) 101-8.

29781 DAVID, C. "Les particularités du droit pénal algérien." *Rev. algérienne des Sci. jur., econ. et polit.* 7, no. 2 (Ju '70) 293-328.

29782 LATIFI, D. "Muslim personal law reform." *J. Constitutional and Parliamentary Stud.* 4, no. 1 (Ja-Mr '70) 111-8.

29783 NIMMER, M. "The uses of judicial review in Israel's quest for a Constitution." *Columbia Law J.* 70, no. 7 (N '70) 1217-61.

29784 PIEMONTESE, A. "The statutes of the Qajar Orders of Knighthood." *East & West* 19, no. 3 (S-D '69) 59 pages.

29785 QADRI, A. "Islamic law reforms in the Pakistan Evidence Act." *Islamic Lit.* 16, no. 12 (D '70) 45-54.

29786 RIFAAT, H.-T. "Le domaine public en droit libanais: libéralisme ou formalisme?" *Rev. jur. et polit.* 24, no. 4 (O-D '70) 913-26.

29787 RIHAWI, M. "Quelques aspects de la théorie générale du domaine public en droit syrien." *Rev. jur. et polit.* 24, no. 4 (O-D '70) 927-36.

29788 ROSHWALD, M. "Who is a Jew in Israel?" *Jewish J. Sociol.* 12, no. 2 (D '70) 233-66.

29789 UDOVITCH, A. "Theory and practice of Islamic law—some evidence from the Geniza." *Stud. Islamica* 32 (1970) 289-304.

BIOGRAPHY

29790 "Atatürk." (Special issue). *Türk Kültürü* 9, no. 97 (N '70).

29791 "Atatürk 1881-1938." (Special issue). *Türk Dili* no. 230 (N '70).

29792 "Nasser as a moderniser and ideologue—two verdicts." *New Mid. East* no. 27 (D '70) 19-26. Articles by Lawrence Whetten and Nissim Rejwan.

29793 "On the 22nd anniversary of the death of a national hero, Mahomed Ali Jinnah." (In Turkish) *Türk Kültürü* 8, no. 96 (O '70) 858-62.

29794 'AṬWĪ, F. "Jamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir." (In Arabic) *al-Adīb* 29, no. 11 (N '70) 4-6.

29795 CIORANESCO, G. "Un orientaliste peu connu: Stanislas Bellanger et sa mission littéraire en Turquie." *Rev. Etudes Islamiques* 38, no. 1 (1970) 55-73.

29796 LOVE, K. "The other Nasser: profile of a bogeyman." *Mid East* 10, no. 6 (D '70) 8-11.

29797 AL-NOWAIHI, M. "Towards a re-evaluation of Muḥammad: prophet and man." *Muslim World* 60, no. 4 (O '70) 300-13.

29798 PAPPAS, L. "Portrait of a charismatic leader." *Arab World* 16, nos. 11-12 (N-D '70) 3-8. Nāṣir.

29799 PEKER, K. "My recollection of Ali Mümtaz Tünay who embarked with Atatürk at Samsum." (In Turkish) *Türk Kültürü* 8, no. 95 (S '70) 753-6.

29800 ROSENTHAL, E. "Arthur J. Arberry—a tribute." *Religious Stud.* 6, no. 4 (D '70) 297-302.

29801 SAMMOUD, H. "Un exégète oriental en Ifriqiya: Yahya Ibn Sallâm." *IBLA* 33, no. 126 (1970) 227-42.

29802 SOUISSI, R. "Waḍḍāh al-Yaman, le personnage et sa légende." *Arabica* 17, no. 3 (O '70) 252-309. A poet of the early Hijrah peroid.

29803 WASHETZ, J. "A state of bereavement." *New Outlook* 13, no. 8 (N '70) 24-9. Article on Nāṣir.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

29804 SCHIRMANN, J. "Studies in Hebrew poetry 1969; a bibliography." (In Hebrew) *Kirjath Sepher* 45, no. 3 (Ju '70) 424-34.

BOOK REVIEWS

29805 *Search for Peace in the Middle East.* New Outlook 13, no. 7 (S-O '70) 74-6. (R. Goldy).

29806 *The Seventh Day: Soldiers' talk about the Six Day War.* **New Mid. East** no. 27 (D '70) 49. (I. Gendzier).

29807 ABBOUSHI, W. *Political Systems of the Middle East in the 20th Century.* **Muslim World** 60, no. 4 (O '70) 368-9. (J. Cooke).

29808 ABDEL-MALEK, A. *La Pensée politique arabe contemporaine.* **Rev. Polit. Internac.** no. 111 (S-O '70) 277-80. (R. Gil Benumeya).

29809 ABRAHAMOWICZ, Z. *Catalog of Turkish Documents: Documents concerning Poland and neighboring countries 1455-1672.* (In Polish). **J. Amer. O. Soc.** 90, no. 4 (1970) 568-72. (A. Horniker).

29810 ABU-LUGHOD, I., ed. *The Arab-Israeli Confrontation of June, 1967: An Arab perspective.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,591 (D 25 '70) 1507.

29811 ADAMEC, L. *Afghanistan, 1900-1923.* **Archiv O.** 38, no. 3 (1970) 362-3. (J. Bečka); **Mid. East. Stud.** 6, no. 3 (O '70) 361-2. (M. Gillett).

29812 ALGAR, H. *Religion and the State in Iran, 1785-1906: The role of the Ulama in the Qajar period.* **Amer. Hist. Rev.** 76, no. 1 (F '71) 176-7. (T. Young).

29813 ALROY, G. *Attitudes toward Jewish Statehood in the Arab World.* **Mid. East Information Series** 14 (1970-71) 10-2. (C. Waxman).

29814 ARMAJANI, Y. *Middle East: Past and Present.* **Mid East** 10, no. 6 (D '70) 44. (M. Peck); **Muslim World** 60, no. 4 (O '70) 362-3. (J. Cooke).

29815 ARNAUD, J. *et al.*, eds. *Anthologie des écrivains français du Maghreb.* **IBLA** 33, no. 126 (1970) 382-4. (In French). (K. Ben Sassi).

29816 ARON, R. *DeGaulle, Israel and the Jews.* **Mid East** 10, no. 6 (D '70) 43-4. (N. Hevener).

29817 AZIZA, M. *Le Théâtre et l'Islam.* **IBLA** 33, no. 126 (1970) 387-9. (In French). (A. Mettrop).

29818 BEAUFRE, A. *The Suez Expedition, 1956.* **MEJ** 24, no. 4 (1970) 522-5. (K. Love); **Mid East** 10, no. 6 (D '70) 45-6. (V. Swenson).

29819 BEAUMONT, P., comp. *Current British Research in Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies.* **RCAJ** 57, pt. 3 (O '70) 344. (P.E.L.F.).

29820 BE'ERI, E. *Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society.* **MEJ** 24, no. 4 (1970) 527-8. (M. Van Dusen); **RCAJ** 57, pt. 3 (O '70) 334-6. (C. Gandy).

29821 BELYAEV, E. *Arabs, Islam and the Arab Caliphate in the Early Middle Ages.* **Internat. J. Mid. East Stud.** 2, no. 1 (Ja '71) 86-7. (I. Lapidus).

29822 BENTWICH, N. *Israel: Two fateful years.* **A. J. A. Quart.** 14, no. 3 (D '70) 16-8. (A. Polack).

29823 BOYLE, J., ed. *The Cambridge History of Iran: Vol. 5, The Saljuq and Mongol periods.* **J. Amer. O. Soc.** 90, no. 4 (O-D '70) 572-7. (K. Luther); **Amer. Hist. Rev.** 75, no. 7 (D '70) 2098-9. (T. Young).

29824 BOYLE, J. *Grammar of Modern Persian.* **Islamic Cult.** 44, no. 4 (O '70) 253-4. (Q. Husaini).

29825 CARMICHAEL, J. *The Shaping of the Arabs.* **Bibliotheca O.** 27, nos. 3-4 (My-Jl '70) 264. (N. Rejwan).

29826 COHEN, C. *Pre-Ottoman Turkey.* **J. Econ. Soc. Hist. O.** 13, no. 3 (N '70) 328-35. (In French). (R. Mantran).

29827 COHEN, D. *Le parler arabe des Juifs de Tunis.* **Archiv O.** 38, no. 4 (1970) 498-9. (L. Drozdik).

29828 COPELAND, M. *The Game of Nations.* **RCAJ** 57, pt. 3 (O '70) 333-4 (G. Furlonge).

29829 CORBIN, H. *Creative Imagination in the Ṣūfism of Ibn 'Arabī.* **Muslim World** 60, no. 4 (O '70) 350-2 (M. Speight).

29830 COULSON, N. *Conflicts and Tensions in Islamic Jurisprudence.* **BSOAS** 33, pt. 3 (1970) 623-6. (Y. Meron).

29831 CRESWELL, K. *Early Muslim Architecture. Vol. 1: Umayyads.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,591 (D 25 '70) 1518.

29832 DANN, U. *Iraq under Qassem—A Political History, 1958-1963.* **Hamizrah Hehadash** 20, no. 4 (1970) 416-7. (In Hebrew); **Mid. East. Stud.** 6, no. 3 (O '70) 350-2. (F. Stoakes).

29833 DAUMAS, Gen. E. *The Horses of the Sahara.* **Amer. Anthrop.** 72, no. 5 (O '70) 1113-4. (C. Reed).

29834 DE GAULLE, C. *Mémoires d'espoir, Le Renouveau, 1958-1962.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,586 (N 20 '70) 1343-4.

29835 DESHEN, S. *Immigrant Voters in Israel.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,591 (D 25 '70) 1507.

29836 DIRKS, S. *La famille musulmane turque, son évolution au XX^e siècle.* **Islamic Quart.** 14, no. 2 (Ap-Ju '70) 109. (C. Dodd).

29837 ENGLISH, P. *City and Village in Iran: Settlement and Economy in the Kirman Basin.* **Iranian Stud.** 3, no. 2 (1970) 115-25. (W. Irons).

29838 EPP, F. *Whose land is Palestine? The Middle East problem in historical perspective.* **The Link** 4, no. 1 (Ja-F '71) 6.

29839 FARNIE, D. *East and West of Suez: The Suez Canal in History 1854-1956.* **RCAJ** 57, pt. 3 (O '70) 339. (C. Gandy).

29840 FEIS, H. *The Birth of Israel; The tousled diplomatic bed.* **Mid East** 10, no. 6 (D '70) 45. (M. Bernstein).

29841 FLEISCH, H. *L'arabe classique: Esquisse d'une structure linguistique.* **Muslim World** 60, no. 4 (O '70) 367-8. (I. Boullata).

29842 FURLONGE, G. *Palestine is My Country: The story of Musa Alami.* **MEJ** 24, no. 4 (1970) 536-7. (G. Stevens).

29843 FYZEE, A. *Compendium of Fatimid Law, I.*

BSOAS 33, pt. 3 (1970) 626-7. (D. Hinchcliffe).

29844 GELLNER, E. *Saints of the Atlas.* **MEJ** 24, no. 4 (1970) 531-6 (D. Hart).

29845 GENDZIER, I., ed. *A Middle East Reader.* **Muslim World** 60, no. 4 (O '70) 361-2. (J. Cooke).

29846 GOITEIN, S. *A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish communities of the Arab World as portrayed in the documents of the Cairo Geniza. Vol. I: Economic foundations.* **J.R.A. Soc.** 1 (1970) 71-7. (M. Cook).

29847 GOLDMANN, N. *Memories.* **A. J. A. Quart.** 14, no. 3 (D '70) 18-9. (H. Joseph).

29848 GOSHEN-GOTTSTEIN, M. *The Modern Hebrew dictionary. Introductory volume.* **BSOAS** 33, pt. 3 (1970) 607-9. (D. Kamhi).

29849 GRAFFTEY-SMITH, L. *Bright Levant.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,591 (D 25 '70) 1519.

29850 GRAHAM, G. *Great Britain in the Indian Ocean: A study of maritime enterprise, 1810-1850.* **J. Mod. Hist.** 42, no. 3 (S '70) 409-10. (S. McCulloch).

29851 GREGORIAN, V. *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of reform and modernization, 1880-1946.* **MEJ** 24, no. 4 (1970) 525-6. (L. Poullada).

29852 HALMAN, T., tr. *Fazil Husnu Daglarca: Selected poems.* **MEJ** 24, no. 4 (1970) 537-9. (D. Kimche).

29853 HAUER, C. *Crisis and Conscience in the Middle East.* **Ann. Amer. Acad. Polit. Soc. Sci.** 393 (Ja '71) 166-7. (H. Howard).

29854 HAWKE, D., tr. PELLAT, C., ed. *The Life and Works of Jahiz.* **RCAJ** 57, pt. 3 (O '70) 340-2. (N. Barbour).

29855 HERSHLAG, Z. *Turkey, the Challenge of Growth.* **J. Develop. Stud.** 7, no. 1 (O '70) 103-5. (A. Sonmez and S. Ilkin).

29856 HIGGINS, R. *United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967, Documents and Commentary, I: The Middle East.* **Israel Law Rev.** 5, no. 4 (O '70) 595-6. (R. Lapidoth).

29857 HILL, R., ed. *On the frontiers of Islam.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,594 (Ja 15 '71) 59.

29858 HINDERINK, J. and M. KIRAY. *Social Stratification as an Obstacle to Development: A study of four Turkish villages.* **METU Stud. in Develop.** no. 1 (1970) 164-8. (Y. Brenner).

29859 HITTI, P. *Makers of Arab History.* **Bibliotheca O.** 27, nos. 3-4 (My-Jl '70) 265. (D. Attema).

29860 HOLT, P. *The Mahdist state in the Sudan,* 2nd ed. **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,594 (Ja 15 '71) 59.

29861 HOPKINS, H. *Egypt, the Crucible—The Unfinished Revolution of the Arab World.* **J. Mod. Afr. Stud.** 8, no. 3 (O '70) 488-90. (A. Ewing).

29862 HOURANI, A. and S. STERN, eds. *The Islamic City, a colloquium.* **Hamizrah Hehadash** 20, no. 4 (1970) 403-4. (In Hebrew); **RCAJ** 57, pt. 3 (O '70) 342-3. (E. Paxton).

29863 HUREWITZ, J. *Middle East Politics: The military dimension.* **Mid. East. Stud.** 6, no. 3 (O '70) 352-4. (U. Dann).

29864 INGRAMS, D. *A Time in Arabia.* **RCAJ** 57, pt. 3 (O '70) 342. (N. Barbour).

29865 JOHN, R. and S. HADAWI. *The Palestine Diary, Vols. I and II.* **Mid. East Forum** 46, nos. 2-3 (1970) 93-9. (N. Ziadeh).

29866 JOHNSON, D. *The Nature of Nomadism: A comparative study of pastoral migrations in Southwestern Asia and Northern Africa.* **Geog. Rev.** 60, no. 4 (O '70) 582-4. (R. Harrison).

29867 JUYNBOLL, G. *The Authenticity of the Tradition Literature Discussions in Modern Egypt.* **Arabica** 17, no. 3 (O '70) 314-5. (In French). (G. Lecomte).

29868 EL-KAMMASH, M. *Economic Development and Planning in Egypt.* **Mid. East. Stud.** 6, no. 3 (O '70) 354-6. (P. Wiles).

29869 KARDOUCHE, G. *The U.A.R. in Development.* **Mid. East. Stud.** 6, no. 3 (O '70) 356-8. (R. Owen).

29870 KEDOURIE, E. *The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern Studies.* **Internat. J. Mid. East Stud.** 2, no. 1 (Ja '71) 91-2. (G. Kirk); **RCAJ** 57, pt. 3 (O '70) 336-7. (G. Wheeler).

29871 KELLY, J. *Britain and the Persian Gulf 1795-1880.* **J.R.A. Soc.** 1 (1970) 78-80. (H. Moyse-Bartlett).

29872 KERR, M. *Islamic Reform: The political and legal theories of Muḥammad 'Abduh and Rashīd Riḍā.* **Bibliotheca O.** 27, nos. 3-4 (My-Jl '70) 265-7. (In German). (F. Steppat).

29873 KIMCHE, J. *Second Arab Awakening.* **A. J. A. Quart.** 14, no. 3 (D '70) 20-1 (L. Kopelowitz).

29874 KNIGHTLEY, P. and C. SIMPSON. *The Secret Lives of Lawrence of Arabia.* **MEJ** 24, no. 4 (1970) 502-1. (J. Mack).

29875 LABICA, G. *Politique et religion chez Ibn Khaldoun.* **La Pensée** no. 154 (D '70) 119-25. (In French). (R. Gallisot).

29876 LAMBTON, A. *The Persian Land Reform 1962-1966.* **Geog. J.** 136, pt. 3 (S '70) 441-2. (K. McLachlan).

29876 LANDAU, J. *Jews in Nineteenth-century Egypt.* **Internat. J. Mid. East Stud.** 2, no. 1 (Ja '71) 93-5. (H. Rivlin); **Amer. Hist. Rev.** 75, no. 7 (D '70) 2097. (O. Janowsky).

29877 LANDEN, R. *Oman since 1856: Disruptive modernization in a traditional Arab society.* **J. Amer. O. Soc.** 90, no. 4 (O-D '70) 581-4. (M. Dresden).

29878 LAPIDUS, I., ed. *Middle Eastern Cities: A symposium on Ancient, Islamic, and contemporary Middle Eastern urbanism.* **MEJ** 24, no. 4 (1970) 539-41. (P. Dodd); **RCAJ** 57, pt. 3 (O '70) 342-3. (E. Paxton).

29879 LAQUEUR, W. *The Struggle for the Middle East: The Soviet Union in the Mediterranean, 1948-1968.* **MEJ** 24, no. 4 (1970) 521-2. (J. Whelan); **RCAJ** 57, pt. 3 (O '70) 338. (G. Furlonge).

29880 LEIDEN, C., ed. *The Conflict of Traditionalism and Modernism in the Muslim Middle East.* **Iranian Stud.** 3, no. 2 (1970) 125-8. (P. Salzman).

29881 LORIMER, J. *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,599 (F 19 '71) 223.

29882 LOVE, K. *Suez: The twice-fought war.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,593 (Ja 8 '71) 32.

29883 MARLOWE, J. *Cromer in Egypt.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,597 (F 5 '71) 148.

29884 MARX, E. *Bedouin of the Negev.* **Mid. East. Stud.** 6, no. 3 (O '70) 358-60. (I. Cunnison).

29885 MAZAHERI, A. *Les Trésors de l'Iran.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,598 (F 12 '71) 186.

29886 MICHALOWSKI, K. *Palmyra.* **RCAJ** 57, pt. 3 (O '70) 342-3. (E. Paxton).

29887 MILLER, D. and C. MOORE, eds. *The Middle East Yesterday and Today.* **The Link** 4, no. 1 (Ja-F '71) 7-8.

29888 MIQUEL, A. *L'Islam et sa civilisation VIIème-XXème.* **Arabica** 17, no. 3 (O '70) 315-7. (In French). (Y. Liant de Bellefonds).

29889 MUHSAM, H. *Bedouin of the Negev: Eight demographic studies.* **Mid. East. Stud.** 6, no. 3 (O '70) 360-1. (T. Smith).

29890 AL-MUNAJJID, S. *Wohin treibt die arabische Welt? Die erste kritische Stimme eines führenden Arabers.* **Internat. J. Mid. East Stud.** 2, no. 1 (Ja '71) 88-9. (G. Von Grunebaum).

29891 MUSA'AD, I. and K. CRAGG, trs. 'ABDU, M. *The Theology of Unity.* **Muslim World** 60, no. 4 (O '70) 352-5. (I. Boullata).

29892 MUSREY, A. *An Arab Common Market.* **RCAJ** 57, pt. 3 (O '70) 339-40. (S. Longrigg).

29893 NORDENSTAM, T. *Sudanese Ethics.* **J. Mod. Afr. Stud.** 8, no. 3 (O '70) 497-8. (L. Michael).

29894 O'SHAUGHNESSY, T. *"Muḥammad's thoughts on death: a thematic study of the Qur'ānic data.* **BSOAS** 33, pt. 3 (1970) 613-5. (J .Wansbrough).

29895 OTTAWAY, D. and M. *Algeria, the Politics of a Socialist Revolution.* **MEJ** 24, no. 4 (1970) 528-31. (I. Gendzier).

29896 PANTUCEK, S. *La littérature algérienne moderne.* **Rev. algérienne des Sci. jur., econ. et polit.** 7, no. 1 (Mr '70) 189-91. (In French). (J. Dejeux).

29897 PERES, S. *David's Sling.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,591 (D 25 '70) 1507.

29898 PERETZ, D., *et al. A Palestine Entity?* **The Link** 4, no. 1 (Ja-F '71) 8.

29899 PFAFF, R. *Jerusalem: Keystone of an Arab-Israeli Settlement.* **Internat. J. Mid. East Stud.** 2, no. 1 (Ja '71) 89-90. (F. Golino).

29900 POLK, W. *The United States and the Arab World.* Rev. Ed. **Internal. J. Mid. East Stud.** 2, no. 1 (Ja '71) 87-8. (J. Badeau); **Muslim World** 60, no. 4 (O '70) 359-60. (J. Malone).

29901 PROTHERO, R., ed. *A Geography of Africa: Regional essays on fundamental characteristics, issues and problems.* **Geog. Rev.** 60, no. 4 (O '70) 589-90. (W. Deshler). ". . . most valuable for northern Africa from Morocco to the Horn. . . ."

29902 PSOMIADES, H. *The Eastern Question: The last phase—a study in Greek-Turkish diplomacy.* **Mid. East. Stud.** 6, no. 3 (O '71) 363-5. (D. Dakin).

29903 QUANDT, W. *Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1968.* **MEJ** 24, no. 4 (1970) 528-31. (I. Gendzier); **Rev. algérienne des Sci. jur., écon. et polit.** 7, no. 1 (Mr '70) 183-8. (In French). (P. Lucas); **Ann. Amer. Acad. Polit. Soc. Sci.** 393 (Ja '71) 169. (D. Peretz); **J. Dev. Areas** 5, no. 1 (O '70) 119-20. (M. Knight).

29904 RESCHER, N. *Studies in Arabic Philosophy.* **J.R.A. Soc.** 1 (1970) 73-4. (J. Mattock).

29905 RODINSON, M. *Israel and the Arabs.* **al-'Arabī** no. 146 (Ja '71) 154-8. (M. al-Farrā).

29906 ROSENTHAL, F. *A History of Muslim Historiography.* **Bibliotheca O.** 27, nos. 3-4 (My-Jl '70) 183. (S. Goitein).

29907 RYPAK, J. *History of Iranian Literature.* **Lit.: East & West** 14, no. 2 (1970) 278-80. (J. Yohannan).

29908 SAAB, G. *The Egyptian agrarian reform, 1952-1962.* **Mid. East. Stud.** 6, no. 3 (O '70) 356-8. (R. Owen).

29909 SACHAR, H. *The Emergence of the Middle East: 1914-1924.* **Amer. Hist. Rev.** 75, no. 7 (D '70) 2096. (N. Itzkowitz).

29910 SAFRAN, N. *From War to War: The Arab-Israeli confrontation, 1948-1967.* **Muslim World** 60, no. 4 (O '70) 363-4. (J. Cooke).

29911 SCHONFIELD, H. *The Suez Canal in Peace and War 1869-1969.* **Mid East** 10, no. 6 (D '70) 45-6. (V. Swenson).

29912 SEARIGHT, S. *The British in the Middle East.* **MEJ** 24, no. 4 (1970) 519-20. (G. Waterfield); **Muslim World** 60, no. 4 (O '70) 360-1.

29913 SHARABI, H. *Arab Intellectuals and the West: The formative years, 1875-1914.* **Mid East** 10, no. 6 (D '70) 42-3. (K. Karpat).

29914 SHILOH, A., ed. *People and Cultures of the Middle East.* **New Outlook** 13, no. 8 (N '70) 53-4. (H. R.)

29915 SIVAN, E. *L'Islam et la Croisade: idéologie et propagande dans les réactions musulmanes aux Croisades.* **BSOAS** 33, pt. 3 (1970) 621-3. (P. Holt); **Amer. Hist. Rev.** 75, no. 7 (D '70) 2094-5. (H. Howard).

29916 STEGENGA, J. *The United Nations Forces in Cyprus.* **India Quart.** 26, no. 3 (Jl-S '70) 270. (K. Singh).

29917 STOCKING, G. *Middle East Oil: A study in political and economic controversy.* **Orbis** 14, no. 2 (1970) 514-8. (N. Constan).

29918 SYKES, P. *A History of Persia.* **RCAJ** 57, pt. 3 (O '70) 345. (A. Lambton).

29919 TALMON, J. *Israel among the Nations.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,591 (D 25 '70) 1507.

29920 TAYLOR, A. and R. TETLIE, eds. *Palestine, A Search for Truth: Approaches to the Arab-Israeli conflict.* **The Link** 4, no. 1 (Ja-F '71) 7.

29921 TEVETH, S. *The Cursed Blessing.* **New Mid. East** no. 27 (D '70) 47-8. (P. Fellowes); **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,591 (D 25 '70) 1507.

29922 THUBRON, C. *Mirror to Damascus.* **Lit.: East & West** 14, no. 2 (1970) 284. (J. McAleer).

29923 TIBAWI, A. *A Modern History of Syria including Lebanon and Palestine.* **Hamizrah Hehadash** 20, no. 4 (1970) 413-6. (In Hebrew); **Amer. Hist. Rev.** 75, no. 7 (D '70) 2098. (E. Dawn).

29924 LE TOURNEAU, R. *The Almohad Movement in North Africa in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries.* **Afr. Soc. Res.** no. 10 (D '70) 800-1; **Arabica** 17, no. 3 (O '70) 323-4. (H. Idris).

29925 TREVELYAN, H. *The Middle East in Revolution.* **RCAJ** 57, pt. 3 (O '70) 331-3. (G. Furlonge); **New York Times Rev. Books** (Ja 31 '71) 3. (M. Copeland).

29926 VATIKIOTIS, P. *The Modern History of Egypt.* **BSOAS** 33, pt. 3 (1970) 627-30. (G. Baer).

29927 WARBURTON, R. *Eighteen Years in the Khyber, 1879-1889.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,599 (F 19 '71) 223.

29928 WATERBURY, J. *The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan political elite.* **Afr. Report** 16, no. 1 (Ja '71) 40-2. (D. Ashford).

29929 WATT, M. *Islamic Political Thought: The basic concepts.* **J.R.A. Soc.** 1 (1970) 75-6. (A. Tritton).

29930 WILLIAMS, J. *The Youth of Haouch el Harimi, a Lebanese Village.* **Muslim World** 60, no. 4 (O '70) 355-8 (J. Hudson).

29931 WILLNER, D. *Nation-Building and Community in Israel.* **New Outlook** 13, no. 8 (N '70) 54-6. (H. R.).

29932 WILSON, E. *Jerusalem, Key to Peace.* **Ann. Amer. Acad. Polit. Soc. Sci.** 392 (N '70) 218. (J. Campbell).

ABBREVIATIONS

A., Asia, Asian, Asiatic, Asie, asiatique, etc.
Acad., Academy
Admin., Administration, Administrative
Aff., Affairs
Afr./afr., Africa, African, Afrique, africain, etc.
Amer., American
Ann., Annals, Annales
Annu., Annuaire
Anthrop./anthrop., Anthropology, Anthropological, Anthropologie, anthropologique, etc.
Assoc., Association
AUFS, American Universities Field Staff
B., Bulletin
BSOAS, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies
C., Central
Cah., Cahiers
Com., Communism
Comp., Comparative
Contemp./contemp., Contemporary, contemporain, etc.
Cult., Culture, Cultural
Cur., Current
D., Deutsch, etc.
Dept., Department
Dev., Developing
Develop., Development
East., Eastern
Econ./écon., Economics, Economist, Economic, Économie, économique, etc.
Fak., Fakülte
Fil., Filosofii
For., Foreign
Fr./fr., France, French, français, etc.
G., Gesellschaft
Geog./géog., Geography, Geographic, Geographical, Géographie, géographique, etc.
Hist./hist., History, Historical, Historie, historique
IBLA, Institut des belles Lettres arabes
Inst., Institute, Institut
internac., internacional
Internat./internat., International, international, Internationale, etc.
internaz., internazionale
Ist., Istorii
J., Journal
jur., juridique
Lit., Literature, Literary
Lab., Labor, Labour
M., Morgenländisch, etc.
Mag., Magazine
Maj., Majallah, Majallat
Mid., Middle
Mod./mod., Modern, moderne, moderno
Nr., Near
O., Orient, Oriental, Orientalia, oriental, oriente, Orientalistczny, etc.
Org., Organization
Pak., Pakistan
Polit./polit., Politics, Political, Politique, politique, Política, etc.
Probs., Problems
Proceed., Proceedings
Quart., Quarterly
R., Royal
Rel., Relations
Res., Research
Rev., Review, Revue, Revista
Riv., Rivista
S., School, Schools
Sci., Science, Sciences, Scienze, etc.
Soc./soc., Society, Social, Sociéte, social, etc.
Sociol./sociol., Sociology, Sociological, Sociologica, Sociologie, sociologique, etc.
Stud., Studies, Studia
Supp., Supplement
Univ., University, Université, etc.
U.S., United States
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Vop., Voprosy
Z., Zeitschrift

COMMUNICATIONS

The JOURNAL *welcomes comments from its readers. All communications should be addressed to the Editor and bear the full name and address of the writer. A selection of those received will be published periodically in these columns. In addition to letters of comment on previous articles, communications on other information of interest will be printed as space is available.*

The 28 International Congress of Orientalists met in Canberra, Australia, on January 6-12, 1971. A summary of the proceedings is planned. Those interested are asked to get in touch with:

The Secretary General
International Congress of Orientalists
Australian National University
Canberra, ACT 2601 Australia

Sir:

I should like to comment on the article, "Modernization and Nationalism in the Identity of the Israeli Arab," by Yochanan Peres. I observed that the study, while being based upon an adequently representative sample of the Israeli-Arab population, apparently did not include respondents from East Jerusalem. In 1968 I was engaged in a research project having to do with prospects for Arab-Jewish administrative and political cooperation on the municipal level in Jerusalem. A sample of 105 respondents from East Jerusalem were interviewed to ascertain the approximate attitude of the city's Arabs, now incorporated into the Israeli state, toward cooperation with Jewish citizens as legal and political equals. The sample represented the major age, education, occupation, and religious groups found in the East Jerusalem population.

One question these respondents were asked is "What, if anything, can you learn from Jews?" The responses showed that 50.4 per cent (N=53) of East Jerusalem's Arabs believed that they could learn something from Jews. These respondents usually replied that they could and should emulate Jewish advances in administration, education, and technical skills. The remaining 49.6 per cent (N=52) maintained that there was nothing that they could learn from Jews. These statistics are somewhat in contrast to the 86 per cent of the Peres sample who agreed that Arabs can learn from Jews.

Another question, which more specifically relates to the evaluative focus of the Peres study, inquires "What kind of government do you prefer in Jerusalem?" Not surprisingly, only 1.9 per cent (N=2) preferred an Israeli government, while 15.3 per cent (N=16) prefer any Arab government. Another group, 16.2 per cent (N=17), called for the internationalization of Jerusalem under the auspices of the United Nations. This particular group was composed almost completely of Christian East Jerusalemites, whose minority status remains regardless of whether Arabs or Israelis have jurisdiction over the city. The remaining 66.6 per cent (N=70) either refused to answer the question or replied that they had no opinion on the matter. The East Jerusalem Arabs were obviously more reluctant to give candid replies than the Arab respondents included in the analysis provided by Professor Peres. The Israeli incorporation of East Jerusalem was less than a year old when my study was conducted and its residents were understandably cautious in their replies. The Arabs included in the sample formulated by Professor Peres had already lived in Israel for nineteen years. It should be noted that the interviews in my study were administered by Israeli Arabs who were students at Hebrew University. Even this practice, however, did not produce complete confidence on the part of the interviewees.

I believe that the results of my study at least partially supplement the conclusion that Professor Peres draws when he states that among Israeli Arabs "modernization does not eliminate hostility toward Jews." Despite the Israeli government's promise of material progress and cultural integrity East Jerusalem Arabs do not desire to become Israelis. One question, for example, asked "Would you accept Israeli citizenship if your living standard would then be as high as that enjoyed by Jews?" Only 11.4 per cent (N=12) replied that they would accept Israeli citizenship under this circumstance.

The Jerusalem incorporation precipitated an integrative process which is formally municipal rather than national and yet has physically consolidated two quite divergent nationalities. It is not unreasonable to hypothesize that East Jerusalem's Arabs probably feel culturally and politically displaced in a predominantly Jewish political system. The very non-Israeli nationalist aspirations of Arabs who have resided in Israel since 1948 is emulated by their recently incorporated counterparts in East Jerusalem.

MARTIN SLANN
Clemson University
Clemson, South Carolina

Sir:

To cover all the points that Mr. Ramazani's lengthy letter [Winter 1971 *MEJ*] raises requires writing another review. Since the space in these pages would not allow this and also because I have written a much more extensive review of his book elsewhere (*World Politics*, April 1971), I will confine myself to two major points.

As my review clearly indicates, Ramazani's otherwise good book suffers from two flaws. First, a theoretical one which relates to his persistent and indiscriminate use of success as the only criterion for evaluating the "rationality" of foreign policy. Indeed, the obsession with success has prevented him from thoroughly investigating other circumstances leading to the inability of Reza Shah to prevent Iran's wartime occupation, necessitated by Anglo-Soviet strategies and political interest. He insists the chief cause was Reza Shah's "procrastination," and he rejects the present Shah's suggestion that a sincere effort to secure alliance with Iran could have been at least attempted (p. 293). It is precisely this "single factor fallacy" in analyzing a complex episode against which such well known realists as Hans Morganthau have cautioned students of international politics. To say that higher moral ends may prompt the David to refuse submission to the Goliath is not to deny that rational choice has its own morality. What is pleaded for is a broader view of rational alternatives, instead of measuring it, as he does, merely in terms of the might of the powerful.

A second shortcoming of the book relates to the depth and scope of research, in support of which only several instances in a brief review could be cited. He asks rhetorically how the accounts of Dr. Mossadegh, Taghi Zadeh and Seyed Zia of the 1921 coup and 1933 oil crisis could have helped his research. I referred to the voluminous records of parliamentary debates of the three sessions of the Majlis as a major source. Plainly he could not have known what contributions these "so called revelations" could have made to our knowledge of these events without having studied them. To dismiss the only available account of the 1921 coup d'etat by its co-sponsor is tantamount to dismissing Trotsky's writing about the Bolshevik revolution. A serious researcher could ill afford to ignore a major source of historical inquiry in a country where the habit of maintaining personal accounts and publishing memoirs is sadly lacking. Had the author carefully examined these, he could have avoided such factual errors as reporting (without identifying his source) that in 1947 Ghavam sponsored a bill declaring the oil agreement with the Soviet Union null and void (p. 313). The fact is that he had urged its passage by the 15th Majlis in accordance with his commitment of a year and a half earlier. (*Rooznamehe Rasmi*, 15th Majlis, October 23, 1947, Teheran).

I submit that the chief value of a book written by an Iranian author is the exhaustive probe of original material rather than a recapitulation and reinterpretation of published works in Western languages. Without extensive field work in the country, which could conceivably have included interviews with some of the above-mentioned statesmen, many of whom were living until several years ago, this could not have been achieved. The author's failure to do so is in large measure responsible for this inadequacy.

SEPEHR ZABIH
Berkeley, California

Sir:

While not arguing with Mr. Hudson's premise that the water resources of Lebanon should be used as productively as possible, his article gives the impression that its use in hydroelectric generation is more productive than would be its use in irrigation agriculture. If such is the case in Lebanon, it suggests that irrigation practices in Lebanon are wasteful of water rather than that the value of water is so low for that use.

For example, in falling 2800 feet from Lake Karaoun to the sea, one cubic meter of water would save the fuel required to produce about 2 kwhr of electricity in a thermal station. This amount of fuel would cost Lebanon less than 2 piasters in foreign exchange. If the cubic meter of water were used efficiently to grow wheat (one of the least valuable of agricultural activities) the net foreign exchange savings would be in excess of 10 piasters. Further, if the higher investment costs for hydroelectric stations relative to thermal stations were taken into account, the preference for the agricultural application would be even more pronounced.

CALVIN C. BURWELL
Middle East Study Project
Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Sir:

Mr. Burwell's figures, presumably based on studies made at the Oak Ridge Laboratories, are not persuasive. They concern only one aspect of the economics—the foreign exchange costs. They compare two different types of things—an input (fuel) and a final product (wheat). I would prefer detailed benefit-cost analyses.

Physical inefficiency ("wasteful practices") in the use of water are usual in irrigated areas, whether in Lebanon or the US. To raise the economic value of irrigation water by raising the efficiency is an attractive proposal. Unfortunately, in the milieu of individually operated farms, raising the efficiency would be quite difficult and might not be worth the effort.

Lebanon might well have found it more economic to have gone to a thermal system for its electricity rather than building the hydro power units of the Litani Project. The elimination of power as a competitor for the water does not mean that irrigation automatically becomes an economic use of water. If the irrigators could not pay the costs of storing and delivering irrigation water in a multiple purpose project, it is less likely they could have done it for a single purpose project.

JAMES HUDSON
Morgan State College
Baltimore, Maryland

Sir:

Dr. Karl Stowasser should be given due credit for performing a task as difficult as reviewing the major multi-author scholarly publication *The Cambridge History of Islam* in the Winter 1971 issue of *The Middle East Journal.* He can be faulted, however, for missing the significance of one of the original contributions in this history.

The chapters by Prof. Halil Inalcik constitute the first published, definitive summary based on the latest research and scholarship of the history of the Ottomans to the 17th century by the leading authority on the subject. These chapters, rather than the outdated and sometimes erroneous Ottoman section in *The Last Great Muslim Empires,* reviewed in the same issue, now give the standard reference on Ottoman history to the 17th century for specialists and non-specialists alike. Hopefully, those who have occasion to mention Ottoman history as they write on European or even more recent Middle Eastern history will avail themselves of Prof. Inalcik's contribution.

Dr. Stowasser does mention the Inalcik chapters with one critical comment. He finds a lack of proportion in Prof. Inalcik's giving one sentence to the submission of the Khan of Bitlis to Selim I and only two sentences to the "momentous" 1529 seige of Vienna. No doubt, the abortive 1529 seige of Vienna is important for the history of Central Europe and not without significance for Ottoman history. Can it even compare, however, with the context in which the submission of the Khan of Bitlis is placed? His act was a part of a larger series of events including the defeat of a major threat to the Ottoman Empire by Persia, the opening of the protracted Ottoman-Persian struggle, which had considerable effect on European as well as Middle Eastern history, the definitive incorporation of eastern Anatolia, and the Ottoman advance into and occupation of the Arabic Islamic territories.

RICHARD E. GREEN
Philadelphia, Penna.

Sir:

In reading the Winter 1971 issue of your journal I have noted that Dr. Lee Bean has correctly pointed out some of the factual inaccuracies of Firoozi's article, "Demographic Review: Iranian Censuses 1956 and 1966—A Comparative Analysis," published in the Spring 1970 issue of the *MEJ*. Since Firoozi in his reply to Bean does not admit the legitimacy of the charges made by Bean and once again tries to mislead the readers and discredit Iran's family planning efforts I am impelled to make the following criticisms:

1. I agree with Bean that there is no evidence today, nor was there in the 1960s, to justify Firoozi's statement that ". . . Thus, the government pursues an active policy of high rate of growth" (p. 221) or his statement, in reply to Bean, that "At the time I wrote my article (early 1968) there was a preponderance of evidence to support the fact that the government's policy was actually one of encouraging a high rate of population increase and there was particularly nothing to support the idea that family planning was promoted" (p. 152). Contrary to these irresponsible statements, official government interest in family planning dates from early 1960s. The early 1960s Iranian population policy and its interest in family planning is best expressed in the *Outline of the Third Plan:* ". . . the declining death rate and the likelihood of a high population growth rate will reduce the pace of increase in per capita income. Thus for both economic and general welfare considerations, in the next decade or two family planning should be popularized and it should constitute one of our important welfare programmes in the future plans." Many other documents (the signing of a U.N.-sponsored declaration on population by the Shahanshah of Iran, the 1966 Population Council mission to Iran, the establishment of Family Planning Unit in 1967, and the existence of a commendable family planning task force in Iran today) are available to show that the Iranian government has not followed a pro-natalist policy in the 1960s nor is it following it today, as pointed out in a recent article on "Iran's Family Planning," published in the January 30, 1971 issue of KAYHAN (International Edition). According to this article ". . . in his policy statement the Shahanshah approved an ambitious 20-year target of one percent growth against the present 3 percent."

2. Equally irresponsible is Firoozi's statement that ". . . the government encourages early marriages and large numbers of children" (p. 221). The recent legislation setting a minimum age at marriage (16 for women and 18 for men) comparable to those in the developed nations is contrary to Firoozi's allegation.

3. I also agree with Bean that the observed sex ratio in Iran is typical of reported sex ratios in the Middle East and/or Moslem World. The examination of sex ratios in 117 United Nations countries shows that 49 of these nations had a sex ratio of 100-plus and 68 nations had a sex ratio of 100-minus. Contrary to Firoozi's claim that Iran is ". . . one of the few places in the world where there were more men than women" (p. 222), most of the Middle Eastern and/or Moslem countries fall in the category of nations with 100-plus sex ratio.

4. Even the opening sentence of Firoozi's article is inaccurate. The figure 15,055,000 that Firoozi claims to be the estimate of Iran's population based on 1939-40 general census actually is an official estimate made in 1935. Firoozi incorrectly cites William Hass. I think he should go back to his reference and read him again.

5. According to 1956 census 5,953,563 persons or about 6 million, not "about 5 million" (p. 221), as we are told by Firoozi, were living in the urban areas in Iran.

6. The sex ratio in Iran in 1966 was 107.3 not 100.73 as stated by Firoozi (p. 222).

7. Throughout his article Firoozi exhibits a lack of familiarity with some basic demographic terminologies, thus, leading him to use improper techniques of analyses. For example, contrary to the demographic convention that regards the population 20 to 64 years as "productive," Firoozi considers the population 15 to 64 years

as "productive" (p. 222); or, in spite of the fact that only a small proportion of the population of Iran in the age group 10 to 14 is married (illegal marriages), Firoozi's discussion of marital status is based on the population 10 years and over rather than the population 15 years and older.

8. In discussing urban-rural population distribution, Firoozi does not bring to the attention of his readers the precise definition of what was regarded as "urban place" in 1956 and 1966 and the differences that existed between the two definitions, which made comparability of the proportion urban for the two censuses somewhat difficult.

9. In his reply to Bean, Firoozi also incorrectly states that the 1956 and 1966 census reports are "available in both languages, English and Persian" (p. 152). I cannot understand Firoozi's motivations in making such an untrue statement. To the best of my knowledge the 1966 census reports are not published in English.

10. Firoozi's discussion of "polygamy" is hardly factual. I only need to refer the reader to Article XIX of the 1967 Family Protection Law that not only openly curtails polygamy and unilateral divorce, but also disproves Firoozi's statement that ". . . the government has not openly prohibited the practice" (p. 223).

In sum, due to many factual inaccuracies of Firoozi's article one must either read it with an utmost care, or not read it at all.

DJAMCHID A. MOMENI,
Associate Professor of Sociology,
Washington College;
Visiting Associate Professor,
Howard University;
Adjunct Professor,
Trinity College.

ST. MARTIN'S PRESS

The first book to reveal the "non-establishment" Israeli attitude toward the Palestinian Arabs.

ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS

Edited by Shlomo Avineri

Daily it becomes clearer that the crucial problem in the Middle East is that of Palestinian nationalism. Shlomo Avineri, Political Science Department Chairman at the Jerusalem Hebrew University, has assembled articles reflecting the viewpoints of the "doves" vis-a-vis the Palestinians. Among the contributors are Moshe Dayan, Aziz Shihadeh (a prominent Palestinian Arab leader), Israel Kolatt (History Lecturer at Hebrew University), and political scientist Ehud Sprinzak. This provocative collection is sure to cause controversy.

Available Summer 1971 *approx. $10.00*

Write for catalogue.

St. Martin's Press, 175 Fifth Avenue, N. Y., N. Y. 10010

harper torchbooks

Makers of Arab History

by PHILIP K. HITTI

"An entirely new work by the country's leading and most prolific Arabic scholar that fills a widely felt need for in-depth profiles of the prominent figures of Islamic history. . . . Thirteen eminent Muslims, from Mohammed to Ibn Khaldun, are presented in sketches which maintain a masterful balance between factual material and readability. Special mention deserves to be made of the eight superb historical maps which accompany the text, as well as the measured, up-to-date, and directional annotation throughout."
—*Choice*

"Professor Hitti's portraits . . . give a much sharper impression of the virtues of Arab civilization than do most short books about it."
—*The Times* [London] *Literary Supplement*

TB/1548 $2.75

At your bookseller
Harper & Row
1817 Paperback Dept. 114, 49 E. 33d St., New York, N.Y. 10016

New

Themes of Islamic Civilization
Edited by John Alden Williams

Drawing upon the Koran and Islamic works of history, law, poetry, drama, philosophy, and letters, each chapter of this book illustrates an inherently Islamic attitude or belief. The authors range from celebrated legalists, officials and academicians to unexalted petitioners. 1971 LC: 78-107659 ISBN: 0-520-01685-8 416 pages illustrations $11.75

A Mediterranean Society
The Jewish Communities of the Arab World as Protrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza
Volume II: The Community
S. D. Goitein

Relying upon the Cairo Geniza (a repository of middle class records and documents from the 10th through the 13th centuries), this volume deals with communal organization and institutions, interfaith relations, communal courts, government control, education, and the professional class of the Mediterranean Muslim.
1971 LC: 67-22430 ISBN: 0-520-01867-2 624 pages $20.00

from California
University of California Press • Berkeley 94720

AAUG Publications

The **Association of Arab-American University Graduates Inc.**, established in December 1967, is a tax-exempt educational and cultural organization; it aims at promoting knowledge and understanding of cultural, scientific and educational matters between the Arab and American peoples. In pursuance thereof, it publishes from time to time Information Papers on relevant questions in the hope of providing the public with the necessary information and background for an informed assessment of critical matters that affect Arab-American understanding. The following three Information Papers are now available:

Information Paper No. 1: **Israel's Occupation of Palestine and Other Arab Territories**

A comprehensive series of essays, statements and reports on the historical claims of Arabs and Zionists to Palestine, the nature of Israeli Occupation and the "defense" laws which are employed to deal with the Palestinian resistance to this occupation. Writers include Isaac Deutscher, Tabitha Petran, Abdeen Jabara, Edward Said, Bertrand Russell and others. $1.00

Information Paper No. 2: **Arab Areas Occupied by Israel in June, 1967**

A series of seven factual, scholarly essays that deal with the social, political, economic and juridical aspects of the Occupied Areas (the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, Sinai) in addition to three essays that address themselves to the conditions under which the occupied people live. Essays are written by five professors at American universities and two Israeli authors. $1.00

Information Paper No. 3: **The United States, Israel and the Arab States**

A series of essays that review comprehensively the nature of economic, political and military relations between the United States and the various countries involved in the Middle East conflict. Valuable data on the extent of military and economic support which the United States provides to Israel and the extent of economic benefit which the United States derives from its relations with the Arab States. Essays are written by professors of Political Science and Economics at various American universities. $1.00

P.O. Box 85, No. Dartmouth, Mass. 02747

Publications by

The Institute For Palestine Studies

- **INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE 1967**
  edited by F. A. Jaber (US$20.00)
- **THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT**
  by Sami Hadawi (US$1.25)
- **THE BALFOUR DECLARATION**
  by J. M. N. Jeffries (US$0.65)
- **TO WHOM DOES PALESTINE BELONG?**
  by Henry Cattan (US$0.65)
- **THE PARTITION OF PALESTINE**
  An Analysis (US$1.25)
- **RIVER WITHOUT BRIDGES: A Study of the Exodus of the 1967 Palestinian Arab Refugees**
  by P. Dodd and H. Barakat (US$1.90)
- **WHOSE SUEZ? Aspects of Collusion**
  by G. H. Jansen (US$1.25)
- **THE LEGAL PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE JURIDICAL STATUS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF THE ZIONIST ORGANIZATION/JEWISH AGENCY: A Study in International and U.S. Law**
  by W. T. Mallison, Jr. (US$1.25)
- **THE ARABS IN ISRAEL (1948-1966)**
  by Sabri Jiryis (US$2.95)
- **THE UNITED NATIONS CONCILIATION COMMISSION ON PALESTINE, 1946-1967**
  by Fuad S. Hamzeh (US$1.70)
- **THE PALESTINE QUESTION: Seminar of Arab Jurists on Palestine, Algiers, 22-27 July 1967**
  (US$2.95)
- **JERUSALEM: Its Place in Islam and Arab History**
  by A. L. Tibawi (US$1.25)
- **THE LEGAL STATUS OF ARAB REFUGEES**
  by G. J. Tomeh (US$1.05)
- **QUO VADIS ZIONIST ISRAEL?**
  by Moshe Menuhin (US$2.50)
- **THE UNITED STATES AND THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE**
  by Michael E. Jansen (US$3.75)
- **SCIENCE AND HIGHER EDUCATION IN ISRAEL**
  by Antoine Zahlan (US$3.75)
- **CAUSE FOR CONCERN: A Quaker's View of the Palestine Problem**
  by Herbert Dobbing (US$2.20)
- **PALESTINE GUERRILLAS: Their Credibility and Effectiveness**
  by Hisham Sharabi (US$1.75)
- **A STATISTICAL STUDY OF THE ARAB BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL**
  by Amer Sharif (US$1.35)
- **FROM HAVEN TO CONQUEST**
  Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem until 1948
  edited by Walid Khalidi (US$12.00)
- **BETWEEN ARAB AND ISRAELI**
  by Lt. Gen. E. L. M. Burns (HC US$8.75, PB US$6.25)
- **ISRAEL AND THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS**
  (US$1.25)
- **CHRISTIANS, ZIONISM AND PALESTINE**
  A Selection of Articles and Statements on the Religious and Political Aspects of the Palestine Problem
  (US$2.00)
- **UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS ON PALESTINE 1947-1966**
  (US$3.75)
- **THE RESISTANCE OF THE WESTERN BANK OF JORDAN TO ISRAELI OCCUPATION, 1967**
  (US$1.25)
- **THE ARAB-ISRAELI ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS, February-July 1949**
  (US$1.25)
- **THE RIGHTS AND CLAIMS OF MOSLEMS AND JEWS IN CONNECTION WITH THE WAILING WALL AT JERUSALEM**
  (US$2.10)
- **THE DESECRATION OF CHRISTIAN CEMETERIES AND CHURCH PROPERTY IN ISRAEL**
  (US$0.65)
- **JERUSALEM: A Collection of United Nations Documents**
  (US$1.70)
- **THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES: A COLLECTION OF U.N. DOCUMENTS**
  (US$11.70)
- **THE DECADENCE OF JUDAISM IN OUR TIME**
  by Moshe Menuhin (HC US$7.00, PB US$5.00)
- **NISI DOMINUS: A Survey of the Palestine Controversy**
  by Nevill Barbour (HC US$6.25, PB US$3.75)
- **WHO KNOWS BETTER MUST SAY SO!**
  by Elmer Berger (US$2.95)
- **PRELUDE TO ISRAEL: An Analysis of Zionist Diplomacy**
  by Alan Taylor (US$2.95)
- **AMERICAN ZIONISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 1942-1947**
  by Richard P. Stevens (US$5.00)
- **ISRAEL'S VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES**
  by George Dib and Fuad Jaber (US$1.70)
- **WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT OF THE ISRAELI ARMED FORCES**
  by R. Ashkar and A. Khalidi (US$2.50)

Order From:

INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES
(Distribution)

From ALDINE•ATHERTON

In two volumes:

MUSLIM STUDIES

by Ignaz Goldziher, edited by S. M. Stern, Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford.

"Any serious student of Islamic society can only profit by reading the brilliant and scholarly analysis in Goldziher's work."—Eastern Horizon

Originally published in 1889-90, Ignaz Goldziher's *Muslim Studies* still ranks high among the classics of Islamic scholarship and remains of fundamental importance to the study of Islam as a religion and a civilization. Translated into English for the first time, Volume I was published in 1968 and with the publication of Volume II, the work is complete.

In Volume I, Goldziher is concerned with the imposition of Islam on the social structure and traditions of different nationalities. He discusses the conflict between the ideals of Islam and the ideals of Arab tribal society, a social system based on keen inter-tribal rivalry and, therefore, antipathetic to Koranic teaching. The relationships among the various nationalities brought into tenuous brotherhood by the conquest are next considered, with emphasis on the tension between Arabs and Persians. The two final essays provide a description of the Shu 'ubiyya movement—a reaction to the ideal of Arab superiority—which demanded equal rights among all the peoples of Islam.

The second volume contains Goldziher's famous study on the development of the Hadith, the "Traditions" ascribed to Muhammad and dealing with theology, law, and proverbs that are the basis of the Islamic religion and ethics. A second major essay discusses the cult of saints which, though contrary to the spirit and the letter of the earliest Islam, nevertheless played an important part in its later development. A final section contains a number of brief essays on various subjects.

These writings by the founder of modern Islamic studies, with his richness of information, historical sense, and sympathetic insight into the motive forces of religion and civilization are as important today as they were when first published. S. M. Stern, a noted Islamic scholar, has brought the annotation up-to-date in the light of modern scholarship and has indicated the most important literaure dealing with the many subjects covered. *Vol. I, 254 pp., $8.75. Vol. II, Approx. 376 pp., $11.50 (available in June). (May not be sold outside the Western Hemisphere.)*

ISLAMIC SURVEYS

A series of introductory works on special subjects showing the present stage of scholarship in the field of Islamic studies, edited by W. Montgomery Watt, Professor of Arabic, University of Edinburgh.

ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY *by* W. Montgomery Watt. *196 pp. $5.50.*
A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW *by* Noel J. Coulson, University of London, *264 pp. $5.50.*
COUNSELS IN CONTEMPORARY ISLAM *by* Kenneth Cragg, Cambridge University. *255 pp. $5.50.*
A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC SPAIN *by* W. Montgomery Watt *and* Pierre Cachia, University of Edinburgh. *210 pp. $6.00.*
THE ISLAMIC DYNASTIES *by* C. E. Bosworth, University of St. Andrews, Scotland. *245 pp. $6.00.*
ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHT *by* W. Montgomery Watt. *186 pp. $5.50.*
AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF ISLAM IN INDIA by Aziz Ahmad, University of Toronto. *226 pp. $5.75.*
BELL'S INTRODUCTION TO THE QUR'AN (2ND EDITION) *by* W. Montgomery Watt. *258 pp. $5.50.*
ISLAMIC PAINTING: A SURVEY *by* David Talbot Rice, University of Edinburgh. *June. Approx. 250 pp. $7.50.*
(May not be sold outside the Western Hemisphere.)

529 SOUTH WABASH AVENUE, CHICAGO, ILL. 60605

from Cambridge

THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF ISLAM

Volume 1: The Central Islamic Lands
Volume 2: The Further Islamic Lands, Islamic Society and Civilization

Edited by P. M. HOLT,
ANN K. S. LAMBTON and BERNARD LEWIS

This work presents the history of Islam as a cultural whole, surveying the political, theological, philosophical, economic, scientific, military and artistic elements of Islamic civilization over more than thirteen centuries.

Contents

Volume 1

Part 1: The Rise and Dominion of the Arabs
Part 2: The Coming of the Steppe Peoples
Part 3: The Central Islamic Lands in the Ottoman Period
Part 4: The Central Islamic Lands in Recent Times

Volume 2

Part 5: The Indian Sub-Continent
Part 6: South-East Asia
Part 7: Africa and the Muslim West
Part 8: Islamic Society and Civilization

Illustrated. Each volume $19.50 Two-volume set $37.50

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
32 East 57th Street
New York, N. Y. 10022



From

ALDINE·
ATHERTON

CLASSICAL ISLAM: A History 600 A.D.—1258 A.D.

G. E. von Grunebaum, Professor of History and Director of the Near Eastern Center, University of California, Los Angeles

This book presents an authoritative history of the classical period of Islam—from 610 A.D. when Muhammad received his "call" until the conquest of Bagdad by the Mongols in 1258. During this time the base was established for developing the high Islamic civilizations of North Africa, the Near East, Persia and India. Professor von Grunebaum examines the relationships, both cultural and political, between the Islamic world and the Mediterranean countries and India and elaborates on the economic, social, and intellectual factors that shaped the Muslim world and molded its interactions with "infidels." Succinct and well-written, this book is important reading for all scholars of Islam, comparative religion, and medieval history. *243 pp. $6.00.*

ISLAMIC PAINTING: A SURVEY

David Talbot Rice, Professor of Fine Arts, University of Edinburgh

A straightforward and informed historical account of the *figurative* art of Islam, with the accent on the less well-known earlier period of Islamic painting and on less familiar aspects such as the painting of Egypt and Turkey, this is an invaluable handbook, aimed at a wide audience. For this reason traditional English spellings of Arabic names have been used. Professor Talbot Rice's scholarship is as evident in his rich and eclectic selection of illustrations as in his commentary. *June. Approx. 250 pp. $7.50.*

Aldine • Atherton
529 S. Wabash Avenue, Chicago, Ill. 60605

IMPORTANT PAPERBACKS ON

THE MIDDLE EAST

FROM MEDINA UNIVERSITY PRESS INTERNATIONAL

THE CONTINUING conflict in the Middle East demands of citizen and student alike an informed view of the totality of the issues of contention among the protagonists, their origin and current state. The following three publications provide the reader with an understanding of many of the problems involved in dealing with these issues as well as the kind of pressures which sympathizers with the Palestinians have been trying to exert.

THE UNHOLY WAR: ISRAEL AND PALESTINE, by the Canadian scholar David Waines, reviews the entire history of the struggle for Palestine set against the background of Middle East and European nationalisms. He provides the reader with an intimate portrait of the organization of Arab and Jewish forces in Palestine, the evolution of the Palestine conflict into an Arab-Israeli conflict, and at the end gives his estimate of the post 1967 resistance. Ideal for class use. **$3.00**

THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE TO ISRAELI OCCUPATION, edited by Political Science professor Naseer Aruri, comprises a set of critical essays by leading specialists on the Palestine Revolution, analyzing its various political and military dimensions. The emphasis in the volume is on the current war of national liberation waged by the Palestinian people. **$3.50**

THE ARAB-AMERICANS: STUDIES IN ASSIMILATION, edited by E. Hagopian and A. Paden, is an anthology of original essays by sociologists, historians and political scientists who address themselves to the origin of Arab settlement in North America, its extent and geographic distribution, the problems of acculturation the immigrants faced, the degree of their participation in the American political process, and the concern they show with their countries of origin. Valuable statistics, data and in depth discussion of problems of social organization. **$3.50**

Medina University Press International

908 ASHLAND AVENUE, WILMETTE, ILLINOIS 60091

SUMMER 1971

THE MIDDLE EAS JOURNAL

THIS ISSUE

rowth and Structural
Change in the
Middle East
Charles Issawi

ational Integration of the
Tribes in Modern Iran
Philip C. Salzman

ırkish Industry and the
Five Year Plans
Jane Perry Clark Carey,
Andrew Galbraith Carey

ırkish Villages in Interior
Anatolia and von Thünen's
"Isolated State":
A Comparative Analysis
William A. Mitchell

ocument Legal Review

ronology Book Reviews

bliography Communications

. 25, No. 3 $2.50

MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE · WASHINGTON, D.

THE
MIDDLE
EAST
INSTITUTE

[illegible]

THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

Editor
WILLIAM SANDS

Book Review Editor
HARRY N. HOWARD

Managing Editor
KATHLEEN H. B. MANALO

Editorial Consultant
A. HOSSEIN FARIS

Editorial Assistants
PETER NULTY
ROXANN VAN DUSEN

Board of Advisory Editors
DOUGLAS D. CRARY
C. GROVE HAINES
HERBERT J. LIEBESNY
ROBERT F. OGDEN
AFIF I. TANNOUS
ROBERT D. SETHIAN
A. J. MEYER
RODERIC H. DAVISON
CHARLES A. FERGUSON
HAROLD W. GLIDDEN
J. C. HUREWITZ
WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH
T. CUYLER YOUNG
CHARLES ISSAWI
CHARLOTTE MOREHOUSE
GEORGE N. ATIYEH

Published quarterly by the Middle East Institute, Washington, D. C. Subscription price, 1 year, $9.00; 2 years, $16.00. Single copies, $2.50. No additional charge for postage to United States and APO addresses. Add $.50 for foreign mailing. Mail all communications to THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, 1761 N St., N. W., Washington, D. C. 20036. Entered as second-class matter at the Post Office at Washington, D. C. Additional entry at Post Office of Baltimore, Maryland.

Vol. 25, No. 3, Copyright 1971. The Middle East Institute. Printed in U.S.A.

-C 3

GROWTH AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Charles Issawi

IN THE DECADE ending with the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, the Middle East's economic performance compared very favorably with that of other regions. Indeed the data in the Pearson Report show that in almost every respect the Middle East stood ahead of both the industrialized and the developing countries, with the exception of Southern Europe.[1] The average annual growth rate in 1960-67 was put at 7.2 per cent.

The Report's definition of the Middle East is rather narrow and covers only Iran (eight per cent), Iraq (5-5.5), Israel (10), Jordan (10), Lebanon (about five) and Syria (five). In the oil producing countries of the Arabian Peninsula growth was almost certainly slightly higher, and in the non-producing it was very low. In Sudan it was about 4-4.5 per cent, in Turkey six and in UAR about five. Thus the overall average for the region as conventionally defined may have been around 6.5 per cent, and the *per capita* growth about 3.5.[2]

The Arab-Israeli war had little or no effect on the countries not immediately involved, and the previous trend seems to have continued. The disruption caused in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and UAR does not yet seem to have been overcome. In Israel, however, which had been in a depression in 1966 and 1967, growth accelerated sharply after the war.[3]

The paucity of data makes it impossible to discuss in detail how this growth in income has affected its distribution. The following general statements may however be made with confidence. First, in almost every country, private consumption has risen appreciably, and this applies to the poor as well as to the rich. Secondly, the amount of social services extended by the governments—in the form of education, health, cheap housing, drinking water, rural electrification and assistance—has greatly increased. Thirdly, and in consequence, the level of living of the masses is distinctly higher than it was some twenty or thirty years ago. But, fourthly, in most parts of the region, the incomes and wealth of the rich have risen still more rapidly, and the distribution of both is probably more unequal than it was, say, before the Second World War. This last tendency has been checked by land reforms in some countries and—of course—reversed by the nationalizations of large sectors of the economy in UAR, Iraq and Syria.

---

[1] Lester B. Pearson, *Partners in Development* (New York, 1969).

[2] For details and sources see original paper.

[3] For a good recent study see Eliyahu Kanovsky, *The Economic Impact of the Six-Day War* (New York, 1970).

△ CHARLES ISSAWI is Ragnar Nurske professor of economics at Columbia University. This article is a shortened version of a paper presented at the Columbia University Conference on International Economic Development, held at Williamsburg, Va., and New York, February 15-21, 1970.

Forces of Growth

Before discussing in detail the structural changes that accompanied and made possible these high rates of growth, four factors making for expansion must be mentioned: the provision of infrastructure and development of human resources in the inter-war and immediate post-war periods; the rapid growth of the petroleum industry; the huge amount of foreign aid received by the Middle East, and the population increase.

Although the 1920s-1940s are usually regarded as a period of stagnation in the Middle East, much was done to provide the region with infrastructure. Railways were built in the countries that needed them most: Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Many thousands of miles of roads were laid down, and carried a large part of the region's traffic. Numerous modern ports and airports were constructed. Irrigation works were extended, especially in Egypt, Sudan and Iraq. And output of electricity increased severalfold. Similarly, the school system, starting almost everywhere from scratch, expanded greatly.[4] No less important, in these countries and still more in Israel and Lebanon, a nucleus of trained engineers, agronomists, statisticians, economists and other technicians had come into being.

The growth of the petroleum industry can be indicated by a few figures. Output of crude oil in the Persian Gulf area rose from 56 million tons in 1948 to 223 million in 1958 and 559 million in 1968: over the same period, refining throughout increased from 33 million tons to 50 million and 91 million respectively. Thanks to the changes in the concession agreements, which raised payments by the companies from about 22 cents a barrel in the 1940s to about 75 cents in the 1950s and 86 in 1968, the Middle Eastern governments' oil revenues multiplied severalfold—from $154 million in 1948 to $1,278 million in 1958 and $3,394 million in 1968. It may be added that, barring a catastrophe, exports of Middle Eastern oil should continue to rise at about seven to eight per cent per annum in the foreseeable future, and revenues by at least as much, implying a total revenue of $6,000 million by 1975.

As for foreign aid, the Middle East has probably received a larger amount per head of population than any other area in the world. Credits extended by the Soviet bloc and China to nine countries in 1954-1968, inclusive, amounted to $4,285 million out of a world total of $9,705 million; of these, a little over two-thirds came from the Soviet Union. The main recipients were UAR $1,679 million, Iran $839 million, Afghanistan $737 million, Syria $418 million, Turkey $218 million and Iraq $184 million. These figures do not include military credits. Data on actual disbursements, as distinct from credits extended, are not available but "The ratio between deliveries and commitments [is] at about 40 per cent." It seems unlikely that the regional share is much higher—say $1,700 million.[5]

---

[4] Thus between the early 1920s and 1950, the school population of Egypt rose from 600,000 to 1,600,000, of Iran from 76,000 to 740,000, of Iraq from 10,000 to 240,000, of Syria from 50,000 to 300,000 and in Turkey from 400,000 to 1,800,000.

United States aid is even larger and has gone to practically every country in the region. Between July 1946 and July 1967 total obligations in economic aid were over $6,500 million, of which $3,000 million were in grants and $3,500 million in loans. The main beneficiaries were Turkey $2,247 million, Israel $1,086 million, UAR $1,039 million, Iran $958 million and Jordan $560 million.[6] United States private investments in the Middle East were put at $1,749 million at the end of 1968, of which $1,608 million was in oil.[7]

To this should be added several hundreds of millions of dollars representing loans from the IBRD and grants from the United Nations and Specialized Agencies to all the countries of the region, and West German and British aid to the UAR, Turkey, Jordan, South Yemen and other countries. British investments in oil are probably of the order of $1,200 million. As for Kuwayt, in 1961-66 it advanced some $500 million to the other Arab countries.

Population increase must also be regarded as a factor making for growth since the marginal productivity of labor seems to be positive.[8] However, there is no reason to doubt that this marginal productivity is, almost everywhere, very low and that *per capita* incomes would rise much more rapidly, and many economic and social problems would be eased, if the growth of population could be slowed down. At present, the annual rate of increase is in practically all the Middle Eastern countries either equal or very close to three per cent. Birth control measures are only just being introduced in a few countries, such as Turkey and UAR, and their effect for some time to come will be minor; since improved hygiene may be expected to reduce mortality appreciably, the rate of population growth may rise well over the three per cent level.

Structural Changes

The main structural changes in the last fifteen or twenty years may be studied under the following headings: savings and investment; development of human resources; infrastructure; composition of GNP; agriculture; industry; foreign trade and balance of payments; planning and growth of government sector.

---

[5] US Department of State, Director of Intelligence and Research, "Communist Governments and Developing Nations: Aid and Trade," September 5, 1969. In 1969, the Soviet Union opened a credit of $350 million for Turkey.

[6] US Agency for International Development, *United States Overseas Loans and Grants* (Washington, D. C., March 29, 1968).

[7] US Department of Commerce, *Survey of Current Business*, October 1969 (Washington, D. C.).

[8] That this is so in the UAR is suggested by Bent Hansen, "Employment and Wages in Egypt," *American Economic Review*, June 1969. The UAR has the most intensive agriculture of the region, and is the most densely populated country; hence one can presume that the same holds for other countries.

Savings and Investment

Rapid growth in GNP presupposes a high investment rate, and Table I shows that a marked rise did indeed take place in the 1950s and 1960s from the very low levels previously prevailing in most countries.[9]

TABLE I *Gross Investment and Saving Ratios*
(as percentages of GNP)[a]

	1957-58		1965	
Country	Investment	Saving	Investment	Saving
Iran	17	16	19	15
Iraq	24	24	15	15
Israel	31	0	28	14
Jordan	13	0	14	0
Kuwayt	20	45	19[b]	37[b]
Lebanon	16	15	15	9
Saudi Arabia	—	—	19	24
Sudan	11	10	10[b]	9[b]
Syria	20	20	17	16
Turkey	14	11	20[b]	18[b]
UAR	14	12	20	14

a) For Kuwayt percentages of GDP.
b) 1966.

Sources: AID, *Near East and South Asia: Economic Growth Trends* (September, 1965); Iran, *4th Development Plan;* UN, *Studies, 1968; ibid., 1969; Israel, Statistical Abstracts,* 1966; Republic of Sudan, *Economic Survey,* 1967; Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, *Report,* 1387 A. H.; Industrial Development Bank of Turkey, *Annual Statement,* 1968.

Five groups of countries may be distinguished in the Table. In Kuwayt and Saudi Arabia, with their huge oil revenues, saving was higher than investment, the balance being transferred abroad in the form of foreign exchange reserves. In Iran and Iraq, oil revenues, though also large, could be absorbed at home, and investment was roughly equal to saving. The same was true of Lebanon,

---

[9] On the eve of the Second World War, the gross investment rate was probably around five per cent in Egypt, six per cent in Iraq and eight per cent in Syria. In Iran it may have been somewhat higher, and in Turkey it was about 10 per cent. All this investment was covered by domestic saving. In Palestine the investment rate in 1936 was as high as 30 per cent, but this was more than covered by foreign resources, giving a negative saving rate.

During the Second World War inflation and a shortage of goods produced a high level of savings, but the limited possibilities for investment meant that most savings were transferred abroad, in the form of foreign exchange reserves.

Sudan and Syria, which had no—or negligible amounts of—oil revenues but where a relatively high level of savings made it possible to maintain a fairly high level of investment. In Turkey and the UAR, foreign aid financed a sizeable proportion of total investment. Lastly, in Israel and Jordan, foreign resources accounted for the bulk, or even the whole, of investment, and in both local savings were small or even negative.

Developments since 1965 have varied sharply between countries. In Iran investment has increased more rapidly than GNP (at an average of 17 per cent in 1963-1968), and the investment rate rose steadily to about 21 per cent in 1967-68; almost all of this was met by higher saving. Although the vast increase in government investment has sharply raised its share of the total, private investment still accounts for just over one-half.

In Turkey investment has also risen more rapidly than GNP, and the investment rate climbed to about 21.5 per cent in 1968; of this about 19.7 per cent was covered by domestic saving. Although in recent years private investment has been growing faster than public, it still accounts for just under half the total.

Another country in which capital formation has risen sharply and continuously is Saudi Arabia. By 1966-67 it accounted for 20 per cent of GNP, and available data indicate that this rate has at least been maintained, and may even have increased. As in the past, saving has exceeded domestic investment, but since the 1967 war a rising share has been absorbed by aid to Jordan and the UAR—$35 million in 1967 and $140 million in 1968. In recent years public investment has risen twice as fast as private (20 per cent and 9 per cent a year, respectively), and the two are now roughly equal.

The Israeli gross investment rate has fluctuated sharply. From an average of over 30 per cent in 1961-64 it fell off during the 1965-67 recession to 21 in 1966 and 15 in 1967. However, since the 1967 war it has once more risen to over 20 per cent in 1968 and about the same in 1969. The saving rate fell even more sharply, from 14 per cent to 11 and four respectively, but rose again to six in 1968. Private investment accounts for about 55 per cent and public for 45 per cent.

In Jordan, too, the investment rate had been declining before the 1967 war, from over 17 in 1959-60 to 14 in 1965-66. In all those years, the saving rate was negative, *i.e.* consumption was slightly greater than GNP. No recent figures are available, but it seems reasonable to infer that the disruption caused by the war must have lowered the investment rate. In the early 1960s, private investment accounted for somewhat over half the total.

Data for Iraq are fragmentary, but show a marked decline in government expenditure on development after 1964-65. Since private investment, which until then had accounted for 40 per cent of the total, fell off sharply after the nationalization measures of 1964, it may be taken that the overall investment rate was greatly reduced. In Lebanon, the crisis caused by the failure of the Intra Bank in October 1966 was aggravated by the 1967 war, and the sharp decline in construction—the main form of domestic investment—points to a decline in the overall rate of investment. Data for Syria are even scantier, but also indicate a general decline.

In the UAR, the gross investment rate also declined before the 1967 war, from a peak of 20 to 17 in 1966-67, while the saving rate was slightly reduced, to a little under 14. There is reason to believe that these figures fell further after the 1967 war, with the loss of productive resources and the rise in military expenditure. The bulk of investment is in the public sector.

Lastly, in the Sudan gross capital formation fell sharply, in absolute terms, from 1963-64 to 1966-67, and rose only slightly in 1967-68. As a percentage of GDP, it declined to under 10 per cent in 1966-67 and 11 per cent in 1967-68. This was mainly due to the reduction in the use of foreign resources, and the savings rate fell only slightly, to 10 per cent. In recent years public investment has accounted for over two-thirds of the total.[10]

Development of Human Resources

The figures on Middle Eastern school enrolment given in the Pearson Report (Appendix II, Table 4) show growth rates that compare favorably with those of other regions. For the countries omitted in the Table—Kuwayt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey—rates of increases are equally high, or higher.

This rapid growth has, over the greater part of the region, raised the ratio of the primary school population to the total population above the 10 per cent level which has been defined as critical for economic development.[11] The countries that have passed that level now include: Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwayt, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey and UAR. In secondary education, the Middle Eastern enrolment ratios are higher than those of Africa and most of Latin America, but below those of some Asian countries, such as India, Taiwan, South Korea and the Philippines. Ratios in higher education compare favorably not only with those of developing countries but also with those of most European countries.

Of course such a purely statistical approach can be seriously misleading. First, it does not allow for the large percentage of dropouts, who represent a partial wastage of investment. Secondly, in secondary education—and much more so in higher—the quality of teaching is generally low. Thus, although the number of students in higher education in the Arab countries, including North Africa, was put at 300,000, "as recently as 1965 no fully-fledged graduate schools existed throughout the entire region."[12] Conditions in Iran and Turkey are no better. However, many students are enrolled, as undergraduates or graduates, in the United States and Western and Eastern Europe—about 40,000 Arabs, 20,000 Iranians and several thousand Turks and Israelis.

---

[10] These figures are taken from the annual reports of the Central Banks of Egypt, Iran, Israel and Sudan, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, the Industrial Bank of Turkey, the *Sudan Economic Survey* and the United Nations *Studies on Selected Development Problems in Various Countries of the Middle East,* 1968 (New York, 1968).

[11] Alexander L. Peaslee, "Education's Role in Development," *Economic Development and Cultural Change,* April 1969; as a proportion of children of primary school age, primary school enrolments vary from over one-half to four-fifths.

These high rates of school attendance mean that, in the next two or three decades, as the present older generation is replaced by men and women who have had at least primary education, the literacy rate should rise sharply. At present, excluding Israel and Lebanon, it stands at 20-40 per cent in the major countries and at perhaps 10-15 per cent in the more backward ones, figures distinctly below those of Latin America and many parts of Asia.

The inflow of university graduates is also rapidly increasing the stock of skills in the Middle East. Data on the latter are very scanty except for physicians, whose number rose by over 50 per cent between 1957 and 1965. The figures in the Pearson Report show that, per head of population, the Middle East stands well below Latin America in this respect, but far above Africa and somewhat above Asia. The available evidence on other professions indicates that the number of engineers, natural scientists and social scientists is growing much more rapidly than that of physicians.

Infrastructure

Except for Egypt, the Middle East had, until quite recently, a very inadequate infrastructure. In the last twenty years, however, great progress has been made and the Pearson Report puts the rate of growth in the Middle East in railway traffic and electricity far above that of other regions. The rates of growth in the other Middle Eastern countries were quite as high.

But the main emphasis has been not on railways but on ports and roads. New ports have been built at Aqaba, Dammam and Jiddah, Hudayda, Kuwayt, Latakia, Tel Aviv-Jaffa, Eilat, Iskenderun and Trabzon, while the older ports have been enlarged and improved. And tens of thousands of miles of highways and secondary roads have been laid down. Between 1948 and 1965, the number of trucks multiplied by four, and the total freight (measured in ton-miles) must have risen much more since the size and length of the average haul has considerably increased.

Composition of GNP

Table II brings out both the distinctive pattern and the trend of the composition of GNP in the Middle East. As regards the first, the main characteristics

---

[12] Claire Nader and A. B. Zahlan (eds.) *Science and Technology in Developing Countries* (Cambridge, 1969) p. 304.

TABLE II *Composition of Gross National Product, 1953-1966*
(per cent of total)[a]

	1953			1966		
	Agriculture	Industry	Other	Agriculture	Industry	Other
Iran[b]	31	27	42	28	29	43
Iraq[c]	22	47	31	21	45	33
Israel	12	23	65	8	24	68
Jordan[d]	18	7	75	19	12	69
Lebanon[e]	20	13	67	13	13	74
Sudan	61	5	34	54	6	40
Syria	44	12	44	28	15	57
Turkey	48	11	41	37	18	45
UAR	32	9	59	28	23	49

a) Agriculture includes forestry and fishing; industry includes mining.
b) 1959 and 1965.
c) 1953 and 1965.
d) 1959 and 1966.
e) 1950 and 1964.

Source: Pearson Report, Appendix II, Table 3; *Statistical Yearbook.*

are the small share of agriculture and the high share of services, compared to other regions with similar *per capita* incomes. The small share of agriculture is explained partly by the aridity of the Middle East, which makes expansion very costly in many countries, and partly by the large size of the oil and services sectors. The services sector is swollen by income accruing because of location (*e.g.* Suez Canal, airlines); by pilgrimage and tourism (particularly in Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia); by the very large size of the government sector, including army and bureaucracy, and by the receipt of massive foreign aid.

As for the trend, the most marked features are the steady decline in the share of agriculture and rise in that of services in practically every country; and the marked increase in the industrial sector. In Israel and the UAR manufacturing and mining now account for nearly a quarter of GNP and in Turkey, Syria, Iran (excluding oil), and Lebanon for a sixth or a seventh. Thus, leaving aside the oil industry, the Middle East is distinctly more industrialized than Africa, where manufacturing accounts for under 10 per cent of GNP, about as industrialized as Asia, where the figure is 15 to 20 per cent, and well below Latin America, where it is 15 to 30 per cent.

Agriculture

The shift to manufacturing and the relative decline of agriculture form part of a world-wide pattern. However, both have been more marked in the Middle

East than in other regions. Taking the developing countries as a whole, agriculture's share in GNP declined from an average of 35.7 per cent in 1950-54 to one of 30.5 per cent in 1960-64; conversely, that of industry rose from 14.5 to 17.9 per cent.[13]

Over the last dozen years, the average annual rate of growth of agricultural output in the Middle East was 3.3 per cent, and the *per capita* increase 0.7 per cent, both figures slightly above those for all other developing regions. Somewhat over half of this increase was due to the extension of acreage and a little under half to higher yields, reflecting the efforts being made to intensify production.

One aspect of intensification has been the shift away from the traditional cereals (mainly wheat and barley) and towards the more valuable cash crops: cotton, rice, fruits, vegetables and sugar beets. As a result, exports of the latter have risen appreciably in the last few years but, on the other hand, imports of cereals have also increased rapidly, to well over 5,000,000 tons, worth nearly $500 million.[14]

Intensification has proceeded on other fronts. Large irrigation works have been built in almost every country, and the irrigated area has been considerably extended. Mechanization is increasing relatively fast and the number of tractors has doubled in the last ten years; however there are still less than 1.5 tractors per 1,000 hectares in the Middle East, a figure equal to the average in developing countries. Between 1952-56 and 1967-68 the use of chemical fertilizer almost quadrupled, to 800,000 tons (nutrient content) and, where until recently only the UAR and Israel used chemical fertilizers on a large scale, Lebanon, Turkey and Iran are now applying rapidly rising amounts and some of the other countries are also beginning to use significant quantities. This advance has been made possible largely thanks to the development of a domestic chemical fertilizer industry, whose output is expected to multiply fourfold by 1972, to a total of about 3,000,000 tons (nutrient content). And, whereas until recently again only the UAR and Israel used selected seeds in significant quantities, Turkey and other countries are now planting rapidly expanding areas to Mexican dwarf wheat and other high-yielding varieties.

Technical progress has been accompanied—and often facilitated—by structural and organizational changes. Major land reforms were implemented in the UAR in 1952, Syria and Iraq in 1958, and Iran in 1963. All four transferred large areas to small holders or landless workers and gave tenants greater security and a higher share of the produce. And all four set up extension services and cooperatives, backed by agricultural banks, to provide credit and technical assistance to the new owners. But their outcome was very different. The evidence to date indicates that both the Egyptian and Iranian land reforms have had favorable effects on production, leading to more intensive cultivation in both countries and to the reclamation of new land in Iran, but the Syrian—and still more the Iraqi—land reforms have been disruptive. In Syria the previous—very impressive—expansion had been carried out by landlords and merchants, whose function does not seem to have been adequately taken over by the government organizations and cooperatives set up to replace them. And in Iraq political instability and ecological deterioration have led to a sharp fall in agricultural output.[15]

---

[13] United Nations, *Industrial Development Survey* (New York, 1969) Vol. I, p. 19.

[14] Food and Agricultural Organization, *The State of Food and Agriculture, 1969,* pp. 2 and 65, where indexes for the main countries are given, pp. 66-67, p. 98.

Industry

In the last fifteen years or so, Middle Eastern industrial output has risen very rapidly. The average annual rate of growth in 1960-67 given in the Pearson Report is 10.8 per cent, which stands above that of all other regions, and Turkey and the UAR also had rates of 10 per cent or over.

But in all these countries industry started from a very narrow base and, except in Israel, production of manufactured goods per head of population is still rather small. A rough indication is given by the following figures (in dollars): Israel 320, Lebanon 60, Turkey 50, UAR 37, Iran (excluding oil) 28, Syria 28, Iraq (excluding oil) 19, Sudan 6. Comparable figures for 1963 were Puerto Rico $201, Mexico $108, Colombia $47, Taiwan $27, India $14, Pakistan $8, Kenya $8, and Tanzania and Nigeria $3.[16] For most Western European countries the figure ranges between $600 and $800 and in the United States it is over $1,000.

This growth in industrial output has gone primarily to the domestic market, although in a few countries—notably Israel, the UAR and Lebanon—exports of manufactured goods have increased appreciably. As a result, in some of the more industrialized countries of the region local production now meets the greater part of domestic consumption of manufactured goods, but the less developed countries still rely on imports for the bulk of their consumption. Thus a recent estimate showed that the UAR produced 82 per cent of its consumption of manufactured goods; for agricultural processing industries the figure was 96, but for metals, non-metals and chemicals only 54. The corresponding figures for Iraq were 59, 71, and 40 per cent.[17] It may be taken that the Sudan and the Arabian Peninsula countries fall below Iraq, and the other countries—with the exception of Israel—between Iraq and the UAR.

---

[15] See Doreen Warriner, *Land Reform in Principle and Practice* (London, 1969); *idem, Land Reform and Development in the Middle East* (London, 1962); Gabriel Saab, *The Egyptian Agrarian Reform* (London, 1969); Robert Fernea, "Land Reform and Ecology in Postrevolutionary Iraq," *Economic Development and Cultural Change,* April 1969; A. K. S. Lambton, *Persian Land Reform* (London, 1969).

[16] The figures for non-Middle Eastern countries were taken from United Nations, *Industrial Development,* p. 11 and "refer to *per capita* gross domestic product, in current US dollars, multiplied by the share of manufacturing production in total product." The Middle Eastern figures were obtained by applying the same method to the latest available figures, generally 1966 or 1967, given in the United Nations *Statistical Yearbook, 1968.* Allowing for the growth in output, these figures are in line with those for 1963 given in United Nations, *The Growth of World Industry* (New York, 1970).

As regards the sectoral composition of manufacturing industry, in the Middle East as in other developing regions industrialization started with three main groups: food processing, textiles and non-metallic minerals (mostly building materials). Since then—in the Middle East as in other developing regions—heavy industry has grown much more rapidly than light. Nevertheless, except where petroleum plays a predominant part in the economy, light industry is still predominant. Its share in value added in 1962 or 1963 was as follows: Israel 52 per cent, Jordan 53, UAR 64, but Iraq only 46. In Iran in 1962-64, the percentage accounted for by the food and drink, tobacco, textile and clothing industries was 61 and that of chemicals, basic metals, metal products and machinery 18 per cent, but these figures leave out the oil industry; in Turkey the corresponding figures in 1963-65 were 49 and 30 per cent.[18]

Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments

The structure of the Middle East's foreign trade has changed in several important respects. First, in the 1960s the value of trade did not keep pace with the rise in GNP. If the oil producing countries of the Arabian Peninsula are excluded, it becomes evident that—with the partial exception of Iran and Israel—the trade of the region grew very slowly and that the ratio of both imports and exports to GNP has fallen appreciably. This shift is largely explained by the sluggishness of exports, which kept down the amount that could be imported, in spite of the large supplement provided by foreign aid. The very slow increase in exports is, in turn, attributable to the low rate of growth of agriculture—which still provides the bulk of exports other than oil—and to rising domestic consumption of certain export goods, such as foodstuffs and raw cotton. And although exports of manufactured goods have increased in some countries, *e.g.* Israel, Lebanon, UAR, Turkey, Syria and Iran, only in the first two do they amount to more than about 15 per cent of total exports.

On the import side, three main trends are clear. First, as already noted, there has been a marked growth in imports of grains and other foodstuffs because of the increase in population, the rise in living standards, the low rate of agricultural growth and the shift to cash crops. Secondly, thanks to the growth of local industry, there has been a sharp fall in imports of manufactured goods into the more advanced countries of the region; in the less advanced countries, however, rising incomes have attracted increasing quantities of foreign consumer goods. Lastly, the industrialization of the Middle East has necessitated a huge expansion of imports of machinery, spare parts and raw materials.

---

[17] United Nations, *Industrial Development,* p. 78; in Iran, the share of local production was 70 per cent in 1965-67, and was scheduled to rise to 75 by 1972.

[18] Iran, Ministry of Economy, *Industrial Guide to Iran* (Tehran, March 1968); OECD, *Turkey,* July 1967, p. 28.

As regards the balance of payments, taken as a whole the region may have a small surplus on current account, but this is due entirely to the Arabian Peninsula oil producing countries. If oil exports are excluded, every single Middle Eastern country has an import surplus, and in almost all this is very large. In the Arabian Peninsula countries, the deficit on merchandise account is more than covered by the foreign exchange received from the oil sector, in the form of direct revenues to the government or local payments to workers and suppliers. In Iran and Iraq, oil receipts almost cover the deficit in merchandise and services. In Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and the UAR, income from services covers part of the import surplus; in Lebanon this comes mainly from tourist expenditures, in Jordan from tourism and remittances sent by Palestinians working in the Persian Gulf area and elsewhere, in Israel from tourism and funds sent by overseas Jewish communities, in Turkey from remittances (about $200 million) sent by the more than 100,000 Turks working in Europe and, in the UAR, from the Suez Canal which, until its closure, brought in over $200 million a year. More generally, tourism is rapidly developing in all the countries bordering the Mediterranean, but it is still far from having fulfilled its great potential and the present annual expenditure of some $400 million may be expected to increase severalfold in the 1970s.

As mentioned earlier, however, income from services and private transfers fails to close the gap in the trade account, and—except for the Arabian Peninsula oil producers—every country in the region is now receiving substantial foreign aid (see above).[19]

Growth of Public Sector

The growth of the public sector is one of the most striking changes in the Middle East in the last ten or fifteen years. In the 1950s in all countries except Israel and the Arabian Peninsula oil producers, government expenditures were below 20 per cent of GNP, and in several they were closer to 10. By the mid-1960s, however, the ratio exceeded 40 per cent in Syria (41 in 1966), Israel (46 in 1967) and the UAR (55 in 1966), as well as in Saudi Arabia (40 in 1966) and Kuwayt (47 in 1966). To this list may be added Jordan (36 in 1967) and Iraq (29 in 1965). Only Iran and Turkey (18 and 19, respectively, in 1966) were below the 20 per cent limit, while Lebanon stood at 21 per cent and Sudan at 23 per cent in 1965, but the rapid increase in Iran's expenditure has since raised its figure to well over 25 per cent.

---

[19] For a thorough study of this subject, with projections through the 1970s, see a paper presented by Michael Bruno at the same conference and published in the *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. XXIV, No. 2 (New York, 1970).

This huge expansion of the public sector has several causes. In some countries such as the UAR, Iraq and Syria, the nationalization of most industrial, financial and large scale commercial establishments has swollen the public sector. The general increase of government services, such as education and health, and the proliferation of the administrative bureaucracy, have worked in the same direction. So has the huge rise in foreign aid, which accrues to the governments in the first instance. Rapidly expanding oil revenues have played a major part in the producing countries. And, as is noted below, defense expenditures have soared to very high levels.

The growth of the public sector has been accompanied by a great extension of government control over economic activity. In the UAR, Iraq and Syria, the government owns and operates most major activities outside agriculture, and the latter is also closely supervised. In Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwayt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Turkey, the government has not taken over any major enterprises, but it accounts for the greater part of investment. Only in Lebanon does the government still play a minor part in economic activity. And only in Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, as well as in some of the countries of the Arabian Peninsula, has no attempt been made to draw an overall plan for the economy. In the other countries, Four, Five and Seven Year Plans, of varying scope, elaboration and consistency, have been framed to guide the economy through the 1960s. However, in view of the paucity and unreliability of much of the data on which they are based, of the inexperience of the planning authorities, and of the lack of coordination between the private and public sectors, it is not surprising that performance has, generally speaking, failed to conform to plan.

Prospects for the 1970s

The above account shows that until 1967 the whole region—and since that date most of it—enjoyed rapid economic growth, accompanied by great social advance. In the process, its structure has been greatly modified, new sources of production have been opened and its human resources have been tapped far more deeply than ever before. It now remains to assess the prospects for continued growth in the 1970s, and to identify the major difficulties lying ahead.

The rapid advance of the 1960s has been attributed to three main factors: the development of human resources; the provision of infrastructure, and the large capital inflow through oil and foreign aid. If this analysis is correct, the chances of maintaining a high rate of growth would, on the face of it, seem to be excellent. For the Middle Eastern countries now dispose of a far larger stock of skills and a far better infrastructure than in the past, and progress in both directions is likely to continue. All projections of oil output and revenues agree on a rapid and sustained rise at least through the 1970s. An increasing share of these oil revenues may be expected to accrue to Arab countries outside the Persian Gulf zone, partly because of increased production in the UAR and Syria but mainly in the form of grants and loans from Kuwayt, Saudi Arabia, Libya and, possibly, some of the Shaykhdoms. And although foreign aid to the region may somewhat diminish, it is unlikely to fall off too sharply in those countries that need it most: Israel, Jordan, Turkey and the UAR.

Nor is there any reason why the structural changes described above should not be maintained or pushed further. Growing incomes should continue to be accompanied by rising rates of saving and investment, higher levels of living, increased industrialization, intensified agriculture, and, possibly, greater balance in international accounts.

But this bright picture is greatly modified—and indeed transformed—by four elements. Of these, three may be expected to slow down the growth of the countries affected, and the fourth would constitute a serious problem even if rapid growth were maintained.

There is, first, the Arab-Israeli smoldering war. The fighting has already caused considerable economic dislocation—including the destruction of irrigation works, industrial plants and transport facilities—in Jordan, the UAR, Syria, Lebanon and Israel. Any intensification of hostilities would inflict further damage.

Secondly, even if actual shooting should stop, tension is likely to continue, and to lead to the diversion of increasing resources to defense. Military expenditures in the Middle East, already very high before 1967, have since soared. As a percentage of GNP, between 1965 and 1969 they rose as follows: Iran 4.4 to 5.9 per cent, Iraq 10.2 to 12.4, Israel 11.7 to 21.3, Jordan 12.9 to 25.2, Saudi Arabia 8.6 to 12.7, Syria 8.4 to 17.8 and UAR 8.6 to 14.6, while Turkey remained unchanged at 4.3. Considering that in 1968 the corresponding figures for Western Europe were between 1.0 (Luxembourg) and 6.2 (Portugal), for India 3.6, Indonesia 2.6, Japan 0.8 and even the United States 9.2, the staggering burden of military expenditure becomes evident.[20]

Of course these heavy defense expenditures have been made possible only by massive external aid—Soviet arms supplied to the Arab countries and Jewish funds to Israel. The actual burden on the Middle Eastern economies is far less. But the fact that, in recent years, in the countries directly or indirectly involved in the Arab-Israeli war, the share of 'Government Consumption' has increased considerably and that of 'Investment' declined significantly shows that military expenditures are beginning to cut into economic development, as well as pressing on living standards.

---

[20] Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1969-1970* (London, 1969); these figures are, if anything, conservative. Thus President Nāṣir stated that the UAR's military budget was the equivalent of $1,100 million or about 20 per cent of its GNP—*New York Times,* November 7, 1969. No comparable figures are given for Africa and Latin America, but in both continents the level of military expenditure is relatively very low. It may be added that the existence of conscription in most Middle Eastern countries understates the real burden of defense, since soldiers receive very low pay.

Thirdly, there is the reduction of efficiency caused by the great extension of the public sector in some countries. This is not to deny that in a region at the economic level of the Middle East—and with its social structure and historical background—the government should play an active part. Indeed, given the resources accruing to the Middle Eastern governments from oil and foreign aid, it is inevitable that they undertake a large share of investment. It is also desirable that they attempt to secure some consistency between the various forces affecting the economy, by means of forecasts and overall indicative development plans—though several of the plans drawn up so far have been based on very shaky assumptions. But the evidence to date seems to indicate that the nationalization of large sectors of the economy has led to a marked decline in efficiency.[21] Nor is this surprising, in view of the inadequacy of the Middle Eastern bureaucracies, of the huge loads that have been piled on them and of the lack of information with which they have to work. And, in the immediate future, there is little reason to believe that matters will appreciably improve in this respect, and the experience of far more advanced countries is not encouraging.

Lastly, there are the related questions of population growth and urbanization. As mentioned before, for at least a decade or two the Middle Eastern population is likely to grow at three per cent a year, or more. Urbanization is increasing still faster, generally at around five per cent. The Middle East has always been a highly urbanized area: today the capital city alone usually accounts for 10 to 15 per cent of the total population, and five cities—Cairo, Alexandria, Tehran, Istanbul and Baghdad—have passed the million mark. The grave social problems posed by this population as well as urban explosion—the strain it puts on housing, municipal services, hygiene, education and the physical environment—can only be mentioned, not discussed here.

As regards the general population growth, only two remarks need be made. First, the necessity of actively promoting birth control and of providing incentives for the limitation of family size. Secondly, the need to use, as far as possible, labor-intensive techniques, in order to find jobs for the additional millions of workers. Industrialization should of course be promoted as vigorously as possible, since it offers the hope of higher incomes. But recent experience has shown that its labor-absorptive capacity is small because existing techniques are capital-intensive and productivity per man is rising rapidly. In many developing countries, industrial output has been doubled with little or no increase in employment. The service sector usually grows faster, but only because it contains an enormous amount of underemployment and disguised unemployment—often connected with mass migration to the towns. This means that much of the increment in population will have to be absorbed in agriculture. Fortunately, both the experience of Japan and Egypt and the possibilities opened by the 'Green Revolution' show that intensification of production can be obtained by greatly increasing labor inputs, together with certain capital inputs, like water, seeds and fertilizers. The aim of agricultural policy should therefore be, as far as possible, to raise output per acre rather than output per man, to use land-saving investments, rather than labor-saving devices like farm machinery and to concentrate on labor-absorptive, high value crops. In the words of a leading authority: "The agricultural revolution of our time is a laboratory revolution, not the engineers' revolution of forty years ago."[22]

---

[21] For a careful and well documented study, see "Plan Implementation in Iraq, 1951-1967," in United Nations, *Studies, 1969;* there is also much similar evidence on Syria and the UAR, and on the public sectors of such countries as Iran and Turkey.

Much of the recent growth of the Middle East is attributable to the oil industry—a sector with a very high capital-labor ratio and a very low labor-absorptive capacity. The capital and by-products generated in that industry are being used to promote development in general, and more particularly certain petrochemical industries which can greatly expand the region's manufacturing sector. It is also imperative that a substantial proportion be used for the intensification of agriculture, a process that could provide both food and work for the Middle East's growing millions.

---

[22] Warriner, *op. cit.,* p. 44.

NATIONAL INTEGRATION OF THE TRIBES IN MODERN IRAN

Philip C. Salzman

THE MOST common view of Middle Eastern nomadic tribes, a view held by laymen, governments and scholars alike, is that they are an archaic survival, divisive to modern society, recalcitrant in the face of demands for change, and doomed to be obliterated by progress. This view has recently been succinctly restated in the *Middle East Journal* by Professor Firoozi:

> ... there are about 3,000,000 tribal members living a nomadic or semi-nomadic life in various regions of Iran. They are reluctant to change and to adopt ways of life more in line with the political, economic and social goals of Iran. Their tribal system is an impediment to rapid growth and modernization of the country. One may disagree with an authoritarian policy of sedentarization, but Iran could not afford to be indifferent to tribal insurrection and adopted a way to deal with the problem. (1970, p. 226)

Before examining the general position, it is necessary to clarify Professor Firoozi's reference to "an authoritarian policy of sedentarization." While it is true that Reza Shah did institute such a policy, and that in recent years forced sedentarization may have been implemented in very special limited cases, as reported in the reference to settlement of the Luranfar nomads after their rebellion in 1963-64 (*ibid.*, p. 226), it is not the general policy of the Iranian government to force the tribes to settle. The major tribal groups have migrated since Reza Shah's abdication and, to a significant extent, continue to do so to the present day. The Shah Savan of Azerbaijan (Tapper, 1969), the Bakhtiari (Brooks, personal communication) and Lurs of Luristan, the Qashqai and Khamseh of Fars (Barth, 1960, 1961), the Turkmen of northeastern Iran (Irons, 1968, 1969, 1970), and the Baluch of southeastern Iran (Salzman, 1969) all have sections which live in mobile dwellings, tents or *yurts,* and migrate as part of their seasonal round of resource extraction.[1] Of course some

---

[1] Professor Firoozi refers to "the official [Iranian government] thesis of an Iranian society devoid of tribes," and to support his assertion that there is such a view, says that "the 1966 census omitted the term 'tribes' in its English version and instead used the term 'migrant population.' Even though unrealistic, the latter approach presents Iran as a country officially without a tribal population." (1970, p. 226).

Thus readers of the census are led to expect no reference to tribes or their vital statistics. And yet, Volume CLIX, *Sistan and Baluchistan, National Census of Population and Housing* contains the following statement:

> The tables in this report relate to the settled population only. They exclude the unsettled population, that is, *nomadic tribes* and persons with no fixed abode who were enumerated

△ PHILIP C. SALZMAN is assistant professor of anthropology, McGill University, Montreal.

tribesmen and some entire sections of these various groups are sedentary, and some of these have of their own accord settled in recent times.

The general view of tribes as set out by Professor Firoozi, which I would call the "archaic tribe" model, compounds a number of factors which must be analytically separated if the situation of the tribes in contemporary Iran is to be properly understood. First, it is necessary to distinguish the tribal form of social organization from the nomadism or semi-nomadism which is a part of the adaptation. Likewise, the adaptation itself, not explicitly mentioned in the model, must be discussed. Second, the "political, economic and social goals of Iran" cannot be lumped together for consideration without gravely confusing the issues. Third, the substantive assertion that "they are reluctant to change and to adopt ways of life more in line with the . . . goals of Iran" must be examined in the light of the available empirical evidence.

The meaning of "tribe" is by no means straightforward when examined carefully (Helm, 1968). Fortunately, for present purposes many of the classificatory and analytical subtleties can be left aside because the crucial comparison is the relatively crude one between the city and its peasant base, on the one hand, and the "tribes," on the other. It suffices to say that the tribes (1) are social groupings, (2) which are based upon a symbolic idiom, such as kinship, which purports to describe and justify the bonds between members, (3) are exclusive in membership, and (4) the boundaries of which define the most extensive limit of political loyalty. Ties, duties, responsibilities or obligations to any individuals, groups or institutions outside the bonds defined by the symbolic "charter" (Malinowski, 1944) of the group, no matter how enthusiastically or extensively such ties are developed for pragmatic and utilitarian purposes, do not claim ultimate loyalty. Thus, in terms of social organization, the membership and group boundaries are defined by the symbolic idiom; in terms of political allegiance, commitment and loyalty are defined by those group boundaries. The picture drawn here is purposely emphatic, for the difficulties of dealing with tribes often arise from these features. But human beings in specific groups usually tend to be flexible, and the social and political implications of defining characteristics such as those mentioned above are often avoided or twisted in the context of concrete circumstances. More about this later.

A tribe is thus a form of social organization. This form of social organization is used in many parts of the world and in many different kinds of environment. Peoples engaged in hunting and gathering, in horticulture, in pastoralism, in

---

wherever they happened to be. . . . *Data for the tribal population will be published in a separate report for the total country.* (p.a., emphasis added).

The reports of the 1966 census do not seem to avoid the use of the term "tribe," and do, according to plan, include information on the "nomadic tribes." It hardly seems accurate, on the basis of this data, to conclude that there is an "official thesis of an Iranian society devoid of tribes."

agriculture use this form. Some of these tribes are nomadic, that is, move their residence in the course of the yearly round of resource extraction, and some are not. There is no necessary connection between a tribal form of social organization and nomadism. It so happens, as a consequence of certain historical dynamics and environmental circumstances that cannot be examined in detail here, that many of the tribes in Iran, or at least significant portions of them, are nomadic. Large parts of important tribes are not nomadic: the Kurds (Arfa, 1964; Barth, 1960), the Turkmen (Irons, 1970), the Baluch (Spooner, 1964), the Lur (Barth, 1960), the Qashqai (Mintz, 1968). It is thus misleading to refer to "tribes" as if they must be nomadic or to "nomads" as if to be a nomad is necessarily to be a tribesman.

What then is nomadism? As mentioned above, it is movement of the residence in the course of the yearly round of resource extraction. That is, nomadism is an adaptive mechanism, a pattern of behavior meant to facilitate extraction from the physio-biotic and socio-cultural environments (Salzman, 1970a). This mechanism is used by various peoples in various places to extract non-domesticated resources (Lee and DeVore, 1968), domesticated plant resources (Barclay, 1964, p. 27), domesticated animal resources (UNESCO, 1960), and very often combinations of these resources (Dyson-Hudson, 1966; Salzman, 1969). In Iran, there is a heavy pastoral bias; domesticated animal species, primarily sheep and goats, but also camels and horses, are herded and husbanded (Paine, 1970) as important parts of the economy of nomadic groups. (Pastoralism, particularly that of sheep and goats, plays a part in the peasant economy also, but this will not be dealt with here.) In western Iran, animals are moved into high altitudes to find pasturage and avoid the hot weather, and to low altitudes to find pasturage and to avoid the cold weather (Tapper, 1969; Barth, 1960, 1961). In eastern Iran, animals are moved in a more limited altitude zone in search of pasture (Irons, 1969; Salzman, 1969). Some migrations are not pastoral migrations, but rather migrations from one kind of resource, pastoral for example, to another kind of resource, such as arboricultural (Salzman, 1969). Nomadism allows use of areas when they are usable and the avoidance of areas when they are not usable. Given technological limits, areas can be thus exploited which would otherwise provide no sustenance for human populations. In this perspective, nomadic movement can be understood as a tool that groups of people use in making their living. While there are social and political implications of nomadism, this key fact cannot be ignored.

The primary military and political implications of nomadism are that its mobility can be put to both offensive and defensive uses. In both raiding and battle, rapid movement facilitates the use of surprise as a tactic; retreat from battle or avoidance of military or political incursions by others is also made possible. Traditionally, the nomadism of certain groups, such as the Turkmen of the Gorgan region, was more a matter of potential mobility for defensive purposes than of extensive migration as adaptation to the physio-biotic environment, although such adaptive movement was not absent (Irons, 1970). But this is an exceptional situation; in most cases, considerable movement was necessary for adaptation to the physio-biotic environment, and the potential for military mobility resulted from the arrangements for that adaptive movement.

To intelligently or even intelligibly discuss the place of the tribes in contemporary Iran, it is essential to distinguish the "political, economic and social goals of Iran." The prime political goal set forth by Reza Shah upon his ascension to power had external and internal aspects: Iran was to be politically independent from other states and free from their interference in her internal affairs. All people and groups in Iran were to recognize the authority of the central government and obey its commands (Arfa, 1964). In practice, these aspects were not unrelated, for those local authorities who were not made to accept the overriding sovereignty of the central government felt free to negotiate and make agreements with foreign powers, usually to the detriment of the operation of Iran as an independent country.

> During the reign of Nasr-ed-Din Shah, the Central Government had a kind of loose control over the provinces, many of which were administered by hereditary governors whose degree of obedience to the Government varied according to the distance of their provinces from Teheran. After the 1906-9 revolution and the 1911 civil war..., this system collapsed, most governors freeing themselves from all kinds of governmental authority except a purely nominal one (Arfa, 1964, p. 47-8).
>
> In particular most of the border regions were under local hereditary chiefs who, although acknowledging allegiance to the Shahinshah, were practically independent, and had their courts, their armed forces, regular and irregular, who more often opposed the Shah's forces than marauding tribes of robbers. These chiefs even conducted correspondence with foreign powers and the Central Government as if they were truly independent. They were the Khans, the Amirs, the Sardars, the Valis in Azerbaijan, Kordestan, Lorestan, Khuzestan, Fars, Baluchistan, Khorasan and Mazenderan, and in that part of the Caucasus which belonged to Iran, before it was annexed by Russia... (Arfa, 1964, p. 1).

It is clear that the tribes were an important part of this problem. They did not accept the authority of the government; they dealt with foreign powers, and furthermore were "marauding tribes of robbers" who looted villages, caravans, and sometimes the cities. Under the guidance of Reza Shah, the army set about pacifying the tribes: the Shahsavan, the Kurds, the Lurs, the Turkmen, the Baluch (Arfa, 1964). But it is noteworthy that in this attempt at political integration, every area and section of the population was a problem, from the governor of the most important province down to the lowliest desert tribe. That is, the problem of integrating Iran politically was by no means a problem with the tribes alone.

From a military point of view, many of the tribes had a special advantage: mobility in a rough country that they knew well. The army had little advanced military technology, in regard either to mobility or firepower, with which to counter this advantage. Sedentarizing the nomadic tribes was a tactic in removing the advantage and thus lessening the military potential of the tribes. It was part of a military solution to a political problem. Circumstances have, of course, changed considerably since that time. The Iranian army is now larger and better organized, and is equipped with modern weaponry and transport. Tribesmen have been disarmed to a greater or lesser degree, and are under the surveillance of government representatives and agents. Tribal irregulars are no longer a match against this modern army, customary migration and mobility notwithstanding. Sedentarization, perhaps a military necessity in Reza Shah's time, would be presently inconsequential in increasing control by the central government. Recent examples of its use seem to be more punitive than strategic. As far as the political goals of avoiding external interference, upholding the authority of the central government, and maintaining local peace and order are concerned, the tribes and their nomadic sections are no longer a major military threat.

But even if the tribes are not a military threat and the mobility of their nomadic sections is no longer of strategic significance, does not the very form of social organization deny ultimate authority to any person or institution outside the boundaries of the tribal unit? Can a modern state such as Iran accept anything less than full loyalty from its citizens, and if the tribal form of organization stands in the way of this loyalty, must it not be destroyed? Loyalty of its citizens is a political goal of every modern state (Fallers, 1963, pp. 204-207) and in striving toward this goal the state must combat every form of particularism and attempt to undermine ultimate loyalties based upon primordial bonds, such as blood, race, language, creed, propinquity, etc., and upon more limited political ties, such as those of the village, province, amirate, sect, party or tribe. In all such dealings, the state must compromise and accept what is feasible, given its minimum demands, just as each particularism has to adjust to a degree to the demands of the state. The tribe is unique neither in its particularism nor in its ability to adjust to circumstances beyond its control. And like the other forms of particularism, it cannot be removed by political acts, but only by changes in the social and economic underpinnings of its existence. In sum, the problem of citizen loyalty is not limited to tribesmen, and certainly not to nomadic tribesmen. Any solution to the problem will involve economic and social integration, rather than direct political acts against tribal organization.

The economic goals set out by Reza Shah and carried forward by Mohammad Reza Shah are national economic independence, modernization and development, and more recently as conceptualized by Mohammad Reza Shah in the "White Revolution," more equal distribution of wealth throughout the country. To what extent do the tribes stand against these goals? It is often thought that tribal pastoralists (presumably the tribally affiliated agriculturalists are not regarded as a problem here) are an economic anachronism. Residing in tents with a minimum of modern amenities and moving about with their animals, the tribesmen seem to be prime examples of a primitive economy. Yet what seems obvious is not necessarily true, and a number of points must be taken into account in a realistic assessment: First, modernization and development are not necessarily a function of fancy edifices, heavy industry and shiny equipment, no matter how powerful these are as symbols. Development must take place in the basic economic activities of the country, and in Iran this means food production, oil extraction, and crafts and light industry. Of these, oil excepted because of its exchange value, food production is the most crucial. Second, pastoralism, the rearing of animals, is a basic part of food production in the most advanced economies. It cannot be realistically despised as a backward activity. From a practical point of view, Iran as a meat importer (*Teheran Journal*, June 10 and 15, 1968; *Iran Tribune*, June 14, 1968) cannot ignore the development of its pastoral resources. In addition, wool is not only a valuable product in its own right, but an important foundation block of the carpet industry. Third, these tribesmen have not maintained their adaptation to be stubborn, but because with the available technology and the conditions of the environment, nomadic pastoralism is a viable adaptation. The greater portion of Iran is both arid and subject to extreme temperatures. This adaptation allows successful exploitation of areas which otherwise would be quite difficult to exploit. Consequently, populations which would otherwise be a drain on limited resources elsewhere are supported. Furthermore, there is evidence that most nomadic pastoralists have a higher standard of living than the agricultural peasants (Barth, 1960, 1964). Fourth, the cost of settling the nomadic pastoralists is prohibitive. According to the economist T. R. Stauffer, "The net economic return upon settlement . . . is seen from these calculations to be minus 105 million dollars [per year] or a net [annual] *reduction* in agricultural output of approximately ten per cent" (1965, p. 298). Furthermore, "Any assessment of the social benefits to be expected also proves to be zero or even negative, since tribal settlement evokes a marked deterioration in the nomads' standard of living, whereas under present circumstances the collective welfare of the peasantry remains quite indifferent to this measure" (*ibid.*, p. 301).

In terms of economic development, it does not seem to be advantageous for Iran to undermine her present pastoral resources. On the contrary, as she is in possession of large numbers of men with cultural commitments to and skills in raising animals and making the most productive use of difficult environments, the rational course would be to invest in this pastoral sector so that it can contribute to a modern food-production economy. There are two levels at which this can be done: First, the marginal environments must be made more reliable through forage production and storage, animal medicine must be made available, and new strains of animal introduced where advantageous. Second, credit, marketing and transport facilities must be made available to redirect the local pastoral economy from a subsistence and local exchange orientation to a national market orientation. Such developments would help to check the deterioration of the physio-biotic environment, as the overstocking and overgrazing which is characteristic of marginal subsistence pastoralism would decrease. The commitments and skills of the nomadic pastoralists, if more fully engaged in the national economy, could turn out to be a most valuable national resource. (See also Barth, 1960, p. 354.)

The social goals of Iran have been set forth by the Shahinshah in the introduction to *The White Revolution:*

> In our noble revolution, the two sacred principles already mentioned, emphasis on spirit and religion and preservation of individual and social freedom have been fully observed, as has the general principle that every kind of exploitation that benefited the interests of limited groups but acted to the detriment of the majority must be discarded.
>
> To realize these goals it was essential that land reform should take place and the feudal landlord and peasant system be abolished; that the relationship between workers and employers should be regularized so that labour should not feel exploited; that women—who after all make up half the population—should no longer be included with lunatics and criminals and deprived of their social rights; that the scourge of illiteracy should be taken away so that illiterates who did not know how to defend themselves would understand and become familiar with their rights; that nobody should die of disease or spend their lives in misery and wretchedness through lack of treatment or care; that backwardness in the villages should be ended, and the undeveloped villages connected with the main centres of the country, and a general condition in harmony with today's civilized world prevail. (Sanghvi, 1968, pp. 347-8.)

Of these goals, those relating to the landlord-peasant system and the worker-employer relationship do not have much direct bearing upon the tribes, except in that certain tribal khans owned or controlled villages. This latter phenomenon is not a necessary or universal feature of tribal organization, and where it exists is not an integral part of the life of ordinary tribesmen. While such land ownership can be the source of trouble, as in the rebellion against land reform in Fars in 1963-64, it is peripheral to the question of tribes, nomadism and pastoralism *per se.* On the other hand, questions of health, literacy and the rights of women can be raised. Once again, however, it is necessary to point out that the tribes are not unique in their distance from these goals; peasants and even parts of the urban population have much progress to make. In fact, those tribesmen who are nomadic are from the start a bit closer to the desired standard: Moving about literally leaves behind some of the sanitation problems that underlie health difficulties among peasants. And the women of nomadic tribes are renowned for their public presence and independent participation (N. Tapper, 1969; Salzman, 1970b). It would of course be a grave error to idealize the conditions among tribesmen and nomadic pastoralists, or to suggest that great improvement was not possible or desirable. But it would be an error in the other direction to think that the tribesmen were particularly to be castigated in these regards. In literacy, the tribesmen, and particularly the nomadic pastoralists, are probably behind the peasants. Most schools are stationary, while the nomads move; schools occupy youngsters, but so do herds and household chores. And yet, these divergences need not exist, as the government tent schools among the Qashqai demonstrate. The Iranian Literacy Corps *(Sepah-i Danesh)* provides personnel to take education to the people, and with a certain amount of logistical planning, educational opportunities can be taken to the tribesmen without disrupting their adaptational activities.

Furthermore, given the Shah's emphasis upon "individual and social freedom," forced sedentarization and forced detribalization (whatever that might entail) can be seen to be detrimental and undesirable irrespective of economic and political considerations. Any such imposed socio-economic uprooting of vast numbers of citizens goes against the spirit of the White Revolution and the social goals of Iran. If "social goals" means anything at all, it means improvements in the welfare of the people, and the welfare of the millions of tribesmen in Iran cannot be considered unrelated to their cultural values, social milieu and customary adaptations. Surely the "goals of Iran" cannot be divorced from the goals of these three million citizens of Iran.

Before going on to discuss the tribes' alleged reluctance to change and to adopt new ways of life, it is necessary to point out that many of the arguments presented above are fully understood and at least partially accepted by the Iranian government. There is, in fact, no program of forced sedentarization or detribalization. Educational, health and veterinary services have to an extent been provided in tribal areas, sometimes as mobile facilities. The Office of Tribal Development *(Edare Abadani Ashair)* of the Ministry of Development and Housing had, in 1968, four regional offices in Luristan, Fars, Kurdistan and Baluchistan, and had proposed five new offices in Gorgan, Mashed, Azerbaijan, Kurdistan (a second office), and Khuzistan. At that time, the offices had been established for only two to four years, and had been primarily engaged in planning and making proposals for the Fourth Five Year Plan, in addition to which they were supervising some small development projects. The Baluchistan Office, headed by Mr. Saidzadeh, submitted a number of projects to the planners: 1) Silos for the storage of fodder against periods of drought. 2) A road from the district capital (Khash) to remote date groves (Mashkel), so that the dates could be transported back to the Iranian market rather than be sold cheaply in nearby Pakistan by the tribesmen. 3) The organization of production and marketing of handicrafts, such as hats, mats, baskets, made of dwarf palm leaves. 4) Sixteen deep wells and fifty shallow wells, all with motors, to supply irrigation water in those places where agriculture is developed. (Saidzadeh, personal communication.)

There are, of course, government officials with little understanding of or sympathy with the tribes, who carry the "archaic tribe" model with them. Highly placed officials in provinces where there are large tribal populations have indicated that their idea of progress is moving all of the tribesmen into Persian-style houses in easily accessible villages from which they would daily go to their new fertile fields in the miraculously transformed semi-desert steppe. It is not surprising that at least some high officials in the distant cities should be suspicious of the tribesmen and their potentials and reluctant to give what seems to be support and encouragement to old enemies and their "rude" patterns of life. All the more noteworthy, then, is the evenhandedness with which the tribes have in general been treated since 1945 and the tentative yet significant support in economic and social development that they have received from the government.

Are the tribesmen truly social and economic reactionaries, bound by their tribal cake of custom, chained by the views of their equally backward fellows, tenacious in their chauvinism and rigid in their traditionalism? Such a view is contrary to recent anthropological thought, which sees culture not as a set of shackles which bind men but rather a set of orientations and frameworks within which men strive to maximize their values (Barth, 1960, p. 354; 1967). As such, neither tribesmen nor their cultures are insensitive to changing circumstances and new opportunities. One must not be misled by the symbolic idiom, often a traditional one, in which new developments are conceptualized. New patterns of behavior called by even the most traditional name are no less innovative.

Most relevant here, perhaps, is the argument that an encapsulated society (such as a tribe) will not be unaffected internally by its contacts with the encapsulating society (the nation-state). These contacts will provide access to various kinds of new resources which can and will be drawn on by tribesmen in their various intra-community and intra-tribal social, economic and political struggles. As these new resources become institutionalized either on a pragmatic or normative level the other tribal institutions will adjust to accommodate them and thus the encapsulated tribe will become more dependent upon and consequently integrated with the larger encapsulating society. (Bailey, 1969, especially Chapters 8 and 9; for an example structurally and geographically close, see Barth, 1959.)

These theoretical considerations are supported by a great deal of empirical study. To cite one case, the author's study of the Shah Navazi (Yarahmadzai)

Baluch of southeastern Iran illustrates the tribesmen's willingness and ability to change and adapt to new circumstances[2] (Salzman, 1969, 1970b). In the semi-desert steppe of the Sarhad of Iranian Baluchistan, this tribe, until pacification in 1935, based its economy on goat and sheep (in a two to one ratio) pastoralism, date palm arboriculture off the Sarhad Plateau at the Mashkel drainage basin, and the exploitation through raiding of Persian peasant communities and trading caravans. Using camels for transport and living for the most part in goat hair tents, the tribesmen migrated with their animals on the Sarhad, and in other seasons migrated from their animals to their date palms. The curtailment of raiding after pacification was a significant economic loss, as the meagre and undependable returns of pastoralism and arboriculture in this unreliable arid environment were not sufficient for sustenance. By 1967-68, two further economic activities were important supplements to the two traditional ones: Migrant labor in surrounding towns (Khash and Zahedan), more distant Iranian cities (Kerman and Bandar Abbas predominantly) and foreign countries (Abu Dhabi and Dubai primarily, Pakistan to a lesser degree) and the complementary and often combined activity of importing goods, especially cloth; irrigation agriculture of wheat and barley (the main dietary staples), vegetables and fruit in the tribal territory. Migrant labor has taken place on a substantial scale in the last decade or two, while irrigation agriculture, based upon the *qanat,* underground irrigation channels, was quite limited. Only in the past few years have agricultural resources in Shah Navazi territory expanded, with the installation of two motor-driven wells (one controlled by the chief of the tribe, and one owned by an outsider, the chief of the small Kurdish tribe) and the availability of funds from the Agricultural Bank. In addition, veterinary services and agricultural advice and aids, such as new strains of grain, have been made use of to a limited but significant extent. In these ways, Shah Navazi tribesmen have taken advantage of economic opportunities in the broader encapsulating societies of the nation and the region, and have taken advantage of the resources offered them through the agencies of the Iranian government.

Various other kinds of social and welfare services have been used by the tribesmen, including those in the areas of health and education. The offerings in these areas are presently limited, and the administration "on the ground" not fully perfected, and, on their side, the tribesmen are not strongly committed to state education or modern medicine, partly because the offerings are limited and the administration imperfect, partly because of the "lack of fit" between these offerings and their ongoing patterns of life and their traditional beliefs and practices. But even where there are hesitations, the flexibility of outlook is obvious: if it can be shown that real concrete advantage will flow from engagement with a government agency and from modifications of traditional behavior, the tribesmen are willing and able. Most of the Shah Navazi men speak Persian adequately (in addition to their native Baluchi); most tribesmen will seek medical aid if their finances allow it; some tribesmen are sending their children to the several Literacy Corps schools in tribal territory. More directly relevant and readily accessible education and more complete and available medical resources would insure greater participation and commitment by the tribesmen. But it is unjustly to belittle the efforts of the Iranian government and the adaptability of the tribesmen to deny the changes that have taken place in recent years.

---

[2] The field study of the Shah Navazi was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation. The author is grateful to that agency, and to the Institute of Social Studies and Research of the University of Tehran, to the British Institute of Persian Studies, and to the Department of Anthropology, University of Chicago.

As regards political integration into the Iranian state, the evidence reveals a partial accommodation. The tribesmen recognize and accept the great military and political strength of the Iranian government. There have been no attempts to establish tribal independence since 1935, and raiding has of course been discontinued. The tribesmen carry their identity papers, are drafted into the Army, and on occasion use the courts to solve disputes. Anti-state sentiments are not openly expressed, but it is difficult to assess what feelings are kept secret or expressed only to intimates. The old times when the Shah Navazi fought the British (during World War I, see Dyer, 1921) and the Persians (1928-35, see Arfa, 1964) are recalled with pride, but this seems to be thought of as a past which is not to be recaptured and perhaps not desirable since "life is much easier now." It would be too much to expect unqualified ideological commitment to the state at this stage of development. The prevailing attitude is rather much more tentative and utilitarian: what will the government do for us?

This tentative attitude suggests that the way to a tribe's political commitment is through its economic and social needs. Projected more generally, this means that, as long as security is maintained, a state government can best achieve political integration of tribes with the larger society by means of economic and social integration. If the tribesmen believe that they are receiving significant economic and social benefits from the state, it seems likely that acceptance of state authority will increase. The interests of the state and those of the tribesmen are not so distant as the "archaic tribe" model would lead one to believe.[3]

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Arfa, Hassan
1964 *Under Five Shahs,* London: John Murray.
1966 *The Kurds,* London: Oxford University Press.
Bailey, F. G.

---

[3] Helpful criticism and suggestions about this paper were given by Professor Dan Aronson of McGill University, and by Joan David Salzman.

1969 *Strategems and Spoils: A Social Anthropology of Politics,* New York: Schocken.

Barclay, Harold
1964 *Buurri al Lamaab: A Suburban Village in the Sudan,* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Barth, Frederik
1959 *Political Leadership Among the Swat Pathan,* London: Athlone.
1960 "Nomadism in the Mountain and Plateau Areas of South West Asia," *The Problems of the Arid Zone,* Paris: UNESCO.
1961 *Nomads of South Persia,* N. Y.: Humanities.
1964 "Capital, Investment and the Social Structure of a Pastoral Nomad Group in South Persia," *Capital, Savings and Credit in Peasant Societies,* Raymond Firth and B. S. Yamey, Editors, London: Allen and Unwin.
1967 "Economic Spheres in Darfur," *Themes in Economic Anthropology,* Raymond Firth, Editor, A.S.A. Vol. 6, London: Tavistock.

Dyer, R.E.H.
1921 *The Raiders of the Sarhad,* London: Witherby.

Dyson-Hudson, Neville
1966 *Karimojong Politics,* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Fallers, L. A.
1963 "Equality, Modernity and Democracy in the New States," *Old Societies and New States,* C. Geertz, Editor, London: Collier-MacMillan.

Firoozi, Ferydoon
1970 "Iranian Censuses 1956 and 1966: A Comparative Analysis," *Middle East Journal,* Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 220-228.

Helm, June (Editor)
1968 *Essays on the Problem of Tribe,* Seattle: University of Washington Press (American Ethnological Society Monograph).

Irons, William
1968 "The Turkmen Nomads," *Natural History,* Vol. LXXVII, No. 9.
1969 "The Turkmen of Iran: A Brief Research Report," *Iranian Studies,* Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 27-38.
1970 "Nomadism as a Political Adaptation: The Case of the Yomut Turkmen," presented at the McGill University Faculty Human Ecology Seminar, March 9, 1970.

Lee, Richard and Irven De Vore (Editors)
1968 *Man the Hunter,* Chicago: Aldine.

Malinowski, Bronislaw
1944 *The Scientific Theory of Culture,* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Mintz, Sidney
1968 "Tribesman and Villager in Southwestern Iran," presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association, New Orleans.

Paine, Robert
1970 "Principles of Herd Management," presented to the McGill University Faculty on Human Ecology, January 19, 1970.

Salzman, Philip
1969 "Multi-resource Nomadism in Iranian Baluchistan," presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association, New Orleans.
1970a "Nomadism as an Adaptive Mechanism," presented to the McGill University Faculty Seminar on Human Ecology, January 19, 1970.
1970b "Movement and Adaptation among the Yarahmadzai Baluch," unpublished manuscript.

Sanghvi, Ramesh
1968 *Aryamehr: The Shah of Iran,* London: Macmillan.

Spooner, Brian
1964 "Kuch U Baluch and Ichtyophagi," *Iran,* Vol. II, pp. 53-67.

Stauffer, Thomas
1965 "The Economics of Nomadism in Iran," *Middle East Journal,* Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 284-302.

Tapper, Richard
1969 "Pasture and Politics among the Shah Savan," unpublished manuscript.

UNESCO, Arid Land Research
1960 *The Problems of the Arid Zone,* Paris.

field—was really under way.[4] With the amendment of the Constitution in 1937 and its legislative reinforcement the next year, *étatism* was included as one of the six cardinal principles of the republic, and so became official government policy.[5] But private enterprise also continued to develop slowly.

The Mixed Economy from World War II until the Republic of 1960

After World War II, national economic policy began to give individual enterprise an important place in the economy, thus stimulating investors and giving them new impetus and courage to go ahead. So private industry grew apace. In the 1950s, the need for infrastructure had become clear in a country where electricity was lacking in all but the larger cities, water supplies and irrigation projects were insufficient for a territory in which so many parts were barren, while roads were poor and, in many places, particularly between small villages, non-existent.

The then-dominant Democratic Party took great strides forward in these matters, and in many ways changed the face of the countryside and the lot of farmers, who became its strong backers. But an important pattern of the era was a *laissez-faire* approach to industrial development, so that by the end of the decade, the increasing private enterprise was unplanned and inflation was serious. With the coming of the new republic in 1960 (often referred to as the Second Republic), private industry continued to forge ahead but planning came into the picture.

The Development Plans

Although there had been industrialization plans under Atatürk in 1936-1939 and from 1937-1942, the first was chiefly a scheme to upbuild the small state industry of the era, and the second came to little because of the problems engendered by World War II, and because the mentality for real development planning had not yet evolved in Turkey. With the domination of the Democratic Party in the 1950s, "almost inherent in the new semi-laissez-faire economic policy was a studied disinterest in any sort of economic planning."[6]

It was not until the revolution of May 27, 1960 that the importance of national[7] economic planning was clearly recognized with the establishment of a State Planning Organization on September 30, 1960, even before the adoption of the new Constitution.[8]

---

[4] See Robert N. Kerwin, *Etatism and Industrialization of Turkey,* A Study of Turkish National Economic Policies and Attitudes (1933-1950), Dissertation for the Ph.D. degree in the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 1956, manuscript, *passim;* Nuri Torun, "Re-organization of the State Economic Enterprises in Turkey," *Planning and Growth under a Mixed Economy,* Istanbul, Economic and Social Studies Board, 1966, esp. pp. 332-351.

[5] Law No. 3460, the Law on the Administration and Control of State Economic Enterprises. See also Law No. 440 of 1964 for amendment and changes.

[6] Robinson, *The First Turkish Republic,* p. 148.

After nearly five years' work, the First Five Year Development Plan became effective in March 1963. It was designed as the first of three five year segments in a total plan period of fifteen years for economic development[9] by rapid industrialization of the country. By the end of the First Plan period an exceedingly creditable record of accomplishment could be seen in various fields, particularly in the physical upbuilding of the country. The rate of GNP increase had been less than five per cent a year at the beginning of the Plan, but five years later the rate was 6.5 per cent and so the target of seven per cent had almost been attained. Although the public sector's investments were about 16 per cent below expectations, those of the booming private sector were about nine per cent ahead. Agriculture, on which the Plan laid much stress, was below expectations, but farm exports remained the backbone of Turkish exports.

While not neglecting agriculture, the Second Plan turned primarily to industry and its development, with the aim of strengthening the position of the weak Turkish balance of payments sufficiently to be able to dispense with foreign development aid during the Third Plan period which will begin in 1973. During the years of the Second Plan, emphasis will remain on the difficult problems of increasing industrial exports and increasing agricultural production. Public investments and public consumption are expected to rise faster than GNP during the Second Plan, and only a moderate increase in the welfare of the people may be expected by 1972. It remains for the Third Plan's impact to better their position markedly.

The most far-reaching innovation of the Second Plan was the greatly enhanced rôle given the State Planning Organization and especially to its Department of Encouragement and Implementation to carry out policies and enter into the actual process of administration.

Industry and the Republic of 1960

The roots of the mixed economy were planted deep by its recognition in the Constitution of the new Republic in 1961, and in both the First and Second

---

[7] Despite Turkey's serious regional problems, planning has been carried out on a national scale only.

[8] The State Planning Organization was set up by Law No. 91, 1960. From 1960-61, laws were enacted by a Committee of National Unity, composed of officers headed by General Cemal Gürsel. The Constitution was approved by a Constituent Assembly on May 27, adopted by referendum July 9, 1961, and promulgated by Law No. 334 on July 27, 1961. See *Constitution of 1961,* translated for the Committee of National Unity, Ankara, 1961.

[9] See *First Five-Year Development Plan,* 1963-1967, Ankara: 1963; *Second Five-Year Development Plan,* 1968-1972, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, Ankara: State Planning Organization, 1969. Preliminary work on the Third Development Plan was begun in 1970.

Plans.[10] The First referred to the public and private sectors as "the two component parts of a whole and not two separate sectors with conflicting interests,"[11] and indicated it was difficult to draw a clear line between the two. The First Plan and legislation of the year following its inception laid stress on public sector investments[12] but the Second Plan leaned somewhat more toward private enterprise.

Public Enterprise Today

Approximately 40 per cent of the capacity of all manufacturing and 80 per cent of the mining industries are owned by the state, as they have been since the 1960s. The kind and variety of public sector activities have grown like Topsy. A large variety of others exists in addition to state enterprises inherited from the Ottoman era, or set up to break foreign monopolies. Some are public services, such as post, telephone, telegraph and radio; others are meant to conserve important natural resources such as minerals and forests;[13] some are intended to provide state control of such dangerous industries as the production and sale of opium and its derivatives, explosives and firearms; still others are manufacturing concerns. In various fields, private enterprise operates in competition with public but in some, private entrepreneurs have found costs too high and rewards too small. Some, such as textiles, welcome state industry as its high prices allow plenty of room for profit by the private textile companies.

Each industrial sector therefore contains different proportions of private and public enterprise. *Sellüloz ve Kagit* (SEKA) controls all the paper industry, while the Sümerbank participates in manufacture of most of the heavy chemicals, half the cotton and wool textiles, etc. The Etibank, producing sulphur, bituminous coal and copper, is also the largest chrome and lignite producer in Turkey.

A new type of public enterprise has developed as a result of a credit agreement between Turkey and the USSR made in 1964 and supplemented in 1967 for the latter to finance certain industrial projects in Turkey amounting to some $200 million. Under a trade agreement dating back to 1937 Turkey had built up a large favorable trade balance with the USSR because of exports of surplus Turkish hazelnuts, raisins, tobacco, etc., for which no Western market could be found. Rather than take a large number of high-priced Russian industrial products in return, Turkey entered a special type of credit arrangement. The USSR contracted to construct large new enterprises in steel, aluminum, sulphuric acid and fibre board for the Turkish public sector. Production is expected to begin in 1972. Credits not already accumulated will be repaid by further exports through clearing arrangements between the two countries.

---

[10] Constitution of 1961, Sec. Three, Art. 40, *First Plan*, "Rules of the Mixed Economy," pp. 53-56, and *Second Plan*, Sec. III and Sec. V, pp. 109-112.

[11] *First Plan*, p. 53. See also Ibrahim Öngüt, "Guidance for private enterprises in a planned mixed economy, Turkish Problems," *Planning and Growth under a Mixed Economy*, Istanbul: Economic and Social Studies Conference Board, 1966, esp. pp. 268-269. The annual Programs indicated the sectors of industry in which it was hoped private enterprises would invest.

[12] Public Law No. 440 replaced Public Law No. 3460 in 1964 and provided the framework for the State Economic Enterprises. Public Law 440 applied only to enterprises aimed at formation of investment capital and excluded monopolies.

[13] Private exploitation of both is allowed under license while the state retains ownership.

State Economic Enterprises, the SEE's

Few state activities except the State Monopolies Administration and a number of the State Economic Enterprises, the SEE's, are even theoretically commercial-type industries aimed at production for profit. Some of the State Monopolies, controlling the manufacture of matches and alcohol (excluding wine and beer), and the sale of salt and tobacco[14] make a little profit. There is a difference of opinion—and to a certain extent of political party stand—as to the true functions of the SEE's. While the Second Plan and many businessmen believe that the SEE's must become profitable concerns, others see the function of all state enterprises as social. As a result of this concept,[15] many SEE's employ large numbers of workers who otherwise would be without full or even partial employment; various state industries are located in remote and backward areas of the country, such as Eastern Anatolia, in which private enterprises as yet find it difficult to make profits.

Financially, economically and politically, the SEE's are of the greatest importance, and have now reached increased levels of fixed investment in the public sector.[16] There are definite legal limits, however, to the SEE's. To be constituted a SEE, an enterprise must be specifically named *as such* in the law establishing it as a joint company, and more than half its capital must be supplied by the state.[17] Even then, the law setting up a joint stock company may specifically give it the status of a private industry. Many such enterprises, however, bemoan their lack of SEE advantages, particularly financial.

---

[14] The activities of the Monopoly Administration come under the Annexed Budgets instead of the general State Budget, which allocates sums to the Annexed Budgets to finance investments and help meet current expenditures. The only Annexed Budget activities from which the State Budget got any return in 1969 were those in which indirect taxes accrued from the sale of monopoly products or those of the Monopoly Administration which made a certain amount of profit. *Turkey,* OECD Economic Report, 1969, pp. 36-37.

[15] For social factors, see arguments in Prof. Besim Üstünel, "Problems of Development Financing: The Turkish Case," *Planning and Growth in a Mixed Economy,* "Discussion," pp. 193-195 and pp. 226-231.

[16] The public sector includes the SEE's, the General and Annexed Budgets Local Administration and the Revolving Funds. The SEE's share is increasing at the expense of the Budget and the Revolving Funds. *The Annual Program,* 1970, p. 12.

[17] See Law No. 440, 1964. The capital structure takes various forms in which: (1) the entire capital is furnished by the state; (2) 51 per cent is owned by the state, but the enterprise is specifically set up as a corporation; (3) 51 per cent is owned by the state and the SEE, and often by foreign capital. See Sadullah Aygun, "Problems of Financing State Economic Enterprises," *State Economic Enterprises,* Istanbul: Economic and Social Studies Conference Board, 1968, esp. p. 214.

The only profitable state enterprises are the publicly owned banks and the pension and social security funds.[18] They have accumulated such substantial amounts of money that they have been able to build and finance various *de luxe*, well run hotels and tourist projects, such as summer camps. But the pension and social security funds use a very large share of their balances to help finance the investment program of the other SEE's. Most of these have such high operational costs that they end each year with operating deficits and thus cannot themselves pay for needed capital expenditures. "There is no time to be lost in taking the necessary action to improve the financial results of the SEE's and their efficiency in general. Meanwhile, it seems that the Social Security and Pension Funds will be expected to continue to bear the brunt of the financing of the SEE's."[19]

The Plans and the Annual Programs have been able to lay down more definite guidelines for the SEE's than for private investment. Decisions concerning individual projects were formerly made in theory by the SEE's themselves but in practice all too frequently were the result of political pressures by various ministries or individuals. During the early part of the First Plan, project preparation was reported as poor,[20] and this was one reason why the SEE's never reached more than 80 per cent of their targets under the First Plan. Now feasibility studies are prepared for individual investment projects, then turned over to the State Planning Organization to work on jointly with the ministry which supervises the particular project. This may be the Ministry of Agriculture in one case, the Ministry of Industry in another, and so on. Final approval comes through the Planning Organization's Department of Encouragement and Implementation.[21] When a project is approved, the Ministry of Finance prepares a document commonly known as "General Investment and Financing Program for State Enterprises." Then further investigation and another decision are made by the State Investment Bank, a public enterprise established in 1964 to make long-term investment loans to the SEE's,[22] and which finances between one-third and one-half of all the SEE's requirements at lower interest rates than are usually available for private industry. Many SEE's have considerable history of not meeting their debts to the government but the creation of the Bank has brought improvement.[23] Although it has no authority to enforce repayment, it can refuse further credit demands or withhold payments for instalments of principal and interest overdue as authorized by the Cabinet.

---

[18] In addition to these, the special Army Pension Fund takes part in financing various private sector projects.

[19] *Turkey*, OECD Economic Survey, 1968, p. 23. "The target in the Second Plan of TL 3.2 billion in 1972 at 1965 prices from this source seems quite feasible given the rapid increase in the number of persons covered by social security law and by the pension fund."

[20] *Planning Development in Turkey*, mimeographed SPO document, undated. See also Osman Nuri Torun, "The Investment Policies of State Economic Enterprises and their Role in the Realization of the Turkish Development Plan," *State Economic Enterprises*, p. 173, "Discussion," p. 201.

[21] In reaching a decision, the SPO studies the project's possible contribution to the national economy, its possible foreign currency earnings and savings, effect on employment, and, finally, comparative costs.

[22] Law No. 441, 1964 established the bank. Its interest rates are fixed by the Ministry of Finance between 5.6 and 8 per cent. The bank's investigation is based purely on financial criteria, to determine whether the project may become profitable enough to enable the SEE to repay the loan within the project's lifetime.

When the Second Plan began, public revenues had increased since the institution of the First Plan, but the SEE's had failed to reach their targets. "The State Economic Enterprises did not improve their financial performance as much as had been hoped";[24] needed reforms in the structure and collection of taxes had not yet been made, and foreign aid was dwindling.

Despite the intentions set out in the Second Plan substantially to raise the profitability of the SEE's in general,[25] their consolidated debts have risen so high that in 1969 they were double those of the preceding year and the SEE losses remained a serious drain on the budget and an important factor in inflation.[26] Several SEE's are such heavy losers as to cause major difficulties in the whole centralized SEE investment and financing operation, and in the entire state budget as well. In 1969, for instance, the railroad, in trouble in Turkey as in other countries, cost the budget TL 800 million and the coal mines TL 400 million—both substantially more than the preceding year[27]—while at the same time, the Ministry of Education's entire budget was TL 2.7 billion and the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare TL 900 million. "Such discrepancy in the allocation of scarce public funds, if it were to persist would not fail to be prejudicial to Turkey's development effort."[28]

The respective rôles of the ministries through which each of the SEE's is responsible to the Grand National Assembly[29] lack clarity. Considerable political interference in investment and pricing, and above all in personnel policies, is still probably the most serious problem. In addition to the almost omnipresent overstaffing of many SEE's is the frustration of their Directors General because they are not responsible for the selection of their own staffs, and a resultant high turnover of top level administrators is inevitable. So "even though personnel expenditures have increased much faster than the volume of business,"[30] it is difficult to recruit trained employees.

---

[23] In 1966, the bank collected 46 per cent of what was due, and in 1969, 79 per cent.

[24] *Planned Investment in Turkey*, mimeographed SPO document, undated, p. 5.

[25] *Second Plan*, c. (5), p. 112.

[26] *Turkey*, OECD Economic Surveys, 1969, pp. 37-8.

[27] In 1968 the corresponding amounts were TL 388 and 125 million.

[28] *Turkey*, OECD Economic Surveys, 1969, p. 38.

[29] *Turkey*, OECD Economic Surveys, 1968, pp. 31-33.

[30] Ismail Ertan, "The Problems of the Reorganization of State Economic Enterprises," *State Economic Enterprises*, p. 141.

Various other reasons can be found for the SEE difficulties. Some of the same problems exist in private enterprise, such as lack of carefully worked out production plans and of adequate cost analyses. But there are especial pitfalls in state industries, particularly in those so far protected from international competition by all but unscalable tariff walls. The Second Plan itself puts a finger on important causes of SEE problems: "the lack of responsibility associated with ownership, failure to establish a clear relation between the risks and rewards of the undertaking and the deficiencies of the direct interference of the state in economic life. The absence of dynamism peculiar to private enterprise in the economic activities of the state causes bottlenecks in communication and an increase in red tape which reduces administrative efficiency."[31] Although defenders of the SEE's stress the losses of many of them as results of tariff policies and limitations on their prices, government commissions set up from 1964 to 1969 to plan SEE reorganization have recognized that SEE difficulties are more basic, as have the Grand National Assembly, and a large segment of business public opinion. Even in 1970 needed reforms still remained a major task awaiting action. But the improvements already made within various state industries must be recognized, as must the great accomplishments of the SPO in lessening red tape and smoothing the path.

Mixed Enterprises

Hope may lie in the large and growing number of industrial ventures of the type called "mixed enterprises," in which state funds are joined with private capital, foreign or domestic, in an industrial undertaking. In some, public enterprise has the largest share and in others, private. Thus *Türkiye Demir ve Çelik Işletmeleri,* generally referred to as Ereğli because of the place of its location, the largest steel producer, is a mixed corporation, 51 per cent private and 49 per cent state owned.

In the partial revulsion against *étatism* which took place in the 1950s, many such mixed enterprises were begun but those which were unsuccessful helped bring the idea into ill repute. In addition, protagonists of public or private industry felt their case for one or the other was weakened by a combination of both. By the time of the Second Plan, however, feeling had changed, and state enterprise was encouraged to enter mixed corporations. They came to be regarded as one answer to the problem of how to carry out such large projects as those involving $100 million or more without forming new SEE's, and so to increase the contribution of the private sector to development efforts. The Plan, furthermore, indicated a preference for this type of undertaking in new industries undertaken by the public sector. Thus a large mixed-enterprise copper complex has been planned near Samsun on the Black Sea.

---

[31] *Second Plan,* p. 111.

Progress of Industry in the 1960s

Despite the problems of the SEE's, industry in general has been moving rapidly ahead. In the latter part of the 1960s, private enterprise was pushing ahead in seven league boots, and was already the fastest growing sector of the economy. Between 1948 and 1967, industrial production grew at an average annual rate of about 10 per cent. Although state economic enterprise had never reached over 80 per cent of its targets in the years of the First Plan, private industry had shot ahead of theirs by approximately eight per cent.

By 1969 and 1970, total industrial output was rising at an annual rate of about 11 per cent, and so was approaching the Second Plan's goals of 12 per cent.[32] If it reaches and continues at this figure, by 1972 Turkey may be said to have become a truly industrialized country, with industry the leading sector of the economy, as the Second Plan envisages it to be.[33] Manufacturing is planned to contribute about one-third of the total increase in GNP, providing over 40 per cent of the growth in employment outside agriculture. "This is a large amount, but if the growth of artisanal activities in food and clothing is allowed for, this can be achieved."[34]

Incentives for Private Industrial Investment

The most important reason for private industry's phenomenal progress is the drive and courage of Turkish businessmen. There is also a large range of incentives made available to both domestic and foreign entrepreneurs for investments in industry in Turkey. In view of Turkey's relationship to the Common Market (European Economic Community), no incentives are allowed any enterprise unless it has promise of international competitiveness.[35] Otherwise, the attractions offered a potential investor have been many and varied—general investment allowances; finances at lower than average rates; deferment and even partial or total exemption from custom duties on important purchases of such items as imported machinery; special priority in import quotas and deduction of investment costs from taxable profits up to 80 per cent of risk investment, and tax rebates on imports.

---

[32] As a result, industry is expected to increase from a 16.3 per cent relative share of GNP in 1967 to 20.5 per cent in 1972. To achieve this, manufacturing is expected to rise to from 22.4 per cent of total investment as compared to 19.6 per cent achieved under the First Plan.

[33] *Second Plan*, p. 3.

[34] *Turkey*, OECD Economic Surveys, 1969, p. 26.

[35] This criterion is suspended if an enterprise can show major secondary benefits to the economy, such as diffusion of new technology. In return, the undertaking must live up to certain standards of modern industry.

Private Investment and the State Planning Organization's Department of Encouragement and Implementation

Some changes were made by a Constitutional Court[36] decision in October 1969 declaring unconstitutional some parts of the Second Plan law establishing the Department of Encouragement and Implementation. Responsible not only for administration of the incentives program, the Department has had other large responsibilities concerning private foreign and domestic industry and investment, and for decisions concerning investment priorities for the public sector. It has nevertheless managed the complexities of administration well, and when it was forbidden the exercise of some of its powers, the administrative process in industrialization was again slowed down.

The Department has had sections dealing with foreign investment, project evaluation, and a bureau dealing exclusively with encouragement and implementation in industry. In its power to grant advantages to private industry for investment, the Department has had jurisdiction over all private investment projects requiring over $200,000 for financing. It has also managed the Development and Encouragement Fund established in 1967 to handle regular Budget allocations and make loans at concessional terms to private firms. Through its divisions, private investors, whether foreign or Turkish, may secure advice on investment prospects for their own and for Turkey's benefit.

A few years ago it was hard to find enough valid investments, but with the increasing boom in private industry, and the help given by incentives and the Department of Encouragement and Implementation, the reverse has come to be true. Thus in the first year of its existence in 1968, 365 projects to a value of TL 7.7 billion were submitted to the Department, of which it granted 183, amounting to TL 3.7 billion. In 1968-69, 418 domestic firms applied for investment aid, and of these 98 were refused, and 320 accepted. In the first quarter of 1969 alone, 96 projects were submitted to a value of TL 1.4 billion, of which 79 were approved, amounting to TL 1.3 billion.

In return for incentive aid, an undertaking must live up to certain standards of modern industry, such as plant construction of minimum size for efficiency and employment of principles of modern management.

---

[36] On October 20, 1969, the Constitutional Court declared certain articles and subsections of Law No. 933 unconstitutional, *i.e.*, Article 1, concerning encouragement funds provided from the Development and Encouragement Fund (Art. 1); investment allowances increasing the upper limit to 80 per cent compared to the fixed lower percentages made available under earlier law (Art. 2A); certain customs duty exemptions (Art. 2B). Exemption from customs duty was again made available for pertinent projects by Decree No. 6/12585 on Oct. 28, 1969, issued in accordance with Law No. 474. A new bill to fit with the Court's decision but maintaining flexibility was pending in the Grand National Assembly on August 1, 1970. Investment allowances for land, buildings and machinery at the rate of 30 per cent for industrial, 40 per cent for agricultural investments and 50 per cent for those in less developed areas remained unchanged by the decision.

Still another way in which private enterprise has been aided has been through the Industrial Development Bank, founded in 1950 jointly with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development[37] as a pilot project to forward industrial growth through individual private initiative, and now a considerably expanded institution.[38] By taking equity participation and giving industrial loans running from five to ten years, the Bank has continued to give the recipient entrepreneurs time and means to modernize their existing industries or establish new ones which promise to be productive.

Imports

An aid—and an impediment—to industry is the high wall of protective tariffs under which Turkey has long operated and which have become higher in recent years. Due to the shortage of foreign exchange, imports are subject to severe limitations, designed to allow entry of only such goods as can be paid for by available foreign exchange, and as are in accordance with Five Year Plan requirements. Foreign exchange shortages have been primarily responsible for the growth of a policy of import substitution, or domestic manufacture of many articles, regardless of cost, to prevent their importation. Such arrangements are apt to encourage inefficient operation and to result in high profit margins, especially for monopolies.

Frequently the limitations on imports are so great as to constitute virtually total prohibition.[39] Despite the high prices for goods made within Turkey, domestic demand has been so pressing that, as living standards rise, all production is bought up at home. The overvalued exchange rate[40] prevailing until devaluation on August 9, 1970, resulted in abnormally low cost for such imports as were allowed to enter the country. There are heavy import duties, taxes and other charges, but these were more than offset by the low prices. So both importation of goods for sale and the protected import-substitute industries became exceedingly profitable. This in turn brought about an increasingly noncompetitive industrial structure, and great pressure on the already weak balance of payments.

---

[37] *Türkiye Sinai Kalkinma Bankasi,* A.S., Industrial Development Bank of Turkey, *Statutes,* 1967, *passim.*

[38] With aid from the World Bank, the European Investment Bank, the USA, Western Germany and Turkey itself, especially by flotation on bonds within the country, still small but significant. See Türkiye Sinai Kalkinma Bankasi, A.S., "Activities of the Bank in 1968," *Annual Statement for the Year Ended December 31st, 1968,* Istanbul, 1969, iii. pp. 59-65. See also *Turkey,* OECD Economic Survey, 1969, pp. 38-9.

[39] "Goods of which internal production quantitatively and qualitatively is sufficient to meet internal requirements at fair prices should not be included in the import lists." *First Plan,* p. 495. The manufacturer of previously imported products now made in Turkey receives total protection if his new domestic-made products, as appraised by the Chamber of Industry, meet certain quality and price standards.

[40] Inflation resulted in an overvalued currency. Until the devaluation of August 9, 1970, the official exchange rate was TL 9 to $1 but the government authorized a special rate of TL 12 to $1 for tourists, diplomatic personnel, and American servicemen in Turkey, but not for business importers, while the free market rate was TL 14 to $1 or higher. At TL 9 to $1, imports tended to be underpriced, while exports tended to be overpriced. With devaluation, the official exchange rate was lowered to TL 15 to the dollar.

Despite the profitability of importation, the difficulties of private industrialists under the prevailing import arrangements are manifold. As new plants come into production, and as manufacturing capacity rises, it is limited in turn by the need to secure enough foreign exchange for importation of raw materials lacking at home, and of machinery not made in Turkey. Thus, for example, a steel industry needs iron ore which necessitates mining equipment, not produced domestically. Import shortages and tight credit remain great and the waiting period to complete foreign exchange requirements has often been so long as to discourage many Turkish entrepreneurs and foreign investors. Because of the delays, a manufacturer must keep a larger than normal inventory of raw materials on hand, thus unnecessarily tying up working capital. But much has been done by the State Planning Organization to simplify procedures since the law of 1967 took effect with the inception of the Second Plan.

Another difficulty for industry is the high cost of basic products manufactured in Turkey, which has a domino effect. For example, the high cost of tin plate at the Ereğli *Demir-Çelik Işletmeleri,* the Ereğli Steel Mill, causes a high cost for tin cans which, in turn, increases the cost of canned food products.

It appears probable that domestic demand will not always support a growth rate of 11 to 12 per cent and that the country must eventually meet the tests of international competition to sell more goods. With this in mind, Turkey became an associate member of the Common Market in 1964 and is now approaching the end of its "preliminary period" of membership and is readying itself for the "transitional period" of some 12 years before the accomplishment of a limited customs union with the Market.[41] Many Turkish manufacturers are girding their loins and looking ahead to the change. Ineffective producers are already being driven out.

Private industry has made progress in the face of other serious problems. Although the largest number of industrial firms are still small, family businesses,[42] many industries are moving ahead both quantitatively and qualitatively, are increasing in size, and using more modern technology, professional managers, and an increasingly skilled labor force to make a growing list of diversified products.

Various private investors, however, still prefer gold, real estate and luxury-type apartments to the risks of industry, so that a great deal of private industry is financed out of personal savings of the entrepreneurs. A capital market is just beginning to emerge with the sales of some industrial bonds and shares through the Development Bank and some commercial banks although most investments in industry are still made from profits or short-term loans by commercial banks. If an enterprise is large and well managed, it is able to qualify for loans from either the Industrial Development Bank or the Industrial and Investment Bank.

---

[41] After the completion of the "transitional period," an additional ten years are required to achieve full customs union and economic integration into the EEC. Problems of Turkey and the EEC are beyond the scope of this discussion.

[42] In 1968, some 1,200 limited companies existed but under 100 non-financial firms had stocks quoted on the Istanbul stock exchange. *Turkey,* OECD Economic Survey, 1968, p. 33.

Under the Second Plan, in general, public industrial investment is to concentrate on essential infrastructure or basic heavy industries.

"In the long run," the Second Plan leaves manufacturing primarily to private industry[43] and the public sector will enter the field only if it would improve existing industrial capacity, or if private industry does not want to enter. In the 1970 Annual Program, manufacture was allotted a substantially larger share of total investment than before.[44] In the past, private enterprise has operated chiefly in light industry, or has produced consumer goods such as beverages, clothing, textiles and food products. It has, however, already begun to invest in the chemical, machinery, cement, vehicles, transportation equipment and metallurgical industries, and has a more important rôle in these sectors in the Second Plan period.

Although the First Plan's promise is reiterated in the Second that the state will ensure equality of opportunity and treatment for private and public enterprises working in the same fields of production,[45] this equality is not always achieved in practice. The Central Bank, for instance, gives credits to privileged borrowers in the public sector only.[46]

Foreign Private Investment

Having had its hands badly burned under the Ottoman Empire by the capitulations under which foreign investors operated, Turkey has become interested in the promotion of modern foreign private investment somewhat slowly. In the wave of international interest and of Marshall Plan Aid in the 1950s, attempts were made to attract foreign private capital but little was accomplished until 1954 when a new law for foreign investment became somewhat more successful.[47]

---

[43] Private manufacturers include: machinery, processed food products (except those with a slow development rate) where the state is given a "pioneering role"; textiles and clothing (public investments are allowed for modernization or enlargement of existing state enterprises and for export potentialities not undertaken by private investors). *Annual Program,* 1969, p. 4.

[44] Rising from 21.5 per cent in 1968 to 24.4 in 1970. *Annual Program,* 1970, Table 6, p. 13.

[45] *Second Plan,* p. 111. Equal treatment does not apply to the interest rate on funds required for investment.

[46] Such as the Monopoly Administration, the Sugar Company, and the Sümerbank.

[47] The early attempts were made under Law No. 5583 of 1950. The more successful law was No. 6224 of 1954.

But delays and difficulties plagued any attempts at investment of foreign private funds. Any foreigner desiring to invest directly in Turkey not only had to buck the age-old objection to foreign "interference"—as indeed it often was—but had to go through the slow-moving mechanism of an inter-ministerial committee. Although not nearly all foreign investment was American, the years of the First Plan were also ones in which the American position on Cyprus was resented by many people as was—and still is—the presence of American troops on Turkish soil. For various reasons, therefore, from 1950-1965, a total of TL 491,115,000 of foreign funds were invested in Turkey[48] under these laws.

Industrial Exports

As Turkey has never turned its attention resolutely towards export as a major part of its economic life, it has regarded the export market as a channel for surplus commodities rather than an end in itself. It is only recently that the Turkish attitude towards exports has begun to change enough "to adapt themselves to the exacting conditions prevailing on the world markets today."[49] So the agricultural domination of exports has remained for many years.

The First Plan therefore devoted its prime attention to increasing agricultural exports to bring in ever-larger amounts of foreign exchange. The attempt was exceedingly successful, in considerable part because of the extraordinary weather during the first part of the period. At the end of the Plan, industrial exports were minimal[50] but necessary for a program of industrialization.

The Second Plan therefore emphasized the need for increased industrial exports. Estimating the total increase of all exports at seven per cent a year (only slightly over the 6.5 yearly average during the First Plan), the Second Plan realized that farm exports will still be dominant for some time but hopefully indicates the share of industrial products will rise from 17.8 per cent at the end of the Second. This rise involves close attention to quality and standardization, better methods of marketing, public relations, and a change in the prejudiced attitude of a number of buyers in other countries.

Attempts have been under way since 1963 to improve the quality as well as the quantity and so change the export pattern. In that year a tax rebate system was introduced[51] by which up to 56 per cent of taxes paid on various exports are returned to the exporter. Although no rebates are given for traditional exports, the list of eligible industries has been made progressively more inclusive so that now even certain farm products are included, but at a lower rate. Exporters may be given credit throughout the manufacturing process up to the time of export;[52] they may have loans to buy the imported raw materials needed for export production; they are eligible for priority in importing such materials up to a limit of 50 per cent of their export earnings.

---

[48] $68,617,998 in dollars. Of this total, American investment amounted to 30.35 per cent, Swiss to 17.66 per cent, the Netherlands 16.02 per cent, West Germany 14.6 per cent, French 6.83 per cent and other countries 14.54 per cent. See Kazim Oksay, *Guide to Foreign Capital Investment in Turkey*, Ministry of Commerce, Ankara, pp. 6-7.

[49] *Turkey*, OECD Economic Report, 1969, p. 20. The Report did not indicate much change up to that time, but evidence exists to show a beginning of change.

[50] In 1968, with agricultural exports amounting to $431.6 million, metals and other mine products accounted for $25.5 million, and "other exports," including manufactured goods, were valued at $38.3 million. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

[51] By Law No. 261.

The administration of export incentives and allocation of the tax rebates, originally in the charge of an Export Tax Rebate Commission in the Ministry of Commerce, was taken over by the Department of Encouragement and Implementation of the State Planning Organization. They have made special efforts to initiate and promote export activities and have established some far-seeing ones such as the organization of regional companies for the export of fresh fruit and vegetables, and a transportation firm equipped with refrigerated trucks. Their efficiency and ingenuity have apparently been a chief reason for an export growth in 1969 of seven per cent over that of 1968, and which brought total exports to some $530 million in 1969.

While incentives make it attractive for a Turkish manufacturer to export, and while he knows Turkey's location gives it markets in both West and East, and the almost untapped ones of the Middle East, he may be held back by two particular factors. Turkey's own industry is booming so that the home market may absorb all he can produce, and he hesitates to expand his factory for an uncertain and untried international market. But, more importantly, his costs are apt to be so high because of the government's import-substitution policy that he could not compete successfully in the rough and tumble of international competition without drastic overhauling of his whole operation. Also realizing that Turkey's Common Market future will make it necessary for him to meet outside competition or wither away, an efficient producer must begin to reduce costs and streamline his operations. While many businessmen believe that lack of enough exports stands out as a major bottleneck in the future development of the whole Turkish economy, others see that the first foundations of an export tradition had been laid.

Tourism

Tourism in Turkey has such great possibilities that it is often called "Turkey's greatest undeveloped resource," and will be a most important industry. Anyone who has seen not only Istanbul with its superb Ottoman palaces and mosques but the breathtaking Greek ruins of the Aegean coast, such as Ephesus, Miletus, Didyma and Aphrodisias, to name only a few; the Greek and Roman remains on the Mediterranean coast; the beauties of the Turkish past in green-surrounded Bursa; or visited the rock churches and dwellings of Cappadocia spiralling in cones from the Anatolian coast; or basked in the warm Turkish sun on the Mediterranean beaches of Antalya or Alanya and on the Aegean beaches from Izmir down to Bodrum has an idea of some of the country's tourist attractions. Although Turkey was late in beginning to exploit them now much has been done to build comfortable and pleasant hotels, motels and camps.

---

[52] Bank credits are offered at a preferential rate of nine per cent. To encourage banks to give these credits, the Central Bank will rediscount paper for the loans at 5.35 per cent.

Under both the First and Second Plans, roads, bridges and other basic infrastructures have been provided by the government so that good roads now lead to places which were inaccessible a few years ago. Although well-run and *de luxe* hotels such as the outstanding Büyük Ankara in the capital, and the fine Büyük Efes in Izmir are financed by the social security and pension funds, priority for investment in hotels and other tourist housing is given to private enterprise, which is aided by long-term credits from the government at low interest rates.[53] With both government and private industry, the new emphasis is on simple and clean arrangements for large numbers of visitors rather than for a few large luxury hotels. The pension funds have built camps in southern Anatolia and private projects are under way for what are referred to as "integrated entertainment and hotel-motel type residential facilities." One of these in Antalya and the other in Muglia together are planned to have some 200,000 beds.

As a result of new facilities and a certain amount of publicity, the number of tourists rose from 163,000 in 1963 to approximately 500,000 in 1969.[54] Even with the planned new accommodations, there is need for still more. If they are completed, the tourist trade better organized and more far-reaching publicity and promotion carried on, a great many more tourists can be expected to come. But there is need for speed, before the tourist wave flowing toward Turkey begins to ebb. And there is still need for attractive small tourist hotels for those uninterested in mass projects.

The Second Plan aims at increase of gross tourist earnings by over 40 per cent a year to reach $135 million in 1972, and a growth of net tourist receipts to $70 million in 1972. Tourist receipts were very low at the end of the First Plan primarily because of the bottleneck of foreign exchange. The overvalued *lira* had caused many tourists to use the black market, where they could get 14 or more *lira* to the dollar instead of the official 9 which they received at the banks and tourist offices. So many Turks, furthermore, go abroad for business or pleasure, and especially for religious pilgrimages to Mecca that their expenditures in foreign currencies have overbalanced tourist income in Turkey, despite a tax of 50 per cent on foreign currency sales in Turkey. So tourism has made no net contribution to foreign exchange. Improvement began after a change instituted on March 1, 1968, by which all tourists exchanging their money at authorized exchange offices received 12 *lira* to the dollar and should accelerate after the August 1970 devaluation.[55]

---

[53] Land owned by the Ministry of the Treasury or forest lands are being leased for long terms at low rates to investors with approved projects.

[54] Those people driving their own cars formed 50.2 per cent, and arrivals by air around 42 per cent in 1968. *Development of Tourism in Turkey,* Ministry of Tourism and Information, Tourist Department, Ankara, undated, apparently 1969.

The Future

Turkey is facing many problems in agricultural development and production, the SEE's, export and import policies, its balance of payments, and its continued lack of enough capital and trained managers and technicians. These problems cannot all be solved during the period of the Second Plan, but the years of the Third Plan, extending until 1978, lie ahead. Meanwhile, in general, during the First and Second Plans, the Turks have chosen wisely among various possible priorities in planning to launch them on their way toward ultimate solutions.

It is a sad commentary on the rôle of the developed countries that just as success appears for Turkey in its development planning, foreign assistance seems destined to be reduced. But there are many plus factors for Turkey. Under the Second Plan, streamlining of procedures has already begun so that not only increased domestic but also foreign private investment has already found its way in Turkey's inviting market. More will pour in when a still more aggressive campaign is carried on to woo investors from other countries. If Turkey carries through with its plans to become a full member of the Common Market, foreign investors will find this an asset. The changed mentality toward exporting on the part of the Turks will also help bring in foreign exchange, as will the newly aggressive campaign to promote tourism which can hardly fail to be successful in a country so rich with tourist sites. By their remittances, Turkish workers abroad are already giving great help in the task of lifting Turkey's balance of payments position from the doldrums, and those who have returned home provide a ready pool of trained workers for new industrial ventures in Turkey.

The most positive factor of all is the patriotism and determination of the Turks. They are now at work trying to lessen the effects on their farm production of the extremes of weather on their great Anatolian plateau. They can accomplish this and much more if they are given time, know-how and have enough capital for investment, and if they have the political stability which they maintained for the decade ending in the winter of 1970 and without which development is all but impossible. They have overcome deeply serious obstacles in the past and will do it again.

---

[55] Foreign diplomatic missions and US civil servants and military personnel stationed in Turkey got the 12 to 1 rate before devaluation. The $10 million rise in tourist receipts in 1968 reflected their inclusion.

TURKISH VILLAGES IN INTERIOR ANATOLIA AND VON THÜNEN'S "ISOLATED STATE": A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

William A. Mitchell

JOHANN HEINRICH von Thünen's *Isolated State* was first published in 1826.[1] In this work he presented a model which showed what patterns of cultivation would develop under certain given conditions. His "Isolated State" was a hypothetical area in which there was only one central city, a market, and an extensive plain of arable land. The area was uniform in its physical characteristics and transportation was by oxcart only. The area was inhabited by farmers supplying the central city, and numerous factors normally contributing to regional diversity of land use were assumed to be constant or nonexistent. The state was commercially oriented but preindustrial, and it was assumed throughout that farming is conducted rationally.

In addition to examining what patterns of cultivation would develop, von Thünen was also concerned with how distance from the Town would affect the farming systems of the various districts. He noted, for example, that the products grown nearest to the Town are either highly perishable or expensive to transport because of a high bulk to value ratio. Von Thünen believed that as distance from the Town increased the land will progressively be given up to products whose value (margin of profit) can stand the higher transport cost. For this reason alone, concentric rings or belts of agricultural land use will form around the Town. Each belt is characterized by its own individually dominant product.[2] This is illustrated in Figure 1.

Various aspects of von Thünen's theory must be clarified or misunderstanding may result.[3] It is important to note that the *Isolated State* contains two theories,

---

[1] J. H. von Thünen: *Der Isolierte Staat* (Berlin: 1826). This book has been translated into English by Carla M. Wartenberg with an introduction by Peter Hall (*Von Thünen's Isolated State,* Glasgow: Blackie and Son, Ltd., 1966). References to von Thünen are based on this English edition.

[2] *Ibid.,* p. xxi.

[3] See "The Present Pertinence of Von Thünen Theory" Annals Commentary, in the *Annals of the Association of American Geographers,* Vol. 57, 1967, pp. 810-815 and "Von Thünen in Retrospect" by Andreas Grotewold in *Economic Geography,* Vol. 35, 1959, pp. 346-355.

△ CAPTAIN WILLIAM A. MITCHELL, US Air Force, is an instructor in geography at the US Air Force Academy, Colorado. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and in no way reflect the opinion of the US government or the US Air Force.


THE ISOLATED STATE
THE LOCATION OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
AFTER VON THÜNEN

CENTRAL CITY
MARKET GARDENING AND MILK PRODUCTION
FIREWOOD AND LUMBER PRODUCTION
CROP FARMING WITHOUT FALLOW
CROP FARMING, FALLOW, AND PASTURE
THREE-FIELD SYSTEM
LIVESTOCK FARMING

Figure I

not one—an intensity theory and a crop theory. The intensity theory says that the intensity of production will depend on the price the farmer gets for his commodity (von Thünen uses grain as his example, but his reasoning could apply to any product), and this price is directly dependent on transport costs and thus distance from the market. Essentially at higher net farm prices, that is sites nearer the market, it pays to choose a more intensive system of cultivation,


THE LOCATION OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN INTERIOR ANATOLIA VILLAGES
VILLAGE HOUSING
GARDENING AND MILK PRODUCTION
CROP FARMING, FALLOW, PASTURE
LIVESTOCK PASTURE

Figure 2

in which a higher level of cost is associated with a later point of diminishing return.

According to Hall the other theory (crop theory) is the central study of the *Isolated State*.[4] It involves the general location theory for a number of different agricultural products. Turkish villages, which are the subject of this paper, will be compared with this theory. More specifically, this is an attempt to determine if von Thünen's crop location theory is valid for villages in interior Anatolia (Figure 2).

Confusion about the crop theory permeates the literature. Even though von Thünen's crop location theory does not follow any simple rule of intensity, the predominant impression is one of rising intensity toward the Town. Chisholm supports this idea with his generalization that those systems which have large inputs of manure, labor, etc. are generally located near the market and the more extensive ones farther away.[5]

---

[4] Hall, *op. cit.*, p. xxx.

The application of von Thünen's model to villages in general is carefully discussed and supported by Chisholm.[6] In order to test the applicability of von Thünen's crop theory to interior Anatolian villages, the villages of Alişar, Hasanoğlan, Yassihöyük and Sakaltutan will be substituted for the "Isolated State." Interior Anatolian villages will be considered as mainly self-governed, legal personalities with populations under 2,000. Included within the village boundaries are dwellings, fields and pastures which are commonly or individually owned by the inhabitants.

Ideally, for a study of this nature one should randomly select villages from all six geographical regions in Turkey so that a more representative sample would be obtained. Unfortunately, however, there is very little data concerning spatial location of agricultural products at the village level. Thus the test sample is composed of four villages in the interior Anatolia region which have been studied in some detail.

Von Thünen used economic rent as an analytical tool in the formulation of his concentric crop zone concept. Ideally, the same tool should be used when evaluating Turkish villages. However, since Anatolian villagers do not operate within strict "costing" and "input-output" terms, and quantitative and economic data does not permit statistical evaluation of economic rent for Turkish villages, distance will be substituted for economic rent and provide the basis for analytical comparison. One should not confuse the current usage of the word "rent" which denotes payment by a tenant for the right to use land or property with von Thünen's definition which involved economic competition between crops or groups of crops for the use of land. Distance and cropping pattern data for the analysis is drawn from the literature and village maps. In some instances these maps are drawn based partly on descriptive information taken from the literary source.

There is justification for substituting distance for economic rent when evaluating village cropping patterns. Because of the amount of time spent in travelling back and forth, fields which lie faraway from the village incur higher costs of operation than do closer plots. Obviously, if the distance is sufficiently great there will be no profit in cultivating a particular crop on the more distant lands. Therefore, at certain distances from the village, the advantage of cultivating a particular crop or group ceases and others take its place.

It should be noted that in most Turkish villages distance equals human travel time and this probably could be converted into money costs if time-and-motion studies for villagers were available.[7] Thus the law of diminishing returns tends to make cultivations of lesser intensity locate farther from the village. This does not necessarily require villagers—*köylü*—to be economically rational. In many cases they seem not to be,[8] even though in most cases they do not choose to do more work than is rationally necessary (in their terms).

---

[5] Michael Chisholm, *Rural Settlement and Land Use* (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1962), p. 28. This book has been recently revised.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 47-75.

In essence, this writer is saying that Turkish villages more nearly correspond to subsistence, rather than commercial, economies. The value of land can more appropriately be considered in terms of the duration and intensity of labor that must be employed on it for production, than in terms of economic rent. Distance of agricultural land from the settlement then becomes important since it reduces the amount of time that a villager can labor in the fields. Therefore, distance will substitute for economic rent and will be considered as the important variable for comparison of Turkish village land use patterns to von Thünen's model.

Now to turn to an examination of the physical and cultural variables of interior Anatolia: After examining the variables, an interpretation of the cropping patterns will be made. The major point of inquiry is to determine if the villages display the agricultural zones—*i.e.* vegetables and milk, forest products, three zones of field crops and ranching—which are shown in von Thünen's model (Fig. 1).

The test site is on a large rolling plateau standing at an average height of about 3,000 feet. It is enclosed on all sides by mountain chains which shield it from marine influences. For the most part the region is an open, treeless landscape with scanty vegetation. Annual precipitation averages between 20-40 centimeters and occurs mainly in the spring. This is the most frequently and most severely drought-affected area in Turkey.

There are generalizations about the contemporary interior Anatolian village which can provide further understanding. While the dominance of wheat is evident in almost all villages, barley is an important second of the dry farming crops. There is always some fallow land around the village and vegetables are irrigated. Fertilization is seldom practiced because there is little natural forest in interior Anatolia and animal manure must serve as fuel during the cold winters. The traditional animal-drawn wooden "needle" plow and two wheel wooden oxcart are used. Small plots are hand-cultivated, and hand-harvesting predominates. All land within the village boundaries is owned by the villagers as a whole, for pasture, or by individual villagers as crop land. The irregularity of field shapes is particularly striking to an American observer. This is attributable in part to adjustments to terrain and soil, but much is related to the villager's attitude. There is no evident desire for orderly patterns. Morrison, as do others, states that field shapes reflect, to a considerable degree, the villager's lack of interest in the future.[9]

---

[7] See Chisholm, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-49, for a more complete discussion.

[8] Paul Stirling, *Turkish Village* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966), p. 70.

In all, Alişar, Hasanoğlan, Yassihöyük and Sakaltutan adapt well to these generalizations on Anatolia. However, one should be aware that there can always be minor exceptions.

Land use zones of Alişar (Fig. 3) indicate that in the area nearest the village, intensively cultivated gardening is conducted. However, the availability of manure is not a major contributing factor for garden locations. Generally, manure is used for fuel and only ashes and a small amount of fowl manure are used in the gardens. Gardens parallel the village and the Alişar Stream. The elongated pattern of the garden is mainly a result of adaptation to the water source and topography. Interestingly, there is an adjustment to distance even within the irrigated garden lands. The more intensively cultivated vegetables, fruit and grapes are closest to the village, while the irrigated grains and other crops are farther out.[10]

There are no stands of forests in Alişar but a few trees are located within the garden area. This location is a cultural-ecological adaptation to a water source to provide a minimum of construction materials, not for fuel as in the "Isolated State."

Data is not available to correlate Alişar's land with von Thünen's three zones of increasingly extensive field crops (zones 3-5). However, dry farming grain crops, with one year fallow, form a roughly concentric zone around the gardens and village. Their irregularity in shape is mainly an adjustment to soils and topography.

There is no distinct zone 6 in Alişar. Pastoralism is conducted on the large areas within the village lands which are unsuited for cultivation, and on the fallow lands and meadows. Thus the steep slope running northwest to southeast through Alişar provides a large portion of the grazing lands. This steppe land and the meadows are the only areas used exclusively for grazing.

Alişar seems to uphold von Thünen's principles of land use. Within its boundaries, certain land use pattterns emerge. When the villagers have a choice, they tend to grow the more intensive crops closest to the dwellings. This is evidenced by vegetable gardens and irrigated crops immediately surrounding the settlement. There is an adjustment to distance even within these irrigated lands (unfortunately, the map scale does not permit this indication). Physiographic barriers tend to prevent concentric zones from forming.

A close look at Hasanoğlan[11] (Fig. 4) shows that intensively cultivated vegetable gardens are grown closest to the village. They are often intermingled

---

[9] John A. Morrison, *Alişar: A Unit of Land Occupance in the Kanak Su Basin of Central Anatolia* (University of Chicago Libraries, private edition, Chicago, 1939), pp. 11-12.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.

[11] Ibrahim Yasa, *Hasanoğlan—Socio-Economic Structure of a Turkish Village*, Public Administration Institute for Turkey and the Middle East (Yeni Matbaasi, Ankara, 1957).

ALIŞAR


Milk Production
Extended Vegetable Garden
Vegetables
Cultivated Fields
Grazing Land
N
800
METERS
Village Area

Fig. 3. Source: Modified after John Morrison, Alişar: A Unit of Land Occupance in the Kanak Su Basin, (Univ. of Chicago, Illinois, 1939), figure 13. The extended vegetable garden is based on Richard D. Robinson, "Alisar Village Revisited", Newsletters, 25 October 1949, figure 1.


HASANOĞLAN
N
MILK PRODUCTION
VINEYARDS
VEGETABLES
TREES
VINEYARDS
PASTURE
DRY CROPS
DRY CROPS
VILLAGE INSTITUTE
HASANDERE

Fig. 4. Source: Modified after Ibrahim Yasa, Hasanoğlan - Socio-Economic Structure of a Turkish Village, 1957, p. 13. This map does not show all of the village territory.

with the poplar trees and are grown as close to the village as water for irrigation allows. Some poplar trees are grown along the Hasan Stream. One explanation von Thünen gives for the location of intensive vegetable cultivation near the city is the availability of manure which could be used for this purpose. This factor, however, does not hold true for Hasanoğlan. Again, dung is used for fuel, not fertilizer. Milk is supplied by cows, goats and buffaloes and is collected near the edge of the village. The cattle graze on pastures which are the lands farthest from the village.

Data is not available to correlate Hasanoğlan's field patterns with zones 3-5 (three zones of increasingly extensive field crops). However, dry farming grain crops without fallow are grown between the zones of vegetables, trees and vineyards and the outermost, less intensively used grazing lands.

Again, we see within Hasanoğlan's boundaries certain land use patterns emerging. Vegetable gardens (high labor input) are located as close to the settlement as a water source permits. The less intensive cultivated fields follow, and are located as near the settlement as physiographic barriers permit. Permanent pastures occupy the areas furthest from the settlement. Yasa describes the land use patterns as follows: "Within 15 minutes walk of the village are vineyards (those along the stream), beyond are the fields, then pasture lands extending to the boundaries of the village territory."[12]

There has been some shift from purely local consumption of products, *i.e.* commercialization of milk products, but this probably has not significantly altered the general pattern of land use in the areas surrounding the village settlement. Von Thünen's principles of land use again seem valid for Hasanoğlan.

In our third test village, Yassihöyük[13] (Fig. 5), horticulture and milk are found in the zone closest to the village but manure from the animals is also used for fuel, rather than fertilizer. Most of the vegetables are grown in a linear pattern along the Sakarya River. This is attributable to the limited water supply in the village as opposed to the more assured supply for irrigation provided by the river. There are a few poplar trees along the river bed and inside the housing area. The trees, however, are not used for fuel and only a few branches are taken for building purposes. The location of the sugar beets is attributable to the availability of water from the Sakarya River. Dry farming fields (zones 3-5) are generally farther from the village. As in most villages grazing lands extend to the outer margins of the village.

Although there is no complete uniformity of arrangement, certain land use patterns emerge in Yassihöyük. Vegetable gardening is located in the village settlement and along the river where water for irrigation is available. When the villagers have a choice, *i.e.* when physiographic conditions permit, they tend

---

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

[13] Middle East Technical University, *Yassihöyük, A Village Study* (U.S.A.I.D. Ankara, 1965).


YASSIHÖYÜK
GRAZING
N
GRAZING
DRY CROPS
BURIAL MOUND
SCATTERED FRUIT TREES
MILK PRODUCTION
VEGETABLES
DRY CROPS
VEGETABLES AND BEETS (4 YR. ROTATION)
2 mi.
GORDIUM
SAKARYA

Fig. 5. Source: Modified after Middle East Technical University, Yassihoyuk, A Village Study, 1965, p. 1. This map does not include all of the village territory.

to locate cultivated fields as near the village as possible. Permanent pastures occupy land unsuited for cultivation or farthest from the settlement.

There has been some shift toward commercialization, *i.e.* sugar beets, but this has not altered the general pattern of land use. As with the other villages, von Thünen's principles of land use seem valid for Yassihöyük.

The generalized map (Fig. 6) of Sakaltutan indicates that intensive vegetable production is located nearest the village. Unlike the "Isolated State," manure is not provided by the milk animals but rather by chickens and pigeons. Partly because of the environment, forests do not make up zone 2. Extensive dry farming is conducted just outside the intensive gardening areas. Permanent grazing lands occupy areas unsuited for cultivation. However, there is grazing on the dry crop fields which are left fallow each year.

Although there is no complete uniformity of arrangement, certain land use zones are evident in Sakaltutan. When given a choice, the more intensive crops are grown closest to the village. There are physiographic barriers which must be adjusted to, but generally there is a pattern of decreasing intensity of land use outward from Sakaltutan. Von Thünen's principles of land use also appear valid for this village.

Now it is appropriate to compare von Thünen's agricultural zones with the villages as a combined unit. The Summary of Correlations (Table I) shows that in certain villages the spatial distribution of agricultural production is in accordance with von Thünen's principles of land use—*i.e.* the intensity of land use generally decreases outward from the village. Commercial market gardening and milk production were found in zone 1 of von Thünen's model. The test villages, with one exception, correspond to this pattern by having intensive irrigated gardening and milk production, although primarily for local consumption. Von Thünen's zone 2, located farther from the town, produced firewood and lumber for commercial sale. Because of ecological factors that result in an infrequent occurrence of this resource, such a zone was not found in interior Anatolia. Von Thünen's zones 3 through 5, where intensity of land use continues to decrease outward from the Town, included: 1) a zone of crop farming with fallow; 2) a zone of crop farming, fallow and pasture; and 3) a zone of threefield system use. All three of these zones were commercially oriented. Unfortunately, available data did not permit a thorough investigation into the possibility that such zones exist in the test sites. The villages did display a mixture of agriculture patterns, such as crop farming with fallow, without fallow and pasture on fallow. And finally, von Thünen's sixth zone of commercially-oriented livestock farming, on the more distant land, is comparable to a similar, less intensive use of the land. The outermost zone in the Turkish case comprises animal grazing primarily for subsistence purposes.

Even though interior Anatolia village land use patterns correspond with the

SAKALTUTAN


TO KAYSERI
GRAZING
TO ELBAŞI
DRY CROPS
DRY CROPS
GRAZING
MILK PRODUCTION
VEGETABLES
GRAZING
VINEYARD?
DRY CROPS
DRY CROPS

Fig. 6. Source: Modified from Paul Stirling, Turkish Village, 1966, p. 19. This map does not include all of the village territory.

TABLE I *Summary of Correlations*

von Thünen's "Isolated State"	Interior Anatolia			
	Alişar	Hasanoğlan	Yassihöyük	Sakaltutan
Zone #1 Market gardening and milk (Commercially oriented)	Subsistence gardening and milk (Local consumption)		Subsistence gardening, primarily, but some commercial sales (beets only)	Same as Alişar and Hasanoğlan
Zone #2 Firewood and lumber production (Commercially oriented)	Resource unavailable on a scale for such usage			
Zone #3-5 Crop farming without fallow; Crop farming, fallow, pasture; Three-field system	Crop farming with fallow, pasture on fallow Wheat[1] Barley Rye	Crop farming without fallow Wheat[1] Barley Lentils	Crop farming with fallow, pasture on fallow Wheat[1] Barley	Crop farming with fallow, pasture on fallow Rye[1] Wheat Barley
(Commercially oriented)	(Primarily subsistence but surplus, if any, is sold)			
Zone #6 Livestock farming (Commercially oriented)	Pastoralism[2] (Grazing for animal subsistence only)			

1. Crops listed in order of economic importance for village subsistence.

2. Occupies a large portion of lands distant from the settlement, but there is a large degree of mixing between cultivated fields and pasture lands. This is attributable to physiographic conditions—pastures occupy land unsuited for cultivation.

principles of the "Isolated State," von Thünen's model must be modified to "fit" interior Anatolian villages. Hypothetically, interior Anatolian villages display three concentric zones of land use when physiographic conditions permit. Zone 1 includes the most intensive land use area—gardening and milk—closest to the village. Following, in a zone of decreasing intensity, are the grain fields. The most distant or third zone is used for grazing which is the least intensive activity (Figure 2).

An analysis of Turkish villages in light of von Thünen's model essentially results in a comparison of a "near-subsistence" economic system to that of a commercial one. One may have doubts about the validity of comparing land use patterns of one economic system to a model derived from a completely different orientation (commercial). Hopefully, the following explanation should clear up any doubts that may exist.

In a commercial economic system, obviously, the farmer is cost-benefit conscious, that is, he will constantly try to maximize his income. This is not always true for the Turkish case. To the villager utilizing a "near-subsistence" economic system, survival and the continuance of his standard of living seems to be his main concern. Sakaltutan provides evidence of villagers who generally lack interest in increasing yields.[14] It seems that the Anatolian villager, producing primarily for the needs of his own family, attempts to be as self-sufficient an economic unit as possible.[15]

A common denominator—by which both the commercial and "near-subsistence" economic systems can be evaluated—is needed. Distance serves this purpose. The "economic man" wants his actions to result in obtaining the maximum dollar. He accomplishes this, in large part, by reducing transport costs which correlates with distance from the town. On the other hand, the Turkish villager wants to survive. The length of daylight hours imposes limitations on the labor-time that he can devote to his agricultural pursuits. In addition to his agricultural responsibilities, numerous domestic chores must be accomplished (maintenance of living area, religious duties, community duties, etc.). All of these things come before he has time for rest. Thus, for the villager, time becomes a critical factor. To reduce the non-productive time involved in walking from one field site to another, the villager logically conducts those activities which require more attention (time) nearest the village. This is clearly related to the fact that for villagers in interior Anatolia distance equals non-productive travel time and is to be reduced whenever possible. Making allowances for the physiographic barriers, this is reflected in the test sites by the general decrease in intensity of land use outward from the Turkish villages. Of course physiographic factors sometimes create obstacles to preferred agricultural production location areas and must be taken into consideration when examining the village maps.

---

[14] Stirling, *op. cit.*, pp. 45, 80.

[15] Resat Aktan, Project Director, *Analysis and Assessment of the Economic Effects Public Law 480 Title I Program Turkey* (Ayyildiz Matbaasi, Ankara, 1965), p. 127.

In conclusion, one must be especially cautious in extrapolating or generalizing about a statistical population of thousands which has been scarcely sampled. However, based on the four test samples and on personal observation in numerous Anatolian villages, it is felt that the modification of von Thünen's model (Fig. 2) and the principles upon which his model was built, are generally valid for many interior Anatolian villages. Hopefully, this paper confirms what von Thünen once said: "The principle on which the Isolated State was formed exists also in reality; though here, where numerous other factors enter into operation, it manifests itself in very different ways."[16]

---

[16] Hall, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

Egypt Under Nasir

A Study in Political Dynamics

By R. HRAIR DEKMEJIAN

Egypt Under Nasir is a comprehensive study of Egyptian politics since the 1952 Revolution with special emphasis on the interaction of charismatic leadership, ideology, elites, social groups, and institutions. Based predominantly on original Arabic-language sources, the study traces the evolution of the political system from 1952 through the June 1967 War and the aftermath of President Gamal Abd al-Nasir's death in 1970.

The central portion of the book is devoted to Nasir's attempts to build a new order on the basis of the legitimacy of his charisma and according to his new ideological precepts. The various constituent elements of the new revolutionary order—National Union, Arab Socialist Union, National Assembly—are discussed in detail. This section also contains an extensive study of the Egyptian power elite since 1952.

ISBN 0-87395-080-1 **$10.00**

The Middle East Supply Centre

By MARTIN W. WILMINGTON

Edited by Laurence Evans

Foreword by Commander Sir Robert Jackson

During World War II, the United States and Great Britain contributed to the successful operation of a regional organization which indisputably saved the Middle East for the Allied cause and which, if perpetuated, might have formed the basis for regional peace and stability. This was the Middle East Supply Centre, whose creation, evolution, responsibilities, and activities are described analytically in this volume.

Beyond the author's narrative and analysis of the Centre's wartime logistical activities, he has placed the whole enterprise in a far larger setting: Anglo-American collaboration; the imperious influence of world powers; the aspirations of underdeveloped nations; and the growth in the area of "economic regionalism."

ISBN 0-87395-081-X **$10.00**

State University of New York Press

Albany, New York 12201

CHRONOLOGY

February 16, 1971—May 15, 1971

Arab Israeli Conflict

1971

Feb. 16: US State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey said of Israeli plans for housing projects in occupied Jerusalem: "Pending a settlement of the issue of Jerusalem, which is really a part of the negotiation, we feel that unilateral actions that tend to be regarded as changing the status of the city—we would find that unacceptable."

Israeli Mayor of Jerusalem Teddy Kollek said Israel's right to build in occupied Jerusalem "is a right that cannot be shaken." He added that Israel is "trying to build a good city for all the citizens of Jerusalem regardless of any future boundaries and as befits good city planning. . . . Whoever introduces politics brings an alien element into this question."

Feb 17: UPI reported Yāsir 'Arafāt met with the Soviet Ambassador to Jordan on Feb. 16 to discuss the possibility of a Palestinian state on the West Bank.

Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban said Israel would insist on keeping some occupied Arab territory under a peace settlement.

President Nixon said he was encouraged by developments especially since Egypt had been "more forthcoming than we expected" and Israel had been "somewhat more forthcoming."

Feb. 18: Israeli Minister of Housing Zev Sharef said US opposition to housing projects in Jerusalem only solidified popular support for the plans and the decision to build was taken in 1967 and the government continues to see "Jerusalem as one."

Jerusalem Mayor Kollek expressed reservations about the plan but added: "We are in full agreement that there must be building and that Jerusalem must never again be 'a divided city'."

The New York Times reported "well-placed diplomats" as saying Egypt told UN Special Envoy Gunnar Jarring that Egypt would sign a peace agreement with Israel in return for withdrawal from all Arab territory occupied in June 1967.

Feb. 19: Israeli Minister Without Portfolio Israel Galili said Egypt's offer to sign a peace agreement was a positive element "even if it is only nominal," and added that Egypt should be willing to talk directly with Israel who was willing to open direct talks, "openly or secretly," within 24 hours.

Feb. 20: Commander-in-Chief of the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) 'Abd al-Razzāq Yaḥyā called for the dissolution of the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) which "had set itself up in place of the Executive Committee contrary to the PLO's charter" and this led to "double leadership and blurring of responsibility."

Feb. 21: The Israeli Cabinet issued a communiqué which said Israel "views favorably the expression of readiness of the Government of Egypt to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and expresses its own readiness for meaningful negotiations. . . . The Egyptian note demonstrates the concrete differences . . . particularly the substantial gap which exists on the issue of borders and refugees. . . . The Govt. of Israel reiterates its position . . . that Israel will not withdraw to the armistice lines of 4 June, 1967."

The Central Committee of the PLO denied that the PLA was challenging the leadership of Yāsir 'Arafāt and rejected the idea of establishing a separate Palestinian state.

An Egyptian spokesman said the Israeli communiqué was a "categorical rejection" of Cairo's position.

Feb. 22: Syrian Premier Ḥāfiẓ al-As'ad said the peace talks would win world public opinion to the Arab cause but "force of arms" would determine the outcome.

Feb. 23: Egypt and Jordan protested to UN Secretary General U Thant against Israeli housing projects in areas of Jerusalem occupied in June 1967.

Jordanian Foreign Minister 'Abdallāh Ṣalāḥ said Jordan would recognize the existence of Israel if Israel would withdraw from all Arab territory. He added that Jordan and Egypt were adopting a single policy to achieve peace.

Feb. 25: President Nixon said no lasting peace could be achieved "without addressing the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people." He said the Arab governments would not accept a settlement without "recovery of terrtiories lost in the 1967 war" and "without such acceptance, no settlement can have the essential quality of assured permanence." Major power guarantees "could add an element of assurance."

Feb. 26: Jordanian Foreign Minister Ṣalāḥ said

Nixon's statement on Feb. 25 showed "understanding" and Nixon "is trying to find a settlement."

Feb. 27: Al-Ahram said Egypt was satisfied that progress was being made in the Jarring talks and that the cease-fire would be extended past March 7.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) called on the entire guerrilla movement to prevent a peaceful settlement.

Feb. 28: The London *Sunday Observer* reported an interview with King Ḥusayn in which he said Jordan would sign a peace agreement with Israel if Israel would withdraw from all Arab territory. He said "there may be some room for minor rectification" of the border "on a reciprocal basis."

Egypt charged Israel with closing the doors on a peace settlement by refusing to withdraw from occupied territory.

UAR President Anwar al-Sādāt told the Palestine National Council meeting in Cairo that Egypt would never agree to a separate peace with Israel: "There is but one solution—an Arab solution."

The Soviet Union said Israel's refusal to withdraw from all Arab territories had set back chances for peace.

Mar. 2: Egypt said the Israeli stand not to withdraw from all Arab territory "flagrantly defies the United Nations Charter and the Security Council resolution and constitutes a challenge to the big four powers which should shoulder a particular responsibility. . . ."

Mar. 3: Iraqi Ba'th Party Assistant Secretary General Shiblī 'Aysāmī said Egyptian and Jordanian willingness to conclude a peace agreement with Israel "brought the Arabs to a plight worse than their plight in 1948" and said only armed struggle would eliminate aggression.

Rumania accused Israel of blocking the way to a negotiated settlement.

Mar. 4: A meeting of the Big Four powers failed to reach agreement on a joint communiqué about the Middle East situation. *The New York Times* reported "reliable sources" as saying the US wanted to include an appeal for an extension of the cease-fire. The appeal was opposed by the USSR.

Mar. 5: UN Secretary General U Thant appealed to Israel to "respond favorably" to a request from Jarring for a commitment to withdraw from all Egyptian territory to the boundary between Egypt and the former British Mandate of Palestine. He called on both sides to "withhold fire" when the cease-fire expires on March 7.

Muḥammad Haykal, writing in *Al-Ahram,* said the Middle East crisis could be solved if the US and USSR adopted similar positions and, since the Soviets support the Arabs, the US should be "neutralized" in the crisis.

Mar. 6: UN diplomats disclosed that a UN proposal sent to Israel on Feb. 8 requested Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territory with free Israeli passage through the Suez, security at Sharm al-Shaykh and establishment of appropriate demilitarized zones.

Israel said Syrian planes flew over Israeli positions in the Jawlān region.

Mar. 7: President Sādāt said Egypt would not extend the cease-fire but would continue to cooperate in diplomatic efforts. He appealed to the US "to perform its duty." "The United States has promised us directly, especially in the last month, that it objects to . . . the principle of seizing land by force of arms." Sādāt revealed that he made an unannounced visit to the USSR on March 2-3 and returned "satisfied" that the Soviets support "our just rights absolutely and positively."

Mar. 8: The New York Times reported that the PLO's budget showed a deficit for the first time because of the failure of Arab states to honor their financial commitments.

The US endorsed U Thant's appeal for an Israeli pledge to withdraw from Egyptian territory.

Israeli troops were put on alert along the Suez Canal as the formal cease-fire expired.

Mar. 9: US Secretary of State William Rogers said it would be "helpful" if the USSR would reduce its military presence in Egypt as part of a settlement.

Mar. 10: Israeli Premier Golda Meir said Israel's declaration barring total withdrawal from Egyptian territory was a negotiating position.

An Israeli policy paper released in the US said Israel would not accept the kind of international security arrangements for Sharm al-Shaykh proposed by Jarring and would "resist all pressures, from whatever source, be they military or political, that aim at resurrecting Israel's past territorial vulnerability."

Mar. 11: A US State Department spokesman said the US "is not exerting pressure on the Israeli Government."

Mar. 12: Premier Meir said Israel's settlement terms included: a demilitarized Sinai; Israeli occupation of Sharm al-Shaykh; a mixed international truce force; a Jordanian port at Gaza; the Jawlān district and a united Jerusalem under Israel and a demilitarized West Bank under Jordan.

Mar. 13: Syrian Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Ḥalīm Khaddām rejected the idea of a Big Four peace force in the region.

Mar. 15: Cairo Radio reported the Central Committee of the PLO ended a 2 day meeting in Damascus after forming a new military command with Yāsir 'Arafāt as Commander-in-Chief and 'Abd al-Razzāq Yaḥyā as Chief of Staff.

The UN Commission on Human Rights passed a resolution condemning Israel's "continued violation of human rights" in the occupied territories.

Mar. 16: Syrian President As'ad said Syrian and UAR forces were under one command and he supported the UAR's participation in negotiations as "complementing" the battle for liberation.

US Secretary of State Rogers said "there seems to be an impasse" in the Jarring talks and urged Israel to seek security in a political settlement rather than in "acquisition of territory."

Mar. 17: Meir said of the US proposal for international guarantees of Israel's borders: "We cannot trust Roger's offer, even if it is proposed in good faith." Israeli Minister Without Portfolio Galili said the government would "go to the nation" when it was time to decide on peace borders with the Arabs.

Mar. 18: Israeli Foreign Minister Eban met with U Thant and Jarring in New York.

Mar. 19: After meeting in the US with Rogers, Eban said he came to explain and not to change his view that Israel would not withdraw to the pre-1967 war boundaries.

Israeli Deputy Premier Yigal Allon said: "All the modern developments in military technology cannot negate the importance of geographically defensible positions. There is no alternative to a peace treaty and secure borders which we can defend with our own forces."

Egypt charged that 2 Irsaeli jets crossed the Suez Canal and were driven off by air defenses.

Mar. 20: A small Israeli force crossed into Lebanon and conducted a house to house search for guerrillas in the village of al-'Adīsah according to a Lebanese spokesman.

Mar. 21: Eban said his talks in the US convinced him the US would not try to impose a solution on Israel.

Mar. 24: Meir said Israel would pay compensation for Arab property in Israel but rejected the idea of a West Bank Palestinian state as "a knife in our backs."

The New York Times reported "reliable Western sources" as saying weapons deliveries from the USSR to Egypt were increasing in recent weeks.

Mar. 25: The UN press office said Jarring left New York for an Easter holiday in Moscow and was scheduled to return late in April or earlier "if developments should warrant it."

Rogers said the US was not urging Israel to withdraw but to accept the principle of withdrawal so negotiations could resume.

Mar. 28: Sādāt said Egypt had reached the end of the road in seeking a political solution since "all these efforts were blocked by Israel's conceit and arrogance."

Mar. 29: Israel and Egypt exchanged 2 prisoners of war who had been seriously wounded.

After UAR Foreign Minister Maḥmūd Riyāḍ met with French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann, French officials said the only way to avoid new hostilities was for the Big Four "to assume their responsibilities."

The Egyptian National Assembly passed a resolution saying "we, under no circumstances, will accept the demilitarization of Sinai."

Mar. 31: Egyptian Foreign Minister Riyāḍ said the refusal of the US to bring effective pressure on Israel was the reason for "the complete and very serious deadlock" in the peace talks.

Apr. 1: Egypt offered to resume a formal cease-fire for a limited time if Israel would agree to a partial withdrawal of troops followed by an opening of the Suez Canal. Egypt rejected the idea of a demilitarized Sinai.

US officials indicated the US would support negotiations to reopen the canal.

Apr. 2: Galili said Israel "is prepared to discuss with Egypt the opening of the canal separately from other issues . . . on the condition that . . . the cease-fire is maintained permanently."

Apr. 4: US Senator J. W. Fulbright accused Israel of "Communist-baiting humbuggery" in an attempt to "manipulate" US foreign policy.

Meir said Egypt's proposal for reopening the canal was "totally unacceptable and cannot serve as a basis for an agreement with Israel."

Apr. 5: Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan said he favored Israel's retaining the West Bank.

Lebanon reported an Israeli force crossed the border and destroyed 6 houses.

Apr. 8: The New York Times reported "reliable sources" as saying Nixon assured Egypt of US support for Egypt's proposal to reopen the Suez Canal.

Apr. 10: The New York Times reported that a "small number" of the USSR's most advanced fighter planes, the MIG 23, and 150 other MIG aircraft were shipped to Egypt in recent weeks.

The Shah of Iran called on Israel to withdraw from Arab territory and said it was a mistake to reject "big four guarantees as a means of achieving security."

Apr. 17: Announcing a federation agreement between Libya, Syria and Egypt, Sādāt said the resources of the 3 countries would be channeled toward liberating Arab territory and that "there will be no negotiations or peace agreement with Israel. . ."

Apr. 19: The US announced a previously unreported sale of 12 Phantom jets to Israel, 8 of which were already delivered.

Israeli Deputy Premier Allon arrived in the US for talks on means to reopen the Suez.

Apr. 20: Deputy Prime Minister Allon said 3 conditions were necessary before Israel would pull back from the east bank of the Suez Canal: a "termination of the state of belligerency," an agreement that neither the UAR nor Russian forces would cross the canal and an agreement to continue the Jarring talks.

Apr. 25: The Israeli Cabinet authorized further negotiation for reopening the Suez Canal.

Apr. 26: Speaking of a proposed visit of Rogers to Egypt on May 4 Sādāt said "the visit and its prologues do not inspire optimism among our people" and that Egypt would receive Rogers with an open mind but was prepared to define its positions, not alter them.

Israel said it opened fire on a MIG 21 which had crossed the Suez Canal.

May 1: Sādāt said he would meet Rogers with "an open mind" but that would not compromise his terms for a reopening of the Suez Canal.

May 4: Rogers arrived in Cairo for talks on the question of repoening the Suez Canal.

May 5: Rogers met for 6 hours with Egyptian Foreign Minister Riyāḍ and Premier Maḥmūd Fawzī. An Egyptian spokesman said the talks resulted in important clarifications of the Suez issue.

May 6: Rogers met with Sādāt before flying to Israel where he met with Meir, Allon, Eban and Dayan.

May 8: Rogers flew to Rome from Israel. A member of the Rogers delegation, Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco, returned to Cairo to report to Sādāt "certain clarifications" resulting from consultations between Rogers and the Israeli government.

Rogers said he found "some narrowing of the gap" between Egypt and Israel on the terms of reopening the Suez Canal.

May 9: Assistant Secretary of State Sisco met with Sādāt. A UAR spokesman said the talks were "useful" but that "the difference in Israeli and Egyptian points of view is large and continuing."

May 10: Rogers delivered a report on his Middle East tour to President Nixon. Aides said the report was "cautiously optimistic."

Sisco returned to the US from Cairo and said difficulties remain but "I do believe there is more hope now that progress can be made on reopening the canal."

May 11: Lebanese Foreign Minister Khalīl Abū Ḥamad left for Italy and France to enlist support against Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem.

General

1971

Feb. 22: The Soviet Union said it would contribute to a program of assistance to the Palestine refugees but on a bilateral basis rather than through UNRWA.

Feb. 23: Algeria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia appointed Libya to represent them in negotiations with oil companies for price increases in the Mediterranean. Deputy Premier 'Abd al-Salām Jallūd said if agreement was not reached by Mar. 9 an embargo on supplies on the West might be put into effect.

Feb. 24: The Arab Lawyers Federation ended a 4 day meeting in Damascus and called on the Arab states to treat the US "as they treat their enemy—Israel."

Mar. 6: The National Council of Palestine ended a 6 day convention in Cairo with a resolution to elect a new Council by June 1971.

Mar. 7: Talks opened in Damascus between the Tripoli Charter States to discuss unification of technical education.

Mar. 13: An Omani delegation presented an application for membership in the Arab League at its meeting in Cairo.

Mar. 14: Negotiations between oil companies and Libya, Iraq, Algeria and Saudi Arabia broke down.

Mar. 15: Oil ministers of Iraq, Libya, Algeria and Saudi Arabia met to discuss the breakdown of negotiations with oil companies. A communiqué said the talks had entered a new phase and that the producing countries were willing to continue trying to reach a "reasonable settlement."

South Yemeni Ambassador to Cairo 'Abd al-Qādir Ba-Faqīh said his country would oppose Oman's membership in the Arab League because Oman was still "under the rule of British colonialism."

Mar. 17: Iraqi oil and minerals minister Sa'dūn Ḥammādī said "radical changes will occur in the oil industry throughout the Mediterranean area" if companies do not meet the demands of the producing countries in the Tripoli negotiations.

Mar. 24: Syrian President Ḥāfiẓ al-As'ad said the Tripoli Charter states would soon take "a constitutional step" to bring about federation.

Apr. 13: The Presidents of Syria, Egypt, Libya and Sudan began meeting in Cairo to discuss the situation in Jordan and the projected 4 state federation.

Apr. 17: Libya, Syria and Egypt announced agreement to establish a Federation of Arab Republics providing federal rule by a Presidential Council, a single constitution, and joint defense and foreign policies. A referendum to endorse the pact in each of the 3 countries was planned for Sept. 1. The agreement was signed by the 3 heads of state in Benghazi.

May 1: A 2 day meeting of the CENTO Ministerial Council ended in Ankara. A communiqué urged a "lasting peace" in the Middle East "in accordance with the principles and provisions of the UN Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967."

Afghanistan

1971

Mar. 1: Celebrations were held marking the 50th anniversary of the Afghan-Soviet treaty of friendship.

Mar. 12: It was announced diplomatic relations with the Yemen Arab Republic would be raised to the ambassadorial level.

Apr. 8: Minister of Finance Muhammad Amman presented the government budget of 8.1 billion afghanis for 1971/72 to the Senate. He said measures would be taken to promote exports and private capital investment.

Apr. 29: Following the departure of a Hungarian goodwill mission it was announced that a treaty for cultural cooperation was signed.

May 4: It was announced that a Department of Capital Investment would be established within the Ministry of Commerce to "consider" domestic and foreign private investment.

Algeria

(*See also* General, Jordan, Libya)

1971

Feb. 20: A delegation from the Syrian Ba'th Party was received by Qā'id Aḥmad, leader of the National Liberation Front (FLN) Party.

Feb. 23: Minister of Industry and Energy Belaid Abdessalam outlined oil policy as requiring oil companies to invest in fields other than oil and that stressed the government's determination to gain control over all companies.

Feb. 25: France said the "unilateral" decision to nationalize the oil industry would "profoundly modify" relations between the 2 countries and called on Algeria to make known the "just and equitable" indemnity it had promised.

Minister of Commerce Layachi Yaker returned from Poland and Rumania where he signed trade agreements.

Feb. 27: A delegation from Oman arrived for a 4 day official visit.

Mar. 2: The USSR signed an agreement to purchase 5m hectoliters of wine in 1971.

Mar. 9: The French government delivered a memorandum stating that France did not contest the principle of nationalization but demanded that the 49% interest retained by French companies be paid in crude oil.

A delegation of French oil companies began talks with the government on their status since nationalization.

Mar. 18: The American company Distrigas signed a contract to export 24,000m cubic meters of natural gas over a 20 year period beginning in 1975.

Mar. 19: The government ordered all banks to seize all direct taxes due from ERAP subsidiaries and threatened to take over the oil companies' share of crude oil if the companies did not carry out "all their obligations."

Mar. 22: Al-Moudjahid reported that the government would grant "certain advantages" to private investors in tourism and industry.

Mar. 26: The French government sent the Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry Hervé Alphand to Algiers in an attempt to break the deadlock in talks between French oil companies and Algeria.

Mar. 29: President Boumedienne said the issues of oil and other relations with France were all connected.

Apr. 1: French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann said technical and cultural cooperation with Algeria is separate from the oil issue.

Col. Abd al-Kadr Chabou, member of the Council of the Revolution and General Secretary of the National Defense Ministry, died in a helicopter crash.

Apr. 5: The government informed 7 French oil companies that beginning Apr. 7 they would have to pay for oil prior to shipping.

President Boumedienne signed a decree giving farmers in the "self-managed sector" the same social security benefits as urban workers.

Apr. 9: Renault closed its factory near Algiers and dismissed 900 workers for lack of imported parts on which the government claimed AD800m in customs duties was due.

Hervé Alphand returned to Paris and said he expected to return to Algiers soon.

Apr. 11: An agreement was signed giving Mauritania an AD5m loan for port improvement.

Apr. 13: President Boumedienne announced the posted price of Algerian oil was raised from $2.85 to $3.60 per barrel retroactive to Mar. 20; French oil companies would receive $100m in compensation for nationalization; 51% of all new oil concessions would be owned by Sonatrach and wine production would be reduced in favor of grain and dairy products.

Apr. 14: France broke off the government to government oil negotiations saying the unilateral Algerian action of Apr. 12 would "render further pursuit of oil negotiations pointless."

Apr. 26: The New York Times reported that the French oil companies, with government support, were seeking to impose a worldwide embargo on Algerian oil.

May 1: Boumedienne warned oil companies against an embargo on Algerian oil which might lead to their losing all holdings in Algeria.

Cyprus

1971

Feb. 28: President Makarios said the Turkish "co-residents . . . want cantons and federations, which, for the sake of debate, they call partnership. We clearly and flatly rejected this demand."

Mar. 24: Foreign Minister Spyros Kyprianou said a solution to the Cyprus problem "is not difficult, provided those in Turkey face the situation without fanaticism."

Mar. 29: Following a meeting of the intercommunal talks, Greek Cypriot negotiator Glafcos Clerides denounced a Turkish statement that the Zurich and London agreements must be implemented. Clerides said if such is the Turkish intention then the intercommunal talks were unnecessary since they "were initiated so that a new Constitutional structure" could be worked out.

Apr. 1: Celebrations were held on the 16th anniversary of the "liberation struggle."

Apr. 2: Minister of Commerce Andreas Loizides said the "all-out effort" to develop the tourist industry was paying off and would be continued.

Apr. 4: General George Grivas called for a change of government to achieve *enosis.*

Apr. 6: An official spokesman, speaking after a meeting of the Council of Ministers, said the government policy continues to be pursuit of the intercommunal talks as the "only correct procedure" in search of a solution.

Apr. 12: Turkish community leader Rauf Denktaş left for a visit to Ankara.

Apr. 23: Turkish Premier Nihat Erim said the intercommunal talks had gone on long enough and Rauf Denktaş and Turkey would soon put forth new proposals for the Cyprus problem.

Apr. 26: President Makarios was quoted by *Vradyni* as saying Turkey was planning to declare Turkish Cypriot areas a Turkish province and that Cyprus would use all means at its disposal to deal with such a move. He added that the new Turkish government appeared to be adopting a more intransigent policy and to be seeking an excuse to end local talks.

May 2: Cyprus Bulletin reported the World Bank granted loans worth $5.4m to cover foreign exchange costs of sewerage and drainage projects in Nicosia and Famagusta.

May 4: Foreign Minister Kyprianou left for talks with the EEC in Brussels. He said the preliminary talks were complete and his meeting would initiate the next step toward a concrete agreement.

May 11: An official protest was delivered to the UN charging the Turkish community with rearming and military training, and obstructing 100 public roads.

May 13: Kyprianou returned from meetings with the EEC and said he expected an agreement to be completed in 1971.

Iran

(*See also* Arab-Israeli Conflict, Lebanon,
Persian Gulf, UAR)

1971

Feb. 20: Tehran Radio said Iran's policy in the Gulf was based on Iran's "indisputable ownership" of the Tumbs and Abu Musa islands.

Feb. 23: Premier Amir Hoveida said recent oil price increases would permit an increase in the defense budget from $772m to $895m and a 30% increase in the development budget for the year beginning March 21.

Feb. 25: The USSR signed an agreement for exchange of scientific and technological delegations.

Mar. 25: Foreign Minister Ardeshir Zahedi said British withdrawal from the Gulf would be a "big diplomatic victory for Iran."

Apr. 4: The government announced 13 members of a Communist China backed ring which attempted a *coup* were executed.

Apr. 7: Ziaddin Farsiou, the head of the military tribunal responsible for political trials, was wounded by gunmen in Tehran.

Apr. 16: After talks with a 25 man Japanese economic mission, it was announced Japan would cooperate in oil, gas, machine building, iron and steel, forestry and mining ventures.

Apr. 21: Princess Ashraf returned from a "personal" visit to Communist China.

Apr. 26: Princess Ashraf said she submitted a report to the Shah on her trip to China and that she was "generally optimistic" on the question of establishing future diplomatic relations with China.

May 8: A government spokesman said Iranian ships were ordered to shoot down any British planes that violate Iranian airspace as had allegedly occurred in the "previous week" over the Tumbs Islands.

May 9: Britain protested the charge that British planes had made threatening flights over Iranian ships and islands in the Gulf.

Iraq

(*See also* Arab-Israeli Conflict, General,
Kuwayt, Syria)

1971

Feb. 21: Lebanese Prime Minister Sa'ib Salām departed after a week of official talks which he described as "useful" in furthering economic relations. Vice President 'Ammāsh said all restrictions on tourism with Lebanon would be abolished.

Feb. 22: Al-Ta'akhi said the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) decided to turn over to the government heavy weapons and a broadcasting station in accordance with the March 11, 1970 Declaration.

Feb. 23: Al-Thawrah reported the government decided on Feb. 21 to abolish the "national defense tax" to reduce the tax burden on citizens to a minimum, and to permit the arming of 1m members of peasant cooperatives "in order to stand in defense of the revolution."

Baghdad Radio reported an agreement with Kuwayt abolishing customs on all agricultural, animal and industrial products and to increase trade to ID 5m annually.

Feb. 25: Ceylon signed a trade agreement to purchase dates, crude oil, sulphur, tobacco and fertilizer.

Mar. 1: Cabinet changes were announced:
Rashīd Rifā'ī: *Planning* and *Industry*
Ṭāhā Jazrāwī: *Acting Minister of Economy*

Mar. 22: Talks between the People's Democratic Front commando leader Nāyif Hawāṭimah and the Ba'th Party leadership were concluded.

Mar. 25: A delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organization ended 5 days of talks in Baghdad.

Mar. 30: Former Vice President Ḥardān al-Takrītī was assassinated in Kuwayt.

Mar. 31: Syria agreed on a joint railway line between Abū Kamāl and Baghdad at an estimated cost of ID 42m.

Apr. 8: The USSR agreed to loan Iraq $222m at 2.5% interest repayable in crude oil. The loan would finance an oil refinery at Mosul, a pipeline, 2 hydroelectric power stations, a phosphate mine and a fertilizer plant.

Apr. 12: A government spokesman said 16 Jews arrested for attempting to leave the country illegally were out on bail and there were no Jews in Iraqi prisons. He added that "Zionist propaganda" was trying to discredit Iraq for persecution which didn't exist.

May 1: President Ḥasan al-Bakr said the government would not allow the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) to "procrastinate any longer" in price negotiations.

May 8: The official *Al-Thawrah* said of negotiations with the IPC: "The Iraqi people will wrest their rights by any method they deem necessary."

Israel

(*See also* Arab-Israeli Conflict)

1971

Feb. 17: Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek said he was trying to reach a compromise with the Ministry of Housing on plans for housing developments in occupied Jerusalem: "We are trying to reach agreement . . . that the whole area should be settled sparsely and only after extensive social and economic research."

Feb. 18: It was announced that a road linking Eilat and Sharm al-Shaykh was "officially" opened on Feb. 17.

Feb. 20: The Ministry of Housing agreed to review development plans for Jerusalem and to consider reducing the scale of proposed housing projects.

Feb. 21: Jerusalem's City Council approved government plans for housing projects in Jerusalem.

Feb. 23: Minister of Agriculture Chaim Gvati told the Knesset that 36 military and agricultural settlements had been established in occupied territories since June 1967.

Feb. 24: It was announced that 28 people were arrested in Gaza in the previous 2 weeks for sabotage activities.

Mar. 8: Italian Foreign Minister Aldo Moro left after a 5 day official visit.

President Shazar met with President Nixon in Washington.

Mar. 16: A motion of no-confidence introduced by the Gahal Party because of Meir's apparent willingness to withdraw from certain Arab territory was defeated by 62 to 0 in an open ballot in the 120 member Knesset.

Mar. 24: The Supreme Rabbinical Council eliminated the 1 year waiting period for conversion to Judaism for the non-Jewish children and spouses of immigrants from Russia.

Mar. 29: Israeli officials confirmed that a request by Palestinians in the occupied territories to convene a conference to discuss founding an Arab university was refused because it might turn into a political forum hostile to King Ḥusayn of Jordan.

Apr. 7: The Labor Party convention approved a resolution for "substantial changes" in the borders with Arab states.

Apr. 30: *The New York Times* reported "reliable sources" in Moscow as saying the USSR permitted 1,300 Jews to emigrate to Israel in April, 1,000 in March, 130 in February and 50 in January.

Jordan

(*See also* Arab-Israeli Conflict)

1971

Feb. 20: The Trans Arabian Pipeline Company agreed to increase transit royalties from $5m to $8.5m.

Feb. 21: The Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) called for the formation of a Palestinian-Jordanian "national front."

Al-Ahram said the nomination of Akram Zu'aytar to be Ambassador to Egypt was withdrawn because he had written newspaper articles against Egypt.

Feb. 22: *Al-Ahram* reported King Ḥusayn cancelled a visit to Egypt because of Cairo's objection to Premier Waṣfī al-Tall's accompanying the King.

Feb. 24: The Parliament issued an appeal to Arab governments and the Palestine Liberation Organization to resist moves to set up a separate West Bank state saying "the Jordanians are a single people and will not agree to secession."

Feb. 26: Former Foreign Minister Qadrī Ṭuqān died in Beirut of a heart attack.

Mar. 4: Premier al-Tall said the commandos no longer have any authority in the country as they had before Sept. when they "were involved" in powers which belong to the state. He said present relations are based on the realization that there is only one authority in Jordan.

It was reported Kuwayt resumed its subsidy after an appeal from King Ḥusayn.

Mar. 5: Emile Ghūrī was appointed Minister of State for Premiership Affairs.

Mar. 7: Kuwayti Deputy Foreign Minister Rashīd al-Rashīd denied reports that the subsidy to Jordan was resumed.

Premier al-Tall met with the President of Chase Manhattan Bank, David Rockefeller.

Mar. 8: Clashes broke out in Amman between security forces and commandos.

Mar. 14: Crown Prince Ḥasan returned from a tour of western European countries and the US. Economy Minister 'Umar al-Nabulsī said the trip would benefit Jordan's economy and development projects.

'Alī al-Hiyārī was appointed Ambassador to the UAR.

Mar. 24: The head of the Arab truce observation team Aḥmad 'Abd al-Ḥamīd Ḥilmī was recalled to Cairo.

Mar. 26: Heavy fighting broke out between the army and commandos in Irbid.

Mar. 28: A demonstration by Palestinians set off fighting in Amman. The government and commandos blamed each other for starting the shooting.

Libyan Revolution Command Council Chairman Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhāfī called on the Jordanian Army to overthrow King Ḥusayn.

Mar. 29: Egypt accused the government of "murder and extermination" of the commandos.

Mar. 31: King Ḥusayn and President Anwar al-Sādāt of Egypt issued separate calls for an Arab summit meeting to deal with the conflict in Jordan.

Apr. 2: Commandos blew up an oil pipeline at Zarqa and announced a military campaign aimed at forcing the ouster of Tall.

Middle East Economic Digest reported the government approved a cooperation agreement with the USSR to prospect for oil and minerals.

Apr. 3: Commandos blew up 3 bridges and a railroad. King Ḥusayn said Jordan was being subjected to an Arab "war of attrition" and that Jordan would not "surrender."

Apr. 4: Commando spokesmen said commandos would be ordered out of Amman to ease the crisis with the government.

Apr. 5: A spokesman for the General Command of Palestinian forces said the commandos began an offensive in "all parts of Jordan, especially along the Jordanian-Syrian border" and that a new agreement would not be reached with the government because Amman had "violated the existing one."

Apr. 6: King Ḥusayn said the commandos must move their weapons out of Amman in 2 days, "or the result will be cruel."

Apr. 7: The US said it planned to increase "substantially" military aid to Jordan in the following year.

Apr. 9: An agreement was reached between the government and commandos through the mediation of Syria's Chief of Staff Muṣṭafā Ṭalās. A committee to oversee the agreement would be formed of 2 Syrians, 2 Jordanians and 2 commandos.

Apr. 10: Delegates from Algeria, Kuwayt, Lebanon, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Egypt, Yemen and South Yemen met in Cairo to discuss the situation in Jordan.

Commandos continued to withdraw from Amman while sporadic shooting occurred.

Apr. 11: An army spokesman said commandos attacked the village of Turra from across the Syrian border but were driven off.

Apr. 12: Commandos continued to leave Amman but a spokesman said the Palestinians would cooperate with the agreement negotiated by a Syrian mediator only if it was ratified by the 9 countries meeting in Cairo.

Apr. 13: Former head of the Higher Arab Committee supervising the truce Bahi Laghdam accused Jordan of ignoring the accords with the commandos and trying to "liquidate" the Palestinian movement step by step.

Apr. 15: The conference of Arab states meeting in Cairo on the Jordanian situation issued a final communiqué saying "there is a plan to liquidate the Palestinian resistance, the conference condemns this plan and considers it imperative to foil it."

Apr. 26: King Ḥusayn said stability was re-established in Jordan and the time had come for reconstruction.

A week of ceremonies began marking the 50th anniversary of the Hashimite Kingdom.

May 2: US Secretary of State William Rogers arrived in Amman for talks with King Ḥusayn.

May 4: Military spokesmen said a Jordanian soldier was killed by commando rockets fired from Syria.

May 8: An official spokesman said commandos had opened machinegun fire from Syria on a Jordanian village on May 7.

Kuwayt

(*See also* Iraq, Jordan, Persian Gulf, Sudan, Yemen)

1971

Mar. 5: *Middle East Economic Digest* reported Iraq signed an agreement to abolish customs duties and local taxes on goods exchanged between the 2 countries.

Mar. 6: UAR Special Envoy Ḥasan al-Khūlī arrived with a message from UAR President Anwar al-Sādāt.

Mar. 12: Lebanese Minister of Finance Ilyās Sabā arrived for discussions on economic cooperation.

Mar. 14: The Cabinet met to discuss setting up diplomatic relations with Communist China.

Mar. 16: Lebanese Finance Minister Sabā ended 5 days of talks on increasing Kuwayti investment in Lebanon.

Mar. 21: Minister of State 'Abd al-'Azīz Ḥusayn said the Cabinet decided to establish full diplomatic relations with China.

Mar. 25: UAR Envoy al-Khūlī arrived for talks at the beginning of a tour of the Gulf.

Apr. 1: Iraqi Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Karīm Shaykhlī arrived for talks on "improving fraternal relations."

Lebanon

(*See also* Iraq, Jordan, Kuwayt, Saudi Arabia, Syria)

1971

Feb. 16: UAR Minister of State Sāmī Sharaf delivered a message from President Anwar al-Sādāt to President Sulaymān Franjiyyah.

Feb. 18: The Democratic Socialist Movement announced that a Revolutionary Peasant Union was established in Akkar to "secure better living conditions and put an end to exploitation by the capitalist tribal clique."

Feb. 22: Demonstrators from the Hermel region declared a 48 hour strike to protest lack of adequate health, education, power and security in their region.

Mar. 3: A student strike began to support demands for educational reforms.

Mar. 4: Negotiations began with the Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company for increased payments.

Mar. 9: Demonstrations were held in Beirut protesting the arrival of Chase Manhattan Bank President David Rockefeller who arrived for economic talks.

Syrian Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Ḥalīm Khaddām arrived in Beirut for talks with Premier Sa'ib Salām.

Mar. 10: Students clashed with police in an attempt to occupy Beirut Airport as part of a 2 week old strike.

Finance Minister Ilyās Sabā said Lebanon would purchase military equipment from any source "provided the price specifications meet our requirements" for the £Leb 200m plan to re-equip the army.

Mar. 13: Representatives from Hermel said the government was attending to their grievances.

Mar. 20: Premier Salām said recent strikes resulted from lack of confidence in the government and called on "every Lebanese citizens to be aware of his responsibility."

Apr. 1: Taxi drivers began a 48 hour strike.

Apr. 3: Salām said the government's patience with strikes and demonstrations resulted from a "determination to prevent bloodshed" but added that "sabotage of this beloved country" would not be permitted.

Apr. 8: Telephone operators ended a 12 day strike to give authorities time to meet their demands.

Taxi drivers ended a strike.

Apr. 9: Twelve people were wounded in clashes between members of the Phalange Party and the Socialist Nationalist Party on the American Univ. of Beirut campus.

Apr. 13: Floods caused heavy damage to agriculture in the Bekaa region.

Apr. 15: Trans Arabian Pipeline signed an agreement increasing annual revenue from the pipeline by 70% to £Leb 28m.

Apr. 22: Television censorship was reintroduced because of alleged broadcast opposition to the Federation of Arab Republics.

Apr. 26: An official delegation returned from talks in Tehran. Head of the delegation Muḥammad Ṣabrā said he was "optimistic" about relations with Iran.

Apr. 29: Students at Lebanese University ended a 2 month strike. Education Minister Najīb Abū Ḥaydar was reported to have undertaken to meet student demands for better conditions and job opportunities.

May 2: Demonstrations were held in Beirut protesting the visit of US Secretary of State William Rogers.

May 3: US Secretary of State Rogers arrived for an official visit.

Libya

(*See also* General, Jordan)

1971

Feb. 16: France reminded the government that Mirage jets were being sold for "territorial defense only."

Feb. 17: UAR Minister of State Sāmī Sharaf delivered a message from President Anwar al-Sādāt to Revolution Command Council (RCC) Chairman Mu'ammar Qadhdhāfī.

Feb. 18: An Algerian delegation ended 2 days of talks in Tripoli on oil cooperation. A joint communiqué said a plan for "establishing a zone of declared oil prices" in the Mediterranean was discussed.

Baghdad Radio reported that Libya had deported 3 Palestinians on Feb. 16.

Feb. 20: Bulgaria signed an agreement to purchase oil over a 5 year period.

Feb. 25: An international delegation of oil executives left for London after the government reiterated its demand to negotiate price increases with the oil companies individually.

Mar. 1: A Civil Defense Law was promulgated establishing a national civil defense council with committees in all provinces.

Mar. 4: Esso reached agreement with the government on the terms for exporting liquified natural gas, ending 9 months of negotiations.

Esso agreed to a 65% price rise for natural gas shipped to Spain thus reopening the liquidation plant at Marsa al-Brega which was closed for 9 months.

Mar. 5: Middle East Economic Digest reported Bulgaria signed 2 agreements for increased trade and technical assistance.

Mar. 8: Greek Deputy Premier Stylianos Pattakos departed after a meeting with Qadhdhāfī.

Mar. 11: Syrian Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Ḥalīm Khaddām ended a 3 day official visit.

Mar. 13: The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) said more than 100 Palestinians were deported from Libya and that the PFLP sent a protest note to RCC Chairman Qadhdhāfī.

Mar. 14: A *Fatḥ* spokesman in Tripoli said the government had expelled Palestinians "related to parties with destructive activities" and added that *Fatḥ* was not responsible for those involved in partisan acts.

Mar. 15: The government warned farmers to invest more in land or face nationalization.

Mar. 18: Tunisian Economy Minister Makki Zidi left after 4 days of talks on economic cooperation.

UAR President Sādāt met Qadhdhāfī in Tobruk to discuss the Middle East situation.

Mar. 31: The RCC approved the General Budget for 1971/72 calling for expenditure of £Lib 200m compared with £Lib 182m for 1970/71.

Apr. 2: Deputy Premier 'Abd al-Salām Jallūd announced a 5 year agreement with oil companies raising the posted price by $.90 to $3.45 per barrel and establishing a 55% tax rate.

Apr. 11: Britain reiterated a denial to sell Chieftain tanks to Libya.

Apr. 16: Middle East Economic Digest reported that the RCC issued a denial of a Libyan radio broadcast that Egyptian workers would be allowed into Libya. The statement said technical and manpower exchange agreements did not permit exchanges when Libyan workers were available.

Apr. 19: France said it would block the delivery of Mirage jets if it were discovered they were going to other countries.

May 4: It was announced that foreign oil companies have been ordered to fill key posts in training, services and personnel with Libyans

May 5: Italian Foreign Minister Aldo Moro arrived for talks on cooperation between the 2 countries.

Morocco

(*See also* Syria)

1971

Feb. 16: Police seized the day's issue of the Istiqlal Party's paper *L'Opinion.*

Feb. 18: A month long strike, involving 13,000 students demanding educational reform, ended.

Feb. 23: A trade protocol was signed with East Germany.

Feb. 25: Spanish Chief of Defense Staff Manuel Diez arrived in Rabat for a 10 day visit.

Feb. 26: An Omani delegation carrying greetings and making contacts with Arab leaders arrived in Rabat.

Mar. 3: King Hasan said the government will "Moroccanize" the services sector of the economy.

Mar. 5: Middle East Economic Digest reported the 1968 trade agreement with East Germany was renewed and trade would increase from $7m a year to $16.7m.

Mar. 12: Middle East Economic Digest reported that the IBRD advanced a $35m credit.

Mar. 13: Following talks in Rabat Spanish Foreign Minister Lopez Bravo signed an agreement establishing a permanent mixed commission to deal with economic and cultural cooperation.

Mar. 17: The daily issue of *L'Opinion* was seized by police.

Mar. 29: The Hasan Eddakhil Dam was inaugurated.

Mar. 30: Tunisian Foreign Minister Muhammad Masmoudi ended a 9 day visit dealing with Maghrib cooperation and the Palestine problem on which the 2 states had "total identity" according to a joint communiqué.

Apr. 5: Rabat Radio reported King Hasan proposed an Arab summit meeting be held in Algiers to discuss "the Middle East situation and adopt the necessary measures."

Apr. 7: Shaykh Zayd Sulṭān, ruler of Abu Dhabi, arrived for a 5 day state visit.

Apr. 15: King Hasan postponed a visit to the US scheduled for Apr. 22-27 because of preparations for a proposed Arab summit meeting.

Apr. 22: The daily issue of *L'Opinion* was seized by police for the 6th time in April.

Apr. 24: King Hasan made the following Cabinet changes:

Muhammad Lazrak: *Tourism*
Muhammad Tahiri: *Commerce, Industry & Mines*
Karim Lamrani: *Finance*
Abdelhadi Sabihi: *Agriculture*
Ahmad Laski: *Education*

Pakistan

1971

Feb. 21: President Yahya Khan announced dissolution of the Cabinet effective Feb. 22 "in view of the political situation in the country."

Mar. 1: Yahya Khan postponed indefinitely the opening of the National Assembly, scheduled for Mar. 3, because of the "political confrontation" between leaders of East and West Pakistan. Shaykh Mujib al-Rahman called for a general strike in the East because the "minority has prevailed over the majority."

Mar. 3: Yahya Khan called for a meeting of all major political leaders in Dacca on Mar. 10. Shaykh Mujib rejected the call for a meeting and demanded an end to military rule in the East. Rioting continued in Dacca for the 3rd day as a general strike continued.

Mar. 4: Mujib authorized a relaxation of the general strike in Dacca and said he had establish control over the central radio of the East.

Mar. 6: Yahya Khan announced the National Assembly would open on Mar. 25. Mujib accused the army of killing 300 persons in disorders in Dacca during the week.

Yahya Khan said Eastern leaders reacted to his postponement of the Assembly in a manner which encouraged "destructive elements coming out into the streets." He said he would "ensure the complete and absolute integrity of Pakistan."

It was reported that 20 persons were killed in clashes between security forces and demonstrators in Dacca.

Mar. 7: Mujib called for a 1 week strike in government offices and courts in protest against military administration in the East.

Mujib made 4 demands to be met before he would attend the National Assembly. The demands were: an end to martial law; all troops must return to their barracks; an inquiry be held into deaths during disturbances and power be transferred to elected representatives.

The general strike was called to an end by the Awami League.

Mar. 8: The Chief Justice of the High Court in Dacca refused to swear in the new military governor to East Pakistan.

Mar. 9: East Pakistani government workers were out on strike.

Mar. 12: The Awami League issued instructions for banks in the East to lengthen their hours, loosen payments for trade purposes, maintain free transfer of funds in East Pakistan and bar remittances to West Pakistan.

Mar. 13: Martial law authorities in East Pakistan issued an order for employees of defense installations to report to work or face prison sentences.

Mar. 15: Mujib announced he was taking over the administration of East Pakistan based on the Awami League's victory in the December elections. He suspended collection of taxes by the central government but said he was willing to meet with Yahya Khan.

Yahya Khan arrived in Dacca for talks with Eastern leaders.

The New York Times reported "authoritative sources" as saying India banned flights of military aircraft over Indian territory to East Pakistan.

Mar. 16: Yahya Khan met with Mujib in Dacca.

Mar. 17: It was announced that an investigation would be held by the government into deaths which occurred during demonstrations. Talks continued between Yahya Khan and Mujib.

Mar. 19: Mujib said after his 3rd meeting with Yahya Khan that leaders of the Awami League would meet with the President's advisors to work out a "formula."

Mar. 20: Mujib said "some progress" had been made in talks with Yahya Khan.

Mar. 21: People's Party leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto arrived in Dacca to participate in the talks. Demonstrations were held protesting his arrival.

Mar. 22: Yahya Khan postponed the National Assembly pending the outcome of talks in Dacca.

Mar. 23: In East Pakistan "resistance day" was celebrated to dramatize opposition to martial law.

Mar. 24: President of the Council of the Muslim League Mumtaz Daultana, returning from Dacca, said Yahya Khan and the Awami League had reached complete agreement in Dacca.

Mar. 25: Mujib called for a 1 day general strike to protest reported "atrocities" allegedly committed by troops against civilians.

Ali Bhutto said he opposed the Awami League's demands for East Pakistani control over its own foreign aid and foreign trade.

Army units occupied Dacca and fighting broke out in the city late in the evening. Mujib declared the independence of the East in a radio broadcast.

Mar. 26: Fighting continued in Dacca and large fires were reported in the city. ***Pakistan Radio*** reported that Mujib was arrested. Reports said civilian casualties were high and clashes spread to other cities.

Yahya Khan returned to the West and outlawed the Awami League, accused Mujib of treason, and said he was ordering the army to restore the government's authority in the East to save the nation's integrity.

Mar. 27: Thirty-five foreign newsmen were expelled from the East. The US Consulate in Dacca reported the city was quiet and martial law was in effect.

Mar. 28: Official radio said Dacca was quiet but the army was quelling disorders in Chittagong.

A clandestine "nationalist" radio station said a "liberation army" was marching toward Dacca after "capturing" army barracks in Comilla, Jessore and Khulna.

Mar. 29: The government said it was in control in the East but that resistance continued in Chittagong.

Mar. 30: The government issued a protest to India against Indian news reports of continued resistance in the East.

Mar. 31: The Indian Parliament accused West Pakistan of "genocide" in the East and said the East would "receive the wholehearted support of the people of India."

The government accused India of infiltrating troops into the East.

Apr. 1: Fighting continued in the East as army troops were reported on the offensive against pockets of resistance.

Apr. 2: The government warned India of "serious consequences" which would result from interference in Pakistan's internal affairs.

The US accepted an offer of the government to use Pakistani planes to evacuate 700 Americans from the East.

The Red Cross announced the government refused to permit a relief team and supplies to enter the East.

The USSR appealed to the government to take immediate measures "to put an end to the bloodshed and repression" in the East.

Apr. 4: Pakistan Radio reported 9 Indian vehicles loaded with arms were intercepted after crossing the border into the East.

Apr. 5: Rebel forces in East Pakistan designated Chuadanga capital of "independent Bengal."

Yahya Khan appealed to the USSR to restrain India from interfering in the East.

Apr. 6: The government informed the USSR that Yahya Khan would start talks "with rational representative elements in East Pakistan at the earliest opportunity."

Apr. 7: The US called on the government to take "every feasible step" to achieve a "peaceful accommodation in the East."

Apr. 8: Air strikes were carried out against rebel forces in the East.

The government charged in the UN that India was interfering directly in the East by sending infiltrators "in plain clothes" over the border.

Apr. 11: Communist China accused the Soviet Union, the US and India of interfering in Pakistan's internal affairs.

The government claimed that 2 companies of Indian troops were wiped out near Jessore in the East.

Indian sources reported heavy fighting throughout the East.

Apr. 12: The government announced China had sent a message to Yahya Khan which said the "unity of East and West Pakistan" is the basic guarantee of attaining prosperity, "what is happening in Pakistan at present is purely an internal affair . . ." and China would "firmly support" the "just struggle to safeguard . . . state sovereignty and national independence."

India denied the charge that 2 companies had crossed the border into East Pakistan.

The government said "subversive elements" around a key railhead were destroyed.

Gen. Tikka Khan announced all employees must return to work by Apr. 21 or face dismissal or 7 years in jail.

The US said it would suspend wheat shipments because of congestion in the ports of East Pakistan.

Apr. 13: The government said it had captured "large amounts of Indian arms and ammunition" in the area of Dinajpur.

The rebel leadership appealed to "democratic nations" for recognition of sovereignty and for assistance.

The US said it had been selling $2.5m worth of ammunition yearly to Pakistan since 1967.

Leaders of the secessionist movement named Tajjudin Ahmad, Mujib's assistant in command of the Awami League, to be Premier and Defense Minister of Bangla Desh.

Rebel spokesmen acknowledged that Mujib was a captive in the West.

Apr. 15: India said Pakistani troops fired over the border from East Pakistan and warned of consequences if such actions should continue.

Apr. 16: Chaduanga, the headquarters of the secessionist leadership, was bombed and the leaders withdrew to Meherpur.

The government said India's charges were an excuse "to intervene directly in Pakistani affairs."

Apr. 18: The Pakistani consulate in Calcutta was taken over by the East Pakistani members of the staff and pronounced the mission of Bangla Desh.

Apr. 19: The government said armed Indians supported by artillery on Indian territory attacked a border post in the East.

India reported heavy fighting in the East as the army began an offensive to seal the borders.

Apr. 22: The government said it had the assurance of India that India did not recognize the autonomy of the East.

Apr. 23: Abdul Bashani, a leader in the secessionist movement, appealed to the US and China to stop the government from using the weapons supplied by those countries and to recognize Bangla Desh.

India appealed to the UN for aid in dealing with a reported ½m refugees from East Pakistan.

Pakistan said it was closing down its high commission office in Calcutta and asked India to close its mission in Dacca.

Apr. 25: The government announced a temporary ban on 46 kinds of imported goods to alleviate pressure on foreign exchange resulting from the "dislocation of trade and industry during recent weeks. . ."

Apr. 27: Pakistan Radio said all anti-state forces in the coastal region of the East had been destroyed.

India said Pakistani troops crossed the border from the East and killed 5 persons. India ordered strict police surveillance of Pakistani diplomats in Calcutta in retaliation for similar measures against Indians in Dacca.

Apr. 29: The government denied Indian charges that troops had crossed the border of the East into India.

May 1: The government announced that a 6 month moratorium on external debt payments would be requested from creditor nations.

May 3: The government protested to India for allegedly "creating an atmosphere of confrontation" by firing artillery across the border at army positions in the East.

The government said Indian fighter planes violated East Pakistani air space.

May 5: Chief of Military Intelligence Muhammad Akbar Khan said India mobilized 2½ divisions on the borders and that Pakistan responded by alerting her own troops.

May 6: India appealed again for aid to care for

Pakistani refugees allegedly totalling 1.5m people.

India denied Pakistani charges that military units on the border were being reinforced.

May 12: Yahya Khan informed UN Secretary General U Thant that relief aid was not necessary in the East.

Persian Gulf

(*See also* General, Algeria, Iran, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia)

1971

Feb. 17: Omani jet planes bombed rebel bases in Dhufar.

Mar. 1: The British government announced the treaties with the Gulf states would expire at the end of 1971 and most British forces would be withdrawn. Proposals for aid and a treaty of friendship with the proposed Gulf Federation were also announced.

Mar. 11: Kuwayti Foreign Minister Rashīd al-Rashīd left Saudi Arabia after talks to coordinate policies for promoting a Gulf Federation.

Mar. 14: The Trucial States Council ended a 2 day meeting. A statement said the question of the states' joining UN agencies was discussed but a decision was postponed until the federation issue is settled.

Mar. 19: Middle East Economic Digest reported Abu Dhabi's development budget for 1971 is 36% higher than for 1970.

Mar. 27: The official Omani newspaper *Al-Watan* reported the army had begun a spring offensive against rebels in Dhufar and that the rebel harbor at Sadah was captured.

Mar. 29: After talks in Kuwayt Special Egyptian Envoy Ḥasan Sabrī al-Khūlī left for a tour of the Gulf amirates.

Apr. 12: Abu Dhabi's ruler Shaykh Zayd Bin Sulṭān returned after a visit to Cairo. A joint communiqué said UAR President Anwar al-Sādāt expressed support for efforts to establish a Gulf Federation.

Apr. 15: Bahrayn's State Council described Kuwayti-Saudi efforts to bring about the Gulf Federation as "positive and encouraging."

Apr. 19: A hospital built by Iran's Red Lion and Sun Society was opened in Ajman.

Apr. 21: A joint Kuwayti-Saudi delegation ended a tour of the Gulf states and reported "full understanding of the mission's proposals" by the Gulf states.

Apr. 22: Baḥrayn announced it had accepted the Kuwayti-Saudi proposals for a federation.

Apr. 24: Oman's Sultan Qabūs arrived in London at the beginning of a European tour.

Apr. 29: Kuwayti Foreign Minister Shaykh Sabāh al-Jābir said Qaṭar had voiced "certain reservations" about the Kuwayti-Saudi proposals for a Gulf Federation.

May 6: British Envoy Sir William Luce renewed his mission to the Gulf arriving in Baḥrayn for talks on the proposed Gulf Federation.

Saudi Arabia

(*See also* General, Persian Gulf, South Yemen, UAR)

1971

Feb. 21: Talks opened with Lebanese Foreign Minister Khalīl Abū Ḥamad for construction of a joint oil refinery in Lebanon.

Feb. 23: Lebanese Foreign Minister Ḥamad said "nothing could provide a stumbling-block to complete co-operation between Saudi Arabia and Lebanon."

Feb. 26: A Saudi spokesman in Beirut denied Saudi involvement in the insurrection in South Yemen.

Mar. 7: A government spokesman said valuable deposits of gold, silver, copper and zinc were discovered in central and western provinces.

Mar. 12: An agreement with Lebanon to build a joint refinery on a 50-50 basis was announced.

Mar. 22: A new agricultural dam at Wādī Jīzān was inaugurated.

Mar. 25: Lebanese Premier Sa'ib Salām arrived at the invitation of King Fayṣal.

Apr. 3: 'Abdallāh Mutlaq was replaced as chief of staff of the armed forces by Ḥamad al-Shunaybil.

Apr. 7: It was reported King Fayṣal approved a recommendation that King 'Abd al-'Azīz University be placed under state control to alleviate financial difficulties.

Apr. 14: The first trade agreement with Iran was signed encouraging mutual private investment.

May 1: US Secretary of State William Rogers arrived in Riyadh and met with King Fayṣal.

South Yemen

(*See also* General, Jordan)

1971

Feb. 16: Defense Minister 'Alī Nāṣir said the government was "following the activities of anti-revolutionary . . . forces along our borders with concern."

Feb. 17: It was announced 300 exiles had returned home since the end of 1970.

Feb. 23: Aden Radio reported the government decided to "launch a wide political initiative at Arab and international levels" to expose conspiracies against the revolution.

Minister of Information 'Abdallāh al-Khamīrī announced that a "large" rebel force was routed in the 3rd governorate on Feb. 20.

Feb. 24: The government announced that a "mercenary force" was routed in the 3rd governorate and captured documents revealed that the rebel leadership included former army officers and members of the Front for the Liberation of South Yemen (FLOSY).

Feb. 28: It was announced that Faḍl 'Abdallāh was appointed to the new post of Deputy Minister of Defense for Moral and Political Guidance Affairs.

Mar. 3: Prime Minister Muḥammad 'Alī Haytham emphasized in a speech the importance of the private sector in national development and said the government grants extensive facilities to businessmen.

Mar. 4: *Aden Radio* said land on Socotra would be reclaimed and agricultural and development equipment sent to the island.

Mar. 5: UAR Special Envoy Ḥasan Ṣabrī al-Khūlī left Aden after 3 days of talks on the Middle East situation.

Mar. 6: UAR Special Envoy Khūlī delivered a message from UAR President Anwar al-Sādāt to President Salīm Rubay 'Alī.

Apr. 10: North Korea signed an agreement for cooperation in telecomunications and postal services.

Apr. 15: A decree named 86 members of the new Supreme People's Council and said 15 more would be chosen after trade union elections are held.

Apr. 24: The government reported routing Saudi-backed mercenaries in the 5th governorate, killing over 40 and capturing others with large quantities of arms and ammunition.

May 6: *Aden Radio* said 100 people were arrested in a plot to overthrow the government.

Sudan

(*See also* Jordan)

1971

Feb. 22: *Time* magazine reported that the USSR was aiding Sudan against southern rebels with 100 advisors and was constructing a naval base at Port Sudan.

Feb. 24: Premier Ja'far al-Numayrī ended a 4 day visit to Chad. A joint communiqué said the 2 countries agreed to support the African struggle against "colonialist and racist régimes."

It was officially reported that Chad would sign agreements for economic cooperation.

Feb. 28: UAR Minister of State Samī Sharaf delivered a message from UAR President Anwar al-Sādāt to Premier Numayrī.

Mar. 2: The Communist Party issued a statement to *Al-Akhbar* of Beirut saying: "Numeiry's two-week-old anti-Communist campaign has imperilled the very existence of his régime. . . ."

Mar. 4: Agreement was reached with Kuwayt to increase trade, open industrial exhibits in Kuwayt, establish reciprocal investment offices and to form a permanent committee for development investment.

An Omani goodwill delegation arrived in Kharṭūm.

Mar. 18: *Omdurman Radio* reported Kharṭūm University was closed down because of student unrest.

Mar. 27: UAR President Sādāt arrived in Kharṭūm for talks with Numayrī which a spokesman said were "crucial."

Apr. 2: A Chinese medical team arrived in Kharṭūm under the terms of a Dec. 1970 protocol.

Apr. 4: Southern Affairs Minister Joseph Garang said the Council of Ministers agreed the northern and southern workers would receive equal pay.

Apr. 16: Numayrī returned from a 2 day visit to the USSR. A communiqué said the 2 sides agreed to expand political, economic and cultural relations.

Apr. 18: Minister of Agriculture 'Abd al-Jalīl Ḥasan al-Jalīl said 24,000 feddans of land was distributed to peasants to boost agricultural output.

Apr. 19: *Al-Ayyam* published a statement by Numayrī which said Sudan would join the Federation of Arab Republics when a permanent constitution and a strong popular organization are established in Sudan.

Syria

(*See also* Arab-Israeli Conflict, General, Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya)

1971

Feb. 16: UAR Minister of State Sāmī Sharaf delivered a message from UAR President Anwar al-Sādāt to Premier Ḥāfiẓ al-As'ad.

Feb. 18: The Cabinet approved a budget for 1971/72 of £Syr 2.870m.

Feb. 22: President Aḥmad al-Khaṭīb resigned his post and was elected president of the People's Council.

An agreement was signed with Iraq providing for scholarships and exchange visits between Iraqi and Syrian workers' federations.

Feb. 26: Turkey signed an agreement under which farm equipment sequestered by both countries in 1958 and £142,000 in blocked funds would be released.

Feb. 28: Premier As'ad said Syria would work toward establishing a one party system.

Mar. 1: As'ad was nominated to be President.

It was announced diplomatic relations with Morocco would be resumed.

Mar. 11: Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Ḥalīm Khaddām said Syria's foreign policy aims at closer relations with socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union, and that the defense budget would be 71% of the total budget.

Mar. 12: It was reported As'ad received 99.2% of the votes cast in the Presidential referendum.

Middle East Economic Digest reported that Economy Minister Muṣṭafā Hallāj said Syria would like an economic agreement with France noting that "we have no economic or political problems with France."

Mar. 14: As'ad was sworn in as President.

Mar. 16: Lebanese President Sulaymān Franjiyyah arrived in Damascus to congratulate President As'ad.

Mar. 29: A Ba'th Party delegation attended the 24th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party.

Apr. 3: A new Cabinet was formed of 15 Ba'thists, 8 Nasirites, 2 Communists and 3 independents:

'Abd al-Raḥmān Khulayfāwī: *Premier*
Muḥammad Ṭālib Hilāl: *Deputy Premier* and *Industry*
'Abd al-Ḥalīm Khaddām: *Deputy Premier* and *Foreign*
Dāwūd al-Ridāwī: *State*
Muḥammad Ḥaydar: *Agriculture*
'Abd al-Karīm 'Adī: *Supply & Internal Trade*
'Abd al-Ghanī Qannūt: *Public Works & Water*
Sāmī Sūṭān: *State Planning*
Shakīr al-Fahhām: *Higher Education*
Muṣṭafā Haddād: *Petroleum, Electricity & Mineral Resources*
Ghālib 'Abdūn: *State*
Fāyiz Ismā'īl: *State*
Nūrallāh Nūrallāh: *Finance*
Fawzī Kayyālī: *Culture, Tourism* and *National Guidance*
Maḥmūd Qumbāz: *Municipal & Village Affairs*
Yūsuf Fayṣal: *State*
Muṣṭafā Hallāj: *Economy* and *Foreign Trade*
Adīb al-Nahāwī: *Justice*
'Umar al-Sibā'ī: *Communications*
Munīr Wannūs: *Euphrates Dam*
'Adnān Baghajātī: *Education*
Aḥmad Qablān: *State*
Mut'ib Shinān: *Defense*
'Abd al-Sattār al-Sayyid: *Awqaf*
Maḥmūd Sa'dah: *Health*
Fāyiz Nāṣir: *Information*
'Alī Zāzā: *Interior*
Marwān Ṣabbāgh: *Social Affairs* and *Labor*

Apr. 14: Minister of Petroleum Muṣṭafā Haddād said the price of Syrian oil was raised $.75 to $3.15-$3.20 per barrel.

Apr. 15: Floods inundated 19 villages in the northeast.

Apr. 26: The Cabinet ratified the agreement to establish a federation with Egypt and Libya.

Tunisia

(*See also* Libya, Morocco)

1971

Feb. 23: An Omani delegation arrived for talks with Premier Hadi Nouira.

Feb. 24: Spanish Foreign Minister Lopez Bravo completed 2 days of talks with Foreign Minister Muhammad Masmoudi. A joint communiqué said a committee would be set up to consider reestablishment of diplomatic relations and Spanish economic aid.

Mar. 3: A trade protocol was signed with Poland.

Mar. 9: Foreign Minister Masmoudi ended talks with Mauritanian President Mokktar Ould Daddah. A joint communiqué said Tunisia supported a plan for an economic Maghrib incorporating Mauritania.

Mar. 17: The US agreed to extend $13.4m in credit to buy wheat.

Apr. 6: A road linking Gafsa and Wadi Suf in Algeria was opened.

Apr. 23: *Middle East Economic Digest* reported Egypt signed a 3 year trade agreement doubling trade between the 2 countries to $7m annually.

Turkey

(*See also* Cyprus, Syria)

1971

Feb. 20: At Haceteppe University 220 students were arrested after a 5 hour gun battle with police who were searching for arms on the campus.

Feb. 28: The State Budget was approved by the National Assembly by a margin of 32 votes.

Mar. 4: Four American soldiers were kidnapped by left-wing extremists who demanded $400,000 ransom.

Mar. 6: Two persons died in disorders when police searched a university dormitory in Ankara for 4 US soldiers. The government refused to pay the ransom and a nationwide search was begun.

Mar. 8: The Supreme Court of Appeal overturned 2 previous rulings that 2 hijackers of a Soviet plane had acted on political grounds and were not subject to extradition.

The 4 US soldiers kidnapped by leftists were freed unharmed.

Mar. 12: The armed forces issued a communiqué to the government to resign or face a military *coup*. Premier Süleyman Demirel submitted his resignation to President Cevdet Sunay.

Mar. 13: President of the Senate Tekin Ariburun called for a referendum to determine "real public opinion" on the political crisis.

President Sunay began talks with military and political leaders to form a new government.

Mar. 14: Acting Premier Demirel called on his Parliamentary supporters to back him in the crisis.

Mar. 15: Republican People's Party leader Ismet Inönü said the government's failure to enact needed reforms partly justified the military intervention but that the intervention damaged the Parliamentary system which could only be repaired by formation of an interim government until new elections would be held.

Mar. 17: Two leaders of the "Turkish People's Liberation Army" who kidnapped 4 American soldiers were arrested.

Mar. 19: Sunay designated Nihat Erim as new Premier. Erim said he would be willing to join all parties in a "national coalition government."

Mar. 21: Premier-Designate Erim said he planned reforms in education and agriculture which, if accepted, would make it unnecessary for the army to take over the government.

Mar. 22: The Justice Party voted to allow Erim to form a Cabinet.

Mar. 26: Sunay endorsed the following Cabinet:

Nihat Erim: *Premier*
Sadı Koçaş: *Deputy Premier for Political and Administrative Affairs*
Atillâ Karaosmanoğlu: *Deputy Premier for Economic Affairs*
Mehmet Özgüneş: *State*
Doğan Kitaplı: *State*
Ismail Arar: *Justice*
Ferit Melen: *Defense*
Hamdi Ömeroğlu: *Interior*
Osman Olcay: *Foreign*
Sait Naci Ergin: *Finance*
Şinasi Orel: *Education*
Câhit Karakaş: *Public Works*
Özer Derbil: *Foreign Economic Relations*
Ayhan Çilingiroğlu: *Industry & Trade*
Türkân Akyol: *Health*
Haydar Özalp: *Customs & Monopolies*
Orhan Dikmen: *Agriculture*
Hâlûk Arık: *Communications*
Atillâ Sav: *Labor*
Ihsan Topaloğlu: *Power & Natural Resources*
Erol Yilmaz Akçal: *Tourism* and *Publicity*
Selahattin Babüroğlu: *Construction & Housing*
Cevdet Ayhan: *Village Affairs*
Sezai Ergün: *Youth & Sports*
Selahattin Inal: *Forests*

Apr. 7: The new government received a vote of confidence in the National Assembly by a tally of 321 in favor and 46 against.

Apr. 11: The apartment of General Atif Ercikan, planning chief of the General Staff, was bombed.

Apr. 14: Minister of State for Economic Affairs Atillâ Karasomanoğlu accused the previous government of "maladministration." He said it would take 2,359 years to reach the level of the EEC, that hard currency reserves would meet demands for only 1 month and 3 weeks and that the foreign debt rose from $1.6 to $3.4 billion under the Justice Party. He said measures would be taken to discipline the balance of payments situation.

Apr. 25: Foreign Minister Osman Olcay said Turkey initiated direct contact with Communist China to explore the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations.

Apr. 26: Martial law was declared in 11 provinces including Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir. Justice Minister Ismail Arar said the action was taken after the Cabinet considered the views of the National Security Council and decided there was "a strong, active uprising against the motherland and the republic."

Apr. 27: Military commanders announced bans on possession of weapons and public meetings in Ankara, Izmir and Istanbul.

Apr. 29: US Secretary of State William Rogers arrived in Ankara for a CENTO meeting.

Martial law authorities ordered *Cumhuriyet* and *Akşam* to cease publication for 10 days for articles critical of martial law.

May 1: Erim said the government would "do everything possible" to halt illicit opium cultivation. He said Turkey would buy the entire 1971 crop of poppies and would have substitute crops introduced in future years.

Erim said there was no imminent danger to the state but a threat of sabotage, subversion and separatist movement in the east. He added that 200 people were detained since martial law took effect.

May 12: An earthquake struck the town of Burdur in the southwest. An estimated 100 people were killed.

United Arab Republic

(*See also* Arab-Israeli Conflict, General, Jordan, Kuwayt, Lebanon, Libya, Persian Gulf, South Yemen, Sudan, Syria)

1971

Feb. 20: Yugoslav President Tito ended a 6 day visit.

Mar. 1: A protocol was signed with Czechoslovakia for cooperation in the economic, political and military fields. A joint communiqué said cooperation was based on "unity ensuing from the economic struggle for the construction of a society without exploitation and imperialist oppression. . ."

Mar. 2: The Cairo International Industrial Fair opened with 28 nations participating.

Mar. 7: President of Chase Manhattan Bank, David Rockefeller left Cairo after talks with President Anwar al-Sādāt and Premier Maḥmūd Fawzī.

Saudi Foreign Minister 'Umar al-Saqqāf ended 6 days of talks on cooperation between that 2 countries "in all fields."

Mar. 12: Editor of *Al-Ahram* Haykal wrote that Egyptian troops face "one of the most difficult battles of all time" and described the Israeli Bar-Lev line as nearly impregnable.

Mar. 16: Ḥafiẓ Ismā'īl was appointed *Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.*

Mar. 18: The Arab Socialist Union paper *Al-Jumhuriyah* accused Haykal of presenting "ambiguous notions, half-truths and illusions" in his editorials in *Al-Ahram.*

Mar. 20: President Sādāt met with top military commanders for the 2nd time in a week.

The USSR signed an aid agreement including $66m for an electrical grid for villages, $40m for desert reclamation, $33m for cement plants and $55m for grain and flour storage facilities. Credits would be repayable over 12 years at 2.5% interest.

Mar. 24: Sādāt said Egypt was paying for all the arms and economic aid it was getting from Russia and that "in the very near future, we will be one of the principal petroleum producers in this part of the world."

Mar. 26: Foreign Minister Maḥmūd Riyāḍ arrived in Italy for talks with Italian Foreign Minister Aldo Moro and Yugoslav President Tito.

Mar. 27: Foreign Minister Riyāḍ held separate talks with Italian Prime Minister Emilio Columbo and Yugoslav President Tito in Italy.

Mar. 29: Riyāḍ went to Paris for talks on the Middle East situation and a conference of Egyptian Ambassadors to western countries.

The government restored broadcasting rights to the Palestinian resistance movement.

Apr. 3: The government announced a rich new oil field was discovered 50 miles south of al-Alamayn.

Apr. 29: The National Assembly voted unanimously in favor of the federation with Syria and Libya.

The Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union ratified the agreement to federate with Syria and Libya with the amendment that federal executive decisions be made by unanimous rather than majority vote.

May 1: Sādāt said the name "United Arab Republic" might be changed to "Egypt."

May 2: Vice President 'Alī Sabrī was relieved of his duties by Sādāt.

May 10: Iranian Foreign Minister Ardeshir Zahedi arrived in Cairo for talks on the Middle East situation.

May 13: The following Ministers resigned from the Cabinet.

Muḥammad Fawzī: *War*
Sha'rāwī Jum'ah: *Interior*
Sāmī Sharaf: *State*
Muḥammad Fā'iq: *National Guidance*
Sa'ad Zayd: *Housing*
Ḥilmī al-Sayd: *Electrical Power*

Three officials of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) also resigned. They were: ASU Secretary General 'Abd al-Muḥsin Abū al-Nūr, Labib Shuqayr and Ẓiā al-dīn Da'wūd.

Gen. Muḥammad Sadik was appointed Minister of War.

Deputy Premier 'Azīz Ṣidqī said of the resignations: "Finally the heads of conspiracy and rebellion have come into the open."

May 14: The following replacements were sworn into the Cabinet:

Mamdūḥ Salīm: *Interior*
'Abd al-Qādir Ḥātim: *Information*
Muḥammad Aḥmad Muḥammad: *State*
Aḥmad Sulṭān: *Electric Power*
'Alī al-Sayyid: *Housing*
Ḥusayn al-Shāfi'ī: *Vice President*

Sādāt said the 6 Cabinet Ministers who resigned had been planning a *coup d'état* and were placed under house arrest. He said there would be free elections to reorganize the ASU.

The National Assembly convened to expel 18 members.

Sādāt pledged to end arbitrary police surveillance and phone tapping.

May 15: Demonstrations of support for Sādāt were held in Cairo.

Yemen

(*See also* Afghanistan, Jordan)

1971

Feb. 22: It was announced the World Bank and the Kuwayt Development Fund agreed to provide planning experts to help the government without charge and to aid in road projects and an agricultural scheme.

Feb. 25: Prime Minister Muḥsin al-'Aynī presented his government's resignation in preparation for general elections. The ministers were asked to continue in office under Deputy Premier for Internal Affairs 'Abd al-Salām Ṣabrā until elections were held.

Mar. 2: UAR Special Envoy Ṣabrī al-Khūlī delivered a message from UAR President Anwar al-Sādāt to President 'Abd al-Raḥmān Iryānī.

Mar. 10: Elections were held for representatives to the Consultative Council.

Apr. 19: The National Assembly met for the first time and elected Shaykh 'Abdallāh al-Aḥmar Speaker.

Apr. 23: The Jerusalem Post reported that the Republican Council resigned and was refusing a request to continue its duties until a new Council could be elected.

Apr. 26: A new 3-man Republican Council was appointed. They were: 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Iryānī, Ḥasan al-'Amrī, Muḥammad 'Uthmān.

May 3: A new Cabinet was announced:

Aḥmad Muḥammad Nu'mān: *Premier*
Muḥammad Ghālib: *State*
Ḥusayn 'Abdallāh al-Marawānī: *Health*
Aḥmad Muḥammad Nu'mān: *Foreign Affairs*
'Abdallāh 'Alī: *Communications*
Aḥmad 'Abduh Sa'īd: *Economy*
'Abd al-Qādir 'Abdallāh: *Justice*
'Abd al-Mālik al-Ṭayyib: *State*
Muḥammad Ismā'īl al-Rubay: *Treasury*
Yaḥyā 'Abdallāh: *Awqaf*
'Abd al-Salām Sabrah: *Deputy Premier*
Muḥammad Ismā'īl al-Hajjī: *Local Administration*
'Abdallāh Ḥusayn Barakāt: *Interior*
Muḥammad Aḥmad Junayd: *Agriculture*
Aḥmad Qa'id Barakāt: *Information*
Aḥmad Zayn al-'Abidīn: *Education*
Yaḥyā Aḥmad al-Mudwahī: *Public Works*
Ṣalāḥ al-Masrī: *State*

from Princeton

Cairo

1001 *Years of* The City Victorious

JANET L. ABU-LUGHOD

Janet Abu-Lughod traces the social and demographic history of Cairo, demonstrating the continuities and transformations that underlie the organization of today's city. Illustrated. *Princeton Studies on the Near East* $25.00

The Political Elite of Iran

MARVIN ZONIS

"A book of splendid clarity and interest, which presents us with new and vital data on Iran's elite and demonstrates their validity rigorously. . . . One of the most solid and revealing studies of any country in the modern Middle East and North Africa."—Manfred Halpern. *Princeton Studies on the Near East* $12.50

Self-Determination and History in the Third World

DAVID C. GORDON

In their struggle for self-determination the newly independent countries of the Third World are reestablishing links with their precolonial pasts. To demonstrate this, David Gordon brings together, interprets, and synthesizes the thought of contemporary Arab historiographers. $7.50

The Future of Law in a Multicultural World

ADDA B. BOZEMAN

Examining the unique cultures of the Islamic Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, Indianized Asia, and China, Mrs. Bozeman attacks the supposition that world unity can be achieved through the application of Western ideals of international law and organization. Cloth, $6.50
Paper, $2.45

Princeton University Press
Princeton, New Jersey 08540

DOCUMENT

THE PERMANENT CONSTITUTION OF THE YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

[Quranic Verse]

"We have made you aware of the rites which you should follow, and to not follow the wishes of the ignorant." AL-JĀTHIYAH 18

"The Qur'ān is a teacher, a guide, and a mercy to the good believers." AL-JĀTHIYAH 20

"Consult them on the matters." AL-'UMRĀN 15

"Their affairs are jointly discussed." AL-SHURA 78

"It said: you people, explain to me my case which I will not decide without your consultation." AL-NAML 32

[PREAMBLE]

We the Yemenis are an Arab and Muslim people. Our survival and that of our country is dependent upon adherence to our true Arab nationality, about which no nation claiming Arab descent can claim priority of such descent over us or deliver sermons to us.

We shall have no life to live among nations and we can claim no pride or character except through our true Islamic religion which has been the religion of our nation through the last fourteen centuries, and through following its divine guidance, achieving its precepts, abiding by its directions and strictures, and by remaining within its bounds.

Our Islamic religion, with its directions, magnanimity and breadth is synonymous with development, marches with time, and does not stand as an obstacle in the path of progress in life. The Qur'ān is explicitly clear in its call for magnanimity, fraternity, and peace among all mankind:

> "Thou should say We believe in God, his message to us, to Ibrāhīm, Ismā'īl, Isaq, Ya'qūb and the Asbat and the messages to Mūsā, 'Isā, and [all] the prophets without distinction and in God whom We trust."

We live today in an era witnessing the progress of nations and the advancement of science and knowledge, interlocked with each other politically, economically, and culturally. Each nation benefits from the experience of others, learns from them, and makes use of their culture, experience, and systems.

Therefore, it is incumbent upon us to learn and benefit from those nations advanced in science and progress but at the same time preserving our character, customs, and heritage which by their nature should in no way impede our march toward our goal of progress.

We should open the doors of Yemen for all useful sciences, arts, and cultures, experienced by all nations, and should, with perception, study, and scrutiny, obtain wisdom wherever it is found and strengthen our ties with our brothers the Arabs and between ourselves and our friends in both the East and the West.

We should, by all possible means, regain Yemeni unity in order to withstand any foreign influences aimed at blocking or fragmenting such unity.

On the basis of such solid principles, we submitted to the Yemeni nation a draft constitution expressing the nation's aspirations, wishes and hopes, as prepared by the National Assembly for all sectors of the nation to study and to comment upon it.

The Nation was given the full freedom to discuss, study and express its views on its contents, stipulations, and standards.

Three months have elapsed since the publication of the draft constitution on the evening of September 26, 1970, and since then meetings of the various sectors have been held in the capital, towns, and villages in which the constitution was openly debated and opinions and views exchanged about it. The Republican Council has received letters and telegrams on the constitution, has held meetings with Sharī'ah scholars, the 'Ulamā', Shaykhs, wise and cultured men, it has listened to their views and entered into useful debates wtih them. The citizens were thus given the opportunity during the past three months to discuss the draft constitution and to submit their views to the Republican Council, which explicitly proves the Nation's determination to follow the democratic, consultative path both by word and action.

With this constitutional document we [assert] our solidarity with all nations who believe in human rights and freedom and who are seeking equity, justice, and peace. By this document we are laying the foundations for democratic life in our country and for the expansion of freedom between individuals and groups.

Therefore, for all these reasons and in order to guarantee the basic principles for the creation of a Yemeni popular democracy on the basis of equality in rights and obligations between citizens without discrimination or differentiation and realizing the separation of powers which is considered as a firm guarantee against the return of dictatorial rule for the benefit of future generations, and affording a safeguard against exposure to the rule of coercion and humiliation under any type of dictatorial rule,

We announce this permanent constitution of the Yemen Arab Republic.

1 Dhu al-Qa'ida 1390 AH
28 December 1970 AD
(signed) 'Abd al-Raḥmān bin Yaḥyā al-Iryānī
Chairman
Republican Council

CHAPTER I
THE STATE

Article 1: Yemen is an Arab Islamic state, independent and enjoying complete sovereignty. It is a consultative, parliamentary republic, and the people of Yemen are a part of the Arab Nation.

Article 2: Islam is the religion of the State, and Arabic is its official language.

Article 3: The Islamic Sharī'ah is the source of all laws.

Article 4: The Nation is the source of all powers.

Article 5: Yemen is an indivisible whole and endeavors to realize the Yemeni unity which is the sacred duty of every citizen.

CHAPTER II
THE BASES OF THE SOCIETY

Article 6: Social reciprocity based on justice and freedom is the basis of the society.

Article 7: The family is the basis of the society and the fundamentals [of the family] are its religion, customs, and patriotism.

Article 8: The State guarantees public and private freedoms within the Sharī'ah and law. It also guarantees security and equal opportunities for all citizens.

Article 9: Education, health, and social services are foundations in the structure and progress of the society.

Article 10: Yemen's economy should be organized in accordance with a plan laid down by the Government in which the principles of Islamic social justice should be taken into consideration, aiming at improving and developing production and raising the standard of living, provided that the plan does not violate the sovereignty and independence of the country.

Article 11: Private economic activity is free provided that it does not violate the interests of the society.

Article 12: Private property is protected. It cannot be expropriated except in the public interest. The law will decide the amount and methods of indemnification.

Article 13: The natural wealth on the surface or in the depths of the earth or in its waters, and all the country's sea and land resources are the property of the State, and the State guarantees the best ways of exploiting it for the good of the Nation.

Article 14: Public properties are revered, and it is the duty of every citizen to protect them.

Article 15: Social justice and public interest are the bases for taxation and public expenditures.

Article 16: The State encourages cooperation and savings and sponsors various cooperative establishments.

Article 17: With the cooperation of the society, the State guarantees to bear all responsibilities resulting from natural catastrophes and major calamities.

Article 18: Public service is the duty of those undertaking it. In performing their duties, government employees should aim at the public interest and at serving the Nation.

CHAPTER III
PUBLIC RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS

Article 19: All Yemenis are equal in [terms of] public rights and obligations.

Article 20: The Yemeni nationality is defined by law. No Yemeni shall be deprived of his nationality, nor can it be withdrawn from anyone who has obtained it except in accordance with the law.

Article 21: There are no crimes and no punishments except as defined; punishment can only result from actions preceding it.

Article 22: Punishment is individual and no one should be made responsible for another's guilt.

Article 23: Prison is for punishment and reform. The State guarantees the realization of this objective.

Article 24: The accused is innocent until he is proved guilty; and no punishment shall be levied without legal trial, the proceedings of which are organized by law. The right to defense is guaranteed by law.

Article 25: Every citizen has the right of expression by word, letter, or illustration within the bounds of the law.

Article 26: The freedom of postal, telegraphic and telephonic communication is protected, and secrecy is guaranteed. [Communications] cannot be censored or delayed nor their secrecy revealed except where defined by law.

Article 27: No Yemeni can be expelled from Yemeni soil or prevented from returning home. It is not permitted to detain, arrest, or search any citizen except in accordance with the law.

Article 28: Places of worship and education are revered. They cannot be violated except in cases necessitated by security requirements as described by law.

Article 29: Places of residence are respected. They cannot be placed under surveillance or entered without the permission of the occupants except in cases prescribed by law.

Article 30: Confiscation of properties is forbidden except in cases prescribed by law.

Article 31: The extradition of political refugees is forbidden.

Article 32: Education is the right of all Yemenis. It is guaranteed by the State through the establishment of schools, and cultural and educational institutions, and the expansion of their scope insofar as the country's resources permit. The State is particularly concerned with the physical, mental and moral development of youths.

Article 33: Health services are the right of all Yemenis. The State guarantees to establish various hospitals and health institutions insofar as the country's resources permit.

Article 34: Women are the sisters of men. They have their mandatory rights and obligations as stipulated in the Sharī'ah and in accordance with the law.

Article 35: In accordance with the law, the State guarantees to consolidate the family, protect motherhood, and sponsor welfare for children, the disabled and the aged.

Article 36: Every citizen has the right to undertake work chosen by him and in accordance with the law. No forced labor shall be imposed upon anyone except in cases in the public interest prescribed by law and with appropriate wages.

Article 37: Partisanship in all its forms is forbidden.

Article 38: The freedom of establishing associations and trade unions on a sound national basis is guaranteed by the State in pursuance of the terms and conditions prescribed by law.

Article 39: The people have the right to hold meetings without permission or prior notice. Public meetings, processions and assemblies are permitted in accordance with the conditions prescribed by law.

Article 40: Payment of taxes and public dues is an obligation in accordance with the law.

Article 41: Defending religion and the homeland is a sacred duty. Military service is an honor and military conscription is prescribed by law.

Article 42: By its policy, the State takes into consideration human rights for all human beings, both within and outside the country, they are:

a. Blood, property and honor are respected. The Sharīʿah and the law guarantee the means for their protection.
b. Women, children, the aged, the sick, the wounded and hostages are respected and cannot be violated. The Sharīʿah and the law guarantee the means for their protection.
c. It is not permissible to torture prisoners bodily or morally.
d. The hungry, the naked, the wounded, and the sick have the right to be cared for. The State guarantees all their human rights. The same applies to fugitives and hostages in accordance with international treaties and the Islamic Sharīʿah.

Article 43: The State has no right to impose distinction in human rights due to religion or color or sex or language or natural origin or profession.

CHAPTER IV
POWERS

PART I. MAJLIS AL-SHŪRA
[The Consultative Council]

Article 44: The Majlis al-Shūra is the supreme legislative body of the State.

Article 45: The Majlis al-Shūra is responsible for supervising the business of the executive authority.

Article 46: The Majlis al-Shūra is composed of 159 members freely and democratically elected. Elections laws define the ways of obtaining membership. The Chairman of the Republican Council has the right to appoint twenty percent of the members.

Article 47: A member of the Majlis represents the whole Nation and protects the public interest. He is not subject to any authority from any source with regard to his work in the Majlis or its committees.

Article 48: A committee to be known as "The Elections Committee" will be appointed by the Republican Council and will consist of a number of persons to be specified in the law, which will also define its terms of reference and detailed procedures.

Article 49: The conditions of membership in the Majlis al-Shūra are:

a. to be Yemeni,
b. to be not less than twenty-five years [of age],
c. not to be illiterate,
d. to be of good conduct, to observe religious rites, and not to have been convicted for immorality unless otherwise rehabilitated,
e. not to be a public employee.

Article 50: The term of the Majlis al-Shūra is four solar years beginning with the date of its first meeting. General elections should take place during the 60 days preceding the date of the expiration of the term of the Majlis. If elections have not been completed at the time of the expiration of the term or if they are postponed for any reason, the Majlis continues functioning until a new Majlis is elected, for a period not exceeding three months. The term of the Majlis should not be extended except in circumstances which prevent the holding of general elections. Such extensions should be made by law.

Article 51: The Chairman of the Republican Council summons the Majlis al-Shūra to its first meeting following the general elections within two weeks after announcing the result of the elections. If the Majlis is not summoned within this period, it will be regarded as summoned to meet in the morning of the day following the two weeks' period.

Article 52: The Majlis al-Shūra is considered to be in permanent session and the Majlis' rules of order define the session and proceedings relating thereto.

Article 53: If, for any reason, the seat of any member of the Majlis al-Shūra falls vacant, a substitute [member] is chosen in conformity with the system prescribed in the constitution within two months from the date the Majlis has announced such vacancy. The term of membership of the new member continues until the expiration of the term of his predecessor. If such vacancy falls within the six months preceding the expiration of the term of the Majlis, no election of a substitute shall take place.

Article 54: The headquarters of the Majlis al-Shūra is the capital, San'ā'. Any meeting held by the Majlis in a place other than that appointed shall be illegal and all the resolutions passed shall be invalid according to the provision of the law except in exceptional circumstances when the Majlis may be summoned to hold its meetings in another area.

Article 55: Before a member of the Majlis al-Shūra shall assume his duties in the Majlis or its committees, the member shall take the following oath in an open session of the Majlis:

> "I swear in the name of the Almighty God to adhere to the Book of God and to the law of His Prophet, to be faithful to my religion, my homeland and my people, to guard the republican system and the objectives of the revolution, to respect the Nation's constitution and laws, to covet the freedoms of the people, their interests, their properties and their dignity, to do all within my means and power to preserve the Nation's sovereignty and independence and to defend the safety of its lands, and to perform my duties as a deputy honorably, trustfully and sincerely, and God witnesseth my words."

Article 56: In its first meeting, the Majlis al-Shūra elects a chairman, two deputies, and a secretary-general from among its members, who will remain in office during the term of the Majlis.

Article 57: A member of the Majlis al-Shūra submits his resignation to the Majlis.

Article 58: No member of the Majlis al-Shūra shall be held accountable, under any circumstances, for having examined or participated with his views and opinions in formulating the minutes, or for his work in the Majlis or its committees, or for his voting in the open or secret sessions of the Majlis. This provision is not applicable when a member defames and abuses others.

Article 59: Members of the Majlis al-Shūra enjoy immunity. It is not permissible for any member to be subject to proceedings of investigation, search, arrest, imprisonment or any other action of punishment without the permission of the Majlis except in the event of criminal action in which case the Majlis shall be notified immediately for its information.

Article 60: (a). The Majlis shall prepare rules of order embodying the working procedures for the Majlis and its committees. Revising this system is not permissible except in accordance with the provisions mentioned therein. (b). Administrative employees in the Majlis al-Shūra, other than its members, are subject to regulations of the State Civil Service.

Article 61: (a). The Prime Minister and Ministers have the right to attend the meetings of the Majlis al-Shūra and its committees and to be heard by the members whenever they so request. They may seek the assistance of senior officials. (b). Questions by the members of the Majlis al-Shūra relating to the work of ministries, departments, or government institutions shall be addressed to the Prime Minister, who shall have the option of deputizing or being accompanied by the respective minister or delegate in order to answer those questions. (c). The Government must be advised of the agenda of the Majlis and its committees for its information.

Article 62: The Majlis al-Shūra may convey its recommendations on public affairs to the Government. If the Government is unable to accept such recommendations, it should explain to the Majlis its reason for not accepting them.

Article 63: Every Cabinet shall, not later than twenty-five days after its formation, submit its program to the Majlis al-Shūra. If the Majlis is not in ordinary session, it shall be summoned to an extraordinary session. The Majlis al-Shūra may comment once on the statement of the Government to express any opinions with regard to the Government's program.

Article 64: If a request signed by 30 members is forwarded to the Majlis al-Shūra, a subject of general nature may be put for discussion to the Majlis in order to obtain the clarification of the Government concerning its policy with regard to that subject and to exchange opinions.

Article 65: The Majlis al-Shūra has the right to withdraw its confidence in the Government. It is not permissible to present the withdrawal of confidence except after forwarding an interpellation to the Government. The request shall be initiated and signed by one third of the members. The Majlis cannot pass its resolution until one week after forwarding the request. Withdrawal of confidence cannot be accomplished except with a majority of two-thirds of the members of the Majlis.

Article 66: The Prime Minister may submit to the Majlis al-Shūra a request for confidence in the Government on the occasion of adopting a new policy or defending it.

Article 67: The Prime Minister shall tender the resignation of the Government to the Chairman of the Republican Council if the Majlis al-Shūra withdraws its confidence in the Cabinet.

Article 68: Either a member of the Majlis al-Shūra or the Government may propose new legislation and amendments to the laws; and any draft law rejected by the Majlis cannot be presented again in the same session.

Article 69: The Chairman of the Republican Council shall publish every draft law approved by the Majlis al-Shūra within 30 days from the day it was forwarded to him. If this period fixed for publication elapses without any request for reconsideration of the draft law having been received from the Chairman of the Republican Council, it shall be regarded as law and the Chairman of the Republican Council shall publish it immediately.

Article 70: The Chairman of the Republican Council has the right, if he finds it necessary to modify a draft law or some of its items, to return it once to the Majlis with an explanatory note within the period fixed for publication. The Majlis shall hold a new debate in accordance with the reasons contained in the explanatory note of the Chairman of the Republican Council. If two-thirds of the members of the Majlis again approve of the draft law, it shall be regarded as law and the Chairman of the Republican Council shall publish it immediately.

Article 71: The Chairman of the Republican Council may dissolve the Majlis al-Shūra by passing a resolution explaining the reasons for such action. However, it is not permissible to dissolve the Majlis a second time for the same reasons. The resolution dissolving the Majlis al-Shūra shall contain an invitation to voters for new elections not less than twenty days and not exceeding ninety days from the date of dissolution, and shall fix a date for seating the new Majlis fifteen days after the results of the elections are known. In the event that elections do not take place during the fixed period, the Chairman of the Republican Council shall invite the dissolved Majlis to exercise its full constitutional authority, to hold a meeting immediately, and to resume its business as if the dissolution had not occurred. The Majlis al-Shūra cannot be dissolved during the year subsequent to its election or during the last six months of the term of the Republican Council.

Article 72: It is not permissible for a member of the Majlis al-Shūra during the term of his membership to be appointed or be engaged on the board of directors of a commercial firm in which the Government participates or to share in commitments concluded by the Government or public establishments. Also, it is not permissible for him to buy or to lease or to barter any Government property or to sell or rent to the Government any of his properties or exchange the same with the Government unless such action takes place by means of a public auction or when expropriated in the public interest as prescribed by law. Article 80 of this constitution shall apply in the case of the Chairman, the Deputies, and the Secretary-General.

CHAPTER IV

PART II

THE REPUBLICAN COUNCIL

Article 73: The Republican Council represents the Presidency of the State. It is the body responsible for specifying the State's general policy and for supervising its execution.

Article 74: The Chairman of the Council is the President of the State and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.

Article 75: It is a condition that any elected Chairman or member of the Republican Council shall be from Yemeni parents, 40 years of age, well conversant with affairs related to the Sharīʿah, of good behavior and conduct, upholding Islamic rites, and not already married to, or, during his Chairmanship or membership, marrying a foreigner.

Article 76: The Republican Council consists of no less than three members or more than five members nominated and elected by the Majlis. The candidate becomes a member of the Republican Council if he obtains the majority of the votes of the members of the Majlis. The Chairman of the Majlis announces the results of the elections.

Article 77: The term of the Council is five solar years beginning with the date of announcement of the results of the elections.

Article 78: The members of the Republican Council elect among themselves a chairman. The Chairmanship is rotating and the election of the Chairman of the Republican Council shall take place sixty days before the end of the term. No election of a new chairman of the Republican Council shall take place in the event of the resignation of the Council of Ministers.

Article 79: The Chairman and members of the Republican Council take the following oath before the Majlis al-Shūra before beginning their duties:

> "I swear in the name of the Almighty God to adhere to the Book of God and the law of His Prophet, to be faithful to my religion, to my homeland and my people, to protect the republican system and the objectives of the revolution, to respect the constitution and laws of the Nation, to covet the freedoms, interests, property and dignity of the people, to endeavor, with all the power I possess, to preserve the sovereignty and independence of the homeland and to defend the security of its soil, and God witnesseth my words."

Article 80: It is not permissible for the Chairman or a member of the Republican Council during his term of office to practice, even indirectly, a free profession or commercial, financial or industrial activity, or to buy or rent any government property even by means of public auction, or to rent to the Government or to sell to it any of his properties or to exchange these with the Government .

Article 81: Ninety days before the expiration of the term of the Republican Council, action shall be initiated to select a new Republican Council. It shall be selected at least one week before expiration of its previous term of office. If this term expires without selection of a new Council, for any reason, the Majlis al-Shūra directs the previous Council to continue functioning for a period not to exceed sixty days. However, it is not permissible for the Majlis al-Shūra to extend this period except when the country is in a state of war rendering it impossible to arrange elections.

Article 82: In the event that any member of the Republican Council tenders his resignation or is permanently disabled, or dies, the Majlis al-Shūra shall resolve that his place has fallen vacant, and that a substitute be selected in accordance with the method prescribed in the constitution, within a period of sixty days from the date that the seat has fallen vacant. The term of the new member lasts until the end of the term of his predecessor.

Article 83: The resignation of the Chairman of the Republican Council and members of the Council shall be tendered to the Majlis al-Shūra.

Article 84: It is not permissible to direct any accusation to the Chairman of the Republican Council or any of its members for breaching the constitution or for high treason except by the resolution of two-thirds of the members of the Majlis al-Shūra. No trial shall be regarded adequate except before the Supreme Constitutional Court.

Article 85: The Chairman of the Republican Council shall appoint a chairman (i.e., Prime Minister) for the Council of Ministers after obtaining the consent of the Republican Council, provided that he is from Yemeni parents and that he is not married to, or does not marry during his term of office, a foreigner.

Article 86: The Chairman of the Republican Council has the right to summon the Republican Council and the Council of Ministers to a joint meeting whenever this is necessary and to preside at such meetings.

Article 87: The death sentence shall not be executed without being confirmed by the Republican Council. It shall have the right to reduce [the sentence] by a majority vote of its membership in cases other than those of Sharī'ah punishment.

Article 88: If, during sessions of the Majlis al-Shūra or during the period of its dissolution, anything occurs necessitating immediate action, the Republican Council shall have the right to pass decisions which shall have the force of law provided that these do not contradict the constitution or the appropriation bill defined in the Budget Ordinance. Such decisions shall be forwarded to the Majlis al-Shūra fifteen days from the date they were issued if the Majlis is in session; or in its first meeting in the event of dissolution, or at the expiration of the legislative term. If these decisions are not forwarded, they shall lose the force of law from the date of issuance without the need for a resolution to that effect. If they are forwarded but not approved by the Majlis, they shall lose the power of law from the date of rejection, and an action to rectify their effects in other aspects shall be undertaken.

Article 89: The Chairman of the Republican Council concludes treaties which shall have the force of law after being approved by the Republican Council and Council of Ministers and ratified by the Majlis al-Shūra and published in accordance with established procedures.

Article 90: The Chairman of the Republican Council declares war or a state of emergency, accepts an armistice or peace following the approval of the Republican Council and the Council of Ministers and the Majlis al-Shūra.

Article 91: The Chairman of the Republican Council shall be responsible for issuance of laws which are approved by the Republican Council and ratified by the Majlis al-Shūra.

Article 92: All resolutions issued by the Republican Council, in order to be executed, shall be signed jointly by the Prime Minister and the Minister concerned, with the exception of the resolution appointing the Prime Minister or accepting his resignation.

Article 93: The Chairman of the Republican Council accredits the State's diplomatic representatives in foreign countries in accordance with law and accepts the accreditation of representatives of foreign countries and international organizations.

Article 94: The Chairman of the Republican Council appoints senior civil and military officials as prescribed by law and in accordance with the nomination by the appropriate quarters.

CHAPTER IV
PART III

THE GOVERNMENT

Article 95: The Government is the supreme executive and administrative body of the State.

Article 96: The Government is composed of the Prime Minister and a number of Ministers as needed in the public interest.

Article 97: The Prime Minister nominates the members of his Cabinet with the approval of the Republican Council and seeks the confidence of the Majlis al-Shūra after the presentation of his Government's political program.

Article 98: A person appointed as Minister should be a Yemeni, 30 years of age, of good behavior and conduct, and a person who adheres to Islamic principles.

Article 99: The Prime Minister and the Ministers are responsible jointly to the Republican Council and the Majlis al-Shūra for the functions of the Council of Ministers and the general policy of the Government.

Article 100: Each Minister shall supervise the functions of his ministry and execute the general policy of the Government.

Article 101: The Prime Minister may deputize one of the members of his Cabinet to perform duties or to be assigned special tasks either in the country or abroad.

Article 102. During his term of office, it is not permissible for a minister to occupy another public post or to exercise, even indirectly, another profession or a commercial or financial or industrial activity. Also, he is not allowed to share in the contracts concluded by the Government or public establishments or to combine his ministerial post with membership on the board of directors of any commercial firm. During the said period, he shall have no right to buy or to rent any Government property or to exchange the same with it even by means of public auction, or to rent or to sell to the Government any of his own property or exchange the same with the Government.

Article 103: When the Cabinet resigns or is compelled to resign or when confidence in it is withdrawn; the Cabinet shall be required to conduct public business except appointments and dismissals until a new Cabinet is formed.

Article 104: Before assuming office, the Prime Minister and Ministers shall take the following oath before the Chairman of the Republican Council:

> "I swear in the name of the Almighty God to adhere to the Book of God and the law of His Prophet, to be faithful to my religion, country and people, to defend the republican system and the objectives of the revolution, to respect the constitution and laws of the country, and to covet the freedoms, interests and dignity of the people, to endeavor, with all the power I possess, to preserve the sovereignty and independence of the homeland, and to defend the security of its soil, and God witnesseth my words."

Article 105: The law establishes the salaries of the Prime Minister and Ministers.

Article 106: The Government performs the following functions:

a. directs and coordinates and reviews the duties of ministries and public establishments and organization, in accordance with the law.

b. issues administrative and executive resolutions in accordance with laws and resolutions, creates departments and public organizations, and insures administrative control over such organizations.

c. prepares draft-laws and resolutions to organize governmental systems, insures the execution of development programs and the development of the economy, implements Islamic social justice, defends traditions and develops national culture and encourages scientific research in accordance with the State's fundamental principles as laid down by the Republican Council.

d. appoints and discharges employees according to the law.

e. prepares the draft budget of the State prior to forwarding it to the Majlis al-Shūra.

f. ensures the implementation of laws, safeguards public finances and interests within and outside the country, and protects the rights of the citizens.

g. supervises the organization and administration of matters pertaining to the monetary, trust, and insurance systems of the State.

h. concludes loans and grants them within the general policy of the State.

Article 107: The Majlis al-Shūra has the right to try Ministers for high treason. The resolution of the Majlis accusing the Minister shall follow a motion put forward by at least one third of the members, and approved by two thirds of the members of the Majlis after an investigation is carried out by a committee appointed as a result of a resolution passed by the Majlis and headed by a magistrate from the Supreme Constitutional Court. This does not preclude termination of his services while the Court is investigating his case or even if no case is proven. The law defines the civil, military and penal jurisdictions and sets forth the procedures for their trial before the Supreme Court without nullifying the application of other laws pertaining to their ordinary deeds or crimes.

Article 108: It is not permissible to combine a ministerial post with membership in the Majlis al-Shūra. A member of the Majlis al-Shūra may retain his seat in the Majlis as vacant if he is appointed Minister.

CHAPTER IV
PART IV
LOCAL ADMINISTRATION

Article 109: The territory of the republic is divided into administrative units, and law defines their number, divisions and boundaries. It also defines the responsibilities of those functioning in the administrative units.

Article 110: The administrative units shall have local councils in which the affairs of the regions shall be administered in a democratic manner according to the law.

CHAPTER IV
PART V
FINANCIAL AFFAIRS

Article 111: Establishing public taxes or revising them or abolishing them shall be accomplished by ordinance. No one shall be exempt from paying all or part of his taxes except in instances prescribed by law. It is not permissible to ask any person to pay taxes, fees and liabilities unless prescribed by law.

Article 112: The law specifies the basic principles for the collection of public money and its disbursement.

Article 113: It is not permissible for the Government to conclude loans or guarantees or to contract for a project which results in expenditures not provided in the State Public Budget during a current year or subsequent years except with the consent of the Majlis al-Shūra.

Article 114: The law stipulates the basis for granting salaries, pensions, compensations, compassionate discharges, and gratuities which it defines as a liability of the State treasury, and regulates exceptional cases and the authorities authorized to implement these laws.

Article 115: It is not permissible to grant a monopoly or concession to invest any of the natural resources of the country or to exploit public resources except by law and for a limited period.

Article 116: A monopoly which harms individuals and groups with regard to the necessities of life is forbidden.

Article 117: The law defines the provisions concerning preserving and administering government property, the conditions of disposing of it and the extent to which it is allowed to relinquish any such properties.

Article 118: The Government prepares the general budget and only the Majlis al-Shūra has the right to approve it.

Article 119: The beginning and the end of the fiscal year are defined by law.

Article 120: The Government prepares the draft annual budget for the revenues and expenditures of the State, and forwards it to the Majlis al-Shūra at least two months before the expiration of the fiscal year for scrutiny and approval.

Article 121: (a) The budget is debated and voted upon in the Majlis al-Shūra. (b) It is not permitted to allocate any of the general revenues for specific expenditures except by ordinance.

Article 122: It is permissible for the appropriation bill to allocate certain sums for more than one year if the nature of such expenditure necessitates, provided that such sums are repeated in subsequent estimates, or separate estimates are prepared for more than one fiscal year.

Article 123: It is not permissible for the appropriation bill to contain any text leading to abolition of an existing tax or the introduction of a new tax or the revision of fixed taxes by increasing or reducing them.

Article 124: The Majlis al-Shūra should not, during discussion of the budget, increase estimates for total revenues or expenditures proposed in the draft budget either by means of modification or by means of special proposals.

Article 125: It is permissible for the Majlis al-Shūra, after approving the budget, to approve laws providing for new expenditures and appropriate revenues to cover such.

Article 126: The budgetary estimate is validated by the appropriations bill.

Article 127: If the general appropriations bill is not issued before the beginning of the fiscal year, the budget of the previous year is adopted until the bill is passed, and this in no event should be delayed by more than 100 days. Revenues are collected and expenses incurred in accordance with the bill adopted at the end of the previous year.

Article 128: The Majlis al-Shūra shall approve every proposal leading to the transfer of any sum from one appropriation to another in the budget, as well as every expenditure not mentioned therein or exceeding its estimates.

Article 129: It is not permissible to exceed the upper limits of the expenditure estimates mentioned in the appropriation bill or related ordinances. Also, it is not permissible for the appropriation bill to contain a text allowing the Government to exceed these upper limits.

Article 130: The final statement of account of the State budget for each year must be presented to the Majlis al-Shūra during the two months subsequent to the expiration of the fiscal year for its consideration and approval in accordance with the law.

Article 131: The independent and supplementary budgets and their final statements of account are subject to the same rules applying in the case of the State budget.

Article 132: The law regulates the provisions of the budget and the final statements of account of the other local establishments and organizations which are legal entities.

Article 133: The Government shall present to the Majlis al-Shūra a statement showing the financial position of the State at least once during each of its ordinary sessions.

Article 134: The law regulates currency and banking and determines measurements, dry measures and scales.

Article 135: The alms tax (zakāt) is one of the basic pillars of Islam. The Government shall endeavor to collect it and to spend it correctly.

Article 136: The Waqf is a sacred institution and the State undertakes to improve its resources and its disbursement in a manner compatible with the Islamic Sharī'ah.

CHAPTER IV
PART VI

NATIONAL DEFENSE

Article 137: By resolution of the Republican Council, a Supreme National Defense Council presided over by the Chairman of the Republican Council shall be formed it. I shall assume responsibility for promulgating a general plan for defense and for internal and external security.

Article 138: The State alone creates the armed forces, public security establishments and militia in accordance with the law. It is not permissible for any organization or group to create military or para-military groups.

Article 139: General and private mobilization is prescribed by law.

Article 140: The law defines the terms of service and promotion for the officers of the armed forces.

Article 141: Any member of the armed forces or security forces is prohibited from joining any political, partisan, factional, or racial movement.

Article 142: The Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces is appointed by a resolution passed by the Republican Council. He receives his orders from the Republican Council.

Article 143: It is permissible for the Commander-in-Chief to appoint one or more deputy Commanders-in-Chief by a resolution passed by the Republican Council as proposed by the Commander-in-Chief.

CHAPTER IV
PART VII

THE JUDICIAL AUTHORITY

Article 144: The Judiciary is an independent authority.

Article 145: Judges are independent. No authority except law is allowed to control them in their judgments. No authority is allowed to interfere in their judgments or in the affairs of justice.

Article 146: No one shall occupy a judicial post except scholars in the Sharī'ah Law, of sound character and behavior.

Article 147: The law specifies the areas of judicial authority, their levels, and defines their responsibilities.

Article 148: The right of litigation is guaranteed for all people. The law defines the proceedings and the conditions necessary to exercise their right.

Article 149: Before assuming his duties, the Qaḍī (judge) swears by the Almighty God to judge the people justly.

Article 150: Judges are not subject to dismissal except in cases defined by law.

Article 151: The law defines the terms of judicial appointment, transfer promotion, and the safeguards related to these.

Article 152: The provisions of the Islamic Sharī'ah relating to business shall be defined provided that they do not differ from any text or ijmā'. The law provides for the appointment of a technical Sharī'ah body to assume this responsibility.

Article 153: In cases heard by the Courts, the provisions of this constitution and of the State's laws shall be applied. If there is no precedent, the Courts shall pass their judgment in the case they are dealing with in accordance with the general principles of the Islamic Sharī'ah.

Article 154: The law provides for decisions in departmental disputes through an organization or a special court. The law defines its rules and how it should exercise its duties concerning the departmental resolutions which contravene the law.

CHAPTER V

THE SUPREME CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

Article 155: A Supreme Constitutional Court is formed from a number of Sharī'ah scholars of high qualifications, elected by the Majlis al-Shūra and nominated by the Chairman of the Republican Council. Its duties will be to give final decisions on the following matters:

a. the constitutionality of constitutional amendments,
b. the constitutionality of ordinances and resolutions which have the force of law,
c. the trial of the Chairman and members of the Republican Council and the Prime Minister and Ministers,
d. investigations in election disputes concerning members of the Majlis al-Shūra.

Article 156: The Chairman and members of the Supreme Constitutional Court shall take the following oath before the Majlis al-Shūra in a special session attended by the Chairman of the Republican Council:

> "I swear by the Almighty God to adhere to the Book of God and the law of His Prophet, to be faithful to my religion, country and people, to guard the republican system and the objectives of the revolution, to respect the Nation's constitution and laws, to covet the freedoms of the people, their interests, their properties and their dignity, to do all within my means and power to preserve the Nation's sovereignty and independence, and to defend the safety of its lands, and God witnesseth my words."

Article 157: The decisions of the Supreme Constitutional Court shall be published in the Official Gazette. They are not subject to objection. They are binding upon the public authorities and all departmental and judicial authorities.

Article 158: A law with a constitutional force determines the proceedings concerning formation of the Supreme Constitutional Court, and basis of its administration, and the proceedings which should be followed before it.

CHAPTER VI

AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION

Article 159: A request for amendment of any of the articles of the constitution shall be submitted in writing by more than half of the members of the Majlis al-Shūra. The revision shall be valid if a majority of two-thirds of the members of the Majlis al-Shūra vote for it.

Article 160: The statute of the Supreme Constitutional Court organizes the proceedings required for amendment of the constitution.

CHAPTER VII

GENERAL AND INTERIM PROVISIONS

PART I: GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 161: The city of San'ā' is the capital of the Yemen Arab Republic.

Article 162: The law defines the emblem, flag, and national anthem of the State and any conditions related thereto.

Article 163: The provisions of the laws shall be effective from the date they are put into force. They shall have no effect on matters which have taken place before that date. It is permissible in non-penal provisions of the law to stipulate things contrary to provisions requiring approval of the majority of the members of the Majlis al-Shūra.

Article 164: Laws are published in the Official Gazette.

Article 165: All of the provisions contained in ordinances, resolutions, rules and regulations issued prior to the publication of this constitution shall remain effective unless otherwise revised or abolished in accordance with the laws and proceedings stipulated in this constitution and provided that these stipulations do not contravene any of the texts of this constitution.

PART II: INTERIM PROVISIONS

Article 166: The temporary Majlis remains in force exercising its business as stipulated in Constitutional Resolution No. 2 for 1969 until the results of the election of the elected Majlis al-Shūra are announced in pursuance with this constitution and until it holds its first meeting.

Article 167: The term of the present Republican Council shall expire only when the new Republican Council has been elected.

Article 168: It is not permissible to suspend any of the provisions of this constitution except during the time when a state of emergency is announced or when a state of war is declared as provided in the constitution.

Article 169: The temporary constitution and all its amendments become ineffective when this constitution is published. All previous constitutions are also abolished, taking into consideration the two Articles 166 and 167 in this constitution.

Article 170: This constitution becomes effective from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette.

Announcing . . .

A NEW KIND OF PUBLICATION ON THE MIDDLE EAST

The first English-language journal to focus exclusively on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict

JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES

In addition to analytical articles on political, military, strategic, and economic matters, written by public figures and Middle Eastern specialists, the Journal will include:

- **REVIEWS OF RECENT BOOKS** published in the Arab World, Israel, Europe, the Soviet Union and the United States.
- **BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REVIEW** of current Arab and Israeli periodicals.
- **DEVELOPMENTS OF THE QUARTER** based on Arab and Israeli sources.
- **DOCUMENTS AND SOURCE MATERIAL.**

* * * * *

Published quarterly (from Autumn 1971) by The Institute for Palestine Studies and Kuwait University. Subscription: $8.00 (£3.30) a year, post free to any address.

For subscriptions write to:

JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES
P.O. Box 7164, Beirut, Lebanon; for U.S.A. and Canada
P.O. Box 329A, Rd. No. 1, Oxford, Pa. 19363

AN ANNOUNCEMENT

By special agreement, Syracuse University Press is now the distributor in the Western Hemisphere and Hawaii for books published by the AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT, Lebanon

These books have not been available previously from an American source. All of the books are in English, and represent some of the most important scholarly publishing in the Middle East. They are known as AUB Publications. Orders will be shipped promptly from Syracuse University Press

Among the titles now available are:

- AGRICULTURE
  Man, Food, and Agriculture in the Middle East.
  Thomas S. Stickley and others, editors.
  692 pages. 1969. SBN 8156-6015-4 $10.00
- ARCHAEOLOGY
  The Role of the Phoenicians in the Interaction of Mediterranean Civilizations.
  William A. Ward, editor.
  152 pages, illustrated. 1968.
  SBN 8156-6011-1 $8.00
- BIOGRAPHY
  The Life and Works of Ibn Qutayba
  by Ishaq Musa Husseini.
  106 pages. 1950.
  SBN 8156-6027-8 Paper, $2.00
- BOTANY
  The Weeds of Lebanon
  by Winnie Edgecombe.
  500 pages, 214 plates. 1970.
  SBN 8156-6001-4 Paper, $8.00
- ECONOMICS
  Foreign Trade of the Middle East: Instability and Growth, 1946 - 1962
  by Joseph Coppock.
  255 pages. 1966.
  SBN 8156-6022-7 Paper, $5.00
- ENGINEERING
  Engineering and Architecture and the Future Environment of Man.
  Friedrich Ragette, editor.
  305 pages. 1968.
  SBN 8156-6013-8 Paper, $5.00
- GEOGRAPHY
  The Lebanon and Phoenicia: Ancient Texts Illustrating Their Physical Geography and Native Industries.
  Vol. I: The Physical Setting and the Forest.
  John Pairman Brown,
  compiler, translator, annotator.
  220 pages. 1969. SBN 8156-6014-6 $10.00
- LITERATURE
  Mikhail Naimy, an Introduction.
  by Nadeem N. Naimy.
  350 pages. 1967.
  SBN 8156-6028-6 Paper, $4.50
- MEDICINE
  Hitti's English-Arabic Medical Dictionary.
  by Yusuf K. Hitti.
  758 pages. 1967. SBN 8156-6004-9 $16.00
- PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION
  God and Man in Contemporary Christian Thought.
  Charles Malik, editor.
  131 pages. 1970.
  SBN 8156-6016-2 Paper, $5.00
  The Refinement of Character, by Abi Alī Ahmad Ben Mohammad Miskawayh
  Constantine Zurayk, translator.
  220 pages. 1968. SBN 8156-6012-X $8.00
- POLITICAL STUDIES
  The Political Doctrine of Al-Baqillani
  by Yusuf Ibish.
  208 pages. 1966. SBN 8156-6029-4 $5.00

The complete list of AUB Publications is available on request from
SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Syracuse, New York 13210

LEGAL REVIEW

SAUDI ARABIA'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM

Soliman A. Solaim

After Madīnah resigned its rôle as the center of Muslim power to Damascus under the Umayyads in the seventh century there was no central power in most of Arabia. Only under the leadership of King 'Abd al-'Azīz Al Sa'ūd did a major part of the Arabian Peninsula become able to shape its own destiny in what is known today as Saudi Arabia. The alliance which was struck between the House of Sa'ūd and the reformist Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb proved capable of responding to the requirements of a modern nation-state. Foremost among these requirements has been, for Saudi Arabia, the development of modern legislation and the reorganization of judicial institutions without necessarily changing their essentially Islamic character.

This article will deal with the development and working of these institutions and their relevance to the general evolution of the country.

The Traditional System

By the time King 'Abd al-'Azīz took control of the Ḥijāz in the early 1920s, he found himself faced with the existence of three different, though not separate, judicial systems. That of the Ḥijāz had the distinction of having considerable Ottoman influence. Although the whole of the Arabian Peninsula was under the nominal sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire, only the urban centers of the Ḥijāz felt the weight of the Ottoman reforms of the 19th century.

The second system was that of the small towns of Najd. Here, the settlement of disputes was the responsibility of the local Amīr (Governor) and a single judge. The Amīr would attempt to reconcile differences or refer them to the judge, either at his own discretion or at the request of one or all of the litigants. The execution of the judge's decision was the duty of the Amīr who was assisted by some of the town notables and a sort of a small police force called "The Amīr's men."

Lastly, the desert men held to their age-old customary tribal law, in which each tribe had its own lawmen render judgments according to precedents and had recourse to a system of arbitration in cases of inter-tribal disputes.

Since these were acceptable and workable systems, the King did not introduce any drastic changes; he merely tried to make them work more smoothly and began a process for their unification. What he brought to the Ḥijāz was the orientation, gained in some twenty-five years experience, towards a system of simple and expeditious justice based on the Ḥanbalī school as interpreted by Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb.

The existing Ottoman laws of the Ḥijāz were so repugnant to the puritanical zeal of his followers that he had to refer the question to the *'ulamā'* (doctors of the law). The latter in their famous legal opinion of February 1927 were

---

△ SOLIMAN A. SOLAIM is assistant Director General of the General Social Insurance Organization of the Saudi Arabian government, Riyadh. This article is based on the author's doctoral dissertation "Constitutional and Judicial Organization in Saudi Arabia," available in transcript at the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D. C.

categorically against his plan of absorbing the more developed Ḥijāzī institutions, "... and as to the laws," they stated, "if there be any of them in the Ḥijāz, it will be immediately abolished, and nothing except the pure Sharī'ah will be applied."[1] Far from acknowledging defeat in this matter, the King, after letting the dust settle, issued an order sanctioning the existing Ottoman laws of the Ḥijāz.[2]

The King then started a campaign of liberalization aimed at drawing upon schools of law other than the Ḥanbalī school and at attacking the concept of *taqlīd* (imitation). He repeated the Prophet's warning, "You will follow the paths of those who preceded you hand-span by hand-span and cubit by cubit. Even if they entered a mastigure's hole you would."[3]

Apart from this campaign, the King brought to law in the Ḥijāz two elements the Ḥijāzīs learned quickly to appreciate: accessibility and speed. These were things the Hashimites, perhaps due to their Ottoman orientation, were incapable of providing for their subjects. From the early days of his conquest of the Ḥijāz, he made himself available for his people. Most representative of this attitude is his invitation to his subjects which was published in the official newspaper:

> "His Majesty the King announces to all the people that anyone who may have a grievance against whomever . . . and then he hides it, he will be sinning only against himself. . . . There is set aside, on the door of the Government Building, a box of complaints whose key is kept by the King. The aggrieved party should deposit his complaint in that box."[4]

This, then, was the simple way the King conceived as sufficient for handling grievances in the Ḥijāz at the beginning. Indeed the idea of a "box of complaints" in itself was an improvement or, perhaps, a necessary refinement of the more simple procedure in Riyadh, where there was no such box.

The Administrative Reorganization

The first step towards laying down the foundation of a unified judicial system for the Kingdom was taken in 1927. A Royal Decree classified judicial institutions into three degrees: expeditious courts, *sharī'ah* courts and the Commission on Judicial Supervision.[5] The expeditious courts handled the more simple criminal and civil cases and were divided into first expeditious courts and second expeditious courts. The latter dealt with cases involving nomads. All other cases were within the jurisdiction of the *sharī'ah* courts. In addition to inspecting and supervising the courts, the Commission had the function of judicial review.

This early jurisdictional delimitation of judicial institutions in the Ḥijāz, rough and brief as it was, could be considered as basically the organizational outline of the *sharī'ah* courts as they stand today. The latest important legislation on the subject, the Attributions of *Sharī'ah* Jurisprudence Responsibilities of 1952, though more detailed, and covering such subjects as the Notaries Public, the Property Departments and the Summoning Officers, did not signify any radical departure. The organizational framework remained as follows:



---

[1] Arabic text in Ḥāfiẓ Wahbā's *Jazīrat al-'Arab fī al-Qarn al-'Ishrīn* (Cairo [n.p], 1935), pp. 319-321.

[2] *Majmū'at al-Nuẓum* (Makkah: Umm al-Qūrā Press, 1938), p. 8.

[3] *Umm al-Qūrā* (Makkah), March 24, 1934.

[4] *Umm al-Qūrā* (Makkah), June 7, 1926.

[5] *Majmū'at al-Nuẓum*, pp. 9-12.

The courts and the single judges were assigned six Ḥanbalī books to draw upon in rendering judgments.[6] This was an important step toward unifying the judiciary, since up to then the prevailing schools of law were the Ḥanafī and the Shāfi'ī in the Ḥijāz and the Ḥanbalī in Najd. It should be pointed out, however, that judges could have recourse to the other three schools of law and to their own reasoning in cases where no provisions were provided in the six books.

Judicial Procedure

Judicial procedure has been the subject of four major legislative actions in 1927, 1931, 1936 and 1952. The latter, "The Organization of Administrative Functions in the Sharī'ah Court System," remains operative today.[7]

Procedural rules in court are simple. When both plaintiff and defendant are present, the judge listens first to the plaintiff's arguments and orders them put on record. He then does the same with the defendant. The litigants at this point may refute each other's arguments and the judge orders the recording of the legally correct refutations only. The litigants may bring witnesses but the judge has the responsibility of ascertaining that they are of good character (*'udūl*). Cross examination can only be done by the judge, but any of the litigants may refute the other's evidence, question the character of his witnesses and examine, in court, the documents he produces. It should be noticed, however, that the characterization of a refutation (*daf'*) by one party as legally correct (*saḥīḥ*) is within the judge's power.

The judge's decision must include a summary of the facts of the case and the legal reasoning behind it. If the decision is appealable it is the duty of the judge, according to "The Instructions on the Reviewing of *Sharī'ah* Judgments," to ask the condemned party whether he is satisfied with the judgment. If the answer is in the negative, the judge then informs him of his right to appeal within ten days during which he should prepare his "bill of objections." The Commission on Judicial Review may ratify or reverse the decision within a period not exceeding one month. It may also ask the judge of the lower court to clarify certain points in his decision.

The judge, in case of a reversal, may make an effort to convince the Commission of the correctness of his original decision or start a new trial. If the judge, however, insists on his original decision, the case is transferred to another court. This procedure seems to give due consideration to the judge's independence and piety.

The simplicity and dignity of these procedural rules are well recognized. Foreigners who have come in contact with Saudi judges have been impressed with their independence, integrity and incorruptibility.[8] Several measures have been taken to overcome some of the shortcomings of the system. The first of these measures has to do with the absence of the right of *habeas corpus* in criminal proceedings. This defect has been balanced by the priority given for considering cases involving imprisonment in both the initial stages of the trial and at the appellate level, by deducting the period served pending trial from jail sentence and by the growing acceptability of the bond system. The need for distinguishing private from public right has been underlined by the assumption that the jurisdiction of *sharī'ah* courts is brought into action only when there is a private aggrieved party. Public right is the responsibility of civil authorities.

Supplementary Organs with Judicial Functions

The *sharī'ah* courts have been functioning effectively due to their simplicity of procedure, speedy handling of cases and, most of all, to the respect the average Saudi citizen holds for the judges and for the Islamic law which they apply. Yet the problems of social, economic and administrative development which modern Saudi Arabia has witnessed and the great volume of legislation they entailed proved too fast for these courts to cope with and too urgent for the King to handle. The King, therefore, gradually delegated semi-judicial power to organs in the form of committees, commissions, boards, councils and tribunals. The following are the most important of such organs:

---

[6] Fu'ād Ḥamza, *al-Bilād al-'Arabīyyah al-Sa'ūdiyyah* (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Nasr al-Ḥadīthah, 1968), p. 197.

[7] *Tanzīm al-A'māl al-Idāriyyah fī al-Dawā'ir al-Shar'iyyah* (Makkah: Maṭba'āt al-Ḥukūma, 1962).

[8] Parker T. Hart, "Application of Hanbalite and Decree Law to Foreigners in Saudi Arabia," *George Washington Law Review,* XXII (Dec. 1953), 173.

- The Grievance Board
- The Committee on Cases of Forgery
- The Commission on Cases of Bribery
- The Commission on the Impeachment of Ministers
- The Commission on the Settlement of Commercial Disputes
- The Central Committees on Cases of Adulteration
- The Supreme Commission on Labor Disputes
- The Disciplinary Councils for Civil Servants
- The Disciplinary Councils for Military Personnel.

While some of these organs, such as the Grievance Board, function on a continuous basis, others, such as the various disciplinary councils, are of an *ad hoc* character.

The Grievance Board can be considered the final refinement of the original idea of the "box of complaints" referred to above. Historically, it goes back to the concept of *maẓālim* in Islamic law. It is the most important of the supplementary organs not only because of the wide area of its jurisdiction, which includes, *inter alia,* administrative justice, but equally because it is progressively asserting itself as a permanent institution. This central position in the system of justice in Saudi Arabia has been the product of the extreme difficulty involved in digesting and incorporating the ever-growing administrative and other regulations into the *sharī'ah* and, consequently, into the *sharī'ah* court system.

The Evolutionary Character of the System's Development

Saudi Arabia's ability to meet the needs of modern legislation was made possible mainly through a combination of tactfulness and firmness on the part of King 'Abd al-'Azīz during his long reign. Many anecdotes have been recounted to illustrate the manner in which he was able to persuade the *'ulamā'* to accept such modern innovations as the radio and the wireless.[9] Yet he did not hesitate to crush controversy over the *sharī'ah* when it bordered on fanaticism. The reorganization of the judiciary and the vast expansion of legislation by decree took place over such an extended period as to make it almost imperceptible. The King, therefore, won the tolerance of the *'ulamā'* not only by his sincere respect for the *sharī'ah* but equally by his deliberate attention to form and his sense of compromise. This tradition of deference to the *'ulamā'* has been continued after the death of King 'Abd al-'Azīz.

The position of the *'ulamā'* in Saudi Arabia *vis-à-vis* modern legislation and judicial reform can be distinguished from that of their counterparts elsewhere in the Muslim world whom Professor Schacht accused of ". . . picking isolated fragments of opinions from the early centuries of Islamic law, arranging them into a kind of arbitrary mosaic, and concealing behind this screen an essentially different structure of ideas borrowed from the West. . . ."[10]

To their credit, the *'ulamā'* of Saudi Arabia never followed such an apologistic approach. Unlike the case in these other countries, the institutions and the laws of Saudi Arabia have been home-grown and voluntarily adopted. The country has never known any system of capitulations and has striven to arrange its judicial relations with other countries by entering in international engagements on an equal footing to organize such questions as extradition, diplomatic immunities, narcotic drugs and execution of judgments. The *'ulamā',* therefore, were not faced with an imposed foreign law which would confront them with the dilemma of either calling for its repeal—and thus creating a vacuum —or producing an instant Islamic alternative, something beyond their human reach. Such was the case in Pakistan as late as the middle of the twentieth century. They, instead, preferred to meet the new decree legislation with dignified silence. This, under the circumstances, was no mean contribution to judicial reform.

---

[9] See for example William A. Eddy, "King Ibn Saud: 'Our Faith and Your Iron'," *Middle East Journal,* XVII (Summer 1963), 257-263.

[10] Joseph Schacht, "Problems of Modern Islamic Legislation" in *The Modern Middle East,* ed. by Richard H. Nolte (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), p. 191.

Certain considerations underlined this attitude of the *'ulamā'*. The first is that, according to precedent and Islamic tradition, they acquired their titles as judges and *muftīs* by virtue of delegation from the people of authority. This system of delegation was only strengthened by the general administrative growth. Literally, they have been bureaucratized. Secondly, the emphasis in the Ḥanbalī school on the Qur'ān and the Sunnah has in effect removed many possible objections to new legislation which could be found elsewhere in the books of jurisprudence. Finally, the rule that says "things are assumed to be allowable unless there is proof of their prohibition" is particularly emphasized in the Ḥanbalī school as applicable to transactions.

As decree legislation grew in size and intricacy, there developed a tendency towards establishing semi-judicial organs to insure its application. Enough coordination exists today between these organs and the *sharī'ah* courts since the former are more concerned with the application of decree legislation while the latter are more concerned with the application of the *sharī'ah*. Yet this is only a matter of emphasis since both pay due respect to the *sharī'ah* and to decree legislation, which is assumed to be conforming to the *sharī'ah*. It is this coordination that made it possible to state in Article 185 of Labor and Workmen Law that:

> None of the Commissions provided for in this Chapter may abstain from rendering a decision on the pretext that there are no applicable provisions in this law. In such a case, the Commission shall be guided by the principles of Islamic *sharī'ah*, local rules, established judicial precedents, principles of justice, usage and the rules of equity.

To the knowledge of this writer, nowhere are the sources of the law more clearly and liberally stated. It is particularly so since the Law of Labor and Workmen has been informally approved of by Saudi Muslim jurists.

Since the legal opinion of 1927 condemning taxes and the wireless the country has come a long way indeed. It has been a steady process, in which the country never lost sight of its past, to the point where it has been remarked that Saudi Arabia is entering the twentieth century riding its camel backward. Yet, in the pragmatic thinking of the bedouin, what counts most is that Saudi Arabia does enter the twentieth century without losing its balance in the process. How else could the country avoid what Alvin Toffler called "the dizzying disorientation brought on by the premature arrival of the future"?

* * *

Since the above was written two developments which are in keeping with the evolutionary character of Saudi Arabia's judicial system took place:

1. Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ḥarkan, a capable and liberal-minded former judge, was appointed Minister of Justice by Royal Decree No. M/105 of September 22, 1970.
2. The Commission on Supervision and Investigation and the Commission on Disciplining Civil Servants were established by Royal Decree No. M/7 of March 28, 1971. Both are permanent in character.

Cornell
University
Press

The Minor Arts of Islam

By ERNST KÜHNEL

Translated by Katherine Watson. The rich field of Islamic decorative arts is thoroughly explored in this study by the leading authority on the subject. After a historical introduction, Professor Kühnel gives detailed descriptions of illuminated manuscripts, miniatures, and book bindings; pottery from different areas; metalwork; glass and crystal; and work in ivory, wood, and stone. The author gives special attention to the problem of forgeries, and offers practical advice for those interested in studying Muslim art objects. 15 pages color plates, 209 black and while illustrations.
$15.00

Islamic Art and Architecture
Also by Ernst Kühnel
200 pages, 118 plates.
$9.50

American Students in Israel

By SIMON N. HERMAN

"The first serious attempt to study the impact and significance of their Israeli experience upon American college students. Based on a number of studies and intensive interviews, the book describes and analyzes the changing motivations, attitudes and values of American students in the one-year program of the Hebrew University. Highly recommended."—*Clearing House*
288 pages, 68 tables.
$7.50

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS
Ithaca and London

BOOK REVIEWS

NOTE—By special arrangement with the Foreign Policy Association, readers of THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL *may obtain from the FPA's Book Center any books listed below published in the United States (except paperbacks) at the publisher's regular list price. Post free for domestic orders only. Send orders with check or money order to Desk ME, World Affairs Book Center, 345 East 46th Street, New York, N. Y. 10017.*

GENERAL

CROMER IN EGYPT, by John Marlowe. New York: Praeger, 1970. 303 pages. Notes. Bibl. Index. $10.

Reviewed by Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr.

As the memory of Britain's occupation of Egypt fades like a morning mist over Cairo, scholars and writers are busily putting together historical accounts of the long watch on the Nile. Why did an avowedly anti-imperialist government send troops to quell an Egyptian nationalist revolt in 1882? Why did Britain risk antagonizing the French, the Turks, and eventually the Egyptians by keeping the troops there long after they had performed their mission? How did Britain's position in Egypt influence her policies toward other parts of Africa and the Middle East? Above all attempts to answer these questions hovers the image of the masterly proconsul, Lord Cromer, who served between 1877 and 1880 as British Commissioner on the Caisse de la Dette and then as Dual Controller, and from 1883 to 1907 as Britain's Agent and Consul-General in Cairo. During the latter period he was, in all but name, the ruler of Egypt: its redeemer in the eyes of his fellow-countrymen or a latter-day pharaoh to his detractors.

Another book on Cromer? John Marlowe's *Cromer in Egypt* comes out soon after Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot's *Egypt and Cromer: A Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations* (*MEJ* 23, no. 3 (1969), p. 393). Their apparent similarities may confuse some readers, but they are really quite different in style, content and viewpoint. Mrs. Marsot's well written book, based on her dissertation, is a topically organized study of Cromer's personality and policies and their impact on Egyptian society and politics: many of her sources are in Arabic. Both the British imperialist and the Egyptian nationalist points of view are presented, the latter more forcefully. John Marlowe's work seems to be an outgrowth of one part of his *Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 1800-1953,* but much more detailed and more solidly based on documentary sources, all of them British. Organized almost like a chronicle, the book requires careful attention. Marlowe's coverage of such difficult topics as Egyptian finances and Britain's negotiations with other European powers will probably lose some readers. Marlowe is not unsympathetic to the Egyptians, but in his book we see them only through British eyes. *Cromer in Egypt* may well be the last major study of the British occupation of Egypt to be written without any reference to Arabic sources.

Marlowe's book begins with a chapter on Britain's relations with Egypt up to 1876 and on Ismāʿīl's financial difficulties. He then describes Cromer's service in Egypt during the period of the Dual Control. Following his absence from Egypt from 1880 to 1883, Cromer returned to Cairo as proconsul, sent by a Liberal cabinet to reform the Egyptian government and evacuate his country's troops, sent during his absence. Cromer soon saw that his government's goals were mutually incompatible. Without disobeying his instructions, he began a gradual but increasingly comprehensive reform program, the primary aim of which was to make Egypt solvent and then prosperous, despite French pinpricks and Ottoman intrigues. Careful investment in Nile irrigation reaped great returns in agricultural productivity. The horrors of pre-Comerian Egypt—the corvée, the *courbash* and corruption—were abolished. Egypt and Egyptians prospered. But economic success led to political failure. A young khedive came to the throne who "knew not Joseph" and quarreled with Cromer over the right to rule Egypt. This provided much of the impetus for a nationalist movement which eventually turned most of Egypt's intelligentsia into opponents of British rule. When Cromer left Egypt in 1907, many believed that his successor was about to hand over the reins of power to Egyptians who wanted to sever their ties with England. Few Egyptians publicly expressed gratitude for Cromer's work in their country—then or now. This reviewer agrees with Marlowe that Cromer stayed so long in Egypt that he became impervious to criticisms from both Englishmen and Egyptians. The most notorious result was the 1906 Dinshaway Incident, so damaging to Britain's reputation among Egyptians. To understand the generally unhappy history of Britain's relationship with Egypt, leading up to Suez fifty years later, Marlowe's book is an enlightening introduction. Marsot's is more so.

△ ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT, JR., is an assistant professor of history at Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pa.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE MIDDLE EAST: 1914-1924, by Howard M. Sachar. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969. xiv + 518 pages. Maps. Index. $12.50.

Reviewed by Sydney N. Fisher

Colorful writing and an interesting style are in part a deployment of highly descriptive adjectives and verbs, replete with imagination, sensitivity and action. Though Professor Sachar is an artist with adjectives, adverbs and verbs, and though his volume reads easily because of its fine style and the directness of its organization and description, it contributes little to the knowledge or understanding of the problems of that area of the world or of that war-torn decade. Harry N. Howard's *The Partition of Turkey, A Diplomatic History, 1913-1923* (University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1931) covers much the same subject more objectively and more fully as does Laurence Evans' *United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey, 1914-1924* (The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1965). In the present volume, Egypt, Lebanon and Syria are virtually ignored, a serious lapse if one is actually considering the "emergence of the Middle East." In the 1920s the term "Middle East" referred to Iraq, Iran, the Persian Gulf and India and did not signify the area which Professor Sachar is describing.

But the volume is full of prejudice of many types. Germans seem always to be arrogant; Turks are inefficient, corrupt or lazy; and Arabs appear as wily Bedouin types of insignificant tribes or aristocratic cruel unbending sycophants. On page 73, Constantinople was described in 1915 as "only twenty miles from the Turco-Bulgar frontier," whereas in 1878 the Russian army (p. 9) dared, "ensconced at San Stefano, not to risk advancing the last twenty miles to Constantinople." Certainly in 1915 the Bulgarians were not at San Stefano! Moreover, the Mudros Armistice was signed on October 30, 1918, by the British and the Ottomans. Page 291 states that the Allied flotilla within forty-eight hours entered the Straits and "steamed majestically toward Constantinople" but on page 247 it was on November 13 that the "majestic procession of British, French, and Italian warships, led by Calthorpe on the *Agamemnon,* sailed the identical route, dropping anchor in the Golden Horn." The former date is incorrect and there are photographs of the ships dropping anchor and landing the Admiral near Dolma Baktche Palace on the Bosphorus.

Chapter Seven, "An Inducement for the Jews," which delineates the experiences of the Jewish settlers and immigrants into Palestine in the nineteenth century and to 1918 is well-documented, but shows little understanding or knowledge of Ottoman history or society. Dr. Sachar calls them (p. 190) "non-Ottoman immigrants," certainly a redundancy, who "enjoyed no rights before the law," (p. 191). On the following page Dr. Sachar notes that in 1914 after the war began, "six thousand Russian Jews, who lived in . . . [Jaffa were] to be immediately expelled from the country." In terror of future deportations, Jewish communal leaders urged all Jews domiciled in Palestine to apply immediately for Ottoman citizenship." In fact, throughout the Ottoman empire after the end of the Capitulations in 1914 and even before, British and French subjects were forced to leave Constantinople and other places of their residence and many were interned for the duration of the war. Statements that in the elections of 1908 and 1914 not one Jew was elected to Parliament seem to indicate that Dr. Sachar is ignoring the millet system within the Ottoman society as well as he is forgetting the Capitulations and the fact that in most countries foreigners do not participate in elections.

This volume is a diplomatic and military history of the demise of the Ottoman empire and as such is in the vein of M. S. Anderson's *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923: A Study in International Relations* (Macmillan, London, 1966). Both only consider the Near East, as it was then called, from the European view of affairs.

△ SYDNEY NETTLETON FISHER is a professor of history at Ohio State University.

ISLAM AND THE TRADE OF ASIA, edited by D. S. Richards. Papers on Islamic History, II, published under the auspices of The Near Eastern History Group, Oxford and the Near East Center, University of Pennsylvania. Oxford: Bruno Cassirer and Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1970. vii + 266 pages. Plates. £3.75 or $10.

Reviewed by George Kirk

This volume contains fifteen diversified papers presented at an international colloquium held at Oxford in 1967. On the one hand, there are essays of broad general import, such as Maxime Rodinson on "The Muslim Merchant," G. F. Hudson on "The Medieval Trade of China," and Charles Issawi on "The Decline of Middle Eastern Trade, 1100-1850." On the other, the paper on "Egypt and China: Trade and Imitation" involves us in ceramic technicalities which not even an elaborate apparatus of footnotes, line-drawings, and ten plates of color and black-and-white photographs can render lucid to a non-specialist. The cost of these illustrations might better have been devoted to a topographical map accompanying the two articles on trade with Indonesia and the Malay Peninsula, and to providing a general index, the lack of which is shared by this volume's predecessor, *The Islamic City*, edited by A. H. Hourani and S. M. Stern.

In an outstanding article on "Trade and Politics in 18th Century India" Ashin Das Gupta demonstrates how, in the breakdown of security that soon followed the death of Aurangzeb, the Mughal officers made up for the decline of their revenue from land-assignments by the "barely concealed plunder" of the Gujarati merchants, to the ultimate advantage of the British East India Co. (pp. 188-93). Two servants of the Netherlands East India Co. provided comparable evidence of the impoverishment of the Hughli merchants by the "brutal and exhausting" government of Shuja' al-Dīn, and Tipu Sahib of the parvenu state of Mysore behaved similarly in the 1770s to the merchants of Calicut (pp. 198, 200).

These are late examples of a recurrent tendency already present in the decline of 'Abbāsid Iraq from the mid-9th century onwards, whereby a soldiery escaping from governmental restraints battened on the urban traders by way of plunder or "protection" rackets, even more grievously than it exploited the peasantry for the simple reason that the former could be made to yield more for less effort than the latter. The helplessness of the traders before the *mamlūk* slave-soldiery is abstractly touched upon in Maxime Rodinson's article, pp. 27-28, and see Claude Cahen in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., Vol. II, coll. 961-2, art. *Futuwwa.* Harassment by the lawless soldiery was the main reason that in 1805 led the 'ulamā' and traders of Cairo to "elect" Muḥammad 'Alī as governor, and the local janissaries' contribution to the decline in Aleppo's trade has been demonstrated by Herbert J. Bodman, Jr.: *Political Factions in Aleppo, 1760-1826* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1963), pp. 103, 133. In all these cases the economic decline was eventually repaired, in whole or part, by the reassertion of firm government, whether indigenous or foreign.

△ GEORGE KIRK is a professor of history at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst.

MUBADELE: AN OTTOMAN-RUSSIAN EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS, translated and annotated by Norman Itzkowitz and Max Mote. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1970. 270 pages. Gloss. Biographical Dict. Bibl. Index. $11.50.

Reviewed by Richard L. Chambers

Article twenty-seven of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca signed between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in 1774 called for an exchange of ambassadors bearing the letters ratifying the treaty and "presents which shall be proportionate to the dignity of their Imperial Majesties." That exchange took place in 1775-1776. Translations of the journals of Abdülkerim Pasha's mission to Moscow and Prince Repnin's mission to Istanbul, as the authors' preface states, "offer to students of Ottoman and Russian studies, and to those of diplomacy in general, the first opportunity to observe in detail an exchange of Ottoman and Russian ambassadors from the point of view of both parties" (p. ix). A whole new dimension is added to the study of Russo-Ottoman relations in the late eighteenth century. This is a crucial period. It marks the inauguration of the modern phase of the "Eastern Question" and the beginnings of reciprocal diplomacy between the Ottoman Empire and the European Powers. It is also significant as the pre-dawn of Ottoman modernization.

Ottoman awareness of Europe and Russian designs on the Crimea are given thoughtful treatment in the introduction which places the missions of the two ambassadors in historical perspective. Utilizing both published and archival materials, the authors supplement the translated texts with additional details regarding the preparation and outfitting of the missions and the various issues which threatened to break the fragile peace and lead to a resumption of hostilities. Administration, diplomacy, protocol and the Ottoman's view of himself and the outside world are depicted against the background of the simultaneous rise of Russia and the decline of the Ottoman Empire.

It is perhaps to be expected that the translations read somewhat less well than the introduction, nor is it surprising that the two journals differ considerably in form and content. Professors Itzkowitz and Mote have sought to preserve in their translations the style and tenor of the originals. Anyone familiar with Ottoman Turkish can immediately appreciate how well the "flavor" of Abdülkerim Pasha's *Sefaretname* has been reproduced in English. It is more colorful and, in some respects, also more informative than Prince Repnin's strictly chronological and often repetitive account. This is attributable not only to the difference in authorship and cultural and literary tradition. The *Sefaretname* was intended to provide the sultan and his top officials with information about the lands beyond the Ottoman borders while Repnin's report was a document published in celebration of Catherine's victory over the Turks. The one was "an intelligence report" (p. 11), and the other "a Festschrift" (p. 33).

The authors are to be commended for the careful attention given to the thorny problems of transliteration, spelling of place names, and conversion of dates. Decisions in these regards were judiciously made and consistently followed. Likewise, the substantial Glossary and Biographical Dictionary is of immense assistance to the reader and preferable to additional lengthy notes throughout the text. Travel Routes, Bibliography and Index also add to the usefulness of this volume which will be read with great benefit and pleasure by scholars and non-specialists alike.

△ RICHARD L. CHAMBERS is an associate professor of Turkish language and civilization at the University of Chicago.

A VIEW OF THE NILE: THE STORY OF AN AMERICAN FAMILY IN EGYPT, by Elizabeth Warnock Fernea, Garden City: Doubleday, 1970. xiii + 320 pages. $6.95.

Reviewed by Alan W. Horton

The academic approach to the study of the Middle East is useful and necessary, but too often it lacks the roundness of approach that permits a reader to know intuitively what things are really like. Enslaved by a consensus on the nature of academic respectability, graduate students and professors toil away on research that demonstrates the obvious, removing for analysis a disciplinary slice from a social whole, collecting statistical data to demonstrate limited truths about the human condition. Most academic writing needs a greater sense of humanity, a greater confidence that less limited truth can be extrapolated from long experience with individual human lives.

Elizabeth Warnock Fernea has written a book about Egypt that in its final impact comes close to the social truth because it rises above academic convention. *A View of the Nile* begins with the arrival of the Fernea family at Cairo International Airport, takes Mrs. Fernea and her anthropolgist husband through their adjustments to Cairo life, recounts Mrs. Fernea's experiences of bearing and raising children under Egyptian circumstances, and tells the tale of how the entire Fernea family—including two young children—resided for many months in a village of Egyptian Nubia. In the final section, after the family has returned to Cairo, Mrs. Fernea speaks of her emerging awareness that she and her husband can be only sojourners on the Nile, never fully engaged; ultimately, she feels, they must go to live in a place of which they are viscerally a part.

It may be that Mrs. Fernea only sojourned on the Nile, but while doing so, she came to understand Egypt better than most foreigners do. More importantly, she is able to illuminate it for her readers, permitting them to see the human relationships involved in every event, the pathos surrounding each uncertainty, the true drama of fast change.

Despite having read Mrs. Fernea's *Guests of the Sheik,* which recounts experiences in Iraq, this reviewer was unprepared for a conversational style—more noticeable in the early chapters—that sometimes creates an atmosphere of small talk. And as she sets the stage for us, Mrs. Fernea has to insert the occasional didactic paragraph about Egyptian politics and change at the national level; some of these paragraphs are in odd contrast to the words around them.

Yet if the reader persists, he will find himself ensnared in the web of Egyptian life. By the end of the third chapter, he will know what happens if an American woman in hospital with her new baby and with too much milk breast-feeds an Egyptian child who is not getting enough—and from then on, by some mysterious chemistry the book's small talk takes on basic meaning. The story of field-work in traditional Nubia gives us not social analysis but an intimate feel for birth, death, and other elementary matters—including justified fears for the lives of the Fernea children. The final episode—a weekend at a landed estate in the Delta at the invitation of upper class friends—dramatizes conflicts that each of us has experienced, between old and new, between regret for the past and enticements of modernity, between feeling foreign and feeling at home.

△ Alan W. Horton is Executive Director of the American Universities Field Staff.

IRAN

Religion and State in Iran, 1785-1906: The Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period, by Hamid Algar. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1970. 286 pages. Index. $9.50.

Reviewed by Hafez F. Farmayan

During the past twenty-five years only three or four books which can be called great scholarly contributions have been published in English on the subject of modern Iran. To this meager list now may be added Hamid Algar's impressive work, *Religion and State in Iran, 1785-1906.* Here, at last, we have the English key to one of the most intricate and enigmatic aspects of Persian culture; namely the relationships between spiritual and temporal powers in their position within the socio-political system of Iran. We in the world of Persian scholarship are indebted to Hamid Algar who has acquired through learning and conviction an unusually penetrating understanding of the inner complexities of Persia's politics and has presented it in a comprehensible exposition.

Now the starved students of this subject can satisfy their hunger at a scholarly feast which has been carefully, even elegantly, prepared for them. Take some advice: do not gorge. Let the author show the way to the feasting places which for the purpose of illumination have been spread widely throughout the heretofore dark and impenetrable world of the 'Ulamā' of nineteenth century Iran.

In his brief informative note on his sources the author regrets that he has made little use of unpublished sources. This statement, although true, is too modest, for many of the sources used by Algar are primary and certainly much of this thusfar has been unnoticed by most Western scholars. In fact, I believe that one of the most significant contributions of this study is the exposure of accessible Persian sources for students of modern Iran. Throughout the book one encounters copious and diligently constructed footnotes, each of which leads the reader to some valuable reference material. The interesting explanatory notes also are often supported by references. It seems that nothing of relevance has escaped the author's attention: from an anonymous article in an obscure monthly journal to the basic religious writings of such prolific sages as Kulayni and Majlisi, all have been examined and pondered. No cursory reading of these could have enabled Algar to produce such a clear picture of the intricacies of the 'Ulamā' 's rôle in nineteenth century Persian society. All of these Persian sources and related works in Western languages and in Russian have been listed for the benefit of students of modern Iranian history in ten pages of bibliography at the end of the text.

Algar's historical approach to this study of nineteenth century Iran has two basic merits: one in its construction, the other in its simplicity of style. First, he always keeps to his proposed themes of religion and state. Second, his separation and periodization of Iran's history during the nineteenth century fits his subject admirably. His first chapter, entitled "The Foundations of Clerical Influence," gives the reader a background to the subject. This is necessary because of the deplorable scarcity in English of meaningful material on Shī'ism. Here the reader finds answers to many of his questions concerning the dogma and the practical aspects of Shī'ism. After his introduction to the religious presence in nineteenth century Iran, we are provided with some background to the Persian monarchial power structure of the period, harking back to the year 1501 and the establishment of the Safavid dynasty, followed by a finely structured discussion of the interrelationships of religion and state in Iran during the nearly three hundred years which ensued between the rise of the Safavids and the rise of the Qajars.

In his third chapter, "The Clerical Policy of Fatḥ 'Alī Shah," the reader finds himself immersed and in fear of drowning in the vortex of intra-politics of religion and state in nineteenth century Iran. But fortunately the author comes to the rescue by deftly separating the subject into specific topics: chapters four and five, although dealing with Fatḥ 'Alī Shah's reign, discuss respectively and with clarity, (1) the significant relationship of the 'Ulamā' with the Crown Prince-reformer, Abbas Mirza, and his famous vizier, Qā'im Maqam; and (2) the reaction of the 'Ulamā' to the early foreign impact on Iranian affairs.

Likewise the second part of the nineteenth century, which corresponds to the comparatively short reign of Muhammad Shah (1834-48) and the long reign of Nasir al-Dīn Shah (1848-96), has been surveyed in ten chapters, in each of which one particular aspect of the subject is set forth and analyzed. The relatively calm atmosphere of mid-nineteenth century Iran becomes increasingly ominous as the grim rivalry of state and religion mounts to its stormy climax, ending with the repeal of the Tobacco Concession and the coming of the Constitutional revolution. The author shows how during this stressful period the 'Ulamā' accumulated more and more power by frustrating every attempt at reform which the Shah and his advisors made. The great vizier, Mirza Taqi Khan Amir Kabir, has a chapter to himself, as do other potent figures of the period—the Bābis, Sipahsalar, Mirza Malkam Khan, Seyyed Jamāl al-Dīn and Amin al-Daula.

Considering the fact that throughout the book Algar upholds the cause of the 'Ulamā' against the state, his handling is nevertheless quite fair. His presentation is always disciplined and nowhere do we find a burst of emotionalism nor condemnation of personalities. This is particularly apparent in the chapter on Bābism. Most authors, Persian and non-Persians alike, have treated this topic emotionally; but not Algar. Despite his indifference to the significance of state or the influence of the Bābis he presents a cool analysis of all issues and all parties involved. The last sentence of the chapter sums up his deliberations on this subject: "Babism was ultimately no more than a side issue in the Qajar history" (p. 151). The relationships of the 'Ulamā' with other reformers, particularly the controversial Mirza Malkam Khan and Sipahsalar, are also masterfully treated. The chapters relating to these two personages reveal the author's immense information in these respects and he provides the reader with an extraordinary insight into Persia's late nineteenth century socio-political structure.

The last portion of the book is devoted to the rôle which the 'Ulamā' played in the establishment of the Constitutional régime in Iran. In these chapters are presented in detail the famous incident of the Tobacco Concession, the 'Ulamā' 's relationship with the last of Persia's powerful grand viziers, Amin al-Sultan, and finally the 'Ulamā' 's alliance with the Constitutionalists against the state. These represent the 'Ulamā' 's finest hours; a series of successes told to us lucidly and eloquently by Hamid Algar, an upholder of the 'Ulamā' of Iran who concludes that

> The obtaining of the constitution was a climax to a century of friction and conflict between the state and the Ulama, and at the same time tended to reduce the influence of the clerical classes on politics and society. It may thus be fittingly regarded as the final episode in the exercise of their dominant role in Qajar Iran. (p. 256).

Algar has impressive erudition, logic and disipline of mind and he marshals them formidably behind his assignment of a saintly rôle to the 'Ulamā' who are presented as saviors of Iran. There is another view. Actually, it is my belief that few Persian historians, if any at all, would agree with Algar on this issue. As more and more sources become available, evidence mounts that modern Iran owes its very existence to the dogged perseverance of the state and much-maligned Persian bureaucracy which, though weak and archaic in structure and method, managed to snatch Iran's political entity from the monstrous jaws of European imperialism and from that spreading tyranny which the 'Ulamā' had achieved over the minds and souls of Iran's people. The 'Ulamā' wanted Iran, and constitutionalism was their towering nemesis which they myopically mistook for a handy weapon with which to destroy the Iranian state.

How helpful it would be to students of Persian history if another qualified Western scholar would publish a study of the same period with its focal point on the rôle of the state. There are literally thousands of files, letters and other materials collecting dust in various libraries of Persia waiting to be read and analyzed. It is also hoped that Hamid Algar will add to his brilliant work by continuing to research, organize, contemplate and publish on the rôle of the 'Ulamā' in the twentieth century which, although it is one of decline and fall, it is also one of drama and greater relevance. Knowledge of the rôle of the 'Ulamā' is essential to the understanding of present day Iran.

△ Hafez F. Farmayan is a professor of history at the University of Texas, Austin, Texas.

ISRAEL

Military and Politics in Israel: Nation-Building and Role Expansion, by Amos Perlmutter. New York: Praeger, 1969. 161 pages. $6.50.

Reviewed by Marver H. Bernstein

This short book on the Israeli army is the best study in English of the development of the military forces of Israel. It provides a summary narrative of the historical evolution of the Israeli army from the early days of the Mandate to the present. The Haganah, which was founded in 1921, developed rapidly after the Arab Revolt of 1936-39 and from its beginning it was allied with the Socialist Zionism of Ben Gurion, who insisted that the defense function remain subordinated to the leadership of the Jewish community. The Haganah, therefore, never became an independent professional military underground and never created an officer élite group.

Perlmutter combines with his historical narrative an analysis of how Israel's volunteer, semi-professional military organizations were transformed into a unified, compulsory, professional, depoliticized army under the guidance of Ben Gurion, who served as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence from 1948 to 1963, except for fifteen months during 1953-55. Under his leadership, the army developed a close identity with the nation, its officers became permanently integrated with Israeli society, and the army itself became the first bureaucratic structure transformed into a national institution subordinate to the government.

Two themes are dominant: first, the persistence of civilian over military authority, and second, the rôle of the military as an instrument of nation building. Apart from the account of the creation of a highly effective military force in Israel, the book's most notable contribution lies in its emphasis on the non-military rôle of the Israeli army. Since 1948 the army became a citizen's academy, an inculcator of civic and nationalist culture, and an educational and pioneering center taking on tasks formerly handled by pioneer groups. Its officers became highly achievement-oriented and provided the most significant source of trained managerial manpower for the industrializing state. Perlmutter concludes that the lesson for developing countries is that "the army was *unified and nationalized prior* to most other political and economic functions and was made responsible to national authority as soon as the first cabinet was formed. In this way the army could not become an instrument of any political party, special interests, or ambitious political and nationalist leaders."

Despite some occasional lapses into jargon, a fondness for labels and categories, superficial treatment of the domestic political crises of the early 1960s, and some undocumented and speculative judgments, the book is a very useful contribution to our understanding of a critical aspect of Israeli development.

△ MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, Princeton University.

PAKISTAN

PAKISTAN: MILITARY RULE OR PEOPLE'S POWER? by Tariq Ali. New York: Morrow, 1970. 244 pages. Appen. Index. $7.95.

Reviewed by Feroz Ahmed

> Ayub Khan has thus framed a constitution well suited to provide strong leadership, stability of administration, and continuity of policy.

Shortly after Gunnar Myrdal (*Asian Drama,* Vol. I, p. 335) had written the above lines and when the Ayub régime was in the midst of celebrating its "decade of development," the people of Pakistan rose in a revolt against the government and not only forced the dictator to resign but had his constitution abrogated and his policies repudiated. The mass upsurge of 1968-69 was not of a sudden occurrence; it was a violent expression of a disinherited people's cumulative anger of two decades. Yet, none of the Western commentators and the Western educated Pakistani political scientists could foresee the emergence of a popular movement that would topple the strongman government despite the timidity of the opposition leaders (*e.g.,* Ziring, Lawrence, "Pakistan then and now: East and West," *Asia,* 7:1-18 (Spring 1967)). The failure is not simply that of prediction but of recognizing the capabilities of the oppressed and exploited masses of the third world. Like the élites of Pakistan, the professional political scientists had taken the "illiterate and apathetic" masses for granted and analyzed the political situation in terms of provincial and personal rivalries. Some spoke of an abstract nationalism, without reference to the class basis of power in the country and the neocolonial domination of the economy (*e.g.,* Malik, Hafeez, *Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan,* 1963). Others, while attempting to analyze the social structure, dwelt mainly on the superstructure (*e.g.,* Sayeed, K. B., *The Political System of Pakistan,* 1967).

Tariq Ali's book is a significant departure from what the Western readers have been accustomed to reading about Pakistan. Tariq Ali not only has the advantage of hindsight but of an analytical tool that focuses on the masses, *i.e.* the dialectical approach. Written by a radical activist, *Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power?* is the first book on Pakistan published in the West that attempts to explain Pakistan's political crises in terms of class contradictions in the society. For the first time, Pakistan's history has been taken out of the arena of Bengali versus Punjabi tug-of-war and egotistical bickering of the individual political personalities.

The book serves at least two important functions. First, to present to the readers in the Western nations a concise account of Pakistan's political developments, interpreted from a radical point of view and written in a straightforward, non-technical language. The three chapters on the upsurge of 1968-69 and the collapse of Ayub's régime probably represent the best documented account of that momentous period published anywhere. It is a result of a careful analysis of the reports published in the anti-establishment and underground press and the author's first-hand experience as a participant in that uprising. It is considerably enriched by Ali's discussions with almost all the important student leaders and interviews with Mujib, Bhutto, Bhashani, Daulatana and other political leaders. Such sources of information are usually beyond the reach of the ordinary political scientists and cannot be treated with justice by those who fail to identify themselves with the aspirations of the masses.

The second function is by far the more important one for the Pakistani readers. And that is to stimulate a critical re-examination of the rôle and tactics of the Pakistani left and to produce a serious thought on the question of a revolutionary organization in Pakistan. Tariq Ali points out that the politics of alliances and the participation of Pakistani Marxists in the bourgeois parties have been entirely at the expense of nurturing a revolutionary vanguard. Castigating the pre-partition leftists who were delighting themselves by writing radical manifestoes for reactionary parties, Tariq Ali remarks, "to expect a party with a strong feudal base to carry out these demands reflected a crude idealism." This part of the book is particularly relevant to the present situation in West Pakistan where many enthusiastic leftists are experimenting with the idea of achieving socialism by forming a coalition with landlords under the banner of the People's Party.

Tariq Ali describes his book as "an unabashed and straightforward polemic against the feudal and capitalist class of Pakistan," and it must, therefore, be judged in that context. However, any reader familiar with the literature on Pakistan's political developments would give far more credit to Tariq Ali for his scholarship than he asks for. Although the author makes no pretense about objectivity, there is no evidence of any attempt to distort the facts in order to suit his argument. This however does not mean that the book is without any inaccuracies. One of the most glaring is the attribution of democratic and progressive motives to the 1961 student demonstrations which were organized on the basis of parochial issues. Such errors may be as much due to the lack of free flow of information as due to the author's partisanship. The final chapter of the book, which has been written with the help of the Fourth International, is perhaps the weakest part of the book. It adds nothing new to the already available superficial analysis of classes in Pakistan and the numerous suggested courses of revolutionary action.

△ Feroz Ahmed is an assistant professor of sociology at East Carolina University in Greenville, North Carolina.

THE PALESTINE PROBLEM

The Arab-Israeli Confrontation of June, 1967: An Arab Perspective, edited by Ibrahim Abu-Lughod. Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1970. xiv + 190 pages. Bibl. Index. $6.75.

ISRAEL AND THE ARAB WORLD, edited by C. H. Dodd and Mary Sales. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970. xvi + 233 pages. Appen. Index. 45s.

PALESTINE: A SEARCH FOR TRUTH, edited by Alan R. Taylor and Richard N. Tetlie. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1970. 284 pages. $6.00.

Reviewed by Abdul H. Raoof

One of the most ominous international conflicts exists in the Middle East where the inhabitants of the region have been placed under constant threat of violence and dislocation. Few scholarly works have treated this conflict with objectivity: as a matter of fact, a great deal of literature on this subject does not escape a certain responsibility for inflaming the conflict by hardening the views of those directly or indirectly involved. Unfortunately, most of our work on the Arab-Israeli conflict is value-loaded, and we tend to regard works as being pro or con—not even the dove-hawk dichotomy helps classify this literature.

The three books under review are welcomed to the study of the Middle East. Their editors seek to view the conflict in a historical perspective and to present a new set of facts and interpretations often dismissed by Western writers. Abu-Lughod and the contributors to his volume given an Arab interpretation of the conflict, and the other two books seek to marshal the views of both sides.

The nine essays in the Abu-Lughod volume are reproduced from a special issue of the *Arab World* (published in 1969); they are written by American scholars of Arab origin. The contributors address themselves mainly to the June 1967 War: its causes, its consequences, and the main issues involved.

Two scholars deal with the cultural bounds of public policy, particularly American policy. Professor Said's "The Arab Portrayed" underlines the Western cultural value which envisioned the "Arab" in the fantasy of a backward personality. Professor Suleiman's study of "American Mass Media and the June Conflict" confirms the main tenets of this thesis. His study of the news coverage and editorial comments for the period of May-June 1967 shows a biased value judgment expressed by seven major American newspapers and magazines favoring Israel's action and condemning Arab policy. Opposed to the prevailing American attitude towards the Middle East antagonists is the American left—a subject discussed by Mr. Abdeen Jabara.

The essays of Professors Abu-Lughod and Hisham Sharabi analyze the June War in terms of the "long drawn-out struggle for the ultimate possession of Palestine" (p. 66) between Zionists and Arab Palestinians. Abu-Lughod points out the significant rôle of Zionist ideology in the formulation of Israel's Arab policy, and how Israel's behavior towards the Palestinians and her neighboring Arab states fluctuates in response to structural change in her internal and external environments without deviating from the main components of Zionism. In interpreting the June War, he argues that:

> By the spring of 1967 specific issues were pressing Israel into a more aggressive policy. In addition, the regional and international climate of opinion was construed by Israeli leaders as favorable to that policy. Finally, Israel's ideological drive was not in conflict with the situational factors leading to the confrontation. (p. 87)

Professor Sharabi's "Prelude to War" speaks of Israel's strategy as an instrument of implementing the Zionist objectives: he argues that this strategy is aimed at protracting conflict, not at resolving it because "the resolution of conflict would necessarily require concessions and the relinquishing of gains forcibly acquired" (p. 59). Professor Kamel Abu-Jaber's "United States Policy towards the June Conflict" examines the United States' support for Israel's foreign policy and strategy.

If the conflict inherited some forces which gives it a permanent feature, a notion which all the contributors share, then it is not surprising to witness the failure of both diplomacy of the UN and international law in introducing a solution to the conflict. This is the main argument of both Professors Cherif Bassiouni's "Some Legal Aspects of the Arab-Israeli Conflict" and Samir Anabtawi's "The U.N. and the Middle East Conflict of 1967." Last but not least is the article of A. L. Tibawi on Jerusalem, in which he stresses the historical significance of this city to the whole Islamic world.

The other two books are anthologies of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Taylor and Tetlie's book draws from the writings of scholars and journalists on the conflict: the editors, in sifting the awesome writings on the subject, sought to select the writings of only those who hold "rational and sober views." Thus, we are led to read articles by humanist Zionists such as Judah L. Magnes and Martin Buber, and Christian writers such as John Badeau and Erskine Childers to name only a few. Those who are willing to listen to reason will find this book indispensable.

Israel and the Arab World is a very excellent collection of official and semi-official documents which have great relevancy to the historical evolution of the conflict since 1917. The editors, despite their admission of how difficult it is to achieve impartiality in dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict, are to be congratulated for their efforts to give the conflict a "fair" historical perspective: the documents included in the book represent the views of both sides in the conflict.

The editors of all three volumes share the same concern and pessimism about the absence of a magic formula for the resolution of conflict in the Middle East. But the key to peace must come from within Israel's society.

> What Israel most desperately needs, then, is a searching reexamination of her own aims, methods, and philosophy. The policies which advocated the hard line of massive retaliation against the surrounding states and the relegation of Israel's Arab minority to second-class citizenship need to be reviewed. Even more basic is the question of Israel's relationship to Zionism as an ideology and a world Jewish movement. *Taylor and Tetlie* (p. 283).

If, out of desperation of the defeated states, peace is ever reached in the Middle East without these structural changes in Israel's society, then all moralists and social scientists would be proven wrong because of their lack of understanding of the operational forces of international politics.

△ ABDUL H. RAOOF is an associate professor of political science at the State University College at Buffalo, Buffalo, New York.

FROM HAVEN TO CONQUEST: READINGS IN ZIONISM AND THE PALESTINE PROBLEM UNTIL 1948, edited with an introduction by Walid Khalidi. Beirut, Lebanon: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1971. lxxxiii + 839 pages. Appen. Index. $12.50.

Reviewed by Harry N. Howard

There are now many useful anthologies which deal with aspects of the Palestine problem, designed to serve various purposes. As Professor Khalidi observes in his well-considered introduction, "any anthology is selective by definition." (The introduction has now been modified and reproduced as *The Origins and Development of the Palestine Problem 1897-1948*, Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1971.) One cannot include everything even in more than 900 pages, and there will be readers who will quarrel both with the method and criteria for selection and the items which have been chosen to illustrate a given point of view.

In a certain sense, this anthology might well be compared with Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg's symposium on *The Zionist Idea* (1964), which, however, concentrated on the presentation of varieties of Zionist thinking. Professor Khalidi has selected his items "to illustrate the central theme in the Palestine tragedy, which is the process by which Zionism has sought to wrest control of Palestine and its surroundings from the Arabs." The first phase of this process ended in 1948 with the establishment of the State of Israel. The second phase, still with us, according to Professor Khalidi, has been characterized by the consolidation of the territorial conquests of 1948, through the systematic expropriation of Arab homes and farms, the successful probing into adjoining Arab territories beyond the Armistice demarcation lines, during 1949-1956, 1956-67, and 1967. A second volume, covering the period since 1948, is under preparation. The volume is not primarily a documentary collection. Most of the chapters are selections from books, memoirs or articles from political literature. With one exception (Chapter 3) the items are all drawn from non-Arab sources.

Essentially the volume, which runs chronologically, is divided into four parts. Part I is devoted to the *Alchemy of a Myth: From the Canaanites to Balfour.* The materials range all the way from Ilene Beatty's brief essay on the Land of Canaan to selections from the King-Crane Report of 1919, with convenient selections from Alfred Guillaume, Elmer Berger, and the 1897 Basle Program. Part II treats of *The British Shield, 1920-1939*—Palestine under the Mandate. The selections range from Lt. Col. W. F. Stirling's account of conditions during 1920-1923 to Nevill Barbour's analysis of the British White Paper of 1939, with excerpts from the writings of Vincent Sheean (1929), Jabotinsky, Chaim Weizmann, David Ben-Gurion and Rabbi Wise. Part III, *Green Light from the White House, 1939-1947,* covers a familiar story, dealing as it does essentially with the Truman Administration and its policies. Herein are included excerpts from Ben-Gurion, Morris L. Ernst, W. E. Hocking, William A. Eddy, Kermit Roosevelt, the Kimches and the Forrestal Diaries. Part IV describes *The U. N. Fig Leaf, 1947-1948.* In this concluding section of the symposium we have very interesting observations, from varying points of view, from Abba Eban, Sir Zafrulla Khan, Carlos P. Romulo, Sir John Bagot Glubb, Erskine Childers and Hans Kohn.

While many of the selections in this ponderous tome are very familiar to serious students of the Palestine problem, some are certainly not, and the convenience of having them all put together in one piece is quite obvious. All told there are eighty selections and twenty-two maps, and an appendix with very useful data on population, finance, arms, etc., which should prove interesting to students. Professor Khalidi is to be congratulated on his presentation of this comprehensive symposium, which should commend itself to all thoughtful students of the Arab-Israel conflict and should be on all reference shelves. It is a library in itself. The complementary volume, bringing the story down to date, will be awaited.

△ HARRY N. HOWARD is book review editor of the *Middle East Journal.*

TURKEY

THE PALACE OF TOPKAPI IN ISTANBUL, by Fanny Davis. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970. xiii + 286 pages. Illus. Index. $14.95.

Reviewed by Jane S. Hart

Topkapı, the great Ottoman palace complex built and rebuilt over a 500-year period on the walls of Constantine above the Bosphorus in Istanbul, is now a museum. Visitors on a day-long tour may comprehend only a fraction of the countless treasures therein described by Mrs. Davis; first, because such areas as the harem and the quarters of the black eunuchs are closed to the public during restoration and second, because a man's eyes and feet can do only limited service in one day. Through the book, we may all enjoy a magnificent orderly exploration, without toil, from the Imperial Gate and the Gate of Felicity through the four courts, the Throne Room, the Treasury, the collections of celadon and ceremonial robes and even the numerous gatehouses and kiosks which comprise the outer palace. Incentive is here to return again and again to Topkapi as one of the principal illustrations of Ottoman history and art.

Mrs. Davis has not written the first detailed modern study of the palace in English. Barnette Miller's *Beyond the Sublime Porte* was published in 1931 and the care with which it was composed helps us to realize what an astonishing amount of material on plans, decoration and history has surfaced during the ensuing forty years. The present volume does not aim to replace a pocket guide in English which we understand is being revised by the staff of the Museum. As a highly readable supplementary source, the Davis book succeeds in satisfying to a considerable degree those who would understand in more detail the inscriptions, the poetic Turkish names for architectural features, the sometimes curious juxtaposition of decorative styles, the outcroppings of unmarked stones, the uses of now abandoned buildings and some of the dramatic events which took place within these walls. Excellent photographs, drawings and color plates confirm descriptions in the text; floor and ground plans and a chronological list of the Ottoman sultans keep one on course.

The book takes its place in a series of studies by respected scholars in America which remind us that a profound appreciation for the historic treasures of Turkey and collaboration with Turkish scholars have been salient features of the recent period of close Turkish-American friendship. Though Dr. Van Nice's folios are a bit large for any regular shelf, his work on the architecture of Aya Sofya, Paul Underwood's three volumes on Kariye Djami and Richard Ettinghausen's scholarly preparation of the catalog for the exhibition of Art Treasures of Turkey and work on ancient miniatures, many from Topkapı, are lasting mementos of this collaboration.

Mrs. Davis has a Ph.D. in Turkish studies from Columbia University, has resided in Turkey and relied on much material from Turkish sources which she gratefully acknowledges in the Preface and Bibliography. Şehtap Güngör's Ottoman decorative designs are scattered throughout the book, adding grace and dignity to it.

△ JANE S. HART, former Book Review Editor, is the wife of a recent Ambassador to Turkey.

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF FOUR TURKISH VILLAGES, by Jan Hinderink and Mubeccel B. Kıray. New York: Praeger, 1970. xxviii + 243 pages. Appen. Tables. Gloss. Maps. $15.

Reviewed by Brian W. Beeley

This case-study in rural change examines the interdependence of agricultural and social change. In keeping with current trends in rural research, the study deals not with one village but with four, selected because they show different levels of agro-economic development, in the Çukurova region of south-central Turkey.

The book opens with a clear demarcation of the problem selected, together with a methodological statement of the field-work in 1964 and 1965 and subsequent analysis. The interests and experience of the senior author, Dr. Kıray, who is well known as a specialist on rural change in Turkey, permeate the whole work. She stresses social change within the context of development in general, an area in which she has made a significant contribution to the Turkish national planning effort. Dr. Hinderink, of the University of Utrecht, contributes the geographer's emphasis on spatial interrelationships between economic and social patterns.

An incisive historical and geographical background is followed by a mass of detail on farming practices and labor and income in the case-study villages, while other chapters examine rural living standards and demographic and sociological facets of change. Some of the most original thinking in the study appears in the consideration of the family as a basis for adjustment to socio-economic change, the significance of religiosity and fatalism, and social stratification *per se*. The authors stress the control-power aspect of social stratification rather than status, its derivative. Rural economic development leads to new occupational patterns and is accompanied by changes in the relationship between land-owner and land-operator, such as the move from share-cropping towards wage-labor. Generalizations about realignments in control-power aspects of social stratification must, however, be based on an awareness of the progress through developmental stages of a particular village. Despite the variety, such power relationships, say the authors, are the real obstacles to development.

The concluding chapter is disappointingly brief. It is a summary of observations made throughout the book in which the reader at times may fail to see the wood of comparative relevance for the trees of case-study village specifics. Some of the finer details on the selected villages might have been omitted to allow for more generalization from the tables of village data (though these were, admittedly, derived from full rather than sample surveys).

Some may be irked by the cost of the volume or by the occasional error of presentation (such as the inaccurate map legend on figure 1). Overall, however, this work is a provocative and substantive addition to the literature on rural development. The value of the painstaking research and analysis which it reflects is obvious, especially to those who might content themselves with nation-wide censuses or superficial sample surveys. Companion volumes are eagerly awaited.

△ BRIAN W. BEELBY is a professor of geography at Kent State University.

LITERATURE AND LINGUISTICS

ENEMY OF THE SUN: POETRY OF PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE, edited by Naseer Aruri and Edmund Ghareeb. Washington, D. C.: Drum and Spear Press, 1970. 141 pages. $2.50.

A LOVER FROM PALESTINE AND OTHER POEMS: AN ANTHOLOGY OF PALESTINIAN POETRY, edited by Abdul Wahab Al Messiri and illustrated by Kamal Boullata. Washington, D. C.: Free Palestine Press, 1970. 98 pages. $3.00. Available from Box 21096 Kalorama Station, Washington, D. C.

Reviewed by Trevor LeGassick

Although Arabic poetry relating to the loss of Palestine has proliferated throughout the past two decades, collection, study and translation of the poems have been surprisingly neglected until recent years. The high drama of the 1967 *Blitzkrieg* and subsequent transformation of Palestinian guerrilla groups into visibly powerful entities, and the use of poetry in their many publications seem to account for that stream of recent anthologies and studies of the "literature of the Resistance" that has been produced particularly in Beirut and Cairo. Apparently recognizing the current "internationalization" of poetry and potential political value of such materials in English, two pro-Arab groups have brought this poetry to a third capital, Washington, D. C.

The two collections differ considerably in content and format. *Enemy of the Sun* includes an impressive lengthy preface by Prof. Samuel Allen of Wesleyan University comparing Palestinian poetry to that of the American Black liberation movements, underlining thereby the volume's place in the "Poets of Liberation Series" projected by the publishers. A following introduction by the collection's Arab-American editors and translators stresses the poetry's focus on the land of Palestine itself as central to the conflict and quotes from the poems of the Syrian Nizār Qabbānī to demonstrate the new level of Arab consciousness of both the tragedy and the danger Israel has come to represent since the 1967 fighting. A total of twelve poets, all except Qabbānī of Palestinian origins, are presented in the body of the text which consists of some sixty-five short pieces. The translations lack organization according to author, subject matter or length and stand as a series of short, dramatic visions and statements of emotion, their impact heightened by variations of printing type and spacing, as well as occasional drawings.

A Lover from Palestine, beginning with an introduction by the editor discussing the origins and motifs of Palestinian poetry, contains twenty-five poems or fragments by eight poets, six for work published within Israel, two writing from exile. In this case the Arabic originals are accompanied by the English versions which are the work of a variety of translators. Basic biographical information concerning the poets is also included, expanding the volume's usefulness to students of Arabic literature. The impact of these poems is greatly assisted by a number of powerful illustrations by Kamal Boullata, a Palestinian artist. In all, the presentation and arrangement are impressive, despite problems with the English version of the first poem that required errata sheets.

The viability of any translation of poetry is, of course, so questionable in terms of the transference of aesthetic and emotional effects that close comparison between the texts seems of little value. From these English versions we do receive some flavor of the overall mood and occasional glimpses of images the poet intends to evoke; the musicality of the originals and the precise emotive value of the Arabic words themselves are lost entirely. Nevertheless, these poems, even in translated form, must impress the reader as statements by sensitive, imaginative minds of the defiance, stoicism and continuing pride of the Palestinian people despite the tragedies of their time.

△ TREVOR LEGASSICK is a professor of Arabic literature at the University of Michigan.

THE MODERN ARABIC LITERARY LANGUAGE: LEXICAL AND STYLISTIC DEVELOPMENTS, by Jaroslav Stetkevych. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1970. xxi + 123 pages. Bibl. Index. $4.95. Publication no. 6 of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies.

Reviewed by Barbara Freyer Stowasser

Dr. Stetkevych's beautifully printed and edited book is written for the professional Arabist-linguist. It will also be of particular benefit to the Middle East historian interested in the *nahḍa* period. With the greatest insight and sensitivity, the author analyzes the methods by which Arabic has been and is currently changing, thereby putting all modern development into historical perspective and showing it to be an expansion and acceleration of old trends. The book is essentially structured along the lines of Arab linguistic theory: it analyzes *al-qiyās, al-naḥt,* and *al-ta'rīb* as the main methods of derivation of neologisms. Since *al-qiyās* is a structure-content as well as a content concept, insofar as it comprises derivation of new terms from existing roots as well as semantic extension of existing terms and translation of foreign terms (*ta'rīb*), the author deals with all three under the heading of *qiyās,* but goes into the semantic developments, particularly the process of conceptualization and abstraction, more deeply in a separate chapter. *Ta'rīb al-asālīb,* the assimilation of foreign modes of expression, is presented as a stylistic phenomenon in the final chapter of the book and includes one sub-section on stylistic borrowings made possible through semantic extension and abstraction as well. In view of this complex layout, undoubtedly necessitated by the subject matter, a more detailed table of contents would have been very helpful.

In one of the most impressive passages of the book, Dr. Stetkevych defines the modernity of modern Arabic as its being a culturally new language, which is condition for as well as result of a modern world-view. Modern Arabic has crossed its genealogical linguistic borders and has "entered into cultural linguistic affinity with the broad supra-genealogical family of modern Western languages," in a process which, however, has only just begun. Modern Arabic is therefore a legitimate new form of Arabic, not a "simplified" form of the old, which may explain why the attempts at a planned simplification of the grammar are, to a point, unnecessary or even unnatural. The author does not say so in his chapter dealing with these attempts, but seems to imply it.

The wealth of illustrative examples is truly impressive. Some of them are taken from related Arabic philological works, most, however, and among them the most striking, are culled directly from literature. Translations are given rarely; this is particularly hard on the reader when the author cites lines of classical poetry. The examples masterfully illustrate the different positions taken by the academies and individual writers in the struggle for modernization.

The only point which this stunning book seems to miss is the relationship of literary Arabic, the dialects and the "middle language." The author rightly characterizes the old literary language with its limited expressive range, followed by its legitimate offspring and successor, modern Arabic, which is a flexible and dynamic language. But he believes that the classical language was once a spoken language, and as such had a wider expressive range than what is recorded. And on the other hand he labels the dialects the "offsprings" of the classical language, as if they were its corrupted descendants. He does not see the dialects as the spoken language of all times and all but the formal situations, ever adaptable and ever changing since not watched over by conservative purists; and apart from it the literary language, an art language with a limited expressive range, changing very slowly since heavily guarded by puristic efforts. All spoken language at all times was, when reduced to writing, translated into this literary, classical language. In this diglossic situation which is as old as classical Arabic, *i.e.* which goes back to the pre-Islamic period, the newly developing "middle language" is a truly new thing since it contains elements from both languages and amounts to a unified conversational language, a phenomenon that never before existed in Arabic. And its very existence seems in turn to contribute greatly to ever deeper modernization of modern literary Arabic.

△ BARBARA FREYER STOWASSER, Georgetown University, Washington, D. C.

STRUCTURAL CONTINUITY IN POETRY: A LINGUISTIC STUDY IN FIVE PRE-ISLAMIC ARABIC ODES, by Mary Catherine Bateson. Paris: Mouton, 1970. 129 pages. Texts. Appen. Gld. 29.

Reviewed by Daud A. Abdo

This is a study of the internal structure of five pre-Islamic poems chosen from a collection containing seven "odes" called *al-Mu'allaqāt.* The author divides each poem into passages on the basis of semantic content, then explores the correlation between this thematic division and the internal structural "regularities" (repetitions of linguistic structures). The underlying assumption is that a poet changes his linguistic patterns whenever he shifts to a new theme, but no correlation is assumed between particular themes and particular patterns (p. 15).

On the phonological level, the author studies vowel frequency and finds their distribution in certain passages is significantly higher or lower than their average distribution in the entire corpus (p. 66). "Deviation" in a passage, concludes the author, constitutes a strong argument "for its integrity and unified composition" (p. 67). The poems are then scrutinized for significant morphological repetitions. Morphemes examined include "functors," "roots," and certain word patterns. Repetitions are found "to greater or lesser extent in more than half of the passages" giving them "much of the same continuity as supplied by phonological deviations" (p. 90). Basing her analysis on Pikes *tagmemics,* the author also studies the poems on the clause level and discovers regularities corresponding "very well" with passage divisions (p. 115).

In addition to the introduction and the chapters dealing with the above linguistic analyses, the book includes a chapter on the "form and background of the *Mu'allaqāt,*" another surveying the five poems, and a third summarizing the findings and their implications. There is also a transcription and translation of the poems and five "stylistic maps" showing linguistic regularities.

Arab literary critics as early as the ninth century had noticed and classified repetitions of consonants as well as symmetry in grammatical structures in poetry.[1] Ḍayf, in a book first published in 1943, discusses the poetic effect of certain repetitions (/s/, /i/, and the pattern *CaCC*) in two poems by Al-Buḥturī.[2] Anīs, also, discussed poetic effects of phonemic repetitions.[3] But Bateson's work is, to my knowledge, the first attempt in Arabic literature to study such repetitions this way.

A few factors may decrease the validity of the findings, though not the significance of the study itself. Pre-Islamic poetry is least appropriate for this type of study because of the presence of many words and phrases versions, and the possibility that certain lines might have been omitted, inserted, rearranged, or altered affect both thematic divisions and phonemic distributions. Furthermore, the results might also have been affected by excluding a vowel per line in four poems (p. 60), treating final long vowels before word initial clusters as not shortened (p. 68) [although she has accepted implicitly in her discussion of meters (pp.

---

[1] See, for instance, Sallām, M.Z., *Ta'rīkh al-Naqd al-'Arabī,* Cairo, 1964; Vol. I, pp. 115-119, and Vol. II, pp. 269-270, and 313-319.

[2] Ḍayf, Shawqī, *al-Fann wa Madhāhibuhu Fī al-Shi'r al-'Arabī,* Cairo, 1960, pp. 81-90.

[3] Anīs, Ibrāhīm, *Mūsīqā al-Shi'r,* Cairo, 1965, pp. 21-48.

29-30) the fact that syllables of the form *CVC*(C) do not exist in Arabic poetry], and making (unexplained) changes in vocalization (p. 131). The morphological and syntactic items (especially the latter) studied in the corpus are relatively few. In short passages, the items counted are so few that many repetitions may be attributed to chance; consequently, no wonder "there is no direct correspondence between the two levels of analysis" (p. 114). Clauses are also lumped up into types. A structure like +V ±S ±A —R ±O ±T (p. 113) is, in fact, an abbreviation of more than fifteen structures which, though grammatically equivalent, may have different poetic effects. The variation between these structures is, actually, more than the formula shows, because each symbol stands for a variety of structures.

Two other comments on this work may be worth mentioning. First, there are several cases where the author has not been specific enough. She does not justify the choice of the particular formulation she has used in the phonemic analysis, nor does she define its variables. In addition she does not explain why all phonemes were taken as her "population," rather than just the vowels (since the distribution of consonants was not studied). Various claims are made without explanation or references. Second, the translation was often literal, and sometimes inaccurate. Occasionally, the author confuses two similar words or two different meanings of the same word or phrase.

The previous remarks do not lessen, however, the significance of this work, which I consider a worthy contribution to Arabic studies. The techniques used, if refined and applied to less controversial material, could yield very interesting and fruitful results.

△ Daud A. Abdo, UNRWA/UNESCO, Beirut, Lebanon.

RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY

A History of Islamic Philosophy, by Majid Fakhry. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1970. xv + 399 pages. Bibl. Index. $15.00.

Reviewed by Erwin I. J. Rosenthal

This substantial, comprehensive history of Islamic *theoretical* philosophy, theology and mysticism is to be warmly welcomed. Preceded in 1964 by Henry Corbin's *Histoire de la philosophie islamique*—with which it has many points of contact and contrast—its chief value is that it is based on expert knowledge of the sources and gives a detailed account in a lucid, authoritative exposition of the main trends and movements of speculation in Islām from al-Kindī through the Middle Ages to the present. It shows the close link between theology and philosophy and of both with theosophy. The reader is made aware of the relevance of Islamic thought for medieval theology, philosophy and mysticism by a master of his subject. Careful study will enrich our understanding and insight.

Prof. Fakhry's exclusive concentration on metaphysics and his omission of practical philosophy—according to Plato and Aristotle an integral part of general philosophy—seem to accord too much emphasis to theoretical philosophy. Ethics is only lightly touched upon in connexion with the theory of the Soul, especially its rational part, and politics is ignored except for a few sentences when he refers to the attainment of Happiness (*e.g.*, p. 291). This is the more surprising since the importance of political philosophy for the correct understanding of Islamic philosophy as a whole has clearly emerged in the research of several scholars over the last 35 years. Fakhry seems to share H. Corbin's view that "politics" in Islamic thought does not mean what we understand by it today! Hence, a certain imbalance results. Fakhry sees in the *Theologia* (wrongly attributed to Aristotle by some of the *Falāsifah*) the exclusive formative influence upon the whole course of Islamic philosophy and theosophy from the start. True, the *Falāsifah* saw the theoretical philosophy of Plato and Aristotle through Neoplatonic eyes—this is brilliantly illustrated in Fakhry's profound analysis of their thought and of the theosophy of the Ṣūfīs. But in political philosophy the "pure" Plato and Aristotle exerted a dominant influence on the *Falāsifah,* in particular al-Fārābī and Averroes. Hence, the foundation of *falsafah* must, to my mind, be at least equally shared by the *Theologia*, the *Liber de causis*, Plato's *Republic* and *Laws* and Aristotle's *Nicomachian Ethics*. For, practical philosophy formed the common ground between Islām and Greek-Hellenistic philosophy in the concepts of law and justice and made possible the reception of Greek-Hellenistic philosophy as a whole in Islām. Of this very little can be detected in Fakhry's exposition. Since Islām is a religious and political unity one misses in Fakhry's exposition the religio-political component so significant in Islamic philosophy, both theoretical and practical. Thus, in an otherwise exemplary treatment of the *Mu'tazilah* its political aspirations and the political implications of Ma'mūn's *miḥnah* are minimized (p. 79). Fakhry's view that "the doctrine of emanation . . . served as the cornerstone of almost the whole of Arab philosophical thought" does less than justice to the Platonic political philosophy of al-Fārābī built, as it is, upon his Neoplatonic metaphysics. "The virtuous city" is an integral part of al-Fārābī's philosophy and even more so for Averroes. The revolutionary character of the *Shī'ah* is rather due to political aspirations than to theoretical speculation, as Fakhry holds (p. 55). Avicenna's exemption of Muḥammad from the emanational theory of prophecy—a theory he took over from al-Fārābī—is not mentioned, nor the significant fact that Averroes does not adhere to this theory and, moreover, sees in Muḥammad's lawgiving the essence of his prophetic character. The heading "Philosophy, the handmaid of politics" in Chapter Five is not borne out in the text. In Fakhry's illuminating treatment of the "Brethren of purity" one looks in vain for a reference to the striking similarity of some of their fundamental ideas with those of Averroes (p. 200ff). Attention must be drawn to Fakhry's balanced, correct assessment of Averroes' philosophy and theology which are in harmony. The present reviewer came to the same conclusion—the unity of Averroes' thought—in his interpretation of Averroes' Commentary on Plato's *Republic* (cf. *BSOAS* xv, 2, 1953). For lack of space other statements and judgments which are open to question cannot be mentioned. Yet, the reservations expressed in no way detract from the excellence of what is in the present phase of our knowledge of the source material a standard work: an achievement of lasting value and usefulness.

△ Erwin I. J. Rosenthal is reader in Oriental studies in the University of Cambridge, England.

SOCIOLOGY AND ECONOMICS

Middle East Oil: A Study in Political and Economic Controversy, by George W. Stocking. Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt Univ. Press, 1970. xii + 461 pages. Appen. Index. $15.

Reviewed by A. C. C. Hill

After the author initially pays tribute to the social responsibilities shown by the "half a dozen of the world's largest corporations" controlling oil production in the Middle East, he turns to the controversies between the owners and the spokesmen of the host governments. He tells the story of these controversies well and his analysis is always interesting, substantially accurate and highly logical. His treatment of Aramco's 50-50 profit-sharing agreement of 1950, which was later adopted by the other three concessionaires, is followed by two chapters on nationalization in Iran under Musaddiq, the Consortium and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and its innovations after 1957 with ENI, Pan-Am, LAPCO, IMINOCO, ERAP, Soviets, Afghanistan and India. Iraq and Syria occupy six chapters, ending with the turnover by the national oil company of most of the IPC concession area to France and Russia after the June War. Two other chapters cover Saudi Arabia: one on Aramco deals with controversies raised by 'Abdallāh al-Ṭarīqī and (later largely resolved by Yamānī) involving relinquishment, Tapline profit-sharing and accounting practices, totalling tax arrears by 1963 of $160 million. The other chapter covers arrangements made by the national oil company for exploration and with AUXIRAP (France) to develop the Red Sea and with AGIP (Italy) to explore and develop the Rub' al-Khālī.

The author then discusses OPEC, set up after the price cuts of 1960, its organization and purposes, its successful moves to require the companies to pay royalties in addition to half the profits based on posted prices and its unsuccessful attempts at proration. Dr. Stocking prophesizes the unlikelihood that "except for short periods the downward trend of prices will soon be reversed." He points out that OPEC's future plans include the rapid development of national oil establishments, accelerated relinquishment, government determined posted prices, recapture of "excessive" earnings, and participation in the ownership of traditional oil companies. The road "is likely to be fraught with bitter controversy" and there is danger that Middle East governments may wipe out "the whole of the economic rent which their low-cost oil has engendered."

Nevertheless, the author states that "barring war, neither Russian encroachment on the Middle East nor the growth of Arab nationalism is apt to impede the flow of Middle East oil to the West more than temporarily." But this optimism he cancels with a final footnote: "In early 1970 the likelihood that the Israeli-Arab conflict may develop into a full-scale war grows greater, as does the possibility that Russia and the United States may be involved in it. Under these circumstances any prognostication regarding the future of Middle East is hazardous."

△ A. C. C. HILL is a former president of the Petroleum Information Foundation. Previously, he was with the Arabian American Oil Company.

READINGS IN ARAB MIDDLE EASTERN SOCIETIES AND CULTURE, edited by Abdulla M. Lutfiyya and Charles W. Churchill. The Hague: Mouton and New York: Humanities Press, 1970. xvii + 719 pages. Index. $15.

Reviewed by Samih K. Farsoun

This is another addition to recently published anthologies on the Middle East. The readings in this collection range from excellent to quaint to irrelevant. The most striking thing about this book is its length—nearly 730 pages including 53 selections. The editors claim that "they constitute almost *all* of the sociological writings of quality other than those devoted to the narrow research interests of a few sociologists" (p. x).

There are four problematic features to be noted in this anthology. First, there is no theme or perspective unifying the selections. The editors explain that "as a consequence of the paucity of research and writing in the field this volume is as much a mosaic picture of the Middle East as is the Middle East society itself a mosaic of various cultures and subcultures" (p. x). The selections appear more as variegated smorgasbord than as a mosaic with a coherent motif.

Second, of the 53 selections, only eight have been published since 1961: three are from the editors' own work and two are chapters from Morroe Berger's *The Arab World Today.* The overwhelming majority of the selections are a decade or more old. This is disappointing since in the last decade, with the burgeoning of Middle East Area studies programs, more empirical and sophisticated work has been done. For example, the selections on the family are merely descriptive, out-of-date, and not inclusive of the recent empirical work which challenges many accepted myths about Arab family structure.

Third, too many of the large number of selections repeat essentially the same ideas. This redundancy occurs especially in the longest sections (I, III and V) of the anthology.

Fourth, almost all of the selections are readily available in English in other sources. Professionals in the field will already know them, and students will be able to get them easily without having to purchase this expensive book.

There are, finally, two theoretically problematic features to be noted in this anthology. First, although modernization (urbanization and westernization) as a conceptual tool in explaining social change in non-Western societies is being increasingly discarded by social scientists, it is stressed in these selections. Second, and most disappointing of all, is the over-stress that is placed on the diversity and disunity of the Arab Middle East. This emphasis on vertical cleavages obscures what seems to me the more important similarities among component social groups and the more basic horizontal cleavages of Arab society. The pivotal concept of social class and the use of class analysis are neglected here.

△ SAMIH K. FARSOUN is an assistant professor of sociology at the State University of New York at Albany.

SHORTER NOTICES

ANNUAIRE DE L'AFRIQUE DU NORD, 1969. Vol. 8. Ed. by Centre de la Recherche Scientifique et d'Etudes sur les Sociétés Méditerranéenes. Aix en Provence: CHEAM, 1970. 1,305 pages. Index. No price indicated.

This eighth volume of the *Annuaire* continues the fine tradition of earlier volumes in providing basic reference material on the countries of North Africa. It includes a complete chronology of events (political, economic and social) in Libya, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia for the year 1969, a selection of important government documents for that year, critical reviews of a selection of studies published on these areas, and finally—and by no means least—an extensive bibliography of relevant articles published in Arabic and Western languages.

The studies of the latest volume focus on the economic situation of the Maghrib in the last decade and consider the motivating forces, both internal and external, which have influenced their development. The three chapters on Algeria include a general survey of the state's rôle in the economy, a study of industrial growth in relation to the serious urbanization problems, and a review of Franco-Algerian petroleum relations since 1965—a very useful background for the most recent events in this field. On Tunisia there is a study of the economy since independence and an evaluation of the economic reforms since 1962. Then there is an overall review of the Moroccan economy since 1956, a discussion of the various negotiations for association with the European Economic Community, and a study of the developing oil economy in Libya. Finally, there are several unrelated studies of 1969 local elections in the Maghrib and their political significance.

Throughout this volume the *Annuaire* maintains the high standards and thoroughness of coverage of its earlier volumes.

△ SALLY JACKSON, Washington, D. C.

THE ARABIC LANGUAGE TODAY, by A. F. L. Beeston. New York: Hillary House Publishers, 1971. 119 pages. Index. $5.50 and $2.50 in paper.

It is no small accomplishment to write a readable description of so esoteric a thing as a language in such a way that both the expert and the general linguist can derive benefit and insight from it. Professor Beeston has been remarkably successful in his undertaking, mainly, it seems, through two devices: a very skillful and well considered distribution of Arabic and English examples to illustrate primarily syntactical points, and a consistent restatement of what is essentially traditional Arab grammatical thought in the concepts and terminology of modern linguistics. Those who teach Arabic will be especially appreciative of this departure from the accustomed philological, and heavily Latinizing, approach to a language which, after all, never knew a "genitive" or a "subjunctive" or a "relative pronoun" as we understand these terms in Indo-European languages.

The author's forte is quite obviously syntax, and the chapters on the syntactical features of Modern Arabic should be a must to read for the student of Arabic and for the experienced Arabist alike. His treatment of morphology, on the other hand, appears to be somewhat uneven by comparison and—sometimes needlessly—sketchy. Internal plurals, for instance, would have called for a more elaborate presentation, and a discussion of the root-and-pattern system and its lexicological and semological significance would seem more desirable and appropriate than the demonstration of a few random morphological irregularities caused by the semivowels (p. 32). The non-Arabist in particular might also have welcomed a less succinct description of Arabic diglossia. A few representative examples chosen from the major dialect groups (and perhaps contrasted with the modern standard language) would doubtless have proven quite helpful to convey at least an impression of the more salient phonological, morphological, and lexical differences among the modern vernaculars.

In view of the overall excellence of the book, one feels particularly reluctant to point out some obvious errors: the third person plural feminine of the prefix tense in the paradigm should read *yajlisna* (for *tajlisna*, p. 77); on page 75, read *tajāssū* (for *tajāsasū*); and the word *tanṣīrahum* in the last line of the text sample (p. 85) must certainly be rendered as "their Christianization" rather than "aid for them." But these are very minor flaws indeed in a book which consistently combines profound linguistic insight with admirable clarity of presentation. One cannot recommend it too highly.

△ KARL STOWASSER, University of Maryland.

DJAMAL-ED-DIN ASSAD ABADI DIT AFGHANI, by Homa Pakdaman. Paris: G-P. Maisonneuve et Larose, 1969. 387 pages. NF 50.

This book brings together materials gathered by the author during years of search and research in a volume that provides the best de-mythologized full biography of al-Afghānī up to its date of publication. The book consists of two parts: a biography that ends with a useful chapter on Jamāl al-Dīn's ideas, and a selection of documents, many of them translated by the author.

The author has gone back to the primary sources and mistrusted the words of Jamāl al-Dīn about himself, and has thus come up with quite an accurate version of his life. There are a few points with which one could take issue, such as the dating of al-Afghānī's pan-Islamic appeal to an Ottoman statesman as at the latest coming in the early 1870s. On this point, however, the author stimulated me to a restudy of the document, and I now believe it to date from the years of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. Another point of disagreement is the author's view that Jamāl al-Dīn was probably poisoned to death. His cancer of the jaw and the operations for it are well attested, and the sources that claim poisoning are mutually contradictory. As a whole, though, the biography is reliable and well documented.

The second section of documents provides very useful translations of some of al-Afghānī's Persian articles and a selection of his letters, among other interesting items. Most useful are the Paris police report and articles in the newspaper *Paris,* both dating from Jamāl al-Dīn's stay in Paris. Also included is a translation of the correspondence between Tehran and Istanbul on the subject of the Iranian government's attempt to get the Sultan to extradite Jamāl al-Dīn.

To be commended is Maxime Rodinson's preface, which points out that we may take a positive view of al-Afghānī's accomplishments even after de-mythologizing his life story. This has been done by Dr. Pakdaman, and she deserves congratulations for a difficult task, very well done. Her research has helped me in my forthcoming *Sayyid Jamāl ad-Dīn al-Afghānī: A Political Biography* (Berkeley, 1971), and should similarly help others who wish to understand this complex and fascinating political figure.

△ Nikki Keddie, department of history, University of California at Los Angeles.

The Early Development of Islamic Jurisprudence, by Ahmad Hasan. Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 1970. vii + 234 pages. Rs. 1800.

This volume is the first in a series of doctoral dissertations which the Islamic Research Institute plans to publish as part of its training program. This program, according to the Preface, "aims at producing scholars of Islamic sciences who would also be familiar with the modern methods of research and scholarship and who could understand and present the teachings of Islam in the light of present-day problems" (p. v). In a Foreword of the book the Professor-in-Charge of the Institute, M. Saghīr Hasan Maʿsūmī, sets a very ambitious goal for this publication series. He expresses the hope that the studies published by the Institute will ultimately help to rekindle in the Muslims "the burning desire, nay, the longing, for exercising *ijtihād,* and that its studies will equally provide sound and solid scholarship for the non-Muslim Islamists" (p. iv).

As far as the latter aim is concerned, this first study certainly demonstrates sound and careful scholarship, whether or not one agrees with all the ideas and conclusions presented by the author. Mr. Hasan has set as his goal a reexamination of the early development of *fiqh.* He discusses the basic concepts of Islamic law including *sunna, ijtihād, ijmāʿ* and *raʾy,* and examines critically some of the important theories developed by Joseph Schacht, taking issue particularly with Schacht's claims of foreign, particularly Roman, legal influences on Islamic law. He also assigns to Shāfiʿī a somewhat less prominent rôle in the development and systematization of Islamic law than do Schacht and other scholars. Many of the theses developed by the author will, no doubt, be subjects of further scrutiny and debate among specialists. The study, however, is well documented and reveals the author's thorough knowledge of both the original sources and the secondary literature. Assuming that future studies live up to the standards of scholarship set by this first volume, the Islamic Research Institute will be able to make a significance contribution to Islamic studies.

△ Herbert J. Liebesny, National Law Center, George Washington University.

The Garamantes of Southern Libya, by Charles Daniels. Stoughton, Wisconsin: The Oleander Press, 1970. 47 pages. $1.50.

Sabratha: A Guide for Visitors, by Philip Ward. Stoughton, Wisconsin: The Oleander Press, 1970. 70 pages. $3.50.

Motoring to Nalut, by Philip Ward and Angelo Pesce. Tripoli: Oasis Oil Co., 1970. 24 pages. $1.25. Available from P.O. Box 395, Tripoli, Libyan Arab Republic.

These three monographs add to the growing list of studies on ancient and contemporary Libya which have been sponsored in recent years by the Oleander Press. The most prolific of Oleander's "Libyanologists" is Philip Ward who has published works such as *Apuleius on Trial at Sabratha, Tripoli: Portrait of a City,* and the trilogy of Libyan poems, *Maps on the Ceiling,* under the Oleander imprint.

In *Sabratha: A Guide for Visitors,* Ward offers a brief handbook for visitors to the extensive excavations at Sabratha, one of the three sister cities of ancient Tripolitania. (The other two Roman cities are Oea, the site of present day Tripoli, and Leptis Magna.) Ward's monograph includes a chapter on the Sabratha Museum, whose mosaics rival those of Ravenna but have not been heretofore catalogued. A useful three page bibliography of Roman Sabratha is also included.

Motoring to Nalut is a story, in words by Philip Ward and pictures by Angelo Pesce, of a drive from Tripoli south across the sandy Jafara to Jadu and Nalut, one of the traditional centers of Berber culture in Libya. This is an excellent, if brief, motoring guide and pictorial atlas of the Jabal Nafusa area and its contemporary inhabitants.

Charles Daniels, a professional archeologist, has for some time been a student of the Garamantes. His monograph, *The Garamantes of Southern Libya,* is one of the few studies published on these ancient inhabitants of modern Libya. It is based on seven visits which he has made since 1958 to Fazzān to study Garamantian remains and carry out excavations in the vicinity of Germa, Gasr, Mara, Murzuk and Zuila.

△ FRANK RALPH GOLINO, Washington, D. C.

HISTORY OF NORTH AFRICA: TUNISIA, ALGERIA, MOROCCO, FROM THE ARAB CONQUEST TO 1830, by Charles-André Julien, translated by John Petrie, edited by C. C. Stewart. London: Routledge and Kegan and New York: Praeger, 1970. 446 pages. $13.50.

Charles-André Julien's *Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord: Tunisie, Algérie, Maroc,* originally published in 1931, with a second and revised French edition in 1952, long recognized as the best general history between antiquity and the French occupation, at last becomes, at least in part, available to English readers. This volume covers in grand style the period from the Arab conquest to the collapse of the Ottoman hegemony in 1830. Thus we have the middle piece of Julien's originally planned three volume work. The translation is smoothly and faithfully rendered by John Petrie. Some new maps, end of chapter notes, and a magnificent bibliography (pp. 359-421) are furnished by C. C. Stewart who closely edited the work and writes a lucid and extremely thoughtful introduction to the English edition.

In more than a limited sense Stewart analyzes Julien's method, particularly the latter's indebtedness to French translations of the Arab authors, upon whom the first four chapters of this seven chapter book rest. Stewart alerts the reader to the instances where the manuscripts used by the French translators were defective and he notes the recent work of archeologists and ethnographers. He thereby enlarges our knowledge over what it was when Julien first wrote or when Le Tourneau revised the work for the second edition in 1952. So in reality this English section of Julien's work is more critical and useful than the earlier French editions. This achievement, reached without impairing the remarkably clear style and lightness of Julien's prose, should make the book an appealing one not simply to the specialist in the history of North Africa but also to the beginning student and general reader. It would be extremely helpful if the other portions of Julien's work, including his *Afrique du Nord en marche,* which studies the nationalisms, could be rendered into up-dated English editions equal to this effort. Of Julien's trail-blazing work itself, those of us who have used it in French find it equally exciting and remarkable in its insight in the English.

△ RICHARD M. BRACE, professor of history, Oakland University, Rochester, Michigan.

ISRAEL'S ADMINISTRATIVE CULTURE, by Gerald E. Caiden. Berkeley: Univ. of California, Institute of Governmental Studies, 1970. xii + 108 pages. Notes. $2.75.

Professor Caiden from Canberra has greatly enriched our knowledge of Middle Eastern administration with this penetrating analysis of what he calls the "administrative culture" of Israel. He emphasizes the rôle of a nation-building élite; their articulation into many groups which negotiate short-range compromises and allocate top posts among themselves; the priority given to national security, and the exceptionally high degree of rational planning and administration in this sector; and the relative absence of rational planning and bureaucratic administration in civilian sectors. Expression such as "crisis administration" and "improvization" recur constantly; and the society in general and its administration are described as "prebureaucratic." The Ottoman and British contribution to the pattern of self-perpetuating multipurpose autonomous entities is downplayed; and no detailed attention is given to local government or fiscal administration. The author has in mind a model of rational bureaucracy by which he judges the behavioral pattern which he has so well observed. Comparing it with that of other small countries, one wonders to what extent the informal personal style of administration may be a function of smallness; and one wishes someone would make a detailed comparison between *protekzia* in Israel and the *zaim* system in Lebanon.

△ W. HARDY WICKWAR, Columbia, South Carolina.

THE JEWS IN EGYPT AND IN PALESTINE UNDER THE FATIMID CALPIHS, by Jacob Mann. 2 vols. in one. New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1970. xxxvii + 280 pages; 484 pages. Indices. Gloss. $22.50.

It is most welcome that Ktav Publishing House undertook to reissue this important work together with the author's Supplements, Addenda and Corrigenda in one huge volume. As S. D. Goitein, the greatest expert today on the Genizah, rightly stresses in his stimulating "Preface and Reader's Guide" Mann's work became a classic immediately after its publication, and although fifty years have elapsed since its appearance it is still one of the most frequently quoted works in Jewish scholarship.

The significance of Mann's research lies in the fact that, with the help of the still unpublished treasures found in the Cairo Genizah at the end of the nineteenth century, he was able to reconstruct one of the darkest periods in Medieval Jewish history, namely the Jews in Egypt and Palestine in the period of the Fāṭimid Caliphs (961-1171).

Those documents of the Genizah written in Hebrew and in Arabic with Hebrew characters which consisted of legal deeds, communal records and other historical accounts, allowed Mann to establish a chronological framework for that obscure period and to bring to light the prominent personalities and leaders such as the Gaon Solomon ben Yahuda of Jerusalem, and others of the Palestinian Gaonate, and to penetrate into the ways of the community with all its manifold human problems. The meticulous investigation is an excellent contribution to the political and communal history of the Jews of that period, a real pioneering study which restored pre-Crusade Palestine for Jewish history and laid the foundation for further research which, indeed, was carried on in the subsequent decades.

Students of Jewish and Islamic history of that period will be grateful for being able to have again access to this stimulating and thought-provoking masterpiece.

△ WALTER J. FISCHEL, department of Near Eastern languages and literature, University of California at Berkeley. He is the author of *Jews in the Economic and Political Life of Mediaeval Islam*, New York, 1969.

KNAFAYIM ME'AL SUEZ [PHANTOM OVER THE NILE: THE STORY OF THE ISRAELI AIR-CORPS], by Zeev Shiff. Haifa: Shikmona Publishing House, 1970. 227 pages. No price indicated. (In Hebrew).

This book concerns the Israeli air force, its history and its operations in the post-June 1967 "war of attrition." Mr. Shiff, who is the military editor of a major Israeli daily newspaper, is best in describing the motivations, preparation and qualities of the Israeli pilot. Although journalistic in flavor and therefore not to be considered accurate history, the book, whose English edition is due to appear shortly, will be of value to students of Israeli military history. The work also surveys the Arab air forces.

Professor Yigael Yadin, who was Israel's first chief of staff, is accused by the author of being a man who tried to deemphasize and limit the air force during his administration. Dr. Yadin, in a *Maariv* interview, replied to Mr. Shiff's allegation saying: "These are twisted facts and a ridiculous misrepresentation of the issues." When asked of the author's remark that Ben-Gurion did not intervene in the debate surrounding the status of the air force, Yadin retorted: "it is simply childish to present it this way. I do not know from whom he received this information. It is absurd to rewrite history and lead readers to believe that on such a vital principal issue, Ben-Gurion would have taken no position. Whoever knows Ben-Gurion can only giggle."

△ GAD SOFFER, University of Dayton.

THE MIDDLE EAST: A HANDBOOK, ed. by Michael Adams. New York: Praeger, 1971. xiii + 598 pages. Index. $25.

Mr. Adams has assembled an extensive range of material combining the techniques of both reference handbooks and anthologies. The first 134 pages are devoted to comparative economic statistics, compiled by the *Middle East Economic Digest*, and to country by country facts and figures including geography, population, social services and constitutional system.

The remainder of the volume consists of contributions by well known scholars in the field. The articles themselves are usually brief but, again, the range of information is impressive. This part of the book is divided into six categories: general background, countries, political affairs, economic affairs, social patterns and the arts and mass media. It is particularly interesting to find the final two categories in a work of this type. There are essays on the position of women, education, land reform, literature, architecture, music and the mass media.

△ PETER NULTY, Middle East Institute, Washington, D. C.

MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICAL SYSTEMS, by Dankwart A. Rustow. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971. xiii + 98 pages. Appen. Tables. Bibl. Index. $5.95 or $2.75 in paper.

This is a revised and up-dated version of the section on Southwest Asia which the author contributed to the text on *Modern Political Systems: Asia*, edited by Robert Ward and Roy Macridis. Clearly, Egypt had to be added because of its central position in the Middle East. The main value of the book is the fact that it is truly comparative, following a definite systematic outline different from the country-by-country approach of other texts on the Middle East. The major topics discussed by the author are: history, ecological and social structure, ideology, political dynamics, the organs of government and governmental performance. While the book is too short and not sufficiently detailed to be used as a main text, it should provide an excellent supplement, especially as an overview of a semester's study. Appropriately, modernization is the central theme—hence the classification of countries as "modern political systems," "traditional political systems" and "political systems in flux." Though it is possible to disagree with the author over some of his interpretations or the classification of certain countries, the book presents an extremely useful survey not only for the student of the Middle East but also for specialists in comparative politics and developing nations generally. Demographic and election tables both in the text and the appendix add to the value of the book.

△ MICHAEL W. SULEIMAN, Kansas State University.

1969 YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST AFFAIRS, edited by Richard F. Staar. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1970. xii + 1,079 pages. Chron. Bibl. Index. $19.95.

This yearbook seeks and succeeds, largely on the basis of primary source material, to compile a comprehensive survey of the 1968 activities of communist parties throughout the world; the internal structure of each party is also examined. The party studies, the largest section of this work, examine the parties in all Middle East countries except South Yemen: both communist parties of Israel are discussed. The other parts of this reference work consider front organizations, international meetings and important documents and do not refer often to the Middle East area. All references to the Palestinians are made within the context of the parties in established Arab states.

△ MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies.

ON THE FRONTIERS OF ISLAM: TWO MANUSCRIPTS CONCERNING THE SUDAN UNDER TURCO-EGYPTIAN RULE, 1822-1845, ed. by Richard Hill. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970. xxx + 216 pages. Appen. Map. Index. $9.75.

In 1820 the forces of Muḥammad 'Alī Pasha, the Ottoman vālī of Egypt, began to penetrate up the Nile and into the vast plains which stretch beyond the river. A handful of Europeans accompanied the Turco-Egyptian military forces as military instructors, medical officers and merchants. Two of these men wrote a chronicle and a journal respectively which are "the only known detailed accounts of the earlier period of Turco-Egyptian rule in the Sudan." They supplement the Arab chronicle *Ta'rīkh Mulūk al-Sūdān* in that the writers did not restrict themselves to the actions of the rulers and religious notables, but recorded "the domestic customs of the Sudanese, the foibles of the Turkish overlords, the iniquities of their fellow-Europeans, the fluctuations in the value of money, the price of slave-girls and of corn." The accuracy of their account has been weighed by the editor who lived in the Sudan for many years and has assiduously sought confirming evidence from other manuscript sources, the sites where the events took place, and the memories of old men who have passed on the traditions of those frontier days as the Sudan was making the painful transition from rebellion to order. His judgment that "the veracity of both writers stands basically unassailable" is probably the most balanced assessment of the accuracy of the texts but their principal value remains in providing a picture of daily life in the Sudan rather than the political activities of the rulers and the ruled.

Who were the authors? In a succinct but thorough introduction the editor makes several intelligent guesses devoid of any smug certainty. His description of the contemporary Sudan is a delightful distillation of a lifetime of scholarship about the Sudan under Turco-Egyptian rule. The translation flows freely and the reader can be grateful for the order which the editor has imposed on the chaos of personal and place names which have bedeviled students and scholars of the nineteenth century Sudan alike. There are the occasional typographical errors (p. 37, line 4; p. 94, footnote 2), but they in no way detract from a splendid edition of two unique sources of Sudanese history.

△ ROBERT O. COLLINS, University of California at Santa Barbara.

POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE 20TH CENTURY, by W. F. Abbouchi. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1970. xiii + 319 pages. Bibl. Index. $8.95.

Addressed chiefly "to college students" and employing a "country-by-country approach," this book emphasizes Turkey, Iran, Egypt and Israel and discusses Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria in shorter chapters. While the author briefly examines some cultural and economic conditions, his stress is on historical and political developments in the twentieth century. Generally, internal political developments are discussed more thoroughly and satisfactorily than foreign relations. For students, the book contains useful material, including a lengthy bibliography. It also criticizes both Arab and Israeli actions and policies.

The book, however, contains many inaccuracies, over-simplifications and questionable statements. For example: Lebanon has "the highest per capita income in the Arab world" (p. 301)—Kuwayt has a higher per capita income; "Communist Jews" in Israel do not "believe" in the "State of Israel" (p. 238)—this is not correct, especially since 1967; "whether

[Britain, France and Israel] were in 'collusion' prior to the events of October [1956] remains questionable for lack of conclusive evidence" (p. 177)—numerous sources, including Anthony Nutting's *No End of a Lesson* listed in the bibliography, prove collusion existed; "the reasons that these [Arab] refugees left their homes are still not certain" (p. 225)—numerous publications, including UN Mediator report A/648, clearly establish the reasons; and "Nasser's nationalism" was the "chief ally" of Communism and "as 1969 began, . . . the danger of a communist takeover in Egypt, Syria, Algeria and Iraq also increased" (pp. 181, 183)—no effort is made to substantiate these questionable statements. Moreover, important topics—such as Arab and Palestine Arab nationalisms, the Arab-Israeli problem and Soviet economic aid—and developments since the middle 1960s have been inadequately covered.

△ FRED J. KHOURI, Villanova University.

PORTRAIT OF ISRAEL, by Moshe Brilliant. New York: American Heritage Press, 1970. 373 pages. Illus. Index. $7.95.

This book is a look at Israel through the eyes of an Israeli of American birth. The seventeen short chapters are written in "an informal, anecdotal style" and are accompanied by a generous sprinkling of photographs. The story of the Western Jewish immigration into Palestine, legal and illegal, followed by the more recent Oriental Jewish immigration is discussed. The culmination of the rebirth of Israel is with the acquisition of Jerusalem so vital to every Jew throughout the world, though the access to the Wailing Wall is given as the goal sought and gained, not the Temple.

The author looks to the people and their life beginning with the urban centers, Tel Aviv and Haifa. He then turns to the industrial potential of the Negev before returning to the inhabited Mediterranean climate areas with a discussion of agriculture and industry. An imbalanced portion is spent on the *kibbutz* with their three per cent of the population. The planned economy of Israel is well seen in the discussion of industry. The book concludes with chapters on changes in government, in the *kibbutz* and in other aspects, but plainly states the continuing powerful influence of the World Zionist Organization. "The main center of power was [pre-1948] the Jewish Agency which, as the executive arm of the World Zionist Organization, controlled the millions mobilized through the United Jewish Appeal and fund-raising organizations throughout the world" (p. 277). After 1948 it "was recognized by the government as competent in matters including immigration, the preliminary integration of new arrivals, and land settlement. . . . Moreover, it was expedient. If United Jewish Appeal funds were spent in Israel by a government agency instead of by a philanthropic society, they would be taxable in the United States" (p. 278).

The aims stated on the jacket are realized; the book will be of interest to the many American Jews who make trips of considerable duration to Israel, and to armchair travelers. However, the book is of little value to serious scholarship or for that matter to university and college libraries.

△ KENNETH L. CROSE, Anderson College, Indiana.

RUSSIA AND NATIONALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA: THE CASE OF TADZHIKISTAN, by Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970. 325 pages. $10.95.

This study analyzes the methods and results of Soviet administrative policies in Tadzhikistan—policies also pertinent to other parts of Soviet Central Asia. After a comprehensive survey of pre-Soviet Tadzhikistan's geography, history, culture and economy and a masterful treatment of traditional Islamic agencies of authority, the author discusses the events leading to the establishment of Soviet power, and the subsequent social and economic transformation of Tadzhikistan which required the destruction of a strong, popular anti-Soviet attitude spearheaded by the Muslim clergy. The last part of the book deals with post-World War II events and juxtaposes the "autonomy" of the Tadzhik Soviet Socialist Republic with the Republic's changing ethnic structure. While the Tadzhiks comprised over 75 per cent of the total population in 1926, in 1959 they represented 53 per cent of the total. On the other hand, the percentage of Russians tripled during the same period forming over 13 per cent of the total population and 25 per cent of Tadzhik Communist Party membership. Even more revealing are the data gathered by the author showing the ethnic composition of the Tadzhik Central Committee and other government positions. Most functionaries were Russians, usually outnumbering the Tadzhiks two to one.

The author poses two crucial questions: who actually runs the Tadzhik government and who is the political élite? In answer, she examines the career and behavior patterns of major Tadzhikistan political personalities—their origins, education, recruitment, turnover and performance. Most political power in Tadzhikistan between 1945 and 1956 rested with 36 individuals, one-third of whom were non-Tadzhik. Sensitive security agencies were always under the control of non-Tadzhiks. The author stresses in her conclusion the local roots of the small, but growing, Tadzhik élite. What the Russians did not foresee, in her opinion, is that the new Soviet-trained Tadzhik élite would begin to challenge the right of the Russians to run the destinies of the Tadzhik people. This local élite is developing a "national communism," and an increasing number of Tadzhik intellectuals are contemplating traveling "their own road to socialism."

This excellent work should tempt scholars to try similar studies on other non-Russian Republics of the USSR: the political implications for the Moscow government of educated, vocal, non-Russian élites in a number of Republics could surely be enormous.

△ HLIB S. HAYUK, Towson State College, Baltimore, Maryland.

THE SUDAN: A SOUTHERN VIEWPOINT, by Oliver Albino. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970. xiv + 122 pages. Appen. $3.

This brief paperback is the second exposition on the "Problem of the Southern Sudan" written from a Southern perspective; it follows an earlier monograph by Joseph Oduhu and William Deng (*The Problem of the Southern Sudan*, London, 1963) and thus balances two books written by Northern authors on this subject, namely B. M. Said's *Sudan: Crossroads of Africa* (London, 1965) and M. O. Beshir's *The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict* (London, 1968).

In terms of exhaustive and systematic treatment as well as quality of documentation, Albino's rather subjective effort compares unfavorably to Beshir's scholarly study. Nevertheless, students of Sudanese and African affairs will benefit from reading this book, primarily because it presents the perspective of an astute and uncompromising Southern intellectual whose standpoint is becoming increasingly representative of Southern leadership. While the frequent lack of systematic analysis—characteristic of Southern élites in general—may disappoint the scholarly reader, the mood conveyed in the latter half of the book elevates the same to the status of a political manifesto of sorts and is worth reading for that reason alone.

This reviewer found the historical essay in the first half to be very astute and to go beyond previous interpretations which tended to lack Southern "inputs." Quite illustrative is also the short chapter describing some of the author's personal experiences with British and Northern administrators. These bare insights into the multifaceted social and psychological problems encountered by the Southern minority and hint at the depth and complexity of animosity and mistrust between the two rival peoples.

△ PETER K. BECHTOLD, University of Maryland.

THE TOPOGRAPHY OF BAGHDAD IN THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES, by Jacob Lassner. Detroit: Wayne State Univ. Press, 1970. 177 pages. Appen. Notes. Bibl. Index. Maps. $12.50.

Baghdad was the megalopolis of the Middle Ages, the capital of the 'Abbāsid Caliphate, perhaps the most flourishing state in the world in the ninth and tenth centuries. The study of Islamic cities has become a fad in recent years, and Baghdad has had more than its share of articles, symposia and even books. Professor Lassner in the book under review has united a translation of the section on the topography of the city from the Arabic history of Baghdad by al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī (d. 1071), with several of his articles published eleswhere, plus maps from a book on Baghdad by G. Le Strange published seventy years ago, and copious notes.

The text is not easy to follow without detailed maps, and those of Le Strange are inadequate, as well as poorly reproduced. The translation of the text of al-Baghdādī is certainly competent, and the notes are very detailed, showing a great exertion of the author to be as complete as possible in his bibliography. The author is quite right in disclaiming an Umayyad city in Darabgird, Iran, as the prototype of the round city of the Caliph Manṣūr, for the round city of Darabgird was pre-Islamic as was also the more impressive round city of Firuzabad also in Fars province. It is conceivable that the Sasanian round cities may have influenced Manṣūr but this cannot be proved.

Lassner's book is not to be read continuously for there is no thesis in it, rather it should be regarded as a kind of encyclopedia on early Baghdad with a great deal of information in it. The present work supersedes the old French translation of al-Baghdādī by Salmon, which was very difficult to understand because of the lack of annotations. In passing it might be mentioned that the rest of the *History of Baghdad* contains topographical information in many biographies, which supplement the information in the foreword to the *History* which is translated by Lassner. One may conclude from reading the present book that little more can be done in reconstructing 'Abbāsid Baghdad from literary sources without excavations preceded by extensive surveys on the site.

△ RICHARD N. FRYE, President, Asia Institute, Shiraz, Iran.

TURKIYE ÜZERINDE 1945 KÂBUSU, by Metin Toker. Ankara: Akis Yayınları, 1971. ix + 122 pages. Illus. TL 10.

The well known Turkish journalist Metin Toker has written a highly readable essay on Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union and the United States with special emphasis on the critical year 1945. The story is appropriately entitled "The 1945 Nightmare over Turkey."

While this study does not add anything new on the subject, it reviews, for the layman, the Soviet demands on Turkey for joint control of the Turkish Straits following the Second World War. An interesting device used by the author to enliven the story is that of presenting conversations between the officials involved in the diplomatic maneuvers as he imagined them to have taken place. While the author quotes from a number of documents, there are no footnotes or bibliography.

The book is divided into six chapters entitled: "The Early Days of the Summer of 1945," "A Look at the 1920s," "Mid-Summer 1945," "Cairo [Conference] 1943," "The Last Days of the Summer 1945," and "A Ship called the *Missouri*."

The author dramatizes effectively the Soviet threat to Turkey and Turkey's courageous resistance to all threats and blandishments. The story ends happily with the 1947 Truman Doctrine and aid to Greece and Turkey—an ending which the author states opened a new era in Turkish history.

△ KERIM K. KEY, Washington, D. C.

THE U.A.R. IN AFRICA: EGYPT'S POLICY UNDER NASSER, by Tareq Ismael. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1971. xiv + 233 pages. Appen. $9.75.

Relying principally on Egyptian newspapers and information service publications in addition to the *New York Times, Christian Science Monitor*, the *Times* of London and the *Egyptian Political Science Review*, Tareq Ismael has produced a very readable account of one aspect of Egyptian foreign policy under former President Jamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir. The author's concern is Egypt's political, cultural, economic and historical interests in both Arab and black Africa, her assumption of the rôle of leader of an all-African "anti-imperialist" movement, her confrontation with Israel in Africa and Arab Africa's *entente* with the Soviet Union. Six excellent maps, showing what the author calls Egypt's "traditional interests in Africa," are conveniently placed in the text.

The ancient Egyptian attraction southward up the Nile provides a useful starting point for the author's theme; this theme is also said to influence contemporary Egyptian policy in Africa. Dr. Ismael treats well the general principles, objectives and instruments of Egypt's African policy and the more specific Egyptian-Sudanese and Egyptian-Congolese relationships. A concluding chapter looks to the future in assessing this policy.

The 1952 Egyptian Revolution and the subsequent rise to power of Jamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir inaugurated a determined effort to give Egypt a place of importance in African and world affairs. However, this rôle was thwarted by the Arab-Israeli conflict even though Israel is to Egypt less a diplomatic than a military problem. Egypt, as the protective power of the African continent, ran afoul of an active Israeli policy. And sixteen years later, in the fall of 1969, this reviewer personally observed the deepening concern among Arabs and Egyptians that Israeli military potential was far more crucial than any of the United Arab Republic's diplomatic efforts.

△ ALBERT NORMAN, professor of history and international relations, Norwich University.

WHO'S WHO IN LEBANON, 1970-1971. 4th Edition. Beirut: Les Editions Publitec, 1970. 439 + 77 pages. £L 100 or $35. Available from P.O. Box 5936, Beirut, Lebanon.

This reference work is divided into four parts: a section of very useful information on Lebanon including such items as the constitution and data on a variety of economic, educational, political and social organizations in Lebanon; a second part deals with large companies in the country; the third, and most important, section is the who's who in Lebanon; and lastly, a seventy-odd page survey of Lebanese living overseas. Many libraries will find this volume a useful reference work. Unfortunately, the utility of the third section, the who's who in Lebanon, is greatly reduced by the lack of an index and the unsystematic system of transliteration of Arabic names used. Such a system exists and should be used despite its conflict with the numerous renditions of Lebanese names in Western language newspapers.

△ MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies.

WESTERN WINDOW IN THE ARAB WORLD, by Leon Borden Blair. Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1970. xiv + 304 pages. Bibl. Index. Illus. $8.50.

The growing number of substantive works in English on Morocco not only provides a useful service in balancing the ledger so long overweighted by French scholarship but is irrefutable evidence of the healthy state of North African studies in general in this country. Of particular interest is the fact that scholars have at last begun to deal with areas of inquiry hitherto neglected or blocked off by the political situation. Dr. Blair's study is an example of this evolving approach which should, in time, produce the tools and insights needed for the definitive analysis of the totality of twentieth century North Africa as a unit of the global community.

Dr. Blair's concern is the impact of the American military "presence" in Morocco from the November 1942 landings (Operation Torch) through the establishment and ultimate retrocession of American airbases to an independent Moroccan government. This period corresponds with the growth of the Moroccan nationalist movement to maturity and its successful campaign to recover from France the independence surrendered at the Treaty of Fez. Because the airbases were negotiated with the French protectorate government without consultation with the Sharifian Makhzen, their disposal involved questions of legal sovereignty as well as Makhzen prestige and aggressive Moroccan nationalism.

The author was a participant in these events and the most valuable sections in the book deal with Franco-American rivalry in Morocco and the interservice, intra-governmental conflicts which developed out of the establishment of the bases. The Navy's retention of the Kenitra base after independence is cited as an example of effective "people-to-people" diplomacy. Unfortunately, American military humanitarianism has yet to prove itself in terms of long term diplomatic gains anywhere. The American impact on Morocco remains minimal and will continue to so long as Morocco remains marginal to American foreign policy.

As a recapitulation of one such effort, Dr. Blair's study has some merit. However, it is full of errors. Names and titles are rendered inaccurately with a consistency unworthy of a university press. The title is misleading; the view of American and French relations in one corner of the Arab world is exclusive rather than encompassing. The most interesting question of all, concerning the economic and sociological effect of the bases in Morocco, is never examined. If the American military transformation of Morocco is indeed measurable as the author suggests (p. 304), one would need a great deal more data than he provides us.

△ William Spencer, Florida State University.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

Documents

African Book Trade Directory, 1971. Ed. by Sigfred Taubert. Munchen: Pullach Verlag, 1971. 319 pages. Map. No price indicated. Includes Egypt and the Maghrib.

Armenian Press Directory. Ed. by Edward Gulbekian. London: Harq Publications, 1971. 76 pages. £.90 or $2.20. Available from 10 Graham Ave., Mitcham, Surrey, CR4 2HG, England.

Directory of Israeli Merchants and Manufacturers, 1971. Tel-Aviv: N. A. Etrogy, 1971. $20. Available from International Publications Service, New York.

Iran Almanac and Book of Facts. 9th ed. Tehran: Echo Publications of Iran, 1970. $17.50. Available from W. S. Heinman, New York.

General

Across a Darkling Plain: An American's passage through the Middle East. By Marshall Frady. New York: Harper's Magazine Press, 1971. xvii + 199 pages. $6.50.

Dictionaries

A Dictionary and Glossary of the Koran. By John Penrice. New York: Praeger, 1971. $17.50. Reprint of the 1873 edition.

Dictionnaire détaillé des noms des vêtements chez les Arabs. By R. P. A. Dozy. Amsterdam: Gé Nabrink et Fils, 1971. Gld 225. Reprint of the 1845 edition.

Farhang-i kamil-i jadid-i Farsi-Faransah [A new complete Persian-French dictionary]. 2 vols. Ed. by Murtaza Muallim. Tehran: Amiri Kabir, 1970. No price indicated.

Ibn Khallikan's Biographical Dictionary. 4 vols. Trans. by B. Mac Guckin de Slane. Beirut: Librarie du Liban, 1970. No price indicated. Photographic reproduction of 1842-3 edition.

Biography

'Allamah Shibli's Sirat al-Nadi. Trans. by Fazlur Rahman. Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1970. x + 547 pages. Rs 30. Biography of Muḥammad.

Ben-Gurion: The biography of an extraordinary man. Rev. ed. by Robert St. John. New York: Doubleday. Index. $6.95. Announced for Ag '71.

La Correspondance du consul Louis Chénier, 1767-1782. 2 vols. Ed. by Pierre Grillon. Paris: SEVPEN, 1970. Bibl. NF 145. About a chargé d'affaires in Morocco.

David Ben-Gurion: Autobiography. Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1971. No price indicated. (In Hebrew). First two volumes to be published in Ap '71.

Ḥiwār wa Asrār ma'a al-Mulūk wa al-Ru'asā' [Memoirs]. By Aḥmad al-Shuqayrī. Beirut: Dar al-Awdah, 1970. 270 pages. No price indicated.

Joseph Trumpeldor: His times and tasks. By Nahum Benari. Tel Aviv, 1970. 96 pages. Illus. I£ 8. (In Hebrew). Available from Israel Export Institute, Book and Printing Center.

The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann. Series A: Letters, November 1902-August 1903, Vol. II. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1971. xlvi + 470 pages. Index. $12.75.

Muḥammad Rūḥī al-Khālidī. By Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Asad. Cairo: Jāmi'at al-Duwal al-'Arabīyah, 1970. 158 pages. No price indicated. Lectures on al-Khālidī (1864-1913), a Palestinian historian.

Nāṣir. By Jamāl Muḥammad Aḥmad. Kharṭūm: Dār al-Ra'ī al-'Āmm, 1970. £E .50. (In Arabic). Tributes to the late Egyptian president.

Shakhṣiyāt Islāmīyah Mu'āṣirah [Contemporary Islamic personalities]. By Ibrāhīm al-Ba'thī. Cairo: Dār al-Sha'b, 1970. 319 pages. £E .20.

Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī: An outline of his thought and a study of his image in the eyes of posterity. By Yohanan Friedmann. Montreal: McGill-Queen's Univ. Press. 136 pages. $7.50. Announced for Spring '71.

Bibliography

Bibliographies of the Middle East and North Africa. Comp. by the Foreign Area Materials Center, State Education Department, University of the State of New York. No price indicated. In Occasional Publications Series. Available from Bro-Dart Inc., 1609 Memorial Ave., Williamsport, Pa. 17701.

A Catalogue of Persian Manuscripts. Ed. by Ahmad Munzavi. Tehran: Regional Cultural Institute,

1969. 717 pages. No price indicated. (In Persian).

An Index and Concordance of Pre-Islamic Arabian Names and Inscriptions. By G. Lankester Harding. Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1971. 943 pages. No price indicated.

Israel: A bibliography; a selected, annotated listing of works on Israel's past history and present structure and culture. Compiled by Iva Cohen. New York: Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, 1970. 70 pages. No price indicated.

Middle East and North Africa: A bibliography for undergraduate libraries. Ed. by Harry N. Howard *et al.* Williamsport, Pa.: Bro-Dart Publishing Co., 1971. xviii + 79 pages. $8.95. Available from 1609 Memorial Ave., Williamsport, Pa. 17701.

The State of Israel 1948-1968: An annotated bibliography. Ed. by Assia Neuberg. Tel Aviv, 1970. 254 pages. I£ 34. (In Hebrew). Available from Israel Export Institute, Book and Printing Center.

Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan

Area Handbook for Iran. Comp. by Foreign Area Studies, American University. Washington: USGPO, 1971. xxii + 603 pages. Bibl. Index. $4.

Baedeker's Handbook for Travellers: Russia. New York: Arno, 1970. lxiv + 590 pages. Maps. Illus. $30. Reprint of the 1914 edition. Covers Tehran, Iran.

Etude sur l'évolution intellectuelle chez les Musulmans du Benghal, 1857-1957. By Mahmud Shah Qureshi. The Hague: Mouton, 1971. NF 28.

Faces of Persian Youth: A sociological study. By A. Reza Arasteh. Leiden: Brill, 1970. vi + 267 pages. Bibl. $17.50. Available from W. S. Heinman, New York.

Ghalib's Dastanbuy: A diary of the Indian Revolt of 1857. Ed. by K. A. Faruqi. London: Asia Publishing House, 1971. £2.75.

History of Muslim rule in Tirhut, 1206-1765. By Radhakrishna Choudhary. Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1970. xi + 284 pages. Illus. Map. Rs 25.

How Lonely Sits the City: A survey of the human impact of agricultural development from prehistoric to contemporary times as seen from the village of Shosh-Daniel on the Khuzestan Plain of southwest Persia. By Richard Critchfield. New York: The Alicia Patterson Fund, 1971. 106 pages. No price indicated.

Mediaeval India under Mohammedan Rule (712-1764). By Stanley Lane-Poole. New York: Haskell House, 1970. xviii + 449 pages. Illus. Map. $14.95. Reprint of the 1903 edition.

Memoirs of the Emperor Jahanguier. Trans. from a Persian manuscript by David Price. Delhi: Rare Books, 1970. iv + 247 pages. Rs 35. Concerns Emperor of Hindustan, 1569-1627.

Muqaddimah bar Jamiah shinasi-i Iran. By Jamshid Bahnām and Shāpūr Rāskih. Tehran: Intishārāt-i Khavārizmī, 1970. 501 pages. No price indicated. An introduction to the sociology of Iran, in Persian.

The Persians from the Earliest Days to the Twentieth Century. By Alessandro Bausani. Trans. by J. B. Donne. London: Elek, 1971. 204 pages. Illus. Maps. Index. Bibl. £2.50.

Problems of Employment Creation in Iran. By William H. Bartsch. Geneva: International Labour Office, 1970. 83 pages. Bibl. $1.50. Available from CH 1211, Geneva 22, Switzerland.

The War for a Persian Lady. By Barbara English. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1971. $4.95. Concerns the Anglo-Persian War of 1856.

Arabian Peninsula

Christians at Mecca. By Augustus Ralli. Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat, 1971. x + 283 pages. Illus. $11. Reprint of the 1909 edition.

Forty Years in Kuwait. By Violet Dickson. London: Allen and Unwin, 1971. £5. Autobiography of Col. H. R. P. Dickson's widow.

La République Populaire du Sud-Yemen. Damas: L'Office arabe de presse et de documentation, 1971. $9.50 and $1 for air post. Available from P.O. Box 3,550, Damascus, Syria.

Southern Arabia. By Brian Doe. London: Thames and Hudson, 1971. Illus. £4.20.

The Trucial States. By Donald Hawley. London: Allen and Unwin, 1970. 379 pages. Plates. Illus. Tables. Maps. Index. £4.25.

Central Asia

Education and Development in Central Asia: A case study on social change in Uzbekistan. By William K. Medlin, William M. Cave and Finley Carpenter. Leiden: Brill, 1971. 285 pages. Tables. Illus. Gld 64.

Narrative of a Mission to Bokhara. By Joseph Wolff. New York: Arno, 1970. xix + 352 pages. Illus. $24. Reprint of the 1845 edition.

Russian Central Asia. 2 vols. By Henry Lansdell. New York: Arno, 1970. 684 pages and xv + 732 pages. Maps. Illus. $48. Reprint of the 1885 edition.

Sketches of Central Asia. By Armin Vámbéry. New York: Arno, 1970. viii + 444 pages. $14.95. Reprint of the 1868 edition.

Travels in Central Asia. By Armin Vámbéry. New York: Arno, 1970. 493 pages. Illus. $14.95. Reprint of the 1865 edition.

Egypt, Sudan, Libya

Die Arabische Sozialistische Union. By Rainer Büren. Opladen: C. W. Leske Verlag, 1970. xxxiii + 234 pages. Notes. DM 25.

The Building of a Nation: The May Revolution and the Southern Sudan Problem. By Isaac Eli. Khartoum: n.p., 1970. 24 pages. No price indicated.

Copts and Moslems under British Control. By Kyriakos Mikhail. Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat, 1971. xv + 146 pages. $7.75. Reprint of the 1911 edition.

La guerra libica, 1911-1912. By Francesco Malgeri. Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1970. 429 pages. IL 7,000.

al-Ḥayāt al-Ḥizbīyah fī Miṣr fī 'Ahd al-Iḥtilāl al-Barītānī [Party life in Egypt during the British occupation, 1882-1914]. By Yūnān L. Rizq. Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, 1970. 270 pages. £E .60.

Ḥurriyat al-Ṣiḥāfah wafqa Tashri'āt . . . [Press freedom according to legislation in the UAR]. By Jamāl al-Dīn al-'Uṭayfī. Cairo: n.p., 1971. 283 pages. £E 1.

Idārat al-Tanmīyah, Dirāsah Taḥlīlīyah lil-Bīrūqarāṭīyah fī Miṣr [Development administration, an analytical study of bureaucracy in Egypt]. By Aḥmad Rashīd. Cairo: Dār al-Nahḍah al-'Arabīyah, 1970. 193 pages. Illus. £E .60.

Jamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir lil-Ta'rīkh [. . . in history]. By Muḥammad Abū Khaddūr. Damascus: Dār Dimashq lil-Ṭibā'ah wa al-Nashr, 1970. 206 pages. No price indicated.

Khiṭṭat al-Khams Sanawāt li-Tanmīyah al-Iqtiṣādīyah wa al-Ijtimā'īyah li . . . [The five year plan for the economic and social development of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan, 1970-1975]. Kharṭūm: al-Maṭba'ah al-Ḥukūmīyah, 1970. No price indicated.

Lamaḥāt 'an Ḥayāt wa 'Ādāt qabā'il al-Sūdān al-Kubrā [Views on the life and customs of the great tribes of the Sudan]. By Yūsuf Abū Qurūn. Umdarmān: n.p., 1969. 168 pages. Illus. Maps. Bibl. No price indicated.

Land Beyond the Rivers: The Southern Sudan, 1898-1918. By Robert O. Collins. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971. xv + 338 pages. Sources. Index. $12.50.

al-Liwā' al-Abyaḍ, Thawrat 1924: Mudhakkirāt wa Mushāhadāt Sajīn [Memoirs of a member of the Liwā, al Abyad, which revolted in 1924 in the Sudan]. By 'Abd al-Karīm al-Sayyid. Kharṭūm: Jāmi'at al-Kharṭūm, 1970. £S .50.

Mādhā Yurīdu al-Sha'b al-Miṣrī? [What do the Egyptian people want?]. By Muḥammad Jalāl Kishk. Beirut: Sharikat al-Tawzī' al-Waṭanīyah, 1970. 92 pages. No price indicated. An open letter to Anwar al-Sādāt.

Mashrū Qanāt al-Suways . . . ḥattā 1856 [The Suez Canal project until 1856]. By Maḥmūd Ḥasan Ṣāliḥ Mansī. Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-'Arabī, 1971. 406 pages. Maps. £E 1.

Mashrū'āt al-Thawrah fī 18 'Āmman: A'māl li-Ra'īs Jamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir [On the cultural, economic and political achievements of Nāṣir during his presidency]. By Sa'd Zaghlūl Ibrāhīm. Cairo: al-Hay'ah al-'Āmmah, 1971. 265 pages. Illus. £E 3.

Min Warā'i al-Ghaym. By Yūsuf al-Sibā'ī. Cairo: Mu'assasat al-Khānjī, 1970. 399 pages. Illus. £E .50. Articles on current issues in the UAR after the 1967 war.

Mushkilat Janūb al-Sūdān [The problem of the Southern Sudan]. By Mudaththar 'Abd al-Raḥīm al-Ṭayyib. Kharṭūm: Dār al-Sūdānīyah, 1970. 224 pages. £S .40. The nature, evolution and influence of British policy on the creation of the problem.

al-Qāhirah, Ta'rīkhuha, Fanūnuha, Athāruha [Cairo, its history, art and monuments]. By Ḥasan al-Bāshā. Cairo: Dār al-Kitāb al-Jadīd, 1970. 647 pages. Illus. Maps. £E 1.

Rural Employment Problems in the United Arab Republic. Geneva: International Labor Office, 1969. 165 pages. No price indicated.

al-Sūdān fī al-Mu'tamarāt al-'Ālamīyah [Sudan in international conferences]. Kharṭūm: n.p., 1970. 138 pages. No price indicated. Speeches and resolutions by Sudanese delegates to international meetings.

The Suez Contractor. By N. Kipping. Havant, Hants, England: Kenneth Mason, 1969. 80 pages, 30s.

al-Sulālāt al-'Arabīyah al-Sūdānīyah fī al-Nīl al-Abyaḍ [Sudanese Arab tribes in the White Nile area]. By al-Tijānī 'Āmir. Kharṭūm: Dār al-Fikr, 1970. 150 pages. £S .25.

Ta'rīkh al-'Abdlāb [History of the 'Abdlāb tribe of the Sudan]. By Aḥmad 'Abd al-Raḥīm Naṣr. Kharṭūm: Jāmi'at al-Kharṭūm, 1969. £S. 80.

Ta'rīkh Dārfūr al-Siyāsī [Political history of Dārfūr (the Sudan) 1882-1898]. By Mūsā al-Ḥasan. Kharṭūm: Jāmi'at al-Kharṭūm, Qism al-Ta'līf wa al-Nashr, 1970. 256 pages. Maps. Bibl. No price indicated.

al-Turāth al-Sha'bī li-Qabīlat al-Musba'āt, Sharq Madīnat al-Fāshir [Folk heritage of the al-Musba'āt tribe, east of the city of al-Fāshir in the Sudan]. By Ādām al-Zayn. Kharṭūm: Jāmi'at al-Kharṭūm, 1970. £S .50.

Fertile Crescent and Cyprus

Ārā' wa Ḥulūl fī Ahamm al-Mashākil al-Iqtiṣādīyah al-Ijtimā'īyah li-Lubnān al-Mu'āṣirah [Views and reflections on the most important socio-economic problems in contemporary Lebanon]. By Salīm Kayrūz. Beirut: Manshūrāt al-Jāmi'ah al-Lubnānīyah, Qism al-Dirāsāt al-Iqtiṣādīyah, 1970. 136 pages. £E 1.20.

Area Handbook for Iraq. American Univ., Foreign Area Studies. Washington: USGPO, 1971. lvi + 361 pages. Bibl. Index. $3.25.

The Art of Cyprus. By Tony Spiteris. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971. 216 pages. Illus. £12.

Le commerce exterieur de la Syrie. Damas: l'Office arabe de presse et de documentation, 1971. $14 and $1 for air post. Available from P.O. Box 3,550, Damascus, Syria.

al-Ḥayāh al-Ijtimā'īyah wa al-Iqtiṣādīyah fī al-Kūfah fī al-Qarn al-Awwal al-Hijrī. [Social and economic life in Kūfa during the first century of the Hijrah]. By Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Zubaydī. Cairo: al-Maṭba'ah al-'Ālamīyah, 1970. 329 pages. No price indicated.

L'Industrie syrienne en 1969-1970. Damas: l'Office arabe de presse et de documentation, 1971. $11 and $1 for air post. Available from P.O. Box 3,550, Damascus, Syria.

Kitāb Akhbār al-A'yān fī Jabal Lubnān [The chronicle of notables of Mount Lebanon]. By Ṭannūs al-Shidyāq. Ed. by Fu'ād al-Bustānī. Beirut: Manshūrāt al-Jāmi'ah al-Lubnānīyah, Qism al-Dirāsāt al-Ta'rīkhīyah, 1970. 2 vols. 634 pages. £E 6.

Le Kurdistan Irakien Entité Nationale: Etude de la Révolution de 1961. By Ismet Cheriff Vanly. Neuchatel, Switzerland: Baconnière, 1970. 418 pages. SF 30.

The Syrian Baath Party and Israel, Documents from the Internal Party Publications. Ed. by Abraham Ben Tzur. Givat Haviva, Israel: Center for Arab and Afro-Asian Studies, 1968. 20 pages. I£ 2.50.

The Third Five-Year Plan of Economic and Social Development in the Syrian Arab Republic (1971/1975). Damascus: Office arabe de presse et de documentation, 1971. 300 pages. $13 and $1 for mailing costs. Order from the publishers, 67 Place Chahbandar, Damascus, Syria.

Israel

The Arab in Israel: Statistics and facts. Ed. by Yechiel Harari. Givat Haviva: Center for Arab and Afro-Asian Studies, 1970. 64 pages. I£ 3.50. Arab and Afro-Asian Monograph Series no. 7. Available from Givat Haviva, P.O. Menashe, Israel.

The Arabs and Jews in Israel: The reality, the dilemma, the promise. By Harry M. Rosen. Jerusalem: Israel Office, Foreign Affairs Dept., 1970. 114 pages. I£ 3.50.

Basic Principles of Israeli Education. By Yaskov Banay. Tel Aviv, 1970. I£ 5. (In Hebrew). Available from Israel Export Institute, Book and Printing Center.

The Battle on the Sea: The battles of the Israeli navy, 1947-1970. By Yehudah Harel. Tel Aviv, 1970. 200 pages. Illus. I£ 8.50. (In Hebrew). Available from Israel Export Institute, Book and Printing Center.

Ben Israel: The odyssey of the modern Jew. By A. Katz. Plainfield, N.J.: Logos International, 1970. 207 pages. $4.95.

Children and Families in Israel: Some mental health perspectives. Ed. by Arie Jarus *et al.* New York: Gordon and Breach, 1970. 634 pages. No price indicated.

The City in the Zionist Ideology. By Erik Cohen. Jerusalem: Hebrew Univ., Institute of Urban and Regional Studies, 1970. 62 pages. No price indicated.

Development Towns in Israel. By D. H. K. Amiran and A. Shachar. Jerusalem: Hebrew Univ., 1969. Tables. Maps. Charts. Bibl. No price indicated.

The Economic Conditions of the Arab Minority in Israel. By Shaul Zarhi and A. Achiezra. Givat Haviva, Israel: Center for Arab and Afro-Asian Studies, 1966. 24 pages. I£ 2.

Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel. 2 vols. Ed. by Ralphael Patai. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970. 1,300 pages. Illus. $39.50.

The German Path to Israel. Ed. by R. Vogel. London: Oswald Wolff, 1969. 325 pages. Index. 70s.

Greater Israel: A study in Zionist expansionist thought. By As'ad Razzūq. Beirut: PLO Research Center, 1970. 326 pages. No price indicated.

Hebron: A mountain city. By Yehuda Karmon. Tel Aviv, 1970. 146 pages. Illus. Maps. Bibl. I£ 8.80. (In Hebrew). Available from Israel Export Institute, Book and Printing Center.

Higher Education in Israel: A guide for overseas students. By Abraham S. Hyman. Jerusalem: Ministry of Immigrant Absorption, 1970. 168 pages. Illus. Map. I£ 5.

Israel: Eine politische Landeskunde. By H. Jandges. Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1970. 144 pages. DM 5.80. Zur Politik und Zeitgeschichte H. 39/40.

Israel Mission to Moscow. By Mordecai Namir. Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1971. No price indicated. Author served two years as Israeli diplomat in Russia.

Israel towards a New Society: Articles and essays. Ed. by Yehuda Gothelf. Tel Aviv: World Secretariat of the Labour Zionist Movement, 1969. 242 pages. I£ 3.50.

The Israeli Soldier: Profile of an army. By Samuel Rolbant. South Brunswick: Yoseloff, 1971. 353 pages. Illus. $8.95.

Israelis versus Israel. Prepared by the Arab League Office. London: Morssett. 20 pages. No price indicated. Available from Arab League Office, 1/11 Hay Hill, London W. 1, England. Reprint of a statement by the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights.

Issar Harel and Israel's Security Services. By Michel Bar-Zohar. Tel-Aviv, 1970. 266 pages. Illus. I£ 9.50. (In Hebrew). Available from Israel Export Institute, Book and Printing Center.

The Jews: Story of a People. By H. Fast. London: Cassell, 1970. 338 pages. Bibl. 63s.

Looking at Israel. By Jonathan Rutland. London: Adam and Charles Black and Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1970. Illus. $3.25.

The Minutes of the Zionist General Council: The Uganda Controversy. Ed. with introduction by Michael Heymann. Jerusalem: Institute for Zionist Research at Tel-Aviv, 1970. Bibl. I£ 18.

Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Israel. By Lucy Behrman. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1971. $7.25.

New Targets for Israel. By Arie L. Eliav. Tel Aviv·

E. Lewin-Epstein Publishers, 1971. 60 pages. No price indicated.

New Towns in Israel. By Aleksander Berler. Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1970. xxviii + 353 pages. Maps. I£ 30.

Public Opinion Survey on Israeli Security Problems. Tel Aviv, 1970. No price indicated. (In Hebrew). Available from Israel Export Institute, Book and Printing Center.

Religion and State in Israel. By Shulamit Allony. Tel Aviv, 1970. 146 pages. I£ 6.60. (In Hebrew). Available from Israel Export Institute, Book and Printing Center.

Science and Higher Education in Israel. By Antoine Zahlan. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1970. 153 pages. LL 15. or $3.75.

State of Israel at Present and Prophesy for the Future. By Yosef Harari. 1970. 231 pages. I£ 12. Available from Israel Export Institute, Book and Printing Center, Tel Aviv, Israel.

A Statistical Study on the Boycott of Israel. By Amer A. Sharif. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1970. 19 pages. LL 4. or $1.35.

Technology of Necessity: Scientific and Engineering Development in Israel. By Roy Popkin. New York: Praeger, 1971. xii + 180 pages. Index. $7.95.

Weapons and Equipment of the Israeli Armed Forces. By Riad Ashkar and Ahmed Khalidi. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1971. 86 pages. LL 7.50.

Whither Israel? A study of Zionist expansion. By Khalid Kishtainy. Beirut: PLO Research Center, 1970. 220 pages. Illus. No price indicated.

Maghrib

The Agadir Crisis. By Ima Christina Barlow. Hamden, Conn.: Shoe String Press, Archon Books, 1971. vi + 422 pages. $12. Reprint of the 1940 edition.

Droit administratif marocaine. By J. Garagnon and M. Rousset. Rabat: Editions La Porte, 1970. 436 pages. No price indicated.

Enigmes du Maroc. By Jean Mazel. Paris: R. Laffont, 1971. 266 pages. No price indicated.

L'Intégration des Juifs Nord-Africains en France. By Doris Bensimon-Donath. The Hague: Mouton, 1971. NF 48.

Morocco. By Betty Cavanna. New York: Watts, 1970. 72 pages. Illus. Map. $3.25. Juvenile literature.

La population rurale du Maroc. 2 vols. By Daniel Noin. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1970. Maps. Plates. NF 76.

Sociologie de l'Algérie. 3rd ed. By Pierre Bourdieu. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1970. 128 pages. Illus. NF 3.50.

Tunesien: Studienreiseführer mit Landeskunde. By Hans Strelocke. Stuttgart: Günther, 1970. 318 pages. Illus. Bibl. DM 30.

The United States and Morocco, 1776-1956. By Leulla J. Hall. Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1971. 1,114 pages. Map. Bibl. $25.

Palestine Problem

American Diplomacy in the Middle East: Russia and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. By Michael Krepon. Washington, D.C.: Student Advisory Committee on International Affairs, 1971. 14 pages. $1. No. 3 in series of Studies in American Foreign Policy. Available from Suite 414, 1211 Conn. Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Arab-Israeli Debate: Towards a socialist solution. New York: Times Change Press, 1971. $1.25. Available from 1923 Sixth Ave., New York, N.Y. 10018.

Attitudes toward Jewish Statehood in the Arab World. Ed. by Gil Carl AlRoy. New York: American Academic Assn. for Peace in the Middle East, 1971. 187 pages. $2.95. Available from 1261 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10001.

The Bi-National Idea in Palestine during the Mandatory Years. By Susan Lee Hattis. Haifa: Shikmona, 1970. 355 pages. I£ 18.

Les clefs de la guerre. By Pierre Rossi. Paris: J. Martineau, 1970. 155 pages. No price indicated.

A Handbook to the Palestine Question. By Ibrahim al-Abid. Beirut: PLO, Research Center, 1969. 198 pages. Palestine Books, no. 17. No price indicated.

In Times of War: Children Testify. Ed. by Mona Saudi. Beirut. 188 pages. Illus. $6 or 50s. Available from Mona Saudi, P.O. Box 1489, Beirut, Lebanon.

L'Italie et la Palestine: 1914-1920. By Sergio I. Minerbi. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1970. 297 pages. No price indicated.

Jerusalem in the Six Day War and Afterwards. By Uri Oren. Tel Aviv, 1971. 187 pages. Illus. I£ 11.50. (In Hebrew). Available from Israel Export Institute, Book and Printing Center.

Mey Meriva [Angry Waters: Controversy over the Jordan River]. By Y. Nimrod. Givat Haviva, Israel: Center for Arab and Afro-Asian Studies, 1966. 116 pages. I£ 5.25.

Miḥnat Filasṭīn [Mission in Palestine]. By Ṣāliḥ Sā'ib al-Jubūrī. Beirut: Maṭābi' Dār al-Kutub, 1970. 527 pages. Reflections by an Iraqi army officer.

Munāqashāt ḥawla al-Thawrah al-Filasṭīnīyah [Controversies about the Palestinian Revolution]. Ed. by Nājī 'Allūsh. Beirut: Dar al-Tali'ah, 1970. 391 pages. No price indicated. Contains articles and documents on the various Fidā'īn groups by their leaders.

Murāsil Ḥarbī fī al-Jabhah [On military activities since the June 1967 war]. By Muḥammad Jabr. Cairo: Dār al-Ta'āwun, 1971. 185 pages. Illus. Maps. £E .20.

The Origins and Development of the Palestine Problem, 1897-1948. By Walid Khalidi. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1971. 67 pages. No price indicated.

The Palestinian Refugees: A collection of United Nations documents. Beirut: Institute for Palestinian

Studies, 1970. vii + 641 pages. No price indicated.

al-Taḥrīr bayna al-Takhṭīṭ wa al-Irtijāl [Liberation between planning and extemporaneous speech]. By Muḥammad Hijāzī. Beirut: n.p., 1970. 256 pages. LL 3. Concerns Palestine.

Ta'rīkh Filasṭīn al-Ḥadīth [Modern history of Palestine]. By 'Abd al-Wahhāb al-Kayyālī. Beirut: al-Mu'assasah al-'Arabīyah lil-Dirāsāt wa al-Nashr, 1970. 472 pages. No price indicated. Covers 20th century until 1948.

The Transformation of Palestine: Essays on the origin and development of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Ed. by Ibrahim Abu-Lughod. Foreword by Arnold J. Toynbee. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1971. 544 pages. $15.

Turkey

Osmanische Polemik gegen die Safawiden im 16. Jahrhundert nach arabischen Handschriften. By Elke Eberhard. Freiburg: Schwarz, 1970. 257 pages. DM 24.

Travels to Russia, Tartary and Turkey. By Edward D. Clarke. New York: Arno, 1970. xxii + 612 pages. Map. $20.75. Reprint of the 1811 edition.

Medieval History

The Caliphs and their Non-Muslim Subjects: A critical study of the Covenant of 'Umar. By A. S. Tritton. London: Cass, 1970. 240 pages. Index. £4.20. New impression.

al-Ḥayāh al-Siyāsīyah fī al-'Irāq . . . [Political life in Iraq in the period of Mongol domination]. By Muḥammad Sāliḥ Dāwūd al-Qazzāz. al-Najaf: Matba'aṭ al-Qaḍā', 1970. 587 pages. ID 1.50.

The Heritage of the Islamic Empire. By Johei Shimada. Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1970. 422 pages. Illus. Bibl. Y 1,600. (In Japanese).

Historia Musulmana de Valencia y su region: novelades y rectivicaciones. 3 vols. By Ambrosio Huici Miranda. Valencia: Ayuntamiento de Valencia, 1969-1970. No price indicated.

History of the Jews in Egypt and Syria under the Rule of the Mamlūks. Vol. 3. By Ali Strauss-Ashtor. Tel Aviv, 1970. I£ 12. (In Hebrew). Available from Israel Export Institute, Book and Printing Center.

L'Islam dans sa première grandeur (VIII^e^-XI^e^ siècle). By Maurice Lombard. Paris: Flammarion, 1971. 245 pages. Illus. Maps. No price indicated.

al-Jaysh al-Miṣrī fī al-'Aṣr al-Islāmī [The Egyptian army in the Islamic period]. By 'Abd al-Raḥmān Zakī. Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, 1970. 270 pages. Illus. Maps. £E .56.

Kitāb al-Milall wa al-Niḥal by 'Abd al-Qāhir. Ibn Tāhir al-Baghdādī, d. 1037. Ed. by Albīr Naṣrī Nādir. Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1970. £E 1.40. (In Arabic).

Modern History and Politics

Die arabischen Staaten Vorderasiens. Hannover: Verlag fur Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, 1970. 144 pages. Bibl. No price indicated.

British Military Administration of Occupied territories in Africa during the Years 1941-47. By Francis J. R. Rennell. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1970. viii + 637 pages. Maps. Bibl. $21.25. Reprint of the 1948 edition.

Conflict Issues and International Civil Aviation Decisions: Three cases. By Young W. Kihl. Denver, Colo.: Social Science Foundation, Univ. of Denver, 1971. xi + 79 pages. Appen. Notes. No price indicated. Monograph Series in World Affairs Vol. 8, no. 1.

Decolonization: The administration and future of the colonies, 1919-1960. By Rudolf von Albertini. New York: Doubleday, 1971. Bibl. Index. $12.95.

The Emergence of the Modern Middle East: Selected Readings. Ed. by Robert G. Landen. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1970. xiii + 366 pages. Bibl. $5.75.

The Great Powers and the Near East, 1774-1923. Ed. by M. S. Anderson. London: Edward Arnold, 1970. x + 182 pages. £1.80 and £.90 in paper. Documents of modern history.

John Company's Last War: An account of the origins and conduct of the Anglo-Persian War of 1856 based on contemporary material. By Barbara English. London: Collins, 1971. 192 pages. Bibl. Illus. Maps. £2.10.

Khuṭab wa Bayānāt Qā'id al-Thawrah [Speeches and statements of the leader of the revolution]. By Ja'far al-Numayrī. Kharṭūm: al-Maṭba'ah al-Ḥukūmīyah, 1970. No price indicated. Covers May 25, 1969 to May 1, 1970.

Leadership of the American Zionist Organization. By Yonathan Shapiro. Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1971. $9.50.

Ligue des Etats Arabes. Damascus: Office Arabe de presse et de documentation, 1971. $15. Available from P.O. Box 3,550, Damascus, Syria.

Mellersta Ostern i svensk opinion, 1967-1970. Ed. by Claes-Adam Wachtmeister. Stockholm: Raben and Sjögren, 1970. 215 pages. No price indicated. Articles from the Swedish press and periodicals on the Middle East.

The Middle East and American Security Policy: Report to the US Senate Armed Services Committee. By Senator Robert Jackson. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1970. v + 23 pages. (No. 5270-0982) $.20.

Le Moyen-Orient: Stratégie, pétrole et monde arabe. Lausanne: Editions Rencontre, 1969. 32 pages. Illus. No price indicated.

Der Nahostkrieg in der westdeutschen Presse. By Kenneth M. Lewan. Köln: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1970. 180 pages. DM 9.80.

Nāṣir al-Nāṣirīyah wa al-Thawrah al-'Arabīyah [The victory of Nasirism and the Arab revolution]. By Muṭā' Ṣafadī. Beirut: Dār al-Awdah, 1970. 224 pages. No price indicated.

Nationalism in Asia and Africa. Ed. by Elie Kedourie. New York: World, 1970. viii + 573 pages. Bibl. $10.

Nationalismus in der Dritten Welt am arabischen Beispiel. By Bassam Tibi. Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1971. 290 pages. Notes. Bibl. Index. DM 18.

The Near East and Iran. By N. V. Pigulevskaya and M. N. Bogolyubov. Leningrad: Nauka, 1970. 256 pages. Illus. Rub 1.15. (In Russian).

The Ottman Background of the Modern Middle East. By Albert Hourani. London: Longmans, 1969. 20 pages. 9s. Carreras Arab Lecture 1969, Univ. of Essex; in English and Arabic.

Our Man in Damascus: The story of Elie Cohn, Israel's greatest spy. By Elie Ben-Hanan. London: Robert Hale, 1971. 192 pages. Illus. £1.70.

People and Politics in the Middle East. Ed. by Michael Curtis. New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1971. 317 pages. Index. $3.95.

Proche-Orient: la guerre de demain? By Pierre Lyautey. Paris: Julliard, 1971. 221 pages. No price indicated.

Self-Determination and History in the Third World. By David C. Gordon. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1971. 192 pages. Bibl. Index. $7.50.

Soldiers without Enemies: Preparing the United Nations for peacekeeping. By Larry L. Fabian. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1971. x + 260 pages. Appen. Notes. Index. $7.50.

The United States and Turkey and Iran. By Lewis V. Thomas and Richard N. Frye. Hamden, Conn.: The Shoe String Press, Archon Books, 1971. xii + 271 pages. Appen. Index. $9.25.

United States Foreign Policy, 1969-1970: A report of the Secretary of State. Washington: USGPO, 1971. xx + 346 pages. Annex. No price indicated. Several sections on the Middle East.

A World History. 2nd ed. By William H. McNeill. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1971. xviii + 531 pages. Bibl. Index. $15. Contains a few sections on the Middle East.

Economics and Sociology

The Agricultural Potential of the Middle East. By Marion Clawson, Hans H. Lansberg, and Lyle T. Alesander. New York: American Elsevier, 1971. xvii + 166 pages. Appen. Index. Map. No price indicated.

La Communauté et les pays méditerranéens. Brussels: Editions de l'Institut de Sociologie, 1971. No price indicated.

Indices of Agricultural Production in Africa and the Near East, 1961-1970. By US Dept. of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1971. 50 pages. No price indicated.

International Symposium on Drug Abuse. Jerusalem: Israel ad hoc Group for the Prevention of Drug Abuse, 1970. I£ 5.

Iqtiṣādīyāt al-Waṭan al-'Arabī. [The Economics of the Arab World]. By Gharīb al-Jammāl. Cairo: Ma'had al-Dirāsāt al-Islāmīyah, 1970. 609 pages. Bibl. £E 1.50.

al-Khidmah al-Madanīyah fī al-Duwal al-'Arabīyah [The civil service in Arab countries]. Vol. 1. By Ḥamdī 'Abd al-Hādī. Baghdad: Maṭba'at al-Ma'ārif, 1970. No price indicated.

Middle Eastern Oil and the Western World: Prospects and Problems. By Sam H. Schurr *et al.* New York: American Elsevier, 1971. 224 pages. Tables. Illus. $16.

Muqaddamāt fī Tārīkh al-'Arab al-Ijtimā'ī [Introduction to the Social History of the Arabs]. By Bulus Farah. Givat Haviva, Israel: Hadfus Hahadash Ltd., 1962. 246 pages. I£ 4.

Petrole Arabe. Damascus: Office Arabe de presse et de documentation, 1971. $17.50. Available from P.O. Box 3,550, Damascus, Syria.

Slavery and Muslim Society in Africa: The institution in Saharan and Sudanic Africa and Trans-Saharan trade. By Allan G. B. Fisher. Garden City: Doubleday, 1971. $6.95.

Religion and Philosophy

Avicenna's De Anima: Being the psychological part of Kitāb al-Shifā'. Ed. by F. Rahman. London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1971. £3.75.

The Book of Certainty. By Abu Bakr Siraj Ed-Din. New York: S. Weiser, 1970. 108 pages. $3. On Sufism.

The Future of Law in a Multicultural World. By Adda B. Bozeman. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1971. xvii + 193 pages. Bibl. Index. $6.50. One chapter on the Islamic Middle East.

Ghazali's Book of Counsel for Kings (Nasihat-al-Muluk). Trans. by F. R. C. Bagley and H. D. Isaacs and ed. by Jalal Huma'i. London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1971. Notes. Bibl. £3.75.

Griechische Philosophie bei den Arabern. Munchen: Heimeran Verlag, 1970. 89 pages. Bibl. No price indicated.

Ibn Kammuna's Examination of the Three Faiths: A thirteenth century essay in the comparative study of religion. Trans. with introduction by Moshe Perlmann. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. 176 pages. $7.50. Announced for Summer '71.

al-Ishtirākīyah al-'Arabīyah ka-Falsafah lil-Tarbīyah [Arab socialism as a philosophy of education]. By Muḥammad Ibrāhīm al-Shāfi'ī. Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahdah al-Miṣrīyah, 1971. 424 pages. £E 1.

Islam and its Cultural Divergence: Studies in honor of Gustave E. von Grunebaum. Ed. by Girdhari L. Tikku. Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1971. 218 pages. Bibl. Index. $8.50.

al-Islām, Ṭarīq al-Taḥrīr [Islam, the way to liberation]. By Muḥammad Ziyād. Beirut: Dār al-Shabībah al-Islāmīyah, 1970. 176 pages. No price indicated. Concerns Saudi Arabian policy on Palestine.

The Jewish Question: A Marxist interpretation. By Abram Leon. New York: Pathfinder Press, 1970. 270 pages. $2.75.

The Koran: Arabic text with a new translation. By Muhammed Zafrulla. New York: Praeger, 1971. $12.

The Mourides of Senegal: the political and economic organization of an Islamic brotherhood. By Donald B. C. O'Brien. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971. xxi + 321 pages. Plates. Illus. Maps. Index. £3.50.

Qabbalah: The philosophical writings of Solomon ben Yehudah ibn Gebirol (Avicebron) and their connection with the Hebrew Qabbalah and Sepher ha-Zohar. Ed. by Isaac Myer. New York: Ktav Publishing Co., 1970. xxiv + 499 pages. Illus. $15. Reprint of the 1888 edition.

The Religion Reformers in Islam. 6th ed. By Huseyin Hilmi Isik. Istanbul: n.p., 1970. 327 pages. TL 6.

Thinkers of the East: Studies in experimentalism. By Shah Idries. London: Cape, 1971. 198 pages. £2.10.

A Treatise on the Canon of Medicine of Avicenna. New York: A. Kelley, 1970. vii + 612 pages. Illus. $17.50. Reprint of the 1930 edition.

Linguistics, Literature and Arts

Abū al-Ṭayyib al-Lughawī wa Athāruhu fī al-Lughah [. . . and his influence on the language]. By ʻĀdil Aḥmad Zaydān. Baghdād: Maṭbaʻat al-ʻĀni, 1970. 213 pages. No price indicated.

An Anthology of Modern Arabic Verse. Ed. by M. M. Badawi. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1971. xl + 243 pages. $6.25. Introduction in English and text in Arabic.

Basic Gulf Arabic. By Hamdi A. Qafisheh. Beirut: Khayats, 1970. 312 pages. No price indicated.

The Blood of Adonis: Selected poems of Adonis (Ali Ahmed Said). Trans. by Samuel Hazo. Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1971. xx + 55 pages. $4.95 and $2.50 in paper. Pitt Paperback no. 64.

Critical Appreciation of the Persian Poetry of Ghalib, 1796?-1869. By Arifshah C. Gilani. Karachi: Medinah Publishing House, 1970. 429 pages. Illus. (In Urdu). Rs 18.

Endless Treasure: Unfamiliar tales from the Arabian Nights. By John Hampden. New York: World, 1970. 155 pages. $4.50. Reprint of the 1968 edition.

al-Firaq al-Islāmīyah fī al-Shiʻr al-Umawī [The Islamic sects in Umayyad poetry]. By al-Nuʻmān ʻAbd al-Mutaʻāl al-Qāḍī. Cairo: Dār al-Maʻārif, 1970. 755 pages. £E 1.30.

Folk Tales from Persia. By Alan S. Fienstein. South Brunswick: A. S. Barnes, 1971. 100 pages. Illus. $4.95.

Ghalib: A critical introduction. By Sayyid Fayyaz Mahmud. Lahore: University of the Punjab, 1969. iv + 518 pages. Bibl. No price indicated.

Iqbal: Poet-philosopher of Pakistan. Ed. by Hafeez Malik. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Studies in Oriental Culture, No. 7. 448 pages. $12.50. Announced for Summer '71.

Lexikalische Untersuchungen zur arabischen Übersetzung von Artemidors Traumbuch. By Elisabeth Schmitt. Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1970. 522 pages. DM 54.

Li-kull Ughnīyah qiṣṣah [On Arabic singing and singers]. By Aḥmad ʻAbd al-Majīd. Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, 1970. 283 pages. £E .60.

Maʻa al-ʻAqqād fī Ẓill al-ʻAqīdah al-Waṭanīyah. By Muḥammad Ṭāhir al-Jabalāwī. Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, 1971. 142 pages. £E .22. On the patriotism of ʻAbbās Maḥmūd al-ʻAqqād (1889-1964), Egyptian writer.

Masterpieces of Persian Art. By Arthur U. Pope. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1970. vi + 204 pages. Illus. $25. Reprint of the 1945 edition.

The Middle of the Fire. By Irwin R. Blacker. New York: Scribners, 1971. $8.95. Novel about Israelis fighting in Jerusalem.

Persian Poetry in Kashmir, 1339-1846. By G. L. Tikku. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1971. 300 pages. $8.

Poèmes palestiniens: Les fleurs du sang. By Mahmud Darwish. Trans. by Olivier Carré. Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1970. 133 pages. No price indicated.

La poésie populaire traditionnelle chantée au Proche-Orient arabe. Vol. I, Les Textes. By Simon Jargy. The Hague: Mouton, 1971. xx + 319 pages. Bibl. Gld 43.

Poetical Horoscope: or Odes of Hafiz. Ed. by Abbas Aryanpur. Tehran: F. Elmi Publication Institute, 196?. 146 pages. No price indicated.

Shāʻirīyat al-Ṣāfī [The poetry of al-Ṣāfī]. Ed. by Khidr ʻAbbās al-Ṣāliḥī. Baghdād: Maṭbaʻat al-Maʻārif, 1970. 288 pages. No price indicated. About Aḥmad al-Ṣāfī al-Najabī (b. 1894), an Iraqi poet.

Textbook of Syrian Semitic Inscriptions: Hebrew and Moabite inscriptions. Vol 1. By John C. L. Gibson. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1971. xi + 84 pages. Notes. Index. $9.75.

Thamanūn Ughnīyah Shaʻbīyah min Wādī al-Nīl [80 folk songs from the Nile valley]. Ed. by Bahījah Ṣidqī Rashīd. Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, 1971. 125 pages. £E .80.

Turkish-English Contrastive Analysis. By Hikmet

Sebüktekin. The Hague: Mouton, 1971. 108 pages. Bibl. Index. Gld 30.

Paperbacks

The Arab Hijack War: The true story of 25 days in September, 1970. By Peter Snow and David Phillips. New York: Ballantine, 1971. $.95.

A Geography of Pakistan. 2nd ed. By Kazi Said U. Ahmad. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1971. $2.50.

The Making of Israel's Army. By Yigal Allon. New York: Bantam, 1971. $1.25.

New Periodicals

British Journal of Political Science 1, no. 1 (Ja '71). Quarterly. Available from Cambridge University Press, 32 East 57th Street, New York, New York 10022.

Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts, University of Riyad. Vol. 1 (1970). Annual. Available from Faculty of Arts, University of Riyad, Riyad, Saudi Arabia.

Middle East International, no. 1 (Ap '71). Monthly. $12 a year. Available from 4 Vincent Square, Westminster, London, SW 1, England.

Nonaligned Third World Annual. Ed. by A. Carvely *et al.* St. Louis: Books Internat. of D.H.-T.E. Internat., Inc., 1970. $14 cloth, $8.50 paper. Order from the publishers at P.O. Box 14487, St. Louis, Missouri 63178.

Palestine Affairs (bimonthly in English). LL 25 or $15 per year. Available from P.O. Box 1691, Beirut, Lebanon.

Publications by **The Institute For Palestine Studies**

- **INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE, 1968. Edited by Zuhair Diab Beirut, 1971, 487 pages. US$17.00**
- **ZIONISM, ISRAEL AND ASIAN NATIONALISM By Godfrey Jansen Beirut, 1971, 336 pages. (HC) $5.50 (PB) $2.00**
- **FROM HAVEN TO CONQUEST: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem until 1948 Edited by Walid Khalidi Beirut, 1970, 938 pages. US$12.80**
- **WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT OF THE ISRAELI ARMED FORCES. By R. Ashqar and A. Khalidi Beirut, 1971, 86 pages. (HC) $4.35 (PB) $2.50**
- A STATISTICAL STUDY OF THE ARAB BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL. By Amer Sharif Beirut, 1970, 29 pages. US$1.35
- CHRISTIANS, ZIONISM AND PALESTINE A Selection of Articles and Statements on the Religious and Political Aspects of the Palestinian Problem. Beirut, 1970, 114 pages. $2.00
- BETWEEN ARAB AND ISRAELI By Lt. Gen. E. L. M. Burns Beirut, 1969, 336 pages. (HC) $8.75 (PB) $6.25
- NISI DOMINUS A Survey of the Palestine Controversy. By Neville Barbour Beirut, 1969, 248 pages. (HC) $6.25 (PB) $3.75
- THE LEGAL PROBLEM CONCERNING THE JURIDICAL STATUS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF THE ZIONIST ORGANIZATION/JEWISH AGENCY: A Study in International and U.S. Law. By W. T. Mallison Beirut, 1968, 76 pages. US$1.25
- THE ARABS IN ISRAEL (1948-1966) By Sabri Jiryis. Beirut, 1969, 80 pages. $2.95
- UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS ON PALESTINE 1947-1966. Edited by Sami Hadawi Beirut, 1967, 104 pages. US$3.75
- SCIENCE AND HIGHER EDUCATION IN ISRAEL. By Antoine Zahlan Beirut, 1970, 153 pages. (HC) $5.00 (PB) $3.75
- WHO KNOWS BETTER MUST SAY SO! By Rabbi Elmer Berger Beirut, 1970, 112 pages. (HC) $4.35 (PB) $2.35
- THE RESISTANCE OF THE WESTERN BANK OF JORDAN TO ISRAELI OCCUPATION 1967 Beirut, 1967, 104 pages. US$1.25
- THE ARAB-ISRAELI ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS, FEB.-JUL. 1949 Beirut, 1967, 40 pages. US$1.25

ORDER FROM: **INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES** (DISTRIBUTION)
Box 329A, R.D. No. 1, Oxford, Pa. 19363

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE

Prepared by the Staff of The Middle East Journal

With contributions from: Jay D. Fuller, Harry N. Howard, Kerim K. Key, A. Albert Kudsi-Zadeh, Jacob M. Landau, Gare LeCompte, Louis E. Leopold, David W. Littlefield, Christopher W. S. Ross, Peter T. Suzuki, Michael H. Van Dusen, Roxann A. Van Dusen.

Note: It is the aim of the Bibliography to present a selective listing of periodical material dealing with the Middle East since the rise of Islām. In order to avoid unwarranted duplication of bibliographies already dealing with certain aspects and portions of the area, the material included will cover North Africa and Muslim Spain, the Arab World, the State of Israel, Turkey, the Transcaucasian states of the Soviet Union, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkestan. An attempt is made to survey all periodicals of importance in these fields. The ancient Near East and Byzantium are excluded.

It would be appreciated if authors of articles appropriate to the Bibliography would send reprints or notices of such articles to: Bibliography Editor, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, 1761 N Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036.

The list of periodicals regularly reviewed will be published annually in the Autumn issue.

GEOGRAPHY

29933 "Encyclopedia of the Arab Maghrib." (In Arabic) *al-Lisān al-'Arabī* 7, no. 1 (Ja '70) 259-329.

29934 CHARBONNEAU, R. "Algerie, 1969." *Séances de l'Acad. des Sci. d'Outre-Mer* 29, no. 7 (1969) 360-77.

29935 COATALEN, P. "Réflexions sur la société Chleuh: région de Tafraouté." *Ann. Marocaines de Sociol.* (1969) 27-31.

29936 DETTMANN, K. "Type-variability of the towns in the Islamic-Oriental world." *Geog. Z.* (Ag '70) 95-123.

29937 DIWALD, H. "Bilanzen-Türkisches Tagebuch, I." *Monat* 23, no. 269 (F '71) 30-7.

29938 FRADY, M. "An American innocent in the Middle East." *Harper's* 241, no. 1445 (O '70) 55-81.

29939 FRADY, M. "In Israel." *Harper's* 242, no. 1448 (Ja '71) 65-81.

29940 GELLNER, E. "Système tribal et changement social en Afrique du nord." *Ann. Marocaines de Sociol.* (1969) 3-19.

29941 GOTTSCHALK, H. "Nordafrika unter der Muslimen." *Bustan* 11, no. 1 (1970) 3-9.

29942 AL-ḤĀZIMĪ, M. "The valley of Alāb: A preliminary report." (In Arabic) *B. Faculty of Arts, Univ. of Riyad* 1 (1970) 99-112.

29943 HAMORI, A. "An allegory from the 'Arabian nights': the city of brass." *BSOAS* 34, pt. 1 (1971) 9-19.

29944 KIZER, C. "Pakistan Journal." *Hudson Rev.* 24, no. 1 (1971) 67-93.

29945 MITCHELL, W. and E. GLOWATSKI. "Some aspects of the Gediz (Turkey) earthquake, (March 28, 1970)." *J. Geog.* 70, no. 4 (Ap '71) 224-9.

29946 AL-NUṢ, 'I. "Nature's temperament in the district of Najd." (In Arabic) *B. Faculty of Arts, Univ. of Riyad* 1 (1970) 9-37.

29947 RAMGE, S. "Kuwait: Cross and Crescent." *Worldmission* 22, no. 1 (1971) 29-33.

29948 AL-SA'ATI, N. "A journey to Spain, Toledo, Part II." *Islamic Rev. and Arab Aff.* 58, no. 10-11 (O-N '70) 22-5.

29949 SEAGER, G. "Five thousand miles by taxi in Anatolia." *RCAJ* 58, pt. 1 (F '71) 53-6.

29950 TOWNSEND, W. "Azerbaidzhan today." *New World Rev.* 38, no. 2 (1970) 65-71.

29951 VALLVÉ BERMEJO, J. "Fuentes latinas de los géografos arabes." *al-Andalus* 32, no. 2 (1967) 241-60.

29952 AL-WUHAYBĪ, A. "The boundaries of the Hijāz according to Arab geographers." (In Arabic) *B. Faculty of Arts, Univ. of Riyad* 1 (1970) 53-70.

29953 ZABBĀL, S. "'Umān." (In Arabic) *al-'Arabī* no. 148 (Mr '71) 69-98.

HISTORY

(Medieval)

29954 ARRIBAS PALAU, M. "Rescate de cautivos mūsulmanes en Malta por Muhammad ibn 'Utmān." *Hespéris Tamuda* 10, no. 3 (1969) 273-330.

29955 AL-BADALĪ, A. "'Alā' al-Dīn 'Aṭā Malak al-Juwaynī and his book of history called 'Jihān-qushā'" (In Arabic) *B. Faculty of Arts, Univ. of Riyad* 1 (1970) 125-40.

29956 CAHEN, C. "Note sur les origines de la communauté syrienne des Nuṣayris." *Rev. Etudes Islamiques* 38, no. 2 (1970) 243-9.

29957 DAVIDOVITCH, E. "Money economy and the partial restoration of trade in Central Asia following the Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century." (In Russian) *Narodi A. i Afr.* no. 6 (1970) 57-67.

29958 AL-DAYŪHJĪ, S. "Connections between the 'Abbāsids and the Bulgars." (In Arabic) *al-Aqlām* 6, no. 5 (F '70) 3-10.

29959 EUSTACHE, D. "Etudes de numismatique et de métrologie musulmanes (II)." *Hespéris Tamuda* 10, nos. 1-2 (1969) 95-190.

29960 FAWZĪ, F. "The re-evaluation of the 'Abbāsid period through the discovery of new texts." (In Arabic) *B. Faculty of Arts, Univ. of Riyad* 1 (1970) 79-98.

29961 GALDIERI, E. "Two building phases of the time of Shah 'Abbas I in the Maydān-i Shah of Isfahan: preliminary note." *East & West* 20, nos. 1-2 (Mr-Ju '70) 60-9.

29962 GÖKBILGIN, O. "L'éxpedition ottomane contre Astrakhan en 1569." *Cah. du Monde Russe et Soviétique* 11, no. 1 (Ja-Mr '70) 118-23.

29963 HAMIDULLAH, M. "The military department of the Muslim state in the time of the prophet Muhammad." *Islamic Rev. and Arab Aff.* 58, no. 9 (S '70) 10-2.

29964 HUDA, M. "Tārikh-i-Nāṣir Shāhī." *J. A. Soc. Pak.* 15, no. 2 (Ag '70) 151-66. A manuscript of the reign of Sultān Nāṣir-ud-Din 'Abdul Qādir of Mālwā (906-916 AH).

29965 HUSSAIN, M. "A brief survey of the sources for the Ṣaffārid dynasty of Sīstān." *J. A. Soc Pak.* 15, no. 2 (Ag '70) 139-50.

29966 IZEDDIN, M. "Notes sur les mariages princiers en Orient au Moyen Age." *J.A.* 157, nos. 1-2 (1969) 139-56.

29967 JABRI, S. "The development of prose in the 'Abbāsid period." (In Arabic) *Maj. Majma' al-Lughah al-'Arabīya fi Dimashq* 46, no. 1 (Ja '71) 3-20.

29968 JAHN, K. "Paper currency in Iran. A contribution to the cultural and economic history of Iran in the Mongol period." *J. A. Hist.* 4, no. 2 (1970) 101-35.

29969 KOLESNIKOV, A. "Iran at the beginning of the seventh century C.E." (In Russian) *Palestinskii Sbornik* 22 (85) (1970) 1-144.

29970 LESSARD, J-M. "Sijilmassa: la ville et ses relations commerciales au XI^e siècle d'après El Bekri." *Hesperis Tamuda* 10, nos. 1-2 (1969) 5-36.

29971 LEVEY, M. and S. SOURYAL. "Some fifteenth century Muslim scientists." *Studies in Islam* 7, no. 1 (Ja '70) 1-8.

29972 LIVINGSTON, J. "Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah: a fourteenth century defense against astrological divination and alchemical transmutation." *J. Amer. O. Soc.* 91, no. 1 (Ja-Mr '71) 96-103.

29973 MONROE, J. "The historical *Arjūza* of ibn 'Abd Rabbihi, a tenth century Hispano-Arabic epic poem." *J. Amer. O. Soc.* 91, no. 1 (Ja-Mr '71) 67-95.

29974 NĀMĪ, K. "Events in the Yemen during the 'Abbāsid period." (In Arabic) *Risālat al-Mu'allim* 14, no. 1 (O-N '70) 52-6.

29975 SEBAG, P. "Une relation inedité sur la prise de Tunis par les Turcs en 1574: Sopra la desoltiona della Goletta e forte di Tunisi de Bartholomeo Ruffino." *Cah. de Tunisie* 17, nos. 65-7 (1969) 2-250.

29976 WENDELL, C. "Baghdâd: *Imago Mundi*, and other foundation-lore." *Internat. J. Mid. East Stud.* 2, no. 2 (Ap '71) 99-128.

HISTORY AND POLITICS

(Modern)

29977 "Another Persia: a survey of Iran." *Economist* (O 31 '70) 42 pages. Several articles.

29978 "Die Auswirkungen der Türkenkriege auf den Handel des östlichen Mitteleuropa." *Scripta Mercaturae* no. 2 (1970) 67-72. Summary in English.

29979 "La Constituzione del Marocco (31 luglio 1970)." *O. Mod.* 50, nos. 7-8 (Jl-Ag '70) 399-404.

29980 "La Grande-Bretagne et le Moyen-Orient de 1968 à 1970." *Chronique polit. étrangère* 24, no. 1 (Ja '71) 75-86.

29981 "Important political statement by the National Front for the Liberation of 'Umān and the Arab Gulf." (In Arabic) *Dirāsāt 'Arabīyah* 6, no. 12 (O '70) 104-12.

29982 "Joint communique of visit of CPSU delegation to the UAR." *World Marxist Rev. Information B.* 9, no. 1 (185) (1971) 40-4.

29983 "The Middle East." *Global Dialogue* (Ap '71) 14-20.

29984 "The Middle East." *Overseas Rev.* 59 (F '71) 12-4.

29985 "Nasser and after: A symposium." *RCAJ* 58, pt. 1 (F '71) 12-23.

29986 "The Party's new 'heroes' promise new ideas and policies." *New Mid. East* no. 32 (My '71) 8-10. Mapai politics.

29987 "1^{er} novembre. La flamme inextinguible." *Révolution Afr.* 30 (O 5-N 5 '70) 20-51.

29988 "Recent developments in the Yemen Arab Republic." (In Arabic) *Dirāsāt 'Arabīyah* 6, no. 11 (S '70) 118-28.

29989 "La République arabe libyenne." *Notes & documentation* nos. 3740-3741 (N 27 '70) 52 pages.

29990 "Révolution arabe: il n'y a pas que la Palestine; Mascate et Salalah." *Jeune Afr.* no. 529 (F 23 '71) 19-27.

29991 "Vast plans for popular political organization in Libya." (In Arabic) *Dirāsāt 'Arabīyah* 6, no. 11 (S '70) 129-43.

29992 AGERON, C.-R. "La politique berbère du protectorat marocain, 1913-1934." *Rev. d'Hist. Mod. & Contemp.* 18 (Ja-Mr '71) 50-90.

29993 AHMAD, E. "Revolutionary war and counter-insurgency." *J. Internat. Aff.* 25, no. 1 (1971) 1-47.

29994 ALI, T. "Revolutionary perspectives for Pakistan." *New Left Rev.* no. 63 (S-O '70) 43-55.

29995 ALLAIN, J.-C. "Les débuts du conflit italo-turc: octobre 1911-janvier 1912 (d'après les Archives françaises)." *Rev. d'Hist. Mod. & Contemp.* 18 (Ja-Mr '71) 106-15.

29996 ARIAN, A. "Stability and change in Israeli public opinion and politics." *Public Opinion Quart.* 35, no. 1 (1971) 19-35.

29997 BAECHLER, J. "Revolutionary and counter-revolutionary war: some political and strategic lessons from the first Indochina war and Algeria." *J. Internat. Aff.* 25, no. 1 (1971) 70-90.

29998 BAKER, D. "The *Millet* system: states within a state, II." *Christian News from Israel* 21, no. 3 (1970) 20-3.

29999 BAXTER, C. "Pakistan votes—1970." *A. Survey* 11, no. 3 (Mr '71) 197-218.

30000 BENUMEYA, R. "Una época clave del cercano Oriente, antes y después de Gamal Abdel Nasser." *Rev. Polit. Internac.* no. 112 (N-D '70) 41-56.

30001 BLAGOJEVIC, M. "Turkish political crossroads." *Rev. Internat. Aff.* 22, no. 501 (F 20 '71) 10-2.

30002 BORELLA, F. "Les biens d'Etat en Algérie (en dehors du domaine public et privé)." *Rev. Jur. et Polit.* 25, no. 1 (Ja-Mr '71) 15-26.

30003 BOURNOUF, D. "La situation en Turquie." *Polit. Etrangère* 36, no. 1 (1971) 53-68.

30004 BROWN, N. "Soviet naval expansion—the global scene assessed." *New Mid. East* no. 30 (Mr '71) 17-21.

30005 BUDRAJ, V. "The evolution of Russia's Pakistan policy." *Australian J. Polit. & Hist.* 16, no. 3 (D '70) 343-60.

30006 CAILLÉ, J. "Sur les rapports du Maroc avec le Saint-Siège." *Hespéris Tamuda* 10, nos. 1-2 (1969) 71-94.

30007 ÇADIRCI, M. "A study of the founding of the organization of Muhtars." (In Turkish) *Belleten* 35, no. 135 (Jl '70) 409-20.

30008 CALOSSO, C. "I due vatti della moderna Turchia." *L'Universo,* 49, no. 3 (My-Ju '69) 455-76.

30009 CAMPBELL, J. "The Soviet Union and the Middle East, I." *Russian Rev.* 29, no. 2 (Ap '70) 143-53.

30010 CARVELY, A. "Libya—Act II." *Nonaligned Third World Ann.* (1970) 111-36.

30011 COHEN, A. "The army in Palestine in the eighteenth century—source of its weakness and strength." *BSOAS* 34, pt. 1 (1971) 36-55.

30012 COHEN, S. "La Turquie et l'Alliance atlantique." *Europe Sud-Est* no. 83 (D '70) 14-6.

30013 COTTRELL, A. "Conflict in the Persian Gulf." *Military Rev.* 51, no. 2 (F '71) 33-41.

30014 COTTRELL, A. "The Soviet Union as a major power in the Middle East: a review of recent literature." *World Aff.* 133, no. 4 (Mr '71) 315-20.

30015 COTTRELL, A. "The Soviet Union in the Middle East." *Orbis* 14, no. 3 (1970) 588-98.

30016 CRAWSHAW, N. "Subversion in Cyprus." *World Today* 27, no. 1 (Ja '71) 25-32.

30017 DE CARDI, B. "Trucial Oman in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries." *Antiquity* 44, no. 176 (D '70) 288-95.

30018 DESSOUKI, A. "The mass political culture of Egypt." *Muslim World* 61, no. 1 (Ja '71) 13-20.

30019 DRAMBYANTZ, G. "The Persian Gulf: Twixt the past and the future." *Internat. Aff.* (Moscow) no. 10 (O '70) 66-72.

30020 DRUKS, H. "The Soviet role in the Middle East." *Eastern Europe* 20, no. 2 (F '71) 19-27.

30021 FAROQHI, S. "Der Aufstand des Yahya ibn Yahya as-Suwaydi." *Der Islam* 47 (Ja '71) 67-92.

30022 FAYEIN, C. "Révolution arabe: il n'y a pas que la Palestine; Dhofar." *Jeune Afr.* no. 530 (Mr 2 '71) 15-7.

30023 FIDEL, K. "Military organization and conspiracy in Turkey." *Stud. in Comp. Internat. Devel.* 6, no. 2 (1970-71). Entire issue.

30024 FRADY, M. "Ägypten—Dekadenz und Revolution." *Monat* 23, no. 270 (Mr '71) 16-24.

30025 GINIEWSKI, P. "La politique européene et américaine d'Israël." *Polit. Etrangère* 36, no. 1 (1971) 69-80.

30026 GÖKBILGIN, O. and D. DESAIVE. "Le Khanat de Crimée et les campagnes militaires de l'Empire Ottoman—fin du XVII^{e}-début du XVIII^{e} siècle, 1687-1736." *Cah. du Monde Russe et Soviétique* 11, no. 1 (Ja-Mr '70) 110-7.

30027 HADDAD, W. "Essai de réforme administrative dans in pays du Tiers-Monde—L'Institut national d'administration et de développement au Liban; Pour une réforme de la réforme." *Rev. Jur. et Polit.* 25, no. 1 (Ja-Mr '71) 77-96.

30028 HALEVI, N. "Israele e la Comunità Mediteranea." *Lo Spettatore Internaz.* supp. no. 4 (Jl-Ag '70) 111-36.

30029 HALLIDAY, F. "Toward a Red Pakistan." *New Left Rev.* no. 65 (Ja-F '71) 94-6.

30030 HAQUE, M. "Election and politicians." *Concept of Pak.* 7, no. 4 (N '70) 17-23.

30031 HART, P. "Middle East perspective." *Foreign Service J.* 48, no. 4 (Ap '71) 4-14ff.

30032 HAYDAR, A. "The political dilemma in Pakistan." *Pak. Student* 17, no. 2 (Ja '71) 6-8.

30033 HEGGOY, A. "Colonial origins of the Algerian-Moroccan border conflict of October 1963." *Afr. Stud. Rev.* 13 (Ap '70) 17-22.

30034 HÖPP, G. "Einige Aspekte des ideologischen Kampfes in der gegenwärtigen Etappe der arabischen Befreiungsrevolution." *Orientforschung* 16, no. 2 (1970) 214-50.

30035 HOTTINGER, A. "Gli stati arabi del bacino orientale." *Lo Spettatore Internaz.* supp. no. 4 (Jl-Ag '70) 35-46.

30036 ḤUSAYN, M. "Stages of development of the Nāṣir régime 1952-1968." (In Arabic) *Dirāsāt 'Arabīyah* 6, no. 11 (S '70) 2-33.

30037 ISLAM, M. "Pakistan since independence." *Perspective* 4, no. 6 (D '70) 39-48.

30038 JAHAN, R. "Ten years of Ayub Khan and the problem of national integration." *J. Comp. Admin.* 2, no. 3 (N '70) 277-98.

30039 JEANTET, C. "De Gaulle et l'insecurité en Mediterrannée." *Ecrits de Paris* (Ja '71) 5-13.

30040 KARIM, A. "'Anti-Duehring,' its relevance to ideological struggle in Arab countries." *World Marxist Rev.* 9 (S '70) 80-2.

30041 KENT, G. "Foreign policy analysis: Middle East." *Papers of the Peace Res. Soc.* 14 (1970) 95-112.

30042 KLING-HOFFER, H. "Staatliche Wahlkampffinaszierung der Parteie in Israel." *Z. ausländ. öffentlich Recht Völkerrecht* (S' 70) 505-27.

30043 KOLLEK, T. "Les prochaines années à Jérusalem." *Preuves* no. 6 (1971) 80-9.

30044 LAQUEUR, W. "Israel und die neue Linke: Manifestation einer Schizophrenie." *Monat* 23, no. 269 (F '71) 49-59.

30045 LIMINANA, J-P. "La constitution marocaine du 31 juillet 1970." *Rev. Jur et Polit.* 25, no. 1 (Ja-Mr '71) 97-140.

30046 LOURIDO, R. "Transformación de la pirateris marroqui en guerra del corso por el sultán Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allah (entre 1757 y 1768)." *Hespéris Tamuda* 10, nos. 1-2 (1969) 39-70.

30047 MANIRUZZAMAN, T. "'Crises in political development' and the collapse of the Ayub regime in Pakistan." *J. Devel. Areas* 5, no. 2 (Ja '71) 221-38.

30048 MARCHAT, H. "La question d'Ifni." *Séances de l'Acad. des Sci. d'Outre-Mer* 29, no. 9 (1969) 425-41.

30049 MARINI, M. "Turquie: la croisée des chemins." *Europe Sud-Est* no. 84 (D '70) 3-6.

30050 MARR, P. "The Iraqi revolution: a case study of army rule." *Orbis* 14, no. 3 (1970) 714-9.

30051 MAYHEW, C. "The Middle East after the death of Nasser." *Commonwealth J.* 15, no. 1 (F '71) 13-5.

30052 MEDZINI, R. "China and the Palestinians—a developing relationship?" *New Mid. East* no. 32 (My '71) 34-7.

30053 MILLER, M. "Israel's quest for military self-sufficiency." *Military Rev.* 51, no. 2 (F '71) 67-73.

30054 MORGANTHAU, H. "The tragedy of Armenia: Greatest horror in history." *Armenian Rev.* 24, no. 1-93 (1971) 35-41.

30055 AL-MUJAHID, S. "Pakistan: the first general election." *A. Survey* 11, no. 2 (F '71) 159-71.

30056 OBERLING, P. "British tribal policy in southern Persia 1906-1911." *J. A. Hist.* 4, no. 1 (1970) 50-79.

30057 PARKER, R. "Catherine the Great's oriental project." *Foreign Service J.* 47, no. 12 (D '70) 42-4ff.

30058 PAUTARD, A. "Algérie: après la nationalisation du pétrole." *Rev. fr. d'études polit. afr.* no. 63 (Mr '71) 3-6.

30059 PAUTARD, A. "Dix ans de relations franco-maghrébines." *Rev. fr. d'études polit. afr.* no. 63 (Mr '71) 36-54.

30060 RAYNER, J. "The state of Israel; a progressive Jewish view." *A.J.A. Quart.* 15, no. 4 (Ap '71) 8-19ff.

30061 RONDOT, P. "Le destin du monde arabe." *Etudes* (Paris) (O '70) 344-59.

30062 RONDOT, P. "Nationalisme économique et affaires arabes, thèmes principaux de la vie politique." *Rev. fr. d'études polit. afr.* no. 58 (O '70) 15-21.

30063 RONDOT, P. "Soudan: aprés la rupture avec les communistes." *Rev. fr. d'études polit afr.* no. 63 (Mr '71) 10-5.

30064 ROSENBAUM, N. "Success in foreign policy: the British in Cyprus 1878-1960." *Canadian J. Polit. Sci.* 3, no. 4 (D '70) 605-27.

30065 SELZER, M. "Nation building and state building: the Israeli example." *Phylon* 32, no. 1 (1971) 4-22.

30066 AL-SHA'AFĪ, M. "Saudi-Omani relations, 1800-1818." (In Arabic) *B. Faculty of Arts, Univ. of Riyad* 1 (1970) 206-30.

30067 SHELDON, J. "Where Arabs murder Africans—the unreported genocidal war in the southern Sudan." *Amer. Zionist* 61, no. 7 (Mr '71) 9-12.

30068 SICK, G. "The U.S.S.R. and the Suez Canal closure." *Mizan* 12, no. 2 (N '70) 91-9.

30069 SIDDIQUI, M. "Third largest democracy takes shape." *Perspective* 4, no. 6 (D '70) 19-24. Pakistan.

30070 SMITH, H. "Where Egypt stands." *The Atlantic* 227, no. 1 (Ja '71) 39-45.

30071 SONYEL, S. "The secret Anglo-Ottoman treaty of 1919 in the light of British Foreign Office Documents." (In Turkish and English) *Belleten* 35, no. 135 (Jl '70) 451-62.

30072 SPAGNOLO, J. "Mount Lebanon, France and Dâûd Pasha." *Internat. J. Mid. East Stud.* 2, no. 2 (Ap '71) 129-47.

30073 STEVENS, G. "What Nasser did." *The Atlantic* 227, no. 1 (Ja '71) 45-7.

30074 STEVENS, R. "Making common cause: Israel and South Africa." *Mid. East Newsletter* 5, no. 3 (Ap-My '71) 11-4.

30075 AL-ṢŪFĪ, A. "The trial of Arab nationalism." (In Arabic) *al-Lisān al-'Arabī* 7, no. 1 (Ja '70) 136-40.

30076 TURTON, E. "Kirk and the Egyptian invasion of East Africa in 1875: a reassessment." *J. Afr. Hist.* 8, no. 3 (1970) 355-70.

30077 VANCE, V. "Le nouveau dossier du proche-orient." *Nonaligned Third World Ann.* (1970) 159-68.

30078 VASHITZ, Y. "The role of the *Fallāḥūn* in the Egyptian national movement, 1881-1952." (In Hebrew) *Hamizrah Hehadash* 21, no. 1 (1971) 1-16.

30079 VERDERY, R. "The publications of the Būlāq press under Muḥammad 'Ali of Egypt." *J. Amer. O. Soc.* 91, no. 1 (Ja-Mr '71) 129-31.

30080 VARANDIAN, M. "A history of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, IV." *Armenian Rev.* 24, no. 1-93 (1971) 63-73.

30081 VLAHOV, G. "Pakistan after elections." *Rev. Internat. Aff.* 22, no. 499 (Ja 20 '71) 11-3.

30082 VINOGRADOV, A. and J. WATERBURY. "Situations of contested legitimacy in Morocco: an alternative framework." *Comp. Stud. in Soc. and Hist.* 13, no. 1 (Ja '71) 32-59.

30083 WATT, D. "The Arabs, the Heath government and the future of the gulf." *New Mid. East* no. 30 (Mr '71) 25-7.

30084 WHEELER, G. "What goes on in Soviet Asia." *RCAJ* 58, pt. 1 (F '71) 46-52.

30085 YODFAT, A. "The attitude of the Soviet Union to the Kurdish question in Iraq." (In Hebrew) *Hamizrah Hehadash* 21, no. 1 (1971) 23-9.

30086 YODFAT, A. "The People's Republic of South Yemen—its instability and changes." *New Outlook* 14, no. 2 (Mr '71) 43-8.

30087 YODFAT, A. "The USSR and Arab Communist parties—a chilling account of great power penetration." *New Mid. East* no. 32 (My '71) 29-33.

Arab-Israeli Conflict

30088 "Can Arab and Jew live together in Palestine?" *Mid. East Internat.* no. 2 (My '71) 23-5. A dialogue with Nabil Shaath, Uri Avnery and David Hirst.

30089 "The dilemma of the Palestinian Arabs and the Rogers Plan." (In Arabic) *Dirāsāt 'Arabīyah* 6, no. 12 (O '70) 2-14.

30090 "U.S. policy defined: the Rogers' press conference (March 16, 1971)" *New Mid. East* no. 31 (Ap '71) 48-9.

30091 BELYAEV, I. "Who is obstructing a Middle East settlement." *Internat. Aff.* (Moscow) no. 11 (N '70) 86-90.

30092 BEN YAHMED, B. "L'Evénement Moyen Orient: l'enfant dans la couveuse." *Jeune Afr.* no. 506 (S 15 '70) 22-4.

30093 BEVIS, R. "Making the desert bloom: an historical picture of pre-Zionist Palestine." *Mid. East Newsletter* 5, no. 2 (F-Mr '71) 2-7.

30094 BOLLINGER, K. and H. WESTPHAL. "War and peace in the Middle East." *German Foreign Policy* 9, no. 6 (1970) 465-74.

30095 BOONE, N. "An American opinion of the Arab-Israeli conflict (essay)." *Nonaligned Third World Ann.* (1970) 207-10.

30096 CARCANO, G. "I nemici di Israele." *Bibl. della Libertà* (Jl-Ag '70) 29-53.

30097 CATTAN, H. "The UN General Assembly must redress its wrongs." *Mid. East Internat.* no. 2 (My '71) 41-3.

30098 CHAPRA, M. "Israel beyond cease-fire." *Military Rev.* 51, no. 2 (F '71) 12-9.

30099 CLEVELAND, R. "Palestine is their home: the predicament of the refugees from Israel." *Nonaligned Third World Ann.* (1970) 169-80.

30100 DAUPHIN-MEUNIER, A. "Arabes et Juifs en Palestine." *Ecrits de Paris* (Mr '71) 42-53.

30101 DAVIS, J. "Why and how the Palestinians fled from Palestine." *Mid. East Internat.* no. 2 (My '71) 35-7.

30102 DEVILLERS, P. "Une idée pour la paix au Proche-Orient; d'abord reconnaître la Palestine." *Jeune Afr.* no. 528 (F 16 '71) 18-21.

30103 DMITRIYEV, E. "Middle East settlement." *Internat. Aff.* (Moscow) no. 12 (D '70) 59-63.

30104 DMITRIEV, Y. "The Arab world and Israel's aggression." *Internat. Aff.* (Moscow) no. 9 (S '70) 20-4.

30105 EDITORS. "Notes on Israel." *Nonaligned Third World Ann.* (1970) 192-206.

30106 EDITORS. "Notes on refugees." *Nonaligned Third World Ann.* (1970) 181-9.

30107 FELLOWES, P. "Can peace be guaranteed? The ultimate enigma." *New Mid. East* no. 30 (Mr '71) 11-3.

30108 FLAPAN, S. "The Egyptian peace offensive." *New Outlook* 14, no. 2 (Mr '71) 3-9.

30109 FORSYTHE, D. "UNRWA, the Palestine refugees, and world politics." *Internat. Org.* 25, no. 1 (1971) 26-45.

30110 FRANCOS, A. "Palestine: la résistance à bout de souffle?" *Jeune Afr.* no. 525 (Ja 26 '71) 42-5.

30111 FRANCOS, A. "Résistance Palestine dans la résistance." *Jeune Afr.* no. 532 (Mr 16 '71) 39-43.

30112 GASPARD, J. "The Arab fear that still lies beneath the surface. . ." *New Mid. East* no. 32 (My '71) 5-7.

30113 GSTREIN, H. "Die arabischen Staaten und Israel." *Areopag* 5, no. 3 (1970) 171-5.

30114 HURNI, F. "The Middle East poker game." *Swiss Rev. World Aff.* 21, no. 1 (Ap '71) 4-8.

30115 JAKOBOVITS, I. "The Middle East from the Jewish point of view." *A.J.A. Quart.* 15, no. 4 (Ap '71) 2-7.

30116 JONES, D. "Reprisal: Israeli style." *Military Rev.* 50, no. 8 (Ag '70) 91-6.

30117 KANOWITZ, K. "Back to Jarring." *New Outlook* 14, no. 1 (Ja '71) 37-42.

30118 KHALIDI, W. "1948—the final moment." *Mid. East Internat.* no. 2 (My '71) 38-40.

30119 KIMCHE, J. "Whose blunder?" *New Mid. East* no. 31 (Ap '71) 4-7. Peace plans for the Middle East.

30120 KITTRIE, N. "In place of big sticks . . . an experience in pursuit of justice in Jerusalem." *New Mid. East* no. 31 (Ap '71) 14-20.

30121 LANDA, R. "The Palestinian Fidais." (In Russian) *A. i Afr. Segodnya* no. 3 (Mr '71) 47-9.

30122 LANG, N. "L'U.R.S.S., la mission Jarring et l'Egypte." *Est & Ouest* 23, no. 462 (F 16-18 '71) 6-9.

30123 LAPTEV, V. and V. ALEXEYEV. "The Middle East: Time for decision." *Internat. Aff.* (Moscow) no. 3 (Mr '71) 42-8.

30124 LAQUEUR, W. "New York and Jerusalem." *Commentary* 51, no. 2 (F '71) 38-46.

30125 LAVERGNE, B. "Le problème d'Israël et l'iniquité des grandes puissances." *L'année polit. & écon.* 43, no. 218 (D '70) 388-406.

30126 LITTLE, S. "Fedayeen: Palestinian commandos." *Military Rev.* 50, no. 11 (N '70) 49-55.

30127 MANIN, P. "Les efforts de l'organisation des Nations-Unies et des grandes puissance en vue d'un règlement de la crise au Moyen Orient." *Annu. fr. de Droit internat.* 15 (1969) 114-82.

30128 MANSOUR, A. and E. STOCK. "Arab Jerusalem and annexation." *New Outlook* 14, no. 1 (Ja '71) 22-36.

30129 AL-MAQDISĪ, A. "The Palestinian question and the Christian west." (In Arabic) *al-Ma'rifah* no. 110 (Ap '71) 3-20.

30130 MARLOWE, J. "Egypt and Israel: what are the real prospects for disengagement?" *New Mid. East* no. 32 (My '71) 17-9.

30131 MEDVEDKO, L. "Zionism and Israel." *Internat. Aff.* (Moscow) no. 1 (Ja '71) 60-5.

30132 MERHAV, P. "Bi-nationalism then and now." *New Outlook* 14, no. 2 (Mr '71) 55-9.

30133 MURPHY, J. "Neutralization of Israel." *Amer. J. Internat. Law* 65, no. 1 (Ja '71) 167-72.

30134 NASCHITZ, F. "Israëlisch-arabische Kulturbeziehungen." *Areopag* 5, no. 3 (1970) 176-9.

30135 NEHER-BERNHEIM, R. "Frontières du Sinai—un siècle de diplomatique au Moyen-Orient, 1940-1948." *Polit. Etrangère* 36, no. 2 (1971) 147-64.

30136 NIXON, R. "U.S. Foreign policy for the 1970s: building for peace; A report to Congress." *Dept. of State B.* 64, no. 1656 (Mr 22 '71) 389-94 on the Middle East.

30137 AL-QAṢṢĀB, N. "A geopolitical conception of the Palestine problem." (In Arabic) *B. Faculty of Arts, Univ. of Riyad* 1 (1970) 175-93.

30138 RADOVANOVIC, L. "The question of Palestine." *Rev. Internat. Aff.* 22, no. 502 (Mr 5 '71) 13-6.

30139 REISEL, M. "Het zionisme, bestaansreden van een politieke beweging." *Internat. Spectator* 25, no. 4 (F 22 '71) 426-35.

30140 SAFRAN, N. "The Middle East: the fleeting opportunity." *Nation* 212, no. 14 (Ap 5 '71) 425-8.

30141 SALPETER, E. "Shadowboxing on the brink." *Amer. Zionist* 61, no. 7 (Mr '71) 13-6.

30142 SHAFEI, H. "Fighting readiness and Arab countries." *Rev. Internat. Aff.* 22, no. 498 (Ja 5 '71) 8-9.

30143 SHERMAN, A. "The Palestinians: a case of mistaken national identity?" *World Today* 27, no. 3 (Mr '71) 104-14.

30144 SIMPSON, W. "The Christian point of view on problems of the Middle East." *A.J.A. Quart.* 15, no. 4 (Ap '71) 24-7.

30145 STONE, J. "Peace and the Palestinians." *New York Univ. J. Internat. Law & Polit.* 3, no. 2 (1970) 247-62.

30146 STOROSUM, C. "Israel und Ägypten. Eine Chronik in Briefen." *Areopag* 5, no. 3 (1970) 167-70.

30147 STRUYE, P. "Hoe de weg opgaan naar vrede in het Nabije Oosten?" *Internat. Spectator* 25, no. 4 (F 22 '71) 377-87.

30148 TONBI, G. "The Middle East: dangers and prospects." *World Marxist Rev.* 11 (N '70) 69-73.

30149 UTLEY, F. "God save Israel (and us) from her friends." *Religion & Soc.* 4, no. 1 (F '71) 2-12.

30150 UVALIC, R. "Yugoslavia supports the position of the UAR." *Rev. Internat. Aff.* 22, no. 500 (F 5 '71) 5-7.

30151 WINSTON, H. "Black Americans and the Middle East conflict." *World Marxist Rev.* 11 (N '70) 18-24.

30152 YEDLIN, R., trans. "The Manifesto of the

Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine." (In Hebrew) *Hamizrah Hehadash* 21, no. 1 (1971) 30-7.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

30153 "L'agriculture dans la sous-région de l'Afrique du Nord." *B. Econ. Afr.* (D '69) 67-108.

30154 "Animal production in the U.A.R." *Central Bank of Egypt, Econ. Rev.* 9, nos. 3-4 (1969) 159-70.

30155 "Cotton market review." *Central Bank of Egypt, Econ. Rev.* 9, nos. 3-4 (1969) 194-201.

30156 "Employment and production in very small industries." *Central Bank of Egypt, Econ. Rev.* 9, nos. 3-4 (1969) 146-8.

30157 "France's Algerian dilemma." *Petroleum Press Service* 38, no. 3 (Mr '71) 85-8.

30158 "Libyan participation in the petroleum industry." *Bank of Libya, Econ. B.* 9, no. 6 (1969) 212-7.

30159 "Libya's trade with countries with whom she has trade agreements." *Bank of Libya, Econ. B.* 9, no. 6 (1969) 218-35.

30160 "Pakistan's new plan." *National and Grindlay's Rev.* 16, no. 4 (N '70) 5-9.

30161 "Les ressources naturelles et la mise en valeur actuelle de la plaine du Haouz." *Rev. géog. Maroc* 17 (1970) 3-42.

30162 "The share of agriculture, industry and services in the domestic product of some selected countries, 1958-1968." (In Dutch) *Maandschrift* 65 (N '70) 1232-48. Pakistan and Turkey included.

30163 "A study of the rural economic problems of Sistān and Baluchestān." *Tahqiqāt-e Eqtesādi* 7, nos. 19-20 (1970) 140-211.

30164 "Survey of construction activities in the private sector in urban areas of Iran: Review [of] 1348 AH." *Bank Markazi Iran* 9, no. 49 (My-Ju '70) 23ff.

30165 "Technical education and training in the Arabian Gulf states." *Labor Develop. Abroad* 16, no. 3 (Mr '71) 1-8.

30166 "Trade and payment agreement between Iran and Poland." *Bank Markazi Iran* 9, no. 49 (My-Ju '70) 15-23.

30167 "La transformation socialiste dans le secteur financier." *Syrie et Monde arabe* (Ju '70) 26-41.

30168 ABDO, A. "Domestic passenger air transport in Saudi Arabia." *B. Faculty of Arts, Univ. of Riyad* 1 (1970) 21-40.

30169 AHMED, I. and J. TIMMONS. "Current land reforms in East Pakistan." *Land Econ.* 47, no. 1 (F '71) 55-64.

30170 ALI, M. "United States economic aid programmes in Pakistan: 1952-62." *Pak. Econ. J.* 20, no. 2 (1969-70) 1-38.

30171 AWAD, H. "Les grands périmètres irrigués de type moderne et leur incidence sur les modes de vie traditionnels. Deux grandes réalisations: La Gézira au Soudan et la Tadla au Maroc." *Rev. Geog. Maroc* no. 15 81-91.

30172 AXELBANK, A. and K. NAKAMURA. "Japan and the Middle East—a trading paradox." *Mid. East Internat.* no. 2 (My '71) 16-8.

30173 BAKALOWICZ, M. and P. OLIVE. "Teneurs en tritium des eaux du Karst du Taurus occidental et de Pisidie." *Rev. Suisse d'Hydrologie* 32, no. 2 (1970) 475-80.

30174 BĀLĪ, T. "The Arab Common Market." (In Arabic) *al-Ma'rifah* no. 109 (Mr '71) 17-42.

30175 BELHASSEN, S. "Tunisie: les marchands de tapis." *Jeune Afr.* 524 (Ja 19 '71) 49-51.

30176 BERKOVICH, Y. *et al.* "Investment and induced employment in the development and coastal districts, 1963-67." *Bank of Israel, Econ. Rev.* no. 36 (D '70) 3-27.

30177 BOUINOT, J. "L'évolution de la comptabilité nationale tunisienne." *Rev. Tunisienne de Sci. Soc.* (Jl '70) 163-83.

30178 CAGNE, J. "Les origines du mouvement jeune marocain." *B. Soc. d'Hist. du Maroc* no. 1 (1968) 8-17.

30179 CARRER, F. "Landwirtschaftliche Projekte Österreichs in Tunesien." *Bustan* 11, no. 1 (1970) 19-22.

30180 CHAMBRE, H. "Le développement économique et social de l'Uzbekistan." *Econ. & soc.* 5, no. 1 (Ja '71) 7-39.

30181 COHEN, A-G. "La réforme commerciale en Tunisie." *Cooperation et Développement* no. 34 (Ja-F '71) 20-30.

30182 DISCH, W. "Die Bedeutung der Aufwertung landwirtschaftlicher Ereugnisse (Turkey)." *Almanach deutschen Stiftung Entwick-Länder* (1969) 77-84.

30183 DONINI, P. "Immigrazione ebraica e trasformazione economica in Palestina." *O. Mod.* 50, nos. 7-8 (Jl-Ag '70) 385-98.

30184 DÖNMEZER, S. "Criminality and economic developments." *J. Regional Cult. Inst. (Iran, Pak., Turkey)* 3, nos. 1-2 (1970) 65-74.

30185 ERFĀNI, E. "A comparative analysis of oil agreements." *Tahqiqāt-e Eqtesādi* 7, nos. 19-20 (1970) 72-80.

30186 EVANS, M. "An econometric model of the Israeli economy, 1952-1965." *Econometrica* 38, no. 5 (S '70) 624-60.

30187 FROOZAN, M *et al.* "The development of the gas industry in Iran." *Tahqiqāt-e Eqtesādi* 7, nos. 19-20 (1970) 25-48.

30188 GINOR, F. "Structural changes in a developing economy: the case of Israel." *Weltwirtsch. Archiv* 1 (1970) 188-208.

30189 GLUKHODED, V. "Soviet-Iranian economic cooperation." *Foreign Trade* (Moscow) no. 4 (1971) 15-20.

30190 GRAJDANKINA, N. and E. RTVÉLADZÉ. "L'influence de Karezm sur l'industrie céramique de la ville da Madjur." *Sovyetskaya Arkheologiya* no. 1 (1971) 127-39.

30191 HAMID, J. "Suggested approach to agricultural taxation policy in West Pakistan." *Pak. Devel. Rev.* 10, no. 4 (1970) 422-47.

30192 HARTSHORN, J. "'Arctic Middle East,' no substitute yet for Arab oil." *Round Table* 241 (Ja '71) 43-50.

30193 HUSSEIN, M. "Le rôle des techniques quantitative dans l'élaboration des plans de développement économique en R.A.U." *Rev. Tiers-Monde* (Ap-Ju '69) 273-99.

30194 JAMNIG, G. "Österreichs Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zum Maghrib." *Bustan* 11, no. 1 (1970) 15-9.

30195 KATRAK, H. "The possibility of real income taxes from technical progress in protected industries: the case of Pakistan." *J. Develop. Stud.* 7, no. 2 (Ja '71) 161-72.

30196 KAZGAN, G. "La secteur agricole dans la premier et la deuxième plan turc." *Rev. Tiers-Monde* 11, no. 44 (O-D '70) 767-92.

30197 KLEVE, J. "Planning in Tunisië." *De Econ.* 118, no. 5 (S-O '70) 506-9.

30198 KORTUM, G. "Die Marwadascht-Ebene und das Daryusch Kabir-Project in Fars." *Orient* (Hamburg) 12, no. 1 (F '71) 3-7.

30199 LALL, P. "The Middle East market—a general export perspective.' *Pak. Econ.* 9, no. 12 (D '70) 17-28.

30200 LHOTE, H. "Le cycle caravanier des touaregs de l'Ahaggar et la Saline d'Amadror: leurs rapports avec les centres commercieux du Soudan." *B. de l'IFAN (Dakar)* 31, no. 4 (1969) 1014-27.

30201 MAITAL, S. "Simultaneous estimates of consumer demand parameters in Israel, 1952-67." *Bank of Israel, Econ. Rev.* no. 36 (D '70) 37-52.

30202 MALAKI, M. and A. NIKFARJAM. "A survey on the quality of water used in food manufacturing plants in Tehran." (In Persian) *J. Veterinary Faculty, Univ. of Tehran* 26, no. 4 (O '70-Ja '71) 36-44.

30203 MASWANI, A. "East Pakistan industries under the Mughals.' *Perspective* 4, no. 6 (D '70) 25-8.

30204 MELMAN, S. "Managerial vs. cooperative decision-making in Israel." *Stud. in Comp. Internat. Develop.* 6, no. 3 (1970-71). Entire issue.

30205 MUHAMMAD, M. "The control of banks in the UAR." (In Arabic) *L'Egypte Contemp.* 61, no. 342 (O '70) 707-31.

30206 MUSHKAT, M. "Israel—a model of economic development." *Interecon.* (Ag '70) 258-9ff.

30207 MUSREY, A. "First steps toward Arab economic integration." *Internat. Develop. Rev.* 13, no. 1 (Mr '71) 13-8.

30208 NAQVI, S. "On optimizing 'gains' from Pakistan's export bonus schemes." *J. Polit. Econ.* 79, no. 1 (Ja-F '71) 114-27.

30209 NULTY, T. and L. "Pakistan: the busy bee route to development." *Trans-action* 8, no. 4 (F '71) 18-26.

30210 PASCALLON, P. "Le système monétaire et bancaire algérien." *Banque* (O '70) 871-82.

30211 RASTOIN, G. "Perspectives industrielles en Méditerranée." *Rev. défense natl.* 27, no. 2 (F '71) 215-29.

30212 RONDOT, P. "Libye: en marge de la bataille pétrolière." *Rev. fr. d'études polit. afr.* no. 62 (F '71) 14-9.

30213 SALATORI, S. "Per un'intesa turistica tra l'Italia e la Tunisia." *Levante* 17, nos. 3-4 (D '70) 17-26.

30214 SCHMIDT, M. "Problèmes du développement agricole dans le périmètre des Abda-Doukkala (Maroc)." *Rev. Tiers-Monde* 11, no. 44 (O-D '70) 793-814.

30215 SETH, K. "East and West Pakistan: a study in regional development." *Internat. Stud.* 11, no. 3 (Ja '71).

30216 STAUFFER, T. "The comparative evaluation of oil concessions, contracts and joint ventures." *Tahqiqāt-e Eqtesādi* 7, nos. 19-20 (1970) 58-71.

30217 TEHRĀNIAN, M. "Iran: alternative strategies of entry into the international petroleum market." *Tahqiqāt-e Eqtesādi* 7, nos. 19-20 (1970) 48-56.

30218 VALLIN, J. "Les populations de l'Afrique au nord du Sahara: Maroc, Algérie, Tunisie, Libye, Egypte." *Population* 25, no. 6 (N-D '70) 1212-34.

30219 WARD, R. "Jordan in a turbulent world: its prospects." *Nonaligned Third World Ann.* (1970) 149-58.

30220 WEISS, D. "Evaluation of a power transmission system in Tunisia." *Socio-economic Planning Sciences* 4, no. 4 (D '70) 429-50.

30221 WINSTON, G. "Overinvoicing, underutilization, and distorted industrial growth." *Pak. Devel. Rev.* 10, no. 4 (1970) 405-21.

30222 ULE, W. "Die landwirtschaftlichen Aktiengesellschaften im Iran." *Vierteljahresberichte* no. 40 (Ju '70) 169-87.

SOCIAL CONDITIONS

30223 "L'Algérie à une nouvelle étape de son développement." *Europe, France Outre-Mer* (special issue) no. 489 (O '70) 1-26.

30224 "The Arab woman: An untypical view." Special issue. *Aramco World Mag.* 22, no. 2 (Mr-Ap '71) 1-40.

30225 "Connaissance et pratique du planning familial à Tunis." *Rev. Tunisienne de Sci. Soc.* (Jl '70) 9-92.

30226 "How young Israeli-Arabs see their future." *Atlas* 20, no. 4 (Ap '71) 26-7. Translated from *Maariv* (Tel Aviv).

30227 "La situation de la femme en Algérie: tragédie ou comédie?" *Jeune Afr.* no. 507 (S 22 '70) 38-40.

30228 "Who is a Jew? A Jerusalem symposium—some Christian views." *Christian News from Israel* 21, no. 3 (1970) 24-7.

30229 'ARAFĀT, 'A. "Well mannered children produce a good generation." (In Arabic) *Risālat al-Mu'allim* 14, no. 1 (O-N '70) 31-5.

30230 ANDERSON, J. "The role of personal statuses in social development in Islamic countries." *Comp. Stud. in Soc. and Hist.* 13, no. 1 (Ja '71) 16-31.

30231 ASHTOR, E. "The diet of salaried classes in the medieval Near East." *J. A. Hist.* 4, no. 1 (1970) 1-24.

30232 'ĀYISH, Ḥ. "The rural school and the solitary teacher." (In Arabic) *Risālat al-Mu'allim* 14, no. 1 (O-N '70) 35-40.

30233 BENSIMON-DONATH, D. "L'intégration des juifs nord-africains en Israël." *Dispersion et Unité* 10 (1970) 89-120.

30234 BURKI, S. "Interest group involvement in West Pakistan's rural works program." *Public Policy* 19, no. 1 (1971) 167-206.

30235 CHARNAY, J-P. "La musulmane dans la ville moderne." *Polit. Etrangère* 36, no. 2 (1971) 141-6.

30236 CHOWDHURY, A. "Socio-economic factors affecting human fertility in East Pakistan." *Concept of Pak.* 7, no. 4 (N '70) 25-7.

30237 DANGOOR, N. "The Jews of Iraq." *A.J.A. Quart.* 15, no. 4 (Ap '71) 29-33.

30238 AL-DAWĀLĪBĪ, M. "The Arabs and human civilization." (In Arabic) *al-Lisān al-'Arabī* 7, no. 1 (Ja '70) 74-8.

30239 EIFERMANN, R. "Cooperativeness and egalitarianism in Kibbutz children's games." *Human Relations* 23, no. 6 (D '70) 579-87.

30240 GOLDFINE, Y. and A. SHAKI. "Staatsangehörigkeit, Nationalität und Religion in Israel." *Verfassung & Recht Übersee* no. 3 (1970) 323-33.

30241 EL-GOULLI, S. "L'exode rural au Maghreb." *Rev. Fr. d'etudes polit. afr.* no. 58 (O '70) 89-100.

30242 GUREVITCH, M. *et al.* "The image of the police in Israel." *Law & Soc.* 5, no. 3 (F '71) 367-88.

30243 HANEGBI, H. "The class nature of Israeli society." *New Left Rev.* no. 65 (Ja-F '71) 3-28.

30244 HAUSLICH, A. "250,000 Israelis live in poverty." *Jewish Observer and Mid. East Rev.* 20, no. 9 (F 26 '71) 14-7.

30245 ḤIZB AL-ṬALĪ'AH AL-ISHTIRĀKĪYAH. "Ideology and the question of education and Arabization in Algeria." (In Arabic) *Dirāsāt 'Arabīyah* 6, no. 10 (Ag '70) 40-67.

30246 ḤUSAYN, F. "The teacher training school in Ḥawārah." (In Arabic) *Risālat al-Mu'allim* 14, no. 1 (O-N '70) 100-11.

30247 AL-KARAMĪ, Z. "Health education and its advantage in our schools." (In Arabic) *Risālat al-Mu'allim* 14, no. 1 (O-N '70) 27-31.

30248 MELIKIAN, L. *et al.* "Achievement motivation in Afghanistan, Brazil, Saudi Arabia and Turkey." *J. Soc. Psych.* 83, no. 2 (Ap '71) 183-5.

30249 MISRI, F. "L'information en R.A.U." *Travaux & Jours* no. 37 (O-D '70) 45-54.

30250 AL-MISURĀTĪ, A. "Porträtskizze eines libyschen Kaufmanns: Der alte Za'tar und ein unvergänglichen Schatz Eingeleitet und übersetzt von Peter Bachmann." *Bustan* 11, no. 1 (1970) 22-34.

30251 MORSY, Z. "Profils culturels et conscience critique au Maroc." *J. World Hist.* 12, no. 4 (1970) 588-602.

30252 MULLER, G. "Pahlavi University: Shah *versus* bureaucrats." *Nation* 212, no. 8 (F 22 '71) 240-3.

30253 NACHTIGALI, H. "Akkulturations-probleme bei einem Berberstamm." *Bustan* 11, no. 1 (1970) 39-43.

30254 NĀṢĪF, M. "Ṭanṭa, UAR." (In Arabic) *al-'Arabī* no. 150 (My '71) 108-30.

30255 AL-QĀḌĪ, Y. "Old and new ways of education." (In Arabic) *Risālat al-Mu'allim* 14, no. 1 (O-N '70) 14-26.

30256 RADI, A. "Processus de socialisation de l'enfant marocain." *Ann. Marocaines de Sociol.* (1969) 33-47.

30257 REJWAN, N. "From 'mixing' to participation: social implications of the rise of Israel's 'Black Panthers'." *New Mid. East* no. 32 (My '71) 20-4.

30258 RIḌĀ, J. "Authority and how it is understood by university students." (In Arabic) *al-'Arabī* no. 147 (F '71) 62-6.

30259 AL-SARŪJĪ, 'A. "Arabization is the most important means of our scientific advancement." (In Arabic) *al-Lisān al-'Arabī* 7, no. 1 (Ja '70) 68-73.

30260 SCHLESINGER, B. "Family life in the kibbutz of Israel: Utopia gained or Paradise Lost?" *Internat. J. Comp. Sociol.* 11, no. 4 (D '70) 251-71.

30261 SEDDON, J. "Social and economic change in northeast Morocco." *Cur. Anthrop.* 12, no. 2 (Ap 71) 227-9.

30262 SERAGELDIN, I. "The search for identity among Muslim youth: the case of the U.A.R." *Nonaligned Third World Ann.* (1970) 245-51.

30263 SERTEL, A. "Ritual kinship in eastern Turkey." *Anthrop. Quart.* 44, no. 1 (Ja '71) 37-50.

30264 SHOKEID, M. "Social networks and innovation in the division of labour between men and women in the family and in the community: a study of Moroccan immigrants in Israel." *Canadian Rev. Sociol. & Anthrop.* 8, no. 1 (F '71) 1-17.

30265 SIMON, R. and M. GUREVITCH. "Some

inter-generational comparisons in 2 ethnic communities in Israel." *Human Org.* 30, no. 1 (1971) 79-88.

30266 STOECKEL, J. "Socio-economic status and family planning knowledge, attitudes and practices in rural East Pakistan." *Soc. & Econ. Stud.* 19, no. 2 (Ju '70) 213-25.

30267 SZYLIOWICZ, J. "Elite recruitment in Turkey: the role of the Mülkiye." *World Polit.* 23, no. 3 (Ap '71) 371-98.

30268 TABET, R. "Pour une pratique nouvelle de l'urbain." *Travaux & Jours* no. 37 (O-D '70) 69-82. A study of Beirut.

30269 TAIEB, M. "La structure urbaine d'Alger." *Ann. de Géog.* 80, no. 437 (Ja-F '71) 33-44 .

30270 THAISS, G. "The modernization of Islamic society in Persia." *Nonaligned Third World Ann.* (1970) 232-44.

30271 TOMEH, A. "Patterns of moral behavior in two social structures." *Sociol. & Soc. Res.* 55, no. 2 (Ja '71) 149-60. From a survey done at Beirut College for Women.

30272 UPLEGGER, H. "Minztee-National getränk Marokkos." *Bustan* 11, no. 1 (1970) 35-9.

30273 WATAD, M. "Israeli Arabs and the generation gap." *New Outlook* 14, no. 2 (Mr '71) 43-8.

30274 WEINGROD, A. "Immigrants, localism, and political power: an American-Israel comparison." *Internat. J. Polit.* 1, no. 1 (1971) 90-103.

30275 ZABBAL, S. "al-Qāt." (In Arabic) *al-'Arabī* no. 147 (F '71) 100-14. A Yemeni narcotic.

30276 ZURAYK, C. "The University and the creation of the future." *al-Kulliyah* (Autumn, 1970) 2-7. On the American Univeristy of Beirut.

SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

30277 ADAMS, C. "Islamic religion, II." *Mid. East Stud. Assoc. B.* 5, no. 1 (F '71) 9-25.

30278 'ALLOUBAH PASHA, M. "Democracy: Greek, Roman and Islamic concepts." *Islamic Rev. and Arab Aff.* 58, nos. 10-11 (O-N '70) 34-40.

30279 AL-'ALWĀNĪ, D. "Islam is a strength of Arabism." (In Arabic) *al-Lisān al-'Arabī* 7, no. 1 (Ja '70) 109-13.

30280 BASETTI-SANI, G. "Cosa un cristiano deve pensare di Muhammad?" *Levante* 17, nos. 3-4 (D '70) 27-35.

30281 BISHAI, W. "A possible Coptic source for a Qur'aric text." *J. Amer. O. Soc.* 91, no. 1 (Ja-Mr '71) 125-8.

30282 BUKHARI, S. "Challenges of the modern age to Islam." *Islamic Rev. and Arab Aff.* 58, no. 9 (S '70) 13-6.

30283 CALCHI-NOATI, G. "Il socialismo arabo come dottrina di sviluppo." *Terzo Mondo* (S '70) 26-46.

30284 CASPAR, R. "Philosophy and revelation according to Avicenna (Ibn Sina)." *Islamic Rev. and Arab Aff.* 58, nos. 10-11 (O-N '70) 12-8ff.

30285 DAIBER, H. "Ein bisher unbekaunter pseudo-platonischer Text über die Tugenden der Seele in arabischer Überlieferung." *Der Islam* 47 (Ja '71) 25-42.

30286 DE ZAYAS, F. "The Islamic concept of charity." *Islamic Lit.* 16, no. 12 (D '70) 5-14.

30287 AL-DŪRĪ, A. "The origins of Iqṭā' in Islām." *al-Abḥāth* 22, nos. 1-2 (1969) 3-22.

30288 FARRAJ, A. "July 23: intellectual-building and history making." (In Arabic) *Dirāsāt 'Arabīyah* 6, no. 12 (O '70) 23-72.

30289 FREUND, W. "Islam und arabischer Sozialismus." *Aussenpolitik* 22, no. 1 (Ja '71) 49-60.

30290 GIMARET, D. "Bouddha et les bouddhistes dans la tradition musulmane." *J.A.* 157, nos. 3-4 (1969) 273-316.

30291 GÄTJE, H. "Die Gliederung der sprachlichen Zeichen nach al-Fārābi." *Der Islam* 47 (Ja '71) 1-24.

30292 EL HABIB, M. "Notes sur deux mesures d'aumône." *Hespéris Tamuda* 10, no. 3 (1969) 263-72.

30293 ILAHABADI, M. "The need of reforms in Sufi ideology with special reference to India and Pakistan." *Islamic Rev. and Arab Aff.* 58, no. 9 (S '70) 30-34.

30294 KAMAL-UD-DIN, K. "Glimpses from the life of the prophet." *Islamic Rev. and Arab Aff.* 58, nos. 10-11 (O-N '70) 5-8.

30295 KANNUN, A. "Private property in Islam." *Islamic Rev. and Arab Aff.* 58, no. 9 (S '70) 22-5ff.

30296 KHAN, Y. "Islamic polity." *Stud. in Islam* 7, no. 2 (Ap '70) 65-110.

30297 KUDSI-ZADEH, A. "Islamic reform in Egypt: Some observations on the role of Afghani." *Muslim World* 61, no. 1 (Ja '71) 1-12.

30298 MAKAREM, S. "The hidden Imāms of the Ismā'īlīs." *al-Abḥāth* 22, nos. 1-2 (1969) 23-37.

30299 MODGKIN, T. "Mahdisme, messianisme et marxisme dans le contexte africain." *Présence Afr.* (1970) 128-53.

30300 NAḤḤĀL, I. "Organization of scientific research on the level of the Arab nation." (In Arabic) *al-Lisān al-'Arabī* 7, no. 1 (Ja '70) 63-7.

30301 PARET, R. "Toleranz und Intoleranz im Islam." *Saeculum* 21, no. 4 (1970) 344-65.

30302 PELLAT, C. "al-Muwashshaḥ and al-Zajal: A bridge to various cultures." (In Arabic) *B. Faculty of Arts, Univ. of Riyad* 1 (1970) 38-52.

30303 QUDDUSI, I. "The future of Islam in Pakistan and the world." *Pak. Rev.* 19, no. 1 (Ja '71) 30-3.

30304 RAHMAN, F. "The conflict between Islam and anti-religious forces." *Islamic Thought* 14, no. 2 (O '70) 33-9.

30305 AL-SĀMARRĀ'Ī, M. "Arabic and intellectual currents." (In Arabic) *al-Aqlām* 6, no. 5 (F '70) 11-7.

30306 SANKARI, F. "Plato and al-Farabi." *Studies in Islam* 7, no. 1 (Ja '70) 9-18.

30307 SAYEED, S. "The Aristotelian and Islamic concepts of slavery—a comparative study." *Islamic Rev. and Arab Aff.* 5, no. 9 (S '70) 17-9ff.

30308 SIDDIQUI, B. "Miskawayh on the purposes of historiography." *Muslim World* 61, no. 1 (Ja '71) 21-7.

30309 SIDDIQUI, M. "The economic system of Islam." *Islamic Thought* 14, no. 2 (O '70) 16-32.

30310 STEWIG, R. "Versuch einer Auswertung der Reisebeschreibung von Ibn Baṭṭuta (nach der englischen Übersetzung von H.A.R. Gibb) zur Bedeutungsdifferenzierung westanatolischer Siedlungen." *Der Islam* 47 (Ja '71) 43-59.

30311 TURNER, B. "Ibn Khaldūn and western technology." *Islamic Rev. and Arab Aff.* 58, no. 9 (S '70) 7-9.

30312 VAHIDUDDIN, S. "Professor Kenneth Cragg's approach to the Qur'ānic consciousness of man." *Stud. in Islam* 7, no. 1 (Ja '70) 19-28.

30313 VAN DAM, N. "Die Ba'th ideologie: Deel I; De orthodoxe richting van 'Aflaq." *Internat. Spectator* 25, no. 4 (F 22 71) 388-408.

30314 VLE, W. "Islam und Wirtschaft." *Der Islam* 47 (Ja '71) 136-67.

LANGUAGE

30315 "Arabic lexical developments." (In Arabic) *al-Lisān al-Arabī* (Special Issue) 7, no. 2 (Ja '70) 1-398.

30316 "Educational and linguistic studies of various Arab countries." (In Arabic) *al-Lisān al-'Arabī* 7, no. 1 (Ja '70) 333-91.

30317 'ĀBDĪN, J. "Arabic in the stages of its development." (In Arabic) *Risālat al-Mu'allim* 14, no. 1 (O-N '70) 66-71.

30318 AMBROS, A. "Die sprachlichen Verhältnisse im Maghrib." *Bustan* 11, no. 1 (1970) 10-4.

30319 AMUZGAR, P. "The cultural problems of translation." *J. Regional Cult. Inst. (Iran, Pak., Turkey)* 3, nos. 1-2 (1970) 5-15.

30320 ATALLAH, W. "Sur un vers de Garīr. Etymologie de zūn et de hirbid." *Arabica* 18, no. 1 (F '71) 49-56.

30321 BARŪ, T. "Arabic and Islam." (In Arabic) *al-Lisān al-'Arabī* 7, no. 1 (Ja '70) 114-6.

30322 DIEM, W. "Die Nominalform fu'āl im klassischen Arabisch." *ZDMG* 120, hft. 1 (1970) 43-68.

30323 JĀSIM, H. "Classes of grammarians and linguists by Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Zabīdī." (In Arabic) *al-Aqlām* 6, no. 6 (Mr '70) 26-32.

30324 AL-JUNDĪ, A. "Challenges to the Arabic language." (In Arabic) *al-Lisān al-Arabī* 7, no. 1 (Ja '70) 97-100.

30325 AL-KAYYĀLĪ, 'A. "Factors in the development and spread of the Arabic language." (In Arabic) *al-Lisān al-'Arabī* 7, no. 1 (Ja '70) 79-88.

30326 KHULUSI, S. "A comparative study of Shakespearian and Arab grammar." *Islamic Rev. and Arab Aff.* 58, nos. 10-11 (O-N '70) 19-21.

30327 LEK'IASVILI, A. "Das diptotische System im klassischen Arabisch." *Archiv O.* 39, no. 1 1971) 57-69.

30328 MAṬAR, 'A. "Arabic linguists preceded modern linguists." (In Arabic) *al-Lisān al-'Arabī* 7, no. 1 (Ja '70) 52-8.

30329 PENNACCHIETTI, F. "Un articolo prepositivo in neosudarabico?" *Riv. degli Studi O.* 44, no. 4 (1969) 285-293.

30330 PETRÁCEK, K. "La fonction emphatique dans la communication en Arabe." *Archiv O.* 39, no. 1 (1971) 70-5.

30331 RIZZITANO, U. "L'Algeria e il suo problema linguistico." *Levante* 17, nos. 3-4 (D '70) 5-17.

30332 AL-SĀYIḤ, A. "Arabic among exalted languages." (In Arabic) *al-Lisān al-'Arabī* 7, no. 1 (Ja '70) 32-43.

30333 VAN RIET, S. "Traduction arabo-latines et informatique." *Rev. Philosophique de Louvain* 68 (N '70) 521-35.

LITERATURE AND ARTS

30334 "The contemporary novel in Syria." (In Arabic) *al-Ma'rifah* (Special Issue) no. 108 (F '71) 3-301.

30335 "L'industrie du cinema au Liban." *Travaux & Jours* no. 37 (O-D '70) 91-106.

30336 "The Jerusalem International Book Fair." *Publishers' Weekly* 199, no. 20 (My 17 '71) 20-4.

30337 ATASOY, N. "Some designs and sketches in two Topkapi albums (H.2152 and H.2153)." *J. Regional Cult. Inst. (Iran, Pak., Turkey)* 3, nos. 1-2 (1970) 16-34.

30338 AVIGAD, N. "Excavations in the Jewish Quarter of the Old City, Jerusalem, 1969/70 (preliminary report)." *Israel Exploration* J. 20, nos. 1-2 (1970) 1-8.

30339 BALOG, P. "Islamic bronze weights from Egypt." *J. Econ. Soc. Hist. O.* 13, no. 3 (N '70) 233-56.

30340 BIN'ABDALLĀH, 'A. "The development of thought and language in the modern Maghrib." (In Arabic) *al-Lisān al-'Arabī* 7, no. 1 (Ja '70) 206-48.

30341 DĀWŪD, A. "Free poetry is the poetry of the nationalist, socialist revolution." (In Arabic) *al-Ma'rifah* no. 109 (Mr '71) 72-88.

30342 DEVERDUN, G. "Une nouvelle inscription saadienne." *Hespéris Tamuda* 10, nos. 1-2 (1969) 37-9.

30343 DONABEDIAN, K. "The theater and dramatic arts in Armenian history, IV." *Armenian Rev.* 24, no. 1-93 (1971) 48-52.

30344 ELLIS, R. "Egypt's antiquities." *Nonaligned Third World Ann.* (1970) 211-5.

30345 AL-FADDA, A. "Bilingual Kharjas in Andalusian poetry." (In Arabic) *B. Faculty of Arts, Univ. of Riyad* 1 (1970) 194-205.

30346 FONTAINE, J. "Aspects de la littérature tunisienne contemporaine: Salah Jabri, Yahya Mohamed, Abdelkader Naceur." *IBLA* 33, no. 126 (1970) 243-64.

30347 GANDJEI, T. "The genesis and definition of a literary composition: the Dahnāma ("Ten Love Letters")" *Der Islam* 47 (Ja '71) 59-66.

30348 GHORAYEB, M. "La presse quotidienne libanaise." *Travaux & Jours* no. 37 (O-D '70) 5-26.

30349 GREINER, M. "Mohammad Khair-Eddine, poète marocaine exceptionnel." *Synthèses* 26, nos. 295-296 (Ja-F '71) 34-6.

30350 GUÉRARD, M. "Contribution à l'étude de l'art de la broderie au Maroc (suite)." *Hespéris Tamuda* 10, nos. 1-2 (1969) 191-216.

30351 AL-HAZIMI, M. "Muḥammad Farīd Abū Ḥadīd, the novelist." (In Arabic) *B. Faculty of Arts, Univ. of Riyad* 1 (1970) 347-425.

30352 IRVING, T. "Architecture and craftsmanship: the Islamic aspect." *Nonaligned Third World Ann.* (1970) 216-29.

30353 KACEM, A. "Situation de la poésie dans la revue *al-Fikr* de 1955 à 1965, I." *Arabica* 18, no. 1 (F '71) 57-98.

30354 KENAN, A. "Arab and Jewish writers get together." *New Outlook* 14, no. 1 (Ja '71) 19-21.

30355 KHATTAB, E. "Muhammad in Marlowe's 'Tamburlaine'." *B. Faculty of Arts, Univ. of Riyad* 1 (1970) 41-52.

30356 KHULUSI, S. "Arabic aspects of Shakespeare." *Islamic Rev. and Arab Aff.* 58, no. 9 (S '70) 26-9.

30357 KHURAYJĪ, M. "The image of the prophet Muhammad in Dante and the Danteists." (In Arabic) *B. Faculty of Arts, Univ. of Riyad* 1 (1970) 165-74.

30358 LABECKA-KOECHEROWA, M. "Le poste de Nasredinne Hodja—la première comédie turque?" (In Polish) *Przeglad O.* 4(76) (1970) 335-43.

30359 LANOT, B. "Les émissions françaises de Radio-Liban et l'ORTF." *Travaux & Jours* no. 37 (O-D '70) 39-44.

30360 LE GASSICK, T. "Literature in translation—modern Arabic." *Mid. East Stud. Assoc. B.* 5, no. 1 (F '71) 26-38.

30361 MARSOT, A. "The cartoon in Egypt." *Comp. Stud. in Soc. and Hist.* 13, no. 1 (Ja '71) 2-15.

30362 MEGGED, A. "How did the Bible put it? Some problems of new Israeli writing." *Encounter* 36, no. 1 (Ja '71) 39-43. Also in *Midstream* 17, no. 3 (Mr '71) 21-8.

30363 MEINECKE, M. "Zur Entwicklung des islamischen Architekturdekors im Mittelalter." *Der Islam* 47 (Ja '71) 200-35.

30364 NAJM, M. "The comedy theater in Egypt." (In Arabic) *al-Abḥāth* 22, nos. 1-2 (1969) 137-88.

30365 QĀSIM, M. "The personality of Muḥyā al-Dīn ibn 'Arabī from his writings." (In Arabic) *al-Aqlām* 6, no. 6 (Mr '70) 3-13.

30366 REYCHMAN, J. "New works on Polish-Belorussian texts in the Arabic alphabet." (In Polish) *Przeglad O.* 4(76) (1970) 344-52.

30367 ROFE, H. "The Persian poet Nizami, (d. 1909)." *Islamic Rev. and Arab Aff.* 58, nos. 10-11 (O-N '70) 30-3.

30368 ṢĀLIḤ, B. "Revolutionary aspects of the poetry of al-Jawāhirī." (In Arabic) *al-Aqlām* 6, no. 6 (Mr '70) 14-20.

30369 SAMMĀK, M. "The New Arab generation in literature." (In Arabic) *al-Lisān al-'Arabī* 7, no. 1 (Ja '70) 101-3.

30370 AL-SHĀMIKH, M. "Literary prose in the Hijaz towards the end of the Ottoman era, 1908-16." (In Arabic) *B. Faculty of Arts, Univ. of Riyad* 1 (1970) 141-64.

30371 SH'ĪB, H. "Architectural planning in Kuwayt." (In Arabic) *al-'Arabī* no. 148 (Mr '71) 56-66.

30372 TURKI, A. "Journalisme et industrie." *Travaux & Jours* no. 37 (O-D '70) 83-90. A debate on journalism in the Middle East.

30373 ULLENDORFF, E. "A letter from Th. Noldeke to E. Mittwoch." *BSOAS* 34, pt. 1 (1971) 5-8.

30374 WASHITZ, Y. "Arab literature since the 1967 war." *New Outlook* 14, no. 1 (Ja '71) 51-5.

30375 ZAJACZKOWSKI, A. "Le traité de l'art chevaleresque (furūsīya) en version mamelouk-kiptchak." *Rocznik* O. 33, no. 2 (1970) 21-66.

30376 ZOLONDEK, L. "Nineteenth-century Arab travelers to Europe: some observations on their writings." *Muslim World* 61, no. 1 (Ja '71) 28-34.

LAW

30377 "Gulf States—Oil Companies: Settlement of *Financial obligations of companies operating in Gulf States.*" *Internat. Legal Materials* 10, no. 2 (Mr '71) 240-55.

30378 "Das iranische Arbeitsrecht." *Orient* (Hamburg) 12, no. 1 (F '71) 11-4.

30379 ALI, M. "Changes in Muslim personal law: scope and procedure." *Islamic Thought* 14, no. 2 (O '70) 1-15.

30380 ANDERSON, J. "Modern trends in Islam: legal reform and modernisation in the Middle East." *Internat. Comp. Law Quart.* 20, no. 1 (Ja '71) 1-21.

30381 BORRMANS, M. "Effort et renouveau dans la législation musulmane." *O. Mod.* 50, nos. 7-8 (Jl-Ag '70) 513-24. A review article of a recent and comprehensive Tunisian textbook.

30382 FRANK, M. "Coming: constitutional and social reform." *Amer. Zionist* 61, no. 7 (Mr '71) 39-42. Israel.

30383 FREIMARK, P. "Stellung des Zwitters im rabbinischen und islamischen Recht." *ZDMG* 120, hft. 1 (1970) 84-102.

30384 GREENWALD, H. "International law and Israel's 'occupied' territories." *Amer. Zionist* 61, no. 7 (Mr '71) 43-5.

30385 LEHMANN, R. "Nationalité et religion en Israël. A propos de l'affaire Shalit." *J. Droit Internat.* 97, no. 4 (O-D '70) 898-901.

30386 LINANT DE BELLEFONDS, Y. "Chronique de jurisprudence de al R.A.U." *J. Droit Internat.* 97, no. 4 (O-D '70) 955-67.

30387 LODI, Z. "A study of the status of the married woman in Roman law, English common law, church law and Islamic law." *Islamic Rev. and Arab Aff.* 58, nos. 10-11 (10-11 (O.N. '70) 26-9.

30388 SHAPIRA, A. "The six-day war and the right of self-defense." *Israel Law Rev.* 6, no. 1 (Ja '71) 65-80.

30389 VITTA, E. "The conflict of personal laws." *Israel Law Rev.* 5 (Jl '70) 337-51.

30390 WANSBROUGH, J. "The safe-conduct in Muslim chancery practice." *BSOAS* 34, pt. 1 (1971) 20-35.

30391 YADIN, U. "The matrimonial partnership (Matrimonial Property Relations Bill, 1969)." *Israel Law Rev.* 6, no. 1 (Ja '71) 106-11.

30392 YARON, R. "The laws of Eshnunna." *Israel Law Rev.* 5 (Jl '70) 327-36.

BIOGRAPHY

30393 "Golda Meir reminisces: an interview." *Midstream* 17, no. 4 (Ap '71) 6-13.

30394 AL-AMĀM, R. "History of the minister Muṣṭafā ibn Ismā'īl." (In Arabic) *al-Abḥāth* 22, nos. 1-2 (Ja '69) 71-136.

30395 BE'ERI, E. "Nasser and Ataturk." *New Outlook* 14, no. 1 (Ja '71) 47-50.

30396 BRYSON, T. ed. "Journal of a journey to the Near East by Walter George Smith." *Armenian Rev.* 24, no. 1-93 (1971) 3-34.

30397 FORSTNER, M. "Ya'qūb b. al-Lait und der Zunbīl." *ZDMG* 120, hft. 1 (1970) 69-83.

30398 FRIEDMAN, S. "Luther and Muhammad; a study in comparative anti-semitism." *Patterns of Prejudice* 5, no. 2 (Mr-Ap '71) 6-10.

30399 KUNITZSCH, P. "Abū Ma'šar, Johannes Hispalensis und Alkameluz." *ZDMG* 120, hft. 1 (1970) 103-25.

30400 PAELIAN, F. "Nounoufar Boghosian." *Armenian Rev.* 24, no. 1-93 (1971) 42-7.

30401 TRELLES, C. "La estela de Gamal Abdel Nasser." *Rev. Polit. Internac.* no. 112 (N-D '70) 15-40.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

30402 ABŪ ḤANĪFA AL-DĪNAWARĪ. "Russian translation of Arabic texts from *Kitāb al-Akhbār al-Ṭiwāl.*" (In Russian) *Palestinskii Sbornik* 22 (85) (1970) 114-35.

30403 AL-'ARABĪ, Ṣ. "A list of Arabic dictionaries published from 1869 to 1969." (In Arabic) *al-Lisān al'Arabī* 7, no. 2 (Ja '70) 160-84.

30404 ATTIÉ ATTIÉ, B. "Les manuscrits agricoles arabes de la Bibliothèque nationale de Paris." *Hespéris Tamuda* 10, no. 3 (1969) 241-62.

30405 CARVELY, A. "Libyan Arab Republic: a chronological bibliography." *Nonaligned Third World Ann.* (1970) 137-48.

30406 COOKE, J. "The army archives at Vincennes: archives for the study of North African history in the colonial period." *Muslim World* 61, no. 1 (Ja '71) 35-8.

BOOK REVIEWS

30407 'ABD AL-RAHIM, M. *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan: A study in constitutional and political development, 1899-1956.* **BSOAS** 34, pt. 1 (1971) 150-1. (G. Sanderson).

30408 AFNAN, S. *Philosophical Terminology in Arabic and Persian.* **Bibliotheca O.** 27, nos. 5-6 (S-N '71) 400. (L. Schuman).

30409 ALBINO, O. *The Sudan: A southern viewpoint.* **Africa** (London) 41, no. 1 (Ja '71) 68-9. (J. Buxton).

30410 ALDRIDGE, J. *Cairo: Biography of a city.* **Geog. J.** 137, pt. 1 (Mr '71) 92. (G. De Gaury).

30411 ALGAR, H. *Religion and State in Iran, 1785-1906: The role of the ulama in the Qajar period.* **RCAJ** 58, pt. 1 (F '71) 117-8. (C. Edmonds).

30412 ALLON, Y. *The Making of Israel's Army.* **Midstream** 17, no. 4 (Ap '71) 63-9. (S. Marshal).

30413 AMUZEGAR, J. *Technical Assistance in Theory and Practice: The case of Iran.* **Tahqiqāt-e Eqtesādi** 7, nos. 19-20 (1970) 212-4.

30414 ARBERRY, A., ed. *The Cambridge History of Iran, I & V.* **Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis** 83, no. 3 (1970) 393-6. (In Dutch). (J. De Bruijn).

30415 ARBERRY, A. *Modern Arabic Poetry: An anthology of English verse translations.* **Der Islam** 47 (Ja '71) 330-1. (F. Steppat).

30416 ARBERRY, A. ed. *Religion in the Middle East: Three religions in concord and conflict.* **East. Churches Rev.** 3, no. 2 (1970) 239-40. (G. Every); **Der Islam** 47 (Ja '71) 362-3. (B. Spuler); **Internat. J. Mid. East Stud.** 2, no. 2 (Ap '71) 191-3. (J. Kritzeck).

30417 ARON, R. *De Gaulle, Israel and the Jews.* **RCAJ** 58, pt. 1 (F '71) 106-8. (D. Watt).

30418 AL-'AZM, S. *Al-Naqd al-Dhati ba'd al-Hazim.* **Midstream** 17, no. 4 (Ap '71) 72-8. (N. Rejwan).

30419 AL-'AZM, S. *Naqd al-Fikr al-Dini.* **Midstream** 17, no. 4 (Ap '71) 72-8. (N. Rejwan).

30420 BADEAU, J. *The American Approach to the Arab World.* **Muslim World** 61, no. 1 (Ja '71) 57-8. (J. Cooke).

30421 BAER, G. *Studies in the Social History of Modern Egypt.* **Soc. Sci. Quart.** 51, no. 3 (D '70) 793-4. (C. Leiden).

30422 AL-BAHARNA, H. *The Legal Status of the Arabian Gulf States.* **Amer. J. Internat. Law** 65, no. 1 (Ja '71) 227-8. (R. Young); **Rev. Belge de Droit internat.** 2, no. 1 (1971) 386-7. (P. Pierson-Mathy).

30423 BAKER, H. *The Legal System of Israel.* **Amer. J. Comp. Law** 18, no. 4 (1970) 870-3. (M. Chancey).

30424 BALUZI, H. *Edward Granville Browne and the Baha'i Faith.* **RCAJ** 58, pt. 1 (F '71) 123. (L. Elwell-Sutton).

30425 BAYNE, E. *Persian Kingship in Transition: Conversation with a monarch whose office is traditional and whose goal is modernization.* **World Polit.** 23, no. 3 (Ap '71) 522-43. (S. Zabih).

30426 BE'ERI, E. *Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society* **Bibliotheca O.** 27, nos. 5-6 (S-N '70) 332-3. (C. Van Nieuwenhuize).

30427 BELDICEAU-STEINHERR, I. *Recherches sur les actes des règnes des Sultans Osman, Orkhan et Murad I.* **BSOAS** 34, pt. 1 (1971) 153-4. (In French). (V. Ménage).

30428 BELLAMY, J. *et al. Contemporary Arabic Readers, V: Modern Arabic poetry.* **Archiv O.** 39, no. 1 (1971) 108. (K. Petracek).

30429 BEN-GURION, D. *Recollections.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,600 (F 26 '71) 231.

30430 BENTWICH, N. *Israel: Two fateful years 1967-1969.* **Internat. Aff.** 47, no. 1 (Ja '71) 188. (S. Leslie).

30431 BERGER, M. *Islam in Egypt Today.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,601 (Mr 5 '71) 272.

30432 BERQUE, J. *L'Egypte—Impérialisme et Révolution.* **Archiv O.** 39, no. 1 (1971) 110-1. (J. Oliverius).

30433 BISHAI, W. *Islamic History in the Middle East; Background, development and fall of the Arab Empire.* **Hamizrah Hehadash** 21, no. 1 (1971) 98-9. (In Hebrew).

30434 BOSWORTH, C. *Sistan under the Arabs, from the Islamic Conquest to the Rise of the Saffarids (30-250/651-864).* **BSOAS** 34, pt. 1 (1971) 148-9. (V. Parry).

30435 BRAND, C. ed. *Icon and Minaret: Sources of Byzantine and Islamic civilization.* **Muslim World** 61, no. 1 (Ja '71) 42-4 (D. Sahas).

30436 BROWN, L. *The Surest Path: The political treatise of a nineteenth century Muslim statesman.* **Cah. de Tunisie** 17, nos. 65-7 (1969) 274-6. (F. Jamali).

30437 BURDETT, W. *Encounter with the Middle East.* **Internat. Aff.** 47, no. 1 (Ja '71) 185-6. (R. Owen).

30438 BUSCH, B. *Britain and the Persian Gulf 1894-1914.* **Der Islam** 47 (Ja '71) 345-6 (F. Steppat).

30439 CAHEN, C. *Pre-Ottoman Turkey: A general survey of the material and spiritual culture and history, c. 1071-1330.* **BSOAS** 34, pt. 1 (1971) 152-3. (V. Parry).

30440 CATTAN, H. *Palestine, the Arabs and Israel: The search for justice.* **RCAJ** 58, pt. 1 (F '71) 106-8. (D. Watt); **Pak. Horizon** 23, no. 4 (1970) 426-9.

30441 CHADWICK, N. and V. ZHIRMUNSKY. *The Oral Epics of Central Asia.* **RCAJ** 58, pt. 1 (F '71) 126. (G. Wheeler).

30442 CHEHATA, C. *Droit Musulman.* **Internat. Comp. Law Quart.** 19, no. 4 (O '70) 724-5. (D. Pearl).

30443 COHEN, A. *Israel and the Arab World.* **New Outlook** 14, no. 1 (Ja '71) 59-64. (M. Nahumi).

30444 COPELAND, M. *The Game of Nations.* **Ukranian Quart.** 26, nos. 3-6 (1970) 322-5. (H. Wolfe).

30445 CRUISE O'BRIEN, D. *The Mourides of Senegal.* **New Mid. East** no. 30 (Mr '71) 45-6.

30446 DANIEL, N. *Islam, Europe and Empire.* **Archiv O.** 39, no. 1 (1971) 105. (Z. Veselá-Prenosilová).

30447 DEFARGE, C. *Yemen '62-'69.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,611 (My 14 '71) 558.

30448 DIRKS, S. *La Famille Musulmane Turque: Son évolution au 20e siècle.* **Amer. Anthrop.** 72, no. 6 (D '70) 1522-4. (M. Meeker).

30449 DOBBING, H. *Cause for Concern: A Quaker's view of the Palestine problem.* **Internat. Aff.** 47, no. 1 (Ja '71) 184-5. (M. Yapp).

30450 DODD, C. and M. SALES. *Israel and the Arab World.* **RCAJ** 58, pt. 1 (F '71) 106-8. (D. Watt); **Internat. Aff.** 47, no. 1 (Ja '71) 185-6. (R. Owen).

30451 EISENSTADT, S. *Integration and Development in Israel.* **Sociol. & Soc. Res.** 55, no. 2 (Ja '71) 235-7. (E. Bogardus).

30452 ELON, A. *The Israelis: Founders and sons.* **New York Times Book Rev.** (My 9 '71) 1ff. (D. Schoenbrun).

30453 FARAH, C. *Islam. Beliefs and Observances.* **J. A. Hist.** 3, no. 2 (1969) 163-4. (A. Chejne).

30454 FARRUKH, O., tr. *Ibn Taimiyya on Public and Private Law in Islam or Public Policy in Islamic Jurisprudence.* **J. A. Hist.** 3, no. 2 (1969) 164-6. (C. Farah).

30455 FERNEA, R. *Shaykh and Effendi: Changing patterns of authority among the El Shabana of* *southern Iraq.* **RCAJ** 58, pt. 1 (F '71) 113. (S. Longrigg).

30456 FIELD, J. *America and the Mediterranean World, 1776-1882.* **Muslim World** 61, no. 1 (Ja '71) 56-7. (T. Bryson).

30457 FISCHEL, W. *Ibn Khaldūn in Egypt, his public functions and his historical research (1382-1406): A study in historiography.* **Muslim World** 61, no. 1 (Ja '71) 46-8. (F. Nucho).

30458 FRADY, M. *Across a Darkling Plain: An American's passage through the Middle East.* **Washington Post Book World 5,** no. 18 (My '71) 8. (A. Pryce-Jones).

30459 GABRIELI, F. *Arab Historians of the Crusades.* **Der Islam** 47 (Ja '71) 321. (B. Spuler).

30460 GARAGNON, J. and M. ROUSSET. *Droit administratif marocain.* **Rev. Jur. et Polit.** 25, no. 1 (Ja-Mr '71) 144-6. (J. Costa).

30461 GARDET, L. *Islam.* **Orientforschung** 16, no. 2 (1970) 321-2. (In German). (M. Grzeskowiak).

30462 GELLNER, E. *Saints of the Atlas.* **Amer. J. Sociol.** 76, no. 4 (Ja '71) 763-5. (H. Geertz); **Ann. Amer. Acad. Polit. & Soc. Sci.** no. 394 (Mr '71) 155. (J. Fiegenbaum).

30463 GLAZER, S. ed. *The Day of Maysulūn: A page from the modern history of the Arabs, by Abū Khaldūn Sāti' al-Ḥuṣrī.* **Muslim World** 61, no. 1 (Ja '71) 50-1. (D. Baly)

30464 GLUBB, J. *The Life and Times of Muhammad.* **RCAJ** 58, pt. 1 (F '71) 117. (R. Serjeant).

30465 GOITEIN, S. *Studies in Islamic History and Institutions.* **Muslim World** 61, no. 1 (Ja '71) 39-41. (A. Motzkin).

30466 GORDON, D. *The Passing of French Algeria.* **Africa** (Rome) 25, no. 4 (D '70) 501. (A. Lamanna).

30467 GRAY, J. *A History of Jerusalem.* **Rev. Polit.** 33, no. 1 (Ja '71) 149-54. (J. Ziskind).

30468 VON GRUNEBAUM, G. *Classical Islam: A history 600-1258.* **RCJA** 58, pt. 1 (F '71) 115. (C. Beckingham).

30469 AL-HAJJI, A. *The Geography of al-Andalus and Europe by Abū 'Ubayd al-Bakrī.* **Muslim World** 61, no. 1. (Ja '71) 55-6. (B. Nijm).

30470 HANNA, S. and G. GARDNER, eds. *Arab Socialism.* **Muslim World** 61, no. 1 (Ja '71) 46. (A. Ahmad).

30471 HENISSART, P. *Wolves in the City: The death of French Algeria.* **Afr. Report** 16, no 3 (Mr '71) 36-7. (W. Spencer).

30472 HERZFELD, E. *The Persian Empire: Studies in geography and ethnography of the ancient Near East.* **BSOAS** 34, pt. 1 (1971) 159-60 (A. Bivar).

30473 HILL, R. *On the Frontiers of Islam.* **Geog. J.** 137, pt. 1 (Mr '71) 93-4. (L. Kirwan); **Afr. Report** 16, no. 3 (Mr '71) 40-1. (J. Spaulding).

30474 HINDERINK, J. and M. KIRAY. *Social Stratification and Development in Turkey.* **Internat. Develop. Rev.** 13, no. 1 (Mr '71) 26-7. (E. Cohn).

30475 HOPWOOD, D. *The Russian Presence in Syria and Palestine 1843-1914.* **Der Islam** 47 (Ja '71) 325-6 (B. Spuler); **Hamizrah Hehadash** 21, no. 1 (1971) 76. (In Hebrew).

30476 HOURANI, A. *Arabic Thought in a Liberal Age.* (In Arabic) **al-Abhāth** 22, nos. 1-2 (1969) 189-94. (I. Ibrāhīm).

30477 HUREWITZ, J. *Middle East Politics: The military dimension.* **Jewish Soc. Stud.** 33, no. 1 (Ja '71) 79-81. (D. Farhi).

30478 INGRAMS, D. *A Time in Arabia.* **Geog. J.** 136, no. 4 (D '70) 663-4. (R. Serjeant).

30479 ITZKOWITZ, N. and M. MOTE. *Mubadele: An Ottoman-Russian exchange of ambassadors.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,605 (Ap 2 '71) 375.

30480 JANSEN, M. *The United States and the Palestine People.* **RCAJ** 58, pt. 1 (F '71) 106-8. (D. Watt).

30481 JOHNSON, D. *The Nature of Nomadism: A comparative study of pastoral migrations in southwestern Asia and northern Africa.* **Muslim World** 61, no. 1 (Ja '71) 53-4. (B. Nijm).

30482 JUYNBOLL, G. *The Authenticity of the Tradition Literature. Discussions in modern Egypt.* **Rev. Etudes Islamiques** 38, no. 2 (1970). (In French). (M. Arkoun).

30483 KAZEMZADEH, F. *Russia and Britain in Persia 1864-1914. A study of imperialism.* **J. A. Hist.** 3, no. 2 (1969) 162-3. (P. Oberling).

30484 KEDDIE, N. *An Islamic Response to Imerialism: Political and religious writings of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "al-Afghani."* **J. A. Hist.** 4, no. 1 (1970) 84-6. (C. Farah).

30485 KHADDURI, M. *The Islamic Law of Nations.* **Hamizrah Hehadash** 21, no. 1 (1971) 67. (In Hebrew).

30486 KHADDURI, M. *Political Trends in the Arab World.* **World Aff.** 133, no. 4 (Mr '71) 329-30. (I. Zartman); **Ann. Amer. Acad. Polit. & Soc. Sci.** no. 394 (Mr '71) 155-6. (B. Reich).

30487 KHADDURI, M. *Republican Iraq.* **Hamizrah Hehadash** 21, no. 1 (1971) 81-2. (In Hebrew).

30488 KHALIDY, W., ed. *From Haven to Conquest.* **Mid. East Newsletter** 5, no. 3 (Ap-My '71) 15. (C. Oliver).

30489 KIMCHE, J. *The Second Arab Awakening.* **Internat. Aff.** 47, no. 1 (Ja '71) 186-8. (P. Vatikiotis); **RCAJ** 58, pt. 1 (F '71) 112-3. (S. Longrigg).

30490 KLAYMAN, M. *The Moshav in Israel: A case study of institution-building for agricultural development.* **J. Devel. Areas** 5, no. 2 (Ja '71) 279-82. (D. Grossman).

30491 KLIEMAN, A. *Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World: The Cairo Conference of 1921.* **Ann. Amer. Acad. Polit. Soc. Sci.** no. 394 (Mr '71). 156-7. (J. McDonald); **New Outlook** 14, no. 1 (Ja '71) 57-8ff. (S.B.)

30492 KNAPP, W. *Tunisia.* **Muslim World** 61, no. 1 (Ja '71) 54-5. (J. Cooke).

30493 LAKIN M. *et al. Arab and Jew: A case study in a human relations approach in conflict.* **Muslim World** 61, no. 1 (Ja '71) 52-3. (D. Baly).

30494 LANDAU, J. *Jews in 19th Century Egypt.* **Mid. East Internat.** no. 2 (My '71) 47.

30495 LAPIDUS, I. ed. *Middle Eastern Cities: A symposium on ancient, Islamic and contemporary Middle Eastern urbanism.* **Amer. Sociol. Rev.** 35, no. 6 (D '70) 1139. (M. Chatti); **Amer. Anthrop.** 72, no. 6 (D '70) 1521-2. (K. Brown); **Amer. Hist. Rev.** 76, no. 2 (Ap '71) 532-3. (J. Christopher); **Muslim World** 61, no. 1 (Ja '71) 48-50. (H. Crane).

30496 LAPIDUS, I. *Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages.* **Rev. Etudes Islamiques** 38, no. 2 (1970). (In French). (J. Sourdel-Thomine).

30497 LENCZOWSKI, G. ed. *The Political Awakening in the Middle East.* **Muslim World** 61, no. 1 (Ja '71) 51-2. (J. Cooke).

30497 LE TOURNEAU, R. *The Almohad Movement in North Africa in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries.* **Hamizrah Hehadash** 21, no. 1 (1971) 71-2. (In Hebrew).

30498 LEVY, R., tr. *The Epic of the Kings. Shah-Nama, the national epic of Persia by Ferdowsi.* **J. A. Hist.** 3, no. 2 (1969) 161-2. (G. Widengren).

30499 LEWIN, B. *Texte im Dialekt von Hama.* **Archiv O.** 39, no. 1 (1971) 108-9. (K. Petráček).

30500 LEWIS, B. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey.* **Der Islam** 47 (Ja '71) 348-51. (R. Kreutel).

30501 LEWIS, S. *Economic Policy and Industrial Growth in Pakistan.* **Amer. J. Agricultural Econ.** 53, no. 1 (F '71) 146-7. (A. Egbert); **J. A. Stud.** 30, no. 2 (F '71) 494-7. (G. Papanek); **J. Devel. Areas** 5, no. 2 (Ja '71) 277-9. (M. Rozen).

30502 LEWIS, S. *Pakistan: Industrialization and trade policies.* **RCAJ** 58, pt. 1 (F '71) 94. (M. Zinkin).

30503 LISSAK, M. *Social mobility in Israel society.* **Internat. Labour Rev.** 103, no. 3 (Mr '71) 306-7. (K.G.).

30504 LUTFI, A. *OPEC Oil.* **Orientforschung** 16, no. 2 (1970) 319-21. (In German). (G. Barthe).

30505 MAHGOUB, F. *A Linguistic Study of Cairene Proverbs.* **BSOAS** 34, pt. 1 (1971) 142-3. (T. Johnstone).

30506 MARLOWE, J. *Cromer in Egypt.* **New Mid. East** no. 30 (Mr '71) 46.

30507 MARMORSTEIN, E. *Heaven at Bay: The Jewish Kulturkampf in the Holy Land.* **RCAJ** 58, pt. 1 (F '71) 106-8. (D. Watt).

30508 MIKES, G. *The Prophet Motive: Israel today and tomorrow.* **RCAJ** 58, pt. 1 (F '71) 106-8. (D. Watt).

30509 MITCHELL, R. *The Society of Muslim Brothers.* **RCAJ** 58, pt. 1 (F '71) 112. (R. Serjeant); **Amer. Sociol. Rev.** 35, no. 6 (D '70) 1137-9. (R. Antoun).

30510 NERSESSIAN, S. *The Armenians.* **Armenian Rev.** 24, no. 1-93 (1971) 78-80. (R. Mirak).

30511 NIRUMAND, B. *Iran: The new imperialism in action.* **World Polit.** 23, no. 3 (Ap '71) 522-43. (S. Zabih); **Internat. Aff.** 47, no. 1 (Ja '71) 189-90. (H. Purcell).

30512 O'BALLANCE, E. *The War in the Yemen.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,611 (My 14 '71) 558.

30513 OTTAWAY, D. and M. *Algeria: The politics of a socialist revolution.* **Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev.** 65, no. 1 (Mr '71) 228-9. (B. Weinstein); **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 31,611 (My 14 '71) 558.

30514 PALVA, H. *Lower Galilean Arabic.* **Archiv O.** 39, no. 1 (1971) 109-10. (K. Petráček).

30515 PARKES, J. *Whose Land? A history of the peoples of Palestine.* **Internat. Aff.** 47, no. 1 (Ja '71) 184-5. (M. Yapp).

30516 PATAI, R., ed. *Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel.* **Amer. Zionist** 61, no. 7 (Mr '71) 51-2. (J. Adler).

30517 PEREIRA, M. *East of Trebizond.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,604 (Mr 26 '71) 342.

30518 PERES, S. *David's Sling.* **Midstream** 17, no. 4 (Ap '71) 63-9. (S. Marshal); **RCAJ** 58, pt. 1 (F '71) 106-8. (D. Watt).

30519 PERLMUTTER, A. *Military and Politics in Israel.* **Jewish Soc. Stud.** 33, no. 1 (Ja '71) 77-9. (C. Kamen); **Ann. Amer. Acad. Polit. & Soc. Sci.** no. 394 (Mr '71) 159. (B. Halpern).

30520 PETERS, F. *Aristotle and the Arabs: The Aristotelian tradition in Islam.* **BSOAS** 34, pt. 1 (1971) 147-8. (J. Mattock).

30521 PIRZADA, S. ed. *Foundations of Pakistan: All-India Muslim League documents, 1906-1947: Vol. I, 1906-1924.* **Muslim World** 61, no. 1 (Ja '71) 44-5. (A. Ahmad).

30522 QURAISHI, A. *Liberal Nationalism in Egypt.* **Pak. Horizon** 23, no. 4 (1970) 421-4. (S. Aktar).

30523 RAKOWSKA-HERMSTONE, T. *Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia.* **Russian Rev.** 30, no. 2 (Ap '70) 186-7. (F. Kazamzadeh); **India Quart.** 26, no. 4 (O-D '70) 435-6. (D. Kaushik).

30524 RAMAZANI, R. *The Foreign Policy of Iran, 1500-1949: A developing nation in world affairs.* **World Polit.** 23, no. 3 (Ap '71) 522-43. (S. Zabih).

30525 REISMAN, M. *The Art of the Possible; Diplomatic alternatives in the Middle East.* **Mid. East Internat.** no. 2 (My '71) 49. (TL).

30526 REVAULT, J. *Palais et demeures de Tunis—XVIe et XVIIe siècles.* **Hespéris Tamuda** 10, nos. 1-2 (1969) 233-5. (M. El Habib).

30527 ROLBANT, S. *The Israeli Soldier.* **Midstream** 17, no. 4 (Ap '71) 63-9. (S. Marshal).

30528 SACHER, H. *The Emergence of the Middle East: 1914-1924.* **Mid. East Internat.** no. 2 (My

'71) 48. (W. Dorsey).

30529 SAMUEL, E. *A Lifetime in Jerusalem.* **RCAJ** 58, pt. 1 (F '71) 110-1. (N. Bentwich).

30530 SARRUF, F. and S. TAMIN, eds. *American University of Beirut Festival Book (Festschrift).* **Muslim World** 61, no. 1 (Ja '71) 58-9. (G. Handford).

30531 SEGRE, V. *Israel: A society in transition.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,611 (My 14 '71) 558.

30532 SHAPIRO, A., ed. *The Seventh Day: Soldiers talk about the six-day war.* **Midstream** 17, no. 4 (Ap '71) 63-9. (S. Marshal).

30533 SINGH, S. *Pakistan's Foreign Policy.* **India Quart.** 26, no. 4 (O-D '70) 434. (H. Arya).

30534 SNEAD, R. *Physical Geography of the Makran Coastal Plain of Iran.* **Geog. J.** 137, pt. 1 (Mr '71) 89. (N. Falcon).

30535 STARK, F. *Turkey.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,604 (Mr 26 '71) 342.

30536 STERN, J. and W. FALCON. *Growth and Development in Pakistan.* **Amer. J. Agricultural Econ.** 53, no. 1 (F '71) 146-7. (A. Egbert).

30537 STEVENSON, W. *Zanek!* **Midstream** 17, no. 4 (Ap '71) 63-9. (S. Marshal).

30538 STIEGLECKER, H. *Die Glaubenslehren des Islam.* **Islamic Rev. and Arab Aff.** 58, no. 9 (S '70) 40. (D. Khalid).

30539 SUZUKI, P. *Social Change in Turkey since 1950: A bibliography of 866 publications.* **Amer. Anthrop.** 72, no. 6 (D '70) 1522 (L. Fallers).

30540 SZYLIOWICZ, J. *Political Change in Rural Turkey.* **Hamizrah Hehadash** 21, no. 1 (1971) 78. (In Hebrew).

30541 TALMON, J. *Israel among the Nations.* **RCAJ** 58, pt. 1 (F '71) 108-10. (N. Bentwich).

30542 TERASSE, H. *La mosquée Al-Qaraouiyin à Fès.* **Hespéris Tamuda** 10, nos. 1-2 (1969) 227-30. (B. Rosenberger).

30543 THOMAS, R. *Dalīl al-Mustalahāt al-Dīniya: Inglizī-'Arabi.* **Muslim World** 61, no. 1 (Ja '71) 41-2. (R. Speight).

30544 TIBAWI, A. *American Interests in Syria 1800-1901.* **Der Islam** 47 (Ja '71) 324-5. (N. Ziadeh).

30545 TIETZE, A. *The Koman Riddles and Turkic Folklore.* **Archiv O.** 39, no. 1 (1971) 106. (L. Hřebiček).

30546 TOMICHE, N. *L'Égypte moderne.* **ZDMG** 120, hft. 1 (1970) 209-10. (F. Steppat).

30547 VANCE, V. and P. LAVER. *Hussein of Jordan: My war with Israel.* **Rev. Polit. Internac.** no. 112 (N-D '70) 248-50. (E.-R. Estrade y de Miguel).

30548 VATIKIOTIS, P. *Egypt since the Revolution.* **Polit. Sci. Quart.** 86, no. 1 (Mr '71) 163-5. (M. Berger); **Bibliotheca O.** 27, nos. 5-6 (S-N '70) 333-4. (C. Nijland).

30549 WARD, P. *Touring Libya. The Eastern Provinces.* **Bibliotheca O.** 27, nos. 5-6 (S-N '70) 397-8.

30550 WATERBURY, J. *The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan political elite—a study in segmented politics.* **Amer. Hist. Rev.** 76, no. 2 (Ap '71) 533. (R. Brace).

30551 WATT, W. *What is Islam?* **Bibliotheca O.** 27, nos. 5-6 (S-N '70) 398-9. (D. Attema).

30552 WILSON, E. *Jerusalem, Key to Peace.* **RCAJ** 58, pt. 1 (F '71) 110. (S. Longrigg); **Internat. Aff.** 47, no. 1 (Ja '71) 184-5. (M. Yapp).

30553 ZIADEH, F. *Lawyers, the Rule of Law and Liberalism in Modern Egypt.* **Hamizrah Hehadash** 20, no. 1 (1970) 108. (In Hebrew); **Internat. Aff.** (GB) 46, no. 3 (Jl '70) 592-3. (N. Anderson).

CENTRAL LIBRARY UNIVERSITY

ABBREVIATIONS

A., Asia, Asian, Asiatic, Asie, asiatique, etc.
Acad., Academy
Admin., Administration, Administrative
Aff., Affairs
Afr./afr., Africa, African, Afrique, africain, etc.
Amer., American
Ann., Annals, Annales
Annu., Annuaire
Anthrop./anthrop., Anthropology, Anthropological, Anthropologie, anthropologique, etc.
Assoc., Association
AUFS, American Universities Field Staff
B., Bulletin
BSOAS, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies
C., Central
Cah., Cahiers
Com., Communism
Comp., Comparative
Contemp./contemp., Contemporary, contemporain, etc.
Cult., Culture, Cultural
Cur., Current
D., Deutsch, etc.
Dept., Department
Dev., Developing
Develop., Development
East., Eastern
Econ./écon., Economics, Economist, Economic, Économie, économique, etc.
Fak., Fakülte
Fil., Filosofii
For., Foreign
Fr./fr., France, French, français, etc.
G., Gesellschaft
Geog./géog., Geography, Geographic, Geographical, Géographie, géographique, etc.
Hist./hist., History, Historical, Historie, historique
IBLA, Institut des belles Lettres arabes
Inst., Institute, Institut
internac., internacional
Internat./internat., International, international, Internationale, etc.
internaz., internazionale
Ist., Istorii
J., Journal
jur., juridique
Lit., Literature, Literary
Lab., Labor, Labour
M., Morgenländisch, etc.
Mag., Magazine
Maj., Majallah, Majallat
Mid., Middle
Mod./mod., Modern, moderne, moderno
Nr., Near
O., Orient, Oriental, Orientalia, oriental, oriente, Orientalistczny, etc.
Org., Organization
Pak., Pakistan
Polit./polit., Politics, Political, Politique, politique, Política, etc.
Probs., Problems
Proceed., Proceedings
Quart., Quarterly
R., Royal
Rel., Relations
Res., Research
Rev., Review, Revue, Revista
Riv., Rivista
S., School, Schools
Sci., Science, Sciences, Scienze, etc.
Soc./soc., Society, Social, Sociéte, social, etc.
Sociol./sociol., Sociology, Sociological, Sociologica, Sociologie, sociologique, etc.
Stud., Studies, Studia
Supp., Supplement
Univ., University, Université, etc.
U.S., United States
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Vop., Voprosy
Z., Zeitschrift

FROM THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE

for an understanding of the events
that make headlines

Middle East
MONITOR

COMMUNICATIONS

The JOURNAL *welcomes comments from its readers. All communications should be addressed to the Editor and bear the full name and address of the writer. A selection of those received will be published periodically in these columns. In addition to letters of comment on previous articles, communications on other information of interest will be printed as space is available.*

Roger Le Tourneau

Professor Roger Le Tourneau died at Aix-en-Provence on Wednesday, April 7, 1971, at the age of 63. All concerned with Islamic studies will regret the loss of this excellent scholar. His contribution as mentor, model, and friend will be most acutely missed by that circle of students, North African, European, and American, who study the medieval and modern history of the Maghrib.

For Roger Le Tourneau's life and career were intimately interwoven with Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. He first arrived in North Africa in 1930 as a young man of 23 to teach at the Collège Moulay Idris at Fez where he was destined to remain for eleven years. His long tenure in Fez, during which he rose to become director of the Collège, coupled with his innate perceptiveness and scholarly diligence, offered the necessary gestation period for what became his master work, *Fès avant le Protectorat* (1949).

In 1941 he moved from Morocco to Tunisia where for two years he served as Directeur de l'Instruction Publique et des Beaux-Arts. Then, following the Second World War Le Tourneau began in 1947 a decade-long connection with Algeria as professor at the Faculté de Lettres in the University of Algiers.

His official career in North Africa, extending almost uninterruptedly from 1930 to 1957, gave him a priceless participant-observer's view of the evolving educational system—and of the ruling élites these systems were creating in all three countries. He lived with and—more important—discerned the old which was changing and the new struggling for its place in the sun. He loved and respected what he saw and although, as a man of strong convictions and principles, he had his favorites, he never let these feelings intrude upon his teaching and scholarship. The happy result may be found in the students trained and the works written that he now leaves as legacy—the scholarly insights of a man who lived through tumultuous times and not only reported them with dispassion but also fitted them into the broader historical sweep.

Perhaps this helps to explain how Roger Le Tourneau could write equally compellingly on medieval and modern subjects. His *Evolution politique de l'Afrique du Nord Musulmane 1920-1961* (1962) is one of the most comprehensive and useful accounts of those stormy years.

He could write the monumental *thèse principale* sort of work (witness his *Fès avant le protectorate*). He also could write with verve at a somewhat more popular level without sacrificing scholarly rigor, for example, in his *Fez in the Age of the Marinides* (1961), *La Vie quotidienne à Fès en 1900* (1965), and *The Almohad Movement in North Africa (1969).*

Le Tourneau made a virtue of old-fashioned "building-brick" scholarship wherein the interpretative synthesis remained closely tied to the known facts. This careful, conscientious scholarship is evident in his thorough revision of what became the second edition of Charles-André Julien's *Histoire de l'Afrique de Nord: Tunisie — Algerie — Maroc — de la conquête arabe à 1830* (1952—English edition 1970). Yet he was equally able to turn his hand to the creative challenge of developing an "ideal-type" or model as may be seen in his monograph, *Les Villes Musulmanes de l'Afrique du*

Nord (1957).

From 1957 until his death Le Tourneau served as professor at the Faculté de Lettres at Aix-en-Provence. He also directed for five years (1965-1970) the Centre de Recherche sur l'Afrique Mediterranéenne.

Roger Le Tourneau also directly shared his scholarly interests and expertise with American students and scholars by accepting in 1959 a visiting professorship at Princeton University which brought him to that campus for one semester in alternate years. His presence greatly stimulated North African studies in this country, and many of the most promising young American scholars in this field look on him as their *maître.*

What better epitaph than to be remembered in fondness and respect by scholars from three different cultural areas—his native France, the Maghrib, and the United States.

Sir:

A reading of Dr. Shepehr Zabih's review of Dr. R. K. Ramazani's *The Foreign Policy of Iran, 1500-1941: A Developing Nation in World Affairs* in *MEJ,* 1970, pp. 382-84, and the subsequent correspondence (*MEJ* 1971, pp. 155-56, 304) brings the following points directly to one's attention:

Those raised in Dr. Ramazani's letter, but left unanswered in Dr. Zabih's reply:

> Ramazani's letter complains of the review's oversight of the chief reason for the adoption of the concept of "rationality." Instead of responding to this point Zabih proceeds to revise his own previous assessment. In his review he praises Ramazani for his "systematic and comprehensive analysis of Iran's foreign policy spreading over four and half centuries," but in the letter he charges Ramazani's analysis with "single factor fallacy."
>
> Ramazani's letter also complains that Zabih's review misrepresents his writing on Qavam's "procrastination" in 1946, but Zabih's reply totally ignores this point.

Dr. Zabih's letter in reply to Dr. Ramazani, on the other hand, raises new criticisms unmentioned in the original review:

> Qavam's role in regard to the 1947 bill declaring the oil agreement with the Soviet Union null and void, and an assertion concerning "recapitulation and reinterpretation of works in Western languages."

In addition to the above, Dr. Zabih refers the reader to a subsequent review by him of the same book in another journal: perhaps he is unaware that the general practice in the scholarly community is to refrain from reviewing the same work in two publications.

MAJID KHADDURI
Distinguished Research Professor
School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University.

ANNOUNCEMENT

An international community of Arab, Israeli and other scholars under the auspices of the Arab-Israeli Research and Relations Project (AIRRP) is trying to examine the missed opportunities for Middle East peace and aspects of the Palestinian national question with the hope of depolarizing American opinion and dealing in a constructive way with the problems of the peoples of the Israeli and Arab worlds.

An Annotated Bibliography on Arab-Israeli Relations has just been published by AIRRP listing twenty-five books on the Middle East. It is designed to aid the general reader in finding pertinent and objective material on the Middle East and may be obtained from their office at 1865 Broadway, New York, N. Y. 10023.

AIRRP is an affiliated project of the Fund for Peace. Its Executive Committee includes: Professor Samir Anabtawi, Mr. Simha Flapan, Professor Fred Khouri, Professor Joseph Lyford, Professor Don Peretz, Professor Hugh Smythe, Mr. John Volkmar, and Mr. Peter Weiss. Mrs. Louise Berman is the Executive Director. The group is promoting scholarly research through writing, by means of seminars, assemblies and discussions to stress the problems shared by the antagonists and the opportunities that exist for their peaceful resolution.

New

Britain, India, and the Arabs, 1914-1921
Briton Cooper Busch
Richly detailed, this work provides a full treatment of the complex shaping and execution of British policies in the Arab world during and immediately after World War I. Professor Busch shows that the British government in India exerted important influence on the reconstruction of the Middle East following the war. Especially valuable are the examination of British relations with Ibn Saud and other eastern Arabian leaders, the discussion of the Mesopotamian Revolt in 1919, and the consequent changes in British policy toward this area.
1971 LC: 71-132421 ISBN: 0-520-01821-4 464 pages $14.50

Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914
Briton Cooper Busch
"The work is a very useful study in the Great Power rivalries during the two decades preceding World War I, in the history of the formation of the British Imperial policy and in the diplomatic and political history of the Middle East. It is a valuable addition to the study of this important area that remains to this day a centre of Great Power ambitions and confrontation—direct or indirect."—*The Indian Political Science Review*
"Professor Busch has written a fast-paced, coherent book—a complicated story, but one that is fascinating in its very complexity."—*The Middle East Journal*
LC: 67-24120 ISBN: 0-520-00200-8 432 pages $10.75

from California
University of California Press • Berkeley 94720

Some said President Sadat's reactions to Moscow-oriented Egyptian leaders in May '71 came as a surprise . . .

Not to us. In January '71, we predicted that President Sadat would strengthen his leadership to include center and to-the-right elements (p. 254)

NONALIGNED THIRD WORLD ANNUAL

1,250 FOOTNOTES 2,500 CITATIONS 6,000 NAME-SUBJECT INDEX

Writing in the Middle East Section: Richard J. Ward • Vick Vance • Ray L. Cleveland • Ismail Serageldin • T. B. Irving • Andrew Carvely • Rowland Ellis • Gustav Thaiss • Nancy W. Boone • Research Notes on Israel, Hangings, Refugees, El Aksah • 723-entry chronological bibliography on the Libyan Arab Republic

Cloth: $14.00 • Paper: $8.50 • 366 pp. • Library of Congress Card No. 74-89628
BOOKS INT'L OF DH-TE INT'L • P.O. BOX 14487 • ST. LOUIS, MO. 63178 • U.S.A.

Africa report

What's Happening in Africa? Whether it's Politics, Social Change, Economics, Science or the Arts — Keep in Touch with the Events, Ideas, Personalities and Trends that are Transforming a Continent.

SPECIAL OFFER: One-year introductory offer of $5.00 to new subscribers covers nine issues and an index. Normal regular mail subscription $8.00.

TO SUBSCRIBE: Please check box below and use coupon to print your name and address.

Cut along dotted line

AFRICA REPORT
530 DUPONT CIRCLE BUILDING
WASHINGTON D.C. 20036

☐ please enter $5.00 introductory subscription. Check enclosed.
☐ please send free specimen copy without obligation.

NAME______________________________

ADDRESS______________________________

____________________zip code____________________

ME-2

AUTUMN 1971

THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

THIS ISSUE

cial and Economic
eterminants of Political
iolence: A Case Study
f the Punjab
Shahid Javed Burki

Changing Pattern of
raq's Foreign Trade
Abbas Alnasrawi

e Recent War-Related
rabic Fiction
Trevor J. LeGassick

ok Reviews Document

iography Chronology

mmunications Annual Index

25, No. 4 $2.50



MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE · WASHINGTON, D.

[redacted]

THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

Editor
William Sands

Book Review Editor
Harry N. Howard

Managing Editor
Kathleen H. B. Manalo

Editorial Consultant
A. Hossein Faris

Editorial Assistants
John Duke Anthony
Peter Nulty
Roxann Van Dusen

Board of Advisory Editors
Douglas D. Crary
C. Grove Haines
Herbert J. Liebesny
Robert F. Ogden
Afif I. Tannous
Robert D. Sethian
A. J. Meyer
Roderic H. Davison
Charles A. Ferguson
Harold W. Glidden
J. C. Hurewitz
Wilfred Cantwell Smith
T. Cuyler Young
Charles Issawi
Charlotte Morehouse
George N. Atiyeh

Published quarterly by the Middle East Institute, Washington, D. C. Subscription price, 1 year, $9.00; 2 years, $16.00. Single copies, $2.50. No additional charge for postage to United States and APO addresses. Add $.50 for foreign mailing. Mail all communications to The Middle East Journal, 1761 N St., N. W., Washington, D. C. 20036. Entered as second-class matter at the Post Office at Washington, D. C. Additional entry at Post Office of Baltimore, Maryland.

Vol. 25, No. 4, Copyright 1971. The Middle East Institute. Printed in U.S.A.

NC ④

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE: A CASE STUDY OF THE PUNJAB

Shahid Javed Burki

The fall of Ayub Khan in the spring of 1969 has already received considerable academic attention. It has been interpreted in many ways. According to Dobell, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's flamboyant and boisterous opposition to Ayub Khan's leadership was largely responsible for the collapse of Pakistan's first military régime. According to this explanation, Bhutto sensed the restlessness that existed within several important sections of the country's population and managed to mobilize it effectively.[1] Wilcox attributes Ayub Khan's eclipse to his near-fatal illness in the spring of 1968.[2] A serious pulmonary embolism immobilized the President. In this period the power passed to a cabal of civil servants. Therefore, Ayub Khan's illness brought to the forefront not only the important question of succession in Pakistan's praetorian society, but also demonstrated the fact that the constitutional instrument under which the country was governed was mostly a convenient façade.[3]

Some Pakistani observers, particularly Z. A. Suleri of *The Pakistan Times,* hold the celebration of the tenth year of Ayub Khan's rule largely responsible for his downfall.[4] The military régime that came to power under Ayub Khan

---

[1] W. M. Dobell, "Ayub Khan as President of Pakistan," *Pacific Affairs,* Vol. XLII, No. 3 (Fall 1969), p. 307.

[2] Wayne Wilcox, Pakistan in 1969: "Once Again at the Starting Point," *Asian Survey,* Vol. X, No. 2 (February 1970), p. 73.

[3] Under article 16 of the 1962 Constitution of Pakistan, the Speaker of the National Assembly was designated as the successor to the President. Abdul Jabbar Khan, the Speaker of the Second National Assembly (1965-1969) was not a member of the group that governed the country when Ayub Khan was incapacitated. Had the President not recovered, it is unlikely that Jabbar Khan would have been allowed to succeed him.

[4] Z. A. Suleri contributed a number of articles to *The Pakistan Times* during the political crisis preceding the fall of Ayub Khan. Under the title "Men and Matters," Suleri elaborated on the impact of government propaganda on the people, particularly those living in the rural areas. Suleri argued that the civil bureaucracy deliberately emphasized the government's economic development rôle in order to cover up its deficiencies in the field of political organization. See *The Pakistan Times,* September-January 1970-71.

△ SHAHID JAVED BURKI has been a research associate at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University for the past year. This article was presented in its original form at the Conference of the Research Committee on the Punjab, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, May 6-8, 1971. The author is indebted to Professors Robert LaPorte, Joan Nelson, Richard Wheeler and Wayne Wilcox for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Part of the research on which this paper is based was sponsored by the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.

in October 1958 concerned itself mainly with the country's economic development.[5] In 1958 the country faced a serious economic crisis. The first and principal concern of the new government was to set Pakistan's economic house in order. This was done expeditiously and effectively. Modernization—a word that Ayub Khan understood only in its economic context—provided the *coup d'état* of October 1958 with its *raison d'être.* Therefore, when the régime prepared to celebrate its tenth year in office, it spent a good deal of its propaganda effort on its economic achievement.[6] There was a difference between the government's and the people's interpretation of economic improvement. The officials spoke in aggregate terms—gross national product, structural changes within and between the productive sectors of the economy, trade balance, etc. Moreover, all these changes were viewed in a long term perspective. The people looked at economic improvement in more disaggregate terms—purchasing power of the rupee, spatial income differences, personal income disparities, etc. The rising prices of 1965-68 reduced the purchasing power of the rupee; rapid strides in agriculture and some sectors of industry increased interpersonal and interregional income disparities. Therefore, the government's view of economic development was not only misunderstood by the people, it was treated as a fraud that a handful of vested interests were perpetrating on the society. The people's reaction was accordingly sharp and violent.

Maniruzzaman also provides a socio-economic explanation for the fall of Ayub Khan. He attributes it to corruption which affected all sections of the powerful civil bureaucracy.[7] Corruption transfers resources from those who wield economic power to those who wield political power. It is tolerated when the rate of growth of the economy can accommodate such a transfer; it is resented when a slowdown in economic development makes it difficult for the recipient of administrative favors to reward those who dispense them.[8] If corruption could be regarded as a separate income-generating sector then it could be argued that over time its share in the national income cake increased at the expense of other sectors.

---

[5] For a detailed analysis of the rôle played by economic development policy in winning support for the régime of Ayub Khan, see W. Howard Wriggins, *The Rulers Imperative: Strategies for Political Survival in Asia and Africa* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 181-187.

[6] Ministry of Information, Government of Pakistan, sponsored a number of publications to celebrate the Decade of Development. A large number of these publications dealt with the economic achievements of the government of Ayub Khan. *The Pakistan Times,* an influential newspaper owned by the semi-official National Press Trust, published 48 special supplements during the period of celebration (October 1967-October 1968); 32 of these dealt with economic matters.

[7] Talukdar Maniruzzaman, "Crisis in Political Development and the Collapse of the Ayub Regime," *The Journal of Developing Areas* (forthcoming).

[8] For a general discussion of corruption in developing societies, see David H. Bayley, "The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation," *Western Political Quarterly,* Vol. XIX, No. 4 (December 1966), pp. 719-732 and Joseph S. Nye, "Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis," *American Political Science Review,* Vol. LXI, No. 2 (June 1967), pp. 417-427.

There is, therefore, considerable divergence in the views that have been presented by academic commentators to explain the fall of Ayub Khan. There is some truth in all of them. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto played a significant rôle in mobilizing the forces that overturned the régime. Ayub Khan's illness, the increase in interpersonal and interregional disparities, the prevalence of corruption, etc., provided Bhutto with an opportunity to bring together the political elements opposed to the régime. It is conceivable that without him the agitation that built up would not have reached the pitch required to dislodge a firmly established régime. It is also conceivable that without the social and economic developments that took place in the Pakistan of Ayub Khan, the Bhutto phenomenon, despite all its attendant charisma, would not have become the social and political force that it did in 1968 and again in 1970.[9] Charismatic leadership fed on socio-economic forces and, simultaneously, socio-economic forces built up charismatic leadership to produce the anti-Ayub Khan movement. The purpose of this paper is to understand the nature of these socio-economic forces. The discussion will be limited to the Punjab, the area in which these forces produced their most significant impact.

The course of violence in Pakistan's two decades of independence has been carefully documented in official publications. Every year, the government issues *The Year Book of Pakistan.* The last section of this publication is devoted to a presentation of time series indicating the trend in crimes committed against persons, property and the state. The last category is subsumed under the title of "riots" and includes mostly acts of defiance by the people of the orders passed by the government under various regulations. Ayub Khan's régime used Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code and various provisions of the Defence of Pakistan Rules to regulate public political behavior. Unwillingness on the part of the public to subscribe to government-established rules of conduct usually led to arrests. Any such defiance leading to an arrest or arrests was interpreted as a riot and included in *The Year Book* statistics.

The Year Book provides aggregate data. In this paper we use the riot data in its disaggregate form—the number of people arrested in the ten quarters between October 1966 and March 1969. The data are for the cities and for the towns with populations of more than 10,000.

Table I reveals a number of interesting things about the course of the political movement that eventually led to the fall of the régime of Field Marshal Ayub Khan. For West Pakistan the series for the number of arrests made per thousand of the urban population shows two discontinuities, one in the second quarter of 1967 and the other in the second quarter of 1968. The index shows an increase of 50 per cent between the first and second quarters

---

[9] In the elections held to the National Assembly on December 7, 1970, Pakistan's Peoples Party of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto surprised all political observers by winning 81 out of 138 seats allocated to the four provinces of West Pakistan.



NOTE: The figures are for arrests made in the cities and in the towns of populations over 10,000. A city is defined as an urban center with a population of more than 100,000. A town is defined as an urban center with a population of between 10,000 and 100,000.

SOURCE: Author's Survey

of 1967 and 64 per cent between the first and second quarters of 1968. The series for the Punjab also shows increase for the same periods though the rates of increase between the first and second quarters (38 per cent) is not as sharp as it is for the rest of West Pakistan. This data gives some indication about the course followed by the political movement that preceded the change of government on March 25, 1969. It appears that the movement against the régime of Ayub Khan picked up some momentum in all regions of West Pakistan in the spring of 1967. However, it seems from the data that the movement first gathered speed in the regions outside the Punjab and that the Punjabis joined the bandwagon in the spring of 1968.

TABLE I *Number of arrests per thousand of the urban population made under various preventive detention ordinances*

	1966 Quarter	1967 Quarters				1968 Quarters				1969 Quarter
	I	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I
West Pakistan	0.15	0.14	0.21	0.24	0.22	0.25	0.41	0.49	0.48	0.38
Punjab	0.14	0.13	0.18	0.18	0.19	0.26	0.43	0.49	0.53	0.40
Punjab Cities	0.15	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.42	0.54	0.62	0.45
Punjab Towns	0.12	0.12	0.23	0.24	0.28	0.42	0.39	0.41	0.41	0.32

Source: Author's Survey

Note: The figures are for arrests made in the cities and in the towns of populations more than 10,000. A city is defined as an urban center with a population of more than 100,000 and a town as an urban center with a population of between 10,000 and 100,000.

There is a considerable change in the scenario if we disaggregate the data for arrests according to the size of the urban centers that were participating in the political movement. The number of political arrests per thousand of the urban population remained remarkably stable right up to the second quarter of 1968. It is then that the seven cities of the Punjab not only joined the movement but overtook it. This is one reason why most scholars date the start of the anti-Ayub movement to the summer of 1968.[10] However, the Punjab towns showed an almost 100 per cent increase in the level of political unrest (if the number of arrests per thousand of the urban population could be used as a surrogate for political unrest and violence) between the first and second quarters of 1967. This means that the 38 per cent increase we noticed above in the level of unrest in the Punjab is wholly accounted for by the towns. If the anti-Ayub movement is to be given a time and a place for its birth then we can say with some confidence that it started in the spring of 1967 in the towns of the Punjab.

---

[10] See the works mentioned in notes 1 to 3. Also see S. M. Zafar, *Through the Crisis* (Lahore: Book Center, 1970), *passim.*

Why did such a sharp increase in the level of political violence occur in the towns of the Punjab in the spring of 1967? Why is it that the political movement, associated with this unrest, once having been generated in the towns, transferred itself to the cities? In order to answer these questions, we must analyze the political upheaval of 1967-1969 in terms of a number of social and economic variables. This can be done by regarding the number of arrests per thousand of the population (NATP) as a dependent variable to be explained by a number of independent variables. The socio-economic independent variables used in this paper are listed in Table II.

TABLE II *Description of the Social and Economic Variables Used to Correlate with the Number of Arrests Per Thousand of the Urban Population*

Variable	Description	Source of Data
PUBP	Percentage of Urban Population in the District	Census of Population, 1961
GRUP	Growth Rate of Urban Population	Census of Population, 1961
PPCC	Percentage of Population in the District/Tehsil living in the City/Town	Census of Population, 1961
GRTP	Growth Rate of Total Population of the District	Census of Population, 1961
PPBO	Percentage of District Population Born Outside	Census of Population, 1961
PLIT	Percentage of Literate Population in the District	Census of Population, 1961
PRUP	Percentage of Refugees in the Urban Areas of the District	Census of Population, 1951
PCIP	Per Capita Industrial Product in the District	Census of Manufacturing Industries, 1968-69
PFAF	Percentage of Farmers Owning More than Fifty Per Cent of the Land	Census of Agriculture, 1960
GCOD	Gini Coefficient of Distribution of Land in the District	Census of Agriculture, 1960

West Pakistan has 45 administrative districts, 19 of which are in the Punjab. To focus on the rôle of the Punjab in the anti-Ayub movement, separate correlation matrices were constructed for the 45 districts of West Pakistan and 53 towns of the province, out of which 19 and 44 respectively were located in the Punjab.[11] Coefficients of correlations between NAPT and various socio-economic variables for both West Pakistan and the Punjab are presented in Table III.

What kind of information do these experiments provide? Table I shows that for the districts of West Pakistan taken together, there is a positive correlation between the level of violence and three of the eight socio-economic variables considered relevant for this purpose. With the remaining five variables the level of violence has a negative relationship. None of these relationships is statistically significant. For the Punjab, however, all the variables are negatively correlated with the level of violence and two of them have a statistically significant relationship with the number of arrests per thousand of the urban population. Therefore the two interesting conclusions that emerge from this exercise are: first, in the Punjab the anti-Ayub Khan movement gained a greater momentum in the areas which had relatively lower levels of per capita industrial incomes. Second, the movement found favor in the areas with low rather than high levels of literacy.

As we see from Table III, the number of significant relationships between the level of political violence and various socio-economic indicators increases when the unrest data is disaggregated for the cities and towns. For the 12 cities of West Pakistan, the level of political unrest is negatively and significantly correlated with the percentage of population in the district that resides in the city, with the rate of growth of urban population, with the percentage of literate population in the urban population and with the percentage of refugees in the city population. For the eight cities of the Punjab only one of these relationships holds its level of significance, that between the level of violence and the rate of growth of urban population. Two interesting things happen when we look at the data for the towns. The number of significant relationships increases to six as against four for the cities and two of the correlations reverse their signs. The two variables that show a positive correlation with the level of violence are the percentage of literacy and the percentage of refugees[12] in the population of the town. No changes take place when correlation coefficients are reworked for the towns in the Punjab. This can be put in another way: Since the bulk of the town population belongs to the Punjab, no difference shows up in the results when the coefficient of correlations are calculated by including the data from the few towns in the North-West Frontier and Sind.

From this exercise we can draw the following broad conclusions. First, the political violence associated with the anti-Ayub Khan movement was higher

---

[11] Government of Pakistan, *Population of Pakistan, 1961, West Pakistan, Vol. III* (Karachi: Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs, 1961), Chapter II.

[12] The reference is here to the 7 to 8 million refugees who migrated to Pakistan from various northern Indian provinces following the 1947 partition of the Indian sub-continent.

TABLE III *Coefficients of Correlations Between the Number of Arrests Per Thousand of the Urban Population and Some Socio-Economic Variables for West Pakistan, North-West Frontier, Punjab and Sind*

Variable	West Pakistan	North-West Frontier	Punjab	Sind
PUBP	−.19	−.59	−.43	−.68*
GRUP	−.26	−.60	−.25	+.12
GRTP	+.16	+.21	.00	−.59
GRPC	−.09	−.67	−.20	+.19
PCIP	−.09	−.87*	−.57*	−.54
PLIT	+.02	−.14	−.48*	−.63*
PPBO	−.16	−.53	−.19	−.77**
PRUP	+.18	+.58	−.07	−.74**

*Significant at .05 level
**Significant at .01 level

Number of Observations:

West Pakistan:	45
North-West Frontier:	6
Punjab:	19
Sind:	11

in the cities and towns with low rates of growth in the population and lower in those that were expanding rapidly. Second, this movement had little success in the areas in which the bulk of the population was concentrated in the urban centers. It was only in those urban areas that were located in the highly populated countryside that the movement gained real ground. Third, the level of industrial incomes per capita of the urban population worked as a constraint against the spread of the movement. This was true more for the towns than for the cities. Fourth, in the towns, the higher the level of literacy in the population, the greater was the incidence of violence. In the cities it was just the opposite. Fifth, in the towns the higher the percentage of refugees from India, the higher was the level of political violence.

The conclusions we drew from the data presented in Table I and from the exercises, results of which are given in Tables III and IV, can be combined to formulate an hypothesis about the political movement that led to the resignation of Ayub Khan as the President of Pakistan. The hypothesis can be stated as follows: The movement originated in the towns of West Pakistan, particularly those of the Punjab, in the spring of 1967. The towns that supported the movement were those that were not growing rapidly, were located in densely populated countryside, did not have many people engaged in industry, had high levels of literacy and a high proportion of refugees from India in their population. For a year the movement was confined to the towns,

TABLE IV *Coefficients of Correlation Between the Number of Arrests Per Thousand of the Urban Population and Some Socio-Economic Variables for Cities and Towns of West Pakistan*

			West Pakistan		Punjab	
Variable	West Pakistan	Punjab	Cities	Towns	Cities	Towns
PPCC	−.29	−.48*	−.63**	−.37*	−.31	−.41*
GRUP	−.26	−.25	−.72**	−.41*	−.87*	−.49*
PCIP	−.09	−.57	−.51	−.81**	−.24	−.78*
PLIT	+.02	−.48*	−.60*	+.38	−.48	+.42*
PPBO	−.16	−.19	−.43	−.08	−.49	−.27
PRUP	+.18	−.07	−.67**	+.43	+.27	+.55*

*Significant at .05 level
**Significant at .01 level

Number of Observations:

West Pakistan districts: 45
Cities: 12
Towns: 53

Punjab districts: 19
Cities: 8
Towns: 44

where it built up gradually in intensity. In the spring of 1968, the movement spread to the cities and reached its peak in the fourth quarter of that year.

This hypothesis, generated with the help of arrest data and data on several socio-economic variables, needs some elaboration before it can be accepted as our explanation for the political events of the years 1967-1969. In particular the two questions posed above have still to be answered.

The evidence presented in this paper to show that during the last two years of the Ayub régime, the towns were politically more restive than the cities seems to go against conventional wisdom. The conventional wisdom feeds itself on a perennial fear of large cities and a perennial hope for small towns. "And both such hopes and fears are so strong because in them the attitudes of various societies and cultures merge; because they are reinforced by the apprehension of bigness as such, and of the images associated with large scale settlements and enterprises—images of depersonalization, alienation, anomie, bureaucratization, and compulsion."[13] Our hypothesis that the small towns played a very significant rôle in the violent political movement of 1967-69 disturbs this image and creates another according to which the towns are the centers of social, political and economic disequilibria. Only small comfort can be drawn from the fact that some responsibility for turning the towns into vortices of political activity rests on the political and economic policies pursued by the régime of Field Marshal Ayub Khan. In what follows we consider the social and economic consequences of some of the program of political and economic modernization launched by Ayub Khan. We will then link these socio-economic developments with the political movement of 1967-1969.

---

[13] Ruth Glass, "Introduction and Conclusions," in *Urban-Rural Differences in Southern Asia, Report on Regional Seminar Delhi, 1962* (Delhi: UNESCO, 1964), p. 3.

Although Ayub Khan defined the genius of the Pakistani people in unflattering terms, he was the first of a series of strong men in the country's brief political history to seek something approaching popular participation in political and economic decision making. The "people are good . . . but they are simple-hearted, hence gullible, and they can be easily misled."[14] They were misled by what he in his military man's language called the "disruptionists, political opportunists, smugglers, black marketeers and other such social vermin, sharks, and leeches."[15] Accordingly, in the program that he formulated for himself, top priority was assigned to the task of ridding the society of these unpleasant influences. This cleansing operation was to be followed by the launching of a new political and economic system.

The régime's first task was to identify and then politically to destroy important social groups within the society. This search and destroy operation was launched with care: a number of commissions were set up to study and report on such matters as land reform, improvement of the legal system inherited from the British, educational reform, settlement of the refugees from India, reform of Muslim family law and incorporation of the private industrial sector into a centrally planned economy. The recommendations made by these commissions adversely affected the interests of such powerful social groups as the landlords, the legal community, the university students, the refugees from India, the *ulama* (religious leaders) and the industrialists. Ayub Khan was right to call the *coup d'état* of October 27, 1958, a social revolution.

The immediate result of the military régime's mission was to reduce the power of the existing pressure groups in the society. A redistribution of this power—the régime conceived this process as a zero-sum game—was to bring new groups into the politicized society. The viability of Ayub Khan's system was dependent on the effectiveness of the new political groups. But in this the régime failed.

"I don't see much sense in it," said Rabbit in *The House at Pooh Corner.* "No," said Pooh humbly, "there isn't. But there was going to be when I began it. It's just something happened to it on the way." Something just happened on the way to Ayub Khan's program of political and economic reform. Some of the social groups that he sought politically to destroy survived, albeit in a mutilated form. And the group that he had chosen to fill the place the old social groups were to vacate never quite came up to his political expectations. Accordingly, in 1962 Ayub Khan changed his political philosophy. Along with the new group—the rural middle class—that he brought up in Pakistan's political society, he included such old groups as the landed aristocracy, the industrialists, city *ulama* and the city lawyers in the broad coalition that he organized at the time of the launching of the 1962 constitution. The students, the small town lawyers, the urban professionals and the small business communities were all discarded. Ayub Khan's program of political reform therefore threw the society into a state of political disequilibrium. That there was no immediate action on the part of the excluded groups to restore the balance in their favor was due to the short-lived period of economic prosperity that swept the entire politicized society in the early 1960s. According to Gustav Papanek, the performance of the régime of Ayub Khan in the field of economic development confounded the prophets of gloom and doom. "Pakistan was widely regarded as one of the half dozen countries in the world with the greatest promise of steady development. In the face of its pitiful resources and capital endowment at independence, and in comparison with other countries, Pakistan's performance was outstanding."[16] Among the groups that were the beneficiaries of this short-lived economic boom were those who had been excluded from the political system of Ayub Khan. Economic participation was regarded as a good substitute for political participation.

---

[14] Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 72.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 89.

Because of a variety of factors, Pakistan's economic bubble was pricked in the late 1960s. Ayub Khan's aggressively maintained stance of neutrality in international affairs and the 17 day war between India and Pakistan in 1965 disillusioned the aid-givers. There was also a change in the attitude of the industrial countries towards the developing nations, from the optimism of the 1950s to the resigned pessimism of the 1960s. This resulted in considerable reduction in the quantities of foreign capital available to the government for economic development. Pakistan's economic difficulties were compounded by a drought-induced agricultural depression in 1965-1966 (Table V). These developments produced a serious impact on the political thinking of such groups as the university students and urban professionals. The impact of the downturn was felt more acutely by the middle classes in the towns than in the cities.

The small town economy, in a country like Pakistan, is influenced more by the agricultural than the non-agricultural sector. The shop keepers and petty merchants find the demand for the goods and commodities they deal with fluctuating in sympathy with non-subsistence rural incomes. A sharp increase in these incomes can send a wave of prosperity through the small town

---

[16] Gustav F. Papanek, *Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 2.

TABLE V *Growth Rates of Pakistan's Economy and Agricultural and Non-Agricultural Sectors at Constant Factor Cost, 1959-60 to 1968-69 (Percentages)*

	GNP	Agricultural Sector	Non-Agricultural Sector
1959-60	4.2	—	—
1960-61	5.2	3.2	7.6
1961-62	5.9	5.2	6.7
1962-63	3.5	0.5	7.1
1963-64	8.3	6.2	10.5
1964-65	4.5	1.8	6.5
1965-66	4.6	1.6	7.5
1966-67	5.0	1.1	8.5
1967-68	7.5	11.3	4.7
1968-69	5.2	2.2	7.8

Source: Government of Pakistan, *Monthly Statistical Bulletin,* Vol. 18, No. 1, January 1970, p. 59.

economy, a fall in the incomes of the surrounding countryside can cause an equally serious depression. Even the professional classes find their incomes fluctuating along with ups and downs in the rural economy. In particular, the lawyers practicing in the civil and revenue courts in the small town *katcheries* (courts) find the quantum of their business moving in sympathy with the incomes yielded by agriculture in the surrounding countryside. This is an interesting point and needs some elaboration.

A depression in the agricultural sector tells heavily on the incomes of the small peasants. In order to mitigate the impact of this squeeze, the small peasants borrow from the relatively prosperous landlords or shop keepers in the village. The money lenders make available the extra resources required by the peasantry in return for mortgages that are easily entered into but not as easily redeemed. When at the time of recovery the peasants find that they have the resources to liquidate some of their debts they also discover that the redemption of debt can be a harrowing experience. Therefore, an increase in the incomes of the small peasants leads to an increase in the number of litigations into which they have to enter. This impression is confirmed by the author's experience as a subdivisional officer and a district administrator in 1964, which as we can see from Table V was a year of agricultural depression. The political unrest in the spring of 1967 was preceded by three years of agricultural stagnation. In this time, the small businessmen, legal community, and other professionals must have suffered great economic deprivation. It is therefore not surprising that the small town lawyers, along with the students, found themselves in the vanguard of the anti-Ayub movement (Table VI).

TABLE VI *Proportion of the students and lawyers arrested in 9 towns of the Punjab under preventive detention ordinances during the second quarter of 1967*

Town	Number of Arrests*	Students	%	Lawyers	%
Gujar Kahn	13	7	53.8	4	30.8
Gojra	17	8	47.1	5	29.4
Jaranwala	28	15	53.6	11	39.3
Kot Radha Krishan	6	2	33.3	1	16.7
Kamoki	24	11	45.1	7	29.2
Sangla Hill	6	2		—	0.0
Daska	11	4	36.4	4	36.4
Pasrur	6	3	50.0	1	16.7
Burewala	19	11	57.9	8	42.1
TOTAL	130	63	48.4	41	31.5

*Includes multiple arrests, i.e., one person arrested more than once.
Source: Author's survey

Out of the 63 students arrested in a sample of nine towns of the Punjab for "anti-state activities" in the spring of 1967, 38 or 60.3 per cent were studying in various city colleges. They had not come from the cities to the towns to spread a political message but belonged to these towns and had come home for the spring vacation. The author's interviews with some of these students reveal the fact that when they left their colleges they carried with them a feeling of acute political and economic frustration. According to them the political constraints imposed on their activities by the régime, particularly in the period following the signing of a peace agreement by Pakistan and India (the so-called Tashkent Agreement of January 1966), had generated a growing feeling of restiveness among the students. The economic down-turn of the late 1960s had augmented these feelings. It became obvious to the students who were resident in the great halls of the Colleges at Lahore, Rawalpindi, Lyallpur, Multan and Sialkot that their share in the reduced number of employment opportunities that were now available would be smaller than that of the students from the cities. The city students had the social, political and economic contacts that the town students could not hope to match. Back in their towns, during the April vacations, the more politically oriented among them came into contact with the disenchanted members of the lawyer community. An alliance was thus automatically forged that ultimately led to the capitulation of the régime of Ayub Khan.

Looking once again at the arrest data, we find that during the early days the agitation was confined to the towns in the northeast of the Punjab. These towns are located in the rain-fed area and hence their countryside is more subject to the fluctuations in output produced by weather conditions than the irrigated countryside of the towns in the southwest Punjab. The skewed distribution of industrial wealth, with concentration in the so-called Lahore-Lyallpur-Multan triangle, has left the northeastern towns of the Punjab at the total mercy of the whims of the agriculture sector. Since organized industry has not reached these towns, they have not been able to attract landless labor from the countryside. Their populations have, therefore, grown at a slow rate. This has kept the level of unskilled labor low in these towns and consequently has increased over time the proportion of the literate population. Since a large number of these towns specialized in crafts like handweaving (the towns in the districts of Rawalpindi, Campbellpur and Jhuhum), pottery (in the towns in the district of Gujrat), and stone-cutting (the towns in the districts of Rawalpindi, Campbellpur and Mianrwali), they attracted a large number of displaced artisans from India in the late 1940s. These socio-economic considerations provide not only the reason why certain towns in the Punjab precipitated the anti-Ayub Khan movement but also explain a number of correlations of Table IV.

As we see from Table I, the indicator of political unrest that we have used to trace the course of the anti-Ayub Khan movement registered a 200 per cent increase in the cities of the Punjab between the first and second quarters of 1968. How do we explain this sudden increase in the level of political violence in the cities?

This question has also to be answered in economic and political terms. As we saw above, Pakistan's economic difficulties in the second half of the 1960-1970 decade began in the agricultural sector. While the economies of the towns were intimately connected with those of the countryside, the economies of the great cities of the Punjab were dependent to a degree on the non-agricultural sectors. These sectors with their long periods of gestation were able to benefit from the investments undertaken during the years of the economic boom. Therefore while the agricultural sector suffered under adverse weather conditions, the non-agricultural sector, despite a change in the aid climate, were able to sustain the city economies at their old levels of prosperity for a little while longer. Moreover, the government, principally because of the presence of the industrialists, followed a complex set of policies to keep down the price of wage goods. Thus the prices of essential food stuffs such as wheat flour were stabilized with the help of PL-480 imports and by the active participation of the government in procuring wheat from the rural areas and distributing it to the consumers in the major urban centers. In Lahore in 1968-1969 the per capita availability of wheat was 15.5 per cent higher and the price of wheat flour charged to the consumer was 13.1 per cent less compared with 1967-1968 (Table VII). However, as we can see from the same

Table, the per capita consumption of other food grains went down in 1966-1967 and 1967-1968; even in 1968-1969 their per capita availability was lower than the level reached three years earlier, in 1965-1966. This produced a sharp impact on prices of some food grains that occupy an important place in the poor man's basket of goods. At the same time the prices of some important food stuffs went up considerably. As the Experts' Committee of Economists noted in their report: "Domestic production of sugar declined drastically in 1967-1968 and led to a crisis in sugar prices. Imports were not arranged in time and could not moderate the price rise effectively."[17] In the Punjab cities of Lahore, Rawalpindi, Multan and Lyallpur, the price of sugar in the spring of 1968 increased by more than 50 per cent. This caused several Pakistani political commentators to label the unrest in the cities in 1968 as "the Great Sugar Revolution."[18]

TABLE VII *Foodgrain Availability and Prices in Lahore*

Year	Per capita availability per day		Average wholesale price of wheat per	Retail price of wheat flour per
	Total food grain	Wheat		
1964-65	12.6	8.9	18.21	0.50
1965-66	13.9	9.8	17.36	0.45
1966-67	10.0	7.0	24.82	0.65
1967-68	9.8	8.4	23.07	0.61
1968-69	13.7	9.7	20.84	0.53

Source: Government of Pakistan, *Report of the Experts' Committee on Economists on Prices* (Islamabad: Ministry of Industries and National Resources, 1969), p. 13.

In 1968 the impact of the scarcity of certain food items on the economy of the cities was compounded by a slackening in the rate of growth of industrial production. The index of industrial production that had been increasing at the rate of over 10 per cent even in the post-1965 period, slowed down its increase in 1967-1968.[19] This produced an impact on the city economy by reducing the number of new jobs available in the industrial sector. Therefore, in 1968 enough economic changes had taken place to make the city dwellers wary of the country's political leadership.

At this time an important political factor contributed to the spread to the cities of the small town movement of political, social and economic discontent.

---

[17] Government of Pakistan, *Report of the Experts' Committee of Economists on Prices* (Islamabad: Ministry of Industries and National Resources, 1969), p. 13.

[18] In particular, see Abdul Majid's weekly political commentaries that appeared in *The Pakistan Times* in the summer and winter of 1968.

[19] Data provided by the Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan.

This was the emergence of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto as a powerful champion of the underprivileged. Using his party's slogan "Islam is our faith, democracy is our polity and socialism is our economy," Bhutto transferred the movement launched by certain disgruntled elements in the small towns into a popular uprising. With his arrival on the scene, the movement gained what it had lacked—a political organization and charismatic leadership. Once a politician and a political organization had taken over the command of the movement, it was transferred into a battle between two powerful political personalities following well defined political and economic philosophies: Ayub Khan versus Zulfiqar Bhutto, authoritarianism versus democracy, capitalism versus socialism. It also caught the imagination of economists, political scientists and the Western press. No wonder, therefore, that most academics see the political disorder that led to the fall of Ayub Khan as originating in the major cities of West Pakistan sometime in the second half of 1968.

The principal conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that the anti-Ayub Khan movement was a complex social, political and economic phenomenon. The political disorder associated with the movement was not compressed in a period of six or nine months prior to the resignation of Ayub Khan in March 1969. It took place over a period of two years and engulfed the entire urban community of West and East Pakistan. It started with the towns in the north-west of the Punjab for a variety of social, economic and political reasons. Slowly it spread to other towns as these too became subject to the forces that had launched it initially. One year after its start in the towns, sudden economic pressures on the city dwellers made them sympathetic to the demands of the people in the towns. At this time a charismatic political personality took over the command of the movement and converted it into a "popular uprising" powerful enough to topple the régime of the Field Marshal.

THE CHANGING PATTERN OF IRAQ'S FOREIGN TRADE

Abbas Alnasrawi

STUDENTS OF IRAQ have dealt in various degrees with the impact of the 1958 Revolution on the various aspects of the Iraqi economy including industrialization, land reform and economic development.[1] Foreign trade, however, has not received the attention commensurate with its importance. The importance of the foreign trade sector derives from the fact that it reflects, to a considerable degree for many developing countries, not only the change in the structure of their economies but also the change in the economic thinking of policymakers as to the nature of economic relationships that they like to maintain with other nations. It is hoped that the present study will shed some light on this important sector of the Iraqi economy.

Introduction

In every economy the foreign trade sector plays an important rôle. The importance of this sector for a developing economy, however, is increased by the fact that foreign trade constitutes a relatively large proportion of the gross national product and that capital goods imports are essential for the process of economic growth. And as the economy of a developing country moves from one level to another the composition and the volume of its exports and imports, as well as their geographical distribution, change also. The effect of an autonomous increase in a country's exports on income and employment, for example, is the equivalent of an indigenous increase in total domestic spending and which, through various linkages, may generate further expansion. Moreover, and if properly understood within the context of planning for economic development, foreign trade should help in lessening the dependence of the economy on its traditional sectors and allow for more diversity in the sources of foreign exchange earnings.

Like most countries, the size, composition and direction of Iraq's foreign trade are determined by a complex of interrelated factors such as the level

---

[1] See, for example, K. M. Langley, "Iraq: Some Aspects of the Economic Scene," *The Middle East Journal,* Vol. 18 (Spring, 1964); J. L. Simmons, "Agricultural Development in Iraq: Planning and Management Failures," *The Middle East Journal,* Vol. 19 (Spring, 1965); F. Baali, "Agrarian Reform in Iraq: Some Socioeconomic Aspects," *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology,* Vol. 28 (January, 1969); R. A. Fernea, "Land Reform and Ecology in Post-revolutionary Iraq," *Economic Development and Cultural Change,* Vol. 17 (April, 1969).

△ ABBAS ALNASRAWI is associate professor of economics at the University of Vermont.

of national income, relative importance of various sectors of the economy, nature of commercial policy and the traditional pattern of foreign economic relations and markets. However, Iraq's foreign trade is also subject to the influence of other factors, such as the revenues from oil, which have a direct effect on the pace of development expenditures and consequently on foreign trade; another is the continued expansion of the public sector at the expense of and relative to the private sector.

The scope of the present study will be limited to an examination of the changing pattern of Iraq's foreign trade since 1958 by analysis of three of its aspects: the changing volume of trade, the changing composition of trade and the change in the pattern of the spatial distribution of trade. The first kind of change—volume—should be reflective of the economy's growth experience and its responsiveness to the world economy. The second—composition—should provide an insight as to the changing demand of a growing economy for various categories of goods and to the changing structure of the domestic supply of goods that the economy is capable of producing to substitute for imports and to increase the volume and the range of its exports. Finally, the changing pattern of spatial distribution should indicate the evolvement of new economic relationships between Iraq on the one hand and her traditional and/or new trading partners on the other.[2]

Volume of Trade

Iraq's volume of trade is an important economic magnitude in both absolute terms and in relation to the gross national product. Iraq's gross national product during the period 1957-1969, the time period chosen for our analysis,[3] increased from ID 413 million to ID 880 million, imports from ID 112 million to ID 155 million and exports from ID 13 million to ID 23 million.[4] In relative terms GNP increased by 113 per cent, imports by 38 per cent and exports by 77 per cent. The relative importance of imports to GNP declined from 27.1 per cent to 17.6 per cent and that of exports declined from 3.1 per cent to 2.7 per cent between 1957 and 1966. On a *per capita* basis GNP increased by 46 per cent, imports declined by 16.9 per cent and exports increased by 21 per cent.

---

[2] Because the oil sector is outside the realm of Iraq foreign trade policy, the transactions of the oil companies as they relate to their imports and to crude oil exports will not be analyzed at present.

[3] The choice of 1957 as the base year was made because it was the last full year prior to the July Revolution. And 1969 was chosen as the terminal year, because it is the last year for which data are available. The foreign trade figures for 1969 in this study are based on actual data for the first nine months of the year.

[4] ID 1 = $2.80. The term "exports" in this study is used to mean nonoil exports. See the tables at the end of this article for sources.

TABLE I *Iraq: Imports, Exports, Gross National Product, 1957-1969*
(millions of Iraqi dinars)

Year	Imports	Exports	GNP	Population (millions)
1957	112.1	12.9	413	6.3
1958	99.8	14.3	436	6.5
1959	99.4	11.5	453	6.7
1960	124.4	8.0	503	6.9
1961	133.5	7.9	557	7.2
1962	127.7	19.3	601	7.4
1963	112.5	16.7	588	7.7
1964	146.7	15.3	638	7.9
1965	161.8	18.1	701	8.2
1966	175.1	23.2	750	8.4
1967	150.4	20.7	760	8.6
1968	143.4	23.0	833	8.8
1969	155.2	23.0	860	9.2

Sources: Imports and Exports: *Central Bank of Iraq Bulletin* (Baghdad, Central Bank of Iraq), various issues.
Gross National Product: International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics, Supplement to 1966/67 Issues* (Washington, D.C., 1968) for 1957-1963 and Ministry of Planning, *National Development Plan 1970-1974* (Baghdad, 1970), for 1964-1969.
Population: Annual Abstract of Statistics, (Baghdad, Central Statistical Organization).

Composition of Trade

Iraq, like other developing countries, has a very small range of exports dominated by few agricultural products such as dates and barley. Imports, on the other hand, consist of a much larger number of items comprising consumer durable and nondurable goods, machinery, transport equipment, raw materials and a large number of capital goods.

Composition of Exports

Iraq's exports fall into three broad categories: agricultural foodstuffs, raw materials and manufactures.

Agricultural foodstuffs: These include dates, barley, wheat, fruits and vegetables. Dates are by far the single most important export item which contributed 26.3 per cent of Iraq's exports in 1957 and 28.9 per cent in 1969. In 1963, however, the contribution of this item was 53.9 per cent. Barley, which was relatively more important than dates as an export item before 1957, contributed 23.3 per cent of the exports in that year and seven per cent in 1969. Its contribution ranged from none in 1967 to 33.1 per cent of total exports in 1958. The relative importance of this category was 54.3 per cent of total exports in 1957 and 41.5 per cent in 1969.

Raw materials: These include cotton, wool, hides, seeds, casings, liquorice roots and fodder. The relative contribution of this category was 26.4 per cent in 1957 and 27.7 per cent in 1969. The range, however, was between 18.7 per cent and 42.2 per cent of exports in 1962 and 1959, respectively.

Manufactures: These include cement, date syrup, and tobacco products and cigarettes. Cement, however, is by far the most important item. Within this group cement accounted for 18.9 per cent of exported manufactures in 1957 and 65.6 per cent in 1969. Other manufactures' contribution increased from 2.1 per cent to 7.2 per cent, respectively.

The foregoing analysis indicates that Iraqi exports throughout the world under consideration continued to be dominated by agricultural products. Of manufactures only cement showed any importance as an exportable commodity. It should be noted, however, that agricultural output, which continued to be the main source of exports, was subject to severe fluctuations which manifested themselves in the annual rate of fluctuating in total exports which ranged between –31.1 per cent and 144.4 per cent during this period. Although severe fluctuation in agricultural output is a common feature of developing economies it was aggravated in Iraq by the dislocational effects of the 1958 Agrarian Reform.[5]

TABLE II *Iraq: Composition of Imports and Exports, 1957-1969**
(millions of Iraqi dinars)

	IMPORTS					EXPORTS			
Year	Nondurable Consumer Goods	Durable Consumer Goods	Raw Materials	Capital Goods	Other Imports	Foodstuffs	Raw Materials	Manufactures	Other Exports
1957	40.1	6.1	10.5	42.8	12.5	7.0	3.4	1.0	1.4
1958	32.7	6.5	8.5	36.4	15.8	8.5	4.1	.7	1.3
1959	40.3	6.2	7.1	29.9	15.9	5.2	4.9	.8	.7
1960	50.6	10.2	10.0	35.0	19.2	4.2	2.7	.7	.4
1961	55.5	9.7	10.5	38.0	19.8	3.9	2.7	.8	.4
1962	44.0	10.3	9.9	43.5	19.9	14.7	3.6	.7	.4
1963	40.2	7.6	8.8	37.5	18.3	10.2	4.5	1.5	.5
1964	56.5	10.6	18.5	49.1	12.0	6.7	5.3	2.3	.6
1965	51.8	10.8	24.1	56.2	18.9	8.4	5.5	3.5	.9
1966	51.5	14.0	20.9	74.6	14.1	10.7	6.3	4.5	1.7
1967	44.3	11.2	19.8	61.3	13.8	7.4	5.1	6.2	2.0
1968	44.6	8.9	19.2	56.7	14.0	7.5	5.4	5.9	4.2
1969	45.1	10.3	18.2	61.2	19.1	9.5	6.4	4.8	2.2

* See Table 4 for sources.

---

[5] See, for example, R. A. Fernea, *op. cit.,* pp. 356-381; A. Alnasrawi, *Financing Economic Development in Iraq* (New York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 72-74.

Composition of Imports

Iraq spent ID 112.1 million or 27.1 per cent of the GNP on foreign goods in 1957 and ID 155 million or 17.6 per cent of the GNP in 1969.

Imports may be grouped into three broad categories: consumer goods, raw materials and capital goods.

While demand for consumer goods is a function of the size of population, level of income, tastes and availability of domestic supply, demand for the other two groups of imports can be said to be determined by the rate of economic growth, stage of industrialization and the availability of export markets. The implications of these observations for Iraq are discussed below.

Consumer goods: This category of imports consists of two major groups: durable goods such as automobiles, household appliances and furniture and nondurable goods such as foodstuffs, textiles and pharmaceutical products. As a category, consumer goods constituted 41.1 per cent of Iraq's total imports in 1957 and 35.7 per cent in 1969. On a *per capita* basis consumer goods revealed a downward trend, from ID 7.3 to ID 6.0, respectively.

More interesting than the behavior of the entire category is the behavior of its two components. While the relative distribution was 86.7 per cent and 13.3 per cent for nondurable and durable goods, respectively, in 1957, this composition was changed by 1969 to 81.4 per cent for nondurable and 18.6 per cent for durable goods. The rate of increase of the value of both components was also revealing. Thus, while the value of the nondurable goods increased by 12.5 per cent during the period under consideration, that of durable goods increased by 68.7 per cent. Finally *per capita* consumption measures of both components reveal that while *per capita* imports of nondurables declined by 20.3 per cent, that of durables registered an increase of 22 per cent during the same period.

The major explanation, if one is to be offered, for the relative decline of consumer nondurable imports may be found in the expansion of the industrial sector during the decade. Industrial output increased at an average annual rate of 18 per cent between 1957 and 1963 and eight per cent between 1964 and 1969.[6]

Given Iraq's stage of economic development it is only natural that the larger part of the industrial sector consists of light industries competing with the foreign suppliers of nondurable consumer goods for a share of the domestic market. According to the Ministry of Planning, local industry was capable of meeting 80 per cent of the domestic demand for processed food items, furniture, beverages and cigarettes and about 40 per cent of domestic demand for textiles, paper and plastic products in 1963. The rising importance of the industrial output is reflected by the fact that this output met in 1957 close to 30 per cent of the demand while its contribution in 1963 was 54 per cent.[7]

---

[6] Ministry of Planning, *The Five Year Economic Plan 1965/1969* (Arabic), in *Al-Iqtiṣādī*, Vol. 6, March 1966, p. 106, for 1957-1963; *National Development Plan, 1970-1974* (Arabic) (Baghdad, 1970), p. 102. It is interesting to note that GNP for the same period increased at an average annual rate of 8.7 per cent. See Table I.

Raw materials: This category which includes plastic, wood, chemical and rubber products, vegetable oils, copper, glass, and silk and cotton yarns continued its upward growth during the decade. This category's relative importance increased from 9.3 per cent to 11.7 per cent in 1957 and 1969, respectively.

Captial goods: This category which includes machinery and equipment, locomotives, vehicles, pipelines, tractors and iron increased its share of total imports from 38 per cent in 1957 to 39.4 per cent in 1969.

The improvement in the relative importance of the last two categories—raw materials and capital goods—could be explained by the continued expansion of industrial activities throughout the period.

Spatial Distribution of Trade

The geographical distribution of Iraq's foreign trade in 1957 revealed that 80.2 per cent of the imports came from the United Kingdom and other countries of the sterling area, the countries of Western Europe and the United States. These same countries bought 58.7 per cent of Iraq's exports. By contrast the Arab League countries contributed 5.6 per cent of Iraq's imports, and 2.1 per cent of the imports was contributed by the socialist countries. The Arab League countries bought 31 per cent of Iraq's exports in that same year while no exports went to the socialist countries.

To change this geographical pattern of Iraq's foreign trade was considered by the July 1958 government as one of the important goals of its foreign economic policy. And toward the achievement of this goal a series of trade agreements was concluded with a number of countries to increase Iraq's options as to the sources of supply of imports and to open up new markets for her exports. The first such agreement was signed with Yugoslavia in October 1958, followed within the same month by another agreement with the Soviet Union. And within the year, other trade agreements were signed with the UAR, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Poland, Bulgaria, China and North Vietnam.[8] One of the main objectives of these agreements was gradually to divert Iraq's trade away from the markets that imperialism imposed.[9] It should be emphasized, however, that the new government's commercial policy was to continue "to maintain the older economic relationships between Iraq and the traditional markets in the West so long as these relationships are freed from the elements of economic and political dependence."[10] To attain these general objectives, the operational principles that were embodied in the new trade agreements included the most-favored-nation clause, the principle that imports should either totally or partially be offset by exports and that trading partners, in certain cases, should buy certain amounts of some of Iraq's exportable commodities which were usually specified in the agreements.[11]

---

[7] Ministry of Planning, *Five Year Economic Plan, op. cit.,* p. 100.

[8] Ministry of the Economy, *Summary of the Accomplishments of the Ministry of The Economy* (in Arabic) (Baghdad: Al-'Anī Press, 1959), preface. Between October 1958 and May 1962, Iraq signed 31 trade agreements. See A. R. al-Habīb, "Notes on Commercial Policy of Iraq" (in Arabic), *Al-Iqtiṣādī,* Vol. 3, Sept. 1962, p. 11.

[9] *14th July Revolution in Its First Year* (Arabic) (Baghdad: Al-Akhbār Press, 1959), p. 163.

To analyze the effects of post-1958 trade policy and agreements, the regional distribution of imports and exports are dealt with separately.

The Changing Regional Pattern of Imports

Between 1957 and 1969 a drastic change in the regional composition of import trade has occurred. The following observations should illustrate this contention.

The United Kingdom: One of the most striking developments during the period was the decline in importance, in both absolute and relative terms, of the United Kingdom's share of Iraq's imports. In 1957 the UK supplied Iraq with ID 27.7 million of the latter's imports or 24.6 per cent of the total. By the end of the period the UK was still Iraq's largest supplier but on a much

TABLE III *Iraq: Regional Distribution of Imports, 1957-1969**
(millions of Iraqi dinars)

Year	UK	Other Sterling Area[a]	US	EEC[b]	Arab League Countries[c]	Socialist Countries[d]	EFTA[e]	Other Countries
1957	27.7	11.8	16.6	27.0	6.3	2.3	5.2	13.7
1958	23.1	11.9	14.0	27.7	4.2	2.2	5.7	11.2
1959	22.7	11.8	9.7	20.1	4.1	7.3	6.4	12.3
1960	21.1	21.8	14.7	27.7	5.3	14.2	8.9	10.7
1961	21.3	23.1	15.1	28.7	4.8	18.4	9.3	12.7
1962	19.6	17.4	14.7	28.8	4.7	21.7	10.6	10.2
1963	16.5	18.0	12.4	22.7	5.8	23.1	8.6	5.4
1964	18.2	22.8	20.1	28.2	8.6	25.7	9.1	13.8
1965	16.7	17.2	20.3	32.5	7.9	41.1	10.4	15.6
1966	23.1	21.6	17.1	42.7	8.4	33.1	12.3	16.8
1967	18.7	18.2	13.8	37.4	7.9	28.9	11.1	14.5
1968	12.0	21.4	5.9	32.1	10.6	31.1	12.1	18.0
1969	17.2	16.1	5.7	35.7	11.7	34.7	12.2	19.8

* See Table 4 for sources and notes.

---

[10] Ministry of the Economy, *op. cit.*

[11] The trade agreement with Rumania, for example, specified that "the value of Rumanian purchases from Iraq shall be no less than 25 per cent of the value of Rumanian exports to Iraq." See United Nations *Treaty Series,* Vol. 405, 1961 (New York, 1962), Document 5836, p. 243; see also "Trade Agreement with the USSR," *ibid.*, Vol. 328, 1959 (New York, 1959), Document 4730, p. 95; al-Habīb, *op. cit.,* p. 12.

smaller scale than earlier. In 1969 the UK was responsible for ID 17.2 million of Iraqi imports or 11.1 per cent of the total.

United States: Iraq's imports from the US represented 14.3 per cent of the total in 1957 but only 3.6 per cent in 1969. It should be noted, however, that this trend was interrupted in 1964 and 1965 when the share of the US of the Iraqi market was 13.7 per cent and 12.5 per cent, respectively. This temporary reversal was due to the shipment of agricultural surplus commodities.[12]

European Economic Community: The Common Market countries achieved a slight improvement in the relative importance of their share. Imports from the six countries declined from 24 per cent of the total to 23 per cent in 1957 and 1969, respectively. It should be noted, however, that, beginning in 1958, Iraq's policy was to exercise economic pressure against France because of the Algerian War. This policy led to drastic decline in her imports from France. Although trade was resumed after 1963, the 1957 level of imports was not regained until 1966.

European Free Trade Association: This group of countries—minus the UK—achieved significant improvement in its relative share of Iraq's imports. This share increased from 4.6 per cent in 1957 to 7.9 per cent in 1969.

The Arab League countries: Although the value of Iraq's imports from other Arab League countries increased by 86 per cent between 1957 and 1969, the relative contribution of these countries to total imports has increased only from 5.6 per cent to 7.6 per cent.

Eastern Europe, USSR and China: The decline in the relative contribution of the West to Iraq's total imports was offset by the emergence of the socialist countries as major trading partners. This group of countries sales to Iraq, which amounted to 2.1 per cent of the latter's imports in 1957, increased to the relatively high level of 22.4 per cent in 1969. The value of Iraq's imports from this group increased from ID 2.3 million to ID 34.7 million.

Japan: Iraq's imports from Japan increased from ID 8.9 million in 1957 to ID 10.8 million in 1969, an increase of 43.8 per cent. Japan's relative share increased from 7.9 per cent to 8.3 per cent, respectively.

The Changing Regional Pattern of Exports

Because of the stage of her economic development, Iraq's exports and their markets are limited. The change, however, in the area and/or country distribution of exports during the decade was no less significant than the change that characterized imports.

The Arab League countries: The change in the exports to the Arab League countries was one of the important developments in the decade. The relative

---

[12] These commodities were wheat, tobacco leaf and poultry. See "US and Iraq Agricultural Commodities Agreement under Title IV of the Agricultural Trade and Development Assistance Act," in UN *Treaty Series,* Vol. 489, 1964 (New York, 1965), Document 7144, p. 271.

TABLE IV *Iraq: Regional Distribution of Exports, 1957-1969*
(millions of Iraqi dinars)

Year	UK	Other Sterling Area[a]	US	EEC[b]	Arab League Countries[c]	Socialist Countries[d]	EFTA[e]	Other Countries
1957	3.7	1.6	.4	1.5	3.9	—	.3	1.6
1958	3.1	1.7	.7	2.2	4.1	—	1.6	1.0
1959	1.5	1.7	1.1	.7	3.6	2.2	.2	.1
1960	.7	1.6	.8	.5	2.5	1.4	.1	.4
1961	.2	2.2	.6	.3	1.6	1.8	.3	.9
1962	1.1	2.5	2.1	4.3	3.7	3.5	1.4	.6
1963	.9	2.6	1.8	.5	5.4	4.4	.3	1.0
1964	.5	3.6	.8	.4	6.1	3.0	.3	.6
1965	.7	3.2	.8	.7	8.2	3.3	.2	1.1
1966	.5	3.9	1.0	.9	10.8	3.9	.0	2.1
1967	.5	3.5	1.1	.3	10.2	3.5	.0	1.3
1968	.3	4.0	.8	.3	12.5	4.0	.0	1.9
1969	.2	3.2	1.1	.1	11.7	5.5	.0	.5

Source: *Central Bank of Iraq Bulletin,* various issues.

a. Australia, Ceylon, India and Pakistan are responsible for the bulk of this area's trade with Iraq.
b. Belgium-Luxembourg, France, Germany, Italy and Netherlands.
c. Algeria, Jordan, Kuwayt, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia and UAR.
d. Albania, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, E. Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, USSR.
e. Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland.

importance of Iraq's exports to these countries increased from 31 per cent to 50.9 per cent of the total between 1957 and 1969. The value of these exports increased by 200 per cent.

Eastern Europe, USSR and China: Iraq had no export trade with these countries before 1958. In 1969, however, these countries bought 23.9 per cent of Iraq's exports.

European Economic Community: The Common Market countries' share of Iraq's exports declined from 11.6 per cent in 1957 to only 0.5 per cent in 1969.

The United Kingdom: Not unlike the decline of her relative importance as a major supplier of Iraq's imports, the UK's purchase of Iraq's exports declined considerably. In 1957, the UK bought 28.9 per cent of Iraq's exports. This share continued its decline throughout the period and by 1969 it reached the low level of 0.7 per cent.

The United States: Although the US share of Iraq's exports increased from 3.1 per cent in 1957 to 10.7 per cent in 1963, it declined to 4.7 per cent in 1969.

European Free Trade Association: To this group of countries Iraq's exports diminished in both absolute and relative terms. This group's share of Iraq's exports was 2.3 per cent in 1957. No exports, however, were recorded in 1969.

Concluding Remarks

The foregoing analysis has shown that Iraq's exports continued to be dominated by primary products. Cement was the only manufacture of any significance. The growth of the industrial sector helped Iraq to meet an increasing share of the domestic demand from domestic sources.

Imports, on the other hand, continued to be dominated by consumer goods but the relative importance of raw materials and capital goods imports improved.

The changing pattern of the geographical distribution of the foreign trade revealed that the Arab League countries and the socialist countries increased their market's share of Iraq's exports. The opposite is true for the UK, Common Market and the EFTA countries. There was a marked diversion of Iraq's import trade away from the markets of the United Kingdom and the US to the markets of the socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union. It should be emphasized that an important factor in this change was the economic aid and loans that the Soviet Union extended to Iraq.

STATISTICAL REFERENCES

Central Bank of Iraq Bulletin (Baghdad), quarterly.

International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics* (Washington, D. C.), monthly.

————, *Direction of Trade* (Washington, D. C.), monthly.

Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Organization, *Annual Statistical Abstract* (Baghdad).

United Nations, *Industrial Development in the Arab Countries* (New York, 1967).

————, *Studies on Selected Development Problems in Various Countries in the Middle East* (New York, 1967).

————, *Foreign Trade Statistics of Iraq,* 1960-1963 (New York, 1967).

————, *Studies on Selected Development Problems in Various Countries in the Middle East, 1968* (New York, 1968).

SOME RECENT WAR-RELATED ARABIC FICTION

Trevor J. LeGassick

IT IS A TRUISM that literature always reflects, directly or otherwise, the interests and concerns of that language, culture and society where it is produced and read. We certainly find that much contemporary Arabic writing, in a variety of fields, deals closely with the Arab world's most fundamental concern, namely the struggle with Israel. A mass of works, many hundreds, have appeared in Arabic in the fields of political science and international affairs dealing with aspects of this confrontation. We find this conflict also, on a different level of emotional and artistic expression, to be a major theme for today's Arab poets. Prose fiction, the novel and the short story, which have only in recent years developed into major Arabic literary genres, are also providing a medium in which Arab intellectuals are expressing their personal reactions and those of their society to this tragic problem.

Fiction in Arabic relating to the Palestine problem developed, however, rather slowly, with early contributions from only a few authors. Apparently the first Arabic novel on the subject was written as late as 1952. Entitled *Lājiʿah (Refugee Girl),*[1] it was the work of the prolific amateur author Jurj Ḥannā, a Lebanese Marxist doctor of medicine. Melodramatic and polemical, with a lengthy introduction analyzing the roots of the conflict, and demonstrating little literary sophistication, the novel aroused scant interest and has appeared only in its first small edition in Beirut. Few of the major contemporary Arabic authors have since, moreover, contributed to literature in this area. Iḥsān ʿAbd al-Quddūs, for all his prominence both in political prose and in fiction both long and short set mainly in Egypt, has still only contributed, to my knowledge, two short stories[2] on the Palestine problem and both appeared over a decade ago. Yūsuf al-Sibāʿī, similarly already a prominent fiction writer by the late 1940s, has apparently published only one novel[3] partially and peripherally dealing with the plight of the Palestine refugees. The other major authors of Egypt, Maḥfūẓ, Idrīs, Ḥaqqī and even Taymūr and al-Ḥakīm, have still written, it seems, no fiction directly and unambiguously relating to the conflict.

---

[1] Dār al-Thaqāfah, Beirut, 1952.

[2] "Baʿīdan ʿan al-Arḍ" and "Sūq al-Fatāfīt" in *Shafatāh,* Beirut, Dār al-Nashr al-Ḥadīth, 1961, pp. 385-428 and 90-96 resp.

[3] *ʿArmala min Falasṭīn,* Cairo, al-Sharikat al-Arabīyah li al-Ṭibāʿa, 1959.

△ TREVOR J. LEGASSICK is professor of Arabic literature at the University of Michigan.

The 1950s and early 1960s did nevertheless see the appearance of some fiction in this field by generally non-Egyptian writers in the form of a handful of novels and a larger number of short stories. Prominent amongst authors of these materials were some Palestinians, the late Samīrah 'Azzām and Ghassān Kanafānī being the most prolific. 'Īsā al-Nā'ūrī, the Jordanian teacher and literary critic, was another consistent early contributor and is especially well known for his touching novella *Bayt Warā al-Ḥudūd (Home Across the Border)*[4] published in Beirut in 1959 as well as for later works. Ḥalīm Barakāt, the Lebanese sociologist, also wrote some of his earliest works at this period on the loss of Palestine and the lot of the refugees. The general tone of these works was nostalgic for better times now gone, the authors tending to dwell on the sadness of the situation. Few of the works from that period dealt with the activities of guerrilla groups and, indeed, tended to relate only peripherally to military engagements of any kind.

Although the body of literature under discussion, from all periods, is essentially still small and our conclusions necessarily tentative, it does seem that changes in the mood, subject matter and popularity of this literature occurred since the *blitzkrieg* of 1967. The number of works of fiction published in Arabic directly relating to the Palestine problem has increased dramatically over the past several years.[5] Short stories especially have been appearing on the subject in a steady stream in a wide range of popular Arabic periodicals, especially *al-Ādāb* and *al-Adīb* from Beirut, in *al-'Arabī* from Kuwayt and in *al-Hilāl* from Egypt. The number of new novels has, of course, been less extensive but some of those are particularly interesting for a variety of reasons. In general they seem to display remarkably similar attitudes on the parts of both the authors and the characters presented in scenes depicting the prelude, conduct and aftermath of the fighting itself and the effects of the defeat on their society. They also demonstrate, amidst all the overlying sense of tragedy, an enthusiasm for the guerrilla movements and an optimism for the future of the Palestine cause more apparent than in the earlier literature.

Of the works under discussion here, Ḥalīm Barakāt's *'Awdat al-Ṭā'ir ilā al-Baḥr (Return of the Flying Dutchman (or Sailor) to the Sea)*[6] seems the most intellectually developed and artistically impressive. Barakāt, born in Syria, brought up in Beirut, with AUB degrees, a Michigan Ph.D. in sociology and now teaching on the AUB faculty, is one of the few Arab writers who dealt with this subject extensively in the earlier period. A short story, *Rimāl (Sands)*, the first story in his collection *al-Ṣamt wa al-Maṭar (Silence and the Rain)*[7] published in 1958, demonstrated the lack of identity, depression and moral decay of a teen-age refugee, unemployed, unaware even of his date of birth, suffering through a conflict-filled disharmony with his mother and sister in a wind-swept refugee tent. So severe are the strains of his existence, we are shown, that he responds by living out his days in a hopeless yet comforting dreamworld of heroic fantasy. A later work, his prophetically entitled *Sittat Ayyām (Six Days),*[8] catalogued the days in a coastal village following delivery of a surrender ultimatum by attacking Zionists during the 1948 conflict. The novella's final mood is of quiet determination but dominated by a sense of despair, typical of this literature before 1967. In the final scene an Israeli officer guarding the captured central figure, Suhayl, comments gazing at the defeated and burning Arab village:

---

[4] Manshūrāt 'Uwaydāt, Beirut, 1959.

[5] For an extensive examination of these materials published up till September 1969 see the doctoral dissertation: *The Arab-Israeli Conflict as represented in Arabic Fictional Literature* by Howard D. Rowland, University of Michigan, 1971.

[6] Dār al-Nahār, Beirut, 1969.

[7] Dār Majallah Shi'r, Beirut, 1958.

"It will soon all be ashes."

"The ashes will fertilize the soil," responds Suhayl.

"And it's we who will exploit it," counters the Israeli, who is followed by Suhayl's final comment:

"For a short time. But I was referring to something else."

(*Op. cit.,* p. 231.)

The novella continues directly to end:

> The officer laughed, pretending to understand. The tide was coming close to land now, no sound heard above the roar of the waves. The gloom was a cloud turning to ashes, then waning but not disappearing. The smoke was still rising, transforming into black clouds. Black clouds and ashes, ashes turning into clouds, the soil itself giving supplication to the clouds and ashes. Something was contracting within his very being. Six days without boredom. What would he do tomorrow? Black clouds and ashes. . . . (*Ibid.,* p. 232.)

Barakāt's latest novel, published in the summer of 1969, is in some ways of similar structure; but, although many of the same points are again made, the concluding mood is both more optimistic and more determined. In its final lines we find the central character in a turmoil of emotions, his mind echoing with the strains of Beethoven's ninth:

> the storms of Wagner and the outburst of Dylan Thomas:
>
> "Death shall have no dominion."
>
> He felt that history was a storm . . . He had to face danger, take risks. He wanted for him to have a shadow. . . . (*Op. cit.,* p. 162.)

Whereas, moreover, *Sittat Ayyām* demonstrated faults in a small village society, leading inevitably to Arab defeat, in *'Awdat al-Ṭā'ir* the canvas is much broader. The novel's action is complex, moving rapidly from one group of characters to another in each of several key centers of the crisis. The principal focus, Ramzy, is again a teacher, this time at the AUB. A well-travelled, American-educated young intellectual, Ramzy is uncommitted to specific social or religious convictions, as is shown by his frankly enjoyed sex relationship and discussions with Pamela, a hippie America tourist separated from her artist husband. Other groups of characters, disconnected from one another, are positioned in Jerusalem, Jericho and a series of named small border villages; events in all these are viewed from time to time throughout the novel's course which covers the crisis period of June 1967. The characters at first display joy and unrestrained optimism in the period prior to and immediately following the start of hostilities. As the Arab defeat unfolds, however, each group's activities are shown gradually changing, death, loss of loved ones and flight into exile being the lot of many exposed to fierce Israeli ground and air attacks. Throughout these dramatic events, Ramzy compensates for his feelings of guilt and impotence in discussions with friends on campus and in sexual encounters with Pamela in his apartment. An artistic unity for the complex whole is achieved by the novel's opening and conclusion being set in Amman, where Ramzy and Pamela view the aftermath of the war and the state of the refugees. The work's central portions, recounting the events of the six days of fighting, intervene in flashback form.

---

[8] Dār Majallah Shi'r, Beirut, 1961.

For all its complicated structure the novel seems to succeed in its apparent threefold objective of expressing the author's emotions, arousing the reader's sympathy and sense of tragedy and making some neatly argued political and philosophical observations. Particularly clearly expressed are the author's criticisms of some evident shortcomings in Arab social behavior and organizational structure. These comments are usually made in dialogue but sometimes through the reported thoughts of Ramzy. One passage, for example, early in the novel, argues against excessive Arab individualism and lack of coordination of effort. Ramzy comments to a colleague, a political scientist:

> "You are expert in your field. Most of our friends are expert in one field or other. Yet can you tell me what they do? Where are the institutions that know how to benefit from their expertise? Whoever cares about them? Who wants them to have opinions? And the experts, how in fact do they operate? Do they cooperate? No one cooperates with anyone else. Each one lives in his own little world. Tell me about the institutions that exist. Tell me about the associations and parties. Nothing. Nothing at all. We lack organization and working as a team. Where's our communication and intercommunication? There are no bridges between the Arab countries. There are no bridges between individuals and groups. That's just the sort of people we are. We are living in times gone by. We sail through swamplands. We eat mud. We seek sanctity from stones and graves. We bow down in prayer before the wind."
>
> (*Ibid.*, p. 23.)

In a later dialogue, a character draws out the Arab's identity crisis, a frequent concern of the author in several of his works and no doubt reflecting his professional expertise in the study of alienation:

> "What bothers me," commented Bashīr joining the discussion, "is that we are a people who have lost their identity and their sense of manhood. Each of us is suffering from a split personality, especially in Lebanon. We are Arab and yet our education is in some cases French, in some cases Anglo-Saxon and in others Eastern-Mystic. A very strange mixture. We need to go back and search out our roots. We're all schizophrenic...." (*Ibid.*, p. 55.)

Arab radio broadcasting is an especially frequent target of critical comment. The excessive emotionalism and militancy of the pre-war broadcasts, with all the heady jubilation of the stirring nationalistic anthems, are shown to have continued long after the Arab defeat was apparent to all. Returning to his apartment late on the second day, Ramzy hears the following news summary:

> "Fierce battles are raging near Jenin in which the Jordanians are fighting heroically."
>
> "Advances on all fronts by Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian and Iraqi forces."
>
> "Iraq and Kuwait have stopped pumping oil."
>
> "Egypt has closed the Suez Canal."
>
> "The Soviet Union has deplored the aggression."
>
> "Hand to hand fighting continues in the streets of Jerusalem."
>
> "Some merchants profiteering in foodstuffs have been jailed."
>
> He turned the dial to another station. Rousing military music. Music that in fact failed to arouse his spirit. On the contrary, it merely made him feel that his country was pathetic. The music was pathetic, the words pathetic, the voices pathetic.
>
> (*Ibid.*, p. 61.)

The consequent love-hate relationship, specifically expressed as such in one passage, he feels towards his country seems paralleled by Ramzy's ambivalence towards the United States. His distress and dislike for what he views as this country's mistaken policies in the Middle East, along with his expressed identification with the Viet Cong, "Third World" victims of "Western Imperialism" and blacks in South Africa and the American South, contrast starkly with his happy memories of travel to American beauty spots and his pride in his position at an American university after an American education. For the course of the novel, moreover, Ramzy is shown having an affair with a blonde American lover for whose qualities, intellectual as well as physical, he has clearly genuine admiration.

Within this novel, surprisingly comprehensive for all its brevity, there is also occasional oblique argumentation for the Arab cause as well as criticism of both the immorality of Israel's ideological position and Israeli conduct of the war itself. The Arabs' prior claim to Palestine is, for example, argued briefly and effectively in reference to a carpenter in the village of Sabastia who, immediately after the outbreak of hostilities, recalls sadly that:

> The evening before they had held a little party in his house. He had played his flute and its melodies had seeped deep within the very fibres of his being. He had quite forgotten his problems with his mother Salimah, his responsibilities to provide for his family, for that of his sister Kayriyah and the two little children of his sister who had been killed. The melodies made him forget everything. In his childhood he had been raised on this music; it was older than the deep-furrowed face of his mother. It was old, like Palestine itself. His mother's face and the flute were living in the hills of Palestine long before Abraham arrived from Mesopotamia.
>
> (*Ibid.*, p. 26.)

In one long passage of quotation and discussion, the Old Testament is cited as an ancient parallel situation where Israeli duplicity exploited Canaanite goodwill and naïveté. The Biblical passage, Chapter 24 of *Genesis,* tells how a Canaanite chief offers Jacob and his people full rights of residence and property ownership in his territory in exchange for acceptance of intermarriage between their peoples. The Israelites cunningly announce agreement provided, however, that all the Canaanite men are circumcised; immediately after this is performed, with their enemy warriors temporarily incapacitated, Jacob's sons attack, slaughter the men and abduct all their women, children and moveable property. Jacob himself, the Bible is quoted as stating, then expresses fear that Canaanite hate will result in their combining forces to attack and destroy him and his men. In discussion of all this with Pamela, who first discovered the Bible passage, Ramzy contrasts the fanaticism, greed and duplicity of Jacob's sons with the liberalism, generosity and naïveté of the "ancient Palestinians." Ramzy is also:

> intrigued by Jacob's reaction at hearing of the slaughter of the men, women and children and their plunder of their homes and possessions. That in itself left him unmoved. The only thing that bothered him was that the Canaanites would seek revenge from him. He was not a bit angry that his sons had committed murder and robbery.
>
> (*Ibid.*, p. 95.)

Many incidents in the novel, apparently inspired by both newspaper accounts and interviews Barakāt himself conducted, describe looting and arrogant, cruel behavior on the part of the invading soldiers and constant Israeli napalm air attacks on civilian targets and refugee columns making for the East Bank. In one dialogue of a child-like simplicity and directness Barakāt expresses, with telling understatement, revulsion at such barbaric actions. A refugee is reported to have asked a student, with the following responses:

> "How is it that God puts up with all the cruelty in the world?"

> "The world has always been full of cruelty. The big fish always eats the little fish. You'll have to become a big fish, my friend."
>
> "If God's will were for me to become a big fish, it would still be impossible for me to eat a little fish. Though I might eat another big fish."
>
> "But you'd be afraid of the big fishes."
>
> "Well, even if it meant dying of hunger, I just wouldn't be able to eat a small fish."
>
> "Oh you would too."
>
> "Simply impossible. We know how small fishes feel."
>
> "That's true. But when you become a big fish, you forget."
>
> "Just not possible."
>
> "The Jews were just a little fish and then became a fairly big one. They forgot everything."
>
> "It's true," the refugee ends the dialogue, "they did eat us greedily and without pity."
>
> (*Ibid.*, p. 153.)

But there is more to this novel than cold criticism and intellectual argumentation. The author's overwhelming sense of the sadness of the situation is movingly expressed through his delicate choice of vocabulary, quotations from poetry and songs and that melancholy sense throughout of a love story likely soon to end. There is, too, the central allegorical comparison between the Arabs and the Flying Dutchman of the legend, each condemned for the sin of pride by the "supreme powers" to a life of endless searching in painful exile. And how effective is the novel's opening and closing parody of the Genesis account of the seventh day of the Creation, where the Arab, looking all around at the disaster he has brought:

> "saw all he had made and, behold, it was very bad."
>
> (*Ibid.*, p. 147.)

A complex, interconnected plot and extended time-sequence similarly provided a format for another Lebanese novel published some months before Barakāt's. The authoress, Laylā 'Usayrān, was herself educated at AUB, has several earlier novels to her credit and is the wife of the Muslim Deputy from Tripoli, Amīn al-Ḥāfiẓ, Chairman of the Lebanese Parliament's Foreign Relations Committee. Although neither as intellectually nor emotionally stimulating as *'Awdat al-Ṭā'ir,* her novel raises many similar criticisms of Arab life and conduct of the war and demonstrates an even more intense determination on the part of all the characters to continue the struggle against Israel. In Barakāt's novel the pride of both refugees and intellectuals in the activities of the guerrillas is demonstrated and the impression given also that the Beirut characters, including the previously uninvolved professor, are resolved to move into a new era of active support. But in 'Usayrān's work, actually dedicated to the *Fatḥ,* the growth of the guerrilla movement is shown to be nothing less than a pivotal force of inspiration and beneficial change in the lives of central figures.

Her novel, entitled *'Aṣāfīr al-Fajr* (*Birds of the Dawn*—an epithet for the guerrillas),[9] has three interwoven plots set in the Arab cities of Beirut, Jerusalem and Amman. The three corresponding central characters are Palestinian. We learn that as a result of the crisis Mariam, in her twenties in Beirut, becomes more intensely aware of her Palestinian identity and disillusioned at the cynicism and disinterest of her Lebanese lover. Determined to become active for the cause, she devotes herself to support activities on behalf of the guerrillas. Her brother Salmān has meanwhile secretly abandoned his studies in Germany and joined *al-'Āṣifah,* the military arm of *Fatḥ* in Jerusalem. He provides, in incidents involving fellow guerrillas and Suhayr, a comrade's sister, the novel's central dramatic movement. The third plot focusses on Aḥmad, a doctor in Amman, a refugee separated from his parents for two decades. From his hospital work and conversations with refugees, depicted as the novel progresses, he too becomes preoccupied with the guerrillas and finally, we learn, intends to dedicate himself to members of the underground injured in engagements with Israeli forces.

The tone, then, of this work is sternly serious, with no relief for comedy, neat academic argumentation or developed romantic involvements. Yet there are many points of interest for the reader, encompassing criticism of the Arabs, the expression of hatred for the Israelis and a near reverence for the guerrillas. The authoress' disdain for Beirut, so uninvolved in the struggle, is mirrored by her consistent reference to it as the *al-madīnat al-mulawwanah* (literally, the "multi-colored city," seemingly a play on *mulawwatha,* meaning "filthy"), and there are deprecating references to the lack of total Arab commitment to the struggle. The novel also stresses the extreme demoralization that followed the defeat, resulting even in loss of religious faith for some characters. In one conversation, for example, the grandmother of Suhayr, an active supporter of the Jerusalem guerrillas, mumbles a prayer to the Lord for the young men she has been hiding. Her granddaughter asks sarcastically:

> "Which lord is that you're speaking of?"
>
> "What, girl, more atheism?"
>
> "How should I not lose faith? How can a person maintain his faith? I believe in only one thing—weapons!"
> (*Op. cit.,* p. 52.)

Later also, when their home is blown up by the Israelis for suspicion of having harbored terrorists, we read that:

> The destruction of her home removed the existence of God from her depths for the very last time and she came to understand then why Mazin had doubted her. For now she had come to believe in the power of weapons more than she relied on the strength of God.
> (*Ibid.,* p. 124.)

---

[9] Dār al-Ṭalī'ah lil Ṭibā'a wa al-Nashr, Beirut, 1968.

And again, at the coming of the New Year, we see Suhayr wondering cynically:

> about the God she had lost, although she could still see those moral principles she had believed in and learned since her childhood, now fading from both herself and her guerrilla brothers. And with the New Year she began asking herself which one was God? The God of the enemy, who was still bloodying, murdering, imprisoning and torturing? And what of the God of the others, was he watching?
>
> (*Ibid.,* p. 193.)

Such a loss of faith in the traditional values and structures of her society soon become replaced, we learn, by a faith in revolutionary activism. It is the dedicated self-sacrifice of the guerrillas that offers a new idea and symbol, dissipating the prevailing mood of gloom and offering an outlet for frustrated Arab energies. Many passages reiterate the idea that action had become an essential psychological need. We learn, for example, that Suhayr eventually realized that:

> What would help her now and other young people would be to press forward with the work they believed in and never to stop. Action alone was the salvation.
>
> (*Ibid.,* p. 56.)

The novel documents precisely how the characters overcome the traumatic shock of the Arab defeat by engaging in such action on behalf of the guerrillas. One minor figure, Shaykh 'Aṭā, in conversation with Aḥmad the doctor specifically states that Arab men:

> "must return to the fight, not to regain their positions and military self-respect alone, but to bring back a sense of honor and humanness to their inner selves as well."
>
> (*Ibid.,* p. 182.)

The novel argues that such regeneration of moral strength does arise from the guerrilla movement and results in a triumphant rebirth of hope and determination symbolized in the novel's concluding sentence:

> An event more important than war was being sung by the "Birds of the Dawn," saying: "Revolution until Victory!"
>
> (*Ibid.,* p. 200.)

The Israelis, in this novel, are the subject of particularly harsh criticism; the characters are shown to feel and express hatred of far greater emotional intensity that the cool disdain of Barakāt's figures. In one passage, for example, Suhayr's grandmother, responding to the girl's comments that the people of Jerusalem following the occupation were staying indoors, ask rhetorically:

> "And why would you want them to go out—to see the faces of those filthy, stinking dogs? We used to treat them like brothers of ours. They're a people without honor."
>
> (*Ibid.,* pp. 52-53.)

An unrestrained, contempt-filled hatred and denigration and even a dehumanization is similarly later expressed through the reported thoughts of Aḥmad, the Palestinian doctor who, at the Jordan bridge:

> suddenly found himself facing that cancer that had afflicted his people, strange types of enemy soldiers, each with a bright-colored hat rammed on top, their shirts open to their waists, pushing people to the river with their rifle butts in an arrogant, delirious, drunken delight. Aḥmad felt that they were people belonging to some extinct species—he did not see men before him but poisonous insects, their noise greater than their size, killing by means of an evil little sting.
>
> (*Ibid.*, p. 73.)

In this novel, as in much of the fictional materials in Arabic on this subject, Israeli torture of Arab prisoners, reported as a matter of fact, also provides a neat vehicle for the author to juxtapose the calculating callousness of the enemy with the cool courage of the guerrillas. Knowledge of the torture is, moreover, shown to be in itself strongly influential in persuading the uncommitted to dedicate themselves to the Arab cause. The indecision and ambivalence of Dr. Aḥmad are brought to an end by his outrage at hearing a patient's lengthy account of his torture by the Israelis. Suspected of knowing guerrillas, we are told, the prisoner was first informed of being condemned to be hanged, threatened with burial alive in the desert, beaten with iron rods, terrorized by shots fired between his legs and finally burned with hot irons. His will still unbroken, the Palestinian is finally deported across the Jordan where his multiple wounds receive medical care.

A third resident of Lebanon provides us with a further interesting example of this recent literary production. Ghassān Kanafānī, like Barakāt, is an early prominent exponent of fiction relating to Palestine but has himself close personal knowledge of the tragedy. According to his own accounts, Kanafānī's life experience mirrors the turmoil of the Eastern Arab world in the past three decades. A refugee at age twelve from Acre to Syria in 1948, he sold newspapers in Damascus to help support his family, studied on his own and at sixteen began teaching art in UNRWA schools. This was followed by a period in Kuwayt as a teacher and at Damascus as a university student, until deported on charges of involvement in a political assassination plot. A dedicated journalist, he has been active in the Arab Nationalist Movement's papers *al-Ḥurrīyah (Freedom)* and *al-Muḥarrir (Freedom Fighter)* and has also edited the popular Lebanese newspaper *al-Anwār (Lights)*; recently, moreover, he has been an official spokesman in Beirut for the PFLP. The author of five short story collections, two novellas, a play and a study of Arabic Resistance poetry written within Israel, Kanafānī is also one of the most sophisticated experimentalists of modern Arabic prose. His work under present discussion, entitled *'Ā'id ilā Haifa (Returnee to Haifa)*,[10] published in Beirut last year, offers some parallels and contrasts with the other fiction examined and some insights, particularly interesting for their comparative rarity, into current Arab assessments of Israeli moral beliefs and motivations and life within Israel itself.

---

[10] Dār al-'Awdah, Beirut, 1970.

This time the story centers around that most constant preoccupation of Palestinians—imagined meetings between themselves and the Israeli occupants of their homes. The plot of this novella is simple and the characters representative rather than individualized. Unlike the complex and organic development of the two novels previously discussed, Kanafānī here gives the impression that his objectives are carefully predetermined, each development and dialogue introduced economically for maximal dramatic effect. Sa'īd S. and his wife Ṣafīyah decide some months after the 1967 war to seize the opportunity offered by the temporary abolition of the border to drive from their present home in Ramallah to their old apartment in Haifa. On the way they ponder and discuss their mixed feelings at making the trip, apprehension centering partly on painful memories of their flight from Haifa in 1948 and their abandonment in the confusion of their five-month-old first son Khaldūn. Sa'īd has no difficulty in locating their apartment in an essentially unchanged and unforgotten Haifa; he is totally unimpressed by Israeli material progress and pointedly remarks to his wife during the drive that the enemy's objective of their open-border policy will prove counterproductive.

The Jewish woman, however, who now occupies their home is not at all surprised at their arrival and has well cared for their furnishings so sacred to their memory; his picture of Jerusalem and his Syrian rug are still there on the walls. He is piqued, nevertheless, to see that the Jews had added some new and obtrusively different chairs and even, in the passage of the twenty years, lost two of the seven peacock feathers he had kept in a glass vase, now itself replaced with a wooden one.

From conversation between the three, supposedly taking place in English, we learn how she and her husband had arrived in Palestine as refugees from Poland. Unable to have children of their own, they had accepted the offer of the apartment from the Jewish Agency on condition that they adopt a parentless baby as their own child; it seems obvious now to all that Dov, their adopted son, is therefore none other than the Arab couple's son Khaldūn. Maryam, the Jewish widow, her husband killed in the Sinai campaign of 1956, suggests that the son be offered on arrival a choice between the parents. Ṣafīyah, the Arab mother, is happy to accept, believing that the young man:

> could not resist the call of flesh and blood. (*Op. cit.*, p. 55.)

But her husband is skeptical, fearing that his upbringing as a Jew would ensure his rejection of Arab parents.

At last, after a tense period of waiting, the young man returns home, dressed in Israeli army uniform! He is shocked and totally antagonistic to the idea that he should accept the Arab couple as his parents and argument soon develops between the two men, while the Arab woman sobs and the Jewish widow remains discreetly silent. Finally the Arab couple leave their son, the apartment, Haifa and Israel convinced that reconciliation is impossible but believing that they have learned much from their visit.

For all its slightness, there is much of interest in this account. The author presents his Jewish characters and their actions in a more neutral light than is common in such materials. Indeed, unusually extensive details of the Jewish Maryam's life are given that arouse the reader's sympathy and even liking. Her father died at Auschwitz, after all, and she saw her own brother shot by the Nazis. And her disgust and revulsion are so aroused by seeing two 'Haganah' youths callously tossing the body of an Arab child into a truck soon after their arrival in Palestine that, she tells her Arab visitors, she almost returned directly to Europe. She is polite and welcoming, moreover, and expresses full understanding of their feelings, even generous in her willingness to allow Dov to choose his parents freely.

A recurring theme of the novella is the guilt of the Arab father at having left their son in 1948, even though it is made clear that they truly spared no efforts to find him, during the war and thereafter. A similar point is nicely reiterated in a partially amusing digression told by the father about an Arab acquaintance who returned to Jaffa. When the door of his former home was opened, the Arab stated bluntly to the occupant extending a friendly handshake:

> "I've come to take a look at my home. . . . This place you're living in is my home, mine, and your presence in it is a tragi-comedy that'll end one day by force of arms. You can shoot me this instant, if you like, but it's my house and I've waited twenty year to return to it, and if . . ."

Imagine the Arab's surprise at the occupant's bursting into laughter, clasping him in his arms and interrupting with:

> "There's no need to pour out your anger on me. . . . I'm an Arab too, from Jaffa like you. I know who you are. . . . Come on in, let's have some coffee!"
>
> (*Ibid.*, p. 60.)

But the guilt theme, not dramatic humor, is the purpose of the digression. On the living room wall the visitor still finds the picture of his famous brother, martyred in the 1947 fighting, and now so revered that the new occupant had named a son after him. They take down the picture for the visitor, but on his way back to Jordan he realized that he could not keep it. Returning next morning to the house, he is told by his new Jaffa friend:

> "I felt a terrible emptiness looking at the rectangular space it had left on the wall. My wife wept and my children were so upset that I was amazed. I was sorry I'd let you take the picture back, because in the final analysis this man belongs to us. We've lived with him and he with us, become a part of us. Last night I told my wife that, if you wanted him back you should also take back the house, and Jaffa and us. . . . The picture won't solve your problem, but for us it's your bridge to us and ours to you." (*Ibid.*, p. 67.)

In conclusion, Sa'īd leans over to his wife and whispers pointedly that his friend, the anecdote's hero:

> "is now bearing arms." (*Ibid.*, p. 67.)

In the scene between father and son, Kanafānī draws out the irony of the confrontation. The father asks who and why his son is fighting in the Israeli army and the response comes:

> "You have no right to ask me those questions. You're on the other side!" (*Ibid.*, p. 74.)

His father can only repeat the comment incredulously and finally bursts into uncontrollable laughter.

The young man, a reservist, has not yet seen action and the Arab points out that in his first engagement he might confront a guerrilla who was in fact his other son, now in Ramallah and Khālid by name. There is irony in this too, because, as he is fully aware, the father had only recently forbidden his son to join the resistance. Now, having told the lie, the father fervently hopes that Khālid will have seized the opportunity of his parents' absence to enroll.

It is the Israeli soldier, who, for all his apparent sense of a new and disturbing reality, expresses the most telling criticism of his father and the Arabs. Excitedly, he charges:

> "It was your duty not to leave Haifa. And if that was impossible it was your duty at all costs not to leave an unweaned baby in his bed. And if this too was impossible, it was your duty to never stop trying to return. . . . You say that that too was impossible? But twenty years have passed, dear Sir! Twenty years! What did you do all that time to get back your son? In your place, I would have borne arms for that. Could there be a stronger reason? You're all disabled! Powerless! Fettered by those heavy chains of backwardness and paralysis! Don't tell me you spent twenty years weeping! Tears won't bring back those lost or wretched, nor accomplish miracles. All the tears in the world would be unable to carry one small boat big enough for two parents seeking their lost son. . . . You've spent twenty years weeping. . . . Is that what you're telling me now?" (*Ibid.*, p. 84.)

Sa'īd, utterly unable to offer any defense against these accusations, can only mumble that he does not wish to discuss it and responds to his wife's query about what the young man had said with the words:

> "Nothing. But yes. He said we're cowards." (*Ibid.*, p. 85.)

To this his wife, however, responds simply:

> "And because we're cowards he becomes one too?" (*Ibid.*, p. 86.)

Her comment inspires Sa'īd to launch an attack of his own, ending with the words:

> "I'm talking to you supposing that in the final analysis you are a human being. A Jew. Or be whatever you want. But it's your duty to grasp things in the proper way . . . I know that one day you will grasp these things and realize that the worst crime any human being can commit, whoever he may be, is for him to believe, if only for an instant, that it's the weakness and faults of others that constitute his right to exist at their expense and justify his own mistakes and crimes . . ."
>
> (*Ibid.*, p. 87.)

The argument thus concluded, Sa'īd tells his wife what new insights he has gained in the encounter. Objects, furniture, places and even people, even blood relatives, from the past were of little relevance regarding feelings towards the Arab homeland. His son Khālid and thousands like him were:

> ". . . looking only to the future and it will be they, therefore, who will right our mistakes and those of the whole world. . . . Dov is our shame, but Khālid our remaining honor. . . . Didn't I tell you from the beginning that we ought not to have come . . . and that what that requires is a war. Come on, let's go."
>
> (*Ibid.*, p. 89.)

Rejecting the widow's offer of further discussion and leaving his son sitting pensively head in hands, Sa'īd makes a final sarcastic thrust:

> "you may stay temporarily in our home. That's a matter it'll take a war to sort out!"
>
> (*Ibid.*, p. 90.)

And then, on their way home in their car at the outskirts of Ramallah, Sa'īd speaks the novella's concluding line:

> "I do hope Khālid has gone. . . . During our absence!" (*Ibid.*, p. 91.)

The overriding concern over the Palestine problem and the authors' appreciation for the guerrilla movement demonstrated in these novels is clearly, of course, not a phenomenon of Lebanese literature only that has appeared in recent years. Also in 1970 there appeared, for example, in Cairo a novella and short story bound together under the same title, *Dumū' min al-Dam (Tears of Blood)*,[11] by Ibrāhīm al-Ba'thī. According to the book's cover, the author is an editor at the Dār al-Hilāl publishing house, a long-time secretary-general of the Egyptian Journalists Union, a pre-Revolutionary activist jailed for his beliefs and has several biographical studies and fiction works to his credit. The novella, although set chiefly in Cairo in the Second World War, nevertheless relates to Palestine, the climax of tragedy occurring when the heroine's husband is killed in the 1948 fighting. And the adjoining short story, entitled *Ḍabāb*

---

[11] Dār al-Ṭibā'at al-Ḥadītha, Cairo, 1970.

(Mist), tells how a Palestinian artist living in Cairo flies to see his brother in Kuwayt to investigate cessation of support payments to himself; the artist is delighted to discover, despite the financial sacrifice he will suffer, that his brother has abandoned wife, child and employment to join the guerrillas. He soon concludes, moreover, that he too must dedicate himself and his art to the struggle, experiencing deep contentment once his decision is made. The story concludes with his artist lover in Cairo reading a letter from him somewhere in the field of battle:

> As she read it, her heart pounded hard. And despite her apprehension for him, she did not disguise her delight at the step he had taken. She moved towards her artist's brushes and colors to paint for him a picture expressing the story of those days he had lived in a mist (of indecision), longing too, for that time to come when she as well would be able to carry arms. (*Op. cit.,* p. 102.)

The clearly dominant feature, then, of these materials all written before the clashes between the Jordanian army and guerrilla groups in the fall of 1970 and the spring and summer of 1971, is disillusionment with Arab armies and governments and optimism based on the activities of the guerrilla movements. Although, of course, these works represent only the personal interpretations of the authors themselves and have no validity as a scientific cross-sampling of Arab attitudes at large, they certainly suggest no greater likelihood of reconciliation between Arabs and Israelis than one gains from study of poetry and political writings in Arabic.

These materials are, moreover, in a sense an integral part of the confrontation, the authors seeking to arouse as well as express antagonism to Israel. In this they are continuing the social-reformist rôle of fiction in Arabic since its early development in the first decades of the century, instinctively affirming the belief express by Khalīl Gibrān in a letter to the editor of the Egyptian monthly *al-Hilāl* in 1919 that:

"It is stories and fiction that have caused the social and political revolutions in Europe and America."[12]

If one accepts, then, as a universal literary criterion the effective fulfilment of the author's intentions, however limited, these works must be considered generally impressive. In some cases, of course, the impact is diminished by lack of artistic finesse, an over-complexity of plot and even at times a near grotesqueness and crudity of expression or sentiment. Others, however, Barakāt's latest novel providing perhaps the best example to date, are so clearly a deeply experienced and movingly expressed representation of this current period of tragic turmoil that they may well withstand the ultimate test of literary greatness, that of time itself, and become classics of the Arabic prose literature of our period.

---

[12] Quoted in: Muḥammad Yūṣuf Najam: *al-Qiṣṣah fī al-Adab al-'Arabī al-Ḥadīth,* 2nd edition, Beirut, 1961, p. 263.

CHRONOLOGY

May 16, 1971—August 15, 1971

Arab Israeli Conflict

1971

May 17: US Secretary of State William Rogers met with UN Special Envoy Gunnar Jarring and Secretary General U Thant to brief them on his efforts to promote an "interim" agreement opening the Suez Canal. Rogers said he hoped a final peace would be achieved by Jarring.

May 20: Egyptian President Anwar al-Sādāt said, despite the shakeup in Egypt, the offer to reopen the Suez Canal on Egyptian terms still stood. He added that he asked US Secretary of State Rogers to "squeeze Israel if necessary for peace" and said Rogers assured him the US would ask no further compromises from Egypt.

May 22: Jordan issued a formal complaint to the UN against Israel's alleged "forcible and inhuman deportation" of Arabs from occupied territory to the East Bank.

June 2: Pravda and *Izvestia* accused the US of trying "to drive a wedge" between the USSR and Egypt by posing as a mediator in the Middle East.

June 3: The New York Times reported the US as confirming that Israel was pressing for long term commitments on arms deliveries in response to the 15 year Soviet-Egyptian treaty of May 27.

June 4: Egyptian Foreign Minister Maḥmūd Riyāḍ left Moscow after a 3 day visit. A joint communiqué said both countries agreed that the Suez Canal should not be opened unless Israel would agree to withdraw from all Arab territory.

June 7: A Lebanese military spokesman said Israeli troops crossed the border and blew up 2 houses in Rāmiyah.

June 9: Israeli Premier Golda Meir said the Egyptian-Soviet treaty of May 27 was a "framework permitting intervention in the life and actions of Egypt," and that Egypt would try to use the treaty as a lever for threatening Israel.

The US State Department accused Israel of violating the 1949 Geneva convention by building apartments in occupied Jerusalem.

June 10: President Sādāt said Egypt would have to fight for "every inch of Arab land and the right of the Palestinian people for self-determination."

June 13: A Liberian tanker carrying crude oil to Elath was attacked by a motor launch armed with bazookas in the Straits of Bab al-Mandab. The ship arrived safely in Israel. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine claimed responsibility for the attack.

June 18: Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan said chances that fighting would resume on the Canal front increased sharply.

June 26: Joseph Kraft of the *Washington Post* reported UAR Foreign Minister Riyāḍ as saying that the ranking American diplomat in Cairo, Donald Bergus, submitted to Egypt on May 23 a memorandum calling for an Israeli withdrawal halfway across Sinai, an advance of UAR forces to 15 miles west of the Israelis and a UN force in between. Riyāḍ said the UAR thought the proposal originated in Israel and sent a favorable reply through Bergus to Rogers.

June 29: The Israeli Ambassador to the US said the disclosure of the Bergus memorandum caused the Israeli government "great concern." The US informed Egypt and Israel that the memorandum did not represent US policy but only Bergus' personal views.

---

[*] The quarterly chronology of the *Journal* is compiled from a large number of sources; somewhat more than half of the items are drawn from *The New York Times;* other sources include *Middle East Economic Digest* of London, *Daily Report of Foreign Broadcast Information Service* of Washington, bulletins of the United Nations Office of Public Information, United Nations, New York, *United Nations Newsletter, Middle East Economic Survey* of Beirut, the *Washington Post* of Washington, D. C., *Arab Report and Record* of London, *The New Middle East* of London, *Africa Report* of Washington, D. C., and *Middle East Newsletter* of New York, regular and occasional bulletins from the offices of press attachés of Middle Eastern Embassies in Washington, *Pakistan Affairs* of Washington, *Pakistan News Digest* of Karachi, *The Arab World* of Beirut, *Vayhan International* of Tehran, and *The Jerusalem Post.*

Lebanon reported fighting a 2 hour battle with an Israeli armored force which allegedly crossed the border.

June 30: Jordanian Information Minister Adnān Abū 'Awdah called an Israeli plan to pay compensation to Arabs in Jerusalem for property lost in 1948 a "conspiracy" to change the citizenship of Jerusalem Arabs and to "complete the annexation of the Holy City."

July 2: Editor of *Al-Ahram* Muḥammad Haykal said Egypt might renounce her commitment to a peaceful settlement and call for an Arab summit conference on a new war strategy.

July 5: Donald Bergus and Egyptian Desk Officer Michael Sterner arrived in Cairo. *Al-Ahram* said the visit was a maneuver to suggest a new American initiative on the Suez Canal.

July 6: Bergus and Michael Sterner met with UAR Acting Foreign Minister Ḥāfiẓ Ismā'īl to discuss terms for reopening the Suez Canal.

July 7: A rocket attack on Petah Tikva in Israel killed 2 and injured 25.

July 11: The New York Times reported that the USSR had sharply increased deliveries of warplanes and helicopters to Egypt and Syria "in recent months." According to the report Syria received 21 Mig-21s in the previous 3 months and Egypt had received 100 Mig-21s since Sept. 1970.

July 12: A US State Department spokesman said the US was satisfied that the military balance in the Middle East was unchanged despite the increase in Soviet arms deliveries to Arab countries. He added that Israeli requests for more US jets were under consideration.

Cairo's *Rose al-Yūsif* said the visit of Bergus and Sterner to Cairo for talks on reopening the Suez was a "theatrical play" to impress world opinion.

July 16: US State Department officer Sterner left Cairo after an 11 day visit.

July 19: The US announced Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco would visit Israel in an effort to break the deadlock in Suez negotiations and to discuss the supply of more US jets to Israel.

July 21: It was reported that Israel was resettling Arabs from Gaza camps to reduce the concentrations of refugees there.

July 23: Sādāt warned that Egypt could not permit the state of no war, no peace to continue past the end of the year. He said Egypt would "sacrifice one million of our people as victims in this battle."

July 28: US Assistant Secretary of State Sisco arrived in Tel Aviv.

July 30: Sisco met with Israeli leaders.

July 31: US officials said Vice President Spiro Agnew was told while in Saudi Arabia that Egypt was willing to discuss an interim settlement with Israel if the negotiators for Israel were native Palestinian Jews.

Aug. 2: Sisco met with Israeli Premier Meir, Foreign Minister Abba Eban, Defense Minister Dayan and Deputy Premier Yigal Allon.

Aug. 3: Israeli newspapers reported that Sisco was proposing to the Israeli government a pullback of 25 miles from the Suez Canal followed by a token crossing of UAR forces and a guaranteed ceasefire of 2 to 3 years.

Aug. 5: Sisco ended talks in Israel. He reported that "While there are differences still to be resolved, we believe a practical basis for future progress on an interim Suez Canal agreement can be achieved."

Aug. 7: Israeli Minister Without Portfolio Galili said there was not much chance "at present" of an interim agreement on the Suez Canal while Egypt insists on the right of her troops to cross the canal and on the agreement's including an Israeli commitment to withdraw to the June 1967 borders.

Aug. 9: Israeli forces attacked commando positions in Lebanon.

Aug. 12: Haykal reported in *Al-Ahram* that early in the summer the US promised Egypt that she would press for specific measures to implement Security Council Resolution #242 if Egypt would maintain the unofficial ceasefire. Haykal said the ceasefire would be respected until Aug. 15 after which the agreement would lapse.

Aug. 13: The US State Department denied that Sādāt set an Aug. 15 deadline for US efforts to achieve an interim agreement and urged "all parties" to "avoid laying down deadlines."

Aug. 14: Reuters reported a general strike called in Gaza by commandos failed when Israeli soldiers began sealing shut shops which were closed in support of the strike. The strike was to protest new security measures.

General

1971

May 27: Jordan, Kuwayt, Sudan, Syria and the UAR signed an agreement setting up an Arab Establishment for Investment Insurance to be based in Kuwayt with a capital of KD 10m.

June 7: The Ministerial Council of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) was adjourned until Oct. 7 after a dispute over Iraq's application for membership.

June 23: The 10th session of the Executive Committee of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization opened in Damascus.

June 28: Consultations between the UAR, Syria and Libya on the draft constitution for the Federation of Arab Republics ended after 11 days of meetings in Cairo. The draft was reported to have been completed.

July 7: The Palestine National Council opened in Cairo.

July 13: The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) ended a conference. A communiqué said resolutions were adopted concerning a joint production program.

July 17: The heads of state of Egypt and Libya and delegations from Syria and Sudan ended 3 days of talks in Mersa Matruh. A communiqué condemned repression in Morocco, the treatment of the Libyan embassy in Rabat and the action of the Jordanian army against the Palestinian commandos.

July 29: The heads of state of Egypt, Syria, Yemen and South Yemen and commando leader Yāsir 'Arafāt arrived in Libya for a conference on the Jordan situation. Libyan Premier Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhāfī called on Arab states to send troops to Jordan to save the commandos from King Ḥusayn. He said the failure to do so would "make them accomplices in the crime."

July 30: The Arab leaders meeting in Libya held a 1 day conference threatening "practical measures" against Jordan for action against commandos.

Aug. 10: The member states of the Arab Economic Unity Council ended a 4 day meeting in Cairo after deciding that in 1975 the members will start coordinating economic and social development plans.

Aug. 13: Middle East Economic Digest reported that the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference scheduled for September was postponed because of the "tense atmosphere existing among some member countries and the world in general."

Afghanistan

1971

May 17: It was announced that the government of Premier Ahmad Etemadi resigned. King Zahir Shah accepted the resignation and requested the Premier stay in office until a new government could be formed.

June 5: Kayhan International reported the International Development Association granted $5m for modernizing irrigation in the Khanabad Valley.

June 8: Former ambassador to Italy Abdul Zahir was asked to form a new Cabinet.

July 5: Premier-Designate Zahir presented a policy statement to the Assembly pledging administrative reform, economic development, and the establishment of "relations with Parliament on the firm basis of cooperation and mutual confidence."

July 26: The National Assembly gave Zahir a vote of confidence after a 17 day debate and he took office along with his Cabinet.

July 29: More than 100 persons were killed in landslides and floods near Khinjan Pass.

Aug. 1: It was announced diplomatic relations would be established with Libya.

Algeria

(*See also* Jordan, Kuwayt, Libya, Morocco, Persian Gulf, Syria)

1971

May 16: Foreign Minister 'Abd al-'Azīz Bouteflika met with UAR President Anwar al-Sādāt in Cairo to "acquaint himself with what has been happening in Egypt."

Le Monde said all but 3 of the several dozen French citizens under detention since April were set free.

May 18: West German Minister of Economic Cooperation Erhard Eppler stopped on his way to Morocco and met with Foreign Minister Bouteflika.

May 21: Mauritanian Foreign Minister Ould Maknass delivered a message from President Ould Daddah to President Boumedienne.

May 22: A Palestinian commando delegation headed by Yāsir 'Arafāt left after a 4 day visit and talks with Boumedienne and Bouteflika.

June 2: Iraqi Oil Minister Sa'dūn Hammādī warned that Iraq would support any measures Algeria might take against foreign oil companies.

June 10: Boumedienne warned "If France doesn't want our oil, we shall go and sell it elsewhere, but we will also buy elsewhere." He added that the effect of the French oil boycott would be felt but that the newly trimmed Algerian economy could take it.

June 18: Italian Foreign Minister Aldo Moro ended an official 4 day visit and protocols were signed setting up joint studies of economic projects. A joint communiqué said Italy might purchase Algerian natural gas and called for more cooperation among Mediterranean countries. Italy agreed to support Algeria's request for a comprehensive cooperation agreement with the European Common Market.

June 21: The UAR signed a cultural cooperation protocol for exchange of experts in education and the arts.

June 26: Minister of Justice Boualim Hamouda said beginning with the autumn legal term court proceedings and written decisions would be in Arabic.

June 30: Sonatrach and Compagnie Française des Pétroles (CFP) signed an agreement ending the French embargo on Algerian oil. CFP would be paid over a 7 year period $50m in compensation for the 51% of its interests which were nationalized.

July 6: Ambassador to Lebanon Muḥammad Yazid said Algeria was giving "military, financial, political and diplomatic support to the Palestinian resistance. However, Algeria . . . will always respect the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other countries . . ."

July 7: The Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French National Assembly Jean de Broglie left after an "extremely cordial" talk with Boumedienne. He said the "storm is over" and relations were "largely restored" between France and Algeria.

July 19: Bouteflika left for visits to North Vietnam, North Korea and China.

June 23: Middle East Economic Digest reported an agrarian reform program was announced providing aid for cooperatives. Farms would be limited to a size that the proprietor could farm and cultivable land not being farmed would be nationalized.

July 28: Minister of Commerce Layachi Yaker said the import, export, distribution and wholesale trades would be nationalized, excluding oil, steel and mining.

Aug. 1: Bouteflika left China after signing an economic cooperation agreement.

Aug. 13: Boumedienne said Algeria would support a project to build a gas pipeline to Europe.

Cyprus

1971

May 26: Britain and the US warned the UN Security Council that other Council members must contribute more if the peace force on Cyprus was to be maintained. The Council voted to extend the force until Dec. 15.

Cypriot Ambassador to the UN Zenon Rossides told the Council the last 6 months were the most peaceful since 1963 but that no progress had been made in the intercommunal talks.

June 2: President Makarios arrived in Moscow for an official visit.

June 9: President Makarios returned from the Soviet Union. A joint communiqué said the USSR stressed its "firm and active opposition to any intervention, interference, use of force or threat to use force against Cyprus."

June 26: Greek Cypriot negotiators submitted to the Turkish Cypriots in the intercommunal talks a paper which agreed to "discuss" the possibility of separate municipal authorities for the 2 communities in the 5 largest cities.

July 20: UN Secretary General U Thant appealed for contributions to overcome a $20m deficit in the operations of the UN peace force.

President Makarios promised Greek Cypriot villagers that they would be protected from alleged harassment by Turkish Cypriots.

July 22: A Turkish shepherd was wounded by a National Guardsman when he aproached a guardpost.

July 28: Greeks and Turks exchanged fire near Kyrenia when a jeep driven by Greek Cypriots allegedly got lost and approached a Turkish checkpoint.

Aug. 9: Turkish Cypriot negotiator Rauf Denktaş submitted to Glafcos Klerides the Turkish reply to the Greek proposals of June 26. In a later statement, Klerides said he did not think the intercommunal talks were a waste of time and nothing would be gained by putting a time limit to negotiations of such a complex nature.

Iran

(*See also* Iraq, Lebanon, Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia.)

1971

May 16: Saudi King Fayṣal, while on a trip to the Far East, met with the Shah at Mehrabad Airport.

May 19: An EEC representative, Ralf Dahrendorf, ended 4 days of talks on the possibility of EEC countries importing Iranian industrial products.

May 21: Premier Abbas Hoveyda began a 7 day goodwill visit to Bulgaria.

May 22: A 15 member Kuwayti trade delegation arrived in Tehran.

May 25: It was announced that diplomatic relations would be established with Albania.

May 30: It was announced the construction of the Cyrus the Great Dam in west Azerbaijan was completed.

The *Sunday Telegraph* of London reported that Britain authorized the sale of 140 Chieftain tanks to Iran.

May 31: It was reported that the government proposed an exchange of prisoners captured in border incidents with Iraq.

June 3: C. Itoh Co. of Japan signed an agreement to develop natural gas resources in Gachsaran for shipment to Japan.

June 26: Foreign Minister Ardeshir Zahedi returned from a 4 day visit to Baḥrayn.

June 27: Premier Hoveyda said Iran would take the Tumbs and Abu Musa islands by force unless they are turned over peacefully when British forces withdraw from the Gulf.

June 29: Turkish Foreign Minister Osman Olcay left after talks with Foreign Minister Zahedi on the projected Iskenderun pipeline. Zahedi said demand for oil justified the pipeline and the search for financing would begin soon.

July 9: The Novin Party won 28 of the 30 contested Senate seats.

July 16: The Novin Party won 226 seats in the 268 seat Majlis in the general election. The Mardom Party won 36 seats and the Iranian Party took 1.

It was reported that Britain agreed to sell between 700 and 800 Chieftain tanks worth over £80m.

Aug. 9: Kuwayti Foreign Minister Sabāh al-Aḥmad al-Sabāh arrived for negotiations on the continental shelf.

An earthquake in Mazandaran Province injured 30 persons and destroyed 900 homes.

Iraq

(*See also* General, Algeria, Iran, Jordan, Kuwayt, Persian Gulf, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia)

1971

May 21: Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Karīm Shaykhlī met with Czech Foreign Minister Jan Marko in Prague.

May 22: Baghdad Radio reported title deeds to 15,559 donums of land were distributed to 235 families in Kirkuk bringing the total distribution to 86,214 donums to 1,014 Kirkuk families.

May 24: A member of the Supreme Committee for Northern Affairs Murtaḍā al-Ḥadīthī met with Muṣṭafā Barazānī and reported that the Kurdish leadership was pleased with the new committee and would cooperate with the government.

May 26: Spain agreed to lend $20m to finance the purchase of 3 oil tankers.

June 7: An agreement was reached with the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) raising the posted price of crude by $.80 to $3.21 a barrel. The IPC also agreed to loan the government $30m and to postpone for 4 years payment of a previous $60m loan.

June 13: The following Cabinet changes were announced:

Murtaḍā al-Ḥadīthī: *Economy*
Khālid al-Hashīmī: *Transport*
Anwar Ḥadīthī: *Labor & Social Affairs*
Aḥmad 'Abd al-Sattār Jawarī: *Education*

June 19: Oil Minister Sa'dūn Ḥammādī announced that Iraq was reviving its claim to a 20% share in the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC).

June 20: A 10 man delegation of the Ba'th Party left for talks in Moscow.

June 22: Iraq News Agency reported that the government officially informed the Arab League that it would not attend a proposed summit conference because previous conferences accomplished nothing.

June 23: The USSR signed a "Protocol of Cooperation" for economic and technical projects including development of the North Rumaylah oil field.

June 24: Following a 7 day visit by a Soviet delegation a joint communiqué said the 2 sides expressed support for "the struggle of the Arab people in the Gulf for the sake of guaranteeing their rights to self-determination."

After a visit to Peking Minister of Oils Ḥammādī announced China granted an interest free loan of ID 14m.

June 29: The Planning Council appropriated ID 5m for development projects and ID 2m for road building in the Kurdish areas.

June 30: President Ḥasan al-Bakr offered to resume cooperation with the UAR and other Arab countries if the efforts to achieve a political settlement would be abandoned. He said there were "signs" that "certain Arab rulers are changing their former positions."

July 2: Middle East Economic Digest reported Kuwayt, Saudi Arabia and Iran were asked to prevent their fishing boats from entering Iraqi territorial waters.

July 5: Seven ministers were dispatched to Arab capitals with messages calling for a united Arab policy toward Palestine and the Persian Gulf.

Two British diplomats were asked to leave the country within 24 hours because of alleged contacts with a "spy and intrigue network."

July 6: Britain denied charges against 2 British diplomats expelled from Iraq.

July 17: President Bakr said Iraq had passed the "difficult point" in economic conditions and had entered "a new stage of economic prosperity."

July 21: Le Monde reported that fighting took place in the north between police and Kurds. A delegation of 3 ministers was sent to Kurdish leader Muṣṭafā Barazānī to mediate the dispute.

July 22: An airliner carrying a delegation to Sudan to congratulate the leaders of the anti-Numayrī *coup* crashed in Saudi Arabia.

Aug. 1: Ḥusayn Muḥammad al-Ṣafī was appointed Minister of Justice replacing 'Azīz Sharīf who became Minister of State.

Israel

(*See also* Arab-Israeli Conflict, Jordan, Turkey)

1971

May 16: 'Abd al-'Azīz al-Zu'abī was appointed Deputy Minister of Health.

May 18: Demonstrators led by "Black Panthers" clashed with police in Jerusalem protesting alleged discrimination against "Oriental Jews."

May 24: The Knesset defeated a Communist sponsored motion of no-confidence in the police for their handling of a Black Panther demonstration in Jerusalem.

Consul General to Turkey Efraim Elrom was buried in Tel Aviv with full military honors after being killed by Turkish terrorists.

June 2: Premier Golda Meir returned from a 10 day tour of Northern Europe.

June 4: The government announced that a 10 man spy ring was uncovered among the Druze community in the Jawlān region.

June 9: Foreign Minister Abba Eban completed a tour of African nations and flew to London.

June 14: US Defense Secretary Melvin Laird said the US earmarked $300m for military aid to Israel in 1972.

June 16: Government hospital employees went on strike for higher pay and better work conditions.

June 18: The Cabinet issued a back to work order to hospital workers by invoking emergency regulations.

June 23: The New York Times reported "foreign diplomats" as saying the USSR and Israel were in touch "through various indirect channels" on the possibility of resuming diplomatic relations.

June 25: Soviet officials at the UN said implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 was a necessary condition for reestablishing Soviet-Israeli relations.

June 29: The New York Times reported "reliable Israeli sources" as saying the director of the US CIA Richard Helms was in Israel for talks.

The government introduced legislation to pay compensation to Arabs in East Jerusalem for property they lost prior to 1948.

June 30: The Foreign Ministry reported CIA Director Helms conferred with Meir, Dayan and Eban on Middle Eastern problems.

July 1: It was announced that Arabs in the West Bank would be permitted to enter Israel without permits for a 3 month trial period made possible by the "improved security situation."

July 5: The National Editors Association criticized the government for trying to censor news items such as those reporting the visits of Helms and Soviet journalist Victor Louis.

July 7: West German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel arrived for an official visit.

July 9: After 2 days of high level talks West German Foreign Minister Scheel assured officials that the "special relationship" between the 2 countries would continue.

July 26: A government official Eli Ben Gal reported he was received by a Chinese cultural attaché in Paris who indicated China was interested in establishing some contacts with Israel. The Chinese Embassy denied the meeting took place.

July 28: In a speech to the Knesset Meir warned industry to honor labor agreements and said that, although poverty exists in Israel, progress has been made to eliminate it.

Aug. 8: Hospital workers agreed to return to work while negotiations with the government for higher pay would continue.

Aug. 9: Premier Meir signed emergency orders for doctors in government hospitals to return to work or face 6 months in prison.

Jordan

(*See also* Arab-Israeli Conflict, General, Kuwayt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey)

1971

May 17: It was announced that repairs to the East Ghor Canal had begun.

May 18: Amman Radio reported that a large arms cache had been found in the Waḥdat refugee camp.

May 22: King Ḥusayn made 6 appointments to the Cabinet:

'Abd al-Salām al-Majālī: *State for Premiership Affairs*
Ya'qūb Abū Ghūsh: *Municipal & Village Affairs*
Ibrāhīm al-Habāshinah: *Interior*
Muḥammad al-Bashīr: *Health*
Muḥammad al-Farḥān: *Public Works*
Anīs Mu'ashshir: *Transport*

May 23: A large arms cache was found in al-Ḥusayn refugee camp near Amman.

May 29: Guerrilla spokesmen said the army launched a large scale attack against their bases in Jarash.

May 31: A government spokesman said the guerrillas began a program to sabotage the economy. He said there have been attacks on phosphate mines, farms and civilians and that public roads were being mined.

The government ordered commandos to evacuate the Jarash area for bases near the Syrian border.

June 1: PLO spokesmen Kamāl 'Adwān and Kamāl Nāṣir said the Jordanian army had been shelling commando bases in the Jarash and Salt regions in an effort to deal a "final blow" to the guerrilla movement in Jordan.

June 2: King Ḥusayn instructed Premier Waṣfī al-Tall in a letter to "deal conclusively and without hesitation with the plotters who want to establish a separate Palestinian state and destroy the unity of the Jordanian and Palestinian people."

The Premier replied that those who "commit crimes in the name of commando action" would be punished.

It was announced the International Development Association granted a loan of $6m for road construction and traffic study.

June 3: Fatḥ leader Abū Iyād called on the Arab world to overthrow King Ḥusayn. Fatḥ radio also accused the PFLP of a conspiracy to crush Fatḥ and said "the enemy" would be eliminated from the ranks of the commando movement.

June 5: An official spokesman said commandos shelled 3 army positions in the Jarash region.

June 6: After a meeting of the joint Jordanian-commando Liaison Committee a Fatḥ spokesman said the army showed "signs of reasonableness in discussions" to end the fighting in the north.

June 9: Saudi Foreign Minister 'Umar al-Saqqāf ended 2 days of official talks in Amman and reported the 2 countries were in "complete and absolute agreement" on international issues including the status of Jerusalem.

June 23: Lebanese Premier Sa'ib Salām left after a 3 day official visit and expressed hope that "cooperation" between the government and commandos would resume soon and that the government would support "honorable commando action."

June 25: The government confirmed reports that it suspended salaries to West Bank officials who were receiving pay from Israel.

June 28: UAR special enjoy Ḥasan al-Khūlī and Saudi Foreign Minister Saqqāf delivered a joint Saudi-UAR message to King Ḥusayn.

July 7: A commando was hanged for sabotage in a phosphate plant.

July 13: A government spokesman reported that the US agreed to give Jordan $15m in aid for the 1971 budget.

Commando spokesmen in Beirut reported an all-out offensive by the army against commando positions in the Jarash and Ajlun regions.

July 14: The government confirmed reports that the army was forcing commandos out of their strongholds after commandos provoked the army with raids on civilians and army troops.

July 15: The government announced that the commandos had been dislodged from sites around Jarash and Ajlun and could go to the Jordan River valley.

A Syrian military delegation flew to Amman accompanied by commando leaders to mediate the dispute.

July 16: Sporadic clashes continued between commandos and the army.

July 17: King Ḥusayn said of the fighting with commandos, "I think this is final" and reported 400 guerrillas had surrendered. He promised Jordan would support commando action against Israel but was forced to act against commandos engaged in divisive activity in Jordan.

July 18: Between 50 and 70 commandos were reported to have crossed the Jordan River and surrendered to Israeli troops to escape the Jordanian army. The government said they were Israeli agents. Commando spokesmen said 250 commandos had crossed to Israel to escape the treacherous action of the army.

Iraq announced it was closing its border with Jordan and asked Amman to withdraw its Ambassador.

July 19: The USSR signed a protocol to set up a trade mission.

Premier Waṣfī al-Tall said the army had "rounded up" 2,300 commandos and only about 200 remained at large in Jordan. He said the commandos would be divided into "good" and "bad" categories. The "bad" would be deported or imprisoned for crimes, the "good" would be allowed to carry out activity against Israel. "Subversive" groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine would be banned from Jordan.

July 20: Syria accused Jordan of shelling Syrian villages and recalled a mediation team which was in Jordan to promote government-commando negotiations.

July 21: The government announced that 2,000 commandos were released from custody; 300 of these went to Syria and 300 to other Arab countries. Commandos who had not taken part in the fighting together with 39 of those who were captured would be permitted to continue actions against Israel.

July 22: Officials reported commandos shelled 4 villages and launched a raid from across the Syrian border.

July 25: King Ḥusayn began a tour of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States.

It was announced that Syria closed its border with Jordan.

July 29: Algeria announced it was "suspending" diplomatic relations.

The government announced that henceforth all imports except air freight would come through Aqaba and a fine worth 30% of the value of the goods would be levied on violators.

Aug. 1: Libyan Premier Mu'ammar Qadhdhāfī declared that "secret resolutions" were adopted by a conference of 5 nations held on July 30 to discuss the situation in Jordan. He added that the implementation of the resolutions "depends on events in Jordan" and explained that Libya was ready to intervene militarily in Jordan but that no other Arab country would agree to do so.

Aug. 3: The government charged that the closure of Syria's borders to Jordanian transit violated the provisions of the Arab Common Market.

Aug. 11: Special Envoys 'Umar al-Saqqāf and Ḥasan al-Khūlī returned on a "last chance" effort to mediate the dispute with commandos.

Aug. 14: The New York Times reported King Ḥusayn demanded an end to the political and economic campaign against his government as a precondition for a new agreement with the commandos.

Middle East Airlines suspended flights to Amman after an alleged anonymous threat to the airline if flights continued.

Aug. 15: UPI reported from Ramthah that Syria was massing troops on the border.

The government said the massing of Syrian troops was "not a mere emotional reaction" and called on Arab states to avert the "catastrophe."

Kuwayt

(*See also* General, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Syria, UAR, Yemen)

1971

May 16: Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs 'Abd al-'Azīz Ḥusayn said the Cabinet fully supported UAR President Anwar al-Sādāt's action in his "domestic trial."

May 20: British Special Envoy Sir William Luce met with Foreign Minister Shaykh Sabāh al-Aḥmad al-Sabāh to discuss the proposed Gulf federation.

May 26: Saudi Foreign Minister 'Umar al-Saqqāf arrived for discussions with Foreign Minister Sabāh on the Gulf federation.

May 30: Minister of Finance and Oil 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Atīqī said he might be forced to "take measures" if the boycott of Algerian oil continued.

The National Assembly defeated a motion to rechannel the Jordanian subsidy to the Palestinian commandos.

June 22: A record budget of KD 359.6m for 1971/72 was approved.

June 29: Premier Shaykh Jābir al-Aḥmad al-Jābir told the National Assembly that efforts to accelerate the formation of a Gulf federation had "not gone as we hoped."

July 6: US Vice President Spiro Agnew arrived for an official visit.

Aug. 5: Iraqi Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Karīm al-Shaykhlī left after 3 days of talks on the Palestine question and Gulf affairs.

Aug. 12: A Sudanese delegation led by Defense Minister Khālid Ḥasan 'Abbās left after signing trade agreements establishing a new Kuwayt-Khartum air link and calling for Kuwayt investment in Sudan.

Lebanon

(*See also* Arab-Israeli Conflict, Jordan, Tunisia, UAR)

1971

May 18: Social Security Fund workers went on strike for a 35-hour work week.

May 19: Foreign Minister Khalīl Abū Ḥamad returned from a 1 week visit in France where he met with Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann for discussions on the future of Jerusalem.

May 20: Students at Lebanese University ended a 3 day strike for an end to oral examinations.

May 23: Defense Minister Ilyās Sabā arrived in France for talks on possible arms purchases.

The General Confederation of Labor postponed the general strike planned for May 25 in order to give the government more time to consider wage increase demands.

May 24: Workers at the Banque Libanaise pour le Commerce and First National City Bank ended a 5 day strike after a government promise to arbitrate.

The American University of Beirut was closed after students rejected proposals of the university president to end the student strike.

May 25: Students occupied 2 buildings on the campus of the American University of Beirut in protest against a 10% rise in tuition.

May 28: The government received a vote of confidence in Parliament by a vote of 48 to 6 with 2 abstentions.

May 29: The General Confederation of Labor and employers reached agreement for a general wage increase of 5% and a minimum monthly wage increase from £Leb 166 to £Leb 185.

June 3: A Council for the South was established to deal with problems arising from hostilities with Israel.

June 6: Permier Sa'ib Salām met with commando leader Yāsir 'Arafāt.

June 7: Telephone workers went on strike for higher minimum wages and more job security.

June 20: Premier Salām met with guerrilla leaders including 'Arafāt.

June 23: French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Jean de Lipkowski told the Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee in Beirut that France would not remain idle if Lebanon were "exposed to danger."

The Cabinet approved a 5% wage increase and a rise in the minimum monthly wage from £Leb 166 to £Leb 185.

June 24: Lipkowski left after a 7 day visit. *Beirut Radio* quoted him as saying "the purpose of our presence here is to guarantee Lebanon's independence."

June 30: Telephone workers ended a strike after Premier Salām promised to investigate their grievances.

July 3: Member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party Georges Hāwī was arrested for belittling the army's stand against Israel.

July 7: The Deputy Chairman of the Council for the South said £Leb 15m were allocated for development and relief in the south.

July 13: It was announced diplomatic relations with Iran would be resumed.

July 14: Deputy Premier Sabā left for the USSR to discuss an offer of Soviet arms.

July 21: Sabā returned from the USSR. He said further discussion of arms purchases would be "through diplomatic channels."

July 24: Chief of Staff Jean Nujaym was killed in a helicopter crash. Iskandar Ghanim was appointed to replace him.

Aug. 5: Health Minister Emile Bīṭār said medicine prices would be cut by 15 to 30% as part of the government's "plan to secure social justice."

The Defense and Finance Committees of Parliament approved a draft bill for appropriating £Leb 200m for the army. President Franjiyah said £Leb 200m would be needed to prepare the army "for the objective for which it was established."

Libya

(*See also* General, Afghanistan, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Yemen)

1971

May 16: Algerian Foreign Minister 'Abd al-'Azīz Bouteflika made an unannounced stop for talks with Premier Mu'ammar Qadhdhāfī on the situation in Egypt.

May 21: *United Press International* reported 20 French Mirage jet fighters had been delivered so far.

May 29: The government gave £Lib 50,000 to Turkey to aid earthquake victims.

June 11: Premier Qadhdhāfī announced Libya would extend diplomatic recognition to Communist China. He also announced that Libyan volunteers would be allowed to fight alongside the Palestinian commandos.

Qadhdhāfī announced that an Arab Socialist Union would be established as Libya's popular political organization.

June 13: Tunisian Foreign Minister Muḥammad Masmoudi left after talks setting up a binational committee "to consider questions" affecting the 2 countries.

June 21: The government decided to reduce by 90% rents of state buildings to people of limited income.

June 24: An agricultural reform plan was published providing for the distribution of 90,000 hectares of land to farmers.

June 26: Deputy Minister of Economy Aḥmad Aṭrash arrived in Poland for talks on expanding economic cooperation.

June 30: Three naval vessels made an official visit to Malta.

July 9: Deputy Premier for Production 'Abd al-Salām Jalūd paid a 1 day visit to Malta and met with Premier Dom Mintoff.

July 10: An official radio broadcast said Libya would "be among the first to render constructive support to Malta" and that Malta should depend on "fruitful cooperation" and be free of foreign bases.

July 11: Tripoli Radio expressed Libyan support for the attempted *coup* in Morocco saying Libya "has dedicated itself to helping the revolutionary tide in the Arab world."

July 18: Deputy Premier for Production Jalūd left London after 4 days of talks to settle outstanding disputes on arms agreements.

July 22: A BOAC jet was ordered to land at Benghazi airport and Ba-Bakr al-Nūr 'Uthmān and Farūq 'Uthmān Ḥamdallāh, who were leaders in the *coup* against Sudan's Premier Ja'far al-Numayrī, were taken off the plane. Britain demanded an apology and release of the 2 men.

July 23: Jalūd returned from visits to France and West Germany. An official spokesman at the embassy in Paris said Libya was seeking to invest a large part of its oil revenues "in joint ventures in France and overseas."

July 24: The Maltese Deputy Prime Minister arrived for talks.

July 26: Jalūd said Libya would welcome foreign investment and would extend "serious guarantees" by accepting international arbitration in economic conflicts.

Aug. 13: A decree was issued "reforming" the Cabinet to include:

Mu'ammar Qadhdhāfī: *Premier* and *Defense*
'Abd al-Salām Jalūd: *Economy, Industry* and *acting Treasury Minister*
'Abd al-Mun'im al-Hūnī: *Interior*
Ṣāliḥ Abū Yāsir: *Information*
Muḥammad 'Alī Jadī: *Justice*
'Izz al-Dīn al-Mabrūk: *Petroleum*
'Abd al-'Āṭī al-'Ubaydī: *Labor & Social Affairs*
Miftāḥ al-Usṭā 'Umar: *Health*
Ṭāhā Sharīf bin 'Amir: *Communications* and *acting Electricity Minister*
Musṭafā Ya'qūbī: *Local Administration*
Muḥammad Musṭafā al-Mazīq: *Education & National Guidance*
Muḥammad 'Alī Tabu: *Agriculture*
Muḥammad Aḥmad Manqūsh: *Housing* and *Utilities*

Morocco

(*See also* Libya, Persian Gulf)

1971

May 21: The World Bank granted a line of credit worth $35m.

June 10: West Germany signed an agreement to loan DM 65m for economic projects.

June 13: A trial of 193 persons accused of treason began in Marrakesh.

June 17: The former editor of *L'Opinion* Muhammad Berrada was released after 9 months in prison.

June 25: Premier Ahmad Laraki ended a 5 day visit to West Germany. A communiqué said Germany would increase its economic cooperation to help the Moroccan 5 year plan.

July 1: US Secretary of Agriculture Clifford Hardin left after a 3 day visit. He said the US was willing to provide $24.5m in food aid under the PL 480 plan.

July 9: Minister of Industry Muhammad Tahiri told a Russian trade delegation that the USSR should diversify and increase its imports from Morocco.

The opposition paper *L'Opinion* was seized for the 3rd time in a week.

July 10: An attempted *coup* failed when army cadets attacked King Hasan's summer palace in Skirat and seized radio stations in Rabat and Casablanca. Loyal troops put down the attackers and King Hasan delegated all civil and military authority to Interior Minister Muhammad Oufkir to regain domestic stability.

King Hasan said the "mutineers" were led by 10 army officers including Gen. Muhammad Medbouh, Minister of the Royal House, who was killed during the fighting.

King Hasan said that Libya appealed to the Moroccan people to join the mutineers and Libyan Premier Mu'ammar Qadhdhāfī threatened to send troops to support the rebels.

July 11: The army was reported cleaning out pockets of rebel resistance in Rabat. Official sources confirmed that Belgian Ambassador Marcel Duprat, Minister of Tourism Muhammad Lazrak and Minister of Justice Muhammad Bahnini were killed in the attack on the summer palace. An estimated 47 other guests and servants at the palace and 150 rebels were killed in the attack.

July 12: Jordan's King Ḥusayn, UAR Special Envoy Ṣabrī al-Khūlī and officials from Tunisia and Algeria arrived to pay respects to King Hasan.

July 13: Ten high ranking military officers, including 4 generals, were executed for allegedly taking part in the attempted *coup.*

The government released a list of 98 guests at Hasan's birthday celebration who were killed in the attack on the palace.

Hasan said his policy would not change but "I am certainly going to change something in the fashion in which my country is governed." The Ministers of Interior, Justice and Defense were designated to form a committee to study the "implications" of the *coup* attempt.

July 14: King Hasan met with Ṣabrī al-Khūlī.

Official spokesmen confirmed that the Libyan Embassy and its higher officials were under "police protection." *Middle East News Agency* reported that Libya broke off diplomatic relations.

July 17: Four military cadets who took part in the attempted *coup* said they were misled into believing they were protecting the King against enemies when they attacked the summer palace.

Al-Ahram reported Libya did not break diplomatic relations fully but only withdrew the Ambassador leaving a *chargé d'affaires.*

July 25: US Vice President Spiro Agnew left after talks with King Hasan "on a wide range of bilateral and international matters."

July 27: King Hasan said the level of corruption was "too high for an underdeveloped country" and "things must change." He said the next Arab summit should not deal with Israel but with the rules of "fair play" between Arab states to end the fratricidal strife.

Aug. 4: King Hasan dismissed Premier Laraki and his Cabinet and promised a new government which would carry out administrative and judicial reforms and eliminate "corrupters and corrupted."

Aug. 6: King Hasan named a new Cabinet:

Muhammad Karim Lamrani: *Premier*
Hadj Bahnini: *Justice*
Muhammad Oufkir: *Defense*
Ahmad Benbouchta: *Interior*
Abdellatif Filali: *Foreign Affairs*
Ahmad Lasky: *Education*
Haddou Echiguer: *Primary Education*
Driss Ben Aomar Alami: *Posts, Telephone & Telegraph*
Maati Jorio: *Agriculture*
Ahmad Bargach: *Islamic Affairs*
Muhammad Bernoussi: *Public Works and Communications*
Abdelmajid Ben Mahi: *Health*
Magid Benjalloun: *Administrative Affairs*
Abdelkader Sehraoui: *Information*
Arsalane al-Jadidi: *Youth, Labor, and Social Affairs*

Pakistan

1971

May 16: A shipment of Chinese powdered milk arrived in Dacca in relief of victims of the fighting.

May 17: The government asked the UN for food and coastal steamers to aid relief efforts in the East.

May 23: People's Party leader Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto said the situation in Pakistan was deteriorating fast. Citing labor unrest, food shortages and economic crisis, he said a solution could be found only by the elected representatives of the people.

May 24: The New York Times reported that "Despite official descriptions of normality in East Pakistan, guerrilla activity and the army crackdown continue, according to reports from the area."

May 26: India said 120 Pakistani and 30 Indian troops were killed in border clashes in 2 days.

May 31: India called for international aid to combat a cholera epidemic among refugees from East Pakistan.

June 4: Jang reported that the government was attempting to form a new party in the East which would include members of the banned Awami League but which would be opposed to the independence of East Pakistan.

June 7: Reuters reported that nearly 5m people had crossed the border into India from the East and that cholera among the refugees was reaching epidemic proportions.

June 10: The government issued an appeal to refugees to return and offered amnesty to military deserters and politicians.

June 15: People's Party leader Bhutto said President Yahya Khan postponed his announcement of a plan to transfer authority to a civilian government. Bhutto reiterated his demand for an "early and effective" transfer of power to elected representatives.

June 17: A government spokesman said Yahya Khan would announce on June 28 his plan to return the country to political normalcy.

June 20: The government announced that newsmen would be allowed into East Pakistan without restriction, ending a ban imposed Mar. 25.

June 27: A new budget was announced for 1971/72. It totaled $1.87 billion compared with $1.89 billion in 1970/71. Defense expenditure increased from 33.8% to 38.7% of the total budget.

June 28: Yahya Khan said a popularly elected legislature could be put into operation in about 4 months but that martial law would remain in effect for some time.

The US said it would continue to supply Pakistan with economic aid and "non-lethal" military equipment.

July 4: The government charged India with an air attack on a village in East Pakistan. India denied the charge.

July 5: It was reported that insurgents destroyed a power station in Dacca on July 3.

July 12: A World Bank report released to *The New York Times* said the situation in East Pakistan was "far indeed from normal" and, therefore, international development efforts "will have to remain in a state of suspension for at least the next year or so."

July 19: The Financial Times of London published an interview with Yahya Khan in which the President said Shaykh Mujib al-Rahman would be tried by a military court in secret "very soon." He also warned that if India stepped up its aid to guerrillas, "I shall declare a general war."

July 26: Handbills were distributed in Dacca warning people to leave the city in preparation for a terrorist campaign.

July 31: The UN and Pakistan agreed to let the US station a 153 man civilian relief group in East Pakistan under UN auspices. The US pledged an initial contribution of $1m.

Aug. 2: UN Secretary General U Thant warned that the situation in East Pakistan could escalate into a major conflict. *The New York Times* reported that U Thant was unsuccessful to date in persuading India and Pakistan to accept UN civilian personnel on their territory to facilitate repatriation of refugees.

Aug. 4: Fourteen East Pakistanis in the US resigned their posts in the Pakistan Embassy and UN delegation and declared loyalty to Bengla Desh.

Aug. 5: The New York Times reported a government white paper asserted that the Awami League was responsible for a "reign of terror" which killed 100,000 people since Mar. 1.

Aug. 7: US State Department spokesman Robert McCloskey said the US was urging restraint by both sides in the dispute with India over the situation in East Pakistan.

The US signed a $15.3m "food-for-peace" agreement to provide 100,000 tons of wheat and 50,000 tons of rice to ease the effects of the 1970 cyclone in East Pakistan.

Aug. 9: It was announced that Shaykh Mujib al-Rahman would go on trial for "waging war against Pakistan." The military trial would begin on Aug. 11 in secret.

US Secretary of State William Rogers met with U Thant to discuss ways the US could provide aid for the destitute in East Pakistan. Rogers gave Thant a check for $1m for relief.

Aug. 10: U Thant warned that the trial of Shaykh Mujib "would inevitably have repercussions outside the borders of Pakistan."

An agreement was reached with India on the repatriation of personnel from diplomatic missions in Dacca and Calcutta.

India appealed to 23 nations to use their influence to save Shaykh Mujib.

Aug. 11: U Thant requested donations to pay "logistical and administrative costs" of distributing aid in East Pakistan. The initial requirement was for $28.2m.

A bomb exploded in the Intercontinental Hotel in Dacca killing 5 people.

Persian Gulf

(*See also* Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwayt, Saudi Arabia, UAR)

1971

May 20: Authorities in Sharjah seized a shipment of arms allegedly smuggled from an Iraqi launch.

May 22: British Special Envoy Sir William Luce flew to Tehran after visiting Abū Dhabi and Kuwayt.

May 29: A meeting of the Deputy Rulers of the Gulf Amirates to discuss the proposed federation was postponed.

June 1: Japan extended diplomatic recognition to Oman.

June 11: London's *Sunday Telegraph* reported Britain will retain naval forces in the Gulf after land and air forces are withdrawn by the end of 1971.

June 17: An agreement on the demarcation of the continental shelf was signed between Baḥrayn and Iran.

June 23: It was announced in Oman that Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia agreed to establish full diplomatic relations.

Premier Ṭāriq bin Taymur said Oman's chances of UN membership were "no more than 40%."

June 29: Iraqi Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Karīm Shaykhlī called for a united Arab response against Iran's "expansionist schemes" in the Gulf.

July 1: Abū Dhabi's 1st Cabinet was formed:
Khalīfah bin Zayd: *Premier, Defense* and *Finance*
Hamdān bin Muḥammad: *Deputy Premier* and *Public Works*
Mubārak bin Muḥammad: *Interior*
Maḥmūd bin Muḥammad: *Agriculture* and *Municipalities*
Muḥammad bin Khālid: *Communications*
Sāyf bin Muḥammad. *Health*
Khalīfah bin Muḥammad: *Water & Electricity*
Aḥmad bin Ḥamīd: *Information & Tourism*
Aḥmad Khalīfah al-Suwaydī: *Premiership Affairs*
Muḥammad bin Battī al-'Utaybah: *Labor & Social Affairs*
Surūr bin Muḥammad: *Justice*
Aḥmad al-'Utaybah: *Economy & Trade*
Manī' al-'Utaybah: *Petroleum & Industry*
Muḥammad Khalīfah al-Kindī: *Education*
Muḥammad Habrushī: *State*
'Adnān al-Pachachī: *State*

July 9: Reuters reported the Abū Dhabi Council of Ministers approved the establishment of an "Arab development fund" with a capital of 50m Bahrayni dinars.

July 18: It was announced that Abū Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaywayn and Fujayrah agreed to form a federation that would have a Supreme Council of the 6 amirs, a Cabinet and an elected Consultative Assembly.

July 25: Shaykh Zayd of Abū Dhabi said the new federation would take over the defense and foreign affairs responsibilities from Britain as soon as possible. He added that a federal army based on the Trucial Oman Scouts would be formed while the states would retain defense forces of their own.

July 27: Abū Dhabi's Minister of Premiership Affairs Aḥmad al-Suwaydī arrived in London for a 3 day visit.

July 28: Deputy Premier of Qaṭar Shaykh Khalīfa met with British Prime Minister Edward Heath in London.

Aug. 13: Middle East Economic Digest reported Ra's al-Khaymah issued a statement saying it was not prepared to accept the "veto rights" given to some states under the draft constitution of the Gulf Federation.

Aug. 14: Baḥrayn's ruler Shaykh 'Isā bin Salmān al-Khalīfah declared Baḥrayn an independent sovereign nation.

Aug. 15: Baḥrayn signed a "friendship" treaty with Britain, calling for "consultation" in time of need.

Saudi Arabia

(*See also* Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwayt, Syria, Tunisia, UAR, Yemen)

1971

May 20: King Fayṣal left Taiwan after a 4 day visit.

May 27: King Fayṣal arrived in Washington and met with President Nixon, to "explain in detail Arab views on the Middle East."

June 1: King Fayṣal returned after visits to Iran, Nationalist China, Japan, the US and France.

June 23: Aramco signed an agreement raising the price of crude oil shipped from Ras Tanura and Sidon (Lebanon) to $3.18 per barrel and raising the tax from 50 to 55% retroactive to Mar. 21.

June 28: Riyadh Radio said 2 agreements were signed with Yemen to facilitate the passage of goods and vehicles and to increase technical cooperation.

June 30: It was reported that King Fayṣal approved a program to spend SR600m to build up the navy.

Egyptian Economy Minister Muḥammad Marzabān said Egypt was willing to raise the volume of trade "to a maximum level."

July 8: US Vice President Spiro Agnew arrived in Jiddah.

US Vice President Agnew met with King Fayṣal and sought to assure him the US favored neither side in the Arab-Irsaeli conflict but sought to prevent further conflict.

The following were appointed Ministers of State and members of the Council of Ministers:

Hishām Muhyī al-Dīn Nāzir,
'Abd al-'Azīz al-Burūsī,
'Abd al-Wahhab 'Abd al-Wasī,
Sālih Bin 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Ḥusayn

July 25: Jordan's King Ḥusayn arrived for talks with King Fayṣal on the commando situation in Jordan.

Baḥrayn's Premier Khalīfa bin Salmān al-Khalīfah arrived for talks with King Fayṣal on Gulf affairs.

Aug. 2: It was announced that the sale, import, cultivation and use of qat was banned.

Aug. 12: Shaykh Muḥammad 'Alī al-Awadī was appointed Minister of Trade & Industry.

South Yemen

(*See also* General)

1971

May 18: Aden News Agency reported that the USSR told Defense Minister 'Alī Nāṣir Ḥasanī that the USSR was willing to extend further aid "in all spheres, economic, military and cultural."

May 23: Fifteen trade unionists were elected to bring the Supreme People's Council to full membership of 101.

May 26: Interior Minister Muḥammad Mutī announced the government hoped the country would be able to join the proposed Federation of Arab Republics.

June 21: President Salīm Rubay 'Alī opened a match factory in Aden which he said was financed 80% by the private sector. He said the government would continue to encourage private capital in national development projects.

July 16: Rumania signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement to aid in developing agriculture, industry and mining.

Aug. 2: The People's Assembly elected Defense Minister 'Alī Nāṣir Ḥasanī to be Premier.

The Assembly elected a new Presidential Council of Salīm Rubay 'Alī, 'Abd al-Fatḥ Ismā'īl and 'Alī Nāṣir Ḥasanī.

Premier Muḥammad 'Alī Haytham resigned and 'Alī Nāṣir Ḥasani was appointed to replace him.

A new Cabinet was announced:

Muḥammad Ṣalīḥ 'Awlaqī: *Foreign Affairs*
Muḥammad Ṣalīḥ Mutī: *Interior*
'Abdallāh al-Khamīrī: *Information* and *Culture*
Muṣṭafā 'Abd al-Khāliq: *Justice* and *Awqaf*
'Abd al-'Azīz al-Dalī: *Health*
Ḥaydar al-'Attās: *Public Works*
Muḥammad 'Alī Amayah: *Labor & Social Affairs*
Maḥmūd 'Abdallāh 'Ushaysh: *Finance*
Muḥammad Sulaymān Nāṣir: *Agriculture*
Ḥasan Yaḥyā: *Economy & Industry*
'Abdallāh Badhīb: *Education*

ʻAlī Salīm al-Bayd: *State for Presidential Affairs*
ʻAlī Nāṣir Ḥasanī: *Premier*

Aug. 3: A new ruling committee of the National Liberation Front was formed: ʻAbd al-Fatḥ Ismāʻīl, Salīm Rubay ʻAlī, ʻAlī Nāṣir Ḥasanī, ʻAbdallāh Kamīrī, Muḥammad Ṣalīḥ Mutī, Maḥmūd ʻUshaysh, ʻAbd al-ʻAzīz, ʻAbd al-Walī, Ṣalīḥ Qāsim and Faris Salīm.

Sudan

(*See also* General, Kuwayt, Libya, UAR)

1971

May 16: A delegation returned from Kuwayt with a Kuwayti agreement to invest in Sudanese development projects.

May 18: The government ordered the Students' Federation and the Women's League to be disbanded.

May 25: Middle East News Agency reported Sam-2 missiles supplied by the USSR were displayed at the National Day rally in Khartum.

Defense Minister Ḥasan ʻAbbāṣ announced military conscription would begin on July 1.

Premier Jaʻfar al-Numayrī said a Sudanese Socialist Union along the lines of the Arab Socialist Union in Egypt would be formed.

May 31: Premier Numayrī said elections for civilian leaders would be held "within 2 years."

June 10: India signed an agreement increasing trade between the 2 countries to £62m in an 18 month period, including export to India of £24 worth of cotton compared with £9.6m in 1970.

June 16: Numayrī said the balance of payments deficit of £25m was a heavy burden and that the country's economic situation could deteriorate unless a "quick remedy" was found.

July 19: Numayrī government was overthrown in a military *coup* led by Major Hāshim al-ʻAṭā.

In a radio broadcast al-ʻAṭā promised economic reform, "scientific" agrarian reform and autonomy for the southern provinces.

Four disbanded communist organizations, the Federation of Labor Trade Unions, the Students' Federation, the Youth League and the Women's League were reactivated. The executive committee of the Sudanese Socialist Union was banned.

July 20: A new 7 man Revolution Command Council was announced: Ba-Bakr al-Nūr ʻUthmān, Chairman; Hāshim al-ʻAṭā, Deputy Chairman and Commander in Chief; Fārūq ʻUthmān Ḥamdallāh; Muḥammad Aḥmad al-Shaykh; Muḥammad Maḥjūb ʻUthmān; Muḥammad Aḥmad al-Zayn; and Muʻāwiyah ʻAbd al-Ḥayy.

RCC Chairman al-Nūr ʻUthmān said in London that the *coup* was planned since February. He accused Numayrī of failing to consult the RCC on important matters and of diverging from the policies of the May 1969 revolution.

July 21: An Egyptian "fact-finding" delegation flew to Khartum. *Al-Ahram* reported that Aḥmad Hamrūsh, editor of *Rose al-Yūsif* and an acquaintance of several officers in the *coup,* was with the delegation.

July 22: Numayrī regained power when loyal officers staged a counter-*coup* against the new RCC. A radio announcement said all the leaders of the *coup* which deposed Numayrī were under arrest.

July 23: Al-ʻAṭā and 3 other officers who had participated in the *coup* were executed.

July 24: Cairo's *Al-Ahram* charged that the leader of the Communist Party in Sudan, ʻAbd al-Khāliq Maḥjūb, had directed the *coup.* Three more *coup* leaders were executed.

Diplomatic relations with Iraq were broken off.

July 25: Numayrī said Sudan would be ready to join the Federation of Arab Republics after a single political party is formed by May 1972.

ʻUthmān Ḥamdallāh was executed. Ba-Bakr al-Nūr ʻUthmān was put on trial. Both were delivered to Khartum after being taken off a BOAC jet which was ordered to land in Libya.

Numayrī said "90 per cent of the Communist gang" had been crushed and accused Iraq of being instrumental in the *coup.*

July 26: The head of the communist Sudanese Trades Union Federation Al-Shafiʻī Aḥmad al-Shaykh was hanged and Communist Party leader ʻAbd al-Khāliq Maḥjūb was captured.

July 27: The USSR appealed to the government to spare the life of ʻAbd al-Khāliq Maḥjūb. *Tass* said the government should be "aware of the danger of the road onto which it is now pushing the country" and deplored the "hysterical anti-communist campaign."

July 28: Maḥjūb and former Minister of Southern Affairs Joseph Garang were executed bringing the total to 14.

Minister of Information ʻUmar Mūsā said more than 1000 people faced trial for the *coup* and that the Communist Party's second in command Muḥammad Nujūd had been captured.

July 29: Numayrī said he didn't want any deterioration in relations with the USSR "but if they want to choose that path we will have no alternative." He said there was no evidence the USSR had been involved in the *coup.*

July 31: The USSR warned against "unfriendly acts against Soviet representatives in the Sudan, damage to property, threats and acts of violence."

The official newspaper *Al-Sahāfa* said: "We used to believe the Soviet Union was a friend of the Sudanese people. But the Soviet information media are making deep cracks in our belief."

Numayrī told Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Nikolayev that if the USSR continued its "unfounded denunciations" he would take action to restore Sudan's "dignity and prestige."

Aug. 2: The counselor of the Soviet Embassy and the

Bulgarian Ambassador were asked to leave the country and the Sudanese Ambassador to the USSR and Bulgaria was recalled.

Aug. 3: The following Cabinet changes were announced:

Aḥmad 'Abd al-Qādir: *Transport* and *Communications*
Abel Alier: *Southern Affairs*
Mūsā al-Mubārak: *Labor*
Manṣūr Khālid: *Foreign Affairs*
Luigi Adwok: *Works*
Muḥammad Hamzāh: *Animal Resources*
Tobi Madut: *State*

Aug. 4: Numayrī received the Chinese Ambassador and gave him an "important and serious message" thanking China for "standing by the Sudanese people during the recent incidents."

Aug. 7: Foreign Minister Manṣūr Khālid said there could be no diplomatic ties with the US as long as the US supports Israel but that economic and cultural ties "continue, with the possibility of improvement."

Aug. 10: It was announced 40 officers were dismissed from the army for having connections with the Communist Party.

Aug. 12: Syrian Vice President Maḥmud al-Ayyūbī and Foreign Affairs Minister 'Abd al-Ḥalīm Khaddām held talks with Numayrī after flying to Khartum from discussions with Soviet leaders in Moscow. Ayyūbī described the talks as "fruitful."

Aug. 14: Numayrī pledged that the constitution which would dissolve the Revolution Command Council, would be ready by the end of 1971.

Syria

(*See also* General, Jordan, Sudan, Tunisia)

1971

May 17: Premier 'Abd al-Rahmān Khulayfāwī said his government was "an extension and continuation of the previous one, both in its composition and objectives."

May 18: A Ba'th Party Regional Command communiqué said the 5th Regional Congress which ended on May 14 had reaffirmed the policy of cooperation with "socialist countries led by the Soviet Union" and recommended a "continuation of friendly relations with France in a manner serving Arab interests."

May 24: *Damascus Radio* urged that "a wide second front be opened against the Jordanian authority" to "free the Resistance to direct its efforts" against Israel.

May 29: Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Ḥalīm Khaddām returned from Kuwayt where he held "useful" talks. Syria agreed to purchase certain industrial products and declared its support for the proposed Gulf federation.

June 1: The government was reported to have signed an agreement permitting 50 Egyptian fighter planes to be stationed at Syrian airfields.

June 7: Three committees were set up with France to "recommend a formula for a new phase in Franco-Syrian economic cooperation."

June 10: Saudi Foreign Minister 'Umar al-Saqqāf met with Foreign Minister Khaddām for talks on the Middle East situation.

July 4: Jābir al-Kafrī was appointed Minister of Local Administration.

July 5: Beirut's *Al-Nahar* reported the government impounded a delivery of Chinese arms to al-Fatḥ which arrived in Latakia. The shipment was said to include 200 tanks.

July 6: A spokesman for *al-Sa'iqah* said the arms impounded in Latakia were from Algeria bound for *al-Sa'iqah.* He said Syria had seized the arms because they were "not commando weapons."

It was announced that the Iraq Petroleum Company agreed to increase by over 50% transit royalties for oil piped to Syrian ports.

July 10: Kuwaytī Head of State Shaykh Sabāh al-Sabāh arrived for a state visit.

July 13: Shaykh al-Sabāh ended a 3 day visit during which it was agreed to set up a committee to increase trade and that the Kuwayt Development Fund would finance some development projects.

July 15: President Ḥāfiẓ al-As'ad met with commando leader Yāsir 'Arafāt and sent a military delegation to Jordan to mediate between the commandos and Jordanian authorities.

Aug. 3: The Supreme State Security Court convicted 99 dissenting Ba'th Party members of plotting against the state. Michel 'Aflaq, Amīn al-Ḥāfiẓ and 3 others were sentenced to death *in absentia.*

Aug. 11: Foreign Minister Khaddām arrived in Moscow for talks on the Middle East situation.

Aug. 12: The government broke diplomatic relations with Jordan and closed airspace to Jordanian planes following reports of border clashes with Jordanian tanks.

Aug. 13: Artillery duels were reported along the Jordanian border between the army and Jordanian forces.

Tunisia

(*See also* Libya, Persian Gulf, Morocco)

1971

May 19: Libya signed an air agreement which would permit both countries to extend air routes.

Foreign Minister Muhammad Masmoudi ended a tour of Europe and urged Europe to evolve a "Mediterranean policy" for peace and economic development.

June 1: The World Bank announced a loan of $24m for road projects to promote agriculture and tourism.

June 17: Minister of Culture & Information Habib Boularis resigned.

June 19: President Bourguiba returned after 6 months of medical treatment in Switzerland.

June 21: Interior Minister Ahmad Mestiri tendered his resignation.

June 24: Shadli Klibi was appointed Minister of Culture & Information.

June 25: Foreign Minister Masmoudi left Britain after an official visit. Britain agreed to double its aid to Tunisia to £500,000 in 1971.

Premier Hadi Nouira said the government's proposed constitutional amendments were drafted and would go to the National Assembly in "good time." He added that "malicious grumbling and base partisan accusations" would not affect the Party's determination to carry on a dialogue.

June 27: Masmoudi arrived in Tunis from Paris after meeting with President Pompidou.

Ahmad Mestiri accused "certain persons" of trying "to block the procedures outlined in the June 8, 1970 speech" and to "undermine the confidence of the Head of State in certain members of the government." He said their efforts had failed.

July 4: Reuters reported Mestiri withdrew his resignation after receiving assurances that liberalization plans would be carried out.

July 22: Bourguiba presided over a Council of Ministers meeting for the first time since Dec. 1970. He congratulated the Council for its internal "harmony" during his illness.

Aug. 5: Masmoudi returned from Libya and reported to Bourguiba the results of his "peace mission" to Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Egypt Libya and Saudi Arabia.

Turkey

(*See also* Libya)

1971

May 17: The Israeli Consul General Efraim Elrom was kidnapped by members of the Turkish People's Liberation Army who demanded the release of all "revolutionaries" held in jail by 5:00 PM, May 20.

May 18: Authorities announced the arrest of a student in connection with the kidnapping of the Israeli Consul General.

Deputy Premier Sadı Koçaş said the government had "no intention of bargaining with a handful of adventurers."

May 23: Over 600 people died in an earthquake in the eastern province of Bingol.

The body of the Israeli Consul General was found shot to death in Istanbul.

May 26: Japan agreed to loan $27m to finance the Hasan Ugurlı Dam on the Yeşilırmak River.

June 1: Police captured 2 men wanted for the killing of Elrom who were holding a girl hostage in an Istanbul apartment.

June 9: The government reported that 4 Jordanian students were expelled from Turkey for "dangerous activities" and that 454 leftists have been detained for political activities.

June 15: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development announced a loan of $10m and credit worth $15m for improving agricultural transportation and marketing.

June 18: The Council of Ministers ordered a 1 month halt to a strike by oil workers in Atas "on grounds of national security."

The IBRD announced a loan of $24m for the development of electrical power.

June 22: US Defense Secretary Melvin Laird said the US and Turkey were near agreement on ending the opium traffic from Turkey. He said the value of Turkey's poppy crop is $3m "and I personally think we should buy the whole crop and destroy it."

June 30: President Nixon reported the Turkish government agreed to ban totally the growth of opium poppies by June 1972.

July 5: Ilhan Selçuk and Oktay Kurtböke, columnists for *Cumhuriyet,* were sentenced to 1 year in prison for insulting the government.

July 15: Premier Erim said price increases in electricity, coal, cigarettes and alcohol were necessary because these state owned industries were operating at a loss.

It was announced that a Ministry of Culture would be formed with Talat Halman as the first Minister.

July 23: The National Assembly voted to extend martial law in 11 provinces for 2 months.

Aug. 5: It was anounced an agreement was reached with Communist China to establish diplomatic relations. Turkey also agreed in principle to permit Chinese aircraft to use Turkish airports.

Diplomatic relations with Nationalist China were "suspended."

Aug. 11: The trial of 83 people, including 69 former military officers, accused of participating in an organization aimed at establishing a "proletarian dictatorship" opened in Istanbul.

United Arab Republic

(*See also* Arab-Israeli Conflict, General, Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwayt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia)

1971

May 16: A new Cabinet was announced:

Muḥammad 'Abdallāh Marzabān: *Economy & Foreign Trade*
Kamāl Henry Badır: *Communications*
Sayyid Jādallāh al-Sayyid: *Planning*

'Abd al-'Azīz Ḥijāzī: *Treasury*
Muḥammad Ḥāfiẓ Ghanim: *Education*
'Abd al-'Azīz Kāmil: *Waqf & Azhar Affairs*
Muḥammad Ḥamdī 'Āshūr: *Local Administration*
'Abd al-Wahhāb al-Burulūsī: *Scientific Research*
Ḥāfiẓ Badāwī: *Social Affairs*
'Abduh Maḥmūd Salām: *Health*
Muḥammad Ḥāfiẓ Ismā'īl: *State for Foreign Affairs*
Muḥammad Aḥmad Muḥammad: *Presidential Affairs*
Ḥasan Fahmī al-Badāwī: *Justice*
Aḥmad 'Abd al-Majīd: *Cabinet Affairs*
Aḥmad al-Sayyid Darwīsh: *Tourism*
'Abd al-Laṭif Bulṭiyah: *Labor*
Aḥmad Nuh: *Civil Aviation*
Muḥammad al-Zayyāt: *State for Assembly Affairs*
Mamdūḥ Salīm: *Interior*
Muḥammad Aḥmad Ṣādiq: *War*
Muḥammad Mursī Aḥmad: *Higher Education*
Aḥmad Sulṭān: *Power*
'Alī al-Sayyid: *Housing & Utilities*
Sulaymān 'Abd al-Hayy: *Transport*
Muḥammad 'Abd al-Raqib: *Irrigation*
'Alī Walī: *Petroleum & Mineral Wealth*
Muṣṭafā Kamāl Tulbah: *Youth*
Ismā'īl Ghanim: *Culture*
Ismā'il Ṣabrī 'Abdallāh: *Deputy Minister of Planning*

May 16: President Anwar al-Sādāt pledged to "build a new state in which every individual will feel free and secure."

May 17: Al-Ahram reported 110 persons had been arrested in connection with the aborted *coup.* President Sādāt appointed a "provisional Secretariat" headed by 'Azīz Ṣidqī for the Arab Socialist Union.

May 20: Sādāt said a secret, Comunist oriented faction centered in the Arab Socialist Union was behind the attempted *coup.* He called for a new constitution and said he would not accept re-election to the Presidency in 1976.

May 25: Soviet President Nicolai Podgorny arrived in Cairo and was received by Sādāt.

May 26: It was announced that an 80 member committee was formed to draft a permanent constitution.

May 27: Soviet President Podgorny and Sādāt signed a 15 year treaty of friendship and cooperation, calling for further development of political, economic and military cooperation "on the basis of . . . sovereignty, territorial integrity, noninterference in the affairs of each other."

May 28: Podgorny left for Moscow.

British Special Envoy Sir William Luce arrived in Cairo after a tour of the Gulf to meet with Foreign Minister Maḥmūd Riyāḍ.

May 29: Lebanese Premier Sa'ib Salām arrived for a 6 day official visit and talks with Sādāt.

May 31: Sādāt took part in a public burning of secret police reports and taped phone conversations.

Kuwayti Foreign Minister Shaykh Sabāh al-Aḥmad al-Sabāh arrived for talks with Sādāt on "Arab and Gulf affairs."

June 3: Treasury Minister 'Abd al-'Azīz Ḥijāzī announced the 1971/72 budget totalling £E 2,820m. He said £E 650m would go to defense and £E 1,242m to economic development, increases of £E 73m and £E 141m respectively over the 1970/71 budget.

June 8: Deputy Ruler of Qaṭar Shaykh Khalīfa Bin Ḥamad left Cairo after talks on the question of a Federation of Arab Gulf Emirates.

June 12: Sādāt ordered the dissolution of 17 trade union councils and the election of new councils by July 20.

June 19: King Fayṣal of Saudi Arabia arrived in Cairo on a 1 week state visit.

June 20: The government ordered the seizure of property belonging to the leaders of the alleged *coup* of May 14.

June 22: Yāsir 'Arafāt arrived in Cairo for talks with Sādāt and Fayṣal on the problems facing the commandos.

June 26: Fayṣal ended a 1 week official visit. A joint communiqué said the King recognized Egypt was the "solid rock" against Zionism and bore the biggest share of the battle. It said talks were held in "mutual understanding" and covered "relations between the two fraternal countries" and in the Arab world.

June 30: Economy Minister Muḥammad Marzabān said the International Monetary Fund agreed to a loan of $41m for the Economic Development Program.

July 1: Foreign Minister Riyāḍ exchanged ratification documents in Moscow for the May 27 treaty.

The first elections were held at the local level in the program to reorganize the Arab Socialist Union (ASU).

July 17: Saudi Foreign Minister 'Umar al-Saqqāf arrived to consult with Sādāt on the joint mediation effort in Jordan.

July 22: It was announced that Britain would be paid £2.1m in compensation for nationalized property.

It was announced 'Alī Ṣabrī and his colleagues in the May *"coup"* attempt would be tried for high treason.

July 23: Sādāt spoke to the opening session of the newly elected Arab Socialist Union and promised to curb the abuse of official authority.

July 26: The ASU voted Sādāt "full powers" for any action necessary to regain Arab territory and it endorsed the plan for a federation with Libya and Syria.

Aug. 2: The Executive Committee of the General Union of Egyptian Workers issued a statement calling on Sudan to end its anti-communist campaign.

Aug. 5: The New York Times said it was "reliably reported" that Sādāt told the USSR after the *coup* in Sudan that Egypt would continue to resist communism in the Arab world.

Aug. 7: Sādāt said Arab workers need national unity rather than class struggle and urged trade unions to purge their ranks of "opportunists and deviationists." *The New York Times* reported "private sources" as confirming the house arrest of 2 noted communist sympathizers, Khālıd Muhyī al-Dīn and Ibrāhīm Sa'd al-Dīn, head of the Socialist Institute.

Aug. 10: The Ambassadors to the US, USSR and UN were called to Cairo for "important consultations."

Aug. 11: Al-Ahram said 100 people including 'Alī Ṣabrī would be tried on Aug. 25 before a "revolutionary tribunal."

Aug. 12: Al-Ahram reported Egypt would pay £E 2m in compensation to 350 foreigners who were affected by the agrarian reform law of 1963.

Yemen

(*See also* General)

1971

May 25: Deputy Prime Minister 'Abd al-Salām Sabrah arrived in Moscow for an official visit.

May 26: The government received a vote of confidence from the Consultative Assembly by a vote of 116 to 3 with 3 abstentions.

May 30: 'Alī 'Abdallāh al-Hanbalī was appointed Minister of Interior.

June 1: Advisor to the Republican Council Muḥammad Aḥmad Nu'mān said in Cairo that Yemen would pursue a policy of "openness towards the whole world" in an attempt to overcome economic problems.

June 3: West Germany agreed to loan DM 31m for airport and road construction.

June 12: Republican Council Chairman 'Abd al-Rahmān Iryānī left for an official visit to Saudi Arabia.

June 15: The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine reported that 4 of its members were arrested for the attack on an Israel bound oil tanker on June 11.

June 16: President al-Iryānī returned from a 5 day visit to Saudi Arabia. A communiqué said it was agreed to strengthen relations in every field.

June 19: Libya announced it would send £Lib 1m in agricultural equipment as aid because of the 1970 drought.

July 8: It was announced that the World Bank and the Kuwayt Fund for Arab Economic Development agreed to grant $200,000 to finance a team of economic exports to help economic development.

July 20: Premier Nu'mān resigned saying he was "unable to shoulder the responsibilities of rule because of the financial difficulties facing the nation." He was asked to remain in his post until a new Cabinet could be named.

July 21: Demonstrations were held in Sana'a calling for reform in administration and a "struggle against corruption."

Aug. 6: Middle East Economic Digest reported Muḥammad Aḥmad Nu'mān, Political Advisor to the Presidential Council and son of former Premier Nu'mān, as saying the financial crisis is the legacy of the civil war. He said the goverment tried to secure aid from Saudi Arabia but Saudi promises were not fulfilled.

Aug. 14: The New York Times reported "American intelligence sources" as saying 7 army officers were arrested in Sana'a for plotting, with the help of the USSR, the overthrow of the government.

DOCUMENT

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERATION OF ARAB REPUBLICS (FAR)

Preamble:

The Arab people in the Syrian Arab Republic, the Libyan Arab Republic, and the Arab Republic of Egypt, out of their faith that they are an indivisible part of the Arab nation, that the three republics believe in a common Arab fate, and that Arab nationalism is a call for liberation, construction, justice, and peace; out of their faith in the Arab course for comprehensive unity and for building a democratic and socialist system to defend the rights of the citizens, safeguard their basic freedoms, and strengthen the sovereignty of the law; in response to the call of Arab unity which occupies a prominent place in the Arab heart and which has been strengthened by the joint Arab struggle against imperialism, Zionism, regionalism, and secessionist movements and confirmed by the contemporary Arab revolution against domination, exploitation, and the violation of man's political and social rights; out of their confidence that all achievements that have been or could be realized by a country suffering from division will not fully materialize and will be subject to distortions and setbacks if not strengthened and (?defended) by Arab unity; on the basis of Arab steadfastness in the decisive battle for the liberation of the occupied territory and its requirements in pooling Arab resources to confront the one challenging the existence of the Arab nation; out of faith in the Arab nation's civilized rôle in overcoming backwardness and subservience and in positively pushing the wheel of progress, safeguarding international peace and security, and establishing rules of relations among states and peoples on the basis of justice and the law; and in implementation of the basic rules of the Federation of the Arab Republics issued in Benghazi on 21 Safar 1391 corresponding to 17 April 1971, have, with reliance on God, approved the establishment of the state of the FAR on the bases of the following principles and provisions:

Part I

Basic fundamentals of the FAR:

Article 1—The Arab people in the Syrian Arab Republic, the Libyan Arab Republic, and the Arab Republic of Egypt agree on the basis of free choice and equality of right to establish a federal state called "the Federation of Arab Republics."

Article 2—Sovereignty in the federation belongs to the people. The federal authorities shall exercise their powers in the people's name in the manner laid down in this constitution.

Article 3—The people of the FAR are part of the Arab nation.

Article 4—The system of government in the FAR is democratic and socialist.

Article 5—The official language of the federation is Arabic.

Article 6—The federal state emphasizes spiritual values and considers Islamic law a principal source of legislation.

Article 7—The federation and its republics shall have one flag, one emblem, and one anthem. A federal law shall be enacted to regulate these matters.

Article 8—The federation shall have one capital, to be fixed by law.

Article 9—Arab republics that believe in Arab unity, work for the realization of a unified socialist Arab society, and agree to accept the rules given form in this constitution shall be admitted to the federation on the strength of a unanimous resolution of the Presidential Council.

Article 10—Until a federal law is enacted to regulate the affairs of unified citizenship of the federation, each member republic of the federation will organize affairs relating to the citizenship of its nationals within a general framework to be laid down in a federal law.

Article 11—Each member republic of the federation shall be committed to insuring that its constitution does not conflict with the provisions of this constitution.

Article 12—The constitutions and laws of the republics shall guarantee, as a minimum, the following principles and rights:

A. Citizens are equal before the law and judiciary. There shall be no discrimination among them for reasons of sex, origin, language, or religion.

B. Sanctity of homes.

C. Crime and punishment shall be defined by law. An accused is held innocent until convicted by a judicial verdict.

D. Citizens cannot be arrested except in accordance with the law.

E. Punishment shall apply to the guilty alone.

F. The right to litigation, appeal, and defense before the judiciary.

G. The right to move and to choose place of residence.

H. Ban on deportation from homeland.

I. Freedom of belief and of conducting religious rites.

J. Freedom of scientific research.

K. Freedom of opinion, press, and publication.

L. Freedom of assembly.

M. Privacy of correspondence.

N. The right of citizens to choose their own rulers and to exact an account from them.

O. Sanctity of private ownership within the limits of the law as long as it does not conflict with the right of society to public and cooperative ownership.

P. The right to work.

Q. The right to education.

R. The right to social security and social insurance.

S. The right to health care.

T. Protection of infancy, motherhood, and family.

U. Realization of equal opportunity for citizens in various fields.

Article 13—The right of movement, residence, and work in the republics is guaranteed for the citizens of the federation. A federal law shall regulate how this right will be exercised.

Part II

The federation's jurisdictions, establishments, and finance:

Chapter 1. The federation's jurisdictions

Article 14—The federation shall exercise the following jurisdictions:

1. In the field of foreign affairs

A. Prepare the bases of the foreign policy and standardize the policies of the republics in their international relations.

B. Questions of war and peace. The presidential Council's decisions on such questions shall be issued unanimously.

C. Coordination among the member republics in the field of diplomatic and consular representation with foreign states.

D. Ratification of international treaties and agreements with foreign states and international organizations on matters that come under the federation's jurisdiction.

2. In the field of defense

A. Organize and direct the federation's defense.

B. Establish a military command responsible for training and operations.

C. Move troops among the republics during operations by decision of the Presidential Council or of any one it delegates.

D. Coordinate military industries of the member republics.

3. In the field of national security

Defend national security and prepare a plan for securing the safety of the federation in accordance with the decisions of the Presidential Council.

4. In the field of economy

A. Prepare the joint general development plans in a manner that will guarantee realization of economic integration of the member republics. In preparing domestic plans, these republics shall take into consideration the requirements for implementing the general plans.

B. Organize the transfer of commodities, services, and capital among the member republics and organize the residence and employment of citizens of one member republic in another member republic of the federation.

C. Standardize economic and financial regulations and policies among the member republics and provide needed statistical and auditing services.

D. Coordinate the federation's economy with that of the other Arab states to achieve Arab economic integrity in accordance with regulations to be approved by the Presidential Council.

E. Standardize the economic policies of the member republics in their relations with other states and coordinate cooperation with international economic and financial organizations.

F. Establish utilities of common benefit to the member republics, and draw up and supervise common projects.

G. Establish and supervise federal economic establishments.

5. In the field of education and culture

A. Prepare an educational and cultural policy aimed at building a socialist Arab, patriotic, and faithful generation.

B. Prepare a unified policy for scientific research to insure that this research will catch up with world standards, and coordinate action among scientific research institutes in the member republics.

C. Prepare a federal information policy serving the aims of the federation.

6. In the field of coordinating and standardizing legislation

The federal authorities shall coordinate the legislation and regulations in the member republics and shall work to standardize them.

Chapter 2. The federation's establishments

Section 1. The federation's executive authority.

(1) The federation's Presidential Council.

Article 15—The federation's Presidential Council shall consist of the presidents of the member republics. The council is the supreme power in exercising the jurisdictions of the federation stipulated in this constitution.

Article 16—The Presidential Council shall elect its chairman from among its members for a 2-year term, renewable. The council shall prepare an internal ordinance regulating its work.

Article 17—All members of the Presidential Council shall take the following oath before the Federal National Assembly: I swear by Almighty God to safeguard sincerely the federation of republics, respect the constitution and the law, and struggle to serve the interests of the people and achieve the aims of the Arab nation.

Article 18—The Presidential Council's decisions shall be issued by majority except in the following cases:

A. Matters on which the constitution and the basic regulations of the Federation of Arab Republics stipulate unanimity.

B. For 2 years following the entry into effect of this constitution, any other important matters which a member of the Presidential Council considers should be decided unanimously.

Article 19—If anything happens between the sessions of the Federal National Assembly or during its prorogation requiring measures that cannot be delayed, it is permissible for the Presidential Council to issue unanimous decisions which will have the force of law. These decisions must be referred to the Federal National Assembly for approval at its first session. If they are not presented to the assembly, they will become invalid as of the date the council convenes. If they are presented but rejected by the council, they will become invalid as of the date of their rejection.

Article 20—The federation's Presidential Council shall issue the necessary regulations to implement federal laws and organize the establishments and institutions sponsored by the federation.

Article 21—The resolutions of the federation's Presidential Council shall be implemented after their publication in the official federal gazette unless these resolutions specify otherwise.

Article 22—The federation's Presidential Council shall convene in the capital of the federation. It is permissible to convene it anywhere in the federation by decision of the council.

(2) The Federal Ministerial Council.

Article 23—The federation's Presidential Council shall appoint a number of ministers who will form the Federal Ministerial Council. Its chairman shall be appointed by the Presidential Council. The Presidential Council shall define the jurisdiction of each federal minister. It is not permissible to combine the post of federal minister with any public post or job in any of the republics except in extraordinary cases approved by the federation's Presidential Council.

Article 24—The federal ministers are responsible to the Presidential Council in the execution of their duty and are sworn in before the council in accordance with Article 17 of the constitution.

Article 25—The Federal Ministerial Council shall hold periodic and emergency meetings to discuss the executory affairs of the federation and to coordinate the work of the federal ministers. The council and the ministers will perform the following work in particular:

A. Prepare bills and federal resolutions.

B. Prepare studies required for execution of tasks assigned to the federation.

C. Contact the concerned ministers in member republics to exercise the federation's jurisdiction on the bases approved by the Presidential Council.

D. Follow up implementation of laws and federal resolutions and prepare periodic reports for submission to the Presidential Council.

E. Prepare the federation's draft budget.

Article 26—The Presidential Council shall issue a resolution defining the work system of the Federal Ministerial Council.

(3) Specialized councils and organizations, and technical committees.

Article 27—The Presidential Council shall establish federal councils for planning, economic, social, and national security affairs, and for foreign policy, education, culture, scientific research, and information, as well as any specialized councils, organizations, and technical committees it deems fit to achieve the federation's objectives. The formation and jurisdiction of these councils, organizations, and committees, and their relationship to the federal ministers, shall be defined by resolutions issued by the Presidential Council.

(4) Federal employees.

Article 28—A federal law on federal employees shall be issued. It shall define the conditions of their employment, their duties, and the moral and material privileges granted to them to assure their independence in carrying out their work.

Section 2. Legislative power.

Article 29—The Federal National Assembly shall consist of 20 members from each republic elected by the people's assembly of each republic from among its members. The term of the Federal National Assembly shall be 4 years. The Federal National Assembly member shall be sworn in before the Federal National Assembly in accordance with article 17 of the constitution. It is not permissible to combine membership in the Federal National Assembly with membership in the people's assembly. In the absence of a people's assembly in a republic and until such an assembly is formed, the political command in that republic shall establish the bases for electing its representatives to the Federal National Assembly.

Article 30—The Federal National Assembly shall elect a chairman and one or more deputy chairmen from among its members.

Article 31—The Federal National Assembly shall hold two sessions a year on summons from the president of the federation's Presidential Council. The bylaws shall specify the length and date of the sessions. The assembly may be summoned to hold an extraordinary session when necessary on request from the federation's Presidential Council or one-third of the assembly members.

Article 32—The Federal National Assembly shall hold its meetings at the place assigned for it in the federal capital. With approval of the federation's Presidential Council, the assembly may hold its meetings anywhere else within the federation.

Article 33—A quorum shall not be formed unless a minimum of two-thirds of the Federal

Article 47—The members of the court shall take the following oath: "I swear by Almighty God to respect the constitution and the law and to be just in my judgments."

Article 48—The Federal Judicial Court shall deal with the following:

A. Decide challenges to the constitutionality of federal laws.

B. Decide the extent of conformity of the republic's laws with the federation's constitution and laws.

C. Decide disputes of a legal nature which may arise between the authorities of the federation and those of the republics, or between the federation's republics.

D. Decide challenges against federal administrative decisions.

E. Give advice on any constitutional or legal problem when requested by the Presidential Council of the federation, federal ministers, or any member republic.

F. Any other jurisdictions prescribed by federal law.

Article 49—The federal court shall issue its decisions by majority vote and in the people's name.

Article 50—The rulings of the federal court will be enforceable in all parts of the federation republics.

Article 51—The constitutional court shall sit at the federation's capital. It may also sit at any other place within the federation.

Article 52—A federal law shall be issued defining the statutes of the court, its procedures, the qualifications of its members, and the immunities and material and moral privileges of the court members and employees.

Chapter 3. The federation's finance

Article 53—The federation's Presidential Council shall prepare the federation's draft budget and refer it to the Federal National Assembly for discussion and approval by a federal law.

Article 54—The federation's annual budget shall indicate the sums each of the member republics will contribute to the expenses of the federation on the basis of equal shares and shall organize the other revenues of the federation by a federal law.

Article 55—A federal law shall be passed prescribing the inclusive dates of the federation's fiscal year and the method of preparing the federal budget. The member republics shall standardize their fiscal years to conform to the federation's fiscal year.

Article 56—The final account shall be referred to the Federal National Assembly for discussion and approval.

Article 57—A federal law shall be issued explaining how the federal accounts will be supervised and audited.

Part III

General and transitional rules:

Article 58—The member republics shall have jurisdiction in all matters that do not fall within the federation's jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this constitution. Each member republic has the right to call on the federal authorities to exercise any of its jurisdictions provided this is approved by the federation's Presidential Council.

Article 59—The Presidential Council shall conclude in the name of the federation the international treaties and agreements on matters that fall within the federation's jurisdiction and shall communicate them to the Federal National Assembly with the appropriate explanation. Such international treaties and agreements shall become effective in the member republics after their approval by the Presidential Council and their publication in accordance with the conditions stipulated in this constitution. International treaties and agreements which affect sovereignty, or which require an amendment to the provisions of the federal laws, or which impose on the federal treasury expenses not provided for in the budget shall not be valid unless approved by the Federal National Assembly.

Article 60—International treaties and agreements concluded by the member republics prior to the establishment of the federation shall remain valid in accordance with their provisions and the scope prescribed at the time of their ratification in accordance with the rules of international law.

National Assembly members is attending.

Article 34—The Federal National Assembly resolutions shall be passed by absolute majority vote unless the constitution stipulates otherwise.

Article 35—The federation's Presidential Council and the Federal National Assembly members have the right to propose laws.

Article 36—The duties of the Federal National Assembly shall include the following:

A. Debating and approving federal laws.

B. Debating and approving the federal budget.

C. Debating and approving treaties and agreements the federation concludes and which this constitution stipulates must be approved by the assembly.

D. Debating the state's general policy and suggesting anything that will strengthen and achieve the aims of the federation.

E. Addressing questions and inquiries to the federal ministers.

Article 37—Laws shall be implemented after their unanimous ratification by the federation's Presidential Council and shall become effective 1 month after their publication in the federal official gazette, unless a provision included in the law stipulates otherwise. Federal law shall have precedence over republic law where the federation's jurisdictions are concerned.

Article 38—The competent authorities in the republics shall implement federal law each in their own region. The federation's Presidential Council shall have the right to appoint officials to supervise the sound implementation of federal law in member republics and to submit periodic reports to both the federation's Presidential Council and the Federal National Assembly.

Article 39—National Assembly sessions shall be public. The assembly may convene in a secret session by request of the Presidential Council or of one-third of the assembly members. Federal ministers shall have the right to attend assembly sessions.

Article 40—The Federal National Assembly shall issue its own bylaws.

Article 41—The president of the National Assembly shall maintain order and security within the assembly.

Article 42—Federal National Assembly members shall not be questioned about the opinions they express within the assembly. Unless caught in an act, assembly members shall not be arrested without permission from the assembly.

Article 43—A federal law shall be issued specifying the material and moral privileges to be enjoyed by the Federal National Assembly members. An assembly member may not hold a public office or job in any member republic or in the federal government, and he may not acquire any privilege not specified in the aforementioned federal law.

Article 44—A Federal National Assembly member will regain his membership in the people's assembly that elected him if his membership in the Federal National Assembly comes to an end for any reason in accordance with the rules of his republic's constitution. If a Federal National Assembly member loses his membership in the people's assembly that elected him because that people's assembly is dissolved or its term comes to an end, the member shall continue to carry out his duty in the Federal National Assembly until a substitute is elected to replace him.

Article 45—The Presidential Council has the right to dissolve the Federal National Assembly. The new assembly must be formed within a maximum of 3 months from the date of issuance of the decision dissolving the assembly. If for any reason the new assembly fails to meet within this period the old assembly will automatically meet until the new assembly is summoned to convene. If the Federal National Assembly is dissolved for a certain reason the assembly [presumably the one following] may not be dissolved for the same reason.

Section 3. The federation's judicial authority.

Article 46—The federation's Presidential Council shall form a Judicial Court consisting of two members from each republic. The Presidential Council shall appoint a president of the court from among its members who will have the deciding vote in case of a tie. The Presidential Council may appoint additional members to the court if general interest demands, provided the principle of equality among member republics is preserved. The term of office on the court shall be 4 years, renewable.

Article 61—So long as it does not violate the jurisdictions established for the federation by this constitution, each republic has the right to conclude international treaties and agreements according to its constitutional procedures. It shall communicate them to the federation's Presidential Council.

Article 62—The federation's President Council shall issue a unanimous decision forming a political front which will include representatives of the leadership of the political organization in each of the member republics. This front shall be committed to a charter of national action in the Federation of Arab Republics to achieve interaction and contacts among the masses of the people in the federation's republics, consolidate the bases and values of democracy, unite the bases and methods of political action in the member republics, and create an atmosphere suitable for the emergence of the united Arab movement. Until this is realized, the political leadership in every republic shall have sole responsibility for organizing the political activity inside the repubilc.

Article 63—The general command of the armed forces in each member republic shall be exercised by the president of the republic or the person specified by the regulations in force in each republic.

Article 64—If internal or external disturbances occur in one of the republics which threaten its security or that of the federation, the government of this republic shall immediately notify the federal authorities so these authorities can take the necessary measures within the limits of their powers to insure security and order. If one of the governments of the member republics is in a position which does not permit it to request aid from the federation, or if the security of the federation is endangered, the competent federal authorities have the right to intervene without a request to safeguard order and return matters to normal.

Article 65—The federation has the right to assume ownership of land in the capital and elsewhere in the territories of the member republics necessary for its establishments. The federation's property and funds shall not be subject to the taxes and fees stipulated in the laws of the member republics. A federal law shall be issued regulating this.

Article 66—The federation's Presidential Council shall establish an official federal gazette in which the federal laws, decisions, and regulations will be published.

Article 67—For the period until the establishments stipulated in this constitution are set up, the Presidential Council shall form a followup committee, including a representative from each republic, whose task shall be to supervise the implementation of this constitution as soon as possible.

Article 68—The constitution can be amended only by approval of two-thirds of the Federal National Assembly members and unanimous approval by the Presidential Council. Any amendment that affects one of the basic provisions of the Federation of Arab Republics shall not be implemented until it has been submitted to a public referendum and approved by a majority in each republic.

Article 69—The preamble of this constitution shall be considered an indivisible part of it.

Article 70—This constitution derives its principles from the basic provisions of the Federation of Arab Republics and shall be interpreted in their light.

Article 71—This constitution shall be approved by the competent constitutional establishments in each of the federation's republics. It shall be submitted for public referendum along with the basic provisions of the Federation of Arab Republics issued in Benghazi on 21 Safar 1391 Hegira, corresponding to 17 April 1971. The federation's basic provisions and those of this constitution shall become valid after their approval by a majority in each of the member republics.

Article 72—As soon as it goes into effect, this constitution shall be communicated as an official document to all the Arab states and to the Arab League's General Secretariat.

(Signed) UAR President Anwar al-Sādāt, Libyan Arab Republic Revolution Command Council Chairman and Prime Minister Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhāfī, and Syrian Arab Republic President Ḥāfiẓ al-As'ad

• •

THE INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES

WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT OF THE ISRAELI ARMED FORCES

by RIAD ASHKAR *and* AHMED KHALIDI The book provides a comprehensive account of the weapons used by the Israeli armed forces. Each item of equipment is described with details of its country of origin, measurement, crew performance and the quantity possessed by Israel.

Hardcover **$4.35**/Paperback **$2.50**

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ISRAELI STRATEGY

by FUAD A. JABER The author establishes from Israeli sources that there is nothing to prevent Israel from manufacturing a nuclear deterrent, and discusses what would be the implications for the Arab-Israel conflict should she decide, or even threaten to take this step.

In Arabic, available only at Beirut Office $2.00

ZIONISM, ISRAEL AND ASIAN NATIONALISM

by GODFREY H. JANSEN This book examines Israel's ideological and political isolation from the nationalist movements of Asia, the continent in which it was created. The author concludes that Israel's Western sympathies make close relations impossible with countries adhering to values of the Third World.

Hardcover **$4.00**/Paperback **$2.00**

CIVIL RIGHTS IN ISRAEL

by SABRI JIRYIS, author of The Arabs in Israel. The author shows that while the Israelis do allow extensive freedoms in many fields, their attitude changes entirely when political considerations come into play, especially when Arabs are involved.

In Arabic, available only at Beirut Office $1.00

THE INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES
P.O. Box 7164, Beirut, Lebanon
Also Box 329-A, R.D. No. 1, Oxford, Pa. 19363

BOOK REVIEWS

NOTE—By special arrangement with the Foreign Policy Association, readers of THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL *may obtain from the FPA's Book Center any books listed below published in the United States (except paperbacks) at the publisher's regular list price. Post free for domestic orders only. Send orders with check or money order to Desk ME, World Affairs Book Center, 345 East 46th Street, New York, N. Y. 10017.*

THE ARAB WORLD

A MODERN HISTORY OF SYRIA INCLUDING LEBANON AND PALESTINE, by A. L. Tibawi. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969. 421 pages. Notes. Bibl. Index. $10.95.

Reviewed by John P. Spagnolo

In Dr. Tibawi's own words,

> Geographical Syria including Lebanon and Palestine east and west of the river Jordan is the subject of this history, from the closing decades of the eighteenth century to the imposition of political divisions after the First World War. From 1921 Lebanon and both parts of Palestine are excluded, and the history continues as that of the Republic of Syria . . . (p. 11)

Such selectivity and confusion of geography, sovereignty, historiographical premises and political assumptions are characteristic of the problems overhanging the last two centuries in the history of that rather narrow strip of the Middle East lying between the eastern seaboard of the Mediterranean and the desert to the east. Dr. Tibawi seeks to write a history in which "the people figure as prominently as their rulers" (p. 11). Nevertheless, his explanations for many developments follow a chain linking them to the influence of Cairo, Istanbul, Paris, London and beyond.

The historiographical problems facing the student of "geographical Syria" are imposing. Webs of geographical, social, intellectual and political circumscriptions swell and ebb, divide and engulf, or overlap each other. These circumscriptions have reflected the dialogue between conceptions of the past, assessments of current realities and objectives for the future formulated by actors within the area, those surrounding it and those further afield who developed interests there. On the whole this particular work under review is an effective discussion of the "geographical Syrian," Muslim and Arab circumscriptions, in that order, for the period up to 1921. It is meant to be an antidote to the Ottoman, Christian and Zionist circumscriptions. In this unusually controversial area of Middle East historiography, any frame of reference may be construed to imply commitment. Legitimate historiographical criteria, however, may exist in the degree of continuity in exposition and of causal integration within the context of the historian's presentation. In this light the decision to confine the last two chapters to the Republic of Syria seems not arbitrary, but inconclusive. Dr. Tibawi does write that he will have more to publish "on both parts of Palestine," but what about Lebanon? Dr. Tibawi concludes on a reflective note, "Syria had often in history marched under the banner of Islam to victory and glory; it had yet to prove that it could do so under the banner of Arab nationalism" (p. 421). Such a reflection is pregnant with implications for a discussion of social change. Dr. Tibawi might perhaps have overcome some difficult problems both of historiography and interpretation, had he chosen to discuss the links between "the people" and international developments in "geographical Syria" in the context of modernization, rather than to survey them in the context of political history.

Dr. Tibawi is concerned throughout to counter failings in the current quality of Middle East historiography, and in many cases he does so effectively. The value of his work to the student of the region is limited by the restricted number of footnotes he provides. He assures us of the care he has devoted to the research of controversial problems, but that is not the point. By not consolidating his discussion with footnotes and critical bibliography, he establishes yet another precedent which can only further the failings of the sort he deplores.

△ JOHN P. SPAGNOLO is an associate professor of history at Simon Fraser University in British Columbia.

THE PATTERNS OF MASS MOVEMENTS IN ARAB REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE STATES, by Enver M. Koury. The Hague: Mouton, 1970. 293 pages. Bibl. Index. Gld 35.

Reviewed by John H. Sigler

The title of this book is somewhat misleading in that the author has really provided a study of the revolutionary process in the Arab world, with emphasis on mass movements only as one phase in the process. The organization of the book centers around a four stage paradigm of the revolutionary process developed by Rex Hopper: (1) mass discontent and unrest, (2) "great men of knowledge" shift their allegiance from the incumbents to the dissidents, followed by the emergence of "men of revolutionary action," (3) conflict between the incumbents and the revolutionaries who use mass movements to take over and consolidate power, and (4) the legalization of the revolution in the hands of administrators. For the author, the first stage of mass discontent and unrest is caused by heightened awareness of new life styles other than the accepted and traditional ones, thus leading to mass demands for social change to meet their new aspirations. The "great men of knowledge" who undermined the traditional order in the Arab world were Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and Muḥammad 'Abduh. The "revolutionary-progressive states" are Syria, 'Iraq, Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia, and the successful "men of revolutionary action" are Nāṣir, Ben Bella, Boumedienne and Bourguiba who have used mass movements in institutionalizing social, political and economic change and have entered the final stage of consolidation of the revolution which is equated with the building of socialism. The only mass movements which are discussed in any detail are the Arab Socialist Union, the FLN, and the Destourian Socialist Party. The author argues that these mass movements characterize transitional societies and provide a new identity and discipline for the psychologically uprooted masses.

The theoretical underpinnings for this work are borrowed from the extensive social science literature of a decade or two ago when theories of mass society were put forward as explanations for the rise of totalitarianism. Dr. Koury indeed argues at one point that in the Arab revolutionary-progressive states, the old authoritarian system will almost inevitably be replaced by a new totalitarianism which may offer "the most promising transitory means" (p. 82). His arguments for the need for strong centralized authority are based on Islamic political theory and history as well as the few intuitive studies of contemporary Arab political culture.

On this question as well as most others in the study, the major problem is in establishing the linkage between theory and data from the empirical world. Dr. Koury relies exclusively on narrative accounts of recent Arab political history, drawing heavily on secondary sources. For the Tunisian and Algerian accounts, he relies almost exclusively on the *New York Times*. The reader is often told a common pattern exists, but the argument from the disconnected narrative accounts is not entirely convincing. Sequencing problems inherent in the use of a developmental paradigm are ignored. Did mass awareness and demand for change exist in the Arab world in the nineteenth century before the alleged defection of the "great men of knowledge"? Is the failure to develop successful revolutionary transitions in 'Iraq and Syria a function of inadequate leadership and the weakness of organized mass movements? Is the mass support in Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia related to greater awareness and demand for change associated with longer colonial presence? These and other questions are largely ignored. The book is also marred by excessive use of obscure jargon, *e.g.* "Paretian tensions," "parousia," "meiosis," and by baffling references to such generalizations as the "law of probability" which is used in some vague psychological rather than statistical sense. The narrative ends in 1965 or earlier in the case of Tunisia, suggesting a considerable delay between the date of the manuscript and publication. Although the book is on occasion insightful, it is on balance disappointing. The topic is a challenging one, and the author has provided what may be a rewarding direction for inquiry. In the absence of adequate data from the Arab world, however, the argument remains entirely speculative.

△ JOHN H. SIGLER is a professor of political science at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada.

IRAN

PROBLEMS IN EMPLOYMENT CREATION IN IRAN, by William H. Bartsch. Geneva: International Labour Office, 1970. 83 pages. Bibl. $1.50.

Reviewed by Lee L. Bean

This book is one in a series of case studies supported by the International Labour Office and designed to present an analysis of the employment conditions and experiences in dealing with employment problems in developing countries. The Iran report is based on the author's doctoral dissertation, "Labour Supply and Employment Creation in the Urban Areas of Iran, 1956-1966" (School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London), and it comes close to meeting the objectives of this series. More important, it serves to confirm the conditions which generated the series—the lack of information on the nature and extent of the employment problems and the effectiveness of corrective measures in developing countries. Bartsch concisely confirms that little is known about employment problems and programs in developing countries because of the lack of adequate data and the absence of significant, well conceived programs to deal with employment problems in the face of rapidly growing populations.

Part One of the report relates demographic data and demographic conditions to employment problems and employment planning. Drawing on the Iranian 1956 and 1966 censuses as well as other sources, Bartsch examines the growth of labor supply and labor demand during the intercensal period. He concludes that despite the high rates of increase in outputs of goods and services, Iran will be faced with an increasingly serious employment situation in the future because of the high rates of population growth observed during the period and projected through 1966-1986.

In Part Two, Bartsch examines the employment promotion aspects of the Second Seven Year Plan (September 1955 - September 1962) and the Third Five Year Plan (September 1962 - March 1968). The Second Seven Year Plan had no explicit references to employment objectives or estimates of employment levels; any employment increasing programs were a spin-off of investment programs. The primary objective of the Third Five Year Plan was an increase in national income, but the creation of an "optimum" number of employment opportunities was a secondary objective. The estimates of jobs to be created during the Plan period (demand) and the increases in supply were unrealistic, according to Bartsch.

Part Three of the report deals with the employment planning aspects of the Fourth Development Plan (1968-1973). In view of increasing employment problems—unemployment and underemployment—specific attention is given to the provision of new jobs and the conversion of unproductive or low-productive jobs into stable and productive employment. Bartsch ends Part Three with the pessimistic conclusion that the Plan achievements are likely to undershoot greatly the needs for new jobs and more productive employment. Central to his argument is that the Plan estimates of annual population growth during the 1968-1973 period are much lower than his own estimates: 2.6 versus 3.2 percent. The Plan estimates of population growth may be too low, but Bartsch's estimates may be equally in error.

The estimate of population growth accepted by Bartsch reflects what this reviewer sees as the major weakness of the study: the uncritical acceptance of demographic and employment data. For example, Bartsch accepts the most unfavorable population projection from a set of four prepared by Chasteland, Amine and Puech—a projection based on an *assumed* (not *estimated* as Bartsch reports) rapid rate of mortality decline (versus a slow rate of mortality decline) and an assumed constant rate of fertility (versus a declining rate of fertility).

The final section of the paper, Part Four, contains a set of recommendations for employment and population statistics, manpower planning and investment programs designed to improve employment conditions in developing countries.

Although this is a sloppily produced monograph (the erratum sheet contains an incomplete list of 87 corrections for the 87 pages of text plus table of contents), Bartsch has produced a useful study. Briefly, he has demonstrated that even with the impressive rates of economic growth in Iran failure to plan early and adequately, and failure to recognize the labor force implications of high rates of population growth, lead to massive and continuing employment problems as expressed not only in unemployment but also in terms of low productivity and underemployment. The study thus has important implications for developing countries which have not been as fortunate as Iran in their economic growth, but which have similar problems of high population growth—the solutions to employment problems must derive from effective employment as well as effective population policies.

△ LEE L. BEAN is the Associate Director of the Demographic Division of The Population Council in New York.

ISRAEL

ISRAEL AND THE ARAB WORLD, by Aharon Cohen. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1970. xvi + 550 pages. Index. $15.00. Distributed by Thomas Y. Crowell, New York.

Reviewed by Aaron S. Klieman

If the key to the resolution of political disputes lies in exposing the roots of conflict and in tracing their subsequent development, then Aharon Cohen has contributed significantly toward a better understanding of the specific Arab-Israel conflict. *Israel and the Arab World* first appeared in Hebrew in 1964; the present English edition, slightly revised to cover the aftermath of the Six Day campaign in 1967, now insures its exposure to, and use by, a wider readership. It is the most comprehensive, factual treatment of the Palestine problem to be written since the two volume study by the ESCO Foundation in 1947 and Professor J. C. Hurewitz's *The Struggle for Palestine* in 1950. By viewing Israeli independence as a product of the tensions which began to surface in earlier decades rather than as the starting-point for the contemporary conflict, Cohen has succeeded admirably in linking present with past. Consequently, whether for its source material or its insights, his book already has become a basic reference work for anyone engaged in researching the genesis of the complex Palestine problem.

Although *Israel and the Arab World* covers Arab-Jewish relations from their initial encounters in the distant past through the 1967 crisis, it is most noteworthy for its coverage of events in the years 1917-1948, corresponding to the period of British dominance in Palestine. Cohen draws two principal conclusions from those formative years. The first, to which most Israelis and Arabs would subscribe, is that Britain was the determining influence; had Jew and Arab been left alone, "they would have been able to reach mutual understanding." His second contention, by contrast, evoked strong reaction when published in Israel, for he argues that "the most deplorable aspect of the great Jewish national revival in Palestine was . . . shortsightedness in relations with the Arabs." Such introspection and candor were still rare among Israelis in 1964, although the furor may well have reflected less a feeling of resentment or guilt than a deep, unarticulated sense of remorse and regret at the earlier lost opportunities of achieving any viable understanding with the Arabs.

Subjectivity and personal involvement by the author with the Arab question constitute at one and the same time the book's chief strength and weakness. As a proponent of Arab-Jewish accord, Cohen participated directly in a number of low-level contacts with various political figures of the Palestine Arab community in the interwar period. Together with such leaders of the Jewish *yishuv* as Ahad Ha-am, Martin Buber, Dr. Victor Jacobson, Chaim Arlosoroff and especially Chaim Margalit Kalvarisky, the author sensed quite early the imperative need to assuage Arab fears and argued his case in the press, at public and private gatherings, and at various Zionist conferences. He has drawn extensively from his personal experiences and files in reconstructing events and in challenging the accepted Israeli interpretation of Zionist history, with its emphasis upon Jewish rights and Arab wrongs. But in criticizing the foreign policy of Israel since 1948, Cohen offers an unbalanced presentation due to his own leftist, pro-Soviet orientation as a member of the *Mapam* party. Indeed, in 1958 the author had been arrested and imprisoned on charges of violating state security by his contacts with Russian agents; he was released only in 1963 by a special presidential decree.

In reviewing Arab-Jewish associations, Cohen demonstrates rather conclusively that communal strife in Palestine resulted from misperceptions, short-sightedness, mutual insensitivity and faulty lines of communication. On the Zionist side, the Arab editor of *Falasṭīn* made a telling point when he told his Jewish audience in 1930:

> I suspect that you will not find a single leaflet in Arabic in which Zionists explain their needs, their rights, their claims—absolutely none. . . . Though they must live among Arabs, the Zionists did not care whether or not the Arabs understood. They thought it more essential for someone in Vienna or Paris to know what Zionism desired.

Cohen is justified in claiming the absence of any concerted Zionist initiative or of any formulated plan to meet Arab objections. Yet he exaggerates in inferring from this that the Zionist leadership, and particularly Dr. Chaim Weizmann, disregarded the Arabs as a political factor in determining the fate of Palestine. Certainly by 1929, and in fact much earlier, there was a general awareness within the Zionist camp of the need for securing the national home by reaching an agreement with the Arabs directly. One need merely recall Weizmann's conversations and initialled agreement with the Amīr Fayṣal, son of the Sharīf Ḥusayn of Mecca, in 1918-1919.

However, such efforts as were undertaken by the Zionists invariably failed because of several enduring features or conditions of Arab politics. Among the Palestinian Arab leaders the Zionists could not find a single figure who was truly representative of his community, who was politically responsible and capable of guaranteeing the implementation of any agreement he might sign, and who was willing to compromise and to accept Zionist aspirations under certain specified limitations. During the long rule of the Muftī of Jerusalem, Hāj Amīn al-Ḥusaynī, the Palestinian Arab position remained intransigent and violently opposed to Zionism. As a result, the Zionist leaders reacted in two ways: by seeking to safeguard their enterprise through the European powers and international support, which might then be applied in pressuring the Arabs to end their opposition; or by negotiating with leaders of the several neighboring Arab countries. The latter, alternative course deflected Zionist attention from the Palestinians themselves, only to be frustrated by the tendency of the regional Arab rulers, such as Nūrī Sa'īd, the Amīr 'Abdallāh and Ibn Sa'ūd, to subordinate Palestine to their own broader rivalries and self-interest.

The collective failure of both sides, and what this has meant, can be gathered from the title of Cohen's book. Since the Palestinians could not, or would not, come to terms with Zionism, they confront the reality of Israel as a sovereign state rather than a movement, minority or national home. Conversely, because the Zionists failed to persevere in seeking a settlement, despite whatever human and political obstacles there may have been, their work is still endangered by the opposition and increased hostility not only of the Palestinians but of the Arab world as a whole. Even as the earlier Mandate period recedes further into the past and is replaced by newer manifestations of the Arab-Israel conflict, Aharon Cohen encourages us to regain a clearer perspective.

△ AARON S. KLIEMAN is assistant professor, Middle Eastern affairs and international relations at Tel-Aviv University.

ISRAEL THROUGH THE EYES OF ITS LEADERS: A SOCIO-POLITICAL READER, ed. by Israel T. Naamani, David Rudavsky and Abraham I. Katsh. Tel Aviv: Meorot, 1971. 447 pages. $7.95. Published for New York University, Institute for Hebrew Studies.

Reviewed by Michael Curtis

Israel Through the Eyes of Its Leaders is a collection of thirty-six statements of uneven length and quality, most of which come from published works or materials and a few of which have been specially written or prepared for the occasion. Some excerpts are familiar such as Jacob Talmon's devastating criticism of Arnold Toynbee, Ben-Gurion's 1946 statement to the Anglo-American Committee and Abba Eban's June 1967 speech at the UN. The collection is unusual in that the editors, having chosen the individual, asked him to select his own statement: these statements therefore must be regarded as the most pertinent utterances of these authors on the problems of Israel. The great defect of such an arrangement is that the excerpts lack any real coherence, pattern or sustained interchange except on the issue of religion.

The value of the book stems from the broad spectrum of individuals providing statements. Many well known political, administrative and intellectual figures from the extreme right of Menahem Begin and Shmuel Tamir to the extreme left of Shmuel Mikunis and Tawfiq Toubi appear. Collectively, they illustrate the intense and unending discussion on the nature of Israel and its Jewish inheritance and the continual self-examination that is characteristic of Israel.

Many of the writers are proud of the achievements of the new state: its social basis and organization, its cultural ethos, its success in absorbing immigrants, its rapid economic and technological development, its military success, its democratic way of life. Golda Meir contrasts favorably the Israeli voluntary kibbutz with the Soviet enforced collective farm. Ambassador Rabin and Yigal Allon pay tribute to the people's army, as devoid of sect or caste, in which bellicosity, hatred and war-mongering are absent and which in peacetime is dedicated to constructive activity. The late Levi Eshkol tells how abandoned villages were rapidly transformed into inhabited settlements to house immigrants. André Chouraqui provides a valuable and balanced appraisal of the situation of immigrants from North Africa.

But the writers are also concerned about the tasks to be performed and the kind of life appropriate for a land of eagles. Eliezer Livneh is caustic about American influence in Israel and on the decline of idealism. David Horowitz provides a short but brilliant analysis of the economics of Israel. The article by Nathan Rotenstreich is an outstanding discussion of the part that religion should play in the Israeli society and state. Other writers deal less valuably with the place of Oriental Jews and with the relationship between Jews inside and outside Israel. Above all the security issue and Israeli-Arab relationships loom large. The articles on these questions run the gamut from Begin's hawkish argument for the retention of all occupied territories through the different cases made by Shimon Peres, Moshe Dayan and Arie Eliav among others for generous accommodation with the Arabs to the call by Uri Avnery for a federal arrangement between Israel and an Arab Palestine.

The idea of self-selection of excerpts was an ingenious one, but a collection of articles on Israeli problems would have been of greater value if the editors had made their own judgment about the material. There are a number of misprints in the book: the most egregious are "George" for Otto Klemperer (p. 88), "Israelis" for "Italians" (p. 108), "Moslow" for "Maslow" (p. 245), and "Sir" for "Six" (p. 466).

△ MICHAEL CURTIS is chairman of the department of political science at Rutgers University.

THE MAKING OF ISRAEL'S ARMY, by Yigal Allon. London: Vallentine, Mitchell, and New York: Universe Books, 1970. 273 pages. Maps. 50s or $8.95.

THE SEVENTH DAY: SOLDIERS TALK ABOUT THE SIX-DAY WAR, ed. by Avraham Shapira. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970. vii + 271 pages. Gloss. Map. $6.95.

ZANEK!: A CHRONICLE OF THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE, by William Stevenson. New York: The Viking Press, 1971. vi + 339 pages. Index. $8.50.

Reviewed by Bernard Reich

The Israeli military has been an enigma to observers seeking to understand and explain the unique fighting force which has been a major factor in Israel's security, has performed well in combat against Arab armies, and has remained under civilian control unlike many of its Middle Eastern counterparts. While a thorough-going analysis of the many facets of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) still remains to be written, the three volumes reviewed here provide insights, from vastly different perspectives, into the nature of the IDF, its relationship to the broader Israeli society in which it functions, and the character of Israel's security strategy and the psychology which undergirds it and the personnel which comprise the forces.

In *The Making of Israel's Army,* Yigal Allon seeks to explain in concise format, the development of Israel's military doctrines of defense. The author is currently Israel's Deputy Prime Minister and a contender for the Prime Ministership. He was a former Palmach commander, one of the architects of the IDF, and a commander of various military units and on several battlefronts during Israel's War of Independence. It is from this perspective that he talks about the evolution of those forces and their doctrines from their early beginnings when the Jewish settlements in Palestine (in the 1880s) undertook their own defenses, through the more elaborate Haganah (the underground organization for self-defense of the Jewish community in Palestine during the Mandate), to the present day Zahal (IDF). He emphasizes both continuity of approach and adaptation to changing circumstances. Allon's narrative is complemented by the "Voices and Documents" of the second part of the book which provide "an insight into the sources of the military conceptions of Israel's Defence Army and their ideological basis" (p. 111).

The Seventh Day is an English translation of a book which originally appeared in Hebrew in 1967. It is the edited and printed version of a series of tape-recordings of kibbutz members discussing their reactions to the June War and, particularly, to their participation in it. It contains a good deal of the philosophy and morality of the kibbutz-reared soldier and the psychology of the young Israeli generation which will provide Israel's future leadership. It is a remarkable volume, in content and tone, illustrating the human aspect of the soldiers who comprise the IDF.

Zanek (the Hebrew command for "scramble") is appropriate as the title of a book dealing with the Israeli Air Force. Stevenson, a journalist and author, has traced the development of the Israeli Air Force from 1948 to the present and has provided valuable glimpses and insights into the people who comprise it. The narrative takes a fiction-like prose form as the author describes the activities of a third person, "S," who lived with the Israeli Air Force during 1970.

△ BERNARD REICH is an associate professor of political science at George Washington University in Washington, D. C.

NORTH AFRICA

POLITICS IN NORTH AFRICA: ALGERIA, MOROCCO, AND TUNISIA, by Clement H. Moore. Boston: Little, Brown, 1970. xx + 325 pages. Appen. Gloss. Index. $4.50.

Reviewed by Louis J. Cantori

Clement H. Moore has written a first class comparative study of North African politics. Its unique feature and its greatest strength is its truly comparative character. Chapter headings such as "The Scope of Government," "Interest Aggregation," *etc.* are dealt with in a deliberately comparative manner. The result is a volume which takes its place among a handful of genuinely comparative books in the political science sub-field of comparative politics. The rigor of this approach, however, diminishes the volume's utility as a first rate book on North African politics. Its organization is such that only the most assiduous reader unfamiliar with North Africa will appreciate its great insights.

A work of scholarship should be judged at least equally if not most importantly in terms of the questions asked as well as the answers adduced. Here Moore has departed on an admirably independent course from that of the series' editors (Gabriel Almond, James S. Coleman and Lucian W. Pye) to essentially ask the twin, but interdependent, questions on the nature of the modernization process and the creation of legitimate political institutions in North Africa. These questions, or at least the former (the latter one regarding legitimacy is one not so often asked), are of course commonly treated by analysts. What Moore does, however, is to rephrase them in an interesting manner. He rejects, for example, the focus upon structural differentiation and secularization as criteria of modernization—the former is seen as not necessarily typical of modernization and the latter is seen, in this reviewer's opinion also, as an ethnocentric Western concept. Instead, in reference to modernization, he focuses upon the differing strategies of political development found among the North African states in reference to common problems: local reform, agriculture and education. The treatment of Tunisia is critical enough to provide for the recent Ben Salah affair and its search for a constitutional organization aftermath.

His treatment of legitimacy is insightful and even provocative: he concludes that only in Tunisia has politics become "sacralized" that is that the "surface" features of Islām (practices and institution) have been stripped away and "inner" Islām has been brought into contact with politics. In Morocco on the other hand, the "surface" features of Islām are political objects which serve to isolate the individual from politics. This is indeed provocative, but even in terms of his own argument the features of "inner" Islām remain unspecified and we are thus left in the dark as to how these are in fact related to politics in order to become sacralized. There is a further and perhaps in the nature of things inevitable difficulty as to what is meant by politics. It seems to be defined in such a fashion as to exclude the sacralization of Moroccan politics.

A further major positive feature of the book is the masterly fashion in which original research is combined with existing scholarship to provide a penetrating analysis of the differing group (interest groups and political parties) bases of the North African régimes. The conclusion appears to be that Morocco has a richness of articulation but minimal aggregation whereas Algeria possesses little of either. Tunisia on the other hand succeeds best in balancing both processes but with a danger that there is insufficient articulation as a result of a combination of the effects of personalized leadership and party bureaucracy. In short, as the foregoing suggests, the strength of the book lies in the unusual combination of political science disciplinary skills and area expertise demonstrated by the author.

△ LOUIS J. CANTORI is an assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles.

THE UNITED STATES AND MOROCCO, 1776-1956, by Luella J. Hall. Metuchen, N. J.: Scarecrow Press, 1971. 1,114 pages. Map. Gloss. Bibl. Index. $25.

Reviewed by John Damis

A thorough study of the entire span of American-Moroccan relations has been needed for a long time. Luella Hall has now given us such a study, a long and detailed work based on extensive research. The author's sources fall into two main categories. The first, consisting of published materials of varying quality (with only a few in French or German), adds only more detail to what is already known. In the case of the final chapter, treating the Moroccan struggle for independence, no attempt was made to consult more recent studies. The second category, consisting of State Department archives, offers detailed information on how questions were viewed both by Washington and by American diplomatic representatives in Morocco.

One of America's consistent aims in her policy *vis-à-vis* Morocco was to secure equal commercial opportunities with other nations—an aim which was eventually embodied in the Open Door policy. From time to time over the years, the United States found it necessary to stand up to one or another European power in order to maintain the Open Door. But for the most part, very little happened during the nineteenth century in United States-Moroccan relations, due partly to what Dr. Hall describes as "the chronic American lethargy concerning Moroccan affairs." The major thread of US policy, in fact, running from the nineteenth century through the Algeciras Conference of 1906 and the period of the French protectorate (1912-1956), was the refusal to intervene in Morocco. In some cases this was due to a simple lack of interest, whereas in others the main concern was the reluctance to antagonize our French ally. (Since American-Moroccan relations have only become important during the last thirty years, beginning specifically with the Allied invasion of North Africa in November 1942, it is regrettable that Dr. Hall chose to end her book with the granting of Morocco's independence in 1956 rather than to bring the story up to the present time.)

The book's major problem is one of focus. Such extensive and detailed coverage is given to internal Moroccan affairs, relations between Morocco and various European powers, relations between various world powers (including the United States), and questions of American foreign policy that the reader often loses sight completely of American-Moroccan relations. The two long chapters on the Algeciras Conference are cases in point. There is no question of the Conference's importance in delaying war between France and Germany, nor of the rôle played by the United States; but, in as much as Moroccan-American relations were largely peripheral to the questions involved, it is difficult to justify such a detailed treatment of the Algeciras Conference in this book. In short, it is hard to avoid the feeling that the author could have adequately covered her subject in a much shorter study, and one free of excessive quotations and containing a bibliography. Finally, the book's price, though understandable even with offset printing, will likely keep it beyond the reach of all but a small number of specialists.

△ JOHN DAMIS is an assistant professor of political science at Portland State University, Portland, Oregon.

THE PALESTINE PROBLEM

GENESIS 1948: THE FIRST ARAB-ISRAELI WAR, by Dan Kurzman. New York: The World Publishing Company, 1970. xvii + 717 pages. Notes. Bibl. Index. $12.95.

Reviewed by Scott D. Johnston

This book by Don Kurzman, a former correspondent for the *Washington Post* with extensive overseas news reporting experience, is a lengthy but episodic account of the initial Israeli-Arab conflict. The extensive bibliography cited by the author as having been used in the preparation of his study includes besides books a collection of diaries, papers, and correspondence, various documentary materials, and a listing of libraries and archives used. The chapter footnotes reveal the use of these sources, as well as numerous interviews with participants in the actions recounted (Ben Gurion, Clark Clifford, Yigal Allon, Egyptian General Fu'ād Ṣādiq, 'Abdallāh al-Tall of Jordan, and various Israeli and Arab rank and file participants in sundry military actions). This is a carefully researched study. From the standpoint, however, of the end result of Mr. Kurzman's labors, the book may be disappointing to many readers. The book is written in a highly journalistic style, concentrating on very personalized accounts of a great variety of episodes and events. Numerous converations with participants in the actions are repeatedly cited in lengthy direct quotations, along with the author's very assured interpretation of moods and reactions of these people. The style of writing presents a sometimes confusing mixture of events that range back and forth from major decisions and turning points in the war to a sea of trivia often presented within a sentimental or emotional context.

Within the framework of this critique, however, interesting and worthwhile materials emerge for the reader who wishes a greater understanding of the conflict. The accounts of Zionist support operations in the United States furnish noteworthy insights with their web of inter-personal relations running from a personal friendship with President Truman that was employed to get him to agree to a key session with Chaim Weizmann, to financial support operations and the organization of supplies and military equipment for the Palestinian Jewish community that included the collection of hand guns and rifles at neighborhood stores in Jewish communities in various American cities. Secretary of State George Marshall's friendly admonition to Moshe Sharett for the Palestinian Jewish leadership not to rely on their military advisors from his own recent experiences in China is a revealing aside.

Kurzman's account of the Council of the Jewish Agency debating and resolving on the issue of immediate statehood and the alternatives in May 1948 is well done and insightful. The account of Ben Gurion's decisions in regard to the subordination of the autonomous military organizations of the Palmach and the Irgun Zvai Leumi with the eventual establishment of one unified military arm for the new Jewish state covers a topic of great importance for Israel and was one of the major long term contributions that Ben Gurion made to the development of a responsible and modern political system under civilian democratic control.

Attempts to include Nāṣir's experiences as a young officer on the Southern front are of an episodic nature and of some interest mainly because of his later career. Accounts of direct negotiations between 'Abdallāh and a battery of Israeli negotiators are most revealing, both in terms of the details of the hard bargaining and the reactions of the participants; there is the anger of 'Abdallāh at being presented a rare Old Testament as a gift from Ben Gurion and finding in it a map of Israel in the days of Solomon which included part of Jordan (an unintentional *faux pas* for which Israeli negotiator Walter Eytan shuddered), and the touching plea from 'Abdallāh to Yigal Yadin, "Mr. Yadin, give me Beit Gubrin [an Arab village in the "Little Triangle" District]. Tomorrow is my birthday. Give me Beit Gubrin as a birthday present." It may be noted that 'Abdallāh's request was rejected, and in the light of Jordanian intransigence on either the fulfillment of some of the armistice conditions, let alone a peace treaty eventuating, at least some question can be raised as to Israeli priorities on the procedural and substantive content of these negotiations.

Mr. Kurzman has produced a volume which is interesting and informative in large part, but most readers will probably find it far too detailed concerning its long succession of episodic and personalized accounts to plow through on any completely systematic and thorough basis.

△ SCOTT D. JOHNSTON is professor of political science at Hamline University, St. Paul, Minnesota.

TURKEY

TURKISH ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHANGE, by Edwin J. Cohn. New York: Praeger, 1970. xiv + 166 pages. Appen. Bibl. $12.50.

Reviewed by Joseph S. Szyliowicz

Recent developments in Turkey have once again brought that country's experiment in rapid development within a democratic framework into critical focus. Hence this book which seeks to analyze the major changes of the past twenty-five years and to identify those analytic and concrete structures that serve as major constraints upon development—the élite-mass gap, the bureaucracy, and the educational system, and those problem areas with more immediate implications—the pattern of industrialization, land reform, the Eastern provinces, and the rôle of political parties and of the armed forces has appeared at an opportune time.

The author, an economist, has, by drawing upon his extensive personal experience and upon many primary sources, presented us with a clear, concise and well written introduction to many aspects of contemporary Turkey.

Unfortunately the book suffers from two weaknesses. First, it is extremely short, some one hundred and sixty pages of text. While brevity is a virtue to be praised, particularly in an era when academicians seem determined to produce ever more voluminous tomes, it has also, in this case, led to a less than adequate discussion of many important topics. To cite but the most obvious example, the rôle of the military is dealt with in two and a half pages (pp. 149-51) and the vital issue of civil-military relations discussed in only two brief paragraphs (p. 40, p. 151).

Dr. Cohn also departs from modern academic practice in another way with more important disadvantages for the book. Nowhere does he define his terms and indeed he uses various concepts interchangeably. This lack of terminological precision is accompanied by, and indeed reflects, the absence of any theoretical framework. The absence of conceptualization greatly complicates Dr. Cohn's efforts to present us with an integrated view of the developmental process and one looks in vain not only for any theoretical or analytical justification for his selection of topics but also for any indication of the ways in which they are interrelated.

His treatment of the political dimension can perhaps serve to illustrate how the author fails to elaborate important issues and to tie his material together. In his view the "structural transformation" of the past decades has been affected only slightly by political considerations (p. 48). Yet when discussing the shortcomings of education, Dr. Cohn concludes that the major problem has been the decisions by successive governments to stress expansion rather than reform. Why this should have been the case or how political variables shaped such decisions is never explored even though the author points out that to deal with such problems as educational reform will not be easy because ". . . short and even medium-term political calculations expressed in terms of votes gained and lost are not likely to look favorable" (p. 79). This judgment, of course, applies equally to the past and it is precisely because such political calculations are made, and not because of mystical technological forces, that the pattern of change took the form that it did first in the fifties, then in the sixties. In each case the sort of dynamic and courageous leadership that was necessary to deal with fundamental issues was seldom forthcoming and led to a deteriorating situation. Ideological and partisan tensions became aggravated until the government seemed no longer able to control the destiny of the country in a way that was consonant with the ideals of the Atatürk revolution and the military felt compelled to intervene. Whether this intervention will in fact serve to facilitate the achievement of social, political and economic development remains to be seen. In the meantime anyone wishing a lucid introduction to the many problems which confront the new government can profit from consulting this book.

△ JOSEPH S. SZYLIOWICZ is an associate professor of international studies at the University of Denver.

THE YOUNG TURKS: THE COMMITTEE OF UNION AND PROGRESS IN TURKISH POLITICS, 1908-1914, by Feroz Ahmad. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1969. xiv + 165 pages. Biographical Appen. Bibl. Index. $7.

Reviewed by Glen W. Swanson

For decades, many observers of Middle East history have disregarded the detailed studies and contemporary accounts of the Young Turk period and have continued to believe that the Committee of Union and Progress was the omnipotent power in Ottoman politics from 1908-1914. Feroz Ahmad's study of the CUP should help change this impression. In his stylistically attractive, critical essay, Ahmad shows that the Committee was not a monolithic structure and that no automatic guarantee existed for its monopoly of political power after the 1908 revolution. Ahmad begins his review of the CUP with the 1908 Young Turk revolution and its political aftermath. He continues with the counter-revolution of 1909; the resultant issues of military-civilian relationships, constitutional reform, and the growth of the opposition; the fall and resurgence of the Committee from 1911 to January 1913; and the consolidation of power prior to the Ottoman entrance into World War I. In the concluding chapter, Ahmad summarizes the changes during the years from 1908 to 1914—the territorial losses; the reapportionment of nationalist, Ottoman and Islamic ideologies; the political shifts in group representations; the quest for modernity and its effect on relations with the great powers. Supplementing his essay are a bibliography and an informative sixteen page biographical appendix.

The elusive nature of the topic and the physical limitations on research have largely determined the merits and weaknesses of this monograph. Ahmad clearly indicates the problems for the Committee: its need to adapt itself to altering circumstances; the relationship of Committee-as-party to Committee-as-society; the increasing futility of bringing about change peacefully and lawfully in the empire; and the conflict between military men and civilians over the question of power. One may disagree, however, with his generalizations about Ottoman military officers, his explanations of the struggle between the executive and legislative branches of government, and his use of the collective "Committee" when actually referring to a few men who were apparently acting independently of the CUP as a whole. Other points need further clarification, such as the Committee's communication and organizational system, especially in the provinces, and the leadership and administration of the Committee's political structure. As for sources, Ahmad's critical employment of information drawn from British archives and from Turkish, French and English language publications, especially contemporary Turkish newspapers, is impressive. His tapping of Public Record Office holdings in London, however, is not matched by similar treatment of Turkish or other European archives. Future studies which incorporate these collections and additional sources will undoubtedly clarify or complement many of Ahmad's findings. But until that occurs, Ahmad's book must be considered as the basic guide in English for the politics of the Young Turk period.

△ GLEN W. SWANSON is an assistant professor of history at the University of Kentucky.

HISTORY, RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY

THE 'ABBASID REVOLUTION, by M. A. Shaban. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1970. xxii + 168 pages. Bibl. Index. $14.50.

Reviewed by Richard W. Bulliet

The 'Abbasid Revolution by M. A. Shaban lives up to its billing. It is a startlingly new and different interpretation of Islamic history between roughly the years 650 and 750. On point after point Mr. Shaban radically disagrees with all earlier historians of this period. This does not mean that his version of Umayyad history is any truer than those of his predecessors; the final judgment on that will undoubtedly be long in coming given the sweeping scope of his reinterpretation. For the intent reader, however, with his Wellhausen and Ṭabarī within easy reach (for Mr. Shaban gives virtually no space to outlining the arguments and repeating the narrative of earlier writers), reading this book can be a challenging and exciting experience.

Despite the title, the book is not primarily concerned with the 'Abbāsid revolution. It seeks to present a more discriminating and accurate picture of Arab society in conquered Persian lands and to highlight in particular the importance of assimilation between the Arabs and Persians. Therefore, the first eight of the book's nine chapters constitute a detailed chronicle of Arab tribal history in the unsettled border province of Khurasan in eastern Iran from the initial conquests up to the 'Abbāsid revolution. It is in these chapters that Mr. Shaban makes his greatest contribution. Rejecting Wellhausen's view that events in Khurasan reflect in general the rivalry between "North" and "South" Arabs, Mr. Shaban looks within the rubrics "North" and "South" to describe a more complex and also more historically satisfying political development stressing the influence of the differing degrees of settlement and assimilation of the Arab tribes.

Chapter Nine on the 'Abbāsid revolution proper is substantially less convincing than what goes before it. Mr. Shaban has a general point to make, that it was a disgruntled and assimilated Arab population in Khurasan that made the revolution and not the suppressed and rebellious Persians, and he abandons some of his earlier scrupulousness to make it. His argument depends to a surprising degree on the correct interpretation of a single word (*taqādum* in his interpretation but also spelled differently) since his supporting evidence is quite ambiguous. Unfortunately, to bolster his argument he makes some rather extravagant points contending, for example, that the revolutionary *nom de guerre* Abū Muslim 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Muslim al-Khurasānī was chosen as a fighting slogan proclaiming the egalitarian goal of the movement. This contention flies in the face of onomastic usage of the period and is not corroborated in the sources.

If in the end the reader is unconvinced by Mr. Shaban's interpretation of the 'Abbāsid revolution itself, the book still stands firm. The solidity of the first eight chapters more than outweighs the weakness of the ninth. *The 'Abbasid Revolution* affords a stimulating new departure in an important but recently stagnant historical field. It might only be wished that he had chosen to write a longer book which might stand alone as a history of the period instead of one that requires frequent reference to earlier works to be fully understandable.

△ RICHARD W. BULLIET is an assistant professor of history at Harvard University.

ISLAMIC RATIONALISM: THE ETHICS OF 'ABD AL-JABBAR, by George F. Hourani. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971. xi + 158 pages. Appen. Index. $6.50.

Reviewed by Lenn Evan Goodman

The discovery in a library at San'ā' in 1951 of the major portion of Abū al-Ḥasan 'Abd al-Jabbār's (*ca.* 935-1025) *Mughnī fī Abwāb al-Tawḥīd wa al-'adl* (Summa on the Major Topics of Monotheism and Theodicy) was as great an event in the study of the *Mu'tazilah* as was the discovery of oil in the history of Libya. With the intellectual as with the material resource, it will be many years before the asset has become fully integrated into the larger framework which affords it significance and value. George Hourani's careful and astute study of the ethics of 'Abd al-Jabbār is a major step toward that integration; for as oil is of little value until refined and put to use, so editions are of value only potentially until read and understood.

In his day a celebrated theologian and chief *Qāḍī* of Rayy, 'Abd al-Jabbār was an *Ash'arī* convert to Mu'tazilism who was drawn into essaying a systematic and detailed ethical theory apparently by the necessity of responding to the challenge of what Hourani calls the "theistic subjectivism" of the Ash'arites. Ethical considerations, or at any rate considerations as to value were at the core of the complex of difficulties which first prompted Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī to break away from the Mu'tazilite fold of his teacher and disputant of perhaps forty years, al-Jubbā'ī. Ash'arī apparently was morally unable to bear the implication of the Mu'tazilite *tout-est-bien* notion regarding the suffering (and indeed the conceivably inadequate recompense) of innocents. God's power over human acts was unlimited, and so therefore was His responsibility. If so and God was not to be accused of injustice, then human moral categories would simply have to yield to the divine: better to say God could do no wrong in harming creatures who are his chattels than to pretend that innocents were not harmed or to subject the divine will to a necessity of recompensing their sufferings adequately by human standards. To escape the dilemma, the Ash'arites made God creator of all things, good as well as evil.

For the *Mu'tazilah,* possessing a stronger sense of human autonomy *vis-à-vis* the divine, these conclusions simply did not follow. Man bore his share of responsibility for evil and no evil was to be attributed to God. If there was a mystery about God it was with respect to His utter unity, not His goodness. No evil could be attributed to God, *and* no disparity was to be found between the objective standards of good and evil on one hand and those of God or man's God-given reason on the other. To suppose that an act was bad because God willed it so or good because He commanded it was blasphemy of a piece with the attribution of evil (in any sense) directly to God. Thus while Ash'arism was at least as moral in its intention as Mu'tazilism, the Mu'tazilites were at least as serious in their theism as the Ash'arites. As in all truly great philosophical standoffs, the values which lay behind the arguments on both sides were worthy of the passions they called forth.

Philosophically, however, it is the arguments, rather than the passions or the values lying behind them, which are the measure of the greatness of their exponents and of the issues over which they warred—for, as with wars, the virtues which the struggle calls forth may have life long after the battles are dead and the issues buried. It is through these virtues, weapons, arguments, that past philosophy continues to haunt those who walk today across the same battlegrounds.

Caution, pertinacity, keen analysis and the very ideals for which he fought (the lady's favor never far from the heart and hand of her knight) were among the strengths of 'Abd al-Jabbār. The enemy itself contributes to his strength, it being obvious that his watchfulness is only in response to their expected attack. The massiveness of their fortifications is mirrored in the elaborateness of his siege equipment. It is only the subtlety of their dialectic which makes of him a supremely subtle dialectician.

A dialectician he is, not a philosopher—not because he takes premises from the *Qur'ān*, for *mutakallimūn* take their premises not from the *Qur'ān* but from the Greeks and the *a priori* imagination; and, as Richard Frank has so wisely shown, in order to draw premises from scripture one must first understand (*i.e.* interpret) scripture: The *Qur'ān* was the object, not the subject of *Mu'tazilī* exegesis. Rather it was because he kept his desired conclusion always before his mind (as the knight kept his lady's face before his mind—the favor was a mere reminder) that the *Mu'tazilī* was a *mutakallim*: He would argue and debate to the furthest reaches of credibility and beyond, without ever being prepared to surrender his conclusion. Premises might be introduced at random or *ad hoc*, and the entire universe be sent spinning, so long as it revolved about the constant and unchangeable constellations: in this case God's goodness and (a corollary) man's rationality. Philosophers, too, if the truth be told, do not for long take their eyes off the desired conclusion. But no true philosopher would ever allow his desired conclusion to influence (to the exclusion of his service to the truth as given) his choice of premises. This implies, of course, that many of our philosophers are *mutakallimūn* in philosophers' clothing—a fact which the medievals well knew. The difference turns out not to have been one of method but one of objective after all: The *mutakallim* may serve many masters, the philosopher, ultimately, but one.

Hourani does not expend a great deal of ink elaborating the theological issues which lay behind 'Abd al-Jabbār's ethical thinking. His interest is in ethical theory and this involves him, as he carefully points out, in a task of philosophical abstraction from the intentions implicit (and often made explicit) in 'Abd al-Jabbār's work. But the outcome of the abstraction is well worth the price, for 'Abd al-Jabbār's theology proper may always be salvaged by another sweep through his vast *Mughnī*, and Hourani has been able to portray him as a first rate ethical theorist capable of taking his place alongside Ross, Moore, Pritchard and Sidgwick, and other opponents of ethical naturalism with whom Hourani compares him. Thus Hourani's full and careful treatment of 'Abd al-Jabbār's ethics will warrant study not only by students of Islamic thought, but also by philosophers cognizant of the philosophical necessity of exploring an elaborate and coherent theistic intuitionism. Still it might have been better had the connection between theology and ethics been drawn more tightly, for surely it was so in 'Abd al-Jabbār's mind.

'Abd al-Jabbār is "ever on the alert," as Hourani points out, against the intrusion of some tone or premise of positivism into his ethical thought or terminology from his theology. The danger is a very real one for the *Mu'tazilī*, who begins of course from apparently *a priori* assumptions regarding the nature appropriate to God. Is "God is good" a synthetic or an analytic proposition? If analytic, God's power is limited, His essence confined by human notions—or as Prior, Findlay, and others put it, God becomes an abstraction—

unless the Ash'arite option is reopened and human moral categories give way before human moral experience, God's "goodness" being retained at the cost of the very significance of the term. If on the other hand the proposition is synthetic, how is it possible for the Mu'tazilite to claim that God can be responsible for no evil? 'Abd al-Jabbār's response to this old (and still alive) dilemma is an excellent gauge of his philosophical sophistication: God *can* do evil—otherwise the attribution to him of mercy and justice would be senseless in the one case, vacuous in the other. But not everything which God can do is done by Him in fact. The sense in which God cannot be said to do evil is (appropriately) a moral one—it is indefensible, blasphemous, impious to attribute such doings to Him, after we have witnessed His generosity and goodness toward us. Thus Mu'tazilism may be saved from a priorism, and the hubris of its exponents who might wish to become makers of gods.

Towards the close of his study, Hourani speculates that the discovery of so impressive a Mu'tazilite as 'Abd al-Jabbār as late as the eleventh century may indicate that rationalism, voluntarism, and the opposition to ethical positivism of the theistic and legalistic varieties may have run deeper and more broadly in Islamic thought than has been generally supposed. I suspect (and sincerely hope) that he is right. When he goes on to hope that some measure of the spirit of Mu'tazilite thinking will be imparted to modern Islamic thought, I must confess that I once spoke the same way. I am somewhat more skeptical about this now as a viable option, not because I fear that the reintroduction of voluntaristic-rationalistic categories (which we are inclined to favor since both are outgrowths of humanism) would be too much at variance with the tides of history, but rather because I suspect that the wilful (that is ideological, or *Kalam*-like) reintroduction of such categories would evidence to some extent a loss of part of the benefit of history's lesson, a failure to understand how Kant leads (not inexorably, but all the more insidiously for that) to Nietzsche. For despite the logical brilliance of 'Abd al-Jabbār, and of many other *mutakallimūn,* rationalistic hubris which would remake the universe and God himself to fit man's image remains the tragic flaw of all voluntarism, intuitionism, and of humanism itself.

We learn from 'Abd al-Jabbār that positivisms of all sorts, legal, theistic, sociolatrous, or scientistic have more in common than we might at first have supposed. We admire rationalism because it is the assertion of the human mind against the religious, social, even the physical given. But we must also understand the strength of positivism from this very fact: for over and against the mind there will always be the given, and the process of relating to it will always have two terms, the subject and the object, except where madness or death has cancelled one or the other. The rationalist will wrestle with gods as he wrestles with nature or with ideas, and the struggle will always be noble, so long as subject and object remain poised in tension and are not merged or confused with one another—so long as the humanist does not betray himself to the most insidious of positivisms, that of the will.

△ LENN EVAN GOODMAN is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Hawaii.

ISLAMIC SURVEYS, NO. 8: BELL'S INTRODUCTION TO THE QUR'ĀN, by W. Montgomery Watt. Edinburgh: University Press, and Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1970. xii + 186 pages. Notes. Tables. Indices. 30s or $5.50.

Reviewed by Lorne M. Kenny

The vast changes that have been occurring in the Muslim environment in the 17 years between the appearance of Richard Bell's *Introduction to the Qur'ān* in 1953 and W. Montgomery Watt's revision of it may be illustrated by the estimated growth in the number of Muslims from three hundred millions to more than four hundred millions (Bell, p. 1; Watt, p. ix—though Watt's estimate is still probably at least one hundred millions short).

More significant than growth in numbers, however, has been the expanding "dialogue" between men of different faiths during this quarter of a century. It is Watt's sharpened consciousness of this latter fact that has given rise to his more sympathetic approach to Islam and his great concern to avoid wounding the sensibilities of Muslims. He has, for instance, expunged all references to the Qur'ān as the product of Muḥammad's conscious mind, illustrated in his omission of Bell's assertions that Muḥammad "often mistook his own brooding reaction to events for the divine afflatus" and further, that he "acquired facility in getting the answer he desired" (Bell, p. 36; Watt, pp. 23f.). Characteristically, he deletes Bell's reference to Judaism and Christianity as "higher religions" (p. 9) and denigrates Bell's emphasis upon the Jewish and Christian sources of the *Qur'ān* (pp. 12-14, 27, Chapter 8 "Contents and Sources" and *passim*), for "the study of sources does not explain away the ideas whose sources are found, nor does it detract from their truth and validity" (Watt, p. 184). Since Watt's approach to comparative religion is to accept the "relative truth" of all the great religious systems of ideas—Jewish, Christian, Muslim, Buddhist and others—as approximations of the unknowable "ultimate truth," he is able to assert that "the Qur'ān is in this sense true" (pp. 183 f.).

Professor Watt is well aware, of course, that the Qur'ān in Muslim dogma is the final, eternal, uncreated Word of God. He does, nevertheless, marshal strong arguments for a careful historical approach from accepted Muslim views regarding the circumstances surrounding the descent of particular passages *(asbāb al-nuzūl)* and the doctrine of abrogation *(nāsikh wa-mansūkh)*, as well as the evidence for revision within the *sūrahs* and the process of the "collection" of the Qur'ānic text *(q.v.)*. At the same time he urges scholars to make the Qur'ān itself the first object of study, rather than accepting later tradition on the one hand or resorting to excessive intellectualizing about it on the other.

There are few passages that do not bear the mark of the reviser's hand. In extensive sections he does follow Bell quite closely or give at least the substance of the original text. Included within such revision is the more logical rearrangement of materials, the introduction of enumeration and so forth. In other places the revision is much more far-reaching, as in the first two chapters, reconstructed from Bell's historical introduction, plus some material from the latter's last chapter on the "Contents and Sources of the Qur'ān," as well as the results of the reviser's own research on the life of the Prophet. Watt's last two chapters are almost entirely new, the first of which is a very brief introduction to "Muslim Scholarship and the Qur'ān" and the second an expansion of Bell's bibliography into an up-to-date bibliographical essay on "The Qur'ān and Occidental Scholarship."

The updating just referred to extends to the whole of the work, adding to the value of Bell's introduction for the serious student of the Qur'ān. Watt has also given us much more numerous references to the Qur'ānic text. This has been supplemented by a useful index to the Qur'ān itself, instead of Bell's "Index of References to the Qur'ān" which occur in his own text. While we cannot expect Watt's index to be complete, one wonders why items important to his own text have been omitted, including the following: *āya* and *āyāt* (signs); *bashshar, bashīr* and *mubashshir; dkakar, dhikr* and *mudhakkir; mathānī; mu'tafikāt; waḥy* and *awḥa* (including 'revelation' and 'inspiration'). Possibly the reader is expected to refer to the index of the book itself for these, but other items are listed in both. Again, there is no consistency in the Index to the Qur'ān in the cross-references from Arabic to English and *vice versa.*

Watt's revision is further justified by a better treatment of many subjects throughout the text. These include, to mention only a few: "The Language of the Qur'ān" (pp. 82ff.-cf. Bell, p. 81); "Bell's Hypothesis of Written Documents" followed by his own critique of it (pp. 101-107-cf. Bell, pp. 90-97); Watt's treatment of *āyāt, mathānī* and other "Names of the Revealed Message" (Chapter 8), where he objects to Bell's attempt to divide the Qur'ān chronologically on this basis so strictly as the latter has done (Bell, Chapter 7 "Stages in the Growth of the Qur'ān).

It is apparent, then, that Bell's *Introduction to the Qur'ān* as revised by Professor Montgomery Watt is a valuable work of scholarship that has enhanced the usefulness of the original work produced by the reviser's former teacher and mentor. It should prove a useful tool for "the further study of the Qur'ān—along new lines—by both Muslims and non-Muslims," to quote the reviser's own parting exhortation.

△ LORNE M. KENNY is an associate professor in the department of Islamic studies, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada.

SHORTER NOTICES

THE ARABS IN ISRAEL: STATISTICS AND FACTS, ed. by Yechiel Harari. Givat Haviva: Center for Arab and Afro-Asian Studies, 1970. 64 pages. I£ 3.50. Arab and Afro-Asian Monograph Series no. 7. Available from Givat Haviva, P.O. Menashe, Israel.

This book is essentially a collection of tables on the statistics of Israeli Arabs which was compiled from the annual Statistical Abstract of Israel and similar publications of the governmental Central Bureau of Statistics. Its main value lies in saving one the time it would take to go to such publications and cull the tables for information on Israeli Arabs. The tables include such standard demographic subjects as vital statistics of Jews and non-Jews (1966-69), sources of population increase, population according to type of settlement, the non-Jewish population in the labor force, information on residence and Arab education, as well as on election results in minority settlements.

In addition to the statistical material, there is other information on the Arabs in Israel and some effort is made to compare the Israeli Arabs with the Jews in Israel and with other populations in Arab countries. An inaccuracy should be noted: on page 13, it is stated that Druze women did not go to hospitals for childbirth until a special "women's only" department was opened in Nazareth. Many Druze women over the years have, in fact, gone to an all-women's private hospital in Haifa. This hospital was used by Druze women from both Carmel and Western Galilee villages.

Obviously, there is a desire on the part of the Givat Haviva Center to present Israel's minority policies in as favorable a light as possible. Unfortunately, when one deals with an area so entangled in controversy as Israeli relations with Arabs, no fact is neutral. For instance, apologists for Israel will see the fact that there is a large pro-Communist vote in Israel as a sign of Israeli freedom, governmental forbearance and tolerance, while foes will emphasize the protest nature of the vote and see it as an indication of alienation. Both are true, but this double truth will often be lost.

The best-foot-forward aim of this book comes in a comparison with the populations of different Arab countries. Apparently, the idea is to compare Israel's minority policies with those of the Arabs, emphasizing the emigration of Jews and others from those countries. This fact, however, is not made clear. A full-scale comparison of this sort would be welcome, but the statistical aspect is only one part. In this volume it is out of place, but an analysis of these policies would reveal parallels as well as significant differences. While the ethical ambiguities of Israeli policies would be revealed, it would no doubt show that most states deviate from their own ideals in dealing with their ethnic minorities.

△ WALTER P. ZENNER, State University of New York at Albany.

BAGHDAD: METROPOLIS OF THE ABBASID CALIPHATE, by Gaston Wiet. Trans. by Seymour Feiler. Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1971. viii + 177 pages. Map. Tables. Bibl. Index. $3.50. Center of Civilization Series no. 28.

The question with this book, as with any popularization, is how effectively it reaches a non-specialist audience. What it reaches that audience with is of importance too, of course; but that problem is shared by all books. Regarding the question of accessibility to a non-specialist, Professor Wiet's *Baghdad: Metropolis of the Abbasid Caliphate* is sadly deficient. Specialized terminology and exotic names are used throughout without elucidation making the book virtually impossible for the lay reader to understand. As for the specialist who might be tempted by a brief book on Baghdad, Professor Wiet's disorganized hodge-podge of facts and ideas has little to recommend it. Baghdad is an exceptionally difficult city to study if one is unwilling to delve into the fourteen volumes of Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī's history of the city, and the mixture offered here of chroniclers' tidbits about floods, fires, and riots fleshed out by a general political history of the 'Abbāsid caliphate leaves one with very little real understanding of the city of Baghdad.

△ RICHARD W. BULLIET, Harvard University.

THE BLOOD OF ADONIS: SELECTED POEMS OF ADONIS ('ALĪ AHMAD SA'ĪD), trans. by Samuel Hazo. Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1971. xx + 55 pages. $4.95 and $2.50 in paper. Pitt Paperback no. 64.

This is a collection of thirty-nine poems by 'Alī Aḥmad Sa'īd, better known by his pen name Adonis. Adonis is certainly one of the leading poets of the new generation who is committed to the cause of cultural regeneration in the Arab world and to the creation of an authentic expressiveness of the Arab soul. It was therefore highly appropriate to have some of his poetry put into English.

Most of the poems are taken from his later anthologies composed after he had broken away from his classical *qaṣīdah* style and old political affiliations. His new style, innovative in its insistence on musicality and meaning rather than on meters or forms, has become a model for a number of young poets. Adonis, furthermore, has endeavored successfully to express his vision of man through poetical exploration of his outer and inner circumstances. His themes dwell on poverty, childhood, hunger, suffering, love, change and liberty.

The translator, who must be congratulated on his courage in rendering the poetry of Adonis into English, was clearly aware of the difficulty of his task, and consequently used the term "transpositions" on the title page instead of "Translations." Therefore, the English reader will only have an uncertain taste of the Adonisian honey.

△ George N. Atiyeh, Washington, D. C.

The Budget of Ottoman Egypt 1005-1006/1596-1597, by Stanford Shaw. The Hague: Mouton, 1968. viii + 208 pages. Tables. Photo. Index. No price indicated.

This is a welcome book because of its value as a published historical source, as well as because of its high editorial merits. The source consists of a lengthy document from the Prime Minister's Archives in Istanbul (Başvekâlet Arşivi, Istanbul, *Maliyeden Müdevvere* Collection, no. 5671, 9 folios, 33 x 7.5 cm.) containing the earliest complete budgetary report for Ottoman Egypt found up to the present time. Scholars interested in the economic history of the Turkish Empire, and especially those studying the role of Egypt in the Ottoman imperial system, will appreciate having at their disposal a published document showing systematically tabulated records of Egypt's annual revenue and expenditure. An additional historical significance of the source arises from the fact that it dates from the waning years of the sixteenth century, immediately preceding, or coinciding with, the beginning of the grave economic decline which the Ottoman bureaucratic administration was to experience in the subsequent centuries.

The value of the publication has been prominently enhanced by the exhaustive editorial contribution of Professor Shaw. Besides furnishing a photographic reproduction of the document, the editor supplied a version of the text in which the original *siyakat* script has been rendered in Western alphabet, and a meticulously annotated translation. His introductory bibliographic and historical comments, a chronological concordance table and a selected index will also prove useful for the interpretation of these and analogous Ottoman archival data.

△ Andrew S. Ehrenkreutz, University of Michigan.

Continuity and Change in the World Oil Industry, ed. by Zuhayr M. Mikdashi, Sherrill Cleland and Ian Seymour. Beirut: The Middle East Research and Publishing Center, 1970. xii + 233 pages. $8 or LL 26. Available from P.O. Box 1224, Beirut, Lebanon.

This volume contains the fourteen papers presented at The Seminar on the Economics of the International Petroleum Industry held at the American University of Beirut in 1969. The contents of some of the papers have already been published and other papers contain well known facts. This short review confines itself to the more significant contributions.

The complexity of the international oil industry and the need for rational decision-making are vividly brought out by Cleland's attempted application of some of the techniques of model building and game theory to the industry. The surveys by Winger and MacDonald of energy needs and trends in coming years are also illuminating. Both surveys, however, are subject to the usual limitations of similar projection exercises. The relative importance of the North Sea is carefully analyzed by Gaskell whose conclusions confirm the view that this source of energy supply can be easily dismissed as a potential threat for the existing sources of supply. Shilleto's analysis of oil transport problems places in proper perspective this important aspect of the industry; his study is commendable.

One of the more important parts of this volume is the discussion of the rôle which the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) played in changing some of the structural and operational aspects of the industry. Both F. Parra and Penrose subscribe to the notion that OPEC was responsible for the last decade's crude oil price stability or at least for the retardation of the rate of the fall of market prices. This, it should be noted, is an assertion which neither author was willing to substantiate. Although it is of crucial importance that the rôle of OPEC in determining prices be analyzed and understood, the fact remains that this has not been done.

Last but not least, the analysis by Montel of the comparative merits of concessions and agency type contracts from the viewpoint of producing countries and by Stauffer of price determination under concessionary and non-concessionary arrangements add a great deal to the relevance and the importance of the volume.

△ Abbas Alnasrawi, University of Vermont.

A HISTORY OF THE EXPEDITION TO JERUSALEM, 1095-1127, by Fulcher of Chartres, trans. by Frances Rita Ryan and ed. by Harold S. Fink. Knoxville: Univ. of Tennessee Press, 1970. xiv + 348 pages. Bibl. Index. $13.50.

The most comprehensive eye-witness Latin Chronicle of the First Crusade and the establishment of the Kingdom of Jerusalem is at last available in its entirety in English. Book I begins with Pope Urban II's proclamation of the holy war at Clermont in November 1095 and ends in September 1100 as Baldwin of Edessa hears of his brother Godfrey's death in Jerusalem and moves fast to collect that legacy, which he will convert into a crown. Book II ends with Baldwin's death in 1118, and Book III nine years later, in the peak of the reign of Baldwin II (d. 1131).

Fulcher chose well when he entitled his book *Historia Hierosolymitana (The Jerusalemite History)*. More than two-thirds of its attention is given to the reigns of those two Baldwins, who with opportunistic vigor, insouciant daring, and a run of very good luck established an improbable state that lasted until 1291, and a title that took several more centuries to lose all its allure. One hundred and fifty years isn't a bad lifetime for an exercise in political allegory—or a self-governing colony—and this foundation-history invites us to speculate on some of the causes for that polyglot kingdom's stubborn resistance to Islamic resurgence. In Book III, for instance (pp. 270-2), the cleric from Chartres celebrates the readiness of "Occidentals" to assimilate to "Oriental" conditions and attitudes. He is calmly certain that he and his fellow-Franks are participating in the designs of Providence, a re-enactment of the feats of Joshua or the Maccabees even more than of the post-Babylonian recovery of Jerusalem. In his open disapproval of the rashness of Baldwin I (whom he served as chaplain) and in the honest impunity and rude frankness of the countless council session he reports, we are shown a freedom to criticize with greater scope and security than was available, by implication, either in Europe or in the intrigue-ridden courts of the Turks and "Babylonians" (Egyptians) who menaced the new homeland. However objective this image of the ruling consensus, it was destined for many echoes in the long range imagination of the West.

Prof. Fink's handsome volume is less original than his other contributions to that long tradition of American medieval scholarship fascinated with the Crusades (readers of *MEJ* will be especially interested in his publications on the foundation of the Latin states and their relations with their Muslim neighbors, cited in the bibliography), but this work bears the marks of his modesty, judiciousness and care.

JEREMY DUQ. ADAMS, Yale University.

THE LIFE AND WORKS OF JĀḤIẒ: TRANSLATIONS OF SELECTED TEXTS, by Charles Pellat. Trans. from the French by D. M. Hawke. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1969. xvi + 286 pages. Gloss. $8.75.

Al-Jāḥiẓ (ca. 776-869) attracted the attention of modern Arab litterateurs for the simplicity and elegance of his prose style, the ease and lightheartedness with which he treats profane and religious matters, the breadth of his human interest, and the power of his observation. More recently, there have been a number of attempts to assess his position in early Islamic intellectual history (especially in politics and theology) and his immense contribution to the development of the Arabic language as a medium of scientific and philosophic thought.

Charles Pellat is a well-known European student of al-Jāḥiẓ. He contributed a number of rigorous and critical studies of his life (notably *Le milieu baṣrien et la formation de Ǧāḥiẓ* [Paris, 1953]), edited the Arabic texts of a few of his works, and translated some of them into French. The present volume is primarily an anthology of relatively short fragments drawn from the whole body of al-Jāḥiẓ's literary, political and theological works. These fragments mirror the diversity of both al-Jāḥiẓ's interests and the culture of early Islām. The selected texts were translated by Charles Pellat to French, and the book was then translated from French to English by D. M. Hawke. Despite the dangers inherent in such indirect translation, the final product has a professional look and is no worse than many direct translations from Arabic, especially when one takes into account the multiplicity of the topics, the complexity of the material, and the inherent difficulty of rendering terms the precise import of many of which is still imperfectly understood. This volume, like others in the series "The Islamic World" edited by Professor G. E. von Grunebaum, gives the undergraduate student of Islamic civilization convenient access to primary sources, whets his appetite, and will perhaps lead him to appreciate al-Jāḥiẓ's remarks on translations and translators:

> These books were transmitted from one country to another, from one generation to another and from one language to another until they finally reached us: we are the latest to inherit them and study them. This demonstrates that books are better than buildings or poetry as a permanent record of the glory of a nation.
>
> But the translator needs to possess as much literary ability as he does knowledge; he must be familiar with the original language and the language of translation, and have perfect command of them both. But when we find someone able to speak two languages we can be sure that he corrupts them, for they are bound to influence each other, borrow from each other and distort each other. . . . Moreover the narrower and more

difficult of access the door to a subject is, and the fewer specialists there are in it, the harder is the translator's task and the greater the risk of his making mistakes: for no translator can ever be the equal of one of those scholars.

△ MUHSIN MAHDI, James Richard Jewett Professor of Arabic and Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard University.

THE MIDDLE EAST: A PHYSICAL, SOCIAL AND REGIONAL GEOGRAPHY, by W. B. Fisher. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1971. xii + 571 pages. Maps. Bibl. Index. No price indicated.

Professor Fisher has added to this sixth edition of his excellent geography a new chapter on Sudan and he has updated the statistical and economic material with recent surveys and reports made available since 1963, the date of the fifth edition.

The book is divided into three parts: The Physical Geography of the Middle East, The Social Geography of the Middle East, including political background, economics, oil resources and demographic trends, and Regional Geography of the Middle East, which discusses the inter-relations of the first two sections.

There are more than 130 maps, diagrams and tables. These alone would make an interesting reference work and their variety demonstrates that there is something of value in this volume for all students of the Middle East, regardless of discipline. The maps and diagrams are exceptionally clear and cover a wide range of geographical data from weather and social patterns to treaty arrangements and oil concessions. A random survey of the map list also reveals such interesting items as locust migrations, distribution of the cedars of Lebanon and traffic density in Saudi Arabic.

△ PETER NULTY, Middle East Institute.

MIDDLE EAST RECORD, 1967. Tel-Aviv: Israel Univ. Press, 1971. xxix + 612 pages. Index. $25.00.

This is a comprehensive survey of political developments in 1967 culled mostly from press sources and documents which are extensive and cited throughout the text. It is divided into four parts: The Middle East in World Affairs, including relations with the USSR, the US, France, Britain and the UN; Relations Between the Countries of the Middle East; The Arab-Israeli Conflict, and The Countries of the Middle East. The material is presented in three useful categories: a record of developments comprising quoted material and commentary, the official views and policies of the government and factual summaries of the first two categories.

It is the third volume in a series, the first two covering the years 1960 and 1961. The format of the first two volumes has been altered, giving the Arab-Israeli conflict more extensive coverage and dropping the chapters on foreign trade and economic aid.

A valuable reference, worth the price.

△ PETER NULTY, Middle East Institute.

THE MIDDLE EAST: THE TEMPLE OF JANUS, by Desmond Stewart. New York: Doubleday, 1971. ix + 388 pages. Bibl. Index. $8.95.

Desmond Stewart has provided an engaging piece of competently researched popular scholarship. Although his book does not contribute much new knowledge, it does provide a vividly written summary interpretation of many of the salient forces, events and personalities that have marched across the Middle Eastern scene during the past century. The view of the Middle East that is presented is a rather restricted one, however, since the work's geographic context is limited to the crescent of territory that stretches from the Bosphorus, through Syria and Iraq, to the Nile valley; the book virtually ignores North Africa, most of the Arabian peninsula, and the Iranian plateau.

Stewart's volume offers an impressionistic picture dominated by colorful images of great men and commanding personalities—Khedive Ismā'īl, al-Afghānī, 'Urābī, Lord Cromer, Sultan 'Abdulhamid, Atatürk, Zaghlūl, Ben Gurion, and 'Abd al-Nāṣir. Clearly, Stewart believes that the significance and distinctive quality of important events and movements can best be understood if these are linked to the story of the lives and beliefs of individuals. Obviously, such an approach will not receive universal acceptance but it is well to recall that this is a book intended more for the general reader than for the professional scholar. Moreover, Stewart's clearly drawn interpretations and biases will not receive universal applause. Nevertheless, the author generally is very open concerning his sympathies. For instance, he candidly admits pro-Arab leanings when discussing recent phases of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The narrative is built around discussions of several key episodes in modern Middle Eastern history. These commence with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and end with the flowering of the Palestine Liberation Movement after 1967. An excellent section, "The Anglo-Arab Twenties," which includes a most illuminating discussion of Sa'd Zaghlūl, is, in my opinion, the book's high point. Indeed, the author's presentation of the recent history of the Arabs, especially those aspects which revolve around Egypt, is very well done. Also good is his handling of European, particularly British, imperial involvement in the area. Less satisfying is his treatment of the late Ottoman Empire and of the Turks who appear rather stilted and wooden. Probably the opus' major historical shortcoming is its relative neglect of the impact of the rise of the Middle East oil industry. There are a few factual and typographical errors but not enough to blemish the work seriously.

In summary, this is one of the few books intended for the general reader that is relatively successful in presenting the area on its own terms rather than through an exclusively Western or "Cold War" centered perspective. Consequently, its appearance is both timely and welcome.

△ ROBERT GERAN LANDEN, professor of history and associate vice provost, University of South Carolina.

NEAR EASTERN ROUND TABLE, 1967-1968, ed. by R. Bayly Winder. New York: Published jointly by the Near East Center and the Center for International Studies, New York University, 1969. 224 pages. No price indicated.

The Center for International Studies at New York University focused its 1967-1968 Round Table discussions on problems of Ottoman politics and history. The five scholarly papers delivered in that series are published in this modest, paper-bound volume produced by photo-offset from the typed manuscripts. The papers cover a diverse range of topics, dealing essentially with nineteenth and twentieth century Turkish history, although C. M. Kortepeter's, "The Islamic-Ottoman Social Structure: The Quest for a Model of Ottoman History," attempts to synthesize the entire scope of Arab Islamic and Ottoman history. Dankwart Rustow's paper on "Ataturk's Political Leadership," and Norman Itzkowitz's, " 'Kimsiniz Bey Efendi,' Or a Look at Tanzimat through Namier-Colored Glasses," are interpretative essays, while Stanford Shaw's, "The Origins of Representative Government in the Ottoman Empire: An Introduction to the Provincial Councils, 1839-1876," and Edward Weisband's "The Sanjak of Alexandretta, 1920-1939, A Case Study," are expository historical analyses of specific questions.

Stanford Shaw's study of the Ottoman provincial councils, based on extensive research in the collections of Istanbul's Bashvekalet Archives, is the most valuable contribution to the volume. It brings to light important new information regarding the development of representative government in the Ottoman provincial administration during the Tanzimat era. The best scholarly opinion has agreed for some time that the 1876 Ottoman constitution represents a culmination of the Tanzimat experience with representative government, and Shaw's detailed research provides significant substantiation for this hypothesis.

The Itzkowitz paper outlines an investigation of the life histories of men holding the offices of Sheyhulislam, Bashdefterdar and Reisulkuttab during the Tanzimat period. The study argues that upward mobility in the Ottoman bureaucracy had been choked off by the late eighteenth century and hypothesizes that the supporters of Tanzimat espoused reform primarily as a means of self-advancement. The theory is provocative and certainly deserves further research; Itzkowitz, however, glosses over the conflict between principle and self-interest and fails to explain why so few Ottoman bureaucrats seized on reformism as the ticket to promotion and success.

Dankwart Rustow provides a short but sensitive and insightful analysis of Ataturk's political principles and career. Edward Weisband traces the diplomatic maneuvers leading up to Turkey's annexation of the Sanjak of Alexandretta, and C. M. Kortepeter ranges across the centuries in a social scientistic search for the key to understanding Islamic history.

△ VICTOR R. SWENSON, Johnson State College, Johnson, Vermont.

PEOPLE AND POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, ed. by Michael Curtis. New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1971. 317 pages. Index. $3.95 in paper.

This book covers the proceedings of the 1970 Annual Conference of the American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East. Like many symposia on the Middle East, there are some excellent articles and some bad ones. Unlike some symposia on the Middle East, this volume on the politics of the Middle East and the problems confronting efforts towards peace lacks a very wide range of opinion on events in the area—a range that is reflected in the intense debate both among those with expertise on the area and among the various parties to the Arab-Israeli dispute. There were, however, many good, original papers delivered at this conference, the Yochanan Peres, Hugh Smythe, Sylvia Haim and Amos Perlmutter studies among them.

△ MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, Washington, D. C.

STUDIA SEMITICA. VOL. I: JEWISH THEMES. VOL. II: ISLAMIC THEMES, by E. I. J. Rosenthal. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1971. Vol I: xv + 352 pages. Notes. Index. $12.50. Vol. II: xv + 214 pages. Notes. Index. $9.50.

These collected articles published over more than thirty-five years survey three millennia of human thought on history and politics. They have been mechanically reproduced (occasionally reduced in size from the original), with only few additional notes at the end of each volume and some easily spotted line changes which, it seems, involve no substantive alterations. This is a highly recommendable procedure, inasmuch as such a collection is in a way an historical document in its own right, whose basic purpose is the illumination of an individual scholar's personality and his relation to the scholarship of his time.

The bulk of the material, both Jewish and Islamic, concerns the medieval period. While among other good things there is much on the metaphysical aspects of philosophy and on medieval Jewish Bible study, it is clearly the concern with political theory that has forged the author's scholarly career. This concern has become prominent as a major scholarly discipline in general during the past fifty years, and Rosenthal's work is an outstanding, solid contribution to it from the Islamic side. During the same time, the tendency towards turning from past history to modern developments in this discipline has also proceeded at an accelerated pace. Thus it is not surprising to find Rosenthal taking the measure of modern Islām with the tools and the insights that have come to him from his immersion in medieval political thought. The result is the emergence of rather well balanced and cool-headed views on hotly debated questions. Rosenthal's corresponding interest in Judaism in the modern period is represented here by a fine study of I. Elbogen and the Wissenschaft des Judentums, touching on religio-political problems similar to, if on a much smaller scale than, those of modern Islām.

Perhaps the title of the collection is somewhat misleading. It seems to this reviewer rather old-fashioned in its (intended?) implications. In every other respect, we have here a very useful guide to a scholar and his times.

△ FRANZ ROSENTHAL, Yale University.

TECHNOLOGY OF NECESSITY: SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT IN ISRAEL, by Roy Popkin. New York: Praeger, 1971. xii + 180 pages. Index. $7.95.

"Ein Breira"—No Alternative—is the theme of this study of Israel's development miracle. Mr. Popkin discusses the work of the scientists who came to Palestine long before Israel was created. Thus in a readable style he reminds us that everything taken for granted today in Israel had its beginnings decades prior to the establishment of the State. Many of these scientists are now in their sixties. Their efforts in the fields of health, defense, agriculture and in the mining and construction industries have permitted them to see their single objective—to help build a Jewish state—come true. One of these pioneers came from Russia in 1919 and said, "I want to bring electricity to this country." Four years later the first electrical system was completed in Tel-Aviv. While emphasizing the work of these pioneers, Mr. Popkin also stresses that today young Israeli scientists are continuing the policy of "Ein Breira."

This book is not a deeply researched analysis of Israel's scientific advancements. It provides a good background into the combination of factors that brought Israel to its high standard of development. Mr. Popkin points out that these scientists who began their research at the turn of the century had few resources at hand. They had to innovate and devise—usually on the spot. The work that they began continues, and Israel is today known as the world's most concentrated laboratory of applied science. And its scientific work is available to all, e.g., the United States-supported desalinization of sea water could have major applications for the whole world.

The author rightfully points out and shows that Israeli scientists readily admit that their work frequently is an adaptation of another scientist's work. The importance here is that adaptation and application have taken place.

△ MICHAEL E. KURTZIG, Regional Economist, US Department of Agriculture.

UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS: A MILITARY AND POLITICAL APPRAISAL, by James M. Boyd. New York: Praeger, 1971. xv + 241 pages. Appen. Bibl. Index. $15.

James M. Boyd, former US Air Force officer assigned to the UN Military Staff Committee, has written a sound introduction to the subject of UN peacekeeping. This study will be particularly useful for undergraduate students of international organization. Students of the international relations of the Middle East will find material related to the 1956 Suez Crisis and the instability in Cyprus during the mid-1960s. The third major source of data comes from the Congo crisis of 1960-1964. All material is presented with a clear emphasis on the institutional problems of organization and operation of UN peacekeeping forces.

The most original sections of the book pertain to strictly military questions of preparedness and command (especially chapters seven and ten). Indeed, the author's interest in such issues is demonstrated by Part III of this work, where political, legal and financial factors are reviewed together in twenty-four pages. Military problems, by contrast, are given a separate chapter. The author suggests:

> . . . there are many things that can be done within the realm of the politically possible to improve the readiness posture of military forces earmarked for possible United Nations use and to insure that field operations . . . have a greater chance for success . . . one key is to augment the staff of the Military Advisor to the Secretary-General and authorize him . . . to initiate steps . . . (p. 209).

As with most books there are some deficiencies. Contrary to the author's assertions (p. 216), there are certainly trends stemming from the Nigerian, Jordanian and Pakistani civil wars indicating a decline in the recourse to UN peacekeeping machinery.

But this book remains a useful synthesis on the subject, with some creativity drawn in part from interviews in New York and Cairo. It is clearly and objectively written.

△ DAVID P. FORSYTHE, Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia.

THE UNITED STATES RESPONSE TO TURKISH NATIONALISM AND REFORM, 1914-1939, by Roger R. Trask. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1971. 247 pages. Notes. Bibl. Index. $11.50.

Roger Trask has written an excellent, broad diplomatic history of Turkish-American relations emphasizing the inter-war period from 1923 to 1939. Separate chapters trace developments in treaty negotiations, commercial relations, investments and technical aid, American educational efforts, social, cultural and philanthropic activities and international politics. However, the best section is the extensive analysis and review of the inter-cultural dimension and public opinion: Trask examines the evolution of US attitudes from misinformed hostility to benevolent toleration to warm understanding. It is to their credit that, during this educational process, most Turkish leaders demonstrated clear visioned patience.

Professor Trask is both fair and accurate although his treatment of Robert College and the Istanbul Woman's College is sketchy and although no attempt is made to identify motives for the curious behavior of James W. Gerard. In citing a book to dispel the "Terrible Turk" image (p. 84), Eleanor Bisbee's *The New Turks: Pioneers of the Republic, 1920-1950* should be mentioned. Trask's summaries at the end of each chapter are, however, concise and well balanced. The author has made extensive use of State Department files and some private records. Multi-source attribution is frequent and the bibliography is excellent despite a few omissions.

In a sense, this book is a tribute to Ambassador Joseph C. Grew. His perceptive diplomacy is still a model for dealing with the Turks. In fact, this work should receive wide distribution in the American government, especially among those Foreign Service and military officers and USIA and AID officials being assigned to Turkey. Professor Trask correctly attributes much of the success of US policy in the inter-war period to our failure to adopt a "big brother" attitude; any weaknesses of our public relations position in Turkey in the postwar period can often be traced to instances when we adopted that attitude. Nor should this book be neglected by other educators and media representatives, for there is still some truth to Grew's statement of October 12, 1931 that "the real Turk, with all his good qualities, has never really been known or understood in our country."

△ WILLIAM P. ROCKWOOD, University of Florida.

VOYAGEURS ET ÉCRIVAINS ÉGYPTIENS EN FRANCE AN XIX SIECLE, by Anouar Louca. Paris: Didier, 1970. 362 pages. Bibl. No price indicated.

It has been widely recognized that the high degree of awareness and knowledge of Western society which Arabs acquired in modern times in part stemmed from the significant contributions of a number of Egyptian writers of the nineteenth century. These had gone to Europe for one reason or another, lived and studied there, and eventually returned to Egypt to describe what they had seen. In their own fashion they were the Occidentalists of their era and performed for Arab society a function not too dissimilar from that which was and is being played by Western Orientalists. They familiarized their compatriots with the institutions of Western society, its history and culture, and more than that, they were affected by the experiences to an extent that could not have been anticipated at the time. Many of these same writers became active participants in the development of new institutions in Egyptian society and in that sense they helped in the officially-sponsored efforts to innovate and reform society. Their contribution, then, was much greater than that of the Orientalist. While their "intellectual" concern with Western society constituted only one part of their activities, they managed to contribute considerably to the education of their compatriots.

While Dr. Louca's work cannot be considered the most original, it is certainly more comprehensive and detailed than all previous studies of Egyptian travellers and writers in France. Not only does he tell us who these travellers and writers were, beginning with al-Ṭaṭāwī and concluding with Muwayliḥī, but he gives adequate information on the circumstances and the context of each writer, with additional data on the background and achievement of each. In a sense the work is more like an anthology; each section deals with certain classes of people in whose writings certain themes, concerns and interests predominate. Thus, al-Ṭaṭāwī and 'Alī Mubārak come under the rubric of student/scholars, Adīb Isḥāq and Abū Naḍḍārah under the rubric of journalistic writings, and 'Abdallāh Fikrī and Aḥmad Zakī under touristic writings. Though thus divided, there is enough in common to justify common treatment and conclusions. Dr. Louca gives an estimate of the impact of these writings on later Egyptian concerns. In that sense, Dr. Louca has performed a very useful service to students of Egyptian society by painstakingly assembling disparate information and by providing good selections from the works of each writer. The student is further aided by a thorough set of bibliographical references by and about each of the men treated in the book. Although the book appeared in 1970, and the bibiography is updated to take account of recent relevant material, the research and writing of the work seem to have been completed in 1963. Can one hope that Dr. Louca will follow up this important study by a companion volume dealing the twentieth century Egyptian writers about the West?

△ Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, Northwestern University.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

Documents

An Index and Concordance of Pre-Islamic Arabian Names and Inscriptions. By G. Lankester Harding. Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1971. xlii + 943 pages. $27.50.

International Documents on Palestine, 1968. Ed. by Zuhair Diab. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1971. xxxvi + 487 pages. Index. No price indicated.

Middle East Record, 1967. Tel-Aviv: Israel Univs. Press, 1971. xxix + 612 pages. Index. $25. Available from International Scholarly Book Services Inc., P.O. Box 4347, Portland, Oregon 97208.

The World This Year 1971. Ed. by Richard Stebbins and A. Amoia. New York: Simon Shuster, 1971. viii + 164 pages. Index. $9.95.

General

Crises and Sequences in Political Development. By Leonard Binder *et al.* Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press. Studies in Political Development no. 7. $8. Announced for O '71.

Masoud the Bedouin. By Alfreda Carhart. Freeport, N. Y.: Books for Libraries, 1971. xiii + 249 pages. Illus. $9.75.

The Middle East: A physical, social and regional geography. By W. B. Fisher. London: Methuen, and New York: Barnes and Nobles, 1971. xii + 555 pages. Gloss. Bibl. Index. £6 or $19.

Politics and the Stages of Growth. By W. W. Rostow. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1971. xiii + 333 pages. Appen. Notes. Index. $9.50 and $3.95 in paper.

The Ra Expeditions. By Thor Heyerdahl. Trans. by Patricia Hampton. New York: Doubleday, 1971. $10.

Reisen in Arabien. By Johann Ludwig Burckhardt. Stuttgart: F. A. Brockhaus, 1971. 744 pages. DM 65. Reprint.

Dictionaries

Deutsch-Arabisches Wörterbuch, Lieferung 7. By Götz Schregle. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1970. Pages 569 to 664. DM 14.

An English-Arabic Vocabulary of Scientific, Technical and Cultural Terms. Comp. by Magdi Wahba. Cairo: Livres de France, 1971. 265 pages. £E 2, or $5. Order from the publisher at 36, Kasr el Nil St., Cairo.

Biography

Abū Tamām al-Ṭā'ī, Ḥayātuhu wa Ḥayāt Shi'rihi {. . . , his life and his poetry}. By Najīb Muḥammad al-Bahbitī. Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1970. 243 pages. £L 6.

Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal Imām Ahl al-Sunnah {On Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, Imām of the people of the Sunnah}. By 'Abd al-Ḥalīm al-Jundī. Cairo: al-Majlis al-A'lā lil-Shu'ūm al-Islāmīyah, 1970. 582 pages. £E .80.

Hundred Great Muslims. By Jamil Ahmad. Lahore: Ferozsons, 1971. ii + 716 pages. Rs 35.

al-Imām al-A'ẓam Abū Ḥanīfah al-Mutakallim {The great Imām Abū Ḥanīfah}. By 'Ināyat Allāh Iblāgh. Cairo: al-Majlis al-A'lā lil-Shu'ūm al-Islāmīyah, 1971. 195 pages. £E .60.

Kahlil Gibran: The nature of love. By Andrew Dib Sherfan. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1971. 106 pages. Bibl. $4.75.

Kifāḥī fī al-Masrah wa al-Sinima {My struggle on the stage and in the cinema}. By Fāṭimah Rushdī. Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1971. 208 pages. £E .45.

The Making of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the life and thought of Sati' al-Husri. By William L. Cleveland. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press. $7.50. Announced for O '71.

Min Mudhakkirāt Nā'ib Sūdānī, 1965-1968 {Memoirs of a Sudanese deputy}. By Muḥammad Sulaymān. Beirut: Dār al-Thaqāfah, 1970. 269 pages. £E .90.

Notice sur la vie et les travaux de Henri Masse. By Gaston Wiet. Paris: Institut de France, 1970. 14 pages. No price indicated.

The Presentation of the Sudanese Mahdi in a Unique Arabic Manuscript Biography. By Haim Shaked. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv Univ. Press, 1971. 18 pages. Shiloah Papers Series. No price indicated.

T. E. Lawrence in Amman, 1921. By Uriel Dann. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv Univ. Press, 1971. 14 pages. Shiloah Papers Series. No price indicated.

Bibliography

Bibliographie économique, juridique et sociale de l'Égypte moderne (1798-1916). By René Maunier. New York: Burt Franklin, 1971. xxxii + 372 pages. No price indicated.

A Bibliography of Reference Books and Basic Works on Arab Language, Literature, History, Civilization and Islam. By Gustav Meiseles. Tel-Aviv: Tel-Aviv Univ., 1970. 128 pages. £I 10. (In Hebrew).

Bibliyūghrāfiyāt al-Adab al-'Arabī al-Masrahī al-Ḥadīth {A bibliography of Arabic drama, 1945-1965}. By Ṣāliḥ Jawād al-Ṭu'mah. Baghdad: Maṭba'at al-Ānī, 1969. 124 pages. No price indicated.

Books Cataloged by Tehran Book Processing Centre, no. 2. Tehran: Institute for Research and Planning in Science and Education, 1970. 127 pages. No price indicated.

Some Recent Studies of Israel. London: Anglo-Israel Association, Pamphlet no. 25, 1970. 32 pages. No price indicated.

Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan

Adam Olearius' Persianischer Rosenthal. By Faramarz Behzad. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1970. 140 pages. DM 24.

Development Policy II: The Pakistan experience. Ed. by Walter P. Falcon and Gustav F. Papenek. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1971. 224 pages. $6.50.

Economic Development in Iran, 1900-1970. By Julian Bharier. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1971. 336 pages. Maps. Tables. $12.

Facts about the celebration of the 2500th anniversary of the founding of the Persian Empire by Cyrus the Great (1971). Tehran: Committee of International Affairs of the Festivities, 1971. 31 pages. No price indicated.

From Consultation to Confrontation: A study of the Muslim League in British Indian politics, 1906-1912. By Matiur Rahman. London: Luzac, 1970. xvi + 313 pages. £5.

The Frontiers of Pakistan: A study of frontier problems in Pakistan's foreign policy. By Mujtaba Razvi. Karachi: Natl. Publishing House, 1971. Maps. Bibl. Rs 30.

The Great Moghuls: The glittering dynasty that ruled in India from 1526-1717. By Bamber Gascoigne. New York: Harper Row, 1971. Illus. Bibl. $15.

al-Ḥudūd al-'Irāqīyah al-Īrānīyah {The Iranian-Iraqi borders}. By Falāḥ Shākir Aswad. Baghdad: Maṭba'at al-'Ānī, 1970. 152 pages. Maps. ID .400.

Incident in Bokhara. By John C. Falk. New York: Exposition, 1970. 93 pages. $3.50.

Iran wie er wirklich ist. By Milli Bau. Munich: Bechtle, 1971. 236 pages. Illus. Maps. DM 19.80.

The Mughal Government, 1556-1707. By U. N. Day. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1970. xvi + 249 pages. No price indicated.

Oriental and Western Siberia. By Thomas Atkinson. Introduction by Denis Sinor. New York: Praeger, 1970. viii + 611 pages. Illus. Maps. $34.50. Reprint of the 1858 edition.

The Political Elite of Iran. By Marvin Zonis. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press. Tables. Figures. $12.50. Announced for September '71.

Resa i Afghanistan. By Jan Myrdal. Stockholm: PAN/Norstedt, 1971. 265 pages. Illus. No price indicated.

Students and the Nation: Political activities of Muslim students in India and Pakistan, 1826-1968. By S. Zia Abbas. Karachi: n.p., 1970. viii + 200 pages. Illus. No price indicated.

Transcaucasia and Ararat. By James B. Bryce. New York: Arno, 1971. xix + 526 pages. Illus. Maps. $18. Reprint of the 4th edition revised of 1896.

Wirkungsvoraussetzungen deutscher Kulturpolitik im Ausland: Erkenntnisse aus e. Modellstudie im Iran. Koln: Arbeitsring Ausland fur Kulturelle Aufgaben, 1970. 57 pages. No price indicated.

Arabian Peninsula

Im Banne der Sahara. By Klaus Polkehn. Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1970. 293 pages. Illus. No price indicated.

The Trucial States. By Donald Hawley. London: George Allen and Unwin, and New York: Humanities Press, 1971. 268 pages. Appen. Bibl. Index. $13.

Egypt, Sudan and Libya

'Abd al-Nāṣir and wa al-Qūwāt al-Musallaḥah {Nāṣir and the Armed Forces}. By Muḥammad Jamāl al-Dīn Maḥfūẓ. Cairo: Idārat al-Tawjīh lil-Qūwāt al-Musallaḥah, 1971. 162 pages. £E .05.

al-'Alāqāt al-Injilizīyah al-Lībīyah {Anglo-Libyan relations}. By Hinrī Anīs Mīkhā'īl. Cairo: al-Hay'ah al-Miṣrīyah al-'Āmmah lil-Ta'līf wa al-Nashr, 1970. 398 pages. Bibl. £E .45.

Asālīb al-Ittiṣāl wa al-Taghayyur al-Ijtimā'ī, Dirāsah Maydānīyah fī Qaryah Miṣrīyah {Communication methods and social change, a field study in an Egyptian village}. By Maḥmūd 'Awdah. Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1971. 476 pages. £E 1.25.

Christian Egypt, Faith and Life. By Otto F. A. Meinardus. Cairo: Amer. Univ. of Cairo Press, 1971. $10.

Egypt Under Nasir: A study in political dynamics. By R. Hrair Dekmejian. Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1971. xvi + 310 pages. $10.

al-'Imārah al-'Arabīyah fī Miṣr al-Islāmīyah {Arabic architecture in Islamic Egypt}. By Farīd Shāfi'ī. Cairo: al-Hay'ah al-Miṣrīyah al-'Āmmah lil-Ta'līf wa al-Nashr, 1970. 665 pages. Illus. Maps. £E 2.

Landforms of Egypt. By M. S. Abou El Ezz. Cairo: Amer. Univ. in Cairo Press, 1971. Maps. $10.

A Manual of Nuer Law. By Paul P. Howell. Westport, Conn.: Negro Univ. Press, 1970. xv + 256 pages. Illus. Bibl. $11. Reprint of the 1954 edition.

al-Nāṣirīyah {Nasserism}. By Muḥammad Abū Zayd Buḥayrī. Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, 1970. 106 pages. £E .15.

Realignments of class consciousness in the military and bourgeoisie in developing countries: Egypt, Peru and Cuba. By Gerard De Gre. Ontario: Univ. of Waterloo, Dept. of Sociol., 1970. 23 pages. No price indicated.

The Sudan under Wingate: Administration in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1899-1916. By Gabriel Warburg. London: Cass, 1971. xi + 245 pages. Plates. Bibl. £3.25.

Tradition and Modernization: A challenge for law among the Dinka of the Sudan. By Francis M. Deng. London: Yale Univ. Press, 1971. 448 pages. £7.85.

The Tripolitan War, 1801-1805. By Henry Castor. New York: Watts, 1971. 62 pages. Illus. Bibl. $3.95.

The United Nations and the Pacific Settlement of Disputes: A case study of Libya. By Hisham M. Sadki. Beirut: Dar el-Mashreq, 1970. xiv + 192 pages. £E 2.40.

The White Nile. 2nd ed. By Alan Moorehead. New York: Harper Row, 1971. Illus. $15. A new format with new illustrations.

Fertile Crescent and Cyprus

Belligerency in a Disintegrating Society: Factional warfare in Ottoman Syria on the eve of the period of modernization. By Shimon Shamir. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv Univ. Press, 1971. 18 pages. Shiloah Papers Series. No price indicated.

Budget unifié de la R.A.S. de l'exercice 1971. Damascus: Office arabe de presse et de documentation, 1971. £S 25 or $7 + $.50 for postal charges. Order from the publishers at B.P. 3550, Damascus, Syria.

Economic Implications of the Size of Nations with Special Reference to Lebanon. By Nadim G. Khalaf. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971. xvi + 259 pages. Diagrams. Tables. Gld 48.

De la loi sur l'administration locale en R.A.S. Damascus: Office arabe de presse et de documentation, 1971. £S 25 or $7 + $.50 for postal charges. Order from the publisher at B.P. 3550, Damascus, Syria.

The Question of Cyprus: Can Makarios abandon enosis? Nicosia: Cyprus Turkish Information Office, 1971. 12 pages.

Sukkān al-ʿIrāq, 1970 [The population of Iraq]. By Fāḍil al-Anṣārī. Damascus: Maktabat Aṭlas, 1970. 276 pages. No price indicated.

Israel

'Aliyah u-fituaḥ baderekh la-medinah [Immigration and economic development in Israel, 1920-1948]. By Heschel Frumkin. Tel Aviv: Israel Export Inst.—Book and Printing Center, 1971. 406 pages. £I 15.

The Art of Israeli Cooking. Ed. by Aldo Nahoum. New York: Holt, 1971. 152 pages. Illus. $5.95.

Bar-Kokhba. By Yigael Yadin. New York: Random House, 1971. $15.

The Export Performance of Six Manufacturing Industries: A comparative study of Denmark, Holland and Israel. By Seev Hirsch. New York: Praeger, 1971. xix + 177 pages. Appen. $15.

The Foreign Policy System of Israel. By Michael Brecher. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. 600 pages. $18.50. Announced for O '71.

Geography of Israel. 3rd rev. ed. By Ephraim Orni. Jerusalem: Israel Univs. Press, 1971. xvi + 551 pages. Illus. £I 25.

"Hashomer Hatzair"—From youth community to revolutionary Marxism, 1913-1936. (In Hebrew). By Elkana Margalit. Tel-Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad Publishing House, 1971. 296 pages. Notes. Index. No price indicated.

Israel and the Holy Places of Christendom. By Walter Zander. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971. viii + 170 pages. Appen. Notes. Index. £2.70.

Israel with a Smile. By Shlomo Kodesh. New York: Tarbuth Foundation, 1970. 266 pages. Illus. $3.

Israel Yearbook. 1971. Ed. by L. Berger. Tel Aviv: Israel Yearbook Publications, 1971. $10. Order from International Publications Service, New York.

The Sand and the Stars: The story of the Jewish people. By Diana Gillon. New York: Lothrop, 1971. 223 pages. Illus. $4.95.

Zionism, Israel and Asain Nationalism. By G. H. Jansen. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1971. xv + 330 pages. £L 6.

Zionism: Studies in the history of the Zionist movement and of the Jews in Palestine. (In Hebrew). Ed. by Daniel Carpi. Tel-Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad Publishing House, 1971. 300 pages. Notes. No price indicated.

The Zionist Idea. Ed. by Arthur Hertzberg. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1970. 638 pages. Bibl. $18.50. Reprint of the 1959 edition.

Maghrib

Cultural Policy in Tunisia. By Rafik Saïd. Paris: UNESCO, 1970. 56 pages. No price indicated.

Les économies maghrébines: l'indépendance à l'épreuve du développement économique. By C. Debbasch *et al.* Paris: Editions du Centre Natl. de la Recherche Sci., 1971. 284 pages. NF 30.

A History of the Maghrib. By Jamil M. Abun-Nasr. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1971. Maps. $8.50.

Marokko: Indfald i den arabiske verden. By Per Ulrich. Kobenhavn: Fremad, 1971. 179 pages. Plates. No price indicated.

Les temps de la violence. By Vitalis Cros. Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1971. 343 pages. Plates. No price indicated. OAS terrorism in Algeria.

La vie quotidienne en Algérie. By Rachid Boudjedra. Paris: Hachette, 1971. 255 pages. No price indicated.

Palestine Problem

Crisis of Diplomacy: The three wars . . . and after. . . . By Abdul-Hafez M. Elkordy. San Antonio: The Naylor Co., 1971. xii + 244 pages. Bibl. Appen. $7.95.

Be-sa'arat ha-vikuaḥ 'al ha-derekh le-shalom [Ways towards peace in the Middle East]. By Mosheh Aram. Tel Aviv: Israel Export Inst.—Book and Printing Center, 1971. 64 pages. £I 1.

Ḥarakat al-Muqāwamah {The resistance movement}. By Karīm al-Shībānī. Beirut: al-Maktab al-Tijārī, 1970. 191 pages. No price indicated.

Ibrat al-Naksah {Reasons for the defeat}. By 'Abd al-Qādir Yūsuf. Kuwayt: Maktabat al-Aml, 1970. 237 pages. No price indicated.

Israel and the Palestinians. Ed. by Shlomo Avineri. New York: St. Martin's Press. $10. Announced for S '71.

Palestine: The road to peace. By Henry Cattan. London: Longman, 1971. 75 pages. Plate. Maps. £.35.

Plight of Arabs in Occupied Territories. Karachi: Times Press, 1970. 36 pages. Bibl. No price indicated.

Rights and Wrongs in the Arab-Israeli conflict, to the anatomy of the forces of progress and reaction in the Middle East. By M. Arnoni. London: Labour Friends of Israel, 1970. 90 pages. Illus. No price indicated.

al-Ṭarīq al-Qawmī li-Taḥrīr Filasṭīn {The nationalist way to liberating Palestine}. By Jabhat al-Taḥrīr al-'Arabīyah. Beirut: Dār al-Ṭalī'ah, 1970. 159 pages. No price indicated.

al-Thawrah al-Filasṭīnīyah {The Palestinian revolution}. By Muḥammad Jalāl Kishk. Beirut: Maṭābi' Ma'tūq Ikhwān, 1970. 317 pages. No price indicated.

The Unholy War: Israel and Palestine, 1897-1971. By David Waines. Wilmette, Ill.: Medina Univ. Press Internat., 1971. 198 pages. Notes Bibl. Index. $3.

Yesodot be-sikhsukh Yisrael-'Arav [Some aspects of Israel-Arab conflict]. By Yehoshafat Harkabi. Tel Aviv: Israel Export Inst.—Book and Printing Center, 1971. 140 pages. Illus. Bibl. £I 2.90.

Turkey

Armenia: Cradle of Civilization. By David Marshall Long. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1971. 296 pages. Bibl. Index. Illus. 126s.

The Eskenci Project: An Ottoman attempt at gradual reform (1826). By Avigdor Levy. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv Univ. Press, 1971. 14 pages. Shiloah Papers Series. No price indicated.

Esasys on Labor Force and Employment in Turkey. Ed. by Duncan R. Miller. Ankara: n.p., 1971. 301 pages. No price indicated. Available from Vali Dr. Resit Cad., no. 16, Ankara, Turkey.

Everyday Life in Ottoman Turkey. By Raphaela Lewis. London: Batsford, 1971. n.p. Illus. £1.70.

Hitler's Route to Baghdad. By Barbara Ward *et al.* Freeport, N. Y.: Books for Libraries, 1971. 356 pages. Maps. $11.75. Reprint of the 1939 edition. Includes an article on Turkey by V. Robinson.

The Ottoman City in the Sixteenth Century: Aspects of taxation as reflected in Jewish and Ottoman sources. By Aryeh Shmuelevitz. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv Univ. Press, 1971. 6 pages. Shiloah Papers Series. No price indicated.

The Ottoman Empire's Place in World History. By Arnold Toynbee. London: Chatham House, 1971. 17 pages. No price indicated. Presented at the Conference on Turkish-Ottoman Studies in the United States, Univ. of Wisconsin, May 1971.

The Stages of Ottoman History. By Kemal Karpat. Univ. of Wisconsin, Dept. of History, 1971. 20 pages. No price indicated. Presented at the Conference on Turkish-Ottoman Studies in the United States, Univ. of Wisconsin, May 1971.

Turkish Islam. By L. A. Fallers. Univ. of Chicago, Dept. of Anthropology, 1971. 17 pages. No price indicated. Presented at the Conference on Turkish-Ottoman Studies in the United States, Univ. of Wisconsin, May 1971.

Untersuchungen zum eiszeitlichen und rezenten klimagenetischen Formenschatz in den Gebirgen Nordostanatoliens. By E. Löffler. Heidelberg: Heidelberger Geographische Arbeiten, 27, 1970. 162 pages. Illus. DM 19.80.

Medieval History

Arab civilization to A.D. 1500. By D. M. Dunlop. New York: Praeger, 1971. 384 pages. Bibl. Index. $15.

Beiträge zur ayyubidischen Diplomatik. By Horst-Adolf Hein. Freiburg: Schwarz, 1971. 207 pages. No price indicated.

The History of the Sarbadar Dynasty 1336-1381 and its Source. By John Mason Smith. The Hague: Mouton, 1970. 216 pages. No price indicated.

Islamic History, A.D. 600-750 (A.H. 132): A new interpretation. By M. A. Shaban. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1971. viii + 198 pages. Bibl. Index. $10.50.

The Latin Conquest of Constantinople. Ed. by Donald E. Queller. New York: Wiley, 1971. xv + 113 pages. Maps. $5.95 and $2.95 in paper.

Malāmih al-Inqilāb al-Islāmī fī Khilāfat 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'Azīz {Aspects of the Islamic revolution in the Caliphate of . . .}. By 'Imād al-Dīn Khalīl. Beirut: al-Dār al-'Ilmīyah, 1970. 211 pages. No price indicated.

Personal Names in Palmyrene Inscriptions. By Jürgen Kurt Stark. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971. xx + 152 pages. Bibl. $19.25.

The World of Late Antiquity. By Peter Brown. London: Thames and Hudson, 1971. 216 pages. £2.

Modern History and Politics

Die Baath-Partei: Portrait einer Panarabischen bewegung. By Horst Mahr. Munich: Gunter Olzog Verlag, 1971. 166 pages. Bibl. DM 22.

Brennpunkt i Midt-Austen: Ein analyse av situesjonen etter juni-krigen. Oslo: Universitetforlaget, 1971. 279 pages. No price indicated.

But there are no Jews in England. By Stephen Aris. New York: Stein & Day. $6.95. Announced for Ag '71. A survey of the Jewish role in English history and business from the 17th century, concluding with English Jewry's reaction to the 6 Day War.

The Formation and Dissolution of the Unity Government of the Six Day War. (In Hebrew). By Dan Margalit. 239 pages. Illus. I£ 11. Available from Israel Export Institute—Book and Printing Center, Tel Aviv, Israel.

Vom Frieden redet keiner: Zwischen d. Fronten im Nahen Osten. By Gerhard Konzelmann. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanst, 1971. 270 pages. Illus. DM 24.

Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal. By Lucy C. Behrman. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1970. xii + 180 pages. Appen. Bibl. Index. $7.25.

Offenbarung und Geschichte im Denken moderner Muslime. By Rotraud Weilandt. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1971. DM 36.

Economics and Sociology

Harems et pieds dorés. By Jean Royere. Paris: Vautier, 1970. 256 pages. NF 18.

The Impact of the Domestic Market on Rural-Urban Relations. By Iliya F. Harik. Bloomington, Ind.: International Development Research Center, 1971. 50 pages. No price indicated.

Linguistics, Literature and Art

Dāt al-Himma: Kulturgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zu einem arabischen Volksroman. By Udo Steinbach. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1971. DM 56.

The Egyptian Novel and its Main Trends from 1913 to 1952. By Hamdi Sakkut. Cairo: Amer. Univ. in Cairo Press, 1971. $5.

Geschichte des Arabischen Schrifttums. Band III and IV. By Fuat Sezgin. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971. Band III: *Medizin, Pharamazie, Zoologie, Tierheilkunde;* 498 pages. Band IV: *Alchimie, Chemie, Botanik, Agrikultur;* 399 pages. Gld 140 and 110.

I am Listening to Istanbul: Selected poems of Orhan Veli Kanık. Trans. with introduction by Talat Sait Halman. New York: Corinth Books, 1971. 94 pages. No price indicated.

The Khalil Gibran Diary for 1972. New York: Knopf, 1971. Illus. $4.50.

al-Majmū'ah al-Kāmilah {Complete works}. 2 vols. By Mīkhā'īl Na'īmah (Naimy). Beirut: Dār al-'Ilm lil-Malāyīn, 1970. £E 5.40.

Manuel du parler arabe moderne au Moyen-Orient. By Jean Kassab. Paris: Librarie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1970. No price indicated.

Modern Tartar. By Gustav Burbiel. The Hague: Mouton. Announced for '71.

The Minor Arts of Islam. By Ernst Kühnel. Trans. by Katherine Watson. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1971. viii + 255 pages. Illus. Bibl. $15.

Moderne türkische Lyrik. Ed. by Yüksel Pazarkaya. Tübingen: Erdmann, 1971. 240 pages. DM 16.80. An anthology.

The Moscow Symphony and Other Poems. By Nāzim Hikmet. Trans. by Taner Baybars. Chicago: Swallow, 1971. 64 pages. $4.95.

al-Naqd al-Adabī 'inda al-'Arab {Literary criticism among the Arabs}. By Hifnī Muḥammad Sharaf. Cairo: Maktabat al-Shabāb, 1970. 440 pages. £L .80.

On Stress and Arabic Phonology: A generative approach. By Daud A. Abdo. Beirut: Khayats, 1969. 128 pages. No price indicated.

Passage des miracles. By Naguib Mahfouz. Trans. by Antoine Cottin. Paris: J. Martineau, 1970. 317 pages. NF 33.

La poésie palestinienne de combat: Anthologie. By Abdellatif Laâbi. Paris: P. J. Oswald. 154 pages. No price indicated.

The Quatrains of Nesimī, Fourteenth Century Turkic Hurufi. By Kathleen R. F. Burrill. The Hague: Mouton. Announced for '71.

Rhétorique et prosodie des langues de l'Orient musulman. 2nd ed. By Garcin de Tassy. Amsterdam: Phil. Press, 1970. 439 pages. No price indicated.

TEFL in the Middle East. Faze Larudee. Cairo: Amer. Univ. in Cairo, 1971. $5. Teaching English as a foreign language.

A Transformational Analysis of Turkish Syntax. By R. H. Meskill. The Hague, Paris: Mouton, 1970. 77 pages. DM 24 in paper.

Türkische und mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen. Band IV: Türkische Elemente im Neupersischen. By Gerhard Doefer. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1971. DM 162.

Die Verbalsyntax des neuarabischen Dialektes von Kwayriš (Irak). By Adolf Denz. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1971. DM 30.

Verzeichnis der Orientalischen Handschriften in Deutschland. Band XVI: Illuminierte islamische Handschriften. Ed. by Stzoukin *et al.* Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1971. DM 160.

Le vocabulaire arabe dans le livre des rois de Firdausi: Etude philologique et de statistique linguistique. By Muhammad J. Mu'infar. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1970. xvi + 110 pages. No price indicated.

Religion and Philosophy

Exégèse coranique et langage mystique. By Paul Nwyia. Beirut: Dar el-Machreq, 1970. 407 pages. Bibl. Index. No price indicated.

Frühe mu'tazilitische Häresiographie: Zwei werke des 'Abdallāh ibn Muḥammad an-Nāšī'. By Josef van Ess. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1971. DM 34.

Great Religions of the Holy Land: An historical guide to sacred places and sites. By Stuart E. Rosenberg.

New York: Barnes-Yoseloff, 1971. 224 pages. Illus. $15.

Handbuch der Ostkirchenkunde. Ed. by Endre von Ivánka *et al.* Dusseldorf: Patmos-Verlag, 1971. xxxii + 839 pages. Bibl. No price indicated.

L'Islam dans le miroir de l'Occident. 3rd rev. ed. By Jean-Jacques Waardenburg. The Hague: Mouton, 1970. 381 pages. No price indicated.

Judaism and Islam. By Abraham Geiger. New York: Ktavm, 1970. xxxii + 170 pages. $12.50. Translation and reprint of the 1898 edition of *Was hat Mohammed aus dem Judenthume aufgenommen?*

Der Koran: Kommentar und Konkordanz. By Rudi Paret. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1971. 559 pages. No price indicated.

A Maronite Hymnal. By Avran David. Trans. By Roseann Williams. Boston: Branden Press, 1971. 79 pages. $5.

La politique de Gazālī. By Henri Laoust. Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1970. 414 pages. No price indicated.

al-Shakhṣīyah al-Duwalīyah fī al-Qānūn al-Duwalī al-'Āmm wa al-Sharī'ah al-Islāmīyah {International personality in Islamic and international public law}. By Muḥammad Kāmil Yāqūt. Cairo: 'Ālam al-Kutub, 1971. £E 2.

al-Takaful al-Ijtimā'ī fī al-Islām {Mutual social responsibility in Islām}. By 'Abdallāh Naṣīḥ 'Ilwān. Jiddah: al-Dār al-Sa'ūdīyāh, 1970. 119 pages. No price indicated.

Paperback

Zanek! A chronicle of the Israeli air force. By William Stevenson. New York: Bantam, 1971. $1.25.

New Journals

The African Review 1, no. 1 (Mr '71). P.O. Box 35042, Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania. A journal of African politics, development and international affairs.

Diş Politika—Foreign Policy. 1, no. 1 (Mr '71). Ed. by Seyfi Taşhan. A bi-lingual quarterly, $8 per year. Available from Foreign Policy Review, P.O. Box 420, Ankara, Turkey.

Focus on Pakistan 1, no. 1 (F '71). Published by the Pakistan Tourism Development Corporation, Hotel Metropole, 2nd floor, Club Road, Karachi, West Pakistan.

Plural Societies 1, no. 1 (1970). Published by the Foundation for the Study of Plural Societies. The Hague, P.O. Box 3566, The Netherlands.

Soviet Jewish Affairs; a journal on Jewish problems in the USSR and Eastern Europe no. 1 (Ju '71). This journal replaces the *Bulletin on Soviet and East European Jewish Affairs.* Published by the Institute of Jewish Affairs, 13-16 Jacob's Well Mews, George Street, London W1H 5PD. Published twice yearly at $5 a year.

USSR and Third World 1, no. 1 (D 7 '70-Ja 10 '71). Published by the Central Asia Research Centre, 1B Parkfield Street, London N1.

1971 PAPERBACKS ON THE ARABS AND THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

THE JUNE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR: MISCALCULATION OR CONSPIRACY? edited by Elias Sam'o, Central Michigan University, Foreword by Eqbal Ahmad.

This unique reader provides what every other book on the Arab-Israeli conflict lacks—a balanced perspective. The essays written by Arab, Israeli, American, Soviet and other European writers and spokesmen enable the reader to evaluate the assumptions and data on the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of alternative perspectives. The contributors include Charles Yost, Simcha Flappan, Isaac Deautcher, Hisham Sharabi and Premier Kosygin, with the editor's own analysis. A highly useful reader to students of international politics as well as of Middle East politics. **$3.50**

THE ARAB WORLD: FROM NATIONALISM TO REVOLUTION, edited by Abdeen Jabara, attorney, and Janice Terry, Eastern Michigan University.

The twenty-one essays in this anthology, originally presented at the Third Annual Convention of the Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc., examine in depth the process of conflict and political change in the Arab World over the past century and a half. Part I of the anthology examines structural changes; Part II, ideological developments and the confrontation with colonialism; Part III, the impact of the mass media; and Part IV, alternative perspectives on the future of Palestine. Contributors include Eqbal Ahmad, Noam Chomsky, Maxime Rodinson, Edward Said, Richard Stevens, Elmer Berger, Baha Abu Laban, Fuad Baali, C. E. Dawn, Anwar Chejne, Fauzi Najjar, Sami Hajjar, Ahmad Baha el-Din. **$3.50**

THE UNHOLY WAR: PALESTINE AND ISRAEL 1897-1971, by David Waines, McGill University.

An analytical survey of the entire history of the struggle for Palestine set against the background of Middle East and European nationalisms. The author provides the reader with an intimate portrait of the organization of Arab and Jewish forces in Palestine, the evolution of the Palestine conflict into an Arab-Israeli conflict, and at the end gives his estimate of the post 1967 resistance. Ideal for class use. **$3.00**

ALSO AVAILABLE

THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE TO ISRAELI OCCUPATION, edited by Naseer Aruri. **$3.50**

THE ARAB-AMERICANS: STUDIES IN ASSIMILATION, edited by E. Hagopian and A. Paden. **$3.50**

Medina University Press International

908 ASHLAND AVENUE / WILMETTE, ILLINOIS 60091

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE

Prepared by the Staff of The Middle East Journal

With contributions from: Jay D. Fuller, Harry N. Howard, Kerim K. Key, A. Albert Kudsi-Zadeh, Jacob M. Landau, Gare LeCompte, Louis E. Leopold, David W. Littlefield, Christopher W. S. Ross, Peter T. Suzuki, Michael H. Van Dusen, Roxann A. Van Dusen.

Note: It is the aim of the Bibliography to present a selective listing of periodical material dealing with the Middle East since the rise of Islām. In order to avoid unwarranted duplication of bibliographies already dealing with certain aspects and portions of the area, the material included will cover North Africa and Muslim Spain, the Arab World, the State of Israel, Turkey, the Transcaucasian states of the Soviet Union, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkestan. An attempt is made to survey all periodicals of importance in these fields. The ancient Near East and Byzantium are excluded.

It would be appreciated if authors of articles appropriate to the Bibliography would send reprints or notices of such articles to: Bibliography Editor, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, 1761 N Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036.

The list of periodicals regularly reviewed will be published annually in the Autumn issue.

GEOGRAPHY

30554 "Facts on Sinai." *Mid. East Information Series* no. 15 (1971) 2-5.

30555 "Spotlight on Jerusalem." *Mid. East Internat.* no. 3 (Ju '71) 24-31.

30556 ABERCROMBIE, T. "Morocco—land of the farthest west." *Natl. Geog.* 139, no. 6 (Ju '71) 834-65.

30557 ANTAR, E. "Earthquake!" *Aramco World Mag.* 22, no. 3 (My-Ju '71) 24-9. Earthquakes in the Middle East.

30558 BARTELS, D. "Luftbild Innenstadt von Izmir, Türkei." *Die Erde* 101, hft. 4 (1970) 233-7.

30559 FARLEY, J. "Morocco today." *Contemp. Rev.* 218, no. 1,265 (Ju '71) 319-24.

30560 GOODERS, J. "Conservation in a desert landscape." *Geog. Mag.* 43, no. 10 (Jl '71) 699-704. Morocco.

30561 LEENHEER, M. "'Habitat précaire' à Marrakech et dans sa zone périphérique." *Rev. Géog. Maroc* 17 (1970) 43-51.

30562 MOUNTJOY, A. "Still waters of Suez." *Geog. Mag.* 43, no. 9 (Ju '71) 649-56.

30563 NICOL, M. "Rescue excavations near Dordzan." *East & West* (Rome) 20, no. 3 (S '70) 245-84. Iran.

30564 NIR, D. "Marine terraces of southern Sinai." *Geog. Rev.* 61 (Ja '71) 32-50.

30565 RICE, D. "A crossroads of civilizations: Byzantium." *J. World Hist.* 13, no. 2 (1971) 364-71.

30566 SERJEANT, R. "The 'white dune' at Abyan: an ancient place of pilgrimage in Southern Arabia." *J. Semitic Stud.* 16, no. 1 (1971) 74-83.

30567 WHITEHOUSE, D. "The houses of Siraf, Iran." *Archeology* 24, no. 3 (Ju '71) 255-62.

30568 ZABBĀL, S. "Suquṭrā." (In Arabic) *al-'Arabī* no. 152 (Jl '71) 84-106.

30569 ZABBĀL, S. "'Umān." (In Arabic) *al-'Arabī* no. 151 (Ju '71) 100-23.

HISTORY

(Medieval)

30570 BARBOUR, N. "Arabs and Norsemen." *A. Aff.* 58, pt. 2 (Ju '71) 159-65.

30571 BONNENFANT, P. "Béja, de la conquête musulmane à 1881." *IBLA* 34, no. 127 (1971) 3-34.

30572 COHEN, C. "Notes pour une historie de l'agriculture dans les pays musulmans médiévaux." *J. Econ. & Soc. Hist. O.* 14, pt. 1 (Ap '71) 63-8.

30573 FORAND, P. "The status of the land and inhabitants of the Sawād during the first two centuries of Islām." *J. Econ. & Soc. Hist. O.* 14, pt. 1 (Ap '71) 25-37.

30574 HAMIDULLAH, M. "Administration of justice under the early caliphate [instructions of Caliph 'Umar to Abū Mūsā al-Ash'arī (17 H)]." *J. Pak. Hist. Soc.* 19, pt. 1 (Ja '71) 1-50.

30575 HASAN, S. "A survey of the expansion of Islam into Central Asia during the Umayyad Caliphate." *Islamic Cult.* 45, no. 2 (Ap '71) 95-113.

30576 HAR-EL, M. "Jewish presence in Jerusalem throughout the ages, I. The Canaanites to the later Persians." *Jewish Observer and Mid. East Rev.* 20, no. 20 (My 14 '71) 14-5. The first of three installments.

30577 KAFÉ, E. "Le mythe Turc et son declin dans les relations de voyage des Européens de la Renaissance." *Oriens* 21-22 (1968-69) 159-95.

30578 KHAN, M. "Miskawayh and the Buwayhids." *Oriens* 21-22 (1968-69) 235-47.

30579 MAGNARELLA, P. and Z. ELGAR. "A view of social classes in the eleventh century Karakhanid state." *Anthropos* 66 (1971) 232-38.

30580 MOTZKIN, A. "A thirteenth century Jewish teacher in Cairo." *J. Jewish Stud.* 21, nos. 1-4 (1970) 49-64.

30581 PAREDES, L. "New light on the military campaigns of Almanzor." *Islamic Quart.* 14, no. 3 (Jl-S '70) 126-42.

30582 SKLADANEK, B. "Settlements in Gharchistan during the early Islamic period (up to the 11th century A.D.)." *Rocznik O.* 34, no. 2 (1971) 57-71.

30583 SMILYANSKAYA, I. "Systems of landownership and social stratification in the Near East (late medieval period)." (In Russian) *Narodi A. i Afr.* no. 1 (1971) 63-77. Summary in English.

30584 VESELY, R. "Trois certificats délivrés pour les fondations pieuses en Égypte au XVI^{e} siècle. Troisième contribution à la question des fondations pieuses ottomanes d'Égypte et de la diplomatique judiciaire." *Oriens* 21-22 (1968-69) 248-99.

30585 WILLIAMS, D. "Imperial Russian rule in Turkestan." *A. Aff.* 58, pt. 2 (Ju '71) 173-9.

HISTORY AND POLITICS

(Modern)

30586 "After Abdul Nasser everything has changed: an interview with Professor J. L. Talmon." *New Mid. East* no. 26 (N '70) 11-6.

30587 "Bemuhungen um Institutionalisierung der islamischen Konferenz." *Europa Archiv* 26, no. 9 (My 10 '71) D226-30. The communiqué of the foreign ministers conference in Karachi on D 26-28 '70.

30588 "Can the Union of Arab Emirates survive?" *World Today* 27, no. 4 (Ap '71) 144-7.

30589 "Crisis in East Pakistan." *Overseas Rev.* 62 (My '71) 13-6.

30590 "Escalation fascista in Israele." *Quad. Medio O.* (D '70) 2-44.

30591 "La Grèce et la Turquie." *Europe Sud-Est* (Ju '71) 15-9.

30592 "Israël: d'où vient l'argent?" *Jeune Afr.* no. 541 (My 18 '71) 24-7. Translated from *Der Spiegel.*

30593 "King Faisal of Saudi Arabia visits the United States (exchange of greetings with President Nixon)." *Dept. State B.* 64, no. 1,668 (Ju 14 '71) 763-4.

30594 "One anthem; one flag; one people." *Mid. East Internat.* no. 3 (Ju '71) 48-9. The text of the agreement signed on April 17, 1971 creating the United Arab Republics.

30595 "Qatar pledges support for a Gulf Federation." *Mid. East Internat.* no. 3 (Ju '71) 18-9. An interview with the Prime Minister of Qatar by Ralph Izzard.

30596 "Les relations franco-algériennes." *Europe Fr. Outremer* 48, no. 495 (Ap '71) 6-12.

30597 "Resolutions of the 15th plenary meeting of the Central Committee, Communist Party of Israel." *World Marxist Rev., Information B.* nos. 3-4 (1971) 20-4.

30598 "The Suez Canal." *Overseas Rev.* 62 (My '71) 10-3.

30599 ABBAS, P. *et al.* "Proposed: a federation in the Sudan." *New Outlook* 14, no. 4 (My '71) 13-7.

30600 ABIR, M. "The 'Arab Rebellion' of Amīr Ghālib of Mecca (1788-1813)." *Mid. East. Stud.* 7, no. 2 (My '71) 185-200.

30601 ABU EISSA, F. "Revolution relieved Sudan's Southern problem." *Mid. East Internat.* no. 3 (Ju '71) 50-2. A statement in London by the Sudanese Foreign Minister on April 13, 1971.

30602 ADENEY, M. "Civil War in Pakistan." *Venture* 23, no. 5 (My '71) 7-9.

30603 AHMED, N. "The bitter struggle in Pakistan." *Commonwealth J.* 15, no. 3 (Ju '71) 53-6.

30604 ARMAOGLU, F. "Recent developments in Turkish foreign policy." *Diş Politika* 1, no. 1 (Mr '71) 85-94.

30605 AUDA, A. "Pan-africanism in Egyptian national culture." *L'Egypte contemp.* 62, no. 343 (Ja '71) 17-40.

30606 AZADEH, B. "L'Iran aujourd'hui." *Temps Mod.* 27, no. 298 (My '71) 2031-66.

30607 BAKHASH, S. "The evolution of Qajar bureaucracy: 1779-1879." *Mid. East. Stud.* 7, no. 2 (My '71) 139-68.

30608 BARSTON, R. "Problems in international peacekeeping: the case of Cyprus." *Internat. Rel.* 3, no. 11 (My '71) 928-40.

30609 BELYAEV, I. "Progressive trends in the Arab world." *New World Rev.* 39, no. 2 (1971) 64-70.

30610 BITAR, S. "The rise and decline of the Baath." *Mid. East Internat.* no. 3 (Ju '71) 12-5. First article in a series.

30611 BOLSHAKOV, V. "The Zionists' profession—anti-Sovietism." *Internat. Aff.* (Moscow) no. 4 (Ap '71) 55-9.

30612 BONDAREVSKIY, G. "The continuing Western interest in Oman—as seen from Moscow." *New Mid. East* no. 35 (Ag '71) 11-5.

30613 BORODIN, N. "The Soviet Union and the Middle East—facts and fictions (a Soviet view)." *New Mid. East* no. 34 (Jl '71) 14-7.

30614 BUSH, G. "U.N. Force in Cyprus extended through December 1971." *Dept. State B.* 64, no. 1,670 (Ju 28 '71) 842-3.

30615 CALCHI NOVATI, G. "Francia e Algeria dieci anni dopi." *Ponte* 27, no. 4 (Ap 30 '71) 417-20.

30616 CARRE, O. "La Ligue des Etats arabes." *Rev. fr. de Sci. polit.* 21, no. 2 (Ap '71) 362-81.

30617 COTTRELL, A. "Implications of reopening the Canal for the area east and south of Suez." *New Mid. East* no. 34 (Jl '71) 29-32.

30618 DARIN-DRABKIN, H. "Israel and the Soviet Union." *New Outlook* 14, no. 4 (My '71) 45-50.

30619 DECTER, M. "A look at Israel." *Commentary* 51, no. 5 (My '71) 38-42.

30620 DEMEERSEMAN, A. "Une mission tunisienne en France dans la première moitié du XIX^{e} siècle." *IBLA* 34, no. 127 (1971) 63-92.

30621 DENKTAŞ, R. "The Cyprus problem." *Diş Politika* 1, no. 1 (Mr '71) 95-100.

30622 DONABEDIAN, K. "The Eastern Question and the Armenian case." *Armenian Rev.* 24, no. 2-94 (1971) 40-54.

30623 EDMONDS, C. "The Kurdish national struggle in Iraq." *A. Aff.* 58, pt. 2 (Ju '71) 147-58.

30624 EINBECK, E. "Moskaus Militärhilfe an die Dritte Welt." *Aussenpolit.* 22, no. 5 (My '71) 300-13.

30625 FARAH, N. "1970: une année politique charnière pour le Liban." *Travaux & Jours* no. 38 (Ja-Mr '71) 115-20.

30626 FELLOWES, P. "The Suez Canal: highway or dead end?" *New Mid. East* no. 33 (Ju '71) 26-8.

30627 FINCANCIOGLU, Y. "Turkey: the new government and basic needs." *Contemp. Rev.* 219, no. 1,266 (Jl '71) 29-33.

30628 GABRIELI, F. "Arabi e Islàm in Africa." *Ulisse* fasc. 69 (Mr '71) 186-91.

30629 GALLISOT, R. "Sur l'impérialisme: le colloque d'Alger." *La Pensée* no. 157 (My-Ju '71) 98-104.

30630 GANDY, C. "A fresh start for North Yemen." *Mid. East Internat.* no. 3 (Ju '71) 16-7.

30631 GASPARD, J. "The Kremlin without Abdul Nasser—a new relationship with Egypt." *New Mid. East* no. 26 (N '70) 17-9.

30632 GAUDIO, A. "L'opposition au maroc." *Jeune Afr.* no. 548 (Jl 6 '71) 31-4.

30633 GINIEWSKI, P. "Bases de la politique européenne d'Israël." *Riv. di Stud. polit. internaz.* 38, no. 1 (Ja-Mr '71) 41-6.

30634 GINIEWSKI, P. "Les bases de la politique européenne et américaine d'Israël." *Internat Probs.* 10, nos. 1-2 (Ju '71) 24-30.

30635 GISSELBRECHT, A. "Quelques ambiguïtés du sionisme." *Nouvelle Critique* no. 44 (My '71) 30-7.

30636 GLEDITSCH, N. "Interaction patterns in the Middle East." *Cooperation & Conflict* 6, no. 1 (1971) 15-30.

30637 GÖKMEN, O. "Turkish-German relations." *Diş Politika* 1, no. 1 (Mr '71) 101-11.

30638 GOLDMANN, N. "Les occasions perdues de nous entendre avec les Arabes." *Réalités* no. 304 (My '71) 15ff.

30639 GURIEL, B. "The Mediterranean in Soviet strategic thinking—gateway to the Atlantic." *New Mid. East* no. 26 (N '70) 20-3.

30640 HAHN, L. "Tunisia prepares for politics after Bourguiba." *Afr. Report* 16, no. 6 (Ju '71) 16-8.

30641 HAZARD, J. "The residue of Marxist influence in Algeria." *Columbia J. of Transnat. Law* 9, no. 2 (1970) 194-225.

30642 HEIFETZ, A. "Fifty years of the first treaties between the Soviet country and Iran, Afghanistan and Turkey (1921)." (In Russian) *Narodi A. i Afr.* no. 1 (1971) 50-62. Summary in English.

30643 HERADSTVEIT, D. "Norwegian policy in the Middle East crisis of 1967." *Cooperation & Conflict* 6, no. 1 (1971) 1-14.

30644 HOLDEN, D. "The Persian Gulf: after the British Raj." *For. Aff.* 49, no. 4 (Jl '71) 721-35.

30645 HOTTINGER, A. "Col. Ghadhafi's pan-Arab ambitions." *Swiss Rev. World Aff.* 21, no. 3 (Ju '71) 22-4.

30646 HOVANNISIAN, R. "The Armeno-Azerbaijani conflict over mountainous Karabagh, 1918-1919." *Armenian Rev.* 24, no. 2-94 (1971) 3-39.

30647 HUNT, K. "A British presence east of Suez—military arguments for and against." *Commonwealth J.* 15, no. 3 (Ju '71) 61-4.

30648 HURNI, F. "Democracy and the Turkish military." *Swiss Rev. World Aff.* 21, no. 2 (My '71) 13-4.

30649 JHA, D. "Roots of Indo-Pakistani discord." *Indian J. Polit. Sci.* 32, no. 1 (Ja-Mr '71) 14-31.

30650 KARABUDA, B. "Red guerillas of the Arabian Gulf." *East. Horizons* 9, no. 5 (1970) 48-54.

30651 KIMCHE, J. "What is a pro-Arab policy?" *A. Aff.* 58, pt. 2 (Ju '71) 140-6.

30652 KUTCHERA, C. "Pakistan: la guerre n'est pas finie." *Jeune Afr.* no. 548 (Jl 6 '71) 45-7.

30653 LEAVITT, W. "Israel's air force—in a class by itself." *Air Force Mag.* 54, no. 6 (Ju '71) 36-42.

30654 LEMERCIER-QUELQUEJAY, C. "Les relations entre la Porte ottomane et les Cosaques

Zaporogues au milieu du XVII^{e} siècle." *Cah. du Monde russe & soviétique* 11, no. 3 (Jl-S '70) 454-61.

30655 LESSER, A. and H. CLESNER. "America's interest in the Middle East." *Amer. Zionist* 61, no. 9 (Ju '71) 11-3.

30656 LEWIS, F. "Israel." *Atlantic Monthly* 227, no. 6 (Ju '71) 14-25.

30657 LINDNER, R. "Die Sowjetunion in Nahost. Politische Taktik und tatsächlicher Einfluss." *Osteuropa* 21, no. 5 (My '71) 305-15.

30658 LITTLE, T. "Why cry havoc at Aswan?" *Mid. East Internat.* no. 3 (Ju '71) 5-6.

30659 LOIR, R. "Comment finit le mandat de la France en Syrie." *Ecrits de Paris* (Ju '71) 46-54.

30660 LOVE, K. "Election fever and the Rogers mission." *Mid. East Internat.* no. 4 (Jl '71) 6-9.

30661 MALAWER, S. "US foreign policy and international law: the Jordanian Civil War and air piracy." *Internat. Probs.* 10, nos. 1-2 (Ju '71) 31-40.

30662 MALDIDIER, D. "Discours politique et guerre d'Algérie." *La Pensée* no. 157 (My-Ju '71) 86-97.

30663 MALLISON, W. "Jewish Fund bores holes in US tax laws." *Mid. East Internat.* no. 3 (Ju '71) 53-6. A statement for the record to the Near East Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee.

30664 MANSFIELD, P. "After the purge—new directions in Egypt." *New Mid. East* no. 33 (Ju '71) 12-4.

30665 McCARTHY, E. "A position paper on Israel." *Midstream* 17, no. 6 (Ju-Jl '71) 51-3.

30666 MEDLICOTT, W. "The Near Eastern crisis of 1875-78 reconsidered." *Mid. East. Stud.* 7, no. 1 (Ja '71) 105-9.

30667 MENER, J. "L'expansion soviétique dans l'Océan Indien." *Internat. Probs.* 10, nos. 1-2 (Ju '71) 93-102.

30668 MESSARA, A. "Les propositions de réforme électorale au Liban (1963-1968): essai de synthèse." *Rev. libanaise Sci. polit.* (Ja-Ju '70) 1-34.

30669 MONATS, T. "Zwei Ebenen sowjetischer Nahostpolitik." *Aussenpolit.* 22, no. 6 (Ju '71) 317-20.

30670 MŪSĀ, S. "The Arab al-Fatāh Society." (In Arabic) *al-'Arabī* no. 151 (Ju '71) 52-9.

30671 N., J. "Sillages soviétiques sur l'Océan Indien." *Rev. Défense natl.* 27 (Ap '71) 647-58.

30672 NAQVI, M. "West Pakistan's struggle for power." *South A. Rev.* 4, no. 3 (Ap '71) 213-30.

30673 N'DIAYE, J.-P. "France-Algérie: les affaires et les sentiments." *Jeune Afr.* no. 546 (Ju 22 '71) 22-7.

30674 PERONCEL-HUGOZ, J.-P. "Le Front de libération nationale: parti unique de l'Algérie." *Rev. fr. d'Etudes polit. afr.* no. 66 (Ju '71) 34-52.

30675 PETKOVIC, R. "Changes in the UAR political leadership." *Rev. Internat. Aff.* 22, no. 508 (Ju 5 '71) 12ff.

30676 POONAWALA, R. "Pakistan's relations with Japan." *Pak. Horizon* 24, no. 1 (1971) 26-34.

30677 PRLJA, A. "Arab unions." *Rev. Internat. Aff.* 22, no. 506 (My 5 '71) 12-4. The new Arab federation of Libya, Syria and the UAR.

30678 ROBERT, J. "La Constitution marocaine du 31 juillet 1970." *Maghreb* (S-O '70) 29-41.

30679 RONDOT, P. "La République Arabe Unie après Gamal Abdel Nasser." *Rev. Défense natl.* 27 (Mr '71) 412-28.

30680 RONDOT, P. "République Arabe Unie: 'New Deal' au Caire." *Rev. fr. d'Etudes polit. afr.* no. 66 (Ju '71) 3-10.

30681 ROSE, N. "The debate on partition, 1937-38: the Anglo-Zionist aspect—II. The withdrawal." *Mid. East. Stud.* 7, no. 1 (Ja '71) 3-24.

30682 RUF, W. "The Bizerta crisis: a Bourguibist attempt to resolve Tunisia's border problems." *MEJ* 25, no. 2 (1971) 201-11.

30683 SAFRAN, N. "The Soviet-Egyptian Treaty—as seen from Washington." *New Mid. East* no. 34 (Jl '71) 10-3.

30684 SCHROEDER, R. "East Pakistan's civil war." *Editorial Res. Reports* 2, no. 4 (Jl 28 '71) 17 pages.

30685 BUCHAN, A. "A sea of troubles." *Round Table* no. 243 (Jl '71) 329-46. The Mediterranean.

30686 SCHÜTZE, W. "Der Maghreb in internationalen Kräftefeld." *Europa Archiv* 26, no. 11 (Ju 10 '71) 383-96.

30687 SCHUYLER, G. "Middle East: it is all sinking in a red sea." *Amer. Opinion* 14, no. 7 (Jl-Ag '71) 31-6.

30688 SCHWEID, E. "Israel as a Zionist state." *Dispersion & Unity* no. 11 (1970) 51-60.

30689 EL-SHEIKH, I. "Ideology and ideological change in Egypt." *Internat. Spectator* 25, no. 12 (Ju '71) 1172-86.

30690 SKIOTIS, D. "From bandit to pasha: first steps in the rise to power of Ali of Tepelen, 1750-1784." *Internat. J. Mid. East Stud.* 2, no. 3 (Jl '71) 219-44.

30691 SPAGNOLO, J. "Constitutional change in modern Lebanon: 1861-64." *Mid. East. Stud.* 7, no. 1 (Ja '71) 25-48.

30692 STEVENS, G. "Suez." *Atlantic Monthly* 228, no. 1 (Jl '71) 16-9.

30693 STOÏAN, S. "La Roumanie et les pays arabes." *Europe Sud-Est* (My '71) 11-4.

30694 SYLVESTER, A. "Muhammad versus Lenin in revolutionary Sudan." *New Mid. East* no. 34 (Jl '71) 26-8.

30695 SYLVESTER, A. "What people are saying in the Southern Sudan." *New Mid. East* no. 35 (Ag '71) 5-8.

30696 TEZIC, E. "L'évolution du système électoral turc sous la seconde république." *Ann. Faculté Droit Istanbul* nos. 29-32 (1968) 170-87.

30697 THORPE, J. "The United States and the

1940-1941 Anglo-Iraqi crisis: American policy in transition." *MEJ* 25, no. 1 (1971) 79-90.

30698 TOUMA, E. "The assault detachment of world Zionism and imperialism." *Internat. Aff.* (Moscow) 5 (1971) 60-5. The author is a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Israel.

30699 TOURNOUX, R. "Une interview du Roi Hassan." *Match* no. 1,159 (Jl 24 '71) 14-27. Many photographs of recent events in Morocco.

30700 TUTU, T. "Black power in the Sudan—new divisions in Africa." *New Mid. East* no. 34 (Jl '71) 21-5.

30701 WALTZ, J. "Historical perspectives on 'early missions' to Muslims; a response to Allan Cutler." *Muslim World* 61, no. 3 (Jl '71) 170-86.

30702 WITTEMA, R. "Arabische eenheid en versplintering." *Internat. Spectator* 25, no. 12 (Ju '71) 1125-71.

30703 YAHMED, B. "Où va l'Egypte?" *Jeune Afr.* no. 542 (My 25 '71) 17-9.

30704 YODFAT, A. "The USSR and Jordan." *Internat. Probs.* 10, nos. 1-2 (Ju '71) 57-63.

30705 ZENATI, A. "France-Algérie: les passions se calment." *Jeune Afr.* no. 548 (Jl 6 '71) 20-2.

Arab-Israeli Conflict

30706 "Dialogue: On a democratic Palestinian state." *Mid. East Information Series* no. 15 (1971) 29-34. An exchange of letters between George al-Matni and Shimon Shamir, reprinted from *New Outlook* (Tel Aviv) D '70.

30707 "New Soviet proposals for a political stalemate." *New Mid. East* no. 26 (N '70) 46-7.

30708 "Israeli, Jordanian and Egyptian attitudes on peace: documenting what Israel and the Arab states told Ambassador Gunnar Jarring: 1968-1971." *Mid. East Information Series* no. 15 (1971) 18-28.

30709 "War in the Middle East." *B. Peace Proposals* no. 2 (1971) 161-74. Documents.

30710 ALEXANDER, Y. "A Christian Church in search of peace in the Middle East." *Internat. Probs.* 10, nos. 1-2 (Ju '71) 41-5.

30711 BEAUFRE, A. "Réflexions sur la crise du Moyen-Orient." *Stratégie* no. 24 (O-D '70) 49-66.

30712 BENDER, J. "*Ad Hoc* committees and human rights investigations: a comparative case study in the Middle East." *Soc. Res.* 38, no. 2 (1971) 241-67.

30713 BENTOV, M. "Demilitarization and 'secure borders'." *New Outlook* 14, no. 4 (My '71) 9-12.

30714 BERQUE, J. "Palestine 1971: the future outlook." *Interplay* 4, no. 1 (Ja '71) 21-5.

30715 DUCLOS, L. "La guerre d'usure israelo-arabe." *Univers polit.* (1969) 305-38.

30716 FENIVSY, C. "With Rogers in Cairo and Jerusalem." *New Mid. East* no. 35 (Ag '71) 28-30.

30717 FULBRIGHT, J. "New politics could bring peace." *Mid. East Internat.* no. 3 (Ju '71) 7-9.

30718 G., E. "Motives for opening the Canal." *New Outlook* 14, no. 4 (My '71) 5-8.

30719 HAMAD, J. "Palestinian future—new directions." *New Mid. East* no. 35 (Ag '71) 16-9.

30720 HARKABI, Y. "Scope and limit of a fedayeen consensus." *Wiener Library B.* 24, no. 4 (1970-71) 1-7.

30721 HATTIS, S. "The bi-national state and the challenge of history." *New Mid. East* no. 35 (Ag '71) 24-7.

30722 HERADSTVEIT, D. "Arab demands and desires in the conflict with the state of Israel." *Cooperation & Conflict* no. 2 (1971) 115-33.

30723 HEYMONT, I. "The Israeli defense of the Suez Canal." *Mid. East Information Series* no. 15 (1971) 9-15.

30724 HODGKIN, E. "Some reflections on a Middle East peace." *Round Table* no. 243 (Jl '71) 383-91.

30725 KIND, C. "Impressions from Jerusalem." *Swiss Rev. World Aff.* 21, no. 4 (Jl '71) 6-8.

30726 LUMER, H. "The reactionary role of Zionism." *Polit. Aff.* 50, no. 7 (Jl '71) 11-21.

30727 MADAULE, J. "Anti-sémitisme pas mort." *Esprit* 39, no. 404 (Ju '71) 1273-81.

30728 MALLISON, W. "The diplomatic methods to achieve minimum order in the Middle East." *J. Internat. Law & Econ.* 6, no. 1 (Ju '71) 113-24.

30729 MAYHEW, C. "Israel, Arabs and the Labour Party." *Venture* 23, no. 6 (Ju '71) 9-10.

30730 MEIR, G. "The right of peoples to live in freedom." *Jewish Observer & Mid. East Rev.* 20, no. 23 (Ju 4 '71) 12-17. The text of Prime Minister Meir's speech to the Socialist International in Helsinki.

30731 MUSHKAT, M. "Conflict and coalitions: structural analysis of the situation in the Middle East in 1967." *Internat. Probs.* 10, nos. 1-2 (Ju '71) 46-56.

30732 NAKHLEH, E. "The anatomy of violence: theoretical reflections on Palestinian resistance." *MEJ* 25, no. 2 (1971) 180-200.

30733 NES, D. "Sharm el Sheikh blocks the way to peace." *Mid. East Internat.* no. 3 (Ju '71) 10-1.

30734 O'BALLANCE, E. "Military solution to Suez?" *Military Rev.* 51, no. 7 (Jl '71) 84-9.

30735 OTEIFI, G. "The demilitarization of Sinai." *Rev. Internat. Aff.* 22, no. 506 (My 5 '71) 10-2.

30736 REMBA, O. "Israel and the occupied areas—a Common Market in the making?" *New Mid. East* no. 26 (N '70) 34-8.

30737 RODLEY, N. "The United Nations and human rights in the Middle East." *Soc. Res.* 38, no. 2 (1971) 217-40.

30738 ROSTOW, E. "The Middle Eastern crisis in the perspective of world politics." *Internat. Aff.* (London) 47, no. 2 (Ap '71) 275-88.

30739 RUBINSTEIN, A. "Why the Israelis are being difficult." *New York Times Mag.* (Ap 18 '71) 32-3ff.

30740 SACHS, S. "True friends of Israel must speak out now." *Mid. East Internat.* no. 3 (Ju '71) 20-1.

30741 SHIHADEH, A. " 'The Palestinians demand justice and an end to bitterness', a call for rationality." *New Mid. East* no. 35 (Ag '71) 20-2.

30742 SLANN, M. "A look at Arab-Jewish cooperation in Jerusalem." *New Outlook* 14, no. 3 (Ap '71) 28-33.

30743 SMART, I. "There is an effective alternative to the United Nations." *New Mid. East* no. 26 (N '70) 28-32

30744 TAYLOR, T. "The control of the arms trade." *Internat. Rel.* 3, no. 11 (My '71) 903-12ff.

30745 UDINA, M. "La protezione internazionale dei refugiati e degli apolidi." *Comunità Internaz.* 25, nos. 3-4 (Jl-O '70) 524-43.

30746 VERNANT, J. "Un espoir au Proche-Orient." *Rev. Défense natl.* 27 (Mr '71) 454-9.

30747 WEIL, P. "Le règlement territorial dans la résolution du 22 novembre 1967." *Internat. Probs.* 10, nos. 1-2 (Ju '71) 16-21.

30748 WHETTEN, L. "June 1967 to June 1971: four years of Canal war." *New Mid. East* no. 33 (Ju '71) 15-25.

30749 YAARI, E. "The decline of al-Fatah." *Midstream* 17, no. 5 (My '71) 3-12.

30750 ZANDER, W. "Holy Places and Christian presence in Jerusalem—a new emphasis in the attitude of the Catholic Church." *New Mid. East* no. 34 (Jl '71) 18-20.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

30751 "L'Algérie à une nouvelle étape de son développement." *Europe Fr. Outremer* (O '70) 4-75.

30752 "L'Algérie et son petrole." *Jeune Afr.* no. 543 (Ju 1 '71) 27-42.

30753 "Basic data on the economy of Kuwait." *Overseas Business Report* (OBR 71-017) (Ju '71) 11 pages.

30754 "Import liberalization policy in Israel, 1962-1967." *Econ. Rev., Bank of Israel* 37 (Mr '71) 28-51.

30755 "L'industrie de la conserve au Maroc: problèmes et perspectives." *Rev. Geog. Maroc* 17 (1970) 109-15.

30756 "The influence of economic recovery (1967-68) on Israel's industrial companies." *Econ. Rev., Bank of Israel* 37 (Mr '71) 3-27.

30757 "Invisible transactions in the UAR's balance of payments." *Natl. Bank of Egypt Econ. B.* 24, no. 1 (1971) 23-35.

30758 "Israel-Cyprus: history—trade—tourism." *Israel Econ.* 27, no. 5 (My '71) 143-52.

30759 "Israeli publishing and printing industry eager to export." *Publishers Weekly* 199, no. 23 (Ju 7 '71) 29-30ff.

30760 "Major Jalloud comments on oil agreement." *Arab Oil Rev.* (Mr-Ap '71) 16-9.

30761 "Maroc." *Europe Fr. Outremer* 48, no. 495 (Ap '71) 30-2.

30762 "Où en est la coopération pétrolière arabe." *Syrie & Monde arabe* (N '70) 62-79.

30763 "The Pakistan Rupee." *Internat. Currency Rev.* 3, no. 2 (My-Jl '71) 42-6.

30764 "Le plan quadrennal algérien 1969-1973." *Maghreb* (Jl-Ag '70) 33-40.

30765 "Price control in Israel, 1949-1958." *Econ. Rev., Bank of Israel* 37 (Mr '71) 68-88.

30766 "Les ressources naturelles et la mise en valeur actuelle de la plaine du Haouz." *Rev. Géog. Maroc* 17 (1970) 3-42.

30767 "Tunisie." *Europe Fr. Outremer* 48, no. 495 (Ap '71) 41-4.

30768 "La volonté collective de développement; le modèle algérien." *Information rapide* (Algiers) (D '70) 11-39.

30769 "Voluntary insurance in the U.A.R." *Natl. Bank of Egypt Econ. B.* 23, no. 4 (1970) 333-58.

30770 EL-AGRAA, A. "The Sudan and the Arab Customs Union; a conflict." *East. Afr. Econ. Rev.* 1, no. 2 (1969) 39-51.

30771 ALDOR, R. "Israel and the developing countries." *Columbia J. World Business* 6, no. 3 (My-Ju '71) 23-8.

30772 AL-AMIN, M. and M. FIKRI. "Planning Arab common petro-chemical industries." *Arab Oil Rev.* (Mr-Ap '71) 21-30.

30773 AL-AṬĀR, A. and M. AL-DĪB. "An analysis of dairy production in the U.A.R." (In Arabic) *L'Egypte contemp.* 62, no. 343 (Ja '71) 73-106.

30774 AYOOB, M. "Pakistan's trade relations with the Soviet Union." *Internat. Stud.* 11, no. 1 (Jl '69) 44-69.

30775 BENNIGSEN, A. and C. LEMERCIER-QUELQUEJAY. "Les marchands de la Cour ottomane et le commerce des fourrures moscovites dans la seconde moitié du XVI^e siècle." *Cah. du Monde russe & soviétique* 11, no. 3 (Jl-S '70) 363-90.

30776 BERGER, L. "Prospective effects of peace on the economy." *Internat. Probs.* 10, nos. 1-2 (Ju '71) 103-7.

30777 BERREBY, J.-J. "Oil in the Orient: the Algerian imbroglio." *New Mid. East* no. 33 (Ju '71) 9-11.

30778 BERREBY, J.-J. "Oil in the Orient: the limits of the American-Soviet entente." *New Mid. East* no. 26 (N '70) 24-7.

30779 BRECKENFELD, G. "How the Arabs changed the oil business." *Fortune* 84, no. 2 (Ag '71) 113-7.

30780 BROOKINS, O. and G. SCHACHTER. "The role of the public sector in industrial investment of developing areas in southern Europe (Spain, Italy, Turkey, and Yugoslavia)." *Estratto dalla Riv. internaz. de sci. econ. e commerciali* 17, no. 12 (1970) 1,191-207.

30781 CARRERE D'ENCAUSSE, H. "Les routes commerciales de l'Asie Centrale et les tentatives de reconquête d'Astrakhan." *Cah. du Monde russe & soviétique* 11, no. 3 (Jl-S '70) 391-422.

30782 CHAROUB, A. "Tunisie: la vie chère." *Jeune Afr.* no. 542 (My 25 '71) 333-7.

30783 DAGAN, A. "Israël: pays développé ou sous-développé?" *Actualités écon.* (Jl-S '70) 321-34.

30784 DESOMOGYI, J. "Economic geography of Islamic countries." *Islamic Cult.* 45, no. 1 (Ja '71) 35-54.

30785 DESPRAIRIES, P. "L'industrialisation du bassin méditerranéen." *Rev. Défense natl.* 27 (Mr '71) 391-411.

30786 DWANS, R. "U.S. Foreign Assistance programs: the impact of local currencies in economic development." *J. Devel. Areas* 5, no. 4 (Jl '71) 589-604.

30787 FRY, M. "An application of the Stone model to the Turkish financial accounts." *J. Develop. Stud.* 7, no. 3 (Ap '71) 271-83.

30788 FRY, M. "Bank lending practices and economic planning in Turkey." *Hacettepe B. of Soc. Sci. & Humanities* 2, no. 2 (D '70) 258-65.

30789 FRY, M. "Turkey's first five year development plan: an assessment." *Econ. J.* 81, no. 322 (Ju '71) 306-26.

30790 GHATTAS, E. "Lebanon's financial crisis in 1966: a systemic approach." *MEJ* 25, no. 1 (1971) 43-56.

30791 GREENFIELD, A. "Three years of economic growth." *Amer. Zionist* 61, no. 9 (Ju '71) 14-6. Israel.

30792 HARSHLAG, Z. "The strategy of planning and growth in Turkey." *Hacettepe B. of Soc. Sci. & Humanities* 2, no. 2 (D '70) 206-19.

30793 HASSAN, A. "Investment of oil revenues in credit projects in Arab countries." (In Arabic) *L'Egypte contemp.* 62, no. 343 (Ja '71) 15-40.

30794 HUDSON, J. "The Līṭānī River of Lebanon: an example of Middle Eastern water development." *MEJ* 25, no. 1 (1971) 1-13.

30795 ISLAM, N. "Export incentive and effective subsidy in Pakistan: an evaluation." *B. Oxford Univ. Inst.* no. 3 (Ag '69) 169-88.

30796 KAZGAN, G. "Le secteur agricole dans le premier et le deuxième plan turc." *Tiers-Monde* 11, no. 44 (O-D '70) 767-92.

30797 KONOPNICKI, M. "The public and cooperative sectors in Israel." *Ann. Public & Cooperative Econ.* 42, no. 1 (Ja-Mr '71) 47-72.

30798 KUTSCHERA, C. "Irak, une forte odeur de pétrole." *Jeune Afr.* no. 549 (Jl 13 '71) 41-7.

30799 LEQUY, R. "L'agriculture algérienne de 1954 à 1962." *Rev. Occident musulman Meditérrannée* no. 2 (1970) 41-100.

30800 LERAT, S. "Hassi Messaoud." *Cahiers d'Outre-Mer* 24, no. 93 (Ja-Mr '71) 16-31. An oil field region in Algeria.

30801 LEVY, W. "Oil power." *For. Aff.* 49, no. 4 (Jl '71) 652-68.

30802 MAKDISI, S. "Syria: rate of economic growth and fixed capital formation 1936-1968." *MEJ* 25, no. 2 (1971) 157-79.

30803 MANDLEUR, A. "Les industries alimentaires de Marrakech." *Rev. Geog. Maroc* 17 (1970) 53-69.

30804 NASMYTH, J. "Libya turns the golden key." *Interplay* 4, no. 3 (Mr '71) 39-43.

30805 ROTH, I. "Government and the development of industry in Pakistan—1947-1967." *A. Survey* 11, no. 6 (Ju '71) 570-81.

30806 SALIGO, R. "Real and illusory aspects of an overvalued exchange rate: the Pakistan case." *Oxford Econ. Papers* 23, no. 1 (Mr '71) 90-109.

30807 SIRONVAL, M.-M. "Animation rurale en Tunisie, dans le cadre du Ministère de l'Agriculture." *IBLA* 34, no. 127 (1971) 177-82.

30808 STONE, R. "Tunisian cooperatives: failure of a bold experiment." *Afr. Report* 16, no. 6 (Ju '71) 19-22.

30809 TÜRK, I. "The 1970 devaluation." *Dış Politika* 1, no. 1 (Mr '71) 146-55. Turkey.

30810 WEISS, D. "Evaluation of a power transmission system in Tunisia." *Ekistics* 31, no. 187 (Ju '71) 444-51. Abstracted from *Socio-Econ. Planning Sci.* 4 (D '70) 429-49.

30811 WYNN, R. "The Sudan's 10-year plan of economic development, 1961/62-1970/71: an analysis of achievement to 1967-68." *J. Devel. Areas* 5, no. 4 (Jl '71) 555-76.

30812 YĀSĪN, B. "Problem of foreign trade in Syria." (In Arabic) *al-Ma'rifah* no. 111 (My '71) 47-69.

30813 YOUNG, R. "The controlled economy and political organization: a cross-national study." *J. Devel. Areas* 5, no. 4 (Jl '71) 543-54. A study utilizing data from Middle Eastern and Latin American countries.

30814 ZENATI, H. "La 'sonatrach'—première compagnie pétrolière du tiers-monde." *Jeune Afr.* no. 539 (My 4 '71) 28-32.

SOCIAL CONDITIONS

30815 "Human rights in the world: Morocco." *Rev. Internat. Commission of Jurists* no. 6 (Ap-Ju '71) 13-6.

30816 "Migrations internes en Tunisie." *Rev. tunisienne Sci. soc.* (D '70) 227 pages.

30817 "Organization and planning of education in Jordan." *Orient* (Hamburg) 12, no. 2 (Ap '71) 43-8.

30818 "Oriental Jews in Israel." *Palestine Digest* 1, no. 3 (Ju '71) 15-20.

30819 ABU-LUGHOD, J. "Cities blend the past to face the future." *Afr. Report* 16, no. 6 (Ju '71) 12-5. North African cities.

30820 ALLON, Y. "Education toward humanity in wartime." *Dispersion & Unity* no. 11 (1970) 245-52.

30821 ANDERSON, J. "The role of personal statutes in social development in Islamic countries." *Comp. Stud. Soc. Hist.* (Ja '71) 16-31.

30822 ANTOUN, R. "Three approaches to the cultural anthropology of the Middle East." *Mid. East Stud. Assoc. B.* 5, no. 2 (My '71) 24-53.

30823 AUPECLE, M. "L'enseignement du français au Liban." *Travaux & Jours* no. 38 (Ja-Mr '71) 7-20.

30824 AWAD, M. "The evolution of landownership in the Sudan." *MEJ* 25, no. 2 (1971) 212-28.

30825 BARTSCH, W. "The industrial labor force of Iran: problems of recruitment, training and productivity." *MEJ* 25, no. 1 (1971) 27-42.

30826 BELHASSEN, S. "Tunisie: les classes de demain." *Jeune Afr.* no. 549 (Jl 13 '71) 38-9.

30827 BERNHEIM, N. "Révolution feminine au maghreb, I." *Jeune Afr.* no. 545 (Ju 15 '71) 55-9.

30828 BERTHELIER, R. "Tentative d'approche socio-culturelle de la psychologie nord-africaine." *Psychopathologie Afr.* 5, no. 2 (1969) 171-222. Algeria.

30829 BON, M. "Preponderance de l'influence socio-géographique sur l'influence ethnique dans la psychologie du peuple marocain." *Rev. Psych. des Peuples* 25, no. 1 (1970) 46-66.

30830 BRYSON, T. "A note on Near East relief: Walter George Smith, Cardinal Gibbons and the question of discrimination against Catholics." *Muslim World* 61, no. 3 (Jl '71) 202-9.

30831 CARMI, S. and H. ROSENFELD. "Immigration, urbanization and crisis: the process of Jewish colonization in Palestine during the 1920s." *Internat. J. Comp. Sociol.* 12, no. 1 (Mr '71) 41-57.

30832 CLEMENT, J.-F. "Etude sociologique d'un tremblement de terre au Maroc." *Cah. Internat. de Sociol.* 50 (Ja-Ju '71) 95-126.

30833 COOLEY, J. "The tribe of morning." *Aramco World Mag.* 22, no. 3 (My-Ju '71) 2-7. Fishing on Beirut's waterfront.

30834 DE JONG, F. "Sociology in a developing country, the United Arab Republic: orientations and characteristics." *Sociol. Rev.* 19, no. 2 (My '71) 241-52.

30835 DE PLANHOL, X. "Principes d'une géographie urbaine de l'Asie mineure." *Rev. géog. de l'Est* 9, nos. 3-4 (Jl-D '69) 249-68.

30836 DE SCHOOTEN, M. "Education comes to Iran's nomadic tribes." *Geog. Mag.* 43, no. 8 (My '71) 549-55.

30837 DONOHUE, J. "Ghassan Tuéni et les étudiants des écoles secondaires." *Travaux & Jours* no. 38 (Ja-Mr '71) 65-80.

30838 DUPREE, L. "Population review 1970: Afghanistan." *AUFS, South A. Series* 15, no. 1 (D '70).

30839 ECKERT, E. "Die Medina-Gesellschaft." *Kolner Z. Soziol. & soz. Psych.* 3 (1970) 473-98.

30840 EDMONDS, C. "Kurdish nationalism." *J. Contemp. Hist.* 6, no. 1 (1971) 87-107.

30841 ERTURK, S. "A comparative study of teacher behaviors in 1960 and 1970." *Hacettepe B. of Soc. Sci. & Humanities* 2, no. 2 (D '70) 158-205. Turkish secondary school teachers.

30842 GOLDBERG, H. "Ecological and demographic aspects of rural Tripolitanian Jewry: 1853-1949." *Internat. J. Mid. East Stud.* 2, no. 3 (Jl '71) 245-65.

30843 GRAY, R. "The Southern Sudan." *J. Contemp. Hist.* 6, no. 1 (1971) 108-20.

30844 GUREVITCH, M. and G. SCHWARTZ. "Television and the Sabbath culture in Israel." *Jewish J. Sociol.* 13, no. 1 (Ju '71) 65-72.

30845 HUDOWICZ, S. "L'élevage au Maroc; situation actuelle." *Rev. Géog. Maroc* 17 (1970) 116-20.

30846 HURWITZ, Y. "The Kibbutz—its socialist and nationalist roots." *Wiener Library B.* 24, no. 4 (1970-71) 15-21.

30847 KHEIR-EL-DINE, H. "Some aspects of regional differences in the U.A.R." *L'Egypte contemp.* 62, no. 343 (Ja '71) 61-82.

30848 KIŞLALI, A. "La lutte de générations." *Hacettepe B. of Soc. Sci. & Humanities* 2, no. 2 (D '70) 235-46.

30849 KOLODNY, E. "Une communauté insulaire en Méditerranée orientale: les Turcs de Chypre." *Rev. Géog. de Lyon* 46, no. 1 (1971) 5-56.

30850 LAZERWITZ, B. "Intermarriage and conversion: a guide for future research." *Jewish J. Sociol.* 13, no. 1 (Ju '71) 41-64. Israel.

30851 LEBRECHT, H. "The war and the class structure in Israel." *Labour Monthly* 53, no. 6 (Ju '71) 257-60.

30852 LEUCATE, C. "Algérie 1970: développement national et luttes de classe." *Critique soc.* (Ja-F '71) 43-58.

30853 LEVI-VALENSI, A. "An Israel-Diaspora dialogue?" *Dispersion & Unity* no. 11 (1970) 93-100.

30854 LEBON, J. "The Islamic city in the Near East." *Ekistics* 31, no. 182 (Ja '71) 64-71. Abstracted from *Town Planning Rev.* 41, no. 2 (Ap '70).

30855 LEWICKI, T. "The Ibádites in Arabia and Africa." *J. World Hist.* 13, no. 1 (1971) 51-132.

30856 LOUIS, A. "Habitat et habitations autour des ksars de montagne dans le Sud tunisien." *IBLA* 34, no. 127 (1971) 123-48.

30857 MAGNARELLA, P. "Jewish Kurds of Iran." *Jewish Digest* 15, no. 7 (1970) 17-20.

30858 MELIKIAN, L. *et al.* "Achievement motivation in Afghanistan, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey." *J. Soc. Psych.* 83, no. 2 (Ap '71) 183-4.

30859. MESSARA, A. "Déclarations ministérielles et éducation (1943-1970)." *Travaux & Jours* no. 38 (Ja-Mr '71) 57-63.

30860 PERES, Y. "Ethnic relations in Israel." *Amer. J. Sociol.* 76, no. 6 (My '71) 1021-47.

30861 RACKMAN, E. "The new 'Jerusalem Programme'." *Dispersion & Unity* no. 11 (1970) 79-86.

30862 RUBINSTEIN, A. "Who's a Jew, and other woes." *Encounter* 36, no. 3 (Mr '71) 84-92.

30863 SALIBI, K. "The Lebanese identity." *J. Contemp. Hist.* 6, no. 1 (1971) 76-86.

30864 SEGRE, D. "Israel: a society in transition—an author reassesses his views." *New Mid. East* no. 35 (Ag '71) 34-6.

30865 SFAR, O. "Les carrières médicales en Tunisie." *IBLA* 34, no. 127 (1971) 167-71.

30866 SHATIL, J. "Development trends in the Kibbutz." *New Outlook* 14, no. 4 (My '71) 32-9.

30867 SÖNMEZ, E. "Turkish women in Turkish literature of the XIXth century." *Hacettepe B. of Soc. Sci. & Humanities* 2, no. 2 (D '70) 123-57.

30868 STARCHENKOV, G. "Problems of labor power in Turkey." (In Russian) *Narodi A. i Afr.* no. 1 (1971) 29-37. Summary in English.

30869 ṬANṬĀWĪ, M. "The women of Kuwayt." (In Arabic) *al-'Arabī* no. 151 (Ju '71) 84-91.

80870 TEKELI, I. "The evolution of spatial organization in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic." *Ekistics* 31, no. 182 (Ja '71) 57-60.

30871 UGUREL-SEMIN, R. "Youth in Turkey." In *Youth: A transcultural psychiatric approach.* Ed. by J. H. Masserman. Proceedings, 5th Transcultural Conference of Psychiatry, 1969. (New York and London) 139-45.

30872 WEIKER, W. "Social sciences in contemporary Turkey." *Mid. East Stud. Assoc. B.* 5, no. 2 (My '71) 72-82.

30873 YOUNG, H. "Mosul in 1909." *Mid. East. Stud.* 7, no. 2 (My '71) 229-36.

SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

30874 AGWANI, M. "Religion and politics in Islamic theory and practice." *Islam & Mod. Age* 2, no. 1 (F '71) 45-50.

30875 ALI, S. "The economics of Ibn Khaldun—a selection." *Afr. Quart.* 10, no. 3 (O-D '70) 251-9.

30876 ATIYA, A. "Religious and philosophical thought: Christendom and Islam." *J. World Hist.* 13, no. 2 (1971) 372-8.

30877 BERTMAN, M. "Alfarabi and the concept of happiness in medieval Islamic philosophy." *Islamic Quart.* 14, no. 3 (Jl-S '70) 122-5.

30878 CATALÁ, J. "Arquímedes árabe: el tratado de los círculos tangentes." *al-Andalus* 23, fasc. 1 (1968) 53-94.

30879 HOTTINGER, A. "Islamic renaissance in Tunisia." *Swiss Rev. World Aff.* 21, no. 4 (Jl '71) 18-9.

30880 ISMAEL, T. "The theory of Nadīm Biṭār." *MEJ* 25, no. 1 (1971) 91-7.

30881 JAWED, N. "Religion and modernity: some nineteenth and twentieth century Indo-Pakistani ideas." *Muslim World* 61, no. 2 (Ap '71) 73-89.

30882 KHAN, M. "Religion and politics in Turkey." *Islam & Mod. Age* 2, no. 1 (F '71) 94-108.

30883 LEWIS, B. "Raza y color en el Islam." *al-Andalus* 23, fasc. 1 (1968) 1-52.

30884 MANNAN, M. "Islam and other isms." *Islamic Rev. & Arab Aff.* 59, no. 1 (Ja '71) 5-11.

30885 MARDIN, Ş. "Ideology and religion in the Turkish revolution." *Internat. J. Mid. East Stud.* 2, no. 3 (Jl '71) 197-211.

30886 NAIMUDDIN, S. "The ideal man in Rumi and Iqbal." *Islamic Cult.* 45, no. 2 (Ap '71) 81-94.

30887 NASR, S. "The spread of the illuminationist school of Suhrawardī." *Islamic Quart.* 14, no. 3 (Jl-S '70) 111-21.

30888 NEUBAUER, E. "Die Theorie vom īqā'. I. Übersetzung des Kitāb al-Īqā'āt von Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī." *Oriens* 21-22 (1968-69) 196-233.

30889 NOLIN, K., trans. "Christ in the Qur'an, the Taurat, and the Injil, by 'Abd al-Karim al-Khatib." *Muslim World* 61, no. 2 (Ap '71) 90-101.

30890 NUCHO, F. "The one and the many in al-Kindī's metaphysics." *Muslim World* 61, no. 3 (Jl '71) 161-9.

30891 OREN, E. "Early Islamic material from Ganei-Hamat (Tiberias)." *Archeology* 24, no. 3 (Ju '71) 274-7.

30892 O'SHAUGHNESSY, T. "Creation with wisdom and with the word in the Qur'an." *J. Amer. O. Soc.* 91, no. 2 (Ap-Ju '71) 208-21.

30893 RONDOT, P. "Le rôle de l'Islam dan la formation et le développement de l'opinion." *Rev. libanaise Sci. polit.* (Jl-D '70) 13-21.

30894 TAL, V. *et al.* "Jewish self-understanding and the land and state of Israel." *Union Seminary Quart. Rev.* 26, no. 4 (1971) 351-81.

30895 VOLL, J. "The British, the 'Ulamâ,' and popular Islam in the early Anglo-Egyptian Sudan." *Internat. J. Mid. East Stud.* 2, no. 3 (Jl '71) 212-8.

30896 WAARDENBURG, J. "Massignon's study of religion and Islam. An essay à propos of his Opera Minora." *Oriens* 21-22 (1968-69) 136-58.

LANGUAGE

30897 ABBOUD, P. "Arabic language instruction." *Mid. East Stud. Assoc. B.* 5, no. 2 (My '71) 1-23.

30898 BLOCH, A. "Morphological doublets in Arabic dialects." *J. Semitic Stud.* 16, no. 1 (1971) 53-73.

30899 BRAUMANN, M. "The origin of the Arabic object pronouns formed with īyā-." *J. Semitic Stud.* 16, no. 1 (1971) 50-2.

30900 HOFMAN, J. and H. FISHERMAN. "Language shift and maintenance in Israel." *Internat.*

Migration Rev. 5, no. 2 (1971) 204-26.

30901 HREBÍCEK, L. "Several Turkish homonymous constructions and their generative description." *Archiv O.* 39, no. 2 (1971) 146-54.

30902 INGHAM, B. "Some characteristics of Meccan speech." *BSOAS* 34, pt. 2 (1971) 273-97.

30903 KAMHI, D. "The term *tō'ar* in Hebrew and its status as a grammatical category." *BSOAS* 34, pt. 2 (1971) 256-72.

30904 NWYIA, P. "L'Islam face à la crise du langage moderne." *Travaux & Jours* no. 38 (Ja-Mr '71) 81-101.

LITERATURE AND ARTS

30905 "Das Israel Museum in Jerusalem." *Du: Kulturelle Monatsschrift* 31 (Mr '71) 156-221.

30906 "The spiritual aspect of the life of the Prophet Muhammed." *Islamic Rev. & Arab Aff.* 59, no. 1 (Ja '71) 22-7.

30907 ASLANAPA, O. "Turkish ceramic art." *Archeology* 24, no. 3 (Ju '71) 209-19.

30908 BOULARES, H. "I problemi della cultura in Tunisia." *Ulisse* fasc. 69 (Mr '71) 204-13.

30909 CARSWELL, J. "New creative force revives Arab art." *Mid. East Internat.* no. 4 (Jl '71) 23-6.

30910 FAHD, T. "Psychologie animale et comportement humains dans les proverbes arabes." *Rev. de Synthèse* 92, nos. 61-62 (Ja-Ju '71) 5-44.

30911 FAUBLEE, J. "Les manuscrits arabico-malgaches du Sud-Est, leur importance historique." *Rev. fr. d'Hist. d'Outre Mer* 57, no. 208 (1970) 268-87.

30912 FILSHTINSKY, I. "Typological traits in Arabic literature from the eighth to the twelfth century." (In Russian) *Narodi A. i Afr.* no. 2 (1971) 78-88. Summary in English.

30913 FONTAINE, J. "Amīn Rayḥānī: chrétien ou musulman?" *Travaux & Jours* no. 38 (Ja-Mr '71) 103-14.

30914 FONTAINE, J. *et al.* "Aspects de la littérature tunisienne contemporaine: Samir Ayadi, Abdelkader Bencheikh." *IBLA* 34, no. 127 (1971) 149-66.

30915 GIBERT, S. "Algunas curiosidas de la poesía arábigoandaluza. (Versos correlativos, versos con eco, versos concatenados en al dīwān de un poeta del siglo XIV)." *al-Andalus* 23, fasc. 1 (1968) 95-122.

30916 GRABAR, O. "Islamic archeology: an introduction." *Archeology* 24, no. 3 (Ju '71) 197-9.

30917 HILLMANN, M. "Sound and sense in a *Ghazal* of Ḥāfiẓ." *Muslim World* 61, no. 2 (Ap '71) 111-21.

30918 KHULUSI, S. "Ibn Jinni's *Commentary* on Mutanabbi's poetry." *Islamic Rev. & Arab Aff.* 59, no. 1 (Ja '71) 28-33.

30919 KURAN, A. "Thirteenth and fourteenth century mosques in Turkey." *Archeology* 24, no. 3 (Ju '71) 234-54.

30920 LOYA, A. "Al-Sayyāb and the influence of T. S. Eliot." *Muslim World* 61, no. 3 (Jl '71) 187-201.

30921 METTROP, A. "Six mois de théâtre à Tunis." *IBLA* 34, no. 127 (1971) 172-6.

30922 MOOSA, M. "The translation of western fiction into Arabic." *Islamic Quart.* 14, no. 4 (O-D '70) 201-36.

30923 NATH, R. "Glass-mosaic decoration and the Shish-Mahal of Agra Fort." *Islamic Cult.* 45, no. 1 (Ja '71) 25-34.

30924 OLIVERIUS, J. "Themen und Motive im arabischen Volksbuch von Zīr Salīm." *Archiv O.* 39, no. 2 (1971) 129-45.

30925 OWENS, G. "Islamic illustrated chronicles." *J. A. Hist.* 5, no. 1 (1971) 20-34.

30926 RAGETTE, F. "Building on tradition." *Aramco World Mag.* 22, no. 3 (My-Ju '71) 15-23. Modern Arab architecture.

30927 ROFÉ, H. "Basra's ugly genius Jahiz." *East. Horizons* 10, no. 1 (1970) 54-7.

30928 ROFÉ, H. "The classical literature of Persia." *East. Horizons* 9, no. 6 (1970) 53-8.

30929 ROSEN-AYALON, M. "Islamic pottery from Susa." *Archeology* 24, no. 3 (Ju '71) 204-8.

30930 S., A. "The Mollanepes Theatre in Ashkhabad." *Mizan* 12, no. 3 (D '70) 172-83. The oldest professional Turkmen theatre.

30931 SCANLON, G. "The Fustat mounds: a shard count 1968." *Archeology* 24, no. 3 (Ju '71) 220-33.

30932 SOMEKH, S. "The sad millenarian: an examination of *Awlād Ḥāratinā.*" *Mid. East. Stud.* 7, no. 1 (Ja '71) 49-62.

30933 TARTAKOVSKY, P. "Ivan Bunin's poetry and the Arab East." (In Russian) *Narodi A. i Afr.* no. 1 (1971) 106-21.

30934 AL-'USH, M. "Incised Islamic glass." *Archeology* 24, no. 3 (Ju '71) 200-3.

30935 VATIKIOTIS, P. "The corruption of Futuwwa: a consideration of despair in Nagib Maḥfūẓ's *Awlād Ḥāritnā.*" *Mid. East. Stud.* 7, no. 2 (My '71) 169-84.

30936 WALLING, W. "Algerian cinema: to give them new faces." *Afr. Report* 16, no. 6 (Ju '71) 29-31.

30937 WIET, G. "Un chandelier en cuivre au nom de la sultane Fatima épouse du Sultan Mamlouk Qaitbay." *Syria: Rev. d'Art O. et d'Archéologie* 47 (1970) 345-55.

LAW

30938 "L'évolution du statut personnel en Afrique du Nord depuis l'independance." *Maghreb* 43 (Ja-F '71) 29-43.

30939 CHARFI, M. "Les conditions de forme du mariage en droit tunisien." *Rev. tunisien de Droit* (1969-70) 11-38.

30940 GORDON, E. "Resolution of the Bahrain dispute." *Amer. J. Internat. Law* 65, no. 3 (Jl '71) 560-8.

30941 KOURIDES, P. "The influence of Islamic law on contemporary Middle Eastern legal systems: the formation and binding force of contracts." *Columbia J. of Transnat. Law* 9, no. 2 (1970) 384-435.

30942 SRADJ, N. and M. "Die Verfassung der VAR vom 25 März 1964." *Verfassung und Recht Übersee* no. 4 (1970) 469-78.

30943 STONE, J. "Between cease-fires in the Middle East." *Israel Law Rev.* 6, no. 2 (Ap '71) 165-87.

30944 YARON, R. "Laws disregarded." *Israel Law Rev.* 6, no. 2 (Ap '71) 188-97. Recorded Israeli laws that are not enforced by the state.

BIOGRAPHY

30945 "Interview with Meir Vilner—General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Israel." *World Marxist Rev. Information B.* 9, no. 193 (1971) 133-5.

30946 "Moshe Dayan." *Planète Action* (Ja-F '71) 8-131.

30947 AL-GEYOUSHI, M. "Al-Hakīm al-Tirmidhi: his works and thoughts." *Islamic Quart.* 14, no. 4 (O-D '70) 159-200.

30948 LIVINGSTON, J. " 'Alī Bey al-Kabīr and the Jews." *Mid. East. Stud.* 7, no. 2 (My '71) 221-8.

30949 MORTIMER, M. "Profile: Mouloud Mammeri bridges cultural worlds." *Afr. Report* 16, no. 6 (Ju '71) 26-8. An Algerian novelist.

30950 NORRIS, H. "New evidence on the life of 'Abdullāh B. Yāsīn and the origin of the Almoravid movement." *J. Afr. Hist.* 12, no. 2 (1971) 255-68.

30951 DE SIMONE, A. "Notizie biobibliografiche su 'Īsā an-Nā'ūrī." *O. Mod.* 50, no. 9 (S '70) 589-92. A contemporary Jordanian poet and writer.

30952 SPENGLER, J. "Alberuni: eleventh-century Iranian Malthusian?" *Hist. Polit. Econ.* 3, no. 1 (1971) 92-104.

30953 STONE, F. "A pioneer in Turkish village revitalization." *Hacettepe B. of Soc. Sci. & Humanities* 2, no. 2 (D '70) 220-34. About Ismail Hakki Tonguç.

30954 WEIKER, W. "Associates of Kemal Ataturk (1932-1938)." *Belleten* 24, no. 136 (O '70). In Turkish and English.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

30955 BACQUE-GRAMMOUT. "Une liste ottomane de prices et d'apanages Abu' l-Khayrides." *Cah. du Monde russe & soviétique* 11, no. 3 (Jl-S '70) 423-53.

30956 BOSWORTH, C. "Manuscripts of Tha'alibi's *Yatīmat ad-dahr* in the Süleymaniye Library, Istanbul." *J. Semitic Stud.* 16, no. 1 (1971) 41-9.

30957 BURKE, E. "Recent books on colonial Algerian history." *Mid. East. Stud.* 7, no. 2 (My '71) 241-50.

30958 BURROWES, R. *et al.* "Sources of Middle East international event data." *Mid. East Stud. Assoc. B.* 5, no. 2 (My '71) 54-71.

30959 CRECELIUS, D. "The organization of *waqf* documents in Cairo." *Internat. J. Mid. East Stud.* 2, no. 3 (Jl '71) 266-77.

30960 DAFTRY, F. "Bibliography of the publications of the late W. Ivanow." *Islamic Cult.* 45, no. 1 (Ja '71) 55-67. A scholar of the Ismā'īlī movement.

30961 DAVID-WEILL, J. "Papyrus arabes du Louvre II." *J. Econ. & Soc. Hist. O.* 14, pt. 1 (Ap '71) 1-24.

30962 GÖKBILGIN, Ö. "Quelques sources manuscrites sur l'époque de Sahib Giray I^{er}, Khan de Crimée (1532-1551)—À Istanbul, Paris et Leningrad." *Cah. du Monde russe & soviétique* 11, no. 3 (Jl-S '70) 462-9.

30963 LANDAN, J. "Russian journals dealing with the Middle East." *Mid. East. Stud.* 7, no. 2 (My '71) 237-40.

30964 ROUBET, C. "Bibliographie Maghreb-Sahara. Anthropologie, préhistoire, ethnographie 1968." *Libyca* 17 (1969) 385-94.

BOOK REVIEWS

30965 *Dine Israel: An annual of Jewish law and Israel family law.* **BSOAS** 34, pt. 2 (1971) 394-6. (J. Webber).

30966 'ABD AL-RAḤĪM, M. *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan.* **Afr. Quart.** 10, no. 3 (O-D '70) 302-3. ('Vijay'); **Afr. Aff.** 70, no. 279 (Ap '71) 182-3. (R. First); **MEJ** 25, no. 2 (1971) 251-2. (R. Tignor).

30967 ABDEL-MALEK, A., ed. *La Pensée politique arabe contemporaine.* **MEJ** 25, no. 2 (1971) 253-4. (T. Ismael).

30968 ABU-LUGHOD, I., ed. *The Arab-Israeli Confrontation of June 1967: An Arab perspective.* **Muslim World** 61, no. 3 (Jl '71) 215-8. (A. Klieman).

30969 AGERON, C.-R. *Les Algeriens musulmans et la France 1871-1910.* **Muslim World** 61, no. 2 (Ap '71) 134-6. (J. Cooke).

30970 AGWANI, M. *Communism in the Arab East.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,619 (Jl 7 '71) 796.

30971 AHMAD, F. *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish politics, 1908-1914.* **Internat. J. Mid. East Stud.** 2, no. 3 (Jl '71) 287-9. (V. Swenson).

30972 ALTOMA, S. *The Problem of Diglossia in Arabic: A comparative study of classical and Iraqi Arabic.* **Muslim World** 61, no. 2 (Ap '71) 127-9 (A. Kaye).

30973 ARBERRY, A. *Religion in the Middle East. I: Judaism and Christianity; II: Islam.* **Rev. d'Hist. Econ. & Soc.** 48, no. 4 (1970) 579-80. (H. Touchard); **Jewish J. Sociol.** 13, no. 1 (Ju '71) 95-101. (R. Werblowsky).

30974 ASAD, T. *The Kababish Arabs: Power, authority, and consent in a nomadic tribe.* **Ann. Amer. Acad. Polit. & Soc. Sci.** 396 (Jl '71) 140-1. (P. Salzman); **British J. Sociol.** 22, no. 1 (Mr '71) 110-1. (E. Gellner).

30975 ASHTOR, E. *Histoire des prix et des salaires dans l'Orient Mediéval.* **Internat. J. Mid. East Stud.** 2, no. 3 (Jl '71) 282-3. (C. Issawi).

30976 BADEAU, J. *The American Approach to the Arab World.* **Polit. Sci. Quart.** 86, no. 2 (Ju '71) 362-4. (P. Vatikiotis).

30977 BAER, G. *Studies in the Social History of Modern Egypt.* **J. Mod. Afr. Stud.** 9, no. 1 (1971) 158-60. (W. Young).

30978 BAR-ZOHAR, M. *"Hamemuneh" (The Boss): Isser Harel and Israel's security services.* **New Mid. East** no. 33 (Ju '71) 41-2. (M. Khaled).

30979 BAŞGÖZ, I. and H. WILSON. *Educational Problems in Turkey, 1920-1940.* **MEJ** 25, no. 2 (1971) 260-1. (H. Reed).

30980 BAYNE, E. *Persian Kingship in Transition.* **Internat. J.** 26, no. 3 (1971) 609-11. (R. Savory).

30981 BEDRI, Y. and G. SCOTT, trs. *The Memoirs of Babikr Bedri.* **BSOAS** 34, pt. 2 (1971) 408-9. (J. Shaked).

30982 BEESTON, A. *The Arabic Language Today.* **BSOAS** 34, pt. 2 (1971) 402-4. (E. Ullendorff).

30983 BELYAEV, E. *Arabs, Islam and the Arab Caliphate in the Early Middle Ages.* **MEJ** 25, no. 1 (1971) 103-4. (G. Atiyeh).

30984 BEN-AMI, A. *Social Change in a Hostile Environment; The Crusaders' Kingdom of Jerusalem.* **Amer. Sociol. Rev.** 36, no. 3 (Ju '71) 553-5. (S. Khalaf).

30985 BERGER, M. *Islam in Egypt Today: Social and political aspects of popular religion.* **Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev.** 65, no. 2 (Ju '71) 543-6. (E. Lear).

30986 BERQUE, J. *L'Orient second.* **IBLA** 34, no. 127 (1971) 185-90. (In French). (A. Demeerseman).

30987 BLAIR, L. *Western Window in the Arab World.* **Afr. Report** 16, no. 6 (Ju '71) 40-1. (J. Damis).

30988 BLAIR, T. *The Land to Those Who Work It: Algeria's experiment in workers' management.* **Muslim World** 61, no. 3 (Jl '71) 223-4. (A. Heggoy).

30989 BLAXLAND, G. *Egypt and Sinai, eternal battleground.* **For. Service J.** 48, no. 5 (My '71) 41. (D. Nes).

30990 BOER, H. *A Brief History of Islam, a Christian Interpretation.* **Muslim World** 61, no. 3 (Jl '71) 218-9. (J. Bodine).

30991 BOIS, T. *Connaissance des Kurdes.* **Archiv O.** 39, no. 2 (1971) 224-6. (A. Křikavová).

30992 BOSWORTH, C. *The Ghaznavids. Their empire in Afghanistan and eastern Iran.* **Oriens** 21-22 (1968-69) 456-7. (L. Adamec).

30993 BROWN, P. *The World of Late Antiquity.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,622 (Jl 30 '71) 908.

30994 CAHEN, C. *Pre-Ottoman Turkey: A general survey of the material and spiritual culture and history, 1071-1330.* **MEJ** 25, no. 2 (1971) 262-7. (M. Kortepeter).

30995 CHEHATA, C. *Droit Musulman. Applications au Proche Orient.* **Amer. J. Comp. Law** 19, no. 2 (1971) 381-9. (H. Liebesny).

30996 CLAUSEN, U., ed. *Der Algerische Sozialismus: Eine Dokumentation.* **MEJ** 25, no. 2 (1971) 249-51. (P. Bechtold).

30997 CLAYTON, G. *An Arabian Diary.* **Amer. Hist. Rev.** 76, no. 3 (Ju '71) 812-3. (A. Gerteiny).

30998 COHEN, A. *Israel and the Arab World.* **Mid. East Internat.** no. 3 (Ju '71) 42. (PGO).

30999 COLLINS, R. *King Leopold, England, and the Upper Nile, 1899-1909.* **Internat. J. Mid. East Stud.** 2, no. 3 (Jl '71) 285-6. (G. Kirk).

31000 COOK, M., ed. *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East: From the rise of Islam to the present day.* **Internat. Aff.** (GB) 47, no. 2 (Ap '71) 431-2. (K. McLachlan); **J. Econ. & Soc. Hist. O.** 14, pt. 1 (Ap '71) 74-8. (In French). (C. Cahen).

31001 COPELAND, M. *The Game of Nations.* **MEJ** 25, no. 1 (1971) 97-8. (D. Schmidt).

31002 CORBIN, H. *Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn 'Arabī'.* **Internat. J. Mid. East Stud.** 2, no. 3 (Jl '71) 278-81. (L. Goodman).

31003 DEMEERSEMAN, A. *Lumière et ombre au Maghreb.* **IBLA** 34, no. 127 (1971) 191. (In French). (M. Borrmans).

31004 DICKSON, V. *Forty Years in Kuwait.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,617 (Ju 25 '71) 730.

31005 DIDDEN, H. *Irak—Eine Sozio-Ökonomische Betrachtung.* **MEJ** 25, no. 2 (1971) 249-51. (P Bechtold).

31006 DODD, C. *Politics and Government in Turkey.* **Ann. Amer. Acad. Polit. & Soc. Sci.** 396 (Jl '71) 141-2. (W. Yale).

31007 DUVIGNAUD, J. *Change at Shebika: Report from a North African village.* **Afr. Report** 16, no. 6 (Ju '71) 35-6. (J. Simmons).

31008 EBAN, A. *Mon peuple, histoire du peuple juif.* **O. Mod.** 50, no. 9 (S '70) 594-6. (In Italian). (L. Goglia).

31009 EISENSTADT, S. *Integration and Development in Israel.* **MEJ** 25, no. 2 (1971) 258. (C. Van Nieuwenhuijze).

31010 FARMER, H. *Islam.* **Oriens** 21-22 (1968-69) 418-31. (In German). (E. Neubauer).

31011 FISCHEL, W. *Ibn Khaldun in Egypt.* **O. Lit. Z.** 65, nos. 7-8 (1970) 370-3. (H. Simon); **Muslim World** 61 (1971) 46-8. (F. Nucho).

31012 FISCHEL, W. *Jews in the Economic and Political Life in Medieval Islam.* **Rev. Etudes Juives** 129, fasc. 1 (1970) 131. (G. Vajda); **Bibliotheca O.** 27, nos. 1-2 (1970) 114-5; **Der Islam** 47 (1970) 35. (B. Spuler); **The New East** 20, no. 3 (1970) 316. (A. Ashtor).

31013 FYZEE, A. *Compendium of Fatimid Law.* **Amer. J. Comp. Law** 19, no. 2 (1971) 381-9. (H. Liebesny).

31014 FYZEE, A. *Outlines of Muhammadan Law.* **Bibliotheca O.** 28, nos. 1-2 (Ja-Mr '71) 99. (E. Ashtor).

31015 GELLNER, E. *Saints of the Atlas.* **Amer. Anthrop.** 73, no. 2 (Ap '71) 357-9. (R. Fernea).

31016 GERVASI, F. *The Case for Israel.* **For. Service J.** 48, no. 6 (Ju '71) 41. (N. Barnes).

31017 GHAZI, F. *Le roman et la nouvelle en Tunisie.* **IBLA** 34, no. 127 (1971) 191-3. (In French). (J. Fontaine).

31018 AL-GHUNAIMI, M. *The Muslim Conception of International Law and the Western Approach.* **Amer. J. Comp. Law** 19, no. 2 (1971) 381-9. (H. Liebesny).

31019 GLUBB, J. *Peace in the Holy Lands.* **New Mid. East** no. 35 (Ag '71) 36-7. (J. Parkes); **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,623 (Ag 6 '71) 932.

31020 GOITEIN, S. *A Mediterranean Society. The Jewish communities of the Arab world as portrayed in the documents of the Cairo Geniza, Vol. I.* **Oriens** 21-22 (1968-69) 408-10. (In German). (E. Dietrich).

31021 GOITEIN, S. *Studies in Islamic History and Institutions.* **Oriens** 21-22 (1968-69) 407-8. (L. Berman).

31022 GOLDMANN, N. *The Autobiography of Nahum Goldmann: Sixty years of Jewish life.* **MEJ** 25, no. 2 (1971) 257-8. (I. Naamani).

31023 GOODWIN, G. *A History of Ottoman Architecture.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,619 (Jl 9 '71) 800.

31024 GREGORIAN, V. *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of reform and modernization, 1880-1946.* **Muslim World** 61, no. 3 (Jl '71) 225-7. (L. Adamec); **J. Econ. Hist.** 31, no. 2 (Ju '71) 486-8. (J. Ragatz).

31025 VON GRUNEBAUM, G., ed. *Logic in Classical Islamic Culture.* **BSOAS** 34, pt. 2 (1971) 406-7. (J. Mattock).

31026 VON GRUNEBAUM, G. *Studien zum Kulturbild und Selbstverständnis des Islams.* **Bibliotheca O.** 28, nos. 1-2 (Ja-Mr '71) 94-5. (C. Van Nieuwenhuijze).

31027 HACHEM, N. *Libanon—Sozio-Ökonomische Grundlagen.* **MEJ** 25, no. 2 (1971) 249-51. (P. Bechtold).

31028 HAGOPIAN, E. and A. PARDEN, eds. *The Arab Americans: Studies in assimilation.* **MEJ** 25, no. 1 (1971) 112-3. (P. Hitti).

31029 HAMBLY, G. *Central Asia.* **J. A. Stud** 30, no. 3 (My '71) 693-4. (G. Penrose); **Mid. East. Stud.** 7, no. 2 (My '71) 259-60. (G. Wheeler).

31030 HANNA, S. and G. GARDNER, eds. *Arab Socialism: A documentary survey.* **MEJ** 25, no. 1 (1971) 98-9. (M. Kerr).

31031 HANSEN, B. *Economic Development in Egypt.* **J. Mod. Afr. Stud.** 9, no. 1 (1971) 158-60. (W. Young).

31032 HARBOTTLE, M. *The Impartial Soldier.* **MEJ** 25, no. 2 (1971) 245-6. (S. Xydis).

31033 HARIK, I. *Politics and Change in a Traditional Society: Lebanon, 1711-1845.* **Mid. East. Stud.** 7, no. 2 (My '71) 257-9. (G. Baer).

31034 HAUER, C. *Crisis and Conscience in the Middle East.* **J. Church & State** 13, no. 1 (1971) 138-41. (D. Baker).

31035 HENISSART, P. *OAS, L'ultimo anno dell'Algeria francese.* **Riv. di Stud. Polit. Internaz.** 38, no. 2 (Ja-Mr '71) 343-4. (In Italian). (N. Torala Serra).

31036 HENISSART, P. *Wolves in the City: The death of French Algeria.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,619 (Jl 9 '71) 796.

31037 HINDERINK, J. and M. KIRAY. *Social Stratification as an Obstacle to Development: A study of four Turkish villages.* **J. Develop. Areas** 5, no. 4 (Jl '71) 621-2. (M. Clement); **Soc. Forces** 49, no. 3 (Mr '71) 522. (A. Wells).

31938 HOLT, P. *et al. The Cambridge History of Islam. I: The Central Islamic Lands; II: The Further Islamic Lands, Islamic Society and Civilization.* **MEJ** 25, no. 1 (1971) 104-6. (K. Stowasser).

31039 HOLT, P. *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent 1516-1922.* **Archiv O.** 39, no. 2 (1971) 232-4. (R. Veselý).

31040 HOURANI, A. and S. STERN. *The Islamic City.* **J. Econ. & Soc. Hist. O.** 14, pt. 1 (Ap '71) 78-80. (In French). (C. Cahen); **MEJ** 25, no. 1 (1971) 113-4. (J. Gulick).

31041 HOUSEPIAN, M. *The Smyrna Affair.* **Nation** 213, no. 2 (Jl 19 '71) 57-8. (P. Sourian).

31042 HUNTER, F. *An Account of the British Settlement of Aden in Arabia.* **Mid. East. Stud.** 7, no. 1 (Ja '71) 121-4 (H. Ingrams).

31043 JOHNSON, D. *The Nature of Nomadism: A comparative study of pastoral migrations in Southwestern Asia and Northern Africa.* **Internat. J. Mid. East Stud.** 2, no. 3 (Jl '71) 286-7. (G. Hale).

31044 JOHNSTONE, T. *Eastern Arabian Dialect Studies.* **Mid. East. Stud.** 7, no. 1 (Ja '71) 126-7. (M. Piamenta).

31045 JUYNBOLL, G. *The Authenticity of the Tradition Literature: Discussions in modern Egypt.* **Muslim World** 61, no. 2 (Ap '71) 122-3. (R. Speight).

31046 KANYA-FORSTNER, A. *The Conquest of*

Western Sudan. **Afr. Aff.** 70, no. 279 (Ap '71) 183-5. (J. Hargreaves).

31047 KAZEMZADEH, F. *Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914: A study in imperialism.* **Polit. Sci. Quart.** 86, no. 2 (Ju '71) 367-8. (H. Deighton).

31048 KEDDIE, N. *Religion and Rebellion in Iran, the Iranian Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892.* **Oriens** 21-22 (1968-69) 509-10. (L. Adamec).

31049 KEDOURIE, E. *The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern Studies.* **MEJ** 25, no. 1 (1971) 108. (A. Tibawi); **BSOAS** 34, pt. 2 (1971) 409-10. (D. Dakin).

31050 KEDOURIE, E. *Nationalism in Asia and Africa.* **New Mid. East** no. 34 (Jl '71) 35. (J.K.).

31051 KERR, M. *Islamic Reform. The political and legal theories of Muhammad Abduh and Rashīd Riḍā.* **Oriens** 21-22 (1968-69) 508-9. (L. Adamec).

31052 KERR, M. *The United Arab Republic: The domestic, political, and economic background of foreign policy.* **J. Mod. Afr. Stud.** 9, no. 1 (1971) 158-60. (W. Young).

31053 KHADDURI, M. *Political Trends in the Arab World: The role of ideas and ideals in politics.* **Amer. Hist. Rev.** 76, no. 3 (Ju '71) 811-2. (E. Burke).

31054 KHOURY, A.-T. *Les théologiens Byzantins et l'Islam. Textes et auteurs (VII^{e}-XIII^{e} s).* **Muslim World** 61, no. 2 (Ap '71) 123-6. (D. Sahas).

31055 KIMCHE, J. *The Second Arab Awakening.* **Internat. J.** 26, no. 3 (1971) 612-3. (W. Cleveland).

31056 KISSLING, H. *et al. The Muslim World, A Historical Survey. Part III. The last great Muslim empires.* **MEJ** 25, no. 1 (1971) 106-7. (C. Bosworth).

31057 KLAYMAN, M. *The Moshav in Israel.* **J. Econ. Lit.** 9, no. 2 (Ju '71) 476-8. (E. Kanovsky).

31058 KLIEMAN, A. *Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World: The Cairo Conference of 1920.* **J. Mod. Hist.** 43, no. 2 (Ju '71) 344-6. (W. Polk); **Muslim World** 61, no. 2 (Ap '71) 141-2. (J. Cooke).

31059 KLIEMAN, A. *Soviet Russia and the Middle East.* **MEJ** 25, no. 2 (1971) 248-9. (J. Campbell).

31060 KOLLEK, T. and M. PEARLMAN. *Pilgrimage to the Holy Land: The story of pilgrimage through the ages.* **Christian News from Israel** 21, no. 4 (1971) 50-2. (W. Pax).

31061 KONONOV, A. *Tjurkskaja filologija v SSSR 1917-1967.* **East & West** (Rome) 20, no. 3 (S '70) 422-4. (G. Glaesser).

31062 KUDSI-ZADEH, A. *Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani: An annotated bibliography.* **Mid. East. Stud.** 7, no. 2 (My '71) 260-4. (E. Kedourie).

31063 LACOSTE-DUJARDIN, C. *Le conte kabyle.* **IBLA** 34, no. 127 (1971) 199-203. (In French). (J. Dejeux).

31064 LACOUTURE, J. *Nasser.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,619 (Jl 9 '71) 796.

31065 LAMBTON, A. *The Persian Land Reform, 1926-66.* **MEJ** 25, no. 2 (1971) 254-5. (P. Salzman).

31066 LANDAN, J. *The Arabs in Israel: A political study.* **Mid. East. Stud.** 7, no. 1 (Ja '71) 125-6. (E. Marmorstein); **O. Mod.** 50, no. 9 (S '70) 592-3. (In Italian). (S. Tamari).

31067 LANDEN, R. *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East: Selected readings.* **Mid. East Internat.** no. 3 (Ju '71) 42-3. (D. Haydon).

31068 LANDEN, R. *Oman since 1856.* **Islamic Cult.** 45, no. 1 (Ja '71) 69. (K. Lal).

31069 LAPIDUS, I., ed. *Middle Eastern Cities.* **J. Econ. & Soc. Hist. O.** 14, pt. 1 (Ap '71) 80-2. (In French). (C. Cahen); **J. A. Hist.** 5, no. 1 (1971) 55. (G. Penrose).

31070 LENCZOWSKI, G., ed. *The Political Awakening in the Middle East.* **Internat. J.** 26, no. 3 (1971) 612-3. (W. Cleveland).

31071 LEWIS, S. *Economic Policy and Industrial Growth in Pakistan.* **J. Econ. Hist.** 31, no. 2 (Ju '71) 500-2. (M. Bhuiyan).

31072 LITTLE, T. *South Arabia: Arena of conflict.* **Mid. East. Stud.** 7, no. 1 (Ja '71) 111-21. (J. Kelly).

31073 LONGRIGG, S. and J. JANKOWSKI. *The Middle East.* **Islamic Quart.** 14, no. 4 (O-D '70) 254-6. (A. Azim).

31074 LUTFIYYA, A. *Baytin. A Jordanian village. A study of social institutions and social change in a folk community.* **Oriens** 21-22 (1968-69) 512-3. (In German). (H. Nachtigall).

31075 EL MALLAKH, R. *Economic Development and Regional Cooperation: Kuwait.* **Mid. East Internat.** no. 3 (Ju '71) 44. (JG).

31076 MANTRAN, R. *L'Expansion Musulmane (VII^{e}-XI^{e} siècles).* **Muslim World** 61, no. 3 (Jl '71) 218-9. (J. Bodine).

31077 MA'OZ, M. *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine, 1840-1861. The impact of the Tanzimat on politics and society.* **J. A. Hist.** 5, no. 1 (1971) 56-7. (C. Farah).

31078 MARLOWE, J. *Cromer in Egypt.* **Ann. Amer. Acad. Polit. & Soc. Sci.** 396 (Jl '71) 145-6. (J. McDonald); **Afr. Hist. Stud.** 4, no. 1 (1971) 227-9. (R. Tignor).

31079 MARMORSTEIN, E. *Heaven at Bay.* **Islamic Quart.** 14, no. 4 (O-D '70) 254-6. (A. Azim).

31080 MAUMÉ, J.-L. *Situation du Théâtre tunisien.* **IBLA** 34, no. 127 (1971) 194-5. (In French). (A. Mettrop).

31081 McDONOUGH, S. *The Authority of the Past: A study of the three Muslim modernists.* **Muslim World** 61, no. 3 (Jl '71) 220-1. (W. Haddad).

31082 MERAD, A. *Le reformisme musulman en Algerie de 1925 à 1940: essai d'histoire religieuse et sociale.* **Afr. Hist. Stud.** 4, no. 1 (1971) 199-200. (B. Martin).

31083 AL-MESSIRI, A. *A Lover from Palestine and Other Poems.* **Muslim World** 61, no. 3 (Jl '71) 213-5. (R. Allen).

31084 MITCHELL, C. *Having been a Soldier.* **Mid. East. Stud.** 7, no. 1 (Ja '71) 111-21. (J. Kelly).

31085 MONROE, J., tr. *The Shu'ūbiyya in al-Andalus.* **BSOAS** 34, pt. 2 (1971) 407-8. (M. Brett).

31086 MOORE, C. *Politics in North Africa.* **World Aff.** 134, no. 1 (1971) 82-4. (M. Tessler); **Afr. Report** 16, no. 6 (Ju '71) 36-7. (I. Zartman).

31087 NAIMY, N. *Mikhail Naimy: An introduction.* **Muslim World** 61, no. 2 (Ap '71) 129-31. (I. Boullata).

31088 NICHOLSON, R. *Studies in Islamic Poetry.* **Internat. J. Mid. East Stud.** 2, no. 3 (Jl '71) 281-2. (G. Von Grunebaum).

31089 O'BALLANCE, E. *The War in the Yemen.* **New Mid. East** no. 33 (Ju '71) 42-3. (E. Macro).

31090 ORTZEN, L. *North African Writing.* **Internat. J. Mid. East Stud.** 2, no. 3 (Jl '71) 283-4. (J. Seddon).

31091 OTTAWAY, D. and M. *Algeria: The politics of a socialist revolution.* **Afr. Report** 16, no. 6 (Ju '71) 37-8. (T. Morris); **Muslim World** 61, no. 2 (Ap '71) 137-8. (A. Heggoy).

31092 OWEN, E. *Cotton and the Egyptian Economy, 1820-1914: A study in trade and development.* **Amer. Hist. Rev.** 76, no. 3 (Ju '71) 810-1. (J. Ruedy).

31093 PAKDAMAN, H. *Djamal-El-Din Assad Abadi dit Afghani.* **Mid. East. Stud.** 7, no. 2 (My '71) 260-4. (E. Kedourie).

31094 PATAI, T. *Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel.* **Mid. East Internat.** no. 4 (Jl '71) 47-8. (M. Selzer).

31095 PELT, A. *Libyan Independence and the United Nations: A case of planned decolonization.* **MEJ** 25, no. 2 (1971) 252-3. (H. Villard); **Internat. Rel.** 3, no. 11 (My '71) 946.

31096 PERETZ, D. *et al. A Palestine Entity?* **MEJ** 25, no. 2 (1971) 259-60. (R. Dekmejian).

31097 PERL, M., tr. AMIN, S. *The Maghreb in the Modern World.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,617 (Ju 25 '71) 730.

31098 PERLMAN, M., ed. SA'D B. MANṢŪR IBN KAMMŪNA. *Examination of the Inquiries into the Three Faiths. A thirteenth-century essay in comparative religions.* **Oriens** 21-22 (1968-69) 440-1. (In German). (E. Dietrich).

31099 PIAMENTA, M. *Studies of the Syntax of Palestinian Arabic.* **Archiv O.** 39, no. 2 (1971) 235-6. (K. Petraček).

31100 POLK, W. and R. CHAMBERS, eds. *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The nineteenth century.* **Polit. Sci. Quart.** 86, no. 2 (Ju '71) 364-6. (N. Keddie).

31101 POUND, O. *Arabic and Persian Poems in English.* **Muslim World** 61, no. 3 (Jl '71) 213-5. (R. Allen).

31102 QUANDT, W. *Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1968.* **Afr. Report** 16, no. 6 (Ju '71) 37-8. (T. Morris); **Muslim World** 61, no. 2 (Ap '71) 136-7. (A. Heggoy); **Internat. Aff.** (London) 47, no. 2 (Ap '71) 434. (E. Alport).

31103 RAPER, A. *et al. Rural Development in Action: The comprehensive experiment at Comilla, East Pakistan.* **Rural Sociol.** 36, no. 2 (Ju '71) 236-7. (E. Erickson); **Pacific Aff.** 44, no. 1 (1971) 137-8. (W. Klatt).

31104 RAWLINSON, H. *England and Russia in the East.* **J. A. Stud.** 30, no. 3 (My '71) 694-6. (E. Widmer).

31105 REISMAN, M. *The Art of the Possible: Diplomatic alternatives in the Middle East.* **Harvard Internat. Law J.** 12, no. 2 (1971) 366-7. (R. Fisher); **O. Mod.** 50, no. 9 (S '70) 593-4. (In Italian). (P. Giovanni Dononi).

31106 REYCHMAN, J. and A. ZAJACZKOWSKI. *Handbook of Ottoman-Turkish diplomatics.* **BSOAS** 34, pt. 2 (1971) 410-1. (S. Skilliter).

31107 RUSSELL, R. and K. ISLAM, trs. and eds. *Ghalib: 1797-1869, I: Life and letters.* **J. A. Stud.** 30, no. 3 (My '71) 714-6. (G. Narang).

31108 SACHAR, H. *The Emergence of the Middle East: 1914-1924.* **Internat. Aff.** (GB) 47, no. 2 (Ap '71) 432-3. (R. Burrell).

31109 SAMUEL, E. *A life time in Jerusalem.* **Polit. Etrangère** 36, no. 3 (1971) 327-9. (In French). (R. Levy).

31110 SCHAM, A. *Lyautey in Morocco: Protectorate administration 1912-1925.* **Muslim World** 61, no. 3 (Jl '71) 224-5. (J. Cooke).

31111 SCHUON, F. *Dimensions of Islam.* **Islamic Rev. & Arab Aff.** 59, no. 1 (Ja '71) 38. (S. Tufail).

31112 SEGAL, J. *Edessa, "the blessed city."* **BSOAS** 34, pt. 2 (1971) 397-9. (S. Brock).

31113 SELZER, M. *The Wineskin and the Wizard.* **MEJ** 25, no. 1 (1971) 109-10. (A. Taylor).

31114 SHABAN, M. *The 'Abbāsid Revolution.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,617 (Ju 25 '71) 730.

31115 SHARABI, H. *Arab Intellectuals and the West: The formative years, 1875-1914.* **Amer. Hist. Rev.** 76, no. 3 (Ju '71) 811-2. (E. Burke); **Muslim World** 61, no. 3 (Jl '71) 221-3. (J. Bodine).

31116 SIDDIQI, N. *Land Revenue Administration under the Mughals (1700-1750).* **BSOAS** 34, pt. 2 (1971) 417-8. (S. Digby); **A. Aff.** 58, pt. 2 (Ju '71) 210. (M. Zinkin).

31117 SINGH, S. *Pakistan's Foreign Policy.* **Pacific Aff.** 44, no. 1 (1971) 136-7. (R. Wheeler).

31118 SIRONVAL, M. *La formation et la fonction de la monitrice rurale dans le cadre de l'école de la Soukra (Tunisie).* **IBLA** 34, no. 127 (1971) 196-8. (In French). (A. Louis).

31119 SIVAN, E. *L'Islam et la Croisade.* **Bibliotheca O.** 28, nos. 1-2 (Ja-Mr '71) 99-100.

31120 SMIDA, M. *Khereddine, ministre reformateur (1873-1877).* **IBLA** 34, no. 127 (1971) 193-4. (In French). (A. Demeerseman).

31121 SOBHAN, R. *Basic Democracies Works Programme and Rural Development in East Pakistan.* **J. Admin. Overseas** 10, no. 1 (Ja '71) 55-60. (A. Pickering).

31122 STEIN, L. and G. YOGEV, eds. *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, Series A: Letters, Vol. I: 1885 - 29 October 1902.* **Polit. Sci. Quart.** 86, no. 2 (Ju '71) 359-62. (S. Baron).

31123 STEWART, C., ed. PETRIE, J., tr. JULIEN, C.-A. *History of North Africa: Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,623 (Ag 6 '71) 936; **Muslim World** 61, no. 2 (Ap '71) 138-9. (R. Crout).

31124 STOCKING, G. *Middle East Oil. A study in political and economic controversy.* **Mid. East Internat.** no. 3 (Ju '71) 43. (JG).

31125 SYLVESTER, A. *Tunisia.* **Muslim World** 61, no. 2 (Ap '71) 139-40. (M. Mickelsen).

31126 TAYLER, C. *et al. Health Manpower Planning in Turkey: An international research case study.* **Econ. Dev. & Cult. Change** 19, no. 3 (Ap '71) 490-4. (M. Perlman).

31127 TAYLOR, A. and R. TETLIE, eds. *Palestine: A search for truth.* **Muslim World** 61, no. 3 (Jl '71) 215-8. (A. Klieman).

31128 TIBAWI, A. *Modern History of Syria.* **Islamic Quart.** 14, no. 3 (Jl-S '70) 157-8. (M. Adams).

31129 LE TOURNEAU, R. *The Almohad Movement in North Africa in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries.* **J. Econ. & Soc. Hist. O.** 14, pt. 1 (Ap '71) 85. (In French). (R. Arié).

31130 TREVASKIS, K. *Shades of Amber: A south Arabian episode.* **Mid. East. Stud.** 7, no. 1 (Ja '71) 111-21. (J. Kelly).

31131 TREVELYAN, H. *The Middle East in Revolution.* **MEJ** 25, no. 2 (1971) 246-8. (R. Hare); **Internat. Aff.** (GB) 47, no. 2 (Ap '71) 433. (R. Burrell).

31132 TRIMINGHAM, J. *The Sufi Orders in Islam.* **Times Lit. Supp.** no. 3,612 (My 21 '71) 600.

31133 TYNDALL, J. *Death in the Lebanon.* **Mid. East Internat.** no. 3 (Ju '71) 43-4. (CH).

31134 UDOVITCH, A. *Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam.* **J. Econ. & Soc. Hist. O.** 14, pt. 1 (Ap '71) 82-5. (In French). (C. Cahen).

31135 ULE, W. *Der Arabische Sozialismus und der Zeitgenössische Islam.* **MEJ** 25, no. 2 (1971) 249-51. (P. Bechtold).

31136 VALI, F. *Bridge Across the Bosporus: The foreign policy of Turkey.* **World Aff.** 134, no. 1 (1971) 87-9. (N. Stavrou).

31137 VAMBERY, A. *Travels in Central Asia.* **J.A. Stud.** 30, no. 3 (My '71) 694-6. (E. Widmer).

31138 VATIKIOTIS, P. *The Modern History of Egypt.* **MEJ** 25, no. 1 (1971) 100-2. (T. Naff).

31139 VERHAAR, J. *The Verb 'Be' and its Synonyms: Philosophical and grammatical studies, Part 4 Twi/Modern Chinese/Arabic.* **MEJ** 25, no. 1 (1971) 110-2. (C. Ferguson).

31140 WAARDENBURG, J.-J. *Les Universités dans le monde Arabe actuel.* **Muslim World** 61, no. 3 (Jl '71) 221-3. (J. Bodine).

31141 WAGTENDONK, K. *Fasting in the Koran.* **Bibliotheca O.** 28, nos. 1-2 (Ja-Mr '71) 95-6. (S. Goitein).

31142 WALKER, W. and A. VYSAL. *Tales Alive in Turkey.* **Internat. J. Mid. East Stud.** 2, no. 3 (Jl '71) 289-90. (A. Tietze).

31143 WATERBURY, J. *The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan political elite—a study of segmented politics.* **Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev.** 65, no. 2 (Ju '71) 570-1. (C. Moore); **MEJ** 25, no. 1 (1971) 102-3. (S. Schaar); **Mid. East. Stud.** 7, no. 2 (My '71) 251-5. (C. Geertz); **Ann. Amer. Acad. Polit. & Soc. Sci.** 395 (My '71) 207-8. (N. Barbour).

31144 WATERFIELD, G., ed. *Letters from Egypt, 1862-1869 by Lady Duff Gordon.* **Afr. Hist. Stud.** 4, no. 1 (1971) 227-9. (R. Tignor).

31145 WATERFIELD, G. *Sultans of Aden.* **MEJ** 25, no. 1 (1971) 99-100. (D. Watt).

31146 WEBER, F. *Eagles on the Crescent: Germany, Austria, and the diplomacy of the Turkish alliance, 1914-1918.* **MEJ** 25, no. 1 (1971) 108-9. (L. Evans).

31147 WHEELER, R. *The Politics of Pakistan: A constitutional quest.* **For. Service J.** 48, no. 6 (Ju '71) 39-40. (E. Cohen).

31148 WILLCOX, F. *In Morocco.* **Washington Post Book World** 5, no. 29 (Jl 18 '71) 5. (D. Ackerman).

31149 WILLNER, D. *Nationbuilding and Community in Israel.* **Polit. Sci. Quart.** 86, no. 2 (Ju '71) 358-9. (B. Halpern).

31150 WINGATE, F. *Mahdism and the Egyptian Sudan.* **Mid. East. Stud.** 7, no. 2 (My '71) 255-7. (G. Sanderson).

31151 WOLF, C. *Garrison Community: A study of an overseas American military colony.* **MEJ** 25, no. 2 (1971) 261-2. (D. Franck).

31152 WRIGHT, J. *Libya.* **Muslim World** 61, no. 2 (Ap '71) 140-1. (A. Heggoy).

31153 YAARI, E. *Strike Terror: The story of Fatah.* **Amer. Zionist** 61, no. 9 (Ju '71) 39-42. (C. Waxman).

ABBREVIATIONS

A., Asia, Asian, Asiatic, Asie, asiatique, etc.
Acad., Academy
Admin., Administration, Administrative
Aff., Affairs
Afr./afr., Africa, African, Afrique, africain, etc.
Amer., American
Ann., Annals, Annales
Annu., Annuaire
Anthrop./anthrop., Anthropology, Anthropological, Anthropologie, anthropologique, etc.
Assoc., Association
AUFS, American Universities Field Staff
B., Bulletin
BSOAS, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies
C., Central
Cah., Cahiers
Com., Communism
Comp., Comparative
Contemp./contemp., Contemporary, contemporain, etc.
Cult., Culture, Cultural
Cur., Current
D., Deutsch, etc.
Dept., Department
Dev., Developing
Develop., Development
East., Eastern
Econ./écon., Economics, Economist, Economic, Économie, économique, etc.
Fak., Fakülte
Fil., Filosofii
For., Foreign
Fr./fr., France, French, français, etc.
G., Gesellschaft
Geog./géog., Geography, Geographic, Geographical, Géographie, géographique, etc.
Hist./hist., History, Historical, Historie, historique
IBLA, Institut des belles Lettres arabes
Inst., Institute, Institut
internac., internacional
Internat./internat., International, international, Internationale, etc.
internaz., internazionale
Ist., Istorii
J., Journal
jur., juridique
Lit., Literature, Literary
Lab., Labor, Labour
M., Morgenländisch, etc.
Mag., Magazine
Maj., Majallah, Majallat
Mid., Middle
Mod./mod., Modern, moderne, moderno
Nr., Near
O., Orient, Oriental, Orientalia, oriental, oriente, Orientalistczny, etc.
Org., Organization
Pak., Pakistan
Polit./polit., Politics, Political, Politique, politique, Política, etc.
Probs., Problems
Proceed., Proceedings
Quart., Quarterly
R., Royal
Rel., Relations
Res., Research
Rev., Review, Revue, Revista
Riv., Rivista
S., School, Schools
Sci., Science, Sciences, Scienze, etc.
Soc./soc., Society, Social, Sociéte, social, etc.
Sociol./sociol., Sociology, Sociological, Sociologica, Sociologie, sociologique, etc.
Stud., Studies, Studia
Supp., Supplement
Univ., University, Université, etc.
U.S., United States
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Vop., Voprosy
Z., Zeitschrift

LIST OF PERIODICALS UNDER SURVEY

While every attempt has been made to keep the file of periodicals under survey complete and current, readers are advised that not all numbers of each of the periodicals listed below may have been noted in Volume 25 of the *Journal.* Readers wishing detailed information concerning the purchase of subscriptions to—or single issues of—any of the periodicals listed below are invited to write the Bibliography Editor of the *Journal.*

al-Abhāth. Beirut, Lebanon
Acta Geographica. Paris, France
Acta Orientalia. Budapest, Hungary
Acta Sociologica. Copenhagen, Denmark
al-Adīb. Beirut, Lebanon
Africa. London, England
Africa. Rome, Italy
Africa Report. Washington, D. C.
African Affairs. London, England
African Historical Studies. Boston, Massachusetts
African Studies Review. East Lansing, Michigan
Afrique contemporaine. Paris, France
L'Afrique et l'Asie. Paris, France
American Anthropologist. Washington, D. C.
American Economic Review. Evanston, Illinois
American Historical Review. Washington, D. C.
American Journal of Comparative Law. Ann Arbor, Michigan
American Journal of Economics and Sociology. New York, New York

American Journal of International Law. Washington, D. C.
American Journal of Sociology. Chicago, Illinois
American Political Science Review. Washington, D. C.
American Sociological Review. Washington, D. C.
American Universities Field Staff Reports Service: North Africa Series, Northeast Africa Series, South Asia Series, Southwest Asia Series. Hanover, New Hampshire
al-Andalus. Madrid, Spain
Anglo-Jewish Association Quarterly. London, England
Annales: Economies — Sociétés — Civilisations. Paris, France
Annales de Géographie. Paris, France
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Annals of the Association of American Geographers. Los Angeles, California
Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord. Aix-en-Provence, France
Annuaire francais de Droit international. Paris, France
Anthropological Quarterly. Washington, D. C.
Antiquity. Cambridge, England
al-Aqlām. Baghdad, Iraq
Arab Journal. New York, New York
Arab World. New York, New York
al-'Arabī. Kuwayt City, Kuwayt
Arabica. Paris, France
Aramco World Magazine. New York, New York
Archaeology. New York, New York
Archiv Orientalni. Prague, Czechoslovakia
Archives europèenes de Sociologie. Paris, France
Armenian Review. Boston, Massachusetts
Asian Affairs (formerly RCAJ). London, England
Asian and African Studies. Jerusalem, Israel
Asian Economic Review. Hyderabad, India
Asian Review. London, England
Asian Survey. Berkeley, California
L'Asie nouvelle. Paris, France
Atlantic. Boston, Massachusetts
Atlas. New York, New York
Aussenpolitik. Freiburg, Germany
Australian Journal of Politics and History. Brisbane, Australia
Australian Outlook. Victoria Australia
Azii i Afrika Segodnia. Moscow, USSR
Balkan Studies. Thessaloniki, Greece
Balkania. St. Louis, Missouri
Bank of Israel Economic Review. Jerusalem, Israel
Bank Markazi Iran Bulletin. Tehran, Iran
Belleten. Ankara, Turkey
Biblical Archaeologist. Cambridge, Massachusetts
Bibliotheca Orientalis. Leiden, Holland
Bulletin d'Etudes orientales. Damascus, Syria
Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research. Cambridge, Massachusetts
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Chicago, Illinois
Bulletin of the College of Arts. Baghdad, Iraq
Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR. Munich, Germany
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies. London, England
Bustan. Vienna, Austria
Cahiers d'Etudes africaines. Paris, France
Cahiers de Monde russe et soviétique. Paris, France
Cahiers de l'Orient contemporaine. Paris, France
Cahiers d'Outre-Mer. Bordeaux, France
Cahiers internationaux de Sociologie. Paris, France
Cahiers de Tunisie. Tunis, Tunisia
Canada Journal of Economics. Toronto, Canada
Canadian Journal of Political Science. Toronto, Canada
Central Asiatic Journal. Wiesbaden, Germany
Central Bank of Egypt Economic Review. Cairo, Egypt (UAR)
Choice. Chicago, Illinois
Chronique de Politique étrangère. Brussels, Belgium
Civilisations. Brussels, Belgium
Columbia Journal of World Business. New York, New York
Commentary. New York, New York
Communita Mediterranea. Rome, Italy
Comparative Political Studies. Beverly Hills, California
Comparative Politics. Chicago, Illinois
Comparative Studies in Society and History. Ann Arbor, Michigan
Contemporary Review. London, England
Criterion. Karachi, Pakistan
Current Anthropology. Chicago, Illinois
Current History. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Current Sociology. Paris, France
Daedalus. Boston, Massachusetts
Demography. Washington, D. C.
Department of State Bulletin. Washington, D. C.
Developing Economies. Tokyo, Japan
Development and Change. The Hague, Holland
Dirāsāt 'Arabīyah. Beirut, Lebanon
Diskussion. Berlin, Germany
Dispersion and Unity. Jerusalem, Israel
East and West. Rome, Italy
Eastern Churches Review. Oxford, England
Eastern Horizon. Hong Kong
Eastern World. London, England
Economia internazionale. Genoa, Italy
Economic Development and Cultural Change. Chicago, Illinois
Economic Geography. Worchester, Massachusetts
Economic Journal. Cambridge, England
Economica. London, England
Economist. London, England
L'Egypte contemporaine. Cairo, Egypt (UAR)
Ekistics. Athens, Greece
Encounter. London, England

Esprit. Paris, France
Est & Ouest. Paris, France
Estudios Internacionales. Santiago, Chile
Ethnology. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Etudes. Paris, France
Europa Archiv. Bonn, Germany
Europe Sud-Est. Athens, Greece
L'Express. Paris, France
Finance and Development. Washington, D. C.
Focus. New York, New York
Foreign Affairs. New York, New York
Foreign Policy. Washington, D. C.
Foreign Service Journal. Washington, D. C.
Foreign Trade. Warsaw, Poland
Fortune. New York, New York
Free Palestine. Washington, D. C.
Geographical Journal. London, England
Geographical Magazine. London, England
Geographical Review. New York, New York
German Foreign Policy. Berlin, East Germany
Government and Opposition. London, England
Hamizrah Hehadash. Jerusalem, Israel
Harper's Magazine. New York, New York
Harvard International Law Journal. Cambridge, Massachusetts
Hespéris-Tamuda. Rabat, Morocco
Historical Journal. London, England
L'Homme: Revue francaise d'Anthropologie. Paris, France
Horizon. New York, New York
Human Organization. Lexington, Kentucky
Human Relations. New York, New York
IBLA. Tunis, Tunisia
India Quarterly. New Delhi, India
Industrial and Labor Relations Review. Ithaca, New York
International Affairs. London, England
International Affairs. Moscow, USSR
International and Comparative Law Quarterly. London, England
International Commission of Jurists Review. Geneva, Switzerland
International Conciliation. New York, New York
International Currency Review. London, England
International Development Review. Washington, D. C.
International Journal. Toronto, Canada
International Journal of Comparative Sociology. Toronto, Canada
International Journal of Middle East Studies. Los Angeles, California
International Journal of Politics. White Plains, New York
International Labour Review. Geneva, Switzerland
International Legal Materials. Washington, D. C.
International Migration. The Hague, Holland
International Organization. Boston, Massachusetts
International Relations. London, England
International Review of Administrative Science. Brussels, Belgium
International Review of Community Development. Rome, Italy
International Social Science Journal. Paris, France
International Studies. New Delhi, India
International Studies Quarterly. Detroit, Michigan
Internationale Spectator. The Hague, Holland
Internationales Afrikaforum. Munich, Germany
Interplay. New York, New York
Iran. London, England
Iranian Studies. Los Angeles, California
Der Islam. Hamburg, Germany
Islam and the Modern Age. New Delhi, India
Islamic Culture. Hyderabad, India
Islamic Literature. Lahore, Pakistan
Islamic Quarterly. London, England
Islamic Review and Arab Affairs. London, England
Israel Economist. Jerusalem, Israel
Israel Law Review. Jerusalem, Israel
Jeune Afrique. Paris, France
Jewish Journal of Sociology. London, England
Jewish Observer and Middle East Review. London, England
Jewish Quarterly Review. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Journal Asiatique. Paris, France
Journal of Administration Overseas. London, England
Journal of African History. London, England
Journal of African Law.
Journal of Arabic Literature. Leiden, Holland
Journal of Asian and African Studies. Leiden, Holland
Journal of Asian History. Bloomington, Indiana
Journal of Arabic Literature. Leiden, Holland
Journal of Asian and African Studies. Leiden, Holland
Journal of Asian Studies. Coral Gables, Florida
Journal of Common Market Studies. Oxford, England
Journal of Conflict Resolution. Ann Arbor, Michigan
Journal of Contemporary History. London, England
Journal of Developing Areas. Macomb, Illinois
Journal of Development Studies. London, England
Journal of Economic History. New York, New York
Journal of Economic Literature. Evanston, Illinois
Journal of Geography. River Forest, Illinois
Journal of International Affairs. New York, New York
Journal of International Law and Economics. Washington, D. C.
Journal of Marriage and the Family. University Park, Pennsylvania
Journal of Modern African Studies. Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
Journal of Modern History. Chicago, Illinois
Journal of Peace Research. Oslo, Norway

Journal of Political Economy. Chicago, Illinois
Journal of Politics. Gainesville, Florida
Journal of Social Psychology. Provincetown, Massachusetts
Journal of the American Oriental Society. New Haven, Connecticut
Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient. Paris, France
Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society. Karachi, Pakistan
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society. London, England
Journal of World History. Paris, France
Kirjath Sepher. Jerusalem, Israel
al-Kulliyah. Beirut, Lebanon
Kurdish Journal. Langley Park, Maryland
Kyklos. Basel, Switzerland
Law and Contemporary Problems. Durham, North Carolina
Levante. Rome, Italy
Literature East and West. New Paltz, New York
Mahfil. East Lansing, Michigan
Majallat al-Akhbār al-Durzīyah. Jerusalem, Israel
Majallat al-Akhbār al-Islāmīyah. Jerusalem, Israel
Majallat al-Shu'ūn al-Sūfyātīyah. Munich, Germany
Majallat Majma‘ al-Lughah al-‘Arabīyah fī Dimashq. Damascus, Syria
Man. London, England
Marches tropicaux et mediterrannéens. Paris, France
al-Ma‘rifah. Damascus, Syria
al-Mashriq. Beirut, Lebanon
Mélanges de l'Institut dominicain d'Etudes orientales. Cairo, Egypt (UAR)
METU Studies in Development. Ankara, Turkey
Mid East. Washington, D. C.
Middle East Forum. Beirut, Lebanon
Middle East Information Series. New York, New York
Middle East International. London, England
Middle East Journal. Washington, D. C.
Middle East Newsletter. Beirut, Lebanon
Middle East Studies Association Bulletin. New York, New York
Middle Eastern Studies. London, England
Midstream. New York, New York
Military Review. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Milletlerarasi Münasebetler Türk Yilligi — The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations. Ankara, Turkey
Miscelanea de Estudios arabes y hebraicos. Granada, Spain
Mizan. London, England
Modern African Studies.
Modern Asia Studies. Cambridge, England
Monthly Review. New York, New York
Muslim World. Hartford, Connecticut
Narodi Azii i Afriki. Moscow, USSR
National Bank of Egypt Economic Bulletin. Cairo, Egypt (UAR)
National Geographic. Washington, D. C.
Naval War College Review. Carlisle, Pennsylvania
New Left Review. London, England
New Middle East. London, England
New Outlook. Tel Aviv, Israel
Orbis. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Oriens. Frankfurt, Germany
Orient. Opladen, Germany
Orient. Paris, France
Oriental Economist. Tokyo, Japan
Oriental Geographer. Dacca, Pakistan
Oriente moderno. Rome, Italy
Osteuropa. Köln, Germany
Pacific Affairs. Vancouver, Canada
Pakistan Development Review. Karachi, Pakistan
Pakistan Horizon. Karachi, Pakistan
Pakistan Journal of Forestry. Peshewar, Pakistan
Pakistan Quarterly. Karachi, Pakistan
Political Affairs. New York, New York
Political Quarterly. London, England
Political Science Quarterly. New York, New York
Political Studies. Reading, England
Il Politico. Pavia, Italy
Politique étrangère. Paris, France
Population. Paris, France
Population Studies. London, England
Problems of Communism. Washington, D. C.
Problems of Economics. White Plains, New York
Przeglad Orientalistyczny. Warsaw, Poland
Public Administration. London, England
Race. London, England
Rahnema-Ye Ketab. Tehran, Iran
Review of International Affairs. Belgrade, Yugoslavia
Review of Politics. Notre Dame, Indiana
Revista de Politica Internacional. Madrid, Spain
Revue algérienne des sciences juridiques, économiques et politiques. Algiers, Algeria
Revue belge de Droit international. Brussels, Belgium
Revue de Défense nationale. Paris, France
Revue de Géographie de Lyon. Lyon, France
Revue d'Histoire et de Civilisation du Maghreb. Algiers, Algeria
Revue économique et sociale. Lausanne, Switzerland
Revue égyptienne de Droit international. Cairo, Egypt (UAR)
Revue francaise d'Etudes politique africaines. Paris, France
Revue francaise de Science politique. Paris, France
Revue francaise de Sociologie. Paris, France
Revue générale de Droit international public. Paris, France
Revue d'Histoire moderne et contemporaine. Paris, France

Revue historique. Paris, France
Revue internationale de Droit comparé. Paris, France
Revue juridique et politique. Paris, France
Revue Tiers-Monde. Paris, France
Rivista degli Studi orientali. Rome, Italy
Rivista di Studi politici internazionale. Florence, Italy
Rocznik Orientalistyczny. Warsaw, Poland
Round Table. London, England
Rural Sociology. Madison, Wisconsin
Russian Review. Stanford, California
Social Forces. Chapel Hill, North Carolina
Social Research. Albany, New York
Social Science Information. Paris, France
Sociological Quarterly. Columbia, Missouri
Sociological Review. Keele, England
Sociology and Social Research. Los Angeles, California
South Asian Review. London, England
Southwestern Journal of Anthropology. Albuquerque, New Mexico
Soviet Studies. Glasgow, Scotland
lo Spettatore internazionale. Bologna, Italy
Sprawy Miedzynarodowe. Warsaw, Poland
Stratégie. Paris, France
Studia Islamica. Vanves, France and New York, New York
Studies in Islam. New Delhi, India
Survey. London, England
Swiss Review of World Affairs. Zurich, Switzerland
Tarbiz. Jerusalem, Israel
Technion. Haifa, Israel
Technology and Culture. Chicago, Illinois
Les Temps modernes. Paris, France
Thaqāfat al-Hind. New Delhi, India
Times Literary Supplement. London, England
Türk Dili. Istanbul, Turkey
Türk Kült ürü. Ankara, Turkey
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings. Annapolis, Maryland
Venture. London, England
Vieterljahresberichte. Bad Godesberg, Germany
Voprosy Filosofii. Moscow, USSR
Voprosy Istorii. Moscow, USSR
Die Welt des Islams. Bonn, Germany
Western Political Quarterly. Salt Lake City, Utah
Wiener Library Bulletin. London, England
Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes. Vienna, Austria
World Affairs. Washington, D. C.
World Marxist Review. Toronto, Canada
World Marxist Review Information Bulletin. Toronto, Canada
World Politics. Princeton, New Jersey
World Today. London, England
Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft. Munich, Germany

NEW FROM YALE

Land Beyond the Rivers

The Southern Sudan, 1898-1918

by Robert O. Collins

The author examines in detail the interactions of the British officers, Arabs, merchants, missionaries, and, most important, the African peoples who had over the centuries constructed a complex society to meet the needs of a harsh environment and saw it jeopardized and destroyed by alien invaders. The story of these groups as they faced the land and river they wanted to conquer or defend is the basis of an exciting and absorbing historical narrative. **$12.50**

Political Roles in a New State

Tanzania's First Decade

by Raymond F. Hopkins

This study examines Tanzania's political system as reflected in the character of role expectations among the elite. The author makes a significant contribution, both in his methodology and in his findings, to political science as well as to our understanding of an African society. **$12.50**

Memoirs of a Russian Diplomat: Outposts of the Empire, 1893-1917

by Andrew D. Kalmykow

With rare scholarly objectivity Andrew D. Kalmykow relates his life in Russia and his diplomatic service in the Far, Middle, and Near East and the Balkans. His numerous diplomatic achievements and adventures are recounted with wit and erudtion, bringing to life a neglected era of Russian international history. **$12.50**

Structural Change and Economic Policy in Israel

by Howard Pack

In its first twenty years, Israel has rapidly transformed its relatively underdeveloped economy to one which, by the late 1960s, was at a level similar to some of the nations of Western Europe. Howard Pack explores some of the major dimensions of this growth and then seeks to identify particular aspects of government policy that account for it. He analyzes the growth of productivity for the entire economy as well as particular sectors, giving special attention to the impact of the country's high level of formal education and large-scale immigration.

Published for the Economic Growth Center, Yale University **$9.75**

Plan and Market in Yugoslav Economic Thought

by Deborah D. Milenkovitch

Can a socialist state decentralize and still remain socialist? This is a real question in Yugoslavia, which started to reform its centrally planned model fifteen years earlier than other East European countries and has gone further in expanding the scope of market relations than other socialist countries have even contemplated. Mrs. Milenkovitch analyzes the Yugoslav experience and raises the intriguing question whether the changes are specific to Yugoslavia or whether there are common forces which will compel other socialist countries to follow suit. **$10.00**

Libyan Independence and the United Nations

A Case of Planned Decolonization

by Adrian Pelt

with a Foreword by U Thant

Adrian Pelt served as the U.N. Commissioner during the transition of the Italian colony of Libya to independence in 1950-51. His book records in detail the many political, economic, and social problems inherent in state-building that had to be solved in the course of his mission. ". . . the concern for detail with which the book is written [does not] detract from its generally readable style. For students of the Middle East and those curious about the practical results which can be achieved by an international body functioning in ex-colonial territory . . . its importance is obvious." Henry S. Villard, **The Middle East Journal** **$35.00**

Yale University Press New Haven and London
in Canada: McGill-Queen's University Press

COMMUNICATIONS

The JOURNAL *welcomes comments from its readers. All communications should be addressed to the Editor and bear the full name and address of the writer. A selection of those received will be published periodically in these columns. In addition to letters of comment on previous articles, communications on other information of interest will be printed as space is available.*

Sir,

Professor Elie Kedourie's scholarly reputation is secure, and in any case requires little defense against a reviewer who invites us to compare Professor Kedourie's academic methods with those of the Nazis (sic).

However, the memory of a remarkable statesman whose published writings display both carefulness in his use of sources as well as temperance in his criticism of others does perhaps invite the correction of a gratuitous misrepresentation by Dr. A. L. Tibawi (in his review of Professor Kedourie's "The Chatham House Version" in the M.E.J., Winter 1971) of the views of Sir Herbert Samuel.

Dr. Tibawi writes.

> "Quoting a second-hand reference the author asserts that Herbert Samuel suggested to the British Government in January 1916 'the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.' (p. 52) I have seen the originals of Samuel's two memoranda. Both urge a British protectorate and as a consequence Jewish immigration. But he specifically says 'the time was not ripe' for a Jewish state."

In fact, Samuel made no recorded representations to His Majesty's Government in January 1916 with reference to Palestine or Zionism. The (printed) memoranda of which Dr. Tibawi claims to have seen the "originals" are dated respectively January and March 1915, and are contained in the large collection of Samuel's papers lodged in the Israel State Archives in Jerusalem. I have recently examined these papers and can report that, notwithstanding Dr. Tibawi's claim to acquaintance with first-hand sources, the documents in fact bear out Professor Kedourie's statement that Samuel urged on H.M.G. the establishment of "a Jewish state." In Samuel's contemporary manuscript notes of a conversation with the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, in November 1914, Samuel states explicitly that he suggested "the restoration there of a Jewish State." (I.S.A. 100/0). Samuel's later memoranda, it is true, do reject the ideas of a Jewish state, but the fact that Samuel changed his mind afterwards does not disprove Professor Kedourie's essential contention.

I hope it will not be thought discourteous (let alone Nazi-like) for me to suggest that in future Dr. Tibawi might be a little more careful before accusing others of errors based on "second-hand references"!

BERNARD WASSERSTEIN

Dear Sir:

Thank you for inviting me to reply to the above. 1) The single footnote to page 52, which is printed on page 402, cites one reference only and no original source. It cites John Bowle, *Viscount Samuel,* a book published in 1957. Hence my statement that the author quoted, on the matter under discussion, a second-hand reference is absolutely accurate.

2) The misprint of the date 1915 might have been left without comment. But there is a misunderstanding of the significance of the meaning of the word "printed" in connection with Samuel's memoranda. Many original secret papers were printed at the British Foreign Office to facilitate circulation to ministers. That does not make them any less original or authoritative. They were usually checked and initialled by their writers. Such was the case

with Samuel's two memoranda which, for students working in England, may be more easily seen at the Public Record Office in London without the trouble and expense of travelling to see duplicates elsewhere.

3) A full account of Samuel's private conversation with Grey on 9 November, 1914 may be seen even more easily without much fuss about archives anywhere. It has been published more than a quarter of a century ago by Samuel himself in his *Memoirs,* page 140 f. But the author did not quote this reference. And his defender creates the wrong impression that the words he quotes on the subject are from a hitherto unknown source. At any rate what he quotes is only part of a sentence which reads in full: "Perhaps the opportunity might arise for the fulfillment of the ancient aspirations of the Jewish people and the restoration there of a Jewish state." Hedged with at least three "ifs," Samuel's suggestion was never submitted officially to the British Cabinet. He does not say it was.

4) So far as I know, the British archives contain nothing from Samuel "urging on" the British Cabinet the idea of a Jewish state. On the contrary, the official records show him, two months after the conversation with Grey, ruling out the idea in two memoranda which he did submit to the Cabinet in January and March, 1915. I referred to these memoranda only and quoted Samuel verbatim that "the time was not ripe" for a Jewish state. Where is "the misrepresentation" in that? What "correction" does it invite? Why my statement that I have seen these documents is described as a "claim" (when reference to my published works shows that I have examined thousands of documents in scores of volumes in the British archives on this and related subjects)?

5) As to the one-sided method of writing history, whether practised by the Nazis or others, there is, in addition to the example I gave in a short review, the volume itself to prove it. It cannot be disproved by flattering assertions in favour of the author, still less by unfounded accusations against the reviewer, and least of all by exclamation marks and the like.

6) Having shown that all accusations are unwarranted, need I add that the advice for me to be more careful in future is uncalled for from one with such qualifications?

A. L. TIBAWI
University of London

FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM
1972-1973

The American Research Institute in Turkey offers several fellowships for the academic year 1972-1973. Provision is made for maintenance and for travel allowance to and from Turkey, and may be made for travel within Turkey.

SCHOLARS AND ADVANCED GRADUATE STUDENTS are eligible if they are engaged in research on Turkey in ancient, medieval and modern times, in all fields of the humanities and social sciences. Student applicants must have fulfilled the preliminary requirements for the doctorate. Applicants are expected to be members in good standing of educational or research institutions in the United States and Canada and to submit a suitable research project or program of study.

ACCOMMODATIONS are available at the headquarters of the Institute in Istanbul and in Ankara for single fellows and for married fellows without children. A nominal fee is charged for these accommodations.

APPLICATIONS should be submitted before February 15, 1972, to American Research Institute in Turkey, 1155 East 58th Street, Chicago, Illinois 60637. Application forms are available and the following documentation is required: A curriculum vitae setting forth educational qualifications, present status and professional experience—An outline of the project or study to be pursued in Turkey—A budget of financial means required, specifying travel, maintenance and research expenses—At least three letters of recommendation from suitable authorities.

The Committee on Fellowships and Funds expects to notify applicants of its decisions on or about March 15, 1972.

CENTRAL LIBRARY

INDEX

Volume XXV • 1971

abā'diyyahs, 220
The 'Abbasid Revolution, by M. A. Shaban, reviewed, 542-3
'Abd al-Rahim, Muddathir, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan: A Study in Constitutional and Political Development, 1899-1956,* reviewed, 251-52
'Abdallāh, Khalīfah, 224, 225
Abdel-Malek, Anouar R., *La Pensée Politique Arabe Contemporaine,* reviewed, 253-54
Abdo, Daud A.; *Review:* Bateson, *Structural Continuity in Poetry: A Linguistic Study in Five Pre-Islamic Odes,* 424-25
Abī Sarh, 'Abdallāh ibn Sa'd ibn, 214
Abṭāl al-'Awdah (Heroes of the Return), 193
Abū al-Jāz, Shaykh Khogalī, 219
Abū Deleij, Shaykh 'Alī, 219
Abu Dhabi, 344
Abu-Lughod, Ibrahim, ed., *The Arab-Israeli Confrontation of June, 1967: An Arab Perspective,* reviewed, 417-19
Abū Shara, Shaykh Yūsuf, 219
Abū Sīn, Shaykh 'Awad al-Karīm, 219, 220
al-Ādāb, 492
Aden: *Books on, reviewed,* 99-100
al-Adīb, 492
Afghanistan, 311; *Books on, listed:* 437, 555; *Books on, noted:* 115, 278
Africa, 314
Afrique Action, 207
Afshār, Iraj, and Mojtabā Minovi, *Yād-Nāme-ye Irāni-ye Minorsky,* reviewed, 255-57
Agricultural Bank, of Iran, 334
"Agricultural Cooperatives and Tunisian Development," Part II, by John L. Simmons, 45-57
Ahmad, Feroz, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914,* reviewed, 541-42; *Review:* Ali, *Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power?,* 416-17
Aḥmad Pāshā Abū Widān, 220
Alabama, 191
Alexandria, 323
Algar, Hamid, *Religion and State in Iran, 1785-1906: The Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period,* reviewed, 413-15
Algeria, 201-10; *Books on, listed:* 126, 281, 556; *Books on, reviewed:* 249-51, 537-38
Algerian War, 488
Der Algerische Sozialismus: Eine Dokumentation, ed. by Ursel Clausen, reviewed, 249-51
Algiers, 201, 205, 211
Ali, Tariq, *Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power?,* reviewed, 416-17
Alışar, 358
Allon, Yigal, *The Making of Israel's Army,* reviewed, 537
Alnasrawi, Abbas, "The Changing Pattern of Iraq's Foreign Trade," 481-90
'Alwa, 214, 218
'amarah, 220
Amirs, 328
Amman, 498
amuzeshagh-e herfe'i, 22, 23
Anatolia, 359
"The Anatomy of Violence: Theoretical Reflections on Palestinian Resistance," by Emile A. Nakhleh, 180-200
Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, 212-13, 220-26
'Anjar, 4, 7
Anti-Lebanon Mountains, 1, 2
anti-Semitism, 198, 200
al-Anwar (Lights), 500
Aqaba, 315
The Arab Americans: Studies in Assimilation, ed. by Elaine C. Hagopian and Ann Parden, reviewed, 112-13
Arab identity crisis, discussion of, 495
Arab immigration to Sudan, 213-17
The Arab-Israeli Confrontation of June, 1967: An Arab Perspective, ed. by Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, reviewed, 417-19
Arab-Israeli War, 323
Arab League, 486, 488, 490
Arab nationalism, 188, 523
Arab Nationalist Movement, 500
Arab unity, 523
Arab Socialism: A Documentary Survey, ed. by Sami A. Hanna and George H. Gardner, reviewed, 98-99
Arabs of Palestine, 190, 198-99
Arabs, Islam and the Arab Caliphate in the Early Middle Ages, by E. A. Belyaev, reviewed, 103-04
Arabian Peninsula, economic development, 309-21 *passim; Books on, listed:* 437, 555
Arabic fiction, 491-505
Arabic resistance poetry, 500
Der Arabische Sozialismus und der Zeitgenössische Islam, by Wolfgang Ule, reviewed, 249-51
Arendt, Hannah, 183, 184, 187, 189
al-Armanī, Abū Ṣāliḥ, 214
Armenians, 337
al-'Arabī, 492
Aristotle, 182
Aron, Raymond, 182
Aruri, Naseer, and Edmund Ghareeb, eds., *Enemy of the Sun: Poetry of Palestinian Resistance,* reviewed, 422-23
al-Asa'd, Kamal, 11-12

al-'Aṣifah, 193, 498
Aswan, 214
al-Aswānī, ibn Salīm, 214
Atatürk, 337-39 *passim*
Atiyeh, George N.; *Review:* Belyaev, *Arabs, Islam and the Arab Caliphate in the Early Middle Ages,* 103-04
Auschwitz, 502
The Autobiography of Nahum Goldmann: Sixty Years of Jewish Life, reviewed, 257-58
Awad, Mohammed Hashim, "The Evolution of Landownership in the Sudan," 212-28
Awwālī River, 7-8, 9, 12-13, 14
Ayub Khan, 465; the changing political philosophy of, 475
Ayyūbids, 216
Azerbaijan, 328, 332
'Azzām, Samīrah, 492

Baghdad, 214, 323
Bagley, F. R. C.; *Review:* Minovi and Afshār, *Yād-Nāme-ye Irānī-ye Minorsky,* 255-57
Bakhtiari, 325-35 *passim*
Ba'labakk, 2
Baluch, 326-35 *passim*
Baluchistan, 328, 332
Bandar Abbas, 344
Bank for Agricultural, Industrial, and Real Estate Credit (BAIRC), Lebanon, 43
Banque de Syrie et du Liban (BSL), 38
Barakāt, Ḥalim, 492
Baring, Evelyn (1st Earl of Cromer), 222
Bartsch, William H., "The Industrial Labor Force of Iran: Problems of Recruitment, Training and Productivity," 15-30; *Problems in Employment Creation in Iran,* reviewed, 533-34
Başgöz, Ilhan, and Howard E. Wilson, *Educational Problems in Turkey, 1920-1940,* reviewed, 260-61
Basle Platform, 198
Bateson, Mary Catherine, *Structural Continuity in Poetry: A Linguistic Study in Five Pre-Islamic Arabic Odes,* reviewed, 424-25
al-Ba'thi, Ibrāhīm, 504
Baṭrūn, 12
Bean, Lee L.; *Review,* Bartsch, *Problems in Employment Creation in Iran,* 533-34
Bechar, 201
Bechtold, Peter; *Reviews:* Clausen, ed., *Der Algerische Sozialismus: Eine Dokumentation;* Didden, *Irāk—Eine Sozio-Ökonomische Betrachtung;* Hachem, *Libanon—Sozio-Ökonomische Grundlagen;* Ule, *Der Arabische Sozialismus und der Zeitgenössische Islam,* 249-51
Beeley, Brian, *Review,* Hinderink, *Social Stratification as an Obstacle to Development,* 421-22
Beirut, 12-13, 491
Beja tribes, 214, 216
Belgium, 32
Belgrade, 210
Belyaev, E. A., *Arabs, Islam and the Arab Caliphate in the Early Middle Ages,* reviewed, 103-04
Ben Bella, Ahmed, 207
Ben Salah, Ahmed, 51-55
ben Yahmed, Bechir, 53
Ben Youssef, Salah, 210
Benghazi, 523
Bernstein, Marver H.; *Review:* Perlmutter, *Military and Politics in Israel: Nation-Building and Role Expansion,* 415-16
Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali, 465; charismatic leadership of, 480
Bir Romane, 205, 206, 208; *map,* 204
Biqā' Valley, 1-11 *passim*
Bīṭār, Nadīm: *Review Article:* "Development: A Process of Social Change and Revolutionary Transition, The Theory of Nadīm Bīṭār," by Tareq Y. Ismael, 91-97
Bizerta, 203, 206, 207-11
"The Bizerta Crisis: A Bourguibist Attempt to Resolve Tunisia's Border Problems," by Werner Klaus Ruf, 201-11
Black Skin, White Masks, 186
Blue Nile Province, 215, 220, 223
Bosworth, E. C.; *Review:* Kissling, *et al., The Muslim World, A Historical Survey.* Part III. *The Last Great Muslim Empires,* 106-07
Boumediene, Houari, 201
Bourguiba, Habib, 45, 50, 51, 53-54, 55, 201-11
Bourguibism, 201-11
Britain, 311
British interests in Sudan, 225
Bulgaria, 486
Bulliet, Richard W., *Review:* Shaban, *The 'Abbasid Revolution,* 542-43
Burki, Shahid Javid, *Article:* "Social and Economic Determinants of Political Violence: A Case Study of the Punjab," 465-80
Büyük Ankara Hotel, 353
Büyük Efes Hotel, 352

Cahen, Claude, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey: A General Survey of the Material and Spiritual Culture and History, 1071-1330,* reviewed, 262-67
Cairo, 323, 504, 505
The Cambridge History of Islam. Vol. I: *The Central Islamic Lands.* Vol. II: *The Further Islamic Lands, Islamic Society and Civilization,* ed. by P. M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton and Bernard Lewis, reviewed, 104-06.
Campbell, John C.; *Review:* Klieman, *Soviet Russia and the Middle East,* 248-49
Campbellpur, 478
Cantori, Louis J., *Review:* Moore, *Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia,* 537-38
Cap Bon, 54
Carey, Andrew Galbraith, and Jane Perry Clark Carey, "Turkish Industry and the Five Year Plans," 337-54
Carey, Jane Perry Clark, and Andrew Galbraith

Carey, "Turkish Industry and the Five Year Plans," 337-54
Casablanca, 201
Caucasus, 328
Central Asia, *Books on, listed,* 437
Central Bank, Lebanon, 32, 34, 35, 36, 42, 43, 44
Central Bank, Tunisia, 53
Chad, 216
Chaliand, Gerard, 194
Chambers, Richard L.; *Review:* Itzkowitz and Mote, tr. and an., *Mubadele: An Ottoman-Russian Exchange of Ambassadors,* 412
The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern Studies, by Elie Kedourie, reviewed, 108
Christians, 188, 200
Clausen, Ursel, ed., *Der Algerische Sozialismus: Eine Dokumentation,* reviewed, 249-51
von Clausewitz, Karl, 182
Code for Money and Credit, Lebanon, 31, 44
Cohen, Aharon, *Israel and the Arab World,* reviewed, 534-36
Cohn, Edwin J., *Turkish Economic, Social and Political Change,* reviewed, 540-41
Colombia, 318
The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite: A Study in Segmented Politics, by John Waterbury, reviewed, 102-03
Common Market, 346, 349, 488, 489
Commission for Banks' Supervision, Lebanon, 43
The Communist Manifesto, 182
Copeland, Miles, *The Game of Nations,* reviewed, 97-98
Coup d'état, of October 1958 in Pakistan, 466
Cromer, Lord, *see* Baring
Cromer of Egypt, by John Marlowe, reviewed, 409-10
Crowfoot, J. W., 213
Curtis, Michael; *Review:* Naamani, Rudavsky and Katsh, *Israel Through the Eyes of Its Leaders,* 536
Cyprus: *Books on, listed:* 125, 280, 438-39, 556
Czechoslovakia, 486

dahawa, 220
dajjajah, 220
Damascus, 500
Damis, John; *Review:* Hall, *The United States and Morocco,* 538-39
Dammam, 315
dammur thaubs, 220
dār, 216-17, 218, 219
Dār Ḥāmid, 218
Dār al-Hilāl, 504
Davis, Fanny, *The Palace of Topkapi in Istanbul,* reviewed, 420-21
de Gaulle, Charles, 206-07, 209-10, 211
Dekmejian, Richard H.; *Review:* Peretz, Wilson and Ward, *A Palestine Entity?,* 259-60
Demir ve Çelik Işletmeleri, 348
Democratic Party, in Turkey, 339
Department of Encouragement and Implementation, in Turkey, 340, 343, 347, 352
"Development: A Process of Social Change and Revolutionary Transition, The Theory of Nadīm Bīṭār," by Tareq Y. Ismael, 91-97
Development Bank, of Turkey, 350
Didden, Horst, *Irak—Eine Sozio-Ökonomische Betrachtung,* reviewed, 249-51
Do It!, 182
Dobell, W. M., 465
Dodd, C. H., and Mary Sales, eds., *Israel and the Arab World,* reviewed, 418-19
Dongowālis, 218
Dubai, 334
dugundi, 220

Eagles on the Crescent: Germany, Austria, and the Diplomacy of the Turkish Alliance, 1914-1918, by Frank G. Weber, reviewed, 108-09
East Bank, 496
East Germany, 486
Eastern Arab World, 500
Eastern Europe, 488, 489
Economic development, in Pakistan, 466
Edjeleh, 206, 208, 209, 210; *map,* 204
Educational Problems in Turkey, 1920-1940, by Ilhan Başgöz and Howard E. Wilson, reviewed, 260-61
Egypt, 212, 214, 221-22, 491; *Books on, listed:* 124-25, 279, 437-38, 555-56; *Books on, noted:* 268-69, 270, 435, 547; *Books on, reviewed:* 100-02, 412-13; *Document:* "The Constitution of the Federation of Arab Republics (FAR)," 506-22
Eilat, 315
Eisenstadt, S. D., *et al., Integration and Development in Israel,* reviewed, 258
The Emergence of the Middle East: 1914-1924, by Howard M. Sachar, reviewed, 410-11
Enemy of the Sun: Poetry of Palestinian Resistance, edited by Naseer Aruri and Edmund Ghareeb, reviewed, 422-23
Engels, Friedrich, 182
Equalization Tax, US, 32
Ereğli, 349
Étatism, 338-39
Ethiopia, 216
Etibank, 338, 341
European Economic Community, 488, 489
European Free Trade Association, 488, 489, 490
European interests in Sudan, 223-24, 226
Evans, Laurence; *Review:* Weber, *Eagles on the Crescent: Germany, Austria, and the Diplomacy of the Turkish Alliance, 1914-1918,* 108-09
Evian, 207
"The Evolution of Landownership in the Sudan," by Mohammed Hashim Awad, 212-28
Export Tax Rebate Commission, of Turkey, 352

Fakhry, Majid, *A History of Islamic Philosophy,* reviewed, 425-26
Fanon, Frantz, 184, 185-86, 187-89
Farmayan, Hafez F.; *Review:* Algar, *Religion and*

State in Iran, 1785-1906: The Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period, 413-15
Fars, 328, 332
Farsoun, Samih K., *Review:* Lutfiyya and Churchill, eds., *Readings in Arab Middle Eastern Societies and Culture,* 427-28
Fatḥ, 181, 187-89, 191-96
Fāṭimids, 216
The Federalist Papers, 182
Federation of Arab Republics (FAR), Constitution of, 523-9
Ferguson, Charles A.; *Review:* Verhaar, *The Verb 'Be' and its Synonyms: Philosophical and Grammatical Studies,* Part 4. *Twi/Modern Chinese/Arabic,* 110-12
Fernea, Elizabeth Warnock, *A View of the Nile: The Story of an American Family in Egypt,* reviewed, 412-13
Fertile Crescent, *Books on, listed:* 438-39, 556
Fisher, Sydney N.; *Review:* Sachar, *The Emergence of the Middle East: 1914-1924,* 410-11
Foreign Legion, 208, 209
Fort Saint, 205, 206, 209; *map,* 204
Fourth Development Plan, Iran, 29
France, 488; Fourth Republic, 203, 211; relations with Tunisia, 203-11; Resistance movement, 184
Franck, Dorothea Seelye; *Review:* Wolf, *Garrison Community: A Study of an Overseas American Military Colony,* 261-62
Franco-Libyan Treaty of August 10, 1955, 205
Frankfurt, 210
From Haven to Conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem Until 1948, ed. by Walid Khalidi, reviewed, 419-20
Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), 206-07, 209, 210
Funj dynasty, 212, 213, 217, 218, 219-20, 221, 226

gadah, 220
Gaitskell, A., 224
Galilean Uplands, 1, 2, 8, 11
The Game of Nations, by Miles Copeland, reviewed, 97-98
Garat El Hamel, 205, 206, 208, 209; *map,* 204
Gardner, George H., and Sami A. Hanna, eds., *Arab Socialism: A Documentary Survey,* reviewed, 98-99
garf, 220
Garrison Community: A Study of an Overseas American Military Colony, by Charlotte Wolf, reviewed, 261-62
Gaza, 192
General Investment and Financing Program for State Enterprises, in Turkey, 343
Gendettu pump scheme, 227
Genesis 1948: The First Arab-Israeli War, by Dan Kurzman, reviewed, 539-40
Germany, 32, 498
Gezira plain, 218, 222, 223
Gezira Scheme, 221
Ghadames, 205
Ghattas, Emile, "Lebanon's Financial Crisis in 1966: A Systemic Approach," 31-44
Gibran, Khalil, 505
Goldmann, Nahum, *The Autobiography of Nahum Goldmann: Sixty Years of Jewish Life,* reviewed, 257-58
Goldschmidt, Arthur, Jr.; *Review:* Marlowe, *Cromer of Egypt,* 409-10
Goodman, Lenn Evan; *Review:* Hourani, *Islamic Rationalism: The Ethics of 'Abd al-Jabbar,* 543-45
Gorgan, 332
Grand National Assembly, in Turkey, 344
Greek immigrants to Sudan, 222
Greeks, in Turkey, 337
Green Revolution, 324
"Growth and Structural Change in the Middle East," by Charles Issawi, 309-24
Gujrat, district, 478
Gulick, John; *Review:* Hourani and Stern, *The Islamic City: A Colloquium,* 113-14

Ha'am, Ahad, 199
habous, 46
Hachem, Nabil, *Libanon—Sozio-Ökonomische Grundlagen,* reviewed, 249-51
al-Ḥāfiẓ, Amīn, 497
Haganah, 502
Hagopian, Elaine C. and Ann Parden, eds., *The Arab Americans: Studies in Assimilation,* reviewed, 112-13
Haifa, 501
Hall, Luella J., *The United States and Morocco,* reviewed, 538-39
al-Hammah, 193
Hammarskjöld, Dag, 209
Ḥannā, Jurj, 491
Hanna, Sami I., and George H. Gardner, eds., *Arab Socialism: A Documentary Survey,* reviewed, 98-99
Ḥarakat al-Qawmiyyīn al-'Arab (Movement of Arab Nationalists), 193
Harbottle, Michael, *The Impartial Soldier,* reviewed, 245-46
Hare, Raymond A.; *Review:* Trevelyan, *The Middle East in Revolution,* 246-48
Hart, Jane; *Review:* Davis, *The Palace of Topkapi in Istanbul,* 420-21
Hasanoğlan, 358-369 *passim*
Hassan II, King of Morocco, 201
Hawatimah, Na'if, 193
Herzl, Theodor, 197-99
Higher Banking Commission, Lebanon, 43
ḥikr, 216
al-Hilāl, 492, 505
Hill, A. C. C.; *Review:* Stocking, *Middle East Oil: A Study in Political and Economic Controversy,* 426-27
Hinderink, Jan, *Social Stratification as an Obstacle*

to Development, reviewed, 421-22
A History of Islamic Philosophy, by Majid Fakhry, reviewed, 425-26
Hitti, Philip K.; *Review:* Hagopian and Parden, eds., *The Arab Americans: Studies in Assimilation,* 112-13
Hobbes, Thomas, 182
Hoffman, Abbie, 182
Holt, P. M., Ann K. S. Lambton and Bernard Lewis, eds., *The Cambridge History of Islam,* Vols. I and II, reviewed, 104-06
honarestan-e sanaʿti, 22, 23
Horton, Alan W.; *Review:* Fernea, *A View of the Nile: The Story of an American Family in Egypt,* 412-13
Hourani, A. H., and S. M. Stern, eds., *The Islamic City: A Colloquium,* reviewed, 113-14
Hourani, George, *Islamic Rationalism: The Ethics of ʿAbd al-Jabbar,* reviewed, 543-45
Howard, Harry N.; *Review:* Khalidi, ed., *From Haven to Conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem Until 1948,* 419-20
Hudayda, 315
Hudson, James, "The Līṭānī River of Lebanon: An Example of Middle Eastern Water Development," 1-14
al-Ḥurrīyah (Freedom), 500
Ḥusaynīs, 190

ibn Khaldūn, 215
The Impartial Soldier, by Michael Harbottle, reviewed, 245-46
Imperialism, 523
Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan: A Study in Constitutional and Political Development, 1899-1956, by Muddathir ʿAbd al-Rahim, reviewed, 251-52
India, 314, 318, 322; displaced artisans from, in Pakistan, 478; war with Pakistan, 1965, 475
Indonesia, 322
Industrial and Investment Bank, of Turkey, 350
Industrial Development Bank, of Turkey, 348, 350
"The Industrial Labor Force of Iran: Problems of Recruitment, Training and Productivity," by William H. Bartsch, 15-30
Industrial Management Institute, Iran, 19
Integration and Development in Israel, ed. by S. D. Eisenstadt *et al.,* reviewed, 258
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 53, 311, 348
Intra Bank, 42-43
Irak—Eine Sozio-Ökonomische Betrachtung, by Horst Didden, reviewed, 249-51
Iran: economic development, 309-21 *passim; Articles:* "The Industrial Labor Force of Iran: Problems of Recruitment, Training and Productivity," by William H. Bartsch, 15-30; "National Integration of the Tribes in Modern Iran," by Philip C. Salzman, 325-36; *Books on, listed:* 122, 278, 437, 555; *Books on, noted:* 270; *Books on, reviewed:* 254-57, 413-15, 533-34
Iraq, 212, economic development, 309-21 *passim; Article:* "The Changing Pattern of Iraq's Foreign Trade," by Abbas Alnasrawi, 481-90; *Books on, listed:* 125, 279-80, 556; *Books on, noted:* 434, 547; *Books on, reviewed:* 249-51; *Modern History Review:* "The United States and the 1940-1941 Anglo-Iraqi Crisis," by James A. Thorpe, 79-89
Iskenderun, 315
Islam and the Trade of Asia, ed. by D. S. Richards, reviewed, 411-12
The Islamic City: A Colloquium, ed. by A. H. Hourani and S. M. Stern, reviewed, 113-14
Islamic Surveys, No. 8: Bell's Introduction to the Qurʾan, by W. Montgomery Watt, reviewed, 545-47
Islamic Rationalism: The Ethics of ʿAbd al-Jabbar, by George F. Hourani, reviewed, 543-45
Ismael, Tareq Y., "Development: A Process of Social Change and Revolutionary Transition, The Theory of Nadīm Bīṭār," 91-97; *Review:* Abdel-Malek, *La Pensée Politique Arabe Contemporaine,* 253-54
isolated state theory, 355-69 *passim*
Israel, 13-14, 187, 188, 189, 193, 199; economic development, 309-21 *passim;* ideological position of, 495; napalm attacks by, 496; *Books on, listed:* 125-26, 280-81, 439-40, 556; *Books on, noted:* 267, 268-69, 276, 430-31, 433, 547, 550-52; *Books on, reviewed:* 257-58, 415-16, 534-37; *Documents on, listed:* 554
Israel and the Arab World, by Aharon Cohen, reviewed, 534-36
Israel and the Arab World, ed. by C. H. Dodd and Mary Sales, reviewed, 418-19
Israel Through the Eyes of Its Leaders, by Israel T. Naamani, David Rudavsky and Abraham I. Katsh, reviewed, 536
Issawi, Charles, "Growth and Structural Change in the Middle East," 309-24
Istanbul, 323
Itzkowitz, Norman, and Max Mote, tr. and an., *Mubadele: An Ottoman-Russian Exchange of Ambassadors,* reviewed, 412

Jaʿāliyīn, 218
Jaffa, 502
Japan, 322, 488
Jerusalem, 498; *Books on, noted:* 549
Jeune Afrique, 53
Jewish Agency, 501
The Jewish State, 197-98
Jews, 188, 197-98, 199, 200, 501; in Turkey, 337
Jhuhum, 478
Jibrīl Group, 193
Jiddah, 315
Johnston, Scott D.; *Review:* Kurzman, *Genesis 1948: The First Arab-Israeli War,* 539-40
Jordan, 187, 189, 192, 502; army and guerrilla

groups in, 505; economic development, 309-21 *passim; Books on, noted:* 268-69, 270
Jordan River, 13
Judaism, 198
Juhaynah tribe, 214, 216

Kanafānī, Ghassān, 492, 500, 501, 502, 503
al-Karamah, 193
Kedourie, Elie, *The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern Studies,* reviewed, 108
Keita, Modibo, 207
Kenny, Lorne M.; *Review:* Watt, *Islamic Surveys, Vol. 8: Bell's Introduction to the Qur'an,* 545-47
Kenya, 318
Kerman, 334
Kerr, Malcolm H.; *Review:* Hanna and Gardner, eds., *Arab Socialism: A Documentary Survey,* 98-99
Khalidi, Walid, ed., *From Haven to Conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem Until 1948,* reviewed, 419-20
Khamseh, 325
Khans, 328
kharāj, 216, 219
Khardalī, 9, 13
Kharṭūm Province, 215
Khash, 332, 334
Khordestan, 328
khums, 220, 221
Khuzistan, 328, 332
kifāyat yad, 217
Kirk, George; *Review:* Richards, ed., *Islam and the Trade of Asia,* 411-12
Kissling, H. J., *et al., The Muslim World, A Historical Survey.* Part III. *The Last Great Muslim Empires,* reviewed, 106-07
Kitchener, Horatio Herbert, 1st Earl of, 224
Klieman, Aaron S., *Soviet Russia and the Middle East,* reviewed, 248-49; *Review:* Cohen, *Israel and the Arab World,* 534-36
Kortepeter, Carl Max; *Review:* Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey: A General Survey of the Material and Spiritual Culture and History, 1071-1330,* 262-67
Koury, Enver M., *The Patterns of Mass Movements in Arab Revolutionary-Progressive States,* reviewed, 532-33
Kurzman, Dan, *Genesis 1948: The First Arab-Israeli War,* reviewed, 539-40
Kurdistan, 332
Kurds, of Iran, 327-35 *passim*
Kuwayt, 311, 312, 314, 315, 320, 321, 505; *Books on, listed:* 278-79

Labor Law of 1959, Iran, 20
Lahore, 477
Lahore-Lyallpur-Multan triangle, 478
Lake Tiberias, 13
Latakia, 315
Lambton, A. K. S., *The Persian Land Reform, 1926-66,* reviewed, 254-55; P. M. Holt and Bernard Lewis, eds., *The Cambridge History of Islam,* Vols. I and II, reviewed, 104-06
Latin America, 314
League of Nations, 190, 191
Lebanon, 187, 189; economic development, 309-21 *passim;* literature of, 504; *Articles:* "Lebanon's Financial Crisis in 1966: A Systemic Approach," by Emile Ghattas, 31-44; "The Litani River of Lebanon: An Example of Middle Eastern Water Development," by James Hudson, 1-14; *Books on, listed:* 125, 279-80, 556; *Books on, noted:* 269-70, 271; *Books on, reviewed:* 249-51, 531-32
Lebanon Mountains, 1, 2, 7, 9
"Lebanon's Financial Crisis in 1966: A Systemic Approach," by Emile Ghattas, 31-44
LeGassick, Trevor J.; *Article:* "Some Recent War-Related Arabic Fiction," 491-505; *Reviews:* Aruri and Ghareeb, eds., *Enemy of the Sun: Poetry of Palestinian Resistance,* 422-23; al Messiri, *A Lover form Palestine and Other Poems: An Anthology of Palestinian Poetry,* 422-23
Leviathan, 182
Lewis, Bernard, Holt, P. M. and Lambton, Ann K. S., eds., *The Cambridge History of Islam,* Vols. I and II, reviewed, 104-06
Libanon—Sozio-Ökonomische Grundlagen, by Nabil Hachem, reviewed, 249-51
Libya, 322, 523; relations with Tunisia, 205, 206, 208; *Books on, listed:* 124, 276, 279, 437-38, 555-56; *Books on, noted:* 429-30; *Books on, reviewed:* 252-53
Libyan Independence and the United Nations: A Case of Planned Decolonization, by Adrian Pelt, reviewed, 252-53
Līṭānī River system, 1-14
"The Līṭānī River of Lebanon: An Example of Middle Eastern Water Development," by James Hudson, 1-14
Literacy Corps, of Iran, 332, 335
A Lover from Palestine and Other Poems: An Anthology of Palestinian Poetry, by Abdul Wahab Al Messiri, reviewed, 422-23
Lugrin, 207
Luranfar nomads, 325-35 *passim*
Luristan, 328, 332
Lutfiyya, Abdulla M. and Charles W. Churchill, eds., *Readings in Arab Middle Eastern Societies and Culture,* reviewed, 427-28
Luxembourg, 322
Lyallpur, 477

Maghrib, *Books on, listed:* 440, 556
Mahdist rule in Sudan, 213, 218-19, 221, 224-25, 226
Makarra, 214, 216, 218
Makdisi, Samir A., "Syria: Rate of Economic Growth and Fixed Capital Formation 1936-1968," 157-79
The Making of Israel's Army, by Yigal Allon, reviewed, 537

Mamlūks, 216
al-Ma'mūn, Caliph, 214
Maniruzzaman, Talukdar, 466
Manpower Section, Plan Organization, Iran, 24
Markabā, 8, 9, 11
Marj'ayūn, 11
Marlowe, John, *Cromer of Egypt,* reviewed, 409-10
Marshall Plan, 350
Marx, Karl, 183, 189
Marxism, 183, 185, 188, 195
Mashed, 332
Mashkel, 332, 334
masid, 219
Masmoudi, Mohamed, 201, 206, 207, 210
matrūkah, 216
Mauretania, 201
Mazenderan, 328
meks, 219
Mers El Kebir, 210
Al Messiri, Abdul Wahab, *A Lover from Palestine and Other Poems: An Anthology of Palestinian Poetry,* reviewed, 422-23
Mexico, 318
Mianrwali, 478
Middle East, 495; economic development, 309-24
The Middle East in Revolution, by Humphrey Trevelyan, reviewed, 246-48
Middle East Oil: A Study in Political and Economic Controversy, by George W. Stocking, reviewed, 426-27
Military and Politics in Israel: Nation-Building and Role Expansion, by Amos Perlmutter, reviewed, 415-16
Military regime, of Pakistan, 465
Mills, C. Wright, 183-84
Minister for Agriculture, Tunisia, 53
Ministry of Commerce, Turkey, 352
Ministry of Development and Housing, Iran, 332
Ministry of Economy, Iran, 16
Ministry of Education, Iran, 21-22
Ministry of Education, Turkey, 344
Ministry of Finance, Turkey, 343
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Turkey, 344
Ministry of Labor, Iran, 19-21, 27-28
Ministry of Planning, Iraq, 485
Minovi, Mojtabā, and Iraj Afshār, *Yād-Nāme-ye Irāni-ye Minorsky,* reviewed, 255-57
mīrī, 216
Mitchell, William A., "Turkish Villages in Interior Anatolia and von Thünen's 'Isolated State': A Comparative Analysis," 355-69
The Modern Arabic Literary Language: Lexical and Stylistic Developments, by Jaroslav Stetkevych, reviewed, 423-24
The Modern History of Egypt, by P. J. Vatikiotis, reviewed, 100-02
A Modern History of Syria Including Lebanon and Palestine, by A. L. Tibawi, reviewed, 531-32
Modernization, in Pakistan, 466
Mohammed Reza Shah, 329-30
Le Monde Diplomatique, 194
Montesquieu, 182
Moore, Barrington, Jr., 183, 185
Moore, Clement H., *Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia,* reviewed, 537-38
Morgenthau, Hans J., 182, 184
Morocco, 201, 211; *Books on, listed:* 126, 281, 556; *Books on, noted:* 121-22, 271, 435-36; *Books on, reviewed:* 100-02, 538-39
Mote, Max, and Norman Itzkowitz, tr. and an., *Mubadele: An Ottoman-Russian Exchange of Ambassadors,* reviewed, 412
Mubadele: An Ottoman-Russian Exchange of Ambassadors, tr. and an. by Norman Itzkowitz and Max Mote, reviewed, 412
al-Muharrir (Freedom Fighter), 500
mulk, 216
Multan, 477
muqaddams, 219
mushā'a, 217
The Muslim World, A Historical Survey. Part III. *The Last Great Muslim Empires,* by H. J. Kissling, *et al.,* reviewed, 106-07
Muslims, 188, 200, 214, 215, 216

Naamani, Israel T.; *Review: The Autobiography of Nahum Goldmann: Sixty Years of Jewish Life,* 257-58; David Rudavsky and Abraham I. Katsh, *Israel Through the Eyes of Its Leaders,* reviewed, 536
Nabaṭiyah, 1, 2, 11
Naff, Thomas; *Review:* Vatikiotis, *The Modern History of Egypt,* 100-02
Nakhleh, Emile A., "The Anatomy of Violence: Theoretical Reflections on Palestinian Resistance," 180-200
Nashashībīs, 190
Nasr-ed-Din Shah, 328
National Agricultural Bank, Tunisia, 53
National Deposit Insurance Corporation, Lebanon, 43
"National Integration of the Tribes in Modern Iran," by Philip C. Salzman, 325-36
al-Nā'ūrī, 'Īsā, 492
Nazis, 184, 502
Negev, 14
Neo-Destour, 203
Netherlands, 32
Nevile, J. H., 222
New Left, 187
van Nieuwenhuijze, C. A. O.; *Review:* Eisenstadt *et al., Integration and Development in Israel,* 258
Nigeria, 318
Nile River, 214, 216, 217, 222
nomadism, tribes in Iran, 325-35
North Vietnam, 486
North-West Frontier, in Pakistan, 471
Northern Province, Sudan, 215, 222, 227
Nuba hills, 218
Nubia, Christian, 213-15, 226

Office of Tribal Development, Iran, 332

Oman, *Books on, noted:* 120
Omdurman, 224
Ottoman Empire, 337
Ouardanine, 53
Ould Daddah, Mokhtar, 201

Pakistan, 318, 334; *Article:* "Social and Economic Determinants of Political Violence: A Case Study of the Punjab," by Shahid Javed Burki, 465-80; *Books on, listed:* 123-24, 278, 437, 555; *Books on, reviewed:* 416-17
Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power?, by Tariq Ali, reviewed, 416-17
The Pakistan Times, 465
The Palace of Topkapi in Istanbul, by Fanny Davis, reviewed, 420-21
Palestine: A Search for Truth, ed. by Alan R. Taylor and Richard N. Tetlie, reviewed, 418-19
Palestine Armed Struggle Command (PASC), 192
A Palestine Entity?, by Don Peretz, Evan Wilson and Richard J. Ward, reviewed, 259-60
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 192
Palestine Movement of National Liberation, *see Fatḥ*
Palestine problem, 491; *Article:* "The Anatomy of Violence: Theoretical Reflections on Palestinian Resistance," by Emile A. Nakhleh, 180-200; *Books on, listed:* 122, 126-27, 281-82, 440-41, 556-57; *Books on, noted:* 268-69, 273, 547, 551; *Books, on, reviewed:* 259-60, 531-32, 539-40
Palestine refugees, 491
Papanek, Gustav, 475
Parden, Ann, and Elaine C. Hagopian, eds., *The Arab Americans: Studies in Assimilation,* reviewed, 112-13
The Patterns of Mass Movements in Arab Revolutionary-Progressive States, by Enver M. Koury, reviewed, 532-33
Peace and War, 182
Pearson Report, 309, 314, 315, 318
Pelt, Adrian, *Libyan Independence and the United Nations: A Case of Planned Decolonization,* reviewed, 252-53
La Pensée Politique Arabe Contemporaine, ed. by Anouar R. Abdel-Malek, reviewed, 253-54
People's Republic of China, 486, 488, 489
Peretz, Don, Evan Wilson and Richard J. Ward, *A Palestine Entity?,* reviewed, 259-60
Perlmutter, Amos, *Military and Politics in Israel: Nation-Building and Role Expansion,* reviewed, 415-16
"The Permanent Constitution of the Yemen Arab Republic," 389-401
Persian Gulf, 310, 320; *Books on, listed:* 278
The Persian Land Reform 1926-66, by A. K. S. Lambton, reviewed, 254-55
Philippines, 314
Plato, 182
Poland, 486, 501
Politics, 182
Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, by Clement H. Moore, reviewed, 537-38
Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, 193
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), 181, 188-89, 192-96, 500
Portugal, 322
Pre-Ottoman Turkey: A General Survey of the Material and Spiritual Culture and History, 1071-1330, by Claude Cahen, reviewed, 262-67
Problems in Employment Creation in Iran, by William H. Bartsch, reviewed, 533-34
Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA), 207
Puerto Rico, 318
Punjab, area of Pakistan, 467

qāḍīs, 219
Qarrī, 218
Qashqai, 325-35 *passim*
Qāsimīyah, 7, 8, 9
Qir'ūn, 1, 6, 7, 8, 11
al-Quddus, Iḥsān 'Abd, 491

Ra's al-Nāqūrah, 13
Rabī'ah tribe, 214, 216
Ramallah, 501
Rambouillet, 206, 209
Raoof, Abdul H.; *Review:* Abu-Lughod, ed., *The Arab Israeli Confrontation of June, 1967: An Arab Perspective;* Dodd and Sales, eds., *Israel and the Arab World;* Taylor and Tetlie, eds., *Palestine: A Search for Truth,* 417-19
Rawalpindi, 477, 478
Rayāq, 4
Readings in Arab Middle Eastern Societies and Culture, edited by Abdullah M. Lutfiyya and Charles W. Churchill, reviewed, 427-28
Red Sea, 216, 222
Reed, Howard A.; *Review:* Başgöz and Wilson, *Educational Problems in Turkey, 1920-1940,* 260-61
Regionalism, 523
Reich, Bernard; *Reviews:* Allon, Y., *The Making of Israel's Army,* 537; Shapira, A., ed., *The Seventh Day: Soldiers Talk about the Six-Day War,* 537; Stevenson, W., *Zanek!: A Chronicle of the Israeli Air Force,* 537
Religion and State in Iran, 1785-1906: The Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period, by Hamid Algar, reviewed, 413-15
Republic, 182
Revolution for the Hell of It, 182
Reza Shah, 325, 328, 329
Richards, D. S., ed., *Islam and the Trade of Asia,* reviewed, 411-12
Romania, 486
Rosenthal, Erwin; *Reveiw:* Fakhry, *A History of Islamic Philosophy,* 425-26
Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 182
Rubin, Jerry, 182

Ruf, Werner Klaus, "The Bizerta Crisis: A Bourguibist Attempt to Resolve Tunisia's Border Problems," 201-11
Rufā'ah, 220, 221

Sabastia, village of, 496
Sachar, Howard M., *The Emergence of the Middle East: 1914-1924,* reviewed, 410-11
Sahara, 203-04, 206-07, 208, 210
Sahel, 54
Sakaltutan, 358
Sakarya River, 363
Sales, Mary, and C. H. Dodd, eds., *Israel and the Arab World,* reviewed, 418-19
Salzman, Philip C., "National Integration of the Tribes in Modern Iran," 325-36; *Review:* Lambton, *The Persian Land Reform, 1926-66,* 254-55
Samsun, 345
Samu', 192
Sannār, 218, 220
Sardars, 328
Sarhad, 334
Sartre, Jean-Paul, 184, 185-86
Saudi Arabia, economic development, 310-21 *passim; Books on, listed:* 124, 279; *Legal Review:* "Saudi Arabia's Judicial System," by Soliman A. Solaim, 403-07
"Saudi Arabia's Judicial System," *Legal Review,* by Soliman Solaim, 403-07
Schaar, Stuart; *Review:* Waterbury, *The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite: A Study in Segmented Politics,* 102-03
Schmidt, Dana Adams; *Review:* Copeland, *The Game of Nations,* 97-98
Second Development Plan, Iran, 15, 28
Second Republic, Turkey, 339
Sellüloz ve Kâğit, 341
Selzer, Michael, *The Wineskin and the Wizard,* reviewed, 109-10
The Seventh Day: Soldiers Talk about the Six-Day War, Avraham Shapira, ed., reviewed, 537
Shaban, M. A., *The 'Abbasid Revolution,* reviewed, 542-43
Shah Navazi, 333, 334, 335
Shah Savan, 325
Shapira, Avraham, ed., *The Seventh Day: Soldiers Talk about the Six-Day War,* reviewed, 537
Shakkah, 12
sharī'ah, 215
shaykh, 217
Shayqiyyah, 218
Shukriyyah tribe, 219
Sialkot, 477
al-Sibā'i, Yūsuf, 491
Sidon, 11, 12
Sigler, John H.; *Review:* Koury, *The Patterns of Mass Movements in Arab Revolutionary-Progressive States,* 532-33
Simmons, John L., "Agricultural Cooperatives and Tunisian Development," Part II, 45-57
Sinai, campaign of 1956, 501
Sind, 471
Singa, 221
Six Day War, 192
Social Stratification as an Obstacle to Development: A Study of Four Turkish Villages, by Jan Hinderink, reviewed, 421-22
Solaim, Soliman A., "Saudi Arabi's Judicial System, 403-07
South Africa, 495
South Korea, 314
South Yemen, 311
Soviet Russia and the Middle East, by Aaron S. Klieman, reviewed, 248-49
Soviet Union, 311, 338, 341-42, 486, 488, 490; *Books on, noted:* 271-72, 273; *Books on, reviewed:* 248-49
Spagnolo, John P.; *Review:* Tibawi, *A Modern History of Syria Including Lebanon and Palestine,* 531-32
State Economic Enterprises, in Turkey, 342-45
State Investment Bank, in Turkey, 343
State Monopolies Administration, in Turkey, 342
State Office of Industry, in Turkey, 338
State Planning Organization, in Turkey, 343, 347, 352
Stern, S. M., and A. H. Hourani, eds., *The Islamic City: A Colloquium,* reviewed, 113-14
Stetkevych, Jaroslav, *The Modern Arabic Literary Language: Lexical and Stylistic Developments,* reviewed, 423-24
Stevenson, William, *Zanek!: A Chronicle of the Israeli Air Force,* reviewed, 537
Stocking, George W., *Middle East Oil: A Study in Political and Economic Controversy,* reviewed, 426-27
Stowasser, Barbara Freyer, *Review,* Stetkevych, *The Modern Arabic Literary Language: Lexical and Stylistic Developments,* 423-24
Stowasser, Karl; *Review:* Holt, Lambton and Lewis, eds., *The Cambridge History of Islam,* Vols. I and II, 104-06
Structural Continuity in Poetry: A Linguistic Study in Five Pre-Islamic Arabic Odes, by Mary Catherine Bateson, reviewed, 424-25
Sudan, economic development, 309-22 *passim; Article:* "The Evolution of Landownership in the Sudan," by Mohammed Hashim Awad, 212-28; *Books on, listed:* 124-25, 276, 279, 437-38, 555; *Books on, noted:* 275, 434; *Books on, reviewed:* 251-52; *Document:* "The Constitution of the Federation of Arab Republics (FAR)," 506-22
Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 225
Suez Canal, 316, 320
Sultans of Aden, by Gordon Waterfield, reviewed, 99-100
Suleri, Z. A., 465
Sümerbank, 338, 341
Swanson, Glen W.; *Review:* Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress*

in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914, 541-42
Sweden, 32
Switzerland, 32
Syria, 187, 212; economic development, 309-21 *passim; Article:* "Syria: Rate of Economic Growth and Fixed Capital Formation 1936-1968," by Samir A. Makdisi, 157-79; *Books on, listed:* 125, 279-80, 556; *Books on, reviewed:* 531-32; *Document:* "The Constitution of the Federation of Arab Republics (FAR)," 506-22
"Syria: Rate of Economic Growth and Fixed Capital Formation 1936-1968," by Samir A. Makdisi, 157-79
Syrian immigrants to Sudan, 222
Szyliowicz, Joseph S.; *Review:* Cohn, *Turkish Economic, Social and Political Change,* 540-41

Taiwan, 314, 318
Tanzania, 318
Tashkent Agreement, 477
Taylor, Alan R.; *Review:* Selzer, *The Wineskin and the Wizard,* 109-10; and Richard N. Tetlie, eds., *Palestine: A Search for Truth,* reviewed, 418-19
Tehran, 323
Tel Aviv-Jaffa, 315
Terrenoire, Louis, 207
Tetlie, Richard N., and Alan R. Taylor, eds., *Palestine: A Search for Truth,* reviewed, 418-19
Third Development Plan, Iran, 15, 22, 23, 28
Third World, 495
Thorpe, James A., *Modern History Review:* "The United States and the 1940-1941 Anglo-Iraqi Crisis: American Policy in Transition," 79-89
Tibawi, A. L., *A Modern History of Syria Including Lebanon and Palestine,* reviewed, 531-32; *Review:* Kedourie, *The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern Studies,* 108
Tignor, Robert L.; *Review:* Abd al-Rahim, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan: A Study in Constitutional and Political Development, 1899-1956,* 251-52
Tlemcen, 201
Trabzon, 315
Trevelyan, Humphrey, *The Middle East in Revolution,* reviewed, 246-48
tribes, definition, 326
Tripoli, 12, 497
Tunis, 201, 205, 209, 211
Tunisia: *Articles:* "Agricultural Cooperatives and Tunisian Development," Part II, by John L. Simmons, 45-57; "The Bizerta Crisis: A Bourguibist Attempt to Resolve Tunisia's Border Problems," by Werner Klaus Ruf, 201-11; *Books on, listed:* 126, 281, 556
Tunisian-Ottoman Treaty of May 12, 1910, 205
Turkey, economic development, 309-21 *passim;* Five Year Plans, 340-54; *Articles:* "Turkish Industry and the Five Year Plans," by Jane Perry Clark Carey and Andrew Galbraith Carey, 337-54; "Turkish Villages in Interior Anatolia and von Thünen's 'Isolated State': A Comparative Analysis," by William A. Mitchell, 355-69; *Books on, listed:* 123, 127, 276, 282, 441, 557; *Books on, noted:* 274-75, 434-35, 548, 553; *Books on, reviewed:* 108-09, 260-67, 412, 420-22, 540-42
Turkish administration of Sudan, 213, 218, 219, 220, 226
Turkish Economic, Social and Political Change, by Edwin J. Cohn, reviewed, 540-41
"Turkish Industry and the Five Year Plans," by Jane Perry Clark Carey and Andrew Galbraith Carey, 337-54
"Turkish Villages in Interior Anatolia and von Thünen's 'Isolated State': A Comparative Analysis," by William A. Mitchell, 355-69
Türkiye Demir ve Çelik Işletmeleri, 345
Turkmen, 325-35 *passim*

Ule, Wolfgang, *Der Arabische Sozialismus und der Zeitgenössische Islam,* reviewed, 249-51
al-'Umarī, 'Abdallāh, 216
Umayyad Caliphate, 214
United Arab Republic, 486; economic development, 309-24 *passim; see also* Egypt
United Kingdom, 32, 35, 486, 487, 488, 490
United Nations, 191, 209, 211; General Assembly 209; Security Council, 209; *Books on, noted:* 552-53
United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), 500
United States, 32, 35, 195, 311, 315, 322, 486, 488, 489, 490, 495; *Books on, listed:* 122; *Books on, noted:* 117, 553; *Books on, reviewed:* 538-39; *Modern History Review:* "The United States and the 1940-1941 Anglo-Iraqi Crisis: American Policy in Transition," by James A. Thorpe, 79-89
United States Agency for International Development (AID), 53
United States Bureau of Reclamation, 6-7, 9-11
The United States and Morocco, by Luella J. Hall, reviewed, 538-39
"The United States and the 1940-1941 Anglo-Iraqi Crisis: American Policy in Transition," *Modern History Review,* by James A. Thorpe, 79-89
University of Tehran, 24
'Usayrān, Laylā, 497
'ushur, 217, 220
USSR, *see* Soviet Union

Valis, 328
Vatikiotis, P. J., *The Modern History of Egypt,* reviewed, 100-02
The Verb "Be" and its Synonyms: Philosophical and Grammatical Studies, Part 4. *Twi/Modern Chinese/Arabic,* ed. by John W. M. Verhaar, reviewed, 110-12
Verhaar, John W. M., *The Verb "Be" and its Synonyms: Philosophical and Grammatical*

Studies, Part 4. *Twi/Modern Chinese/Arabic*, reviewed, 110-12
iet Cong, 495
View of the Nile: The Story of an American Family in Egypt, by Elizabeth Warnock Fernea, reviewed, 412-13
illard, Henry S.; *Review:* Pelt, *Libyan Independence and the United Nations: A Case of Planned Decolonization*, 252-53
on Thünen, Johann Heinrich, 355-69 *passim*
ad Dakīn, Sultan Bābī, 219
ad Ḥassūnah, Shaykh Ḥasan, 219
adi Halfa, 222
ils, 220
iqf, 216
ard, Richard J., Don Peretz and Evan Wilson, *A Palestine Entity?*, reviewed, 259-60
askow, Arthur I., 184, 189-91
aterbury, John, *The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite: A Study in Segmented Politics*, reviewed, 102-03
aterfield, Gordon, *Sultans of Aden*, reviewed, 99-100
ithīqah, 219, 220, 221
att, D. C.; *Review:* Waterfield, *Sultans of Aden*, 99-100
att, W. Montgomery, *Islamic Surveys, No. 8: Bell's Introduction to the Qur'an*, reviewed, 545-47
irs, 219
ber, Frank G., *Eagles on the Crescent: Germany, Austria, and the Diplomacy of the Turkish Alliance, 1914-1918*, reviewed, 108-09
st Germany, 311
estern Europe, 486
estern imperialism, 495
st Pakistan, *see* Pakistan
hite Revolution, 330, 332
cox, Wayne, 465
ilson, Howard E., and Ilhan Başgöz, *Educational Problems in Turkey, 1920-1940*, reviewed, 260-61
Wilson, Evan, Don Peretz and Richard J. Ward, *A Palestine Entity?*, reviewed, 259-60
The Wineskin and the Wizard, by Michael Selzer, reviewed, 109-10
Wingate, Sir Francis Reginald, 225
Wolf, Charlotte, *Garrison Community: A Study of an Overseas American Military Colony*, reviewed, 261-62
World Bank, *see* International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
The Wretched of the Earth, 185-86

Xydis, Stephen G.; *Review:* Harbottle, *The Impartial Soldier*, 245-46

Yād-Nāme-ye Irāni-ye Minorsky, ed. by Mojtabā Minovi and Iraj Afshār, reviewed, 255-57
Yassihöyük, 358-69 *passim*
The Year Book of Pakistan, 467
Yemen: *Books on, listed:* 124, 278-79; *Document:* "The Permanent Constitution of the Yemen Arab Republic," 389-401
The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914, by Feroz Ahmad, reviewed, 541-42
Yugoslavia, 486

Zahedan, 334
Zaḥlah, 1, 4
Zamiti, Khalil, 46
Zanek!: A Chronicle of the Israeli Air Force, by William Stevenson, reviewed, 537
Za'rur Group, 193
Zghal, Abdelkader, 50-51
Zionism, 187, 189, 194, 196-99, 523
Zionist Congress of Basle, 198
Zionists, 493

Oxford University Press

Islamic Rationalism

THE ETHICS OF 'ABD AL-JABBĀR

By GEORGE F. HOURANI, *State University of New York, Buffalo.* Professor Hourani has reconstructed the Mu'tazilite theory of rationalist ethics most thoroughly developed by 'Abd al-Jabbār in the tenth and early eleventh centuries. This theory closely resembles modern British intuitionism. *3 tables.* $6.50

The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann: Series A–Letters

VOLUME II: NOVEMBER 1902 - AUGUST 1903

Edited by BARNET LITVINOFF *and* GEDALIA YOGEV. During the period covered in this book, Weizmann increased his work on behalf on the Zionist cause and began extensive correspondence with people throughout the world. *Frontispiece, 8 plates.* *(Weizmann Letters and Papers.)* $12.75

An Anthology of Modern Arabic Verse

Edited by M. M. BADAWI. This anthology provides a clear picture of the development of modern Arabic poetry from the rise of neo-classicism at the beginning of the nineteenth-century Arabic literary renaissance to the current movement of symbolism and social realism. It presents the Arabic text of works by fifty major poets from the entire Arab world. *Paper,* $6.25

Catalogue of the Ancient Persian Bronzes in the Ashmolean Museum

By P. R. S. MOOREY. The Ashmolean Museum has a very representative collection of over five hundred bronze objects from western Persia, virtually all pre-Achaemenid in date. This catalogue presents a complete illustrated inventory of the collection. *85 plates, 38 text figures.* $41.75

A Concise Pahlavi Dictionary

Edited by D. N. MACKENZIE. This dictionary gives in concise form the essential vocabulary of the published Pahlavi texts and, unlike any previous Pahlavi dictionary, shows the words in a real linguistic context. An English-Pahlavi index is included for comparative purposes and a complete Pahlavi script key links texts and dictionary. $20.00

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016